The Journal of Engineering

The 7th International Conference on Renewable Power Generation

(RPG 2018)

Technical risk synthesis and mitigation eISSN 2051-3305

Received on 30th October 2018
Accepted on 10th January 2019
strategies of distributed energy resources E-First on 4th June 2019
doi: 10.1049/joe.2018.9325
integration with wireless sensor networks and www.ietdl.org

internet of things – review

Emmanuel K. Payne1 , Qian Wang1, Lu Shulin2, Licheng Wu1
1School of Energy and Power Engineering, Jiangsu University, Jiangsu, People's Republic of China
2College of Energy Engineering, Zhejiang University, Zhejiang, People's Republic of China
E-mail: mypaynegl@yahoo.com

Abstract: As electrical power operations tend to be smart grid with strong penetration of renewable energy resources, the
evolution of operational technology brings on board another dimension of vulnerabilities with the participation of cyber-physical
systems (CPSs). Thus, it becomes essential to perform technical risk assessment and CPS prognosis to envisage the integrity
of the system's operational resilience. The communication network elements such as cyber signal transmission, wireless sensor
networks (WSNs) and the internet of things (IoTs) converges as a superhighway hub. This seeks to improve on network
operations for efficient power delivery of distributed energy resources (DERs) integration grid. It then demands system
configuration to be firewalled to avoid operational intrusions and malfunctions. The paper examines the technical threats
involved in the paradigm of schemes and mitigation strategies. The areas of study are the vulnerabilities of the DERs integration
with CPS, WSNs and IoTs layers. The risk aversion strategies of DERs integration with CPS are also discussed. The study aims
to ascertain the intrusion level and responses of the integrated DERs grid in terms of power management. The paper's objective
is to present an overview of current developments in the integrated cyber-power systems evolution and the implementation
strategies with DERs.

1 Introduction
Distributed energy resources (DERs) network relies on resilient
communication schemes for the integration of the grid system [1].
The communication scheme coordinates all the links from the
sources to the demand sides, through which information for the
system performance and actuations are transmitted [1, 2]. Without
robust communication backbone, the control intelligence and
regulation of the network activities will be sedentary and be in
disarray [2]. To this effect, the choice of communication paradigm
is extremely important for the optimal performance of the DERs
integration [3]. Resilient communication enhances operational
effectiveness of the network coordination for prompt interaction
and functional activities [4, 5]. With the advent of wireless sensor
network (WSN) and internet of things (IoTs) configuration in
power system communication schemes, especially in the DERs
integration for smart grid applications, cyber physical system plays
active and very interactive roles [4]. However, the system becomes
technically susceptible to vulnerabilities resulting from host of
cyber-attacks which requires critical appraisal of such projects to
ensure operational integrity and to secure infrastructure sustenance
for value addition and investment returns [6]. Networks
incorporating cyber physical systems (CPSs) are deemed complete
integration of computing technology and configuration of
algorithms to interact with power distribution physical components
such as protection and regulation intelligence (built-in sensors,
processors and unit identifications) [7]. These communicate with
physical real world applications as transactive entities through
uniquely defined signal propagation [8]. The transactive ability of
the communication medium loses its uniqueness when it is
subjected to unwanted attacks [8]. Where directives for the
execution of specific applications are denied or redirected from the
assigned tasks, this then renders the system inoperative from its
desired functional capabilities [9]. CPS contains interdisciplinary
approaches to cybernetics, mechatronics, design configurations and
process sciences. Cyber subsystems of the network forms
mechanism to either control or monitor scheme applications
through computer algorithms, which are closely integrated with
J. Eng., 2019, Vol. 2019 Iss. 18, pp. 4830-4835
This is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative Commons Attribution License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
signal processing or internet from its user agents through wired or
wireless sensors within that network arrangement [5, 7, 9].
The physical subsystems of the network are typical real world
applications that provide services different from the scope of cyber
subsystems element although they are interactive. These make
CPSs network a complex entity embodiment of configured
operational technology, comprising cybernetics and physical device
characteristics that actuate systems to perform and actualised
functions [7]. It is expected that CPSs configuration becomes
reliable and interoperable with the assigned links, immune to any
form of algorithm intrusions or not susceptible to any form of
cybernetic vulnerabilities [7, 9, 10]. Fig. 1 illustrates block diagram
of CPS configured architecture, where the power system side
denotes the physical subsystem, and the cyber system side
represents cyber subsystem. The CPS interface gives credence to
the controlling and monitoring elements which impacts greatly on
the physical subsystem functioning.
2 Overview of DERs integration with cyber
physical systems
The increase in the application of DERs leads to enhance power
delivery at the distribution level [3]. This supports the paradigm of
energy conservation and improves greenhouse gas (GHG)
emission. It then demands dynamic systems for network integration
and coordination of communication signals for prompt responses
and data transmission flexibility with less cost incursion [11].
Distributed renewable generation integration may be considered as
the most beneficial of CPSs, thus state estimation and system
forecasting play pivotal role in its application. Besides, the
dynamism of demand side management application promotes the
concept of readily communication scheme which is easily deployed
for promptness and resilience [8, 12]. The technology concept is
much availed in the energy management system (EMS) scheme,
where advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) performance relies
mostly on CPSs configuration. The regime of CPSs deployment in
the DERs integration promises to enhance diversification of
4830

