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The process and the implications of change in the Guatemalan

Catholic Church

Chea, Jose Luis, Ph.D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 1988

Copyright 01988 by Chea, Jose Luis. All rights reserved.

300 N. Zeeb Rd.

Ann Arbor, MI 48106
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 THE PROCESS AND THE I M P L I C A T I O N S OF CHANGE

I N THE GUATEMALAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

by

JOSE L U I S CHEA, B.A., M.A.

DISSERTATION

P r e s e n t e d t o t h e F e c u l t y oF t h e G r a d u a t e S c h o o l o f

The U n i v e r s i t y o f Texas a t A u s t i n

in P a r t i a l Fulfi 1 lment

of t h e Requirements

for the D e g r e e o f

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

THE U N I V E R S I T Y OF TEXAS A T A U S T I N

M a y 1 988
THE PROCESS AND THE I M P L I C A T I O N S OF CHANGE

I N THE GUATEMALAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

APPROVED BY
SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE:
 Copyright by

by
Jose L u i s Chea
1988
To and for Patricia, Jorge L u i s *
and Maria Jose
 PREFACE

The two main objectives of this investigation

are as follows:
a ) To analyze the political response that the
Guatemalan Catholic Church has made through its various
religious elites concerning the call for change made by
the Second Vatican Council and the Conference of Latin
American Bishops at Meda:::; i n :966; and

b) The implications that this response has

had for the process of change in Guatemalan society.
I argue in this paper that the Guatemalan
Catholic Church did not respond well to the call, as
proclaimed and promoted by the universal church, that
the clergy assume a major role in the defense o f human
rights, justice, and liberty. I further argue that the
failure occurred primarily because of the limitations
"i-n the ecclesiastical structures that were charged with
the formalization, articulation, and implementation of
the ideas meant to generate change. Within this
structural aspect, we must include the important
influence and leadership of the more traditional
elements within the ecclesiasticel hierarchy. We must
v
also consider other institutional linkages such as the
cultural, historical, administrative, and financial.
Moreover, the violent response of the more reactionary
elements t o the initiative undertaken by groups who
wanted t o establish change contributed t o the
undermining o f any possibility of success for
compromise and reform that some of the leaders of the
Guatemalan Catholic Church wanted t o implement.
As a historical framework, I will use, with
some flexibility, the period during which Czirdinal
Mario Casariego served as Archbishop of Guatemala
11964-1983). The beginning of this period coincided
with the meeting o f the Second Vatican Council. At
this time, vsrious national religious organizations in
the country responded to the council's resolutions.
For purposes of reference, I will consider
the genera1 interrelation between church and society in
Latin America. From this perspective, I will be able
t o analyze the Catholic Church a s a force of change,
and will try t o evaluate whether this force was

dynamic, moderate, or weak. The Catholic Church will

be viewed as a traditional institution passing through

a period of adjustment or transition. I will also
vi
apply this approach t o the society in which the church
participates as an influential force.
As a model for the study of the relationship

between church and state, I will use the approach

followed by Thomas C. Bruneau in his analysis of the
Brazilian church.' According t o Bruneau, the
fluctuations in the relationship between church and
state change according t o a variety o f political,
religious, and structural factors,
In this respect, Bruneau established four
categories that reflect major cr minor flacbations in
the degree of autonomy exerted by the church in its
relations with the state. His four categories are
1 ) coalition, which exists when the goals and

structures of both church and state coincide; 2)

cooperation, when the goals o f the church are the same,
but the structures established to reach them are
different; 3) competition, when both institutions
pursue similar objectives? using not only different
structures but different strategies as well; 4 )

1 Thomas C. Bruneau, The Pol it i ca 1 Transformat ion of

the Brazilien Catholic Church, Cambridge University
Press, 1974, p. 5.
conflict, when the objectives as well as the structures
to be used by each entity are rejected by the other.
In the Latin American environment, the
Guatemalan Catholic Church may be categotized as a
traditional institution affected by the winds of the
"Catholic Revolution." This new direction pressed the
church t o assist those groups and social classes who
were desperately in need of a new social order.
Consequently, we can see, in the period covered by our
investigation, how the traditional position of a weak
church that has defended the status quo is now being
pressured by various groups within the Guatemalan
Catholic Church itself.
When I selected the national Catholic Church
as a unit for analysis, I was aware that many

Guatemalans viewed their church as a monolithic

institution. In fact, rather than a national church,
Guatemala has a church distributed among thirteen
s e m i a u t o n m u s dioceses, with characteristics of
extreme decentralization and overlapping of
jurisdiction and competence. Paradoxical ly, in spite
of iks prevailing administrative decentralization, it

is possible t o identify and analyze the Guatemalan

viii
Catholic Church as a unit because of the establishment
o f the Guatemalan Episcopal Conference. This
conference seriously studied the many responses offered
by the country's religious elites t o the demands for
change presented by the universal church. This
analysis, however, will be limited to the goals and
structure of the conference. I include in this
analysis other religious elites and groups who,
independently of their hierarchical position within the
Guatemalan Catholic Church, were or continue t o be
influentia! in implementing, neutralizing, or opposing
the so called change sponsored by the universal church
after the Second Vatican Council. In this context, the
archbishop, bishops, members o f the religious orders
and congregations, and the diocesan priests were
analyzed because they all exerted some degree of
influence on the process of change and growth of the
Guatemalan Catholic Church and i t s repercussions for
Guatemalan society.
The first argument o f this study holds that
the Catholic Church can become a force for change in
society. The impact that this institution may have
upon the process will depend in great measure on the
ix
particuiar conditions present in each country. A
second premise entails the belief that politic's and
religion not only are related t o each other, but cannot
be separated, analytically or empirically. This is the
reason answers brought forth by the religious el i tes
concerning change were emphasized along with the i r
political implications.
This emphasis has restricted our study of
other important aspects of Guatemalan religious life,
such as the orientation of the Christian Democratic
party, Protestantism, and religious syncretism. These
factors are, however, considered in a very broad
manner. On the other hand, the absence of other
similar investigations forces us t o confine our
analysis t o the Guatemalan Catholic Church.
Comparisons with these factors will occasionally be .

made.
For practical pwposes, i n this investigation
change is defined as the chsice and adoption o f
activities by the Catholic Church on behalf of the poor
as opposed t o its traditional defense on behalf of the
status quo. This choice undoubtedly implied a change
of goa Is, procedures, and structure. In add ition, this
X
choice meant that the church had t o examine itself and
consider the expenditures and the necessary courage
required to denounce the conditions o f injustice and
repression o f the poor. This also implied a
reaffirmation of its support on behalf of justifiable
initiatives and the freedom o f workers' organizations
composed of poor peasants and city laborers.
I will use the term religion t o signify all
symbolism and belief that motivates and generates a
certain pattern o f action (apostolic activity,
observance o f the sacraments? mass attendance, and so
forth) among the faithful believers. Finally, within
the term Catholic Church we include the hierarchy of
bishops, national and foreign clergymen, and
influential laymen who make up the national church.
This church in turn plays a role in the national
political system.

The focus followed by this investigation is

of a historical and institutional character, which then
permits us t o concentrate our interest on the
institutional level. From this perspective, we are
able t o observe the relationship between the Guatemalan
Catholic Church and the state and the enormous
xi
difficulties encountered in the process of change for
both institutions.
My focus is historical because the process of
development and change within the Guatemalan Catholic
Church as well as the particular origin of the process
are set within a determined and precise time period.
Within this historical framework we strive to interpret
the ongoing advances or regressions as well as the
upswings and downswings of the process of interaction
that involved the institutional Catholic Church with a
recently modernized Guatemalan society.
My orientation is institutional because it is
directed to the study of the Guatemaian Catholic Church
as an institution. With this in mind, the relationship
of this institution to the Guatemalan state has been
brought out. Nevertheless, this aspect will not entail
an analysis of the law or formal agreements between the
two institutions. It centers on the relationship
between institutions where the Catholic Church seeks to
achieve a measure of autmomy and influence with
respect t o the state and for the purpose of
maintaining, reforming, or restructuring the country's
political, social, and economic status quo.
xi i
 Even though there is an emphasis in several
chapters on the attitudes and actions o f the principal
religious Guatemalan elites, this does not mean that
the orientation is elite-centered. On the one hand. it
does not emphasize either a specific elite or a
vertical stratification or conflict analysis, which are
characteristic of the elite approach. On the other
hand, the response o f the Guatemalan religious elites
t o the call for change by the Second Vatican Council
are always set within the historical-institutional
framework. This circumstance avoids any confusion with
respect t o the type of approach used.

The methodology includes a critical and

exhaustive analysis of published and unpublished
sources. In addition, it includes the results o f a
poll conducted among 89 priests o f the Archdiocese o f
Guatemala. which the author prepared during the months
of May, June, and July, 1985. It also includes a
questionnaire completed by all the bishops in July of
the same year. Likewise, there are interviews in which
almost all the bishops, religious leaders, and
prominent laymen of the country participated.
The particular frame o f reference for this
xiii
work is presented in the introduction of this
investigation. The principal theoretical topics are
broadly expiained and will be elaborated on as the work
proceeds. A n exhaustive analysis of the existing

literature that relates to the church and poiitics in

general is also included, as well as citations of works
written on the Guatemalan Catholic Church.
Chapters I and I 1 contain a historical
analysis of the period that precedes our study,
encompassing the discovery, conquest, and development
of Guatemala UP t o 1983. Our fundamental intention 5s
to acquaint the reader with the historical weakness of

the institutional church, the decentralization that

occurred in its physical growth, and its alliance with
the conservative political sectors. All these factors
are related to the various types of response offered by
the Guatemalan church in view of the call for change.
The importance of these two chapters rests on the fact
that the process and implementation of change cannot be
understood away from the historical context.
Chapter 1 1 1 discusses the administrative-
apostolic structures that constitute the vehicle
through which the Guatemalan Catholic Church's

xiv
responses are channeled. They ere characterized by
lack of content, inefficiency, and a macrocephalic
administration. The latter circumstance makes it
extreme!y difficult for the church to adapt itself, as

an institution, to the process o f change. In that same

chapter, the weakening structure uniting the Guatemalan
Catholic Church t o the popular sectors and the poor
correlation that is present among religious be1 iefs,
besides the political participation of bishops and

priests, are all analyzed.

In our opinion, this incoherence is nothing
more than the reflection of a climate of change,
confusion, and uncertainty that has permeated the
country during the past 30 years. This situation has
produced an insecure clergy that lost its self
confidence and became extraneous t o the possibility for
social change and the role the Catholic Church should
assume in that change.
Chapters IV, V, VI, and VII present an
analysis o f the various political responses t o the
call for change presented by the elites of the
Guatemalan Catholic Church. These responses have been
classified within a typology prepared by the author,
xv
who groups them into traditional, reformist,
rebellious, and revolutionary. These responses have
been analyzed in relation t o the attitude that each o f
them assumes with respect to the state.
This investigation presents conclusive
evidence that even though the intent t o change is
present in some Catholic religious elites, little or
almost nothing has been achieved t o give preferential
attention t o the poor. The same condition is perceived
in the fact that not even a consensus has been reached
concerning the manner in which t o implement this
choice. This lack of success i s attributed to
cultural, financial, structural, administrative, and
political factors.
This study includes two appendices. The
first shows the results, analysis, and conclusions of a
questionnaire circulated throughout the G ~ a t e ~ l a n
archdiocese. Each church belonging to the archdiocese
(83 in all) chose a priest at random who was

subsequently interviewed.2 The results o f the data

Even though it was my intent ion to interview on1 y

83 priests, the final results show 89 responses because
six more priests who were present when the
questionnaire was distributed were included.
acquired through these interviews show evidence that
the Guatemalan religious elites' attitudes are varied
insofar as the implementation and interpretation of the

teachings of the Second Vatican Council and Medellin

are concerned. In general terms, the predominant
political trend within the Guatemalan Catholic Church,
subsequent t o Casariego's demise, is of an evolutionary
character. Finally, we can assume from the results of
the data that in the final instance, the Guatemalan
church has grown more in membership than 'it has
changed.

The second appendix exhibits a copy of

information supplied by each of the Guatemalan bishops.
The objective of this questionnaire was to gather
first-hand information related to the number of
priests, parishes, extent, and principal apostolic
movements present in every diocese in the country.
This information was processed and the results were

integrated with other data used in Chapter 1 1 1 . The

preparation o f such a questionnaire was deemed

necessary due to the alarming lack of information and

trustworthy statistics concerning the types of
information requested of the bishops.
xvi i
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Introduction. ................. 1

Chapter 1. Institutionalization and

Consolidation o f the Guatemalan
CatholicChurch ..........
Chapter 2. The Revival o f the Catholic Church
in Guatemala ............
Chapter 3. The Administrative Structure of the
Reformed Church ..........
Chapter 4. The Catholic Church's Traditional
Response t o Change .........
Chapter 5. The Catholic Church's Reformist
Response toward Change .......
Chapter 6. The Rebellious Response to Change .
Chapter 7. The Revolutionary Response t o the
Call f o r c h a n g e ..........
C o n c i u s i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Appendix1 ...................
Appendix11 ..................
Appendix111 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bi bl iography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vita......................
xviii
 L I S T OF TABLES AND !LLUSTRATIONS

I1 1 u s t r a t i o n s

Diagram No .1............... 220

D i a g r a m No. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

D i a g r a m No. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479

Map No .1................. 50

Map No . 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Map No .3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Map No .4 . . . . . . . . ......... 95

Map No . 5 . . . . . . . . ......... 119

Map No . 6 . . . . . . . . ......... 149

Map No . 7 . . . . . . . . ......... 190

 INTRODUCTION

In the social sciences, and especially in

political science, few studies made before World War I 1
concerned the church a s an institution, much less its

relationship t o modernization and the process o f

change. This was due essentially to the predominant

academic concept that held, traditionally, that the

church had never played an important role as an agent

for change in relation t o society in general.

As products generated by that perception, we

have such classical studies as those that consider the

religious impact within the process o f change of a

specific society. The general conclusion of these

studies was the same: that religion is intrinsically

an integrating and legitimating force of the values and

structure o f society, more than a motivating force

leading t o social change. Authors such as Spencer,

Durkheim, Ma1 inowski , Marx, and Weber concluded that in

general the objectives of the most. influential

religions o f the world were not oriented toward the

transformation of the societies they influenced.1

Herbert Spencer, The Pr incipl es o f Sociol oqy, 3

1
 The Latin ~ m e r i c a n experience up t o World War
I 1 strengthens the same conclusions perceived by the

above-mentioned authors. As an institution within the

region, Cathelicism, even more than a s a religion,
became one o f the supports o f a scheme for colonial

control. Along with the military and the landlords,

the church for a long time was one o f the three basic

pillars of the status quo.2 Church principles and

teachings became fundamental t o the political culture

and moral practice of Latin America in general.

To understand the pattern o f behavior

established by the Latin American Catholic Church and

its influence on the cultural values s f the society, we

need t o go back t o the arrival o f Catholicism in the

region. The Spanish and Portuguese colonies were

volumes, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1896, Vol.

3, pp. 104-106; Bronislaw Malinowski, Masic, Science
and Reliaion, Doubleday, Garden City, New Jersey, 1948,
pp. 63-69, 87; Emile Durkheim, Elements and Forms o f
Reliqious Life, Collier, New York, 1947, p. 257; Karl
Marx, "Contribution t o the Critique o f Hegel's
Philisophy
- inas,
. o f Right: Introduction," in Karl Marx, Early
ed. T. B. Bottomore, McGraw Hill, New York,
1963, pp. 43-44; Max Weber, The Sociolosy of Reliqion,
trans. Ephraim Fischoff, Beacon Press, Boston, Mass.,
1963, passim.
Howard W i arda and Harvey Ki i ne, Latin American
Politics and Development, Houghton Mifflin Company,
Boston, Mass., 1979, p. 20.
created within an institutional framework o f absolute,

authoritarian, hierarchical, Catholic, corporative,

mercantilistic, orthodox, and scholastic values that

definitely influenced the development pattern o f Latin

American society.3 Moreover, the Catholic Church in

the national period carried over values inherited from

the era of conquest, including the concept o f a society

built on hierarchy and authority. Such values have

affected social, political, and zconomic development in

Latin America. Some recent academic studies attribute

cultural characteristics t o the phenomenon o f

authoritarian bureaucracy, which up until recently was

dominant in several South American countries. This

perspective ccncleded that the authoritarianism

embodied in the Catholic Church contributed t o the

formation and acceptance o f this type o f regime.4

In this way, the Catholic religion, a s a

defender o f the established system, earned throughout

Latin America a solid reputation a s the defender o f

3 Ibid., p. 21.
4 For a more clear understanding of bureaucratic
authorftarianism, see Authoritarianism and Corporatism
in Latin America, James Malloy, ed., University o f
Pittsburgh Press, 1977, and The New Authoritarianism in
Latin America, David Collier, ed., Princeton University
Press, New Jersey, 1979.
ideas and values totally opposed to those traditionally
associated with the process of modernization and
development characteristic o f contemporary Western
society. This reputation practically foreclosed, in
the eyes o f scholars, any possibility for change in
Latin American society that the Catholic Church could
have promoted.
In the specific Guatemalan case, up t o the
beginning of the 1960s the Catholic Church did not
constitute an exception. Just as it fought hard t o
maintain its position and privileges against the
Liberal Revolution in 1871, the church continued t o
fight with all its strength against the latter stages

of the Guatemalan Revolution, at the beginning of the

1 9 5 0 ~which
~ it perceived as a Communist rnenace.5

Nevertheless. after World War I 1 and

especially during the 1960s, a series of changes took
place within religious outlooks that had a direct
influence on the structure and behavior of the Catholic

5 Mario Rossell y Arellano, Carta pastoral sobre 10s

avances del Comunismo en Guatemala, Guatemala, April 4 9
1954. This document is in the possession of the
author. It is necessary here to note that
Protestantism also constitutes a menace t o the position
and privi!eges of the Guatemalan Catholic Church. For
more information, see Chapter I, pp. 70-71.
Church. Furthermore, the changes questioned
traditional theories related t o the role of the church
in society.6

This process of societal change became

strongly manifested in the Catholic Church.
Paradoxically, this was the same religion that, a
century before, had Ted classical authors t o conclude
that this institution was not only a basically
conservative force, but also was reactionary in Latin
Amer i ca .
Among the most explosive principles within
this change, the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965),
summoned by Pope John XXIII, led the way. This council
constituted a coherent and broad effort meant to pursue
an in-depth approach t o investigating the true nature
o f the church and the world in which it exerted its
influence, leadership, and activity. The Second
Vatican Council also tried t o prepare a guide for
establishing a more harmonious relationship between
church and society. The relationship was therefore t o

For some authors such as Thomas G. Sanders, the

process of modernization of the Latin American Catholic
church started in 1930 with Jacques Maritain's neo-
Thommist philosophy.
be more compatible with the currents o f o u r era; in

other words, the council envisioned a grandiose effort

t o bring the universal church up t o the present moment.

We are still experiencing the consequences of this

effort.
-
The result of the Second Vatican Council was

a new conciliatory spirit, which was warmly welcomed by

the Latin American clergy, among whom there were

important differences in interpretation. Even a s they

acknowledged its limit~tions, the clergy assumed

leadership and dedicated itself with compulsive

enthusiasm, denouncing the oppression o f the vast

masses of the dispossessed. It began to promote

structural and attitudinsl chsnges thet wocld be more

in agreement with the council's call. By giving

special attention t o the process of change, the Second

Vatican Council practically established a program of

social action that enabled the church t o assume a more

active role in the defense o f human rights, justice,

and liberty.7

7 "Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern

World," Nos. 1 , 26, 27, The Documents of the Vatican
-
1 1 , ed. Walter Abbott, M.S.J., America Press, Angelus
Books, New York, 1966, pp. 199-200, 225-227.
 A second factor that must be taken into

account is the papal cyclicals that promoted zhe common

good, the principles o f solidarity and subsidiarity,

the need for state economic planning, the worker's

participation in profit-sharing enterprises, and t h e

right o f underdeveloped countries t o obtain fair prices

for their products and new materials in the

international market.8

For example, John XXIII's encyclical "Mater

et Magistra." published in 1961, mentioned two

fundamental aspects that would be a great influence on

the 1 fving conditions characteristic o f underdeveloped

societies. In the first place, the Pope emphasized the

process o f socialization, which was becoming known

throughout the world at that time. This circumstance

justified the need t o organize and unite for the

purpose o f achieving common objectives. in the second

place. the Pope pointed out the need for a person's

total development as a member o f society. Such a

-
Q
-- - - - - -- - --

Pope John XXIII, "Mater et Magistra," Nos. 82-103;

Pope John XXII, "Acem in Terris," Nos. 60-66; and Pope
- -

Paul VI, "Popoulorum Progressio," Nos. 23, 33, 44, 49,

56-61. All o f the above are included in The Gospel o f
Peace and Justice, Joseph Gremillion, ed., Maryknoll,
Orbis Books, New York, 1976.
development implied responsibilities and obligations

that a person has t o himself and t o the universe that

surrounds him. The Pope concluded that the fruits o f

development should be shared by all and not just a

few.9

Finally, among the steps that accelerated the

process o f change within the Latin American Catholic

Church. we have the Medellin Conference of 1968.10

The sessions o f the conference revolved around three

main themes: 1) the promotion of human and basic

values such as peace and justice, which were

reaffirmed; 2) evangelization and the growth o f the

faith; and 3) the evaluation o f the visible church and

its structure.11

Medell in is extremely important because it

represents an advanced step in the process o f change

initiated by the church and the Second Vatican Council.