Fig. 1  Block diagram of CPS configuration model [7]
Fig. 2  CPS integrated aspect of DERs grid application [4]
Fig. 3  CPS structural framework configuration of DERs [13]
operational applications, where WSNs communicate with IoTs to
monitor and control functions [13]. The entities which interface for
the communication and control of CPS activities heavily depend on
frameworks which pose increasing risk of cyber-attacks [14–16].
These frameworks need to be firewalled to protect integrated and
critical grid infrastructures from malicious network attacks [17].
The firewall, thus, describes the ensuring security integration
without disrupting network reliability and stability with high
permeability structure of the network physical systems [3–5].
Fig. 2 shows CPSs aspect of DERs integrated grid application.
2.1 CPSs structural frameworks
Legacy grid networks cannot reliably guarantee the use of large
penetration of renewable power generation with the integration of
CPSs, due to network reformation challenges as result of structural
reconfiguration cost and the characteristics of distributed
renewable power generation dispatch [4, 10, 18]. This leaves no
other choice than for the CPS to be applied predominately in the
modern DERs integration as smart grid at the distribution network
level [18]. The effort to achieve smarter grid network with DERs
integration inevitably serves as double edge cutting saw as this
approach is used to monitor and curtail DERs uncertainties through
forecasting and state estimation, and also developing the network
to be responsive to technological trend of transactive energy
involving the demand side management [4, 7]. The scheme of
smart grid proposes a framework to overlay the distribution of
J. Eng., 2019, Vol. 2019 Iss. 18, pp. 4830-4835
This is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative Commons Attribution License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
power grid with more extensive computation and communication
infrastructures. The structural framework leads to an improved
intelligent network compositions, standards and applications [6].
The framework integrates the concept of industrial control systems
(ICSs) [15].
In various industrial configuration settings, ICSs have been
used to enhance the control, monitoring and production of
advancement in the connectivity with communication
configurations, and as a result it can be accessed remotely [15, 16].
ICSs play important roles in the monitoring and controlling of
physical productions and chemical processes [16]. ICS is a
universally accepted term that embraces several types of control
systems used in industrial application, namely, supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA), distributed control systems (DCSs)
and other miniature control system formations like programmable
logic controllers (PLCs) [15, 18]. Incorporating CPSs with ICSs in
electricity distribution grids, especially for automatic control for
distribution tasks in order to achieve optimal performance, in this
context fits into an EMSs paradigm. The purpose of contemporary
EMSs is to enhance the functionality of interactive control
strategies leading towards energy efficiency and a more
comfortable or user-friendly environment [15, 19, 20]. Lately,
EMSs and, more generally, ICSs have been integrated together as
communication scheme, consenting to remote monitoring and
controlling for underlying processes. While this can enhance
significant performance efficiency and usability benefits, it also
increases the possibility of cyber physical attacks, hence
developing CPS structural framework in consonance with ICSs
configuration scheme to formulate the security dimensions of CPS
attacks [6, 8, 21, 22]. The scheme is infused into the power grid
application, where electricity from distributed generation (DG) is
being enhanced as a smart grid. The smart grid thus offers several
benefits and advanced characteristics. At the national level, it
delivers an enhanced emission control with global load balancing
through smart generation and energy savings. Whereas at the local
level, it allows home consumers better control over their energy
use that yields benefit in terms of economics and environmental
[17, 23, 24]. These aforementioned applications are susceptible to
severe cyber-attacks mostly from the cyber interactive end of the
distribution network. The CPS structural framework of DERs
integrated grid composition has two major components, namely,
power application and supporting infrastructure [16, 25–27]. The
power application is where the core functions of the distribution
grid are provided (electricity generation, transmission and
distribution). Whereas the support infrastructure is the intelligent
components that include the core operations of set of software/
algorithms, hardware and communications networks to control and
monitor the distribution grid network performances [4, 15, 22]. The
framework defines the CPS structural segmentation, where the
security attributions can be applied. Each structured component
defines the kind of attacks prone to be experienced and the level of
influence on the system. The severities of the attacks depend on the
application and configuration status of the components [28]. Thus,
the magnitude of the vulnerability impact and the dimension of the
attack exposure determine the level of severity. Details of the
attacks in relation to the structural framework are outlined in the
technical risk synthesis in Section 4. Fig. 3 depicts the structural
framework of CPS configuration. The physical power system is
controlled by the system model and control which harnesses the
nonlinear controller and the state estimator. The inputs to the state
estimator are either derived from stored database or real-time
online monitoring through WSNs and IoTs. The susceptibility of
the data topology subjects the system into vulnerabilities, where
cyber-attacks are prone and intruding.
2.2 CPS security development and deployment models
Fig. 4 illustrates the CPSs security and vulnerability hierarchical
model. The access point vulnerability defines the source of the
attack and its dimensions. When the security configuration of the
access point is weak, there is the probability of intrusion to hack
into the system easily. For this reason, any scheme of intrusion tries
through this stage to infiltrate the system. The model configuration
4831