On the other hand, this conference legitimized a series

9 Pope Paul XXIII, "Mater et Magistra."

10 The Medel 1 in Conference used the fol lowing
documents a s a source for its discussions and
conclusions: the "Populorum Progressio" encyclical; the
Conciliar Constitution, "Gaudium et Spes"; and Pope
Paul VI's speech delivered at Bogota o n this occasion.
l 1 Renato Poblete, S.J., "From Medell in t o Puebla,
Notes for Reflection," Journal o f Interamerican Studies
and World Affairs, Vol. 21. February 1. 1979, p. 35.
of changes that had occurred in Latin America during
the previous decade. In addition, while the
conference was being held, a rigorous and exhaustive
analysis of the Latin American situation was developed.
This in a sense provoked the resurgence of a prophetic
church that condemned the violence institutionalized by

the system. It made the possessors of the greatest

wealth and power responsible for provoking a dangerous

and hopeless revolution because they zealously defended

their privileges.12

Thus, after several decades of negligence and

oblivion, there was renewed interest in the possibility
of a viable political contribution by Latin American

Catholicism. This possibility was perceived during the

1960s, when it appeared at first as an unsuspected
factor o f social change occurring in a region where the
process toward social change existed in the midst of
political instability.13

I2 CELAM, ~a evanae lizacion en el Presente v en el

futuro de America Latina, Puebla, Mexico, 1978.
documento d e consulta a las Conferencias Episcopales,
1 1 1 Conferencia General del Episcopado Latinoamericano,
Bo ota.
19 Gerhard Drekon ja, "Re1 ig ion and Soc ia 1 Change in
Latin America," Latin America Research Review, Vol. VI,
NO. 1 , Spring 1971.
 The emergence of renewed interest in the

study o f religion and Latin American politics coincided

with a more vigorous acceptance o f the so called

concepts o f development, accepted especially by North

American academic circles. This concept tried t o

explain the process of change in underdeveloped

societies from the perspective o f the process o f

modernization and political development.14

The word modernization, in this respect,

implied a broad and varied concept that tried t o

explain a multiphasic process o f change present in the

areas o f human thought and activity. At the same time,

it attempted t o clarify the transitional process o f a

traditional society on its way toward modernization.15

According t o some North American authors, the

concept o f modernization is an illusion pursued by the

14 For example, see Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell,

Comparative Politics: A D e v e l o p m e ~ ~Apsroaeh,
t Little
Brown and Company, Boston, 1966; David Apter, The
Politics of Modernization, University o f Chicago Pressp
1965; Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and
Political Development," American Political Science
Review, Vol. 55, September 1961, pp. 493-514; Lucian W.
Pye. &spects o f Political Development: An Analytic
Study, Little Brown and Company, Boston, 1966; Samuel
P. Huntington, Political Order in Chanqinq Societies,
Yale Universit6y Press, New Haven, Conn., 1968.
l 5 Samuel P. Hunt ington, Po 1 it i ca 1 Order in Chanq i ng
Societies, pp. 32-39.
social sciences. It is true that up t o now there has
been no consensus with regard t o its true outreach,
significance, and utility; because of this lack, there
are, for example, as many definitions of modernization
as there are authors who write on the subject.16

Nevertheless, in spite of the lack of clarification

concerning modernization, it is still possible t o
locate certain indicators that may permit us t o
quantify the degree o f modernization present in a
society in the midst o f change. However, such
quantification may be incomplete. These indicators
would include degree o f urbanization, industrializa-
t i on, secu 1 ar izat ion , democrat i zat i on , and educat ion ;
fundamental change o f values, activities, and
expectations; change in the identification of the
particular t o the universal; modification in life
expectancies; social and geographic mobility; degree of
knowledge concerning the environment; rapid urban
population growth; and diversification in economic
activity.17 In the specific case o f religion, it is

l6 James Bill and Robert Hardgrave, Comparative

Politics, the Quest for Theory, University Press of
Arpgrica, Inc., Washington, D.C., 1981, P. 63.
" Samuel Huntington. Political Order in Changing
Societies, p. 33.
the interconnection existing between religion and the
process o f modernization that, theoretically, a
particular society should attain. In this respect,
Ivan Vallier suggested that there is a causal

relationship between the changes experienced by the

Catholic Church, such as institutionalization, and the
changes occurring in secular institutions. This
confirms that the modernization o f the church becomes
an essential prerequisite for the modernization of
society. 18

At the most el ementa 1 1 eve1 of acceptance,

the secularization process basically implied the
separation o f society and religion in a political
environment. In this manner, the symbolism and
structures that traditionally have united them are
removed. Consequently, the fact that the political
system generally derived its legitimacy from secular
and not religious ideology was recognized because o f
its legal and constitutional character.19

18 Ivan Vallier, Catholicism. Social Control and

Modernization in Latin America, Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey, 1970, p. 149.
l 9 Donald E. Smith, Religion and Political
Development, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1970,
 North American society constitutes, within
the possible and with certain limitations, the nlaximum
example of a secularized society. Nevertheless, it is
evident that any attempt t o repeat this phenomena
throughout the American hemisphere is unrealistic. It
ignores the history and tradition o f the region,
besides which, this is not necessar ily the only model
that can be followed.
In the specific case of Guatemala, even
though the local Catholic Church had throughout the
years accepted the basic principles of structural
differentiation and separation between church and state
inherent t o the process of modernization, it still
participated in affairs that carried moral and
political implications and in which the church was
interested; for example, repression, violence, and

human rights. Concerning the meaning o f political

development. this implied a more specific character,
basically that of the rationality o f the principle of
authority, a process of structural differentiation, and
the stimuli o f participation, all o f which are part of
the institutional framework.20
-- - - - -

20 Samue 1 Huntington, Po 1 it i ca 1 Order i n Chang i ng

 From this perspective, the role played by
religion in the political process of developed Western
societies has had particular significance. It is also
true if we take into account that religion has
established significant ideas in the political culture
of the society. These ideas have permitted the
development of individual liberty, the birth o f secular
ideology, and the adequate function of political
parties.
In the Latin American area it is evident that
religion has contributed recently t o the promotion of
incipient development i n the political process o f a
country. 1t.substitutes hierarchical and authoritarian
. L
c~ aul~ional values
&---I
for other values that are more
consistent with contemporary expectations. The latter
would entail social justice, the common good, liberty,

political pluralism, and democracy.

In the specific case of Guatema!a, the
, Catholic elites, each according to his own
possibilities and according t o a degree of compromise,
have tried to help in the political development of the

Societies, p. 34. These categories correspond to those

established by Lucien Pye in his book Aspects of
Political Development. pp. 45-47.
country. However, due t o external as well as internal
factors, the impact that this participation has had on
the political development process has been limited.
Among the limiting factors extraneous to the Catholic
Church we can point out a new outbreak of violence and
religious repression; the spread of Protestantism,
offering greater participation as an alternative; and
the gains o f Communism, which offers heaven on earth.
Among internal factors we have the lack o f priests,
poor economic resources, !a& of vocations, disunion,

macrocephalia, managerial deficiency, and the strong

personality of conservative leadership.
The changes occurring within the Catholic
Church during the 1960s. as well as the proliferation
of the development theory, created circumstances
whereby North American academics believed that the
Catholic Church, in spite o f its conservative
tradition, cauld play an active role in the promotion
of social change and political development. At the
same time, this influenced a come-back of the old
debate about whether religfon could or could not become
an agent for change in society.21

2 1 Kalman Silvert, Churches and States: The Reliqious

 Likewise, the topic of church participation
in the political process came alive. As a corollary t o
this question, and assuming the church must participate
in politics, there was discussion on how the
institution should participate within the process.22

As a product of academic research, investigating

answers to the first question c ~ q c e r n i n gthe influence

of religion on the process of change in society, we

found several sources that may be analyzed from the
perspective o f four different approaches.
The defenders of the first approach perceive
the church as an institution that can become a dynamic
force toward change in Latin Arnerica.23 The

Institution and Modernization, American University

Field Staff, New York, 1967; Donald E. Smith, Religion
an
c i h and State in Latin America:
A History of Politico-ecclesiastical Relations (revised
edition), University o f North Carolina Press, Chapel
Hill, 1966; Frederick 6. Pike, ed., The Conflict
Between Church and State in Latin America, Alfred A.
Knopf, New York, 1964; Ivan Vallier, Catholicism,
Social Control. and Modernization in Latin America;
3aniel Levine, Religion and Politics in Latin America:
The Catholic Church in Venezuela and C o l o ~ b i a ,
Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1981.
23 I van Va 1 1 i er, "Church Devel opment in Lat i n Amer i ca:
A Five Country Comparison," Journal o f Developinq
Areas, Vol. I, No. 4, 1967, pp. 461-476; Ivan Vallier,
Catholicism, Social Control and Modernization in Latin
America; Edward Williams, "Latin American Catholicism
and Political Integration," Comparative Political
supporters of this scheme conceive of the modernization
of the Catho?ic Church es a restatement of religious
values destined t o promote change, consensus, and
integration. By this it is understood that such
consensus would permit the strengthening of the
innovative process; at the same time, it would diminish
the degree of competition between new and old religious
elites. Thus any kind o f unnecessary and
counterproductive type of conflict would be avoided.24

A second approach perceived the Catholic

Church as a force of change, albeit moderate.25 These

Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1969, pp. 327-347; Edward

!+lilliams,"The Emergence of the Secular Nation State
and Latin American Catholicism,'' Comparative Politics,
Vol. 5, No. 2, 1973, pp. 261-277; Thomas G. Sanders,
"The Church in Latin America," Foreign Affairs, Vol.
48, No. 2, 1970, pp. 285-300; Gerhard Drekonja,
"Religion and Social Change in Latin America,'' Latin
American Research Review, Vol. 6, No. 4, Spring 1971,
pp. 53-73; Frederick C. Turner, Catholicism and
Political Development in Latin America. University of
N rth Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1971.
q4 Edward W i 1 1 iams, "Lat i n Amer i can Catho 1 i c i sm and
Political Integration," Comparative Political Studies,
334-335.
PBg Brian Smith, "Re, lgion and Social Changes:
Classical Theories and New Formulations in the Context
o f Recent Development in Latin America," Latin American
Research Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1975, pp. 3-34; Brian
Smith, The Church and Politics in Chile: Challenge t o
Modern Catholicism, Princeton University Press, New
Jersey, 1982; Thomas Bruneau, The Church in Brazil: The
Politics of Relision, University of Texas Press, 1982.
authors did not have the hope and optimism that the

defenders o f the first approach showed. The sponsors

o f this alternative were trying t o avoid a unilateral

interpretation concerning the true perspectives of the

process o f change that the Latin American region was

experiencing. They concentrated their efforts on

trying to interpret coherently and in a systematic

manner complex interactive patterns that appeared

between the progressive forces and the traditional

groups o f the Latin American Catholic Church. All this

took into account the fact that both coexisted and

operated simu!taneously at every ecclesiastical level

in the region. The supporters o f the second approach

also included the patterns of interaction of the

national church with the universal church, which were

limiting factors for the impact the church could have

in the process o f social change and political

development.

In this regard, Brian Smith addressed two

basic questions. The first question, at the internal

level, asked: How can the values o f liberty and

participation promoted by the contemporary church be

~ e c o n c i l e dt o the hierarchical and authoritarian
patterns of the traditional church? The second
question, at the external level, inquired: How do the
church's actions and operations at the transactional
level interfere with security measures and the national
sovereignty of the various countries as the church
tries t o become an agent for change? Concerning this,
Smith concluded that the institutional impact of the
church on each society depended on the alliances it
made with other types of organizations within its own
realm.26

A third approach sustained that Catholicism,

more than an element of development, was something of
an obstacle to the process of social change in Latin
America.27 According to this interpretation, in the
majority of the Latin American countries the
hierarchical position of the Catholic Church in regard
to the process of change was only marginally different
from those groups or institutions who supported a
regime. Consequently the impect of the radical
ecclesiastical minorities was minimal, almost

26 Brian Smith, The Church and Politics in Chile.

'2 Emanuel de Kadt, "Church, Society and Deve 1 opment
in Latin America," Journal of Development Studies, Vol.
8, NO. 1 , 1971, pp. 23-43. '
nonex i stent .
Emanuel De Kadt expressed concisely that many
Latin American Catholic Church leaders (lay and
religious) had set aside their conservative attitudes
as a result o f doctrinal change decrees by the
universal church through the Second Vatican Council and
messages from the Pope, as well as the apparent failure
of the development model in underdeveloped societies.
But even so, the possibility of their influencing the
process of social change was minimal because of the

great advancement in the secularization process among

the lead ing sector and a reduction among the group o f

loyal fo llowers, which had become a conglomerate formed

essent i a Ily by middle class women and illiterate
peasants.
A last approach perceived Catholicism as a
serious obstacle for social change.28 Its supporters
argued that the internal division o f the church as well

28 David Mutchler, "Adaptations of the Roman Catholic

Church t o Latin American Deve!opment: The Meaning o f
Internal Church Conflict," Social Research, Vol. 36,
No. 2, 1969, pp. 231-252; Roger Vekemans, "Economic
Development, Social Change and Cultural Mutation, in
William D. Antonio W. and Frederick Pike, eds.,
Religion, Revolution and Reform: New Forces for Chanqe
in Latin America, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1964,
pp. 129-142.
as the authoritarian and hierarchical values proclaimed
by its traditional sector had produced passivist
attitudes and social extremism. These attitudes were
extremely damaging to the process of change; likewise,
they presented social, economic, and political
implications. In this manner, supporters of the
Catholic Church concluded that all efforts that were

being conducted in order t o influence the process of

social change were having a negative result.
Three clearly different positions were
perceived in regard to the second part of the debate
concerning the church's participation in politics. The
first position stood for absolute and complete
separation between church and state. This position
argued that any trace of religious influence on public
life should be elimineted. This exclusion represented
one of the basic components of the secularization or
modernization process.29

Donald Smith presented a typology concerning

the process of secularization, which he divided into
five stages that explored the religious-ideological

29 Donald Smith, Reliqion and Political Development,

pp. 243-245.
change that developed within the secularization
process. The first of these stages was called
"traditional religiosity." Within this stage, religion
became a fundamental factor that supported the system
and the status quo. The last stage was called
@'pragmatic humanism," where there was no need for a
secular ideology because humanistic ends were reached
through merely pragmatic means.30

The second position emphasized the adaptation

of a process of structural differentiation that
permitted the church to separate itself from party
politics.31 The reasons for this position had

historical connotations. in that the Latin American

independence movements did not establish legal
regulations to enforce separation of church and state.
This would have Seen very difficult to accomplish,

especially in the case of Guatemala, where several of

the signatories of the Declaration of Independence Act
- --

30 ibid., PP. 243-245.

Lloyd ~echam. Church and State in Latin America;
Frederick 6 . Pike, ed., The Conflict Between Church and
State in Latin America; Ivan Vallier, "Religious
Elites: Differentiation and Development in Roman
Catholicism," in Seymour Lipset and Aldo Solari, eds.,
Elites in Latin America, Oxford University Press, 1967;
Ivan Vallier, Catholicism, Social Control, and
Modernization in Latin America,
were distinguished members of the contemporary Catholic

Church .
On the contrary, Catholicism in Latin America
continued t o be considered the official religion o f the
newly formed countries. The church was the recipient
of material, legal, and political privileges. This was
the institutional framework that permitted the Catholic
Church t o consolidate its political power at the
expense of a continued weakness in its spiritual work.
It also lost considerable popular support. As time
went by these circumstances also contributed t o
diminishing the church's moral credibility and aligned
the church with the more conservative sectors of
colonial society. In this manner* the Catholic Church,
instead of becoming a religious agency different from
the state, became the religious arm of the state. It

became directly involved in joint strategic tactics

that permitted its own survival and the maintenance o f
its privileges within Guatemalan society.
It is in respect t o the above that we must
understand Lloyd Mecham's proposed solution. If the
Latin American Catholic Church wished t o contribute t o
the development process* it had t o first stop
intervening directly in party politics, necessitating
the legal formalization of separation between church
and state.32
Going beyond the institutional-structural
focus presented by Mecham. Vallier insisted on the need
to separate church and state and establish a structural
differentiation between both institutions.33
Concerning this thesis, Vallier was o f the opinion that
instead o f continuing the use of a "poiiticai strategy"
through which the Catholic Church hierarchy tried t o
exert political and direct intervention, it should
choose a "pastoral strategy." By involving itself in
this strategy the hierarchy would refrain from direct
p a r t i c i p a t i o n f n the political process. This type of
activity would then become the responsibility of laymen
as individuals or representatives o f communal entities;
these in turn, a s circumstances permitted. would
receive direct ion from the ecclesiastical
hierarchy.34

Val 1 ier's argument agreed perfectly with the

32 Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America,

PPI 416-427.
. 3 3 Ivan Vallier, Catholicism, Social Control and
Modernization in Latin America, pp. 149-155.
j4 Ibid., pp. 155-159.
scope of action presented by developmental literature.
As we saw before, this literature assigned religion an
important role as a continuity factor during difficult
eras and circumstances. It also became a factor in the
analysis of a series o f phenomefla that are hard to
understand, such as death, suffering, and poverty.
Finally, we have a third position that stated
that the concepts o f politics and religion could not
and must not be separated.35 Daniel Levine explicitly
stated that a radical separation within the activities

of the church and the state, such as is advocated by

Donald Smith, cannot occur in the Latin American
continent. Such a premise would imply the existence of
a parallel division in the mind o f the principal actors
involved in the political process of the region. For
those who were well acquainted with the region, this
circumstance was far from becoming a reality in Latin
America.36

Furthermore, Levine wrote about the close

. .
35 Thomas Bruneau, The Political Transformat sxU?fAx
Brazilian Catholic Church; Daniel Levine, "Re igion and
Politics. Politics and Religion," Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 21, No.
1 1979, pp. 5-29.
36 Daniel Levine, "Religion and Politics, Po itics and
Re1 igion," p. 7.
interrelationship between religion and politics that
existed in Latin America. He demonstrated that there
was an overlap between religious and pastoral
activities and political concepts and realities. Ths

latter were not limited to partisan activity, but also

included matters involving power, autonomy, legitimacy,
and distribution. Therefore, the author concluded that

the Latin American church's neutrality was a

ut0~ia.37

Elitism in Latin America was and continues t o

be part of a historico-political tradition cheracter-
istic of the region, with origins that go back t o the
nobility and the great lords of Spanish tradition. The
rationality of these values was inherent in the Spanish
culture of that time, and in the philosophy of Saint
Thomas Aquinas who, among other theoreticians of the
era, argued that society should be governed by its
"natural elitesttbecause the unlearned masses were
incapable of governing themselves wisely.38

In Latin America this tradition was

37 Daniel Levine, Rel iqion and Politics in Latin

America, p. 172.
jU Howard Wiarda and Harvey Kline, Latin American
Politics and Development, p. 1 1 .
reinforced by the fact that large expanses of land as
well as a great number of Indians became available t o
the Spanish colonists. These Indians were originally
organized through the encomienda system and later
became integrated in the haciendas. Guatemala was not

an exception in this respect.

The most ambitious
... effort to date concerning

the establishment of typologies i s that of Ivan

Vallier, who created four religious elite categories
and analyzed the cause of their origins and possible
structural product.39 Vallier's categorization was
important because, as I stated before, the author
, .

believed in the relationship of chance between the

modernization process of the Cathoiic Church and that
of society in general.
Vallier's typology was supported by two
fundamental premises. The first sustained that, in
terms of social impact, the institutional organization
and the strategy desigr!ed by the Catholic Church to

exert influence were more effective than religious or

social ideas, per se. The second premise believed in

39 Ivan Vallier, "Religious Elites: Differentiation

and Development in R O M ~ Catholicism," pp. 203-210.
the church's potential for change a s seen from a
-^-
~ " a I ~a
--
t .L :
I ef e t h ica 1 and mora 1 1 eadersh ip. 40 Accord 5 ng
t o these concepts. Vallier classified religious elites
into four groups: political. papists. pastoral , and
pluralists. Among these groups, the last three were of
a progressivist character and were compatible among
themselves. Furthermore, Val lier concluded that the
pastoral groups, a s well a s the pluralists, had t o wait
until the papists had consolidated.41

For Vallier, papists were like a transitional

group, with their activity directed toward the
strengthening of the church through nonparticipation in
psrtisan politics. At the same time they tried t o
improve their internal organization and promote lay
participation. All their endeavors respected t h e basic
principles of authority and hierarchy.42 The pastoral
a s well as pluralist groups, in turn, worked t o
revitalize the local church by updating the liturgy.
forming base communities, and promoting lay initiative.
The differences between both groups were purely those

40 Ibid., pp. 203-210.

41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.. p. 204.
of outreach and focus.43

Another meritorious effort in this direction

was the work of Thomas Sanders, who went beyond the
structural-functional focus of Vallier and added
motivational and ideological elements t o his typology.
Following this order o f ideas, Sanders also presented
four types o f religious elites characteristic o f the
Latin American continent: reactionary, conservative,
progressive, and innovative groups.44

Within such a classification. both

reactionary and conservative groups were characterized
by their defense of the system and the traditional
values o f the church, even though reactionaries acted
more vehemently and conscientiously than conservatives.
On the other hand, both progressives and innovators
were also believers. although they differed in their
projections in the mdernization process and in the
need for the Catholic Church t o participate in this
process.45

43 Ibid.. p. 205.
44 Thomas Sanders, "A Typology o f Catholic Elites,"
and "Religion and Modernization: Some Reflections," in
Catholic Innovation in a Changing Latin America,
Institute of Current World Affairs, 196, pp. 3-6.
45 Ibid.
 Finally, we have Daniel Levine's typology.
Levine argued that religious differences did not
necessarily correspond t o political positions.
Consequently, he proceeded t o elaborate a
differentiation between these two dimensions. Within
this context he pointed out the following

differentiation. In the religious sphere. there were

two positions: the ecclesiastical, which emphasized
the church's hierarchical division, and the church,
which tried t o convert the recornendations o f Vatican

I 1 into practice. Levine gave special attention t o the

development o f base community congregations and
minimized the traditional principles of authority.46

Concerning the political order, he

established three categories: the traditional, the
promotional, and the activist. The traditional
corresponded t o the classical approach in that it was
concerned with the resolution of social problems and
established morai and charitable goals. The

promotional directed its strategy toward motivating lay

groups into action. The activist, as Vallier would

4 6 Daniel Levine, Religion and Politics in Latin

America, pp. 138-141.
say.47 implied a pattern of regressive behavior
because it attempted to have the religious elites
participate directly in the promotion of change and
social justice.48

In the particular case of Guatemala, little

has been written on the subject of church-state
relations and the influence of religion on the
development process and social change. Likewise, the
few accounts that exist were outdated. Even though
this literature was important, it did not represent a
trustworthy s c x c e from which t o interpret the degree
of advancement of the Guatemalan society within the
process of social change, as well as the contribution
of the Catholic Church in this respect.
Traditionally, the classic source concerning
the analysis of church-state relations in Guatemala was
the book written by Mary P. Holleran.49 In general
terms, the book was an adequate study of politico-
ecclesiastical relations in Guatemala up to the end of

47 Ibid.
-

4 8 Ivan Vallier, Catholicism, Social Control and

Modernization in Latin America, p. 81.
4y Mary P. Holleran, Church and State in Guatemala,
Octagon Books, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, New York,
1974.
the 1940s. Moreover, it gave a clear explanation of
the motives for the existence of Guatemalan
anticlericalism. However, the author did not deeply
explore or clarify the basic reasons for the origin of
the motivating forces present i n church-state
relations. In this respect, the author concentrated
throughout most of her book on the study of the written
laws, considering these as the most significant
expression of the modus vivendi between both
institutions.
It is necessary to clarify that even though
it is true that both the concordats as well as the
constitutional laws could be used as reference sources
for the study of the Guatemalan Catholic Church, it is
also true that these sources were only one indicator,
and even then not the most important one for the study
of church-state or religion versus politics
relationships.
Nevertheless, it must be understood that when

Dr. Holleran wrote her book, there existed a

predominant interest within the academic community in
studying this type of phenomena. Scholars were
interested in the functional legal perspective and not
in the structural functional view. Interest in the
latter aspect developed several years ,after the
publication of her book. This new perspective
established a new methodology, new concepts, and
theoretical tools for the study of the phenomena
occurring in societal relations.
Anita Frankel's chapter on Guatemala's
religious elites was more relevant to the subject. In
her analysis, the author identified the Guatemalan
religious elites as faithful disciples of the Latin
American religious tradition, ful ly integrated within
the hierarchical and authoritarian values. The former
constituted the roots of Guatemalan society.50

According to Frankel, the Guatemalan

religious elites played an important role in protecting
the political social system through their alliance with

the traditional and powerful classes of the country.