Fig. 4  CPS security hierarchical model
(a) Vulnerability model, (b) Intrusion flow path [4, 5, 8]
Fig. 5  Depicts cybersecurity life cycle model [4, 8]
development standard should be strengthened to an extent, where
the attack base will be shrieked [20, 23]. This suggests a firewall
rule to determine the probability of a malicious packet traversing.
The model should be able to indicate the frequency of the
malicious packets that endeavour to enter a firewall rule, with a
specified tuning ratio to enforce the firewall rule logging. System
vulnerability guidelines should be configured to determine the
probability of the intrusion targets threshold response for a
specified application. Where applicable, the transition probability
model should be applied to determine the processing execution rate
in response to an attack event. Whereas data diode application
could be considered as in reference [25, 29]. The intrusion should
be real-time monitored in the context of analysis of threats,
vulnerabilities and assessment of impacts to determine responses.
The model should anticipate to affect the purpose of cybersecurity
resources and the control in power applications [4, 13, 15, 24, 30].
Fig. 5 represents cybersecurity life cycle model. The model
presents a paradigm of resilient fault grid to a resilient attack grid,
which seeks to improve the CPSs security characteristics for power
grids. Cyber-security configurations against attacks are developed
to preserve grid networks in the event of intrusions. These evolve
the deployment of the large-scale integration of DERs to allow the
power grid to be a fast centric utility structure of a distributed
intelligent network. The model framework presents an overarching
architecture for an attack-resilient DERs integration. This takes
into account both the cybernetics and physical characteristics of the
power grid by combining efforts to prevent, detect and respond to
cyber-attacks of the cyber physical devices and layers of the utility
scale. The performance areas influencing the model framework
consent to the following DERs integrations principles, namely,
resilience metrics designs, prevention of attacks, detection of
attacks and the deterrence of attacks [4–8, 23].
Resilience metrics designs: Cyber vulnerabilities that are
present in DERs integration and the risks they pose to the grid
through complex interactions with other devices and applications
must be determined [8]. Resilience metrics and cybersecurity
4832
This is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative Commons Attribution License
principles should also be developed to increase assurance in DERs
grid functioning. Stringent security measures, vulnerability indices
with robust design principles should be developed to help guide
utility services and consumers as they become more receptive to
cyber-attacks. The metrics should be developed to determine the
impact of cyber-attacks on DERs integration, particularly in the
context of increasing DG consolidation to intrusion, alerting
suspected scenarios [1, 4, 8, 23].
Attacks prevention: Incorporating many unique features to
expand the DERs grid network exploration of opportunities to
prevent attacks on the system. Security of power system network
equipment, hardware and utility layer components should be strong
part of the DERs model development mechanism [4, 8, 23].
Attacks detection: The system must be deployed to immediately
detect malicious activity in DERs grid. Effective approaches
should be designed to identify anomalies and patterns of misuse by
cybernetics and the physical components of the DERs network.
Model procedures should be designed to monitor the modes of
detection to ensure greater confidence in the detection of attacks [4,
8, 23].
Deterrent attacks: Appropriate and expeditious measures should
be taken to sever defective systems from being controlled by other
methods. The purpose of cyber-attacks deterrence model is to
prevent malicious intrusions or cyber-attacks from continuing to
perform in the system, while ensuring that the system continues to
function as much as possible [4, 8, 23].