This also impiied their fervent anti-Communism and the
special emphasis placed on charity as a solution to
social problems.51

50 Anita Franke 1 , Po 1 it i ca 1 Deve 1 ooment in Guatema 1 a.

1944-1954: The Impact of Foreign, Military and
Relisious Elites, Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Connecticut, 1969, pp. 169-265.
5 1 Ibid., pp. 169-177.
 Nevertheless, this study had serious

limitations because it concentrated only on the

attitudes and values of the Guatemalan religious elites
within a determined and controversial historical
framework of time, the period of 1944 to 1954, known in
Guatemalan history as the revolutionary decade. For
this reason, we could not obtain a more coherent and
complete picture of the true influence of the
Guatemalan church in the process of social change and
political development of the country. The span of time
covering the 1960s was not studied by Frankel, and this
was the decade that followed the meeting of Vatican I 1
and the Medell in Conference.

The thesis of Bruce Calder covered a more

recent period in the contemporary history of the

Guatemalan church, analyzing the process of growth and
change occurring in the Guatemalan Catholic Church from
1944 t o 1966.52 Even though this study was relevant,
especially concerning the organizational side of the
church in the country and the work developed by this
institution in the urban and rural areas, by the end of

52 Bruce Calder, Crecimiento y cambio de la iglesia

Catolica Guatemalteca, 1944-1966, Estudios
Centroamericanos, No. 6, Guatemala, 1970.
the book the reader had the impression that the author
was more interested in analyzing the growth process of
the Guatemalan church than examining the process of
change in detail. Concerning the attitudes and values
characteristic of the Guatemalan religious elites,
Calder first outlined the conservative and

progressive tendencies of these elites in a broad

fashion. Nevertheless, he did not identify in detail
the diverse differences that characterized the
religious Guatemalan elites, especially after the
1960s.
Finally, we have two books whose principal
topic was the historical development of the church of
the poor in Latin America. One chapter in each of
these books was devoted to the history of that church
in Guatemala. The previously mentioned books and the
one written by Frankel showed the same failure. They
were nothing more than a fraction or one version of the
true origins of the process toward change undertaken by
the Guatemalan church.53 Consequently, the relevance

53 Pablo Richard, Guillermo Melendez, eds., La iqlesia

de 10s pobres en America Central: Un analisis socio-
politico y teoloqico de la islesia centroamericana
(1960-19821, Departamento de Investigaciones, DEI,
Costa Rica, 1982, pp. 195-241; Philip Berryman, wThe
of this study is quite simple. Unless we understand
the limitations and implications o f the process of
change characteristic of the Guatemalan church during
the past 20 years, marginal as it could be. we will
never be able to understand the general process of
change occurring in Guatemalan society.
The use o f concepts such as modernization and

political development, secularization, and structural

differentiation between church and state are o f vital
importance as sources of reference. They are useful
and help t o set parameters that can measure the degree
of participation and compromise of the Guatemalan
religious elites in the process of change.
It is therefore evident t o any person who hzs
followed the process of change and growth of the
Catholic Church during the last two decades that this
institution has grown and developed in a different
direction than the one that traditionally characterized
it, and has assumed positions that are more relevant t o
the country's socioeconomic reality.

Color of Blood Is Never Forgotten," The Reliqious Roots

o f Rebellion: Christians in Central American
Revolutions, Orbis Books, Maryknoll. New York, 1984,
pp. 163-220.
 However, in spite of the evident process of
change in the areas of growth and development that the
Guatemalan church has undertaken during the more recent
years, very little has been written concerning the

subject. This dissertation intends to contribute to

the bibliography on this topic. It is worthwhile to
clarify that this investigation does not pretend to
generate great theoretical positions on the religious
theme and its relatfon to society. It is more likely
that the relevancy of the topic will become a modest
contribution to the literature that has been produced
to date. On the other hand, this author hopes to offer
some opinions that may contribute to solving the
conflict between those who argue, on one side, that the
Guatemalan church has suffered a radical change and
those who contend that the church continues to exist as

a static institution.
 CHAPTER I

INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND CONSOLIDATION

OF THE GUATEMALAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

Until the end o f the fifteenth century,

Europe had not become unified or consolidated.

Consequently, the only stable institution in the

political sphere that could act as a unifying force was

the universal Catholic Church. The church, led by the

Pope and supported by the national churches o f almost

all the emerging European states, became the most

important institution of the era.

Spain at the end o f the fifteenth century was

a complex society, different from the majority of the

European states, with an absolutist and authoritarian

governmental political structure that directed and

supported the concept of the state consisting o f a

vertical social corporate order (church, army,

bureaucracy, university) and a horizontal plane formed

by a rigid system o f class and caste. It included a

mercantile economic system (monopolistic, centralized,

and state-directed) and an educational system based on

38
scholastic tradition. l
On the other hand, the Spain of that era
possessed many elements from the Arabic tradition,
among which was a tendency to accommodate the goals and
intentions of the state with those of the church. This
trend practically made Spain the instrument for the
salvation of the world.2 This is reflected in

legislation and the policies followed by Queen Isabel

and her successors.3

The Catholic Church, therefore, did not

remain on the fringes of the political and social
events of that time. On the contrary, it tried to
influence the behavior of those who governed as well as

1 Howard Wiarda, elitics and Social Chanse in Latin

America: The Distant Tradition, University of
Massachusetts Press, Boston, 1982, p. 15.
2 Enrique Dussel, Historia de la inlesia en America
Latina, Editorial Nova Terra, Barcelona, 1974, p. 80.
Other examples of this type of religious-political
monism have been found in Henry VIII's English
ab olutism, in the Caliphate, and in Visigothic Spain.
4 Richard Morse, "Toward a Theory of Spanish Amer ican
G ~ v e r n m e n t ,in
~ ~ Howard Wiarda, ed., Politics and Social
Chanqe in Latin America, pp. 109-111. This same
author, in "The Heritage of Latin America," included in
the same volume, confirmed that even though the Spanish
church was national, its members considered themselves
part of the "true" ancient and universal church. In
the author's opinion, this "kingdom of faith" permitted
the Latin American colonies to keep their distance from
the mother country and the medieval Christian heritage.
Howard Wiarda, Politics and Social Change, pp. 31-32.
those whom they governed. The church based the
rationality of its authority on the fact that it was
the only institution that had the appropriate means to
achieve what was perceived as one of the most important
values of the era, salvation.4

Nevertheless, during the fifteenth and

sixteenth centuries, the predominance that the Catholic

Church exerted over the European states began to lose

ground. A reversal process began to appear in the
control and power exercised by that institution.5
From that time onr the state, as an institution, began
to substitute for the church as the dominant
organization within the political context. This
development had implications for Spain as well as for

4 Faith in God or a supreme divinity as a means of

salvation constituted, and continues to this date, to
be a relevant role in the motivation and development of
ideas and political institutions. For example, the
birth of the state of Israel, the separation of India
from Pakistan, the Islamic evolution, and the dispute
concerning the status of the city of Jerusalem all
confirm the relevance of the idea of salvation. See
Arnold Brecht, Teoria politica, Ediciones Ariel,
Barcelona, 1963, p. 470.
The power of the church began to decl ine as a
consequence of the conciliatory movements occurring
both internally and externally as a result of the
attacks conducted by the Turks. See Thomas Bruneau,
The Pol'itical Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic
Church, p. 1 1 .
its colonies, where the church also started to lose
influence and power.6 In the New World, the best
medium of control by the state over the church was the
Royal Patronage, which included the placet (the right
to review papal bulls). The church gave the sovereign
this and other privileges in return for the protection
of its interests.7 To carry out the process of
institutionalization and consolidation, the Catholic
Church in Latin America used a model, which Troeltsch

called "Christendom" and which dominated the religious

panorama in Europe from the fourteenth to the sixteenth
century. This model was basically structured to
include four features: total coverage of the
territory. inclusion of all groups, a close relation-
ship between church and society. and use of the

Ibid.
The patronage, according to the Hispanic system,
goes back to ~i sigothic times. The closest antecedents
of the discovery of America include the conquest and
evangelization of the Canary Islands in 1418, when the
Pope gave Spain jurisdiction over their inhabitants.
Spain was entrusted with the responsibility for
defending them by preparing missionaries for the
conversion of the islanders. On the other hand, there
is the reconquest of the Arabic kingdom of Granada.
With regard to the Americas, the papal bulls
"Provisionis Nostrae" (1486) and ltDom ad Illam1* ( 1 4 9 2 )
gave the Spanish Crown the right to appoint all bishops
and to participate in the tithe and the church's
benefits. Dusse?, Historia de la iglesia, p. 81.
structures inherent in society for Christian-

i zat i on purposes. 8

In this manner, as soon as knowledge of the

discovery of America became known, a juridical base was
established t o enable the state t o control the new
territories.9 Subsequently, on March 4, 1493, the

Pope gave Spanish kings, by means o f the bull "Inter

Coetera," the exclusive prerogative t o spread
Christianity within certain frontiers that included
almost half of the known world.10 The Crown then

became apostolic vicar and received, according t o the

model of Christianization, total coverage of the
territory.
From the time o f the discovery of America and

Thomas Bruneau, The Political Transformation of the

Brazilian Catholic Church, pp. 11-12. The model was
kept in force throughout Spain and Portugal and was
transferred to the newly discovered territories,
because, among other things, both countries had not
been influenced by the values and ideas o f the
Re ormation.
Jorge Lu jan Munoz, 1 n i c io del dorni n io Espanol de
las Indfag, Editorial Universitaria, Guatemala, 1978,
p. 8.
l o A1 1 lands t o the south and west o f a 1 ine traced
from the Azores and the Cabo Verde Islands belonged to
Spain; the rest were Portugal's. The treaty of
Tordesillas was signed in 1494, moving the line 270
leagues toward the west. An Encyclopedia of World
History, William Langer, Ed., Houghton, Mifflin
Company, Boston, 1948, p. 367.
throughout the conquest period, the church and the
Spanish Crown began and continued t o apply the first
principle o f the Christianization model: the
conversion, by force if necessary, of all the supposed
subjects of the Catholic kings in the American
territory.11 The application o f this principle
implied the complete integration between church and
state. 12

During this period, and almost simultaneously

with the principle of total coverage o f the territory,
the Spanish Crown began applying the second principle
of the model of Christendom, the conversion o f all
groups t o Christianity, which is the same as having a

monopoly over the faith.

In this way an ideological battle ensued,
which Lewis Hanke called "the battle t o justify the
conquest. "13 This strife had two phases: the
justif!cation for the conquest of territories t o be
carried out by the Spanish Crown and the justification

l 1 Ernst Troeltsch, cited in Bruneau, The Political

Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church,
11.
P i 2 Enrique Dussel. Historia de la iglesia en America
Latina, p. 80.
Jorge Lujan Munoz, Inicio del dominio Espanol de
las Indias, p. 7.
to make war against any Indian who refused to convert
to the Catholic faith. The first phase is known by the
name "Just f ftle" and the second as "Just War. l1
The Spanish Crown, loyal to the principles of
Christianity, dedicated itself to the zealous conquest
of Central America. This process occurred
simultaneously throughout several subregions of the
Central American isthmus, considered since the
beginning as one political entity, and continued for
almost 15 years. Later on, the territory was

dismembered and consequently subdivided into various

political units.14

When Guatemala City was founded in 1524,

Spain started imediately to implerilent the second

l 4 Guatema 1 a City eventua 1 1 y became the headquarters

of one of the capitals of the Audiencia de 10s Confines
de Guatemala and Nicaragua, which was established in
1542. This audiencia encompassed all the geographic
territory included in the Central American isthmus from
Tehuantepequec to the Atrato, and the provinces of
Tabasco, Chiapas, Soconuzco, Yucatan, Cozumel,
Guatemala (and El Salvador), Honduras, Nicaragua (and
Costa Rica), Veragua, and Darien or Panama. See
Alberto Herrarte, La union de Centroamerica traqedia Y
esperanza, Editorial Jose de Pineda Ibarra, Guatemala,
1964, p. 66. For another version on the geographical
limits of the Audiencia de 10s Confines, see Agustin
Estrada, Datos para la historia de la iglesia en
Guatemala, Volume 3, Tipografia Nacional, Guatemala,
1979, pp. 719-720.
principle of the model of Christianization, which
demanded the conversion of the native Indians. The
formal aspects of the conversion process (external
rituals such as baptisms) were easily applied.15

People in great numbers were baptized in seconds, even

though the sacred and traditional values of the Indian
population are still difficult to uproot.16

Guatemala's colonization was only one step

behind the Conquest; they both occurred almost
simultaneously. Once the territory was conquered,
towns and villages were founded immediately, along with
a rudimentary civil and religious organization. From
that day on, and for practical reasons, the Guatemalan

state was created and the institutional church was

founded .
The colonial period corresponded t o the third
principle of the Christian model, initiated and

15 Jorge Lujan Munoz, Ini cio del dominio Espanol de

las Indias, p. 2.
lb Up t o the present, the Guatemalan Catholic religion
is present in external and formal affairs such as
rituals and prayers. Nevertheless, in many ways the
church continues t o be intimately close to inherited
values. For example, the Guatemalan Indian population
(in spite OF the advances o f Protestantism) is still
Catholic. A great majority has been baptized, but
their religious activities still have pagan traits.
established by the close relationship between church
and society. During this period, because all matters
were related to salvation, the church saw itself
involved in all phases of human life. From this

perspective, society took on new life within the bosom

of the church, accomplished through the sacrament o f
matrimony. Society received all kinds of instructions
from that institution.
At this time, what Bruneau called "coalition"
between church and state was initiated.17 During the
coalition period, the Guatemalan church worked in close
collaboration with the state. Having identicai goals,
the state and the church, as institutions, felt
obligated t o work vithin the same structures, producing
a complimentary and harmonious relationship.
The Guatemalan church was modest at the
beginning, but subsequently gained importance as the
pace o f colonial life became settled. With the
assistance of the Crown, the church initially developed
missionary activities. Nevertheless, the missionary
endeavor quickly disappeared, partly because the

17 Thomas Bruneau, The Pol itical Transformat ion of the

Brazilian Catholic Church, p. 5.
colonists were not as enthusiastic when they saw that
the established religious orders were dedicating their
efforts to protecking the Indians who were being
victimized and abused. The church's role was
deteriorating because, in its efforts to consolidate.
it placed more emphasis on political affairs than on
spiritual matters. As a result of the slack in
missionary activity, there arose during the colonial
period a Guatemalan Catholic Church that became more
compatible with the dominant sociai environment. Under
these circumstances. society in turn molded itself even
closer to the church.18 The multiplication of
religious houses was the best demonstration of the
assimilation between the church and colonial society.
The former was supported by the latter through cash
contributions and other resources.19

The fourth principle of the model of

Christianization was also implemented during the
colonial period. Organizations and sccistal groups
were created at the civic and religious levels. These

18 Andre Saint-Lu, Condicion colonial y conciencia

criolla en Guatemala. 1524-1821. Editorial
Universitaria, Guatemala, 1978, p. 84.
19 Ibici.
groups became the instruments that generated, expanded,
and channeled the influence of the Christian faith
throughout the country.
During the same period the church extended
its geographical boundaries of influence by creating
religious-administrative subdivisions, which enhanced
the presence of the church and gave it more
administrative flexibility along the Central American
isthmus. The administrative organization of the
Catholic Church in Central America was established
before that of the government. Consequently, in 1531
the diocese o f Leon was established; it covered the
territory o f Nicaragua and Costa Rica.20 The

Guatemalan D i o c e ~ ewas created in 1534 and, in reality,

covered what we k m w today as the state o f Chiapas in
Mexico, as well as Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Honduras. The Guatemalan Diocese was subordinate to
the Seville Diocese.21 Chiapas separated in 1534 and

Trujillo or Comayagua (Honduras) withdrew in 1538. In

20 Ralph Lee Woodward, Central America. a Nation

Divided, Oxford University Press, New York, 1976,
p. 261.
Agusti n Estrada, Datos para la hi stor ia de la
Iglesia en Guatemala, Tipografia Nacional, Vol. I,
1972, p. 44.
1547 the Guatemalan Diocese ceased to be subordinate to
Seville; from that time on. i t became dependent on

Mexico. In 1559 the Bisho~ricof Verapaz was created,

but it disappeared in 1607 as a result of bitter

conflict. (See Map No. 1.) The conversion of the

Diocese of Guatemala to an archdiocese occurred in

1743, when a new metropolitan seat was established to

include the dioceses of c'hiapas, Leon, and Comayagua as

dependents.22 (See Map No. 2.)

During all this time, the church as an

institution continued to influence every aspect of

daily 1 ife. It sanctioned a1 1 activities from

festivities to calamities, personal as well as pub!ic

affairs. All these were accompanied by religious

22 " I 1 Centenario del Arzobispado de Guatemala," Union

Tipografica, Guatemala, 1947, p. 12, no author. For
further reference. see also Ernesto Chinchilla Aguilar,
La vida moderna en Centro America, Editorial Jose de
Pineda Ibarra, Guatemala, 1977, p. 214, and Agustin
Estrada, Oatos para la historia, Vol. 11, 1974, pp. 33-
 MAP NO. 2 CAPITANIA GENERAL OE GUATEMALA
1650 t o 1753

/' Oiocsas o f
1743 I, Comayagua
\ Subordinate to,-"/

Subordinate
t o Guatemala
Source: Alberta Hsrrsrtc.
La Union do Csntroamsrica
Tragsdia Y Eeparanza,
Csntro E d i t o r i a l Jose ds Pinada
I b a r r a , 1964, p. 74. Map
spprovad by t h o Gansral
O i r a c t o r s h i p of Cartography.

Source: Albarto Harrarta,

La Union ds C s n t r ~ a m a r i c a ~
Tragsdia y Eeparanza, Guatamala,
Cantro E d i t o r i a l Jose ds Pinada I b a r r a ,
1964, p. 74. Map approved by t h o
Gsnaral O i r o c t o r s h i p of Cartography.
functions23 and, naturally, under the patronage every
church activity was authorized by the king. For this
reason, in Guatemala during the sixteenth and part of
the seventeenth centuries* all ecclesiastical sffairs
were personally attended t o by the monarch. As time
went on, these functions were gradually assumed by
municipal officials or the audiencias. embodying a
transition until the time when said functions were
assumed by officials o f the republic.
During that era the Catholic Church also grew
in physical terms, evidenced by data on the
establishment of the various religious orders that had
arrived in the country, which give us an idea
concerning the physical growtb cf the r h n m h , Far
example, in Guatemala City the Dominicans founded a
convent in 1535. In 1540, the Franciscans established

a house o f studies and a school for young people. The

23 For examp 1 e , when Guaterns !a C i t y was founded,

Santiago the Apostle was selected as patron. Guatemala
City's location had to be changed three times because
its site was endangered by Indian attacks, inundation,
and earthquakes, respectively. The first city at
!ximche was only provisional; the second was settled at
Yalle de Almolonga, and this is the one referred t o in
the text. The third was established at the Valle de
Panchoy (Antigua), and the fourth and present at the
Valle de la Ermita, where it has been situated since
the end o f the eighteenth century.
Mercedarians, in 1537, had a house o f studies and

conducted several other missions. The Santiago

Hospital had been in existence since 1553 and was

managed by the San Juan de Dios religious order, caring

for Spaniards as well as mestizos. They were also in

charge of the San Alejo Hospital for the care o f

Indians, which began operations in 1667.24 There were

also seven schools for girls where Christian doctrine

was taught in addition t o reading, writing, handiwork,

and homemaking. Likewise, there were other orders (lay

religious associations) such as the Immaculate

Conception, which was founded in 1527 and the one at La

Merced founded in 1583.25

Church membership also increased. A census

was taken in 1570 with the following results: 174,000

faithful present in Guatemala and 7,660 Indians under

Spanish control.26 The total population at that time

24 Domi ngo Juarros, Compendia de la hi stor ia de la

Ciudad de Guatemala, Edicion del Museo Guatemalteco,
Guatemala, 157, pp. 160-200. Juarros gives a detailed
description o f all the orders, convents. nunneries,
h mitages, parishes, and churches.
35 Ramon Salazar, Historia de veint iun anos.
Tipografia National, Guatemala, 1897, pp. 59-60.
26 Ernesto Chinchiolla, Blasones y heredades,
Seminario de Integracion Social de Guatemala, Editorial
Jose Pineda Ibarra, 1975, p. 360.
was estimated at approximately 400,000 inhabitants.z7

By 1778, the number o f faithful had increased t o

396,140; to 451,435 by 1821; and t o 512,120 by 1875.28

The censuses and other statistical data o f the era did

not mention the number o f religious leaders and clerics

living in Guatemala. Tomas Gage, a Dominican English

friar o f Irish origin who arrived in New Spain in 1675

and who was accused o f being an English spy because of

his writings, mentioned that in 1675 the principal

orders had "about one hundred" members each.29 In any

event, their numbers were never sufficient t o cover the
spiritual needs of all the faithful. The majority o f

them were known for their conservative ideas.