3 WSN and IoTs topology characteristics
The deployment of communication technology for power systems
and for that matter, DERs integrated grid functionality, depends on
certain attributes that are determined by the requirements of the
grid regime [31]. The emphasis on the selection of the type of
communication technology gives credence to the configuration of
the signal and the control intelligence of the grid integration
network [9, 14]. The two main channels available for signal
transmission are the wired and wireless medium. The choice of any
medium is determined by the application requirements, including
network latency, data transmission thresholds, time synchronisation
and security. The concept of reconfiguring electric power grid
communications brought the development of the smart grid, where
the networks respond interactively, and signal being transmitted
conveniently [4, 21, 32]. Due to the constraints of renewable power
generation, wireless communication technology gained
considerable application for network condition monitoring and also
AMI purposes in line with EMS applications [1, 9, 33]. Besides,
demand side management concept also adapt to this practice for
energy conservation drive. WSNs and IoTs are promising
communication technologies playing important roles in the wide
area monitoring system (WAMS). This communication paradigm
uses Internet, ZigBee, wireless networks, WiMAX, 3G, 4G, WiFi
and Bluetooth, among others, to disseminate application signals [1,
31–33]. However, the technology since deployment has been
challenged with cybersecurity issues, which have received critical
attention from researchers for solution. The cyber problems have
been identified as potential attacks, threats and vulnerabilities,
thwarting the power provider's efforts to secure power delivery
efficiency and reliability of performance [21, 34, 35]. The cause
has been to avoid information alteration or destruction, thus to
ensure information transmitted remains indisputable and authentic.
The loss of signal integrity is information impairment and may lead
to incorrect decisions on power system monitoring and control
management [16]. Signal integrity attacks are either directed at the
customer information points (such as pricing information and
account balances) or network operational information (for
example, voltage values and device running status). In other words,
such attacks intentionally attempt to modify the original
information synthesis in DERs integrated grid communication
system to interrupt critical data exchange in the smart grid [13].
Table 1 explains the risk characteristics of WSNs and IoTs
deployment layers.
J. Eng., 2019, Vol. 2019 Iss. 18, pp. 4830-4835
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
Table 1 WSN/IoTs CPS deployment risk characteristics [31–34]
S/N Domain Security threats Security measures
1 sensing layer 1. Node control 1. Authentication
2. Node theft 2. Data integrity verification
3. Node tampering 3. Spread spectrum
4. Frequency interference 4. Message priority
5. Intrusion detection and intrusion recovery
2 sensing layer 1. Network layer authentication 1. Mutual authentication between nodes
2. Access control of network 2. Hop-bv-hop encryption
resources 3. Cross-network authentication
3. Confidentiality and integrity of 4. End-to-end authentication and key negotiation
data transmission 5. Key management and password algorithm selection
4. Remote access security 6. Denial of service and distributed denial of service attack
5. The security of the routing detection and defense Hierarchical architecture
system 7. Broadcast radius limit
8. Port blocking
3 collaborative 1. Data confidentiality 1. Virus detection
processing 2. Data integrity 2. The reliability of the data source is good
3. Access Control Box Disaster Recovery
4. Secure multi-party computing and secure cloud computing
5. Efficient data mining of encrypted data
4 application user privacy 1. Differentiated database security services
control layer 2. User privacy protection mechanism
3. Access control
4. Security software
5. Patch
6. Upgrading the system

Fig. 6  Cyber-attacks against critical infrastructures [8]

4 Technical risk synthesis
The impact of network attacks aggravates the integrity of cyber
physical systems which makes the power grid unusable, and
renders the confidentiality of the DERs integration worthless [4, 6,
8]. CPSs primarily consist of three types of components;
communication and computing, control and monitoring, equipment
and operation. Communication can be wireless or wired, and it can
connect CPS to parent systems, such as control centres, or to
subordinate components in the physical world [31, 35, 36]. The
computation and control configuration are embedded in the
intelligence regulation, for sending control commands and
receiving the tracking operations. The monitoring and operation
aspects connect the CPS to the physical world applications through
sensors to monitor physical components and operate actuators. The
CPS component may have the ability to communicate with the
control centre or other CPS configuration per design criteria [22].
Although the computing capabilities of CPS components do not
affect physical equipment applications directly, they can still be
exploited to cause unexpected attacks and physical consequences
[17, 31]. Regardless of the CPS's ability to monitor and control the
physical properties, the physical components can cause to
themselves unexpected attacks not of physical attacks but
misleading information being sent to CPS via other components
malfunction. This heterogeneity within the CPS intermediate
component or component itself leads to lack of understanding of
cyber types of security threats that may exploit this heterogeneity.
Therefore, it is necessary to make clear the aspects of security
analysis and engineering prediction in three ways to differentiate
between cyber, cyber physical and physical. The cyber considers
data computing, communication and interactions that do not affect
the physical world, while the cyber physical considers all
interactions with the physical world. The cyber physical aspect is
where the cyber and the physical world can connect and interact.
Finally, the physical aspect contains all the physical components
which might have security-related vulnerabilities and needs
intrinsically safe properties [11, 14, 19]. Figs. 6 and 7 present
cyber-based attacks on infrastructures and technical risk synthesis,
respectively, whileTable 2 briefly discusses the attacks.
5 Risk mitigation strategies of CPS in DERs
integration applications
The paradigm of DERs integration brings on board advanced
software and other cyber configurations to be applied within the
distribution grid. The concept of CPS risk mitigation mainly
centres on the cyber and cyber physical aspect of the grid network,
although the rippling effect ends up at the physical side. Brief
description of targeted areas of risk mitigation techniques are being
outlined in Table 3 and Fig. 8 shows schematic segmentation of the
risk mitigation scenarios. This present areas of much concern
which needs critical attention in relation to CPS security advance
in real world application [4–6, 8, 9, 15].
6 Conclusion
The study undoubtedly has uncovered interesting thoughts about
the cyber physical systems application relating to DERs integration

J. Eng., 2019, Vol. 2019 Iss. 18, pp. 4830-4835 4833

This is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative Commons Attribution License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
Fig. 7  CPS technical risk synthesis [4, 8, 16] modified

Table 2 Overview of cyber-based attacks [1, 4, 8, 23]

S/N Cyber-based
attacks
1 protocol attacks
2 routing attacks
3 intrusion
4 malware
5 denial of service
(Dos) attacks
6 insider threats
Overview of attacks
network protocols used in energy systems, such as ICC'P, IEC 61850 and DNP3, maybe used to initiate cyber-
attacks if they are not properly protected.
network's attack from the cyber routing infrastructure and other wide area network.
exploited vulnerabilities in software and communications network infrastructure, and then effect access to critical
system elements.
malicious software that exploits vulnerabilities in the system be it from software, programs of programmable logic
controller or other protocols.
attacks that rejects normal legitimate service users. It could also mean refused control or ability to monitoring in the
power gild context.
risks developing internal threats, such as malicious insiders which liave access of control to system networks and
can easily misuse such state of trust.

Table 3 Risk mitigation strategies frameworks [1, 4, 8, 16]

SN Mitigation Information security Infrastructure security Control security Physical security
posture
1 Security Information Protection Infrastructure Protection • Generation control apps 1. Control center
Domain • Transmission control apps 2. Power plant (DERs
Attribution • Message confidentiality • Routers • Distribution control apps source sites)
• Message integrity • DNS • Real-tune energy market 3. Transmission and
• Message authenticity • Links pricing information distribution lines and
• Message availability • Internet protocols equipment
• Non-repudiation 4. DERs integration
Service availability configuration sets
5. Customers devices
2 Security • Encryption decryption • Traffic monitoring 1. Attack-resilient control 1. Secured physical
Strategies • Digital signature • Firewall algorithms assets
• Message authenticity • Intrusion detection 2. Model-based algorithms 2. Surveillance provisions
coding • Attack attribution
• Public key infrastructure • Authenticity protocols • Anomaly detection
paradigm • Secure protocols • Intrusion tolerance
• Secure servers • Bad-data elimination
• Statistical analysis 3. Risk modeling and
mitigation