Once the pace o f life had become regular,

27 Ibid., p. 361.
28 "First Population Census of the State of Guatemala
established by Assembly decree of October 12, 1825,"
Imprenta Mayor, Casa de Porras, Guatemala, 1825,
unpublished document* library of Agustin Estrada
Monroy.
29 The identification of the number of clergymen in
Guatemala has always been difficult. On the one hand,
the orders did not want t o give out this type of
information; on the other hand, the statistics o f the
era referred t o geographic areas that were not clearly
defined. Sometimes they included the whole Kingdom of
Guatemala and at other times only certain dioceses were
included. Tomas Gage, Nueva relacion que contiene 10s
viajes de Tomas Gaqe en la Nueva Espana, Sociedad de
Geografia e Historia, Guatemala, 1946, Vol. 7, p. 181.
colonial life continued in the midst of a few
confrontations between the clergy and the civilian
authorities. These came as a result of poor relations
between creoles and peninsulares.30 During the
c~!cn!=! =r=, s v x thessh the e h ~ r t hwas tstally
dependent on its relationship to the state, relations
between church and state remained harmonious. This was

possible because both institutions had the same

objectives and the same structures. The confrontations
that occurred between church and state were true
conflicts between civilian authorities and orders or
individual clerics. Nevertheless, they did not affect
overall church and state relations.
Relations among clergymen generally had their
origin in conflict because, as was pointed out before,
the relations between creoles and peninsulares had
deteriorated.31 Apart from these confrontations, the

coalition between church and state throughout the

colonial period was excellent. especially in the field

30 For an example of this type of confrontat ion, see

Andre Saint-Lu, Condicion colonial Y conciencia criolla
en Guatemala, 1524-1821, p. 112, note.
For an example of this type of conflict, see Andre
Saint-Lu, Condicion colonial y conciencia criolla,
p. 112.
of education. We must state that the education of the
Indians was not left unattended. Religious instruction
was given since the beginning through the systematic
teaching of the catechism. For example, the bishops

who met at the First Provincial Council held in Mexico

in 1555 decreed 93 statutes concerning the teaching of
the Christian doctrine to Indians.32 The clergy was
in charge of education during the colonial period and
even after independence. When the religious orders
were expelled from the country, these foundations were
carried on by the secular clergy until 1871.
It is worth mentioning here that there are
certain features that escape Bruneau's categorization
of cclonial life. One of these is *he tribunal of the
Inquisition, a royal court run by the church. I n this

particular case, in spite of the fact that both state

and church had different goals, the structure with
which t o achieve the goals was the same: the tribunals
of the Inquisition, which were in charge of judging

crimes committed against the church as well as crimes

committed against the state. T h r e - fore, pol itical

32 Juan Gavarrete, Anal es para la hi storia de

Guatemala, 1 4 9 7 - 1 8 2 , Editorial Jose de Pineda Ibarra,
Guatemslz, 19809 pp. 20 and 21.
treason and religious transgressions became one crime.
During the time of rebellion prior t o
independence, the censorship o f books was directed by
that tribunal. It initiated processes accusing the
leaders of the movement for independence of treason.
Generally, the Inquisition in Guatemala behaved, more
than anything else, as a political tribunal and did not
become as important as it was in other countries.33

Consequently, during the period from the

discovery of Guatemala t o its independence, the
Catholic Church achieved total implementation of the
Christianization model. The first and second
principles of the model (total territorial coverage and
total conversion o f all groups t o the Faith) occurred
during the time from discovery t o conquest. During the
colonial period, the other two features o f the model

were implemented. This procedure produced a society

that became compatible with the principles and values
o f the church. Society, in turn, nourished the church.
New mechanisms and structures were created in this
manner, allowing the church to exert decisive influence

33 Jose Mata Gavidia, Anotaciones para la historia

patria Centroamericana, Editorial Universitaria,
Guatemala, 1969, p. 177.
on the way of life of the Guatemalan inhabitants of the
era, even though this institution was a dependent of
the state.
At the end of the establishment of the model,
we see a church dependent on the state; however, this
church was influential and rich. The church lent money
and owned considerable property consisting o f
haciendas, farms, sugar mills, grain mills, and even
mines. In addition, it owned urban property such as
houses, convents, churches, and in some cases entire
towns.
The church's alliance with the state or
colonial government allowed it t o acquire considerable

political influence, which contributed t o the

deterioration of its spiritual influence. In this
manner, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the
Catholic Church was at the summit of its power. It was
influential, complztely entrenched, and firmly planted
in the country. However, the influences of the
Enlightenment and the French Revolution began t o be
felt, eventically causing the fall of colonialism that
was brought on, i n great measure, by some clerics who
supported the independent movement without suspecting
that independence would signal the collapse of the
church and the loss of its wealth, power, and
influence.

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE GUATEMALAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

The model of Christianization that had been
inherited from Spain began t o collapse in Europe during
the second half of the eighteenth century, when the
renovating currents of thak century were published.
The possibilities for change in Guatemala arose at the

beginriing of the nineteenth century, resulting from

that society's contacts with ideas* technology, and the
tools used by more advanced groups. Thus, for example,
the Enlightenment with its antidogmatic position
weakened the faith and modern man distanced himself
from the church.
During the pre-independence period, the
Guatemalan church and the state continued their
coalition relationship. a s had been characteristic of
both institutions. Even though the Enlightenment was
gaining ground, the church as well as the state
continued to share common structures and objectives.
At this point, when the influence of the church as an
institution began to diminish in Guatemala as it had in
the rest of the Americas.34 the clergy reduced its

spiritual activities and pursued political activities

with renewed energy.
Another factor that contributed to
diminishing the position of the Guatemalan church was
the war against Napoleon in Spain, because of which

several provinces throughout the Kingdom of Guatemala

had no bishop. This undermined, at the same time, the
disintegration process of the Christian model. The
Catholic Church was unable t o maintain the principle of
total coverage of the territory.35

Nevertheless, not all clerics favored

independence. The Guatemalan Bishop Fray Ramon Casaus
y Torres was always oppos=d to the rebel movement, and

ordered the clergy to influence the faithful against

34 Renato Poblete. S.J.* in "The Church in Latin

America: A Historical Survey," in The Church and Social
Chanqe in Latin America, Henry A. Landsberger, ed.,
University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1970, p. 43.
wrote that the expulsion of the Jesuits marked the
initial stage of the collapse of the church in Latin
.
Amer i ca
35 Poblete wrote that the need to fi 1 1 these vacancies
was one of the basic problems that contributed to the
antagonistic feelings between the traditional church
directed by bishops of the old school and the new
republics. Ibid., p. 44.
any ideas concerning independence.36 However, his
motives were more political than religious and his
principal interest remained the defense of the status
quo a s well as the prestige and influence of the

church. 37

The process for Guatemalan independence

continued from 1821 t o 1824. during which period three
different stages were perceived.38 In the first stage
(18211, both the liberal and conservative parties
agreed and declared themselves independent from Spain,
as stated in the Declaration of September 1821.
Nevertheless, these parties were not in agreement
concerning annexation to Mexico. In the first stage,
then, the church maintained its influence and continued
allied with the state.
The second stage corresponded to the question
o f the annexation of the Central American provinces to

- - - --

36 Ramon Salazar, Historia de veintiun anos, p. 157.

37 The same phenomena occurred in other Latin American
countries. Brian Smith, The Church and Politics in
Chile, p. 67.
3 8 o r a social interpretat ion of the independent
process. see Jorge Lujan Munoz, La independencia y la
anexion de Centro America a Mexico, Guatemala,
Serviprensa Centroamericana, 1977, pp. 61-79. The text
of the Declaration of Independence of 1821 may be read
in this source.
Mexico. The conservatives and Archbishop Casaus y

Torres supported annexation to the Mexican Empire.

They felt that through annexation, as was pointed out
before, they could prevail in maintaining the status
quo. The Mexican Empire lasted a very short time, only
ten months. It was ephemeral in spite of Emperor
Iturbide's petitions for God's aid through masses, te
deums, and conservative support.39 After the Empire
was dissolved in Central America, a provisional council
guaranteed to keep the old official appointees in their
positions within the civil, military, and
ecclesiastical government.40 Thus, the era of

coalition between church and state was prolonged.

During the third stage, an assembly
representing all the provinces convened on July 1 ,
1823, and declared total independence from Spain,

Mexico, or any other country. The installation of this

assembly marked. in practice, the end of the coalition
period between church and state. At this time, the
liberals were insisting that the church must be kept

39 Victor Miguel Diaz, Guatemala inde~endiente:

Recopilacion de documentos historicos, Tipografia
Nacional. Guatemala, 1932, p. 258.
40 Vicente Filisola, La independencia de Guatemala,
Imprenta Valdes, Mexico, 1823. p. 3.
out o f the public and private activities of Guatemalan
society. In response t o this view, a differentiation
in goals arose that eventually led t o the structural
differentiation between church and state.
Consequently, from that point on, the
propagation o f the faith was no longer a common goal.
The structures of the state and the church began to
change. Some common objectives persisted, such as the

consolidation of power and the restructuring o f the

government; however, these were achieved through
different means. At this point, the category called
cooperationT mentioned by Bruneau, begins to appear.
In 1823, the assembly decided t o establish

the United Provinces of Central America. Meanwhile, a

constitution was being prepared and when it became
approved by decree. it converted the United Provinces
o f Central America into the Federal Republic o f Central
America, ending the third stage. The Central ArnerIcan
provinces, as well as the Federal Republic o f Central
America, expressed their desire t o continue formal
relations with the Holy See.41

4 1 The government of the Federal Republ ic of Central

America was formed with a president and a vice-
president as the executive power. A federal assembly
 The decision whereby a federal republic was
established was made in order to avoid old regional
hostilities, but this solution proved to be too
idealistic. Conflicts of interest and objectives,
regional rivalries, jealousy, and contentions among
individuals, in addition to financial and economic
difficulties, caused the Federal Republic to fail.42

State domination over the church persisted

from the beginnings of the Federal Republic. As proof
of the cooperation between both institutions it was
decreed, for example, that all authorities, civilian
and military, of religious corporations should swear an
oath of allegiance. Later another decree was issued
that prescribed the type of oath to which the clergy
had t o conform. Wherl the oaths were carried out, the
archbishop certified them, Copies of these

and a senate formed the legislative power. The

government of each state was composed of a chief of
state and a vice-chief as executive, an assembly and a
state senate as legislative power.
42 The diversity of regional interests did not permit
the Federal Republic to function properly. It had been
involved in a state of war since its creation, and was
dissolved in 1838. Attempts in 1840, 1884, and 1921 to
unite the federation failed. Nevertheless, it is
interesting t o note that from the beginning, the
authorities who lived in Guatemala City (including the
archbishop) collaborat~don the formation of the new
republ ic.
certifications were then sent to the Secretary General
of the State of Guate~ala.43 Not all clerics wanted
t o give the oath of allegiance. It became necessary to
fnstitute measures that would obligate them to take the
oath, among which was the threat of expulsion or actual
expulsion.44

The history of the Federal Republic of

Central America and that of the State of Guatemala is
very confused.45 From 1 8 2 A t o 1828 there was constant
conflict between liberals and conservatives; there were
frequent changes in the executive power, elected public
servants changed their loyalty often, and federal
authorities intervened in state matters. The situation
was so entangled that it is difficult to define clearly
the years when liberals or conservatives ruled.
Likewise* it is hard to know when the church was
gaining or losing ground. This conflict became an

obstacle to the cooperation that had been established

43 Archivo General de Centro America (AGCA). 24919.

44 Mary P. Holleran, Church and State in Guatemala,
DD. 77-78.
' 4 5 For more information concerning this historical
period, refer to a reliable source such as Alberto
Herrarte, La union de Centroamerica: Tragedia o
esperanza, Editorial Jose de Pineda Ibarra, Guatemala,
1964.
between church and state. Subsequently, we see a
rupture between church and state concerning goals,
especially those related t o religion, education, and
the family. On the other hand, the church was now

pushed aside as an element of influence. Finally, at

the structural level, the differences between both
institutions continued t o broaden.
At this point, we should mention that the
change from cooperation t o conflict did not occur
suddenly. Gradually relations between church and state
became less cordial, beginning in 1824 when the
liberals took power and tried t o end conservative
domination and church support. To achieve control over
the latter, the liberals limited the church's funding
and curtailed its control over education. Liberals
also tried t o terminate the church's ability t o control
society by means of the confessional.
Subsequently, in 1826 when President Manuel
Jose Arce came t o power, all parish subsidies were
suppressed. Some clerical privileges were likewise
abolished. During this period, the part of the tithe
that the church received wss reduced by half. Persons
under 25 years of age were forbidden t o enter the
priesthood. The conservatives also tried to prejudice
the poor people against the liberals, whom they called
heretics and enemies of the church. The liberals
ridiculed the friars and described them as "termites"
who were undermining the social order.46

Civil war ensued in 1826 when the president

of the Federation, a former federalist, joined the
conservative side, provaking a liberal reaction. For
as long as the civil war lasted, until 1829, the
population was manipulated by both parties. Yet it is
possible that because the faith and the custom of
obedience to religious suthority had penetrated so
deeply into society, the conservatives were better
equipped to control the multitudes.
Nevertheless, the civil war was won in 1829
by liberal troops. Since the church had been so openly

on the side of the conservatives, the liberals

proceeded to banish the clerics and to suppress
monasteries and convents. It is worth noting here that
this measure did not affect the secular clergy because

46 A1 ejandro Marure, Bosquejo hi stori co de las

revolucfones de Centro America de 1811 e 1834,
Biblioteca de Cultura Popular, Ministerio de Educacion
Publica, Vol. 36, Guatemala, 1960, p. 273.
the liberals considered "the ritual and the nourishing
of souls" worth conserving. Neither did it affect the
local Bethlemite religious order.47
The properties owned by the religious orders
were also confiscated "to avoid the enemy's greed" and
to benefit the national treasury, which needed the
income to pay for war expenditures. The government
also embarked on a vendetta against Archbishop Casaus y
Torres, who was banished from the country in 1830 and
settled in Havana.48

Even though the government had problems with

the religious, it did not persecute religion itself.
Instead, it continued to avail itseif of some religious

ceremonials such as the tolling of bells, the

celebration of masses, and the singing of the te deum
to celebrate official events and legitimize government
officials.49 In 1830, a mission was appointed by

47 Agustin Estrada, Decreto del 30 de septiembre de

1829, Vol. 1 1 , pp. 529-536.
his was to be the first expulsion of a Guatemalan
archbishop, but it was not the last. During 100 years,
four archbishops were banished. The see remained vacant
or obstructed during various decades: Fray Ramon
Casaus y Torres, 1830; Bernardo Pinol y Aycinena, 1871;
Ricardo Casanova y Estrada, ' 1887; Havier Munoz y
Capuron, 1922.
49 Lorenzo Montufar y Ri Vera, Resena hi stori ca de
Centro America, Tipografia de El Progreso, Guatemala,
.congress to travel to Rome to assure the Pope that the
state of Guatemala would &main close t o the leader of
the church. The mission was also t o petition the
appointment of a new archbishop.50 The petition did
not succeed, and the leadership of the church in
Guatemala continued under Dr. Diego Jose Batres until

he died in 1838.51 Upon his death, the Cathedral

Chapter elected Dr. Antonio Larrazabal as capitular
vicar and Casaus continued as archbishop of an insecure
see. 52

The liberal victory c F 1825 saw the

beginnings of a deterioration process in the political
and religious influence of the Catholic Church in
Guatemala. Conflicts and tension between church and
state became exacerbated. During the decade o f the
liberal government (1829-1839) the Catholic Church's
loss of influence became evident. During this period,

50 David vela., Barrunia ante el espejo de su tiempo,

Editorial Universitaria, Guatemala, 1956, Vol. I.,
196.
'51 Father Diego Jose B a k e s was elected vicar by the
Cathedral Chapter in the asence of Casaus y Torres.
52 The Cathedral Chapter was the office in charge of
church administration. Its chief was the archbishop,
and in his absence, a vicar was elected. An insecure
see was identified as a situation where the archbishop
was hindered from carrying out his duties.
the government, acting through the assembly's decrees
or those promulgated by the executive or by both
bodies, regulated the administration of the tithe and
property owned by the religious orders. The Cathedral
Chapter publicly protested, but had t o give in in the
majority of cases. A decree o f 1831 stipulated that
all parish appointments as well as ecclesiastical
employees had t o be previously approved by the
government because it preferred trustworthy persons.
The papal bulls also required the governmental seal o f
approval.53

During the time when Mariano Galvez, a

liberal, became chief .of state (1831-18381 the most
radical reforms were carried out with the intention of
totally modernizing the country, an attempt that
eventually failed. Mariano Galvez tried t o eliminate
the church's power by exercising absolute control over
the institution, declaring Catholicism as the offic ial

religion, while at the same time permitting freedom of

worship. In addition, the government assumed the r i ght

o f patronage and suppressed the tithe.

53 Mary P. Hol leran. Church and State in Guatemala,

p. 119.
 During this period, the conflict between
church and state continued, but this time it seemed
keener than during the era from 1826 to 1829. During
the decade 1829 to 1838, the role and functions of the

church were substantially reduced. On the other hand,

there was already a great difference present in the

levels of objectives and structure. One of Galvez's
reforms that affected religion was the introduction of
..
civil matrimony and the establishment of divorce. He

also promoted reforms in the educational system,

transferring education to state control. Cemeteries
were secularized and processions were forbidden.
Similar measures were followed by other Latin
American liberal governments during the same period.
In 1833 Mexico suppressed convents and confiscated
property. In Peru the tithe was abolished and
novitiates were closed; in 1826 the convents were
piundered. In Argentina. the same occurred in 1822.
In Chile secularization was initiated in 1823. Bolivia

experienced religious reform in 1825. By 1829 there

were no bishops left in Mexico.54 During the same

54 Enrique Dussel, Historia de la gilesia en la

America Latina, pp. 155-161.
period the number of priests declined in all countries

and the teaching of the faith remained neglected.

However, the Galvez government was unable to
keep itself in power; it was confronted by a popular
reaction caused by these reforms. The reforms and
other tax increases provoked a peasant uprising that
the conservatives supported, and the Galvez government
fell in 1838.
When Galvez fell, the conservative party came
to power again. The situation concerning the church
began to reverse as the model of Christianization was
again implanted. This effort was only partially
achieved because the church now was not as strong as
before; the numbers of clerics had been drastically
reduced. This fact hindered the development of a model
that would cover the whole territory and assimilate all

groups. Otherwise, the era of conflict between church

and state ended. The cooperative category was adopted
again and continued for as long as the conservatives
were in power in Guatemala (1839-1871).
It is difficult to establish. during the
course of this period, the difference between the
categories of cooperation and coalition as created by
Bruneau. Nevertheless, we can confirm that up to the
consolidation of conservative power in 1844 there
existed a relationship based on cooperation between
church and state because the structures that supported
these institutions implemented their objectives, which
were not identical. However, after 1844 these
structures returned t o the same form they had been in
before 1826, making us able to place this era, until
1871, within Bruneau's category of coalition.
When the conservatives came to power, they
constituted an assembly whose membership included many
clerics. Consequently, the majority of decrees related
to the church that had been promulgated during Galvez's
time were eliminated.55 Church.properties were also
returned, though not all of them because third parties

55 For example, decree 1830 was repealed. This decree

had condemned Archbishop Casaus as a traitor. Now his
rights as archbishop were returned t o him. Neverthe-
less, the archbishop did not accept the petitions that
wanted him to return, and he died in Havana in
November 1845. Civil matrimony was also suspended;
divorce was prohibited. The decree suppressing the
religious orders was revoked and the temples were
returned to the religious. The Jesuits returned until
1843, The church received the tithe again and the
ecclesiastical courts were reinstated, All holidays
and religious feasts that had been forbidden were again
held, and proces3ions were authorized. Montufar and
Rivera, Resena historica de Centro America, Vol. 1 1 1 ,
1879, pp. 369-385.
had bought some and these could not be returned. For
this reason, church property as well as income was much

less than before.56

The ecclesiastical population also diminished

considerably. In 1805, there had been 276 secular

priests and 177 religious priests in 23 parishes (the

total number of parishes was 129). After expulsion in

1529, 112 priests died, 12 were ordained, and 7 arrived
from abroad, making a total of 183. 57 Furthermore, in

1842 the diocese o f San Salvador (See Map No. 3 )

separated from Guatemala. This fact makes it difficult

to ascertain the exact number of priests living in

Guatemala. These numbers, as Holleran observed in

1946, never seemed to coincide.

In 1844 when Rafael Carrera came t o power, he

was able to achieve a closer relationship and coalition

between church and state. This was due on the one hand

to Carrera's political ability and, on the other hand,

t o the weakness of the church leaders of the time.

56 Mary P. Hol leran, Church and State in Guatemala,

128.
P37 Anton io Larrazaba 1 , Bosque jo estad i st i co de l
arzobispado de Goatemala y obispados sufraqareos, 1844,
in Anales de la sociedad de geoqrafia e historia de
Guatemala, Guatemala, Vol. 28, Nos. 1-4, March to
December, 1953, pp. 119-121.
MAP NO. 3

Archdiocese

Guatemala

Archdiocese of Guatemala
23 priests, 54 parishes
Established a s a parish
in 15i3

Source: Prepared by t h e author, based on a bull issued

by Pope Gregory XVI on September 28, 1842. In Estrada,
Oatos para la Historia de la Iglesia en Guatemala,
Vol. 1 1 , pp. 562-571.
 On March 21, 1847, Guatemala separated from
the federation and proclaimed itself a republic. This
step caused the division of Central America into
several states, which had a direct influence on the

loss o f cohesiveness in the medieval Christianization

model inherited from Spain. When the federation was
dissolved, the bishops who formerly belonged t o one
nation were left alone. They all had t o make

individual decisions concerning solutions to the

religious problems of their countries.
After 1851, Guatemala prepared a new
constitution in which the church assumed a privileged
position.58 This constitution prepared the way for a
future concordat with the Holy See (Article 7 ) ; in
addition, it established that the archbishop and
bishops could vote and participate in the state council
(Article 10). and that the archbishop would be among
those who would alect the president (Article 5). It
also stated that the president would be sworn in by the

archbishop and that the former would swear to uphold

the maintenance of a pure and unadulterated Catholic

58 Kar 1 Schmitt, The. Roman Cathol i c Church in Modern

Latin America, Alfred Knopf, New York, 1972, pp. 13-
16.
religion (Article 16). Finally, it stated that all

clergymen would be considered public employees, since

they also had to swear an oath to the constitution

(Article 17).59
This constitution was the first to proclaim

Guatemala as a republic and independent state. The

previous one, from 1825, proclaimed Guatemala as a

state within the federal republic. The advantages that

the new constitution gave the church with relation to

the previous state and federal constitutions during the

years 1824, 1825, 1835, and 1838 can be compared, as

shown in Table 1.1.

Later on, on October 7, 1852, the concordat

between the State of Guatemala and the Vatican was

signed.60 It contained 29 points that covered topics

such as relationships, education, finances, and the

59 *lConstitutional Record of the Republic of

Guatemala," October 19, 1851, in Disesto
Constitutional, Revista del Colegio de Abogados de
Guatemala, Nos. 4-7, Talleres de Serviprensa
Centroamericana, Guatemala, 1978, pp. 154-160.
In Agustin Estrada, Datos para la historia d e la
iqlesia en Guatemala, Vol. 1 1 , p. 734. The importance
of a concordat rests in its definition of the role that
the nation will play in relation to the Vatican.
Besides, it defines relationships, forecasts
legislation and actions, and is a document where legal
details concerning church and patronage are stated.
 TABLE NO. 1.1

FEDERAL TO 1824 STATE TO 1825 1835 REFORM CONSTITUTIONAL LAW NATIONAL TO

OF 1838 (DECREE)

Preamb 1 e Does not Does not Does not invoke Invokes God
invokes God invoke God invoke God God

Official Cathol ic re1 i- Freedom of The executive will The Catholic

Catholic reli- gion. state worship accor- protect Catholic re2 igion w i 1 l be
gion; excludes religion; ex- ding t o religious worship, maintained pure
others from pub- cludes others conscience and which is that of and unadul-
lic practice from public in accordance the state. its terated.
pract i ce with the law dependencies, and
its ministries.