as a departure from the legacy systems. The legacy system had less This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation
of cyber security deployment. The advent of smart grid encourages of China (No.51476071) and the National Key Technology Support
the evolution of CPS to enhance resilient system against attacks as Program, China. [Grant number 2015BAD21B06].
a departure from resilient fault regime. The concept proposes more
state estimations and algorithm computations, which demands
intelligent programming. This brings huge task to the power
system providers, where cyber-attack issues keep escalating. This
is to reemphasis that before large-scale DERs integration projects
of any sort is undertaken, it first needs to address the cybersecurity
prognosis and ascertain the state of system reliability. The paper is
a motivation for ongoing and future works on DERs integration
control design for active power delivery incorporating wireless
sensors and internet of things as communication scheme.

7 Acknowledgments
4834 J. Eng., 2019, Vol. 2019 Iss. 18, pp. 4830-4835
This is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative Commons Attribution License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)

Fig. 8  Schematic illustration of cyber-attacks and mitigation strategies of
DERs integration [4]
8 References
[1] Zahurul, S., MariunaI, N., Grozescu, V., et al.: ‘Future strategic plan analysis
for integrating distributed renewable generation to smart grid through wireless
sensor network: Malaysia prospect’, Renew. Sust. Energy Rev., 2016, 53, pp.
978–992
[2] Parikh, P.P., Kanabar, M.G., Sidhu, T.S.: ‘Opportunities and challenges of
wireless communication technologies for smart grid applications’. IEEE
Power and Energy Society General Meeting, Providence, RI, USA, 2010, vol.
17
[3] Islam, S.Z., Mariun, N., Hizam, H., et al.: ‘Communication for distributed
renewable generations (DRGs): a review on the penetration to smart grids
(SGs)’. Proc. of the IEEE Int. Conf. on Power and Energy (PE Con), Kota
Kinabalu, Malaysia, 2012, pp. 870–875
[4] Qi, J., Hahn, A., Lu, X., et al.: ‘Cybersecurity for distributed energy resources
and smart inverters’, IET Cyber Phys. Syst., Theory Appl., 2016, 1, pp. 28–39
[5] IEEE Smart Grid webinar slide cyber physical system
[6] Available at https://arxiv.org/pdf/1701.04525v1 (cyber physical security sury)
[7] Tariq, M.U., Grijalva, S., Wolf, M.: ‘A service-oriented cyber-physical
reference model for smart grid’, in Khaitan, S.K., McCalley, J.D., Liu, C.C.
(Eds.): ‘Cyber physical systems approach to smart electric power grid. Power
systems’ (Springer, Berlin, Germany, 2015), pp. 25–42
[8] Govindarasu, M., Hann, A., Sauer, P.: ‘Cyber-physical systems security for
smart grid’ (PSERC Publication, New York, 2012)
[9] Tsado, Y., Lund, D., Gamage, K.A.A.: ‘Resilient communication for smart
grid ubiquitous sensor network: state of the art and prospects for next
generation’, Comput. Commun. J., 2015, 71, (1), pp. 34–49
[10] Mo, Y., Kim, T.H-J., Brancik, K., et al.: ‘Cyber-physical security of a smart
grid infrastructure’, Proc. IEEE, 2011, 100, (1), pp. 195–209
[11] Khaitan, S.K., McCalley, J.D.: ‘Cyber physical system approach for design of
power grids: A survey’. IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting
(PES), Vancouver, Canada, 2013
[12] Khaitan, S.K., McCalley, J.D.: ‘Design techniques and applications of cyber
physical systems: a survey’, IEEE Syst. J., 2014, 9, (2), pp. 350–365
[13] Muharrem, A.: ‘Cyber-physical robust control framework for enhancing
transient stability of smart grids’, IET Cyber-Phys. Syst., Theory Appl., 2017,
2, (4), pp. 1–9, ISSN 2398-3396
J. Eng., 2019, Vol. 2019 Iss. 18, pp. 4830-4835
This is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative Commons Attribution License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
[14] Wang, W., Xu, Y., Khanna, M.: ‘A survey on the communication architectures
in smart grid’, Comput. Netw. J., 2011, 55, pp. 3604–3629
[15] Paridari, K., O'Mahony, N., Mady, A.El-D., et al.: ‘Framework for attack-
resilient industrial control systems: attack detection and controller
reconfiguration’, Proc. IEEE, 2018, 106, (1), pp. 113–128
[16] Sridhar, S., Hahn, A., Govindarasu, M.: ‘Cyber physical system security for
the electric power grid’, Proc. IEEE, 2012, 100, (1), pp. 210–224
[17] McDaniel, P., McLaughlin, S.: ‘Security and privacy challenges in the smart
grid security & privacy', IEEE Proc., 2009, 7, (3), pp. 75–77
[18] Mallouhi, M., Al-Nashif, Y., Cox, D., et al.: ‘A testbed for analyzing security
of SCADA control systems’. IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies,
Anaheim, CA, USA, 2011
[19] Davis, C.M., Tate, J.E., Okhravi, H., et al.: ‘SCADA cyber security testbed
development’. North American Power Symp., Carbondale, Illinois, 2006
[20] Farraj, A., Hammad, E., Kundur, D.: ‘A cyber-physical control framework for
transient stability in smart grids’, IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, 2016, PP, (99), pp.
1205–1215
[21] Bao, L., Zhang, D.Y.: ‘The internet of things and privacy protection
technology’, Electron. Technol., 2010, 23, (7), pp. 110–112
[22] Madakam, S., Date, H.: ‘Security mechanisms for connectivity of smart
devices in the internet of things’, in Mahmood, Z. (Ed.): ‘Connectivity
frameworks for smart devices’ (Springer, Berlin, 2016), pp. 23–41
[23] Horvath, I., Gerritsen, B.: ‘Cyber-physical systems: concepts, technologies
and implementation principles’. TMCE, Karlsruhe, Germany, 2012, pp. 19–36
[24] Taha, A.F., Qi, J., Wang, J., et al.: ‘Risk mitigation for dynamic state
estimation against cyberattacks and unknown inputs’, IEEE Trans. Smart
Grid, 2018, 9, (2), pp. 886–899
[25] Kim, K., Chang, Y., Kim, H., et al.: ‘Physical one-way data transfer system
design for control system network’, J KISS, 2013, 40, (2), pp. 126–130
[26] Gollmann, D.: ‘Security for cyber-physical systems’, in Kučera, A.,
Henzinger, T.A., Nešetřil, J., et al. (Eds.):‘Mathematical and engineering
methods in computer science’ (Springer, Berlin, Germany, 2013), pp. 12–14
[27] Ilić, M.D., Xie, L., Khan, U.A., et al.: ‘Modeling future cyber-physical energy
systems’. Proc. of Power and Energy Society General Meeting-Conversion
and Delivery of Electrical Energy in the 21st Century, Pittsburgh, PA, USA,
2008
[28] Nolan, K., Kelly, M.: ‘IPv6 convergence for IoTs cyber–physical systems’,
Information, 2018, 9, p. 70, pp. 1–22
[29] Stevens, M.W., Pope, M.: ‘Data diodes, DSTO electronics and surveillance’
(Research Laboratory, Adelaide, 1995)
[30] Cardenas, A.A., Tanya, R., Shankar, S.: ‘Rethinking security properties threat
models, and the design space in sensor networks: A case study in SCADA
systems’, Ad Hoc Netw., 2009, 7, (8), pp. 1434–1447
[31] Yang, G., Xu, J., Chen, W., et al.: ‘Security characteristic and key technology
of the internet of things’, J. Nanjing Univ. of Post and Telecommun. Natural
Sci., 2010, 30, (4), pp. 20–29
[32] Ding, C., Wu, LM.: ‘Security system structure and key technology of IoT /
CPS’, Zhongxing Commun. Technol., 2011, 17, (1), pp. 11–16
[33] Bao, L., Zhang, L.: ‘Security analysis of cyber-physical system’. AIP Conf.
Proc., Hangzhou, China, 2017, vol. 1839, pp. 020178-1–020178-6
[34] Wu, C.: ‘First exploration for security consumption of the internet of things’,
Strategy Decision Res., 2010, 25, (4), pp. 411–419
[35] Kim, Y.K., Lee, S.H., Na, J.C., et al.: ‘Multi-channel transmission method for
improving TCP reliability and transmission efficiency in UNIWAY’, J.
Ambient. Intell. Humaniz. Comput., 2017, 8, pp. 1–16
[36] Lee, E.: ‘Cyber physical systems: design challenges’. ISORC. IEEE, Orlando,
FL, USA, 2008, pp. 363–369
4835