A deputy or A member of A deputy may Authorization fol. The membership

senator may be the council be lay or the promulgation will be
a layman or a must be a religious. of bulls is re- protected.
secular c 1 ergy- 1 ayman. quired. Appointments
man. o f parish priests
will be controlled.
Compl iance with
their obligations
will be supervised.

The president A chief or The president The archbishop

must be a assistant chief or vice- will be among
layman. must be a president must those who shall
layman. be a layman. choose the presi-
dent.

A member of the A member o f the Bishops and pres-

supreme court must supreme court idents of the
be a layman. must be a Iay- Cathedral Chapter
man. wil I become
advisors of the
state.
spreading of the faith. This document also established
the Catholic religion as the only religion o f the
country, which permitted the church t o receive anew the
necessary funds t o sustain itself and t o try again t o
extend its power over the territory. The concordat
specified that the government would collect the tithe
and would deliver it t o the church. Should this not be
sufficient, the government would pay the difference.
The church continued directing education and was able
t o keep or establish new contents. It became easier t o

continue with missionary work.

Consequently, it appeared as if the church
had received many benefits. However, we must consider
that the interpretation of the concordat was dependent
upon those who exercised civil authority in t h e
country. Consequently, for as long as the government
retained the right of patronage, the church was not
free.
The period o f coalition between church and
state during the brief tenure of the conservatives and
the restoration of the church culminated with the
triumph o f the liberal revolution in 1871. This event
opened a new conflict with the church as a result of
the new laws. That same year, Archbishop Bernardo
Pinol y Aycinena was banished. The church acquired
legal autonomy at this time, but received no assistance
whatsoever. Therefore, as the state began t o pursue
different goals, it also began to eliminate the
structures of the church.
From the perspective of church-state

relations, the liberal revolution of 1871 signified the

consolidation of the secularization process within the
framework of the Guatemalan political system. This
process must be understood as a direct consequence of

the breakdown in the traditional political-religious

system of Guatemala. At the same time, this breakdown
meant, in ideological and structural terms, the advent
of a new national stage of development closely tied to
an incipient modernization process.
Previously the surv;val of the colonial
system had been clearly associated with the existing
religious organization and its capacity to explain and
satisfactorily legitimize the actions of the regime and
the structures of its power. Nevertheless, from 1871

on, due to a series of external and internal factors,

i-e., the Enlightenment, Napoleon's invasion of Spain,
the liberal-conservative conflict, among others, it
became cvident that the Catholic religion was incapable
of continuing t o play a legitimating role within the
power structure of the era as efficiently as it had

done before. In this way the secularization of the

Guatemalan political system resulted in an autonomous
religious system that had no previous experience in
self government. This lack of experience caused the
Guatemalan religious system, with its weak and
deficient structure, to be obligated to confront the
challenges of change and modernization. Yet, it had no
conceptual, human. or economic resources with which to
meet this challenge.
It is necessary to explain that the
divisiveness between church and state brought on by the
secularization process did not mean that the political
and religious systems ceased to continue to interact.
This was the reason the Guatemalan Catholic Church.
because it kept a semblance of its former organization,

was able to adjust and adapt itself to the

modernization process without perishing. By the decade
of the 1940s, it emerged with renewed vigor.
The rupture between church and state caused
by liberal revolutions occurred almost as a
simultaneous process throughout Latin America. It was
conducive t o the permanent disintegration of the
Christienization model throughout the continent.61

It is worthwhile to note that in an effort t o

eradicate religious influence and religious values, the
government of Hariano Galvez (in power during the
1830s) suppressed clerical privileges and declared
freedom of worship in 1873. This anticlerical policy
continued during the following years. The laws were as
diverse as those forbidding the use of clerical garb in
public and those expelling the nuns who had rermined
together at the convent of Santa Clara.62

The liberals felt very strongly concerning

the curtailment of the Catholic Church's supremacy. So
'strong was their desire that Barrios misjudged its

61 The first church and state rupture took place in

Colombia in 1853; in Mexico it occurred in 1859. In
Central Americao the conservatives fell in El Salvador
at the beginning of 1871, and the same occurred in
Guatemala by the middle o f that year. Twenty years
later, it occurred in Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa
Rica. John L. Mecham, Church and State in Latin
America, p. 418.
bL Decrees 118 and 119, promulgated under Justo Rufino
Barrios, in Agustin Estrada, Datos para la historia de
la iqlesia en Guatemala. Vol. 3, 1979, pp. 166. 168-
169.
quasi-legal annu lment and the economic strangulation
its eradication implied. He proceeded to invite the
Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian church in
New York to establish a mission in Guatemala in order
to present the Catholic Church with a rival. In 1882.
the first Protestant missionary, John C. Hill, arrived
in Guatemala. In 1887, Edward M. Haymaker arrived.
Haymaker was a pastor who settled in Guatemala and
lived there for more than 60 years. He was responsible
for the establishment and dissemination of Protestant-
ism in Guatemala.63

63 Around 1900 other religious Protestant groups

arrived in Guatemala. Among them were the Friends
(Quakers), the Primitive Methodist church, the Nazarene
church, and the Central American Mission. These
churches considered themselves the possessors of
historical, traditional, fundamentalist, and orthodox
doctrines.
These groups grew and multiplied with the
arrival of new groups. Today more than 200 Protestant
denominations work in the country, which shows the
degree of expansion and inFluence that Protestantism
has had in the country. By 1978 the country had a
Protestant university, the Mariano Galvez University,
two seminaries, four broadcasting stations, numerous
radio and television programs, printed publications,
and several bookstores. Nevertheless, it was not until
after 1980 that Protestantism experienced a surprising
rate of growth in the country. In December 1981, the
Protestant population was estimated at 1,337,812
members, 18.4 percent of the total population. It is
not unreasonable to state that since that time the
number of Protestants has continued to grow in the same
proportion or perhaps even greater. The influence of
 The 1 iberal party cons idered education the
cornerstone for the construction of a world guided by
order and peace.64 Consequently, its leaders believed

this field needed special attention. So after

nationalizing the religious schools in 1875, they
proceeded to organize a uniform, lay obligatory and

Protestantism on government had no? been nzticed in

Guatemala until a Protestant became president. In
March 1983, the government of Lucas Garcia was
overthrown by a military coup d'etat, after which
General Efrain Rios Montt, a born-again Christian,
assumed power because "God so ordained."
Rios Montt governed for sixteen months.
During his term there was religious manipulation,
Protestant sermons on television, and moralizing
discourses directed at various groups. Furthermore,
the presidential advisory board was composed of General
Montt's church members, a fact that originated tension
and discomfort among Catholics as well as within the
national Cathol'c church.
Thus, the possibility occurred that religion
could become one more factor in the social
disintegration of a country already divided by
economic, racial, and political problems. It became
apparent that this possibility could become a reality
where Catholics would be confronting Protestants, if
the latter group were ever to place a fanatical
president allied with the Protestant cause in the
position of head of state. See Dfrectorio de iqlesias,
orqanizaiones y ministerios del movimiento protestante:
Guatema>. Servicio Evangelizador para America Latina,
Guatemala e Institute International de Evangelizacion a
Fondo, Costa Rlca, 1981; and Joseph Anfuso and David
Sczepanski, Efrain Rios Montt: Siervo o dictador? La
verdadera historia del controversial presidente de
Guatemala, Gospel Outreach, Guatemala, 1984.
b4 Hubert J. Miller, La iglesia catolica y el estado
en guatemala, translated by Jcrge Lujan Munoz,
Editorial Universitarfa, Guatemala. 1976, p. 339.
 gratuitous system that had no municipal differences.65

Sunday schools were opened for workers. Schools of

arts and sciences, a military school, a normal school,

and a kindergarten were also established; the

University of San Carlos de Borromeo was declared a

national university. The achievements of the liberals

in ths educational field were so impressive that even

their enemies admired their accomplishments.66

Continuing the model established by the

liberals of 1830, cemeteries became nationalized; the
municipalities were now in charge of them.67

Furthermore, civil matrimony became, in effect, a civil

contract; matrimonial annulment and divorce became

regulated. The conservatives opposed all this, arguing

that these measures curtailed civil liberties. The

liberals defended them for the same reason, and the

1 atter won. 6 8

By comparison, the differences between this

Decree 13 1, January 2, 1875. See Hubert J. Mi 1 l'er,

La iglesia Catolica y el estado en Guatemala, 1871-
1885, pp. 355-356.
X ~ u b e r tJ. Miller, La ialesia catolica y el estado
en Guatemala, p. 421.
b ' Decree of November 10, 1871, in Mary P. Holleran,
Church and State in Guatemala, p. 166.
s o / ante la posteridad,
Tipografia Nacional, 1935, pp. 374-375.
era and the time of Galvez were great. in 40 years,
the country had developed enough so that the measures
promoted by the liberal reform did not cause
upheaval. I wish to point out here t h a t the church"^

power was not as strong as it had been before when it

was rich in human and economic resources. Besides, the
Barrios movement carried more weight and had more
authority than did Galvez.
On the legal plane, the drafting of a new
constitution had been contemplated since 1876. But not
until 1878, when the regime was firmly established and
had little opposition, was a constituent assembly
sumoned. Previously, in a speech delivered at the
opening oP the sessions in March 1879, with the intent
of calming some unrestful spirits, Parrios said that
relations between church and stace had net been
altered.69 Nevertheless, the legislation would show
quite the contrary.
The sessions began and the oaths were sworn,

but there was no reference to God as in the sessions of

1835. The new constitution did not mention the church.
The fundamental law guaranteed religious practice as
long as it stayed within the temples (Article 24); it
ratified the suppression of monastic life (Article 25)
and vaguely mentioned the old religious institutions.
,,
A-.L 2 -* -- 49. 65, and 72 of the constitut!cn estab!fshed

that the deputies, the president, and the secretary of

state should be laymen, thus excluding the clerics.
Finally, concerning property, Article 21 prohibited the
entailment and institution in favor of mortmain,
denying the church the right t o become a p r ~ p r i e t o r - ~ o

In this way, the 1879 constitution completed the

destruction of the church's power by denying its right
to purchase property and by denying its members the
privilege of playing a political role. Even though the
1852 concordat was nominally in effect, the new laws
practically abolished it.
However, while Barrios was restricting the

power and influence of the church through the

constitution, he personally sought to maintain good
relations with the Vatican. A product of this quest
was the concordat of July 29 1884, through which the
Guatemalan church obtained freedom to carry on local

70 Ley Constitutiva de la Republ ica de Guatemala,

December 1 1 , 1879, Digesto constitutional, pp. 167-
178.
activities and to communfcate with the Vatican, a state
subsidy for the seminery, liberty for the Holy See to
appoint prelates in consultation with the government,
and eoizpensation C e r s ~ i er F thiz exprrpi:~t& r e ; fgfogs

properties.
Nevertheless, in spite of the concordat, the
state continued to exercise control over all the
important church activities i n accordance with the
newly established law. At the same time, the state
retained the ecclesiastical properties that had been
confiscated and the church acknowledged the new
proprietors of this wealth. However, the concordat was
never ratified.71
-,
~ n i stype of relationship between church and
state, where legislation restricted the radius of
influence of the church and where the government
comunicated with the representatives of the church and
awarded it several concessions, would appear to be an
end to the state of conflict within church and state
relations. However, since the legislation did not

The 24th session of the Legislative Assembly

approved postponement of the agreement held with the
Apostolic Holy See. See Agustin Estrada, Datos para la
historia de la iglesia, Vol. 1 1 1 , pp. 226-227.
change, the situation of conflict remained in effect
and continued throughout the whole liberal era, which
survived until 1931, with the exception of a few
instances of poor but tolerable relations between
ecclesiastical and government authorities.
In conclusfon, for comparative purposes we
can say that the religious reform of 1830 was a
failure. However, the reform of 1871 was a complete
success due to the fact that the situation was
different. For example, the ideology of the

Enlightenment had become known through the flow of

publications. As ideology spread and received support,
it created an anticlerical atmosphere among political
and intellectual circles that had traditionally

promoted change. which was the case in Guatemala.

Barrios died in battle in 1885 as he was
fighting for the Central American union. His
successors continued the liberal program. President

Manuel Lisandro Barillas, who succeeded Barrios,

insisted on appointing parish priests. He adopted a
harder line and issued two decrees forbidding foreign
clergy to enter the country. These decrees also
required that priests who had committed a transgression
appear before the civilian courts or be expelled.72

Friction became sharper as a decree that exempted

clerics from military service was abolished. A war of
words was declared between church and state; pamphlets
circulated reflecting the views of the contending
sides. Archbishop Ricardo Casanova y Estrada, the
leader of the conservatives, was accused in 1887 of

disobeying the order requiring pastoral letters and

apostolic briefs to be submitted to the censor. The
assembly decreed his expulsion, stating that his return
would not be permitted.73

President Manuel Estrada Cabrera, who

succeeded Jose Maria Reyna Barrios in 1898, was not
satisfied with the state of relations between church
and state. Reyna Barrios had come to power following
Lisandro Barillas. When Archbishop Casanova died,
Estrada Cabrera decided to take charge of the
appointment of a new archbishop, and sent a delegate to
Rome to nes~tiatethe appointment of Fray Julian
Riveiro. When the Holy See acceded to the appointment,

-- -

'2 Decrees 365 to 395, Manuel L isandro Barr i I 1 as, in

Agustin Estrada, Oatos para la historia de la iqlesia,
Vol. 1 1 1 , pp. 233 and 247.
73 Decree 339, ibid., pp. 250-251.
Estrada Cabrera was congratulated by his friends, who
told him, "Now you are President as well as

~rchbishop."~4
The new archbishop was like clay in the hands

of Estrada Cabrera. Relations between church and state

did not suffer for many years. On the contrary, the
government awarded traveling allowances to the church
and made it easier for the church t o file matrimonial
papers. The government permitted processions in the
streets as long as they passed in front of the
presidential house. When they arrived there, they were
under obligation t o turn the images so they would face

the presidential balcony, as a sign of attention and

respect.75 The Estrada Cabrera gbvernrnent was further
evidence o f a situation in which an inherited conflict
existed because the legislation restricted the church,
even though its relations with the authorities were
good.
After the earthquakes o f 1917 and 1918,

discontent with Estrada Cabrera's dictatorship

flourished. When people became inspired by the

74 Agust in Estrada, Datos para la hi stor ia de la

i~iesia,Vol. 1 1 1 , pp. 309-310.
Ibid., P. 381.
political sermons of Bishop Jose Pinol y Batres and
the government sent him into exile.76 A few months
later, Estrada Cabrera was deposed and replaced by
Carlos Herrera. At this time, Archbishop Fray Julian
Raymundo Riveiro, who had removed Pinol, was called to
Rome, where he explained the situation and then
resigned. When Monsignor Riveiro left, the Vicar
General of the Archdiocese of Guatemala, Rafael
Alvarez, took charge on December 31, 1920. He was then
replaced in September 1921 by Archbishop Luis Javier
Munoz y Capuron.77

However, in 1922 Archbishop Munoz y Capuron

was accused of sedition and was expelled from the
country. The liberal government of General Jose Maria
Orellana, Herrera's srlccessor, initiated a campaign
against the clergy, denouncing Munoz y Capuron's
political intrusion. The indigenous cofradias were

incited to free themselves from the priests and to stop

payment for religious services. Some clerics were
accused of trying t o change local customs. One month
after his investiture as archbishop, Luis Javier Munoz

76 Ibid., pp. 370-381.

77 Ibid., pp. 388 and 426.
y C ~ p u r o nwas arrested and expelled.
To replace him, Vicar Don Rafael Alvarez was
called upon t o represent the church, which he did untfl
1927. From that date until 1928, c~ z!-mstolic
admjnistrator, Monsignor Jorge Caruana, took charge of
the church. During the period from 1922 to 1928 (the
Alvarez and Caruana terms) a few petty problems between
the church and state continued t o be brought up,
including the collection o f alms, criticism of the
government, skirmishes against the civil order, and
commenting on pol ttics in sermons.78 Nevertheless,

Monsignor Caruana managed t o calm the situation and

improve relations with the government to a greater

degree than before.

Monsignor Caruana was replaced in 1928 by
Monsignor Luis Dorou y Sure, a gifted man who managed
to reconcile and maintain good relationships with the
government of General Lazaro Chacon, Orellana's
successor. Dorou also obtained the appointment of the
first papal nuncio t o the country in 1936. Through h i s
efforts, a few Jesuits were allowed to return to the

78 Mary P. Ho 1 1 eran, Church and State in Guatemala,

pp. 209 and 2iO.
country in 1937 to instruct the national clergy.79
These events initiated a new era of growth for the
Guatemalan Catholic Church.
Parallel to Dorou's appointment, the
presidential term of Jorge Ubico, successor to Lazaro
Chacon, began in Guatemala. His term became known as
"the dictatorship of the last of the liberals," and
ended in 1944. As leader of the church, Dorou
maintained good personal and institutional relations
with Jorge Ubico and his government. However, at this

time the Guatemalan Catholic Church began to

decentralize geographically. In 1921, the diocese of
Quetzaltenango had been established, and in 1935, the
diocese of Verapaz was created as a result of the
division of the Guatemalan archdiocese. (See Map
No. 4 . )
The establishment of these new dioceses (by
then there were three in the country) was very
im~ortant in that it permitted the decentralization of
ecclesiastical government and concentrated greater
attention on each pastoral area. The vast territorial

' Richard Adams, Crucifixion by Power: Essays on

9
Guatemala, National Social Structure, 1944-1966,
Austin, University of Texas Press, 1970, p. 280.
MAP' NO. 4 1935 DIOCESES

1 - Guatemala
2 - Quetzaltenango (1921) Areas Depts. o f :
San Marcos
3 - Verapaz (1935)
Huehuetenango
Quiche
* Quetzaltenango
Source: Prepared by t h e <: Totonicapan
a u t h o r and based on Solola
i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d by * Retalhuleu
t h e d i o c e s e s o f Guatemala, Suchitepquez
Q u e t z a l t k n a n g o . and
Verapaz . :k Now b e l o n g t o t h e
Quetzaltenango D i o c e s e
(1913131
area of the Guatemalan diocese showed that difficulties
in communication were present. In 1939, Monsignor
Dorou was replaced by Monsignor Rossell y Arrellano.
In retrospect, we can state that the
Declaration of Independence from Spain and Guatemala's
withdrawal from the Federal Republic determined the
beginning and consolidation of the deterioration
process of the medieval Christianization model that had

permeated the country from the time of the conquest to

the colonial era. On the other hand, the liberal
triumph of 1829 and the Liberal Reform of 1871 also
determined the beginning and consolidation of the state
versus the Guatemalan Catholic Church and the
secularization of the political system of the nation.
Both historical eras were characterized by conflict in
the relationships between these institutions.
For this reason, the alignment of the
Guatemalan Catholic Church with the status quo and its
political participation directly conducted amidst the
instability of the period preceding the liberal reform
of 1871, coupled with its constant lack of autonomy and
dependence on the state in all matters pertaining to
civil and administrative order since the post-
independence era, became important factors that were
exacerbated by the lack of priests, resources, and
missions. All these factors contributed to the loss of
economic, legal, political, religious, and moral
influence.
However, even though the Guatemalan Catholic
Church as an institution lost its influence and
privileges, it still continued to cultivate a series of
contacts and ties with the existing social order of the
era. This allowed the church, even without its former
influence, to have access to the power groups within
Guatemalan society, which eventually assisted the
institution in recovering part of its former sinecures
and privileges.
 CHAPTER I I
THE REVIVAL OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
IN GUATEMALA

The revival of the Guatemalan Catholic

Church, just as its process of disintegration as an
institution, was gradual and characterized by two very
different phases. The first phase occurred within a
period of growth and lasted from 1939 t o 1963. The
second stage entailed a process of change that took
place from 1964 t o 1983. During the first period, the
church worked under the leadership of Monsignor Mariano
Rossell; in the second, Monsignor Fario Casariego was
in charge o f church administration.
Historically speaking, the revival of the
Guatemalan Catholic Church must be understood as part
of the modernization process that had originated in
1871 w i t h the triumph of the liberal revolution and the

secularization of the political system of the country.

The secularization process was so broad that it became
fundamental t o the process o f development in various
countries and it occurred worldwide, not just in Latin
America. In respsnse t o this situation, the universal
98
Catholic Church adopted a different position in

relation to change and the challenge present in the

intellectual ideas of liberalism, rationalism, and
Marxist doctrine. It tried t o t!pdate and offer a new

interpretation of the Catholic religion that was to

stand a s a legitimate bulwark amidst the process of

change and modernization characteristic of that era.

A product of this new interpretation and

change o f direction was Leo XIII's encyclical "Rerum

Novarum." This document signaled the beginning of the

church's new social doctrine, which condemned the

exploitation of the working class by a small though

powerful g r o w of capitalists and called for

legislation t o defend the rights of the workers and

their free unionization. It is within this context

that we must evaluate the work of Archbishop Marian3

Rossell y Arellano during the first phase of the

Catholic Church's renewal, which, as we mentioned

previously, was characterized more by a process of

growth than a process of change.

In my opinion two features were present

during Archbishop Mariano Possell's tenure (1939-1964)

that were related t o the process of growth experienced

by the Guatemalan church. First, there was a pastoral
political phase, which cuvered the period 1939 t o 1944.
During this tifie both the political interests o f
Archbishop Rossell and those o f Ubico were not
contradictory. For this reason. since the archbishop
did not have t o confront the political ideology o f the
government, Rossell was able t o conduct purely pastoral
activities. These included providing better religious
education for the faithful and promoting their active
participation in the activities o f the church.

This type o f pastoral work and the excellent

political and personal relations between Rossell and
Ubico permitted the archbishop t o direct his efforts
toward the institutional growth o f the church. Ubico,
in turn, was the recipient of the credibility and
legitimacy that Archbishop Rossell y Arellano's
political support bestowed on him.
During the second phase, which took place
from 1944 t o 1964, there was greater political

participation on the part of the church. At this time,

Archbishop Rossell's concerns made him intervene
politically. First, he conducted a n anti-Communist
campaign (1944-1954). and subsequently (1954-1964) he
collaborated on the consolidation of the conservative
regimes that came t o power. The change from a pastoral
policy t o the assumption o f a political position became
necessary because Archbishop Mariano Rossell y Arellano

opposed some development policies that the political

leaders of that erz were trying t o implement. Rossell
y Arellano's antipathy t o Comnunism contributed to his
decision to participate more directly in the political
process o f his time. His participation manifested
constant opposition t o the policies of the
revolutionary governments that led the country between
1944 and 1954.
Following the above-mentioned trends, two
particular stages may be defined. The national stage,
1939-1951, occurred when the Guatemalan church was not
influenced much from abroad, with the exception of the
Vatican. The activity o f the church during this period
was concentrated in the establishment of a sufficient
number of national clergy that could cover the needs of
the country. However, this objective was never
achieved. The international stage, from 1951 t o the
end o f 1964, was characterized by an enormous affluence
in human as well a s economic resources. This
circumstance had a more direct influence on the
church's process of growth than on the process of
change and adaptation to the "signal of the times."
As far as its relations with the state, the
church during Ubico's regime continued t o be in
conflict, as it had been categorized during 1871. It
held opposing points of view, especially in the field
of education. But as we have pointed out before, this
was an inherited situation. It is apparent that during
Ubico's time the church had no fntention of augmenting
the conflict. but rather it hoped to reduce its
severity. A product of this rapprochement, as we said
before, was the appointment of Alberto Levame as
nuncio1 and the return of the Jesuits.

ROSSELL AND THE FEATURES OF PASTORAL POLICY

(1939-1944) (National Stage)
During the first period of Mariano Rossell's
tenure, the same legal situation of conflict continued
to be present in church and state relations. This

1 Monsignor Levame had the rank that accredited him

before the governments o f El Salvador and Hondurss.
See Agustin Estrada, Datos para la historia de la
iqlesia, Vol. 1 1 1 , p. 506.
inherited situation persisted even as the new
archbishop was installed as a result of the law. In
appearance, church and state relations were cordial;
nevertheless, the laws being enforced at the tfme
continued t o restrict the church.
In sp ite of the legal restrict ions, relations
between Rossell and Jorge Ubico remained amiable until
Ubico's fa1 1 in 1944. During the entire period, the

religious hierarchy adopted a prudent, supportive

stand, and were careful not to antagonize the president
of the republic. A s the first stage of the pastoral

policy ensued, Monsignor Mariano Rossell gave priority

to three principal areas: 1 ) the need to strengthen

the national clergy; 2) Catholic education; and 3)

involving the Indian people in Catholic pastoral
activities. These priorities were evidence of a deeply
nationalistic and strong paternalistic approach.
The beginning of Rossell's pastoral

activities reflected a concern for revitalization of .

the national church by correcting its lack of better

prepared clergy. In reality, the lack of national

clergymen was truly a serious prob lem. Statistics for

1940 revealed a total of about 126 clergymen, divided

between seculars and regulars, to attend a population
of three million people. Another important factor was
the large concentrat ion of clergy in Guatemala City.
The same statistics, as an example, showed that the
city had approximate ly 40 clergymen for a population of
170,000 inhabitants attending 60 parishes. In
Escuintla. there was one priest for 200,000 people.2

Rossell's intensive nationalism was probably

based on his fear that a foreign religious domination
would be used as an excuse by any liberal government
who wished t o attack the Guatemalan Catholic Church.
On the other hand. the arrival of foreign priests
represented an eventual challenge to Rossell's control
over the national church. This foreign influence also
seemed to threaten the archb.ishop's ideas and values.

In view of this, the arrival in 1943 of the Maryknoll.

who came from China. had special importance.3 These
missionaries were educated and trained. Some of them
had more progressive views than the outlook on the

world held by the traditional Guatemalan priest.

" I Congreso Nac i ona 1 de Vocac i ones Sacerdota l e, "

Publicaciones del Seminario Conciliar de Guatemala, No.
3, Union Tipografica, Guatemala, September 3-6, 1942.
Richard Adams, Crucifixion by Power, p. 280.
 Rossell's interest i n advancing Christian
education was undoubtedly the product of a conservative
tradition that believed education should be gufdeti by
the clergy, not the state. Notwithstanding, Rossell

was aware of the political implications that could

result from educating a population based on Catholic
authoritarian and h?erarchical principles. One of the
recurring topics of his letters and pastoral sermons

was the clear message addressed to the dominant elites

concerning the advantage they had of coexisting with a
humble and docile population that had been educated to
follow such Catholic principles as resignation,
humility, and respect for authority.4

Finally, during this period Mariano Rossell

emphasized the urgent need t o establish a secular
apostolate and involve the Indian communities in
pastoral activity. This view broadened the influence
of Catholic Action as it started to work in othei- parts

4 See Mariano Rossell y Arellano, Tercera carta

pastoral sobre la iqnorancia religiosa, Guatemala,
February 11, 1940; and Ehortacion pastoral con motivo
del dia de pentecostes, Guatemala, May 25, 1944. These
documents are in the possession of the author.
of the country away from the city.5
Archbishop Rossell continued his drive toward
a pastoral and spiritual development until the middle
of March 1944. His policy was seen as legitimate
because it was supported by the Catholic Church, whose
highest representative in the country was the
archbishop himself. However, from that date on, world
and national events challenged him t o follow a more
active and opposing political posture. In this period,
the archbishop concentrated his attention on
explaining, whenever possible, the church's position
vis a vis the polit ical situation of the country.
Using the encyclica 1s of Pius XII, he intended to

define the stand of the Guatemalan church as. it

confronted the so cal led advancement of communism, the
social and labor prob lems, and Guatemala's electoral

process.

- - - -

5 The Guatemalan Catholic Acf.ion was founded in 1935

by a small group of members who met to learn religious
and moral education. They were being trained to
participate in the secular apostolate. Agustin
Estrada, Datos para la historia de la inlesia, Vol.
111, p. 504.
ROSSELL AND HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE
(1944-1951) (National State)

In June 1944, Ubico's government was deposed

by an urban popular movement led by university
students, some professionals, and the military. Their
participation was significant. The movement was
approved and supported from the beginning by the clergy
at large and by Monsignor Marfano Rossell y Arellano as

we1 1.6 The Catholic Church. through Verbum. its

official weekly publication. applauded what it
considered a collective action by the people. The
institution took advantage o f this occasion t o announce
that Guatemala was living in a time of transition.7
Rosscll y Arellano said he admired the patriotism shown
by the civilian combatants and called for unity under
the banner o f Christian charity.8
At the ideological level. the collective

Ba 1 tasar Mora 1 es , Derrocami ento de m a t i ran ia,

Ti ografia Nacional, Guatemala, 1958, pp. 104-106.
Verbum, July 9, 1944. cited in Agustin Estrada.
Datos para la historia d e la iqlesia, Vol. 1 1 1 ,
p. 576.
Mariano Rossell y Arellano, Exhortacion a1 civismo,
Guatemala, July 14. 1944. Document in the possession
of the author.
action aimed at unseating Ubico dissolved the old
animosities between liberals and conservatives. From
that day on, there arose instead an ideological
division that divided Guatemala into two camps: the
left and the right. This change would later hamper
Monsignor Mariano Rossell y Arellano's last efforts.
On the other hand, this moment coincided with
the end of the Second World War and another change in
government for Guatemala, which provoked a
transformation of the sl ignment that the church would
henceforth follow in its relations with the state.
These relations changed positions, from a state of
conflict to a state of competition. The goals of the
church and of t h e s t a t e remained the same, social
justice and material well-being, but the strategies
leading to those goals were different. In addition,
the Vatican's position also changed, as Schmitt notes.
Its emphasis passed from the spiritual t o the material
realm, with its focus directed at the socioeconomic
problems of the era, in particular.9

Nevertheless, the Guatemalan church was

Kar 1 Schmi tt, The Roman Cathol ic Church in Modern

Latin America, p. 21.
unable to redirect the socioeconomic problems of the
country, as was called for in the "Quadrigesimo Anno"
encyclical of Pius XI and the "Rerum Novarum" of
Leo X I I I . The lack of economic and human resources
made any positive action impossible to execute. In
addition, it seemed evident that the church reacted too
late t o the economic and social situation in the
country. Consequently, the concern for social problems
was appropriated by other groups and institutions who
were better organized t o engage in the process of
change. Due to this lack of wfll and capability t o
change from within, certain foreign elements pressured
the Guatemalan Catholic Chdrch to initiate, if not a
process of change, at least a process o f growth.
Ubico's fall signaled the arrival of Juan
Jose Arevalo, and along with him, the revolutionary
decade, as it became known. When Arevalo was elected
president, he declared himself to be a Catholic; yet he
maintained that the separation between church and state
had been beneficial for Guatemala since 1871 and
therefore should remain ~0.10

l o Juan Jose Arevalo, Escritos pol iticos y discursos.

The president elect addressed the people of Guatemala,
broadcast on February 15, 1945. Cultural, S.A.,
 Arevalo added that the Catholic Church was
free to practice its religion in the same manner as all
the other churches. He advised that Catholics should
not confuse a religious doctrine, whose central idea
was the saving of souls, with politics, whose purpose
was offer leadership to the country. Furthermore, he
cautioned that Catholics who were concerned with
socioeconomic problems should join the political
parties whose objective was to work for a solution to
this struggle. Finally, he made it clear that the new
constitution would not affect religious liberty; its
only purpose concerning this was to put an end to
certain political trends aimed at converting the church
into a political party.11 Rossell's answer was
immediate. In a pastoral letter he mentioned, "...the
winds of persecution are blowing," as he requested
strength and support for all the clergy at that
time, 12

When the assembly met that year to write a

Havana, Cuba, 1953, p. 164.

l 1 Ibid., p. 164.
12 Mar iano Rossel 1 y Are1 lano, Pastora 1 con ocas ion de
la Cuaresma de 1945, acerca de la obra de la iglesia
catolica, Guatemala, February 22, 1945. A copy of this
document is in the possession of the author.
new constitution, the Catholic Church fought for
legislation to reorganize the institution as a
juridical entity in order to be able to maintain
properties. It also requested the right to rr!fgious
education. All this meant that Rossell wanted the
church to recover its former power and influence.
Notwithstanding, the 1945 constitution gave no
concessions to the church; on the contrary, it
reiterated the previous prohibitions and established
new ones, including prohibiting the clergy from
intervening in political or labor affairs. This
constitution coincided in many aspects with the Liberal
Constitution of 1879, as we can see from the
comparative table that follows.13

It i s in this manner that the promulgation of

the 1945 constitution sharpened the competitive

situation between church and state, even though

officially and at first glance the church maintained
good relations with the state.14 One of these
competitive points between both institutions during .

l 3 Constitutions of 1879 and 1945. Diqesto

Constitutional, pp. 167-178 and 302-341.
14 The Nuncio Jose Beltrami gave a speech at President
Arevalo's inaugural.
1945 was the unionization of laborers. In order to
challenge the fact that pro-union leaders could have
influenced the wsrkers to oppose the church.15
Rossell, through Catholic Action.16 tried to organize
unions control 1 ed and di rected by the church. l The
goals of such unions were to improve the workers'
welfare and to avoid any type of hatred.18

Consequently, such groups as the Guatemalan Workers'

League were founded. The promotion of Catholic Action
by Rossell marked a change in the orientation of the
Guatemalan Catholic Church, and its creation reflected
renewed emphasis on the laity. In general terms, this
implied the acceptance of the premise that an intimate
relationship existed between the influence that an
institution might have on a modern society and the
influence that this institution might have over the

Accion social Cr istiana, church newspaper pub1 i shed

by the laity, Guatemala, June 29, 1945, p. 1.
16 Under Rossell, Catholic Action became
institutionalized on April 21, 1946, even though it had
been founded in 1935. Mariano Rossell y Arellano,
Decreto de orqanizacion de la Accion Catolica
Guatemalteca, Guatemala, April 2 1 , 1946. See Frankel,
Political Development in Guatemala, 1944-1954, p. 251.
1 ' Accion Social Christiana, Guatemala, May 31. 1945,
p. 1.
18 Accion Social Christiana. Guatewla, April 5, 1945,
p. 12.
masses.
In the particular case of Guatemala, the use
of this group that pursued political goals was due to
the fact that the recently approved constitution denied

the church direct access to politically influential

circles. Consequently, Mariano Rossell y Arellano
decided t o take a more indirect route and his vehicles
became the newly created lay groups such a s Catholic
Action (1946) and the Christian Family Movement
(19611.19

Nevertheless, the creation o f Catholic Action

did not respond t o Mariano Rossell y Arellano's
expectations . Catho 1 i c Act ion had' very 1 i tt 1 e , if any,
influence on politics, which clearly demonstrated that
the modernization process of lay groups did not
necessarily imply changes restricted t o their
organization. On the contrary, the process required
this type o f group to be capable of influencing large
sectors of the population.

In my opinion, these groups failed partly

because they were organized by and their actions

l9 For a detai led analysis of these organizations, see

Bruce Calder, Crecimiento y cambio, pp. 125-137.
directed to the members of the middle and the upper
classes of Guatemalan society. These classes were more
interested in maintaining social stability than in
promoting social change.

It should be noted here that the degree of

control exerted by Rossell y Arellano over the movement
was complete. As a matter of fact, the general
statutes of this national organization stated that
Catholic Action was "directly dependent on the
ecclesiastical hierarchy." It continued to state that
those who wished to serve the organization should
demonstrate 'la spirit of discipline and total obedience
to the hierarchy and its representatives."20

In 1948, the central theme of social justice

created poor relations between government and church.
In January of that year, the social security service
was inaugurated. Landlords and businessmen affected by
the program opposed their obligation to affiliate with
the Guatemalan Institute for Social Security (Instituto

Guatemalteco de Segwidad Social, IGSS). Instead, they

proposed the organization of other private

20 Estatutos senera 1 es de 1 a Accion Catol i ca de 1 a

archdioceses de Santiaso de Guatemala, Tipografia
Sanchez y De Guise, Guatemala, July 1946.
organizations. In this case, the patrones received
total support from the Catholic Church.21

Mariano Rossell y Arellano's position

concerning social justice, as perceived from the
pastoral letters,22 gave the impression that the
archbishop supported a progressivist position.
Nevertheless, any detailed analysis of his work and
activity will show that his conceptualization of social
justice was not innovative. It leaned more toward the
concurrent dominant opir~ionthat exhorted the poor to
be humble, patient, and resigned r and appealed to the
well-to-do to be charitable and understanding.

ROSSELL AND HIS INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS (1951-1964)

(Internaticnal Stage)

In 1951 Arevalo was succeeded by Jacobo

Arbenz, who was elected president in November 1950.
This event did not alter the condition of church versus

21 This continues to be a topic today. Nevertheless,

the patrones today do not have the support of the
church in this particular aspect.
22 Mariano Rossel 1 y Are1 lano, Carta pastoral sobre la
justicia social, Guatemala, November 15, 1948. This
document is in the possession of the author.
state relations, which remained bad, but did prolong
the competitive spirit that existed between both
institutions. The objectives of material welfare and
social justice continued to be the same, but the means
by which to achieve them were different.
Legislation continued to express anti-church
sentiments. In relation to the historic Arbenz period,
very possibly it was the same weakness of the church
that gave power to Arbenz; because the church had
nothing, nothing could be taken away from that
institution.23 According to Calder, the opposition at
this time gathered around the church and included many
former enemies. This fact encouraged the church and

gave it strength and power to chailenge the

leftists.24 This situation contributed to church
growth, but because it could not guide this growth by
itself for lack of national clerical leadership, the
church foresaw the need t o import foreign clergy.

23 At the same time, this weakness made it impossible

for the church to resist foreign pressure. Instead,
the church became an agent for the promotion and
development of conformity, acquiescing to the desires
of the Vatican and the government of the United Ststes.
See Calder, Crecimiento Y cambio de la iqlesia
Catolica, p. 47.
L4 Ibid., p. 22.
 The arrival of a few foreign priests was
accepted as inevitable, though not with pleasure. This
was the way Arevalo, Arbenz, and Rossell felt about the
matter. Arevalo and Arbenz admitted these priests to
calm the state's relationship with the church and also
the large numbers of able persons gathering in support
of the church. The archbishop received them in order
to strengthen the church's position and t o try to
revitalize the Christianization model or, as Bruneau
calls i t , "neochristianization."25 The latter

involved the church's desire to recover its complete

control over the territory, although by this time its
relationship with the state was more autonomous.
Therefore, Colonel Arbenz's administration marked the
beginning of a new model of neochristianization in
Guatema 1 a.
During Arbenz's control of the government,
the principal topics of contention between church and
state were Catholic education--the archbishop wanted to
extend Catholic education from the public school system
into the university--church property, freedom of the

25 Thomas Bruneau, The Pol it ica 1 Transformat ion of the

Brazilian Catholic Church, p. 47.
press, social justice, unionization, agrarian reform
and private property, suffrage, and the political
parties.26

During Jacobo Arbenz's administration, the

relationships of competitiveness between church and
state were not an obstacle to the church as it
continued organizing, growing physically, and
decentralizing. Thus, in 195:, four new dioceses were
created in Jalapa, Zacapa, San Marcos, and Solola,
besides an apostolic administrative office in El Peten
(See Hap No. 5.) Of the new leaders who were to
preside over these dioceses, three were foreigners, for
which the Vatican was highly criticized. The Nuncio
Juan Emilio Castellano, who had chosen the bishops,
defended his decision, saying that there were no
adequate candidates among the ~uatemalans.27 The

displeasure he caused was so persuasive that he was

forced to ask for a transfer "for health reason^.^ His

26 For example, the church vehemently attacked Decree

900, which established a moderate agrarian reform in
Guatemala. The attack cited the doctrine of the church
and the Christian right to private property. Anita
Frankel, Political Development in Guatemala, 1944-1954,
pp. 224-235.
27 Bruce Calder, Crecimiento y Cambio de la iglesia
Catc!fca, p . 56.
MAP NO. 5 1951 OIOCESES

1 - Jalapa
2 - Zacapa
3 - San Marcos
4 - Solola
5 - Quetzaltenango
6 - Verapaz
7 - Guatemala
8 - E l Peten

Source: Prepared by t h e a u t h o r based on i n f o r m a t i o n

made a v a i l a b l e by t h e N a t i o n a l A r c h b i s h o p r i c .
replacement was Nuncio Genaro Verolino, who was to play
an important role in the coming years.28 The creation
of new dioceses was probably caused by the church's
concern with Communism and its influence in certain
areas where the Catholic Church had little or no
contact at all. Thus Guatemala was to have seven
dioceses and one apostolic administrative office in El
Peten. 29

The policies of President Arbenz were

severely criticized by the archbishop and by the

conservative sectors of the country. He was accused of
leading G Communist government. The church contributed
to the fostering of anti-Communist sentiment that
concurred with the objectives of the model o f
neochristianization. This model subscribed t o "an open
battle policy" against the enemies of the church, and
Comnunlsm in particular.
Rossell personally adopted a political stand

28 Agustin Estrada. Datos para la historia de la

iqlesia, Vol. 1 1 1 , p. 638. Good relations between
Genaro Verolino and Arbenz, for example, made possible
the arrival of new religious orders in the country.
29 Isidoro Alonso y Gines Garrido. La iglesia en
America Central Y el Caribe, Oficina Internacional de
Investigaciones Soc;ales de FERES, Friburg, 1962,
pp. 169-170.
the purpose of which was to preserve church doctrine
and the spiritual welfare of Catholics. This he did in
response to what he perceived as the threat of
atheistic Communism. For example, in 1953 he initiated
a national crusade against Communism by organizing a
national pilgrimage led by the most venerated image in
the country, the Black Christ from Esquipulas. In this
way, Rossell appealed to the religious f e r v o ~of the
Guatemalan population against Communism.
At this time, a new political ent ity was
formed that eventually would become the Chr istian
Democratic party. This party was created as an
alternative Catholic anti-Comnunist policy that was
trying to become a third power and a viable alternative
to Communists and conservatives.30 During the brief

history of the Christian Democratic party, organized by

Lic. Rene de Leon, it was mentioned that "absenteeism"
by Christians fronithe political life of the country
between the years 1344 and 1954 resulted in the
socialist leadership that t.ook command of the
revolution. In other words, the course of events would

30 Politica y sociedad, Universidad de San Carlos de

Gautera ia, Guatelie iil < spec i a i n u m o e r ;, Apr i 1 197 1 9
pp. 31-32.
 I??

have been different if Christians had participated more

actively in politics. Hence, the need to enter
politics and defend the Christian ethic was
encouraged. 3 1
The Christian Democratic party, as well as
the Catholic Church, were in agreement in that they
both believed that the best way t o confront Communism
was the promotion of a social justice policy that could
close the breach between the rich and the poor. At the
same time, the function of private property should have
two characteristics, one private, the other sociai.
This coincidence was nevertheless purely rhetorical.
The founders of the Christian Democratic party, because
of their social ties, their close personal and
ideological identification with Archbishop Rossell y
Arellano, and their contacts with the Guatemalan
bourgeoisie, were more inclined to achieve social
stability than social change.
A year later, on April 4. 1954, Rossell
published his pastoral "on the advances of Communism."
Here he cited some paragraphs from the Papal encyclical
"Divinis Redemptoris," which called for the "combat and

31 Ibid., p. 32.
destruction of Communistic activities'' advancing in
Guatemala under the guise of social demands. He used
Pius IX's terminology and referred to socialism as a
"shameful puppet." He further commanded the people of
Guatemale to rise up as one man against the enemy of
God and the country.32

Rossell played a very active role in the

oppositioa and eventually contributed to the demise of

the Arbenz government. Even though the church was
alone and lacked sufficient influence to overthrow a
government, it still had its prestige and was serving
as a unifying force.33 Nevertheless, it is possible

that if Rossell had not had such a strong personality

and the deep conviction for his reasoning, he would not
have become the symbol of such a crusade.
When the pastoral of April 1954 was
published, the rebellion against Arbenz was already in
place. This rebellion was being financed by the United

States.34 which was defending, besides its own

32 Mariano Rossel 1 y Are1 lano, Carta pastoral sobre

10s avances del Comunismo.
Anita Frankel, =tical Development in Guatemala,
1944-1954, p. 236.
j4 In this respect, see Stephen Schlessinger and
Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the
American Coup in Guatemala, Doubleday and Company,
preponderant interests, the interests of North American
companies operating in Guatemala. The rebellion was
carried out by malcontent Guatemalans and did not last
long. No one opposed it because the army did not want

t o support Arbenz, who had to resign and leave the

country in exile.
The revolutionary period of 1944 to 1954
unsuspectingly affected the growth process of the
Guatemalan Catholic Church in a curious way. The

attempt to transform an elitist political system into a

political system in which the common people could
participate provoked such a negative reaction within
the Guatemalan Catholic Church that it resulted in the
arrival o f foreign priests and money, resources that
aided church growth.
During this period, the Guatemaian Catholic
Church, instead of assuming a position in accordance
with current pluralistic ideas, preferred to adopt a
highly conservative attitude that was dogmatic,
hierarchical, and systematically opposed to the

Inc., Garden City, New York, 1982; Richard Immerman,

The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of
Intervention, University of Texas Fress, Austin, 1982;
Richard Adams, Crucifixion by Power, p. 282.
revolutionary government. Paradoxically, the
Guatemalan revolutionary era contributed t o
strengthening the Catholic Church, since under a
supposedly menacing Comnunist reginre the hierarchy
managed to unite the conservative element around
itself. This fact revitalized and gave new vigor t o
the Catholic institution.35

However, the events that took place during

the revolutionary era demonstrated the need to adopt a
more progressive position in relation t o the social
problems of the country; if noto Comnunism wculd take
advantage of the existing social conditions, These
circumstances forced the hierarchy, st least
rhetorically, t o take another position than the
traditional, insofar as social problems were
concerned.

On July 2, 1954, at the time when the

rebellion had almost ended, Rossell published a new
pastoral in which he lamented the sacrifice of the
workers and peasants, whom he called martyrs, and
reminded the people that years ago he had admonished

35 Bruce Calder, Crecimiento y cambio de la iqlesia

Catolica, pp. 177-178.
them in regard to "the mercenary sale of Guatemala to
international Communism and the systematic
dechristianization of Communism."36 He also appealed
to Guatemalans to obey the papal encyclicals in order
to achieve Christian socia! j~stice. A t =the7 Cirnes,
during funeral prayers, he continued to repeat these
themes. They became a leitmotif that he brought up
many times in the coming years.
After the triumph of Castillo Armas's

liberation, the archbishop continued to be active in

politics, even though he declared that it was uctsue
that the church wanted "to take advantage of the anti-
Corrmunist policy of the government to establish its

hegemony and act on behalf of the government,

submitting it t o its inf l uence." Furthermore, the
archbishop stated that the church had never lost its
hegemony because people "trusted its word, believed its
doctrine, and were active in its work." It merely

demanded to hold the same rights as the smallest

36 Mariano Rossel l y Are1 lano, Carta pastoral la paz,

fruto de la justicia Y el amor, G u a t e ~ l a ,July 2 ,
1954. This document is in the possession of the
author.
institutions were able to hold.37 During Castillo

Armas's tenure, the categorization of cooperation again

surfaced where the church and the state had similar
objectives but did not use the same structures and
where the church enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy

in its actions.
Concerning the legal aspect, the Constitution
of 1956 was somewhat of a triumph for the church, even
beginning with a prayer for God's protection. Article

23 prohibited institutions from adhering to Communist

ideology or to any other totalitarian system. Article

50 recognized church institutions of all creeds as

legal entities and permitted them to buy, possess, and

sell property as long as these were kept for the
exclusive use of the church, its educational
activities, or social assistance programs. It also
explained that these rights did not affect the status
of properties existing prior to this constitution.
Concerning this point, the constitution
protected the nation from any claims to properties

37 Statement by Hi s Exce 1 1 ency, Mons i gnor Mar i ano

Rossell y Arellano, Archbishop of Guatemala, Contra
demagosia comunista y liberal: La iqlesia no busca
privilegios, Guatemala de la Asuncion, July 20, 1954.
This document is in the possession of the author.
expropriated in 1871 that had already changed hands.
Article 51 guaranteed the right to practice any
religion and stipulated that religious rites could be
held in public as long as they were peaceful and
orderly. It admonished associations and religious
organizations and the ministers of any creed from
participating in politics. On the other hand, Article

54 permitted the free association of religious

interests, which meant that the religious orders could
function in the open.
The constitution provided that religious
education could be taught because Article 97 guaranteed
the liberty to teach. However, religious instruction
would be optional and the state would not sponsor

it.38 With respect t o this point, the c h r c h did not

get what it wanted, even though Rossell sent a petition
to the assembly in which he stated that lay education
was pro-Communist because secularism led to atheism and
irreligion. He wanted the state to guarantee religious

instruction.39 Later on, Rossell sent another

38 Constitution of February 2, 1956, in Disesto

Constitucional, pp. 342-382.
jY Mariano Rossell y Arellano, Carta a la asamblea
constituyente, Oerecho de la iglesia en la legislacion,
Guatemala, May 9, 1955. ThSs document is in the
petition in which he protested because religious
baptism and matrimony were required to be certified by
the Civil Registry, which he considered improper. In
his opinion, these two completely different ceremonies

were not to be mixed.40

For a comparative analysis of the 1945
Constitution and the Constitution of 1956, see the
following outline.

1945 CONSTITUTION 1956 CONSTITUTION

Does not invoke God Invokes God
Article 29 Article 23
The practice of all reli- The organization and
gions is free, as well as function of political
the practice of all creeds parties organized in
without distinction that accordance with democrat-
are carried out within ic principles is free.
their temples. This right The organization or
may not be extended to the function of all institu-
execution o f subversive tions that profess the
acts or practices incom- Communist ideology or
patible with peace and that of any other totali-
public order. It does not tarian system is foi-bid-
exempt anyone from com- den.
pliance with civil or
political obligations.
Societies and religious
associations or their mem-
bers and religious minis-
possession of the author.
40 Mariano Rossell y Arellano, Carta a la asamblea
constituyente, Contra requisites antidemocraticos sobre
el bautismo y el matrimonio. Guatemala, December 18,
1955. This document is in the possession of the
author.
ters cannot intervene in
politics or in matters
related to the organiza-
tion of labor.
Article 31 Article 53
The right t o meet peace- The right meet peace-
fully without bearing fully without bearing
arms is recognized. The arms i s recognized. The
law shall regulate the rights to open meetings
right to hold open meet- and public demonstra-
ings or public demonstra- tions shall not be re-
tions. Religious demon- stricted, diminished, or
strations outside the altered and the law shall
temples are permitted regulate them for the
and will be subject to purposes of maintaining
the respective law, order only. Religious
demonstrations outside
the temples are permitted
and will be subject to
the respective law.
Article 32 Article 51
The right to organize The practice of all re-
for social purposes is ligions is guaranteed.
guaranteed according t o Every person has the
the law. Conventual right to practice his
congregations are for- religSon or creed indi-
bidden as well as monas- vidually or collective-
tic institutions or ly, in public or in
associations and the or- private, for the teach-
ganization or function of ing, creed, and worship
political international without any limitations
or foreign societies, except that they be
Not included in this pro- peacefully and orderly
hibition are the organi- conducted. Associations
zations that promote the or religious groups and
Central American Union or ministers are forbidden
the Pan American doc- to intervene in politics.
trines of continental
solidarity.
Article 28
Everyone may freely dis-
pese of t h f r pro~erty,
as long as it does not
contravene the law. How-
ever, entailments are
absolutely forbidden as
well as any principle
favoring mortmain, ex-
cept foundations whose
purpose is the establish-
ment of oeneficient,
artistic, or scientific
institutions, which must
be approved by the gov-
ernment. The establish-
ment of trusteeships is
authorized for a term
not to exceed 25 years;
in any case, they should
be administered tnrough
a bank of credit insti-
tution authorized to
engage in business within
the country. This
authorization is not
extended to religious
congregations, monasteries,
priests; or ministers of
any creed or religion.
Article 81
A minimum of common and
obligatory education will
be established for the
inhabitants of the coun-
try, within the limita-
tions of age and according
t o plans and programs
designed under the law.
Education in state schools
will be secular.
Article 50
The churches of all
creeds are hereby recog-
nized as juridical
entities. They way
acquire and possrss
properties and may dis-
pose of them as long as
they are used for reli-
gious purposes only, or
for sociai assistance
or education. Juridical
prerogative w;ll be
determined by the rules
of their institirtions or
the basis of their or-
ganization and will be
approved according t o
the laws of the republic.
The promulgation of this
right does not affect the
status of existing real
estate at the time of
this constitution's
proclamation.
Article 97
Freedom of worship and
teaching criteria is
guaranteed. The law
shall regulate religious
instruction in official
locales. The state will
not offer it and it is
declared as optional.
Article 82 Article 106
School diplomas or grad- The establishment and
uation titles other than functioning of other
officially awarded by the universities throughout
state or the University of the country is free, but
San Carlos in Guatemala it is indispensable that
will not be recognized. its organization, its
examinations, curricula
accreditation, and an
evaluation of the titles
and diplomas it awards
be approved by the Uni-
versity of San Carlos in
Guatema 1 a.
Article 112 Article 141
To become an elected rep- To become an elected
resentative, a person representative...rnust be
must be a Guatemalan by 21 years of age.
birth, be ready to exer-
cise his rights as a
citizen, must be a layman,
and must be 21 years of
age.
Article 130 Article 160
To become elected presi- To become elected presi-
dent, a person must be a dent, a person must be a
1a w n . 1 ayman.
Article 140 Article 172
To become a minister of To become a m in i ster of
state, a person must be state, a person is re-
more than 30 years old quired to be...over 30
and a layman. years old and to be a
1 ayman.
There was, then, a great difference bztween
the 1945 Constitution, which prohibited religious
associations, prohibited the churches from owning
property, and prohibited the clerics from intervening
in labor affairs, and the Constitution of 1956. Even
though it did not achieve all the things it wanted, the
church did obtain a similar status to the one it held
under the Constitution of 1851, in spite of the fact
that the hierarchy's participation in ceremonies and
swearings disappeared, especially in regard to

education.
With the aid of the new legislation, we
arrived at what Bruneau called "a model similar to
Christianization." Within this model, there was total

coverage; the church was united with every social group

and depended on organizations and the government in
order to exercise influence. The danger lay in the
implemertation of the model, especiaily when structures
were used to channel operations because these could
become like empty shells, devoid of content.41

A s soon as the conflict with C o m u n i m ended,

the religious furor subsided, precluding any intent t o

strengthen the Catholic Church. This was due in part
to the scarcity of clerics, even though after 1944

41 Thomas Bruneau, The Pol i tical Trsnsformat ion of the

Brazilian Catholic Church, p. 5C.
their numbers had increased considerably. especially
after the fall of the Arbenz government.42 (See
Tables 1 and 2 , )
In this regard. the affluence of foreign

clergy must be interpreted as a product of the

Vatican's influence, which. preoccupied by the
institutional weakness of the Guatemalan
Catholic Church, had tried to strengthen it. This
assistance was hindered by the deep nationalistic
sentiments of Rossell. O n the other hand, Hossell's

dogmatic anti-Communism also became an obstacle to the

revitalization of a church that should have been ready
to respond and support meaningful changes within the
G u a t e ~ l a nsociety in accordance with the encyclicals,
"Mater et Magistraw and Pacem in Terris," issued by
John XXIII.
For this reason. the attitudes displayed by
Rossell in regard t o the foreign clergy and Communism
became an inducement for the Vatican. which tried to

exert enormous pressure through the apostolic nuncio in

42 Bruce Calder. Crczimiento y cambio de ? a iqiesia

catolica, pp. 22 and 48.
 TABLE NO. 2.1

POPULATION
PRIESTS NUNS GROWTH
YEAR NUMBER INDEX NUMBER INDEX I NDEX

Source: Isidro Alconso y Gines Garrido, Estudios

socioreliaiosos Latinoarnericanls--la iqlesia en la
America Central Y el Caribe, Estudios Eclesiasticos,
FERES, 19629 p - 271.
 TABLE NO. 2.2

POPULATION NATIONAL FOREIGN

PAR I SH- GROWTH CLERGY CLERGY
YEAR ES PRIESTS NUNS INDEX (%I (4.1

1944 109 114 84 102.6 -- --

1954 132 192 189 110.4 -- --
1959 172 346 364 124.7 3.16 remain-
der

Source: Isidro Alonso y Gines Garrido, Estudios

socio-reliqiosos Latinoamericanos--La iglesia en la
America Central Y el Caribe, Estudios Eclesiasticos,
FERES, 1962, P. 271.
order to revitalize the Guatemalan Catholic Church.
This was to be achieved through a decentralized
managerial processo the arrival of the foreign clergy,
and economic resources.
Parallel to the Vatican's efforts, the
government of the United States alsc applied pressure
to strengthen the Guatemalan Catholic Church, working
through its own national Catholic Church. This
influential support translated itself into economic
resources and North American anti-Communist clergymen
who began to revitalize the Guatemalan Catholic Church
so that it could become a powerful bulwark capable of
stopping the spread of Communism and converting itself

into a powerful foundation for 6 stable society.

From that point of view, undoubtedly the
increase in the number of clergy seemed essential to
the growth of the Catholic Church and its expansion ~f
action and influence.43 On the other hand, as I
- - - - - - - - - -

43 According to Calder, there were four groups

involved in the growth process of the Guatemalan
Catholic Church: 1) church-oriented groups who were
already in Guatemala; 2) the Vatican; 3) the government
of the United States; and 4) some Spanish, Italian, and
Mexican clerics who more or less represented the
interests of their rzspective governments. Bruce
Calder. Crecimiento y cambio de la iqlesia catolica,
pp. 177-181.
expressed at the beginning of this chapters undoubtedly
the arrival of the foreign clergy in the country, even
though the majority of them were conservative, became
one of the basic elements for the promotion of growth
of the Guatemz!an Cetholic Church during Mariano
Rossell y Arellano's tenure.
From 1940 until the second half of the decade
of the 1950s. Rossell opposed the arrival of foreign
clergy. Rossell maintained that the native church was
healthy and perfectly capable of working and subsisting
because it was self ~ufficient.~4 Nevertheless, the

nuncio's authority was so powerful that Rossell yielded

and let the foreign clergy come t o Guatemala. It is
necessary to take into account that this increase in
the number of priests promoted, in accordance with
anti-Communist sentiment* a social and Christian
development model that was somehow to be incorporated
into the social activities of the church.
Among the principal activities that the
church developed in the social field were construction
of schools, establishment of cooperatives for credit

and savings* infrastructure projects such as

44 Ibid., p. 54.
neighborhood roads, bridges, and major roads. The
foreign missions dedicated t o this type o f work were
probably the Maryknollers and the Congregation of the
Sacred Heart, who concentrated their efforts in the
departments of El Peten, Huehuetenango, Quiche, and San
Marcos. Parallel t o the arrival of numerous foreign
clergymen and during the Castillo Armas regime, there
was a revival among secular groups, especially in the
universities.45

Many of the foreign clerics tried t o impose a

liturgical and pastoral model that was incompatible
with the way o f thinking and the popular religious
values of the Guatemalan peasantry. For this reason,
the success of their mission was minimal. Furthermore,
sending missionaries t o the most remote and
inhospitable regions o f the country resulted in a lack
of men who could attend t o the needs o f the urban
poor. 46

It should be mentioned that not all the

45 Such groups as Jtiventud Un i vers i tar ia Centro-

americana ( J U C A ) and Accion Catolica Universitaria
(ACU) became very active. Iqlesia de 10s Pobres en
America Central, p. 200.
4b Bruce Calder, Crecimiento y cambio de la iglesia
Catolica, pp. 175-176.
foreign clergy were progressives. Adams wrote that
there were only a few who showed any interest in the
"enlightenea principles" that were later listed by the
Second Vatican Council.47

Castillo Armas was assessinated in 1957 and

the country suffered a period of instability untii
Ydigoras Fuentes won the presidential election in 1958.
During his regime, Ydigoras tried to calm the
opposition coming from the moderate leftists. However,
he had t o confront extreme rebellion mounted by the far
left, which was finally suppressed in 1960. The
survivors o f the rebellion initiated, at that time, the
war o f the guerrillas, which is still being waged with
periods of defeat and victory. During Ydigoras
Fuentes's tenure, the Catholic Church continued its
process of expansion: indigenous schools and seminars
flourished with the aid of the new clergy as they
arrived among the remote Indian areas, where they were

47 Statist i ca 1 1 y, the most progress i ve general 1 y came

from the United States and Canada (FERES statistics
show that they were the youngest o f the group), as we1 I
as from the European orders (Belgian, Dutch).
Paradoxically, the Latin American clergy were as
conservative a s their Guatemalan counterparts. Richara
Adams, Crucifixion by Power, pp. 283-284.
sore!y needed.48
The concentration of energy in the rural
areas brought about a decentralization in the national
organization of the church. It made the dioceses more
dependent on foreign financial, humen. and technical
resources. In this respect, we must consider that the
newly arrived clergy were generally backed by an order
that financed their activities. They were highly
trained men and for these reasons, they enjoyed an
enormous advantage over their national companions.49
In addition, their pastoral program differed because it
was directed at the improvement of the quality o f life
among the rural lower classes. This program cgnsisted
basically of.establfshit;g cdoperatives, clinics, credit
unions, and schools, all of which, as was mentioned
before, were included under the development conc~pt.50

Unfortunately for the success of this program, although

the organizations themselves ran smoothly. when the
missionaries left, these institutions disappeared.51

4 8 Richard Adams, Crucifixion bv Power, p. 283.

4 9 Bruce Calder, Crecimiento v cambia de la ialesia
catolica, pp. 60-61.
Ibid.. pp. 67-68 and 175-176.
5 1 Car 10s Enrique Centeno Cordon, Cooperatives de E 1
Peten, thesis. Facultad de Ciencias Economics,
Universidaa tie San Carios de Guatemala, p. 137.
 During Ydigoras's term, the church continued
to cooperate with the state, since both institutions
had the same goals: the struggle against Communism and
the quest for social stability.52 In the legislative
area, Rossell obtained some concessions from the
National Congress, which had not been the case in
Castillo Armas's time. Congress approved a series of
laws that favored the Catholic Church. It recognized
the church as a legal entity, granted it the right to
become a proprietor, and gave civil validation to
re1 igious matrirnony.53
O n the other hand, the church continued

during this period to promote the model equated with

Christianization. This time the church attempted to
cover the whole Guatemalan territory and to be united
with every social class. However, it remained

dependent on certain groups as well as on government

legislation. Besides, it was founded on a structure
that grew more each day, but had little substance.
- - - - -- -

52 To Rosse 1 1 , Ydi goras was on l y a "pseudo-

anticommunisr." Mariano Rossell y Arellano, Funeral
Oration, "El seudo-Anticommunism," Guatemals, July 7,
1958. This document is in the possession of the
author.
-
53 Iglesia de 10s Pobres en America Central, pp. 202-
203.
 At this time Father Mario Casariego was
appointed assistant bishop in Guatemala. This fact is
o f special interest because Casariego eventually became
the most important figure in the Guatemalan church
until his death in 1983. His appointment was the
product not only o f his good relationship with John
XXIII, but also corresponded t o the fact that he was
not opposed t o receiving a larger number of foreign

clerics in Guatemala.
During this time the church was very

energetic and continued the process of proselytizing

through eucharistic congresses. For example, in 1959
it held a Central American Eucharistic Congress where
delegates from all o f Central America were present.
Significantly, the special representative o f the Pope
was Cardinal Spellman of New York, who had been
Castillo Armas's close friend.54

At the same time, such lay organizations as

Catholic Action became dedicated t o apostolic work in

54 Mariano Rossell y Arellano, Funeral Oration, En el

segundo aniversario de la muerte de Castillo A r m s ,
Guatemala, July 26, 1959. This document is in the
possession o f the author.
the rural areas.55 New religious groups arrived in
the country and worked intensively to fill the vacuum
that was present. With this in mind, they tried t o
incorporate middle class families into a program of
active religious life. Such was the beginning in 1961
of the Christian Family Movement, a branch of Catholic
Action aimed at involving married couples, preferably
together, in carrying on the apostolic mission. it
emphasized the sanctity of matrimony and other
sacraments where family participation was requested.
In addition, the Maryknolls taught the

clerics through a series of workshops called

"Christianization courses" (1963:. which were later
offered to laymen to enable them to participate in the
secular apostolic program. Socioeconomic justice and
charity (within a reformist. not revolutionary,
context, of course) were important aspects. These
movements integrated the middle class of all the
departments of the republic into a program that became
known as the Secular ~~ostolate.56

55 Bruce Calder. Crecimiento y cambio de la iqlesia

catolica, pp. 87-105.
5b The same occurred in other Latin American countries
among this type of organization. In Colombia, the
bishops' pastoral letters promoted them as they sought
 All apostolic lay organizations were also
revitalized under the pastoral effort. Laymen and
priests frequently held spiritual exercises. Hundreds
of persons attended religious education courses; they

met to become acquainted with the liturgical changes

called for by the Second Vatican ~ouncil.57 At the
same time, the first masses in the Spanish language
were held. During this period, the church continued
growing, and in 1961, the Catholic university of Rafael
Landivar was established. The National Catholic
Secretariat was also established as part of the
Episcopal Conference.
Two other external factors, the Vatican and
the government of the United States, played a decisive
role, along with the Guatemalan religious elite who had
supported Rossell, in the developmental process of the

a closer harmony between social classes. They also

sought to avoid moral decadence which, according to
them, constituted the basis of all social problems. In
Peru these workshops influenced the military's
modernization program. See Daniel H. Levine, Reliqion
and Politics in Latin America, pp. 235-239, and Thomas
Maloney, The Catholic Church and the Peruvian
Revolution: Resource Exchanqe in an Authoritarian
Setting, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Texas at
Austin, 1978, pp. 154-158.
57 Agust in Estrada. Datos para la hi stor ia de 1 a
iqlesia, Vol. 111, pp. 647-650.
church.58 The Vatican could not afford the luxury of
Guatemala falling into the hands of atheistic
Communism. a situation that almost occurred during the
1944 to 1954 period.59 On the other hand. the
government of the United States also had political and
ideological interests committed t o the establishment

and permanence of a strong pro-capitalist and pro-

Lestern alliance.60 For this reason, the United
States felt an anti-Cormunist Catholic Church was a
necessary ally.
The desire t o influence the Guatemalan church

and to transform it into a modern anti-Cormunist

institution was made possible by the economic aid
contributed by the United States and the large numbers
of foreign priests and nuns who arrived in the country.
Later, the Vatican. acting through the Second Vatican
Council, and the government of the United States.
acting through the Alliance for Progress. were to
contribute to the future process of change and growth
of the Guatemalan Catholic Church.

5* Bruce Calder. Crecimiento y cambio de la iglesia

catolica, pp. 48-49.
3y Richard Adams, Crucifixion by Powerr p. 282.
Richard immzrman. The CIA in Guatemala, pp. 68-
100.
 Final'ly, it is worth mentioning here that the
Guat ema lan elite, ass isted by the infiuence and
resources of the United States and the Vatican, tried
very hard t o revitalize the Catholic Church in
Guatemala. Their purpose was to convert the church
into an anti-Comnunist bulwark and a defender of the
status quo.
It is interesting to note in this respect

that the agglutination of the various foreign and

national pressure groups involved in the revitalization
of the church was spurred on by a supposed threat of
Communism, because this ideology signified a danger to
the existing economic system of the country and a
threat to the religious values of the Vatican ss well
as to the welfare and stability of the upper class in
Guatema 1 a.
Physically, the decentralization process of
the church continued. Thus, in July 1961,
Huehuetenango was separated from the Diocese of San
Marcos and became the Apostolic Prelacy of the
Archdiocese of Guatemala. Five years prior to this
date, Esquipulas had also been constituted as a
prelacy. (See Map No. 6.)
 The number of priests continued increasing.
For example, the 1962 census presented the following
data: parishes and chaplaincies, 326; priests (secu-
lar and regular), 409; religious in 20 comunities,
460. There were 20 male religious r o i i ~ m n i t S e s$hat
included 263 priests and 1 1 1 laymen, 48 schools for
boys, 58 schools for girls, 29 beneficient
associations, 17 pious associations, and 9 lay
groups. 6 1

It is necessary t o mention once more. that the

foreign clergy, who were better prepared and had mcre

financial resources* became a valuable part of the
growth of the Guatemalan Catholic Church. However, as
I stated before, the majority of foreign priests showed
little interest in promoting the process of change such
as was later requested by Vatican 11.62

From 1960 on, Archbishop Rossell y Arellano

was silent. He did not issue any exhortations,

6 1 Agustin Estrada, Datos para la historia de la

iziesia, Vol. 1 1 1 , p. 650.
Richard Adams, Crucifixion by Power, p. 283.
MAP NO. 6

5 - ~ o l o i a
6 - San M a r c o s
7 - Quetzaltenango
8 - Esquipulas Prelacy
9 - E l Peten
( A p o s t o l i c Admin.)
10 - Huehuetenango
(Prelacy)
Source: Prepared by t h e
a u t h o r on t h e b a s i s o f Diocesan l i m i t s
data provided by t h e
A r c h b i s h o p r i c of G u a t e m a l a .
----- Departmenta 1
l i m i t s
authoritative addresses, or pastoral letters. This
silence was maintained until 1963, when Rossell
addressed the faithful on the celebration of the fourth
centenary of the death of the first archbishop of

Guatemala, Francisco Marroquin. It is probable that

the archbishop's silence was caused by health problems,
although there were individuals who thought the silence
was caused by Casariego. In spite of the fact that
relations between Rossell and Casariego were cordial,
their strong personalities did not permit truly
harmonious relations. Therefore, it is possible that
because of Rossell's poor health, Casariego managed to
impose his opinions and thus forced Rossell to maintain
si lence.
Relations between church and state during
Ydigoras's time were cordial. A cooperative scheme was
maintained and, in effect, there was no evidence of
great conflict- Nevertheless, on a personal level they
did not seem that cordial. Rossell severely criticized

Ydigoras for pursuing unsupported methods of stopping

Comunism and for not promoting social justice.
Even though it is true that during this
period the social program of the church, in its
developmental phase, never questioned the social,
political, and economic structures of the country, a
series of internal contradictions felt within the
church were beginning to sprout. This was due to the
degree of involvement shown by some priests. In their
struggle to fight for the eradication of misery, these
priests had distanced themselves from the pastoral
model that initially had sponsored their arrival in the
country. Elsewhere, the interpenetration of the
secular movement into the national reality distanced
the hierarchy of the church from these movements.
A military coup overthrew Ydigoras in 1963,
the leaders giving as their reason for the coup the
terrible state of corruption existing in government.

Ydigoras's successor, Enrique Peralta Azurdia,

maintained good relations with the church at the

personal as well as institutional level. During his

term there was a close cooperation between both
institutions. Both the church and the state had the
same goals: anti-Communism, a desire for stability,
and a type of education that might be religious.
Likewise, the model exemplifying Cnristianization
continued to be promoted, albeit with restraining
structures. John XXIII died during this year and was
succeeded by Paul VIT who continued the council's
programs. In spite of i l l health, Rossell travelled to
Rome to participate in the sessions.
During Peralta Azurdia's administration there
was a schism in the leadership of the Guatemalan
Christian Democratic party provoked by Peralta
Azurdia's proposal t o have the Christian Democrats
participate in a distribution of congressional seats
that was supposed t o take place.63 For this reason.

the question of supporting Colonel Peralta Azurdia

divided the Christian Democratic party into
conservative and progressive forces. The former became
identified with anti-Communist ideology and were
closely interrelated with the local bourgeoisie. The
latter were more inclined t o establish a closer
relationship with the popular sectors of the nation.
From the date of that schism, the Christian
Democrats separated from the Guatemalan C&holic
hierarchy and adopted, up until today, a position of
total independence from the church. It should be
mentioned here that the Guatemalan Christian Democratic

63 Politica y Sociedad. USAC, p. 42.

party had always been in close touch with the
ecclesiastical hierarchy. This was most probably the
result of the personal and friendly relations that some
of the leaders and founders of the party had with
Rossel 1 .
The party's closeness to the Catholic Church
is also evident in the fact that up to 1964 the
Christian Democratic party in Guatemala had adopted the
principles of the encyclicals "Rerum Novarum" and
"Mater et Magistra." By adopting these guides they

were demonstrating their preoccupation with the dignity

of man and the improvement of the conditions
surrounding his life.
Another consideration revealed that the

emergence in 1964 of the Episcopal Conference of

Guatemala, composed of this country's bishops,
initiated a new kind of relationship within the
Guatemalan Catholic Church, This situation some day
would favor a more flexible communication process
between the hierarchy and the remaining priests.
However, up to that date the traditional internal
relations had practically precluded a more efficient

type of organization or communication.

 During Peralta Azurdia's term of office, the
church continued growing, considerably increasing the
number of diocesan priests and clerics. Better
coordination among certain sectors of the church's
hierarchy was set in place in order to comply with the
Vatican's call for the church t o "update" itself.64

One important feature of the Peralta Azurdia

administration was the appointment of Mario Casariego
as coadjutor archbishop, holding the right of
succession to the metropolitan see of Guatemala, which

occurred in November 1963.65 This appointment was of

vital importance because Casariego became the principal
leader of the Guatemalan Catholic Church after Rossell
y Arellano's death.
A year later, in 1964, there wss much
activity geared to establishing episcopal conferences
at the naticnal and Central American levels. These
conferences took place in Guatemala and Costa Rica, and
were intended t o achieve the implementation of the
reforms proposed by the council as well as serve as a

6 4 Iqlesia de 10s Pobres en America Central, pp. 2 0 5 -

206.
65 Agust in Estrada, Datos para la hi storia de la
islesia, Vol. 111, p. 671.
means of modernizing the church. Rossell, in spite of
his bad health, attended the sessions and even traveled
to Rome by the en3 of November. That year he
celebrated a Silver Jubilee as archbishop of Guatemala.

Many ceremonies were prepared to celebrate the

anniversary and all sectors of society participated.
Unfortmately, the celebration never took place because
Rosse! ! d i e * cn D e c ~ z + b e rloth of that year. Large
numbers of Catholics attended his funeral.
During Rossell's tenure as archbishop, we can
observe the transition of a bucolic era, It began with
pastora 1 activity, went through the political and
aggress ive years, and finished in an era of silence.
Rosse 1 1 remained an anti-Communist and a protector of
private property, Perhaps because he was pressured by

events of an international scope, he seemed t o have

turned more progressive in his last writings.
More than anything, Guatemala needs to
increase welfare benefits for its workers
and peasants. It has to increase the
purchasing power of salaries. For this
purpose it should create cooperatives that
can sell products to workers and the labor
class in general. If necessary, it must
intervene against companies who exploit the
worker or the national welfare. It must in-
crease agricultural production, intervening
in cases where the owners delay the process.
Where intolerable abuse is perpetrated, great
 decisions must be made. The resources of
Guatemala should be used to benefit all
Guatemalans. Therefore, when because of
avarice or incompetence of one or many
people who utilize the resources for their
exclusive personal benefit at the expense of
the welfare of the rest of the people. the
state has the obligation to take action.
This lack of intervention caused the spread
of Coirmunism, because wherever there is
social injustice, there will be a focus on
the preaching of Communism.66
Another important aspect was the fact that at
the time of Rossell's death, the Guatemalan church was
in the full process of growth (physically, there were
more churches. more dioceses, more seminaries).
Nevertheless, the foundation that supported the
organization, the programming, and the personnel were
too weak at the national level, which caused the church
to lose members during the following two decades.
These Catholics fell into the hands of the church's
greatest enemies: Marxism and Protestantism.

As far as legislative measures were

concerned, in 1965, the 1956 Constitution was abolished
and a new one was drafted. As usual, the Catholic
groups began lobbying on behalf of the church's

66 Mariano Rossell y Arellano, Message to the People

of Guatemala. "En pro del bienestar social futuro de
Guatemala," delivered j ~ s tbefore the presidential and
congressional elections, Guatemala, October 15, 1957.
This document is in the possession of the author.
interests. This time they were awarded new
concessions: the articles concerning freedom of
worship and those permitting the church to retain
property were confirmed. A declaration stated that the

teaching of religious education in national schools was

of general interest. The Catholic university was
liberated from academic control by the national
university. Religious marriages became legally valid.
Even though the constitution was finished and published
after Rossell's death, he received credit for what the
church achieved. Almost every law he had ever wanted
for the church was reflected in this constitution.67

Thus he had practically left the church in a privileged

position. (For an analysis comparing the two
constitutions, see the following outline.)
1956 CONSTITUTION !965 CONSTITUTION
Invoked God Invoked God
Article 23 Article 27
Pol itical parties are free The state guarantees the
to organize and function organizakien and func-
according to democratic tion of all politicai
principles. The organi- parties whose regulations
zation and function of and principles are demo-
all entitles promoting cratic. The organiza-
the Communist ideology tion or function of
67 Constitution of 1965, i n 0 i ciesto Const i tuc i ona 1 ,
pp. 383-4.38.
or that of any other parties or institutions
totalitarian system is that promote the Commu-
forbidden. nist ideology or that
through their doctrines*
activities, or interna-
tional connections act
against the sovereignty
o f the state or the basic
democratic organization
o f Guatemala are hereby
forbidden.
Art icie 53 Article 63

The right t o meet peace- The right t o meet peace-

ful ly and without bear- fully and without bear-
i ng arms is recognized. ing arms is recognized.
Open air meetings and The rights t o meet as
public manifestations well as public dernon-
may not be restricted, strations may not be re-
diminished, or stopped. stricted, diminished, or
The law shall regulate stopped and the law shall
them with the sole ob- regulate them with the
Sective o f guaranteeing sole objective o f guar-
public order. Religious anteeing public order.
processions outside the Religious processions
temples are permitted as outside the temples are
long a s they abide by permitted as long as they
the law. abide by the law.

Article 51 Article 66

The practice o f all reli- The liberty t o practice

g i ons i s guaranteed. all religions is hereby
All persons have the guaranteed. All persons
right t o manifest their have the right t o prac-
religion or creed, indi- tice their religion or
vidually or collectively, belief, in public or in
in public or in private, private, by teaching,
by teaching. worshipping, worshipping, and obser-
and observance without vance without any other
other limitations than limit than peace* morals,
peace and public order. the public order, and
All associations and respect for all patriotic
reiigious groups as well symbols. All associa-
as the ministers of these tions or religious groups
churches may not inter- are hereby forbidden from
vene in politics. intervening in partisan
pol itics. The ministers
of these churches may
not be active members in
partisan politics.

Article 50 Article 67

The churches of all The Catholic Church and

creeds are hereby recog- other churches are hereby
nized as legal entities, recognized as legal
enabling them to pur- entities. They may pur-
chase and possess prop- chase and possess prop-
erties and to use them as erties and use them as
long as they are utilized long as they are des-
exclusively for religious tined for religious pur-
purposes. social welfare. poses, welfare. or edu-
or education. The right cation. Their immovable
to become a legal entity goods w i 1 1 be exempt from
will be determined by taxes. contributions. and
its institutional rules excise fees. The
and constitutional church's legal entity
basis and will become will be determined by
approved in accordance its regulations and con-
with the laws of the stitutional basis. The
republic. The declara- state will extend to the
tion of these rights does Catholic Church property
not affect the status of titles for immovable
existing immovable goods goods that it now
at the time of publica- possesses and uses for
tion of the constitution. its own practical pur-
poses. Properties regis-
tered favor ing th ird
parties may not be
affected nor those regis-
tered to favor the state
that m y have been used
in its service.
Article 97 Article 93
The freedom to teach and The freedom to teach and
to implement educational to implement educational
criteria is guaranteed. criteria is guaranteed.
The law will regulate The teaching of religion
religious teaching in in government buildings
government buildings. remains optional. Reli-
The state will not gious education may be
sponsor it and declares taught within the'regular
it as optional. schedules of public as
well as private institu-
tions, Civic, moral, and
religious teaching is
declared in the national
interest. The state may
contribute to the support
of the latter without
discrimination.

Article 106 Article 102

The establishment and All private existing

functions of other universities are hereby
universities in the recognized. Others may
country are freely per- be established in order
mitted. However, it is t o contribute to the de-
indispensable that their velopment of superior
organization a s well as education in the nation
any examinations, curri- and professional educa-
cu 1 a eva 1 uat i on, and tion... The Council for
accreditation of titles Private Superior Educa-
and diplomas extended by tion is in charge of
them become approved by approving the establish-
the Uni versidad de San ment of private universi-
Carlos de Guatemala. ties. certifying their
statutes, and authorizing
their operations. after ,

the Universidad de San

Carlos de Guatemala has
i ssued a statement i 13
this respect and the
executive has so indi-
cated according to the
agreement made by the
president of the republic
and his cabinet minis-
ters,
Article 14i Article 164
To b e ~ a n ea represen- The following may not
tative, it is required become representatives...
that...the candidate be 7) Ministers of any
a layman and older than religion or creed.
21 years old.
Article 160 Article 184
To become elected presi- The following may not
dent, it is required that become elected president
,..dl the candidate be a of the repubic...5) Min-
1a w n . isters of any religion
or creed.
Article 172 Article 200
To become minister of The followin2 may not
state, it is required become ministers of
that...^) the candidate state,..5) Ministers of
be older than 30 years any religion or creed.
of age and that he belong
to the secular state.
Mario Casariego was appointed successor to
Mariano Rossell y Arellano, and was in charge of the
office as Archbishop of Guatemala until his death on
June 15, 1983. Casariego's term was extremely
important to the modernization process of the country
because, precisely during his term, certain sectors of

the church in Guatemala made a serious attempt at a

popular political mobilization program that
contemplated integrating the masses within the
decision-making political process of the country. Seen
from this perspective, various sectors within the
Guatemalan Catholic Church now played an important role

as they tried to transfer the center of gravity of the

decision-making process, moving it away from the elite
into the hands of the masses.
Naturally. this attempt to raise the
consciousness and to mobilize the population in order
for them to participate directly within the political
process of the country took place amidst an environment
of conflict and violence. Both conflict and violence
were the result of the awakening of a popular
consciousness, which, as it became organized, began to
demand its rights amidst a system that traditionally
had left large segments of the population at the margin
of economic integration, social injustice. and
political repression. Within this context we must

remember that there is an interconnection between the

modernization process and violence. Thus, in general.
countries that struggle daringly t o modernize
themselves have to submit to a process of
institutionalization, which, in most cases, produce
accompanying disorder, instability. and political
violence.
In like manner, the Guatemalan Catholic
Church tried to initiate, along with its characteristic
pattern of growth developed since the 1944 Revolution.
a parallel process of change that would place the
Catholic Church on the side of the oppressed and the
marginal ized.
Unlike his predecessor Rossell, Casariego was
not able to exercise total authority over the
ecclesiastical hierarchy of the country as a result of
the administrative decentralization of the church.
Therefore the position of headship of the Guatemalan
Catholic Church did not give Casariego the maximum or
total authority in the country because the dioceses

.
were autonomous among themse 1 ves 68 Even though
Casariego was archbishop and even though his
archdiocese had the largest number of parishes and

religious persons, this did not give him enough

authority over the other dioceses. The remaining
dioceses were led by the will of their respective
bishops* and they depended only on the Vatican. The
nuncio acted as intermediary.
Casariego himself explained the situation in
this way,

68 In effect, at each diocese the bishop in charge has

the last word. The archbishop consequently has a
limited capacity to influence the affairs of these
dioceses .
 The Pope appoints as archbishop a prelate
designated for a metropolitan see, as in the
case of Guatemala. Here, the person occupy-
ing the see of the capital of the republic
is appointed as archbishop. Nevertheless.
he has no other jurisdiction except that
which corresponds to him. At present, the
Archbishopric of Guatemala includes the
Departments of Guatemala, Sacatapequez, and
Santa Rosa.... Consequently, it is erroneous
to think or believe that the archbishop is
the head of the Guatemalan church.69

Bishops as well as archbishops exercise their

authority throughout the territory covered
by the diocese, but not outside its limits...
even when they have to perform religious
ceremonies in another diocese, they must
first request permission from the bishop
who rules that particular territ0ry.7~

Nevertheless, although it is true that

Casariego had no overall control over the ecclesias-

tical hierarchy, one must not underestimate his
influence. especially in a country like Guatemala where
the archbishop's authority was always, and continues to
ber of importance. In this respect, it is necessary to
recall that unconsciously the people continue to
remember the days when the archbishop of the Guatemalan

69 Mario Casar i ego, Cuarta I nstruct ion Pastora 1 :

Acerca de la orqanizacion Y qobierno de la iqlesia con
ocasion de celebrarse oficialmente en la arquidiocesis
el I1dia del Papa", Guatemala, July 16, 1978, in Cartas
pastorales y discursos, Vol. IV, 1975-1980, n.d., n.p.,
D. 177.
archdiocese was the only bishop who controlled the
entire country.
During Casariego's time in office, the
number of priests continued to increase. Therefore, in

1981 there were 22 maie orders and 41 female orders in

the archdiocese alone.71 The major part of these

orders conducted missions, schools, hospitals, and held
pastoral services in the remainder of the republic.
Compared to Rossell, Casariego's term, in
spite of his traditional stand. was characterized more
by a process of change than by one of growth. Among
the elements that promoted the process of change within
the G2atem=!sn Cethelic C h ~ r c h ,the most important ones
were of a doctrinal nature, such as the Second Vatican
Council and the Medellin assembly. Both meetings
served as programs for action and were used by some
priests who, basing themselves on the principles set
forth by Vatican I 1 and Medellin, attempted t o modify
the national structure according to their capabilities
and interpretation of the facts.
Influence from abroad was still felt. The

7 1 Archdiocese Directory, Guatemala, 1981. This

document is in the possession of the author.
United States continued trying t o guide the country

within the parameters of the development process. At

times they participated in programs or with
international organizations involved in development,
such a s the Alliance for Progress, ROCAP, and AID.
Finally, the foreign influence was also felt as a
result of the assistance provided by international
religious organizations such as Catholic Relief
Service, Caritas, Adveniat, Miserior, and Oxfam.
Casariego entered domestic politics at the
time of Col. Enrique Peralta Azurdia's de facto
government in 1966. A new constitution was being
drafted and as was pointed out before, it was favorable
t o the church and permitted a fast-paced increase of
educational religious institutions and proselytizing
activity.

When Julio Cesar Montenegro was elected

president, among the various problems he had t o
confront was a guerrilla movement that had begun in the
rural zone in 1960. This movement was i e a by
malcontent military leaders who had taken up arms t o
secure power, reform the army, and eventually institute
a new social and economic order.72
With the assistance of the United States, the
government almost managed t o destroy the movement.
Nevertheless, its destruction generated a curve
of violence, repression, and political assassinations
that affected all sectors of the population.
The four years from 1966 t o 1970 were very
difficult for Casariego, and signalled the initiation
of religious violence. For example, 1967 and the
beginning of 1968 produced the case o f the Maryknoll
revolutionaries (See Chapter VII). In March 1968, even
Casariego became a victim of public violence; he was
kidnapped. (See Chapter I V . )
During Mendez Montenegro's government the
kidnaping and assassination of Ambassadors John Gordon
Main from the United States and Karl von Spretti of
Germany took place. There was increased violence in
the country; at the same time, these deeds opened up

the doors t o greater involvement by the government of

the United States in the domestic affairs of the
country. The objective o f the kidnappings perpetrated

.
72 Susanne Jonas and Dav i d Tob i s , eds , Guatemala : Una
historia inmediata, Siglo XI1 Editores, Mexico City,
1976, p. 295.
by the guerrilla groups was the exchenge of leftist
political prisoners held by the government for the
ambassadors.73
From 1970 t o 1974 Guatemala was governed by
Carlos Manuel Arana, a military man who became famous
for the annihilation of guerrilla groups occupying the
eastern zone of the country. Throughout these years,
the leftist insurgents and the violent groups of the
extreme right accelerated the conflict. The government
applied rigorous measures t o pacify the nation,
including assassination, death, torture, and the
disappearance of thousands of Guatemalans who were
sacrificed without mercy in the name of the "national
security1*doctrine. Following an alignment similar t o
church versus state relations during the term of Mendez
Montenegro, relations under Arana remained at the

cooperational level.
The government o f the United States, besides

collaborating in counterinsurgent activities during the

Mendez Montenegro and Arana governments, contributed an
enormous quantity of economic and technical resources
t o support activities related t o the development of the

73 Ibid., pp. 313-314.

country. These resources were used, among other
things, to construct schools and roads and to
distribute land according to a colonization prograrn.74

New elections took place in 1974, won

fraudulently, some say, by the official candidate,
General Kjell Eugenio Laugerud.75 Laugerud attempted
t o continue the hard line established by Arana, but was
less successful. Personal as well as official
relations between Laugerud and Casariego were
excellent.
During 1975, a new guerrilla movement began
operations in Quiche. This group became known as
Ejercito Guerrillero de 10s Pobres (Guerrilla Army of
the Poor, EGP). According to more recent information,
this group was supported by some religious
personnel.76

An unforeseen event, the earthquake that

74 Ibid., p. 316.
75 The principal cha 1 1 enger, and poss i bl e winner, was
General Efrain Rios Montt, a candidate considered to be
left of center. This general participated in the 1982
coup and proclaimed himself president. He governed
with such extreme harshness that his government can
hardly be called left of center.
76 Jonathan Fried, Marvin E. Gett 1 eman, Deborah T.
Levensor, and Nancy Peckenhan, eds., Guatemala in
Rebellion: Unfinished History. Grove Press, Inc., New
York, 1983, p. 219.
occurred on February 4, 1976, temporarily broke up all
insurgent and counterinsurgent activity in the country.
The earthquake was seen as the evidence of the spread
of misery and became known a s "the earthquake of the
poor." In our opinion, the earthquake marked the
beginning of the revitalizing forces of the evangelical
churches in relation t o the Catholic Church. The
evangelical churches were provided with significant
economic resources and great motivation. They were
able t o reach the areas most affected by the
earthquake, and benefitted from an exchange of
assistance for massive conversions.

Casariego suffered from a stroke in April o f

the same year, but this did not deter him from
continuing his efforts on behalf o f reconstruction.
With this goal, he reorganized the administration of
the archdiocese. He brought new life to the collection
of funds by increasing the fees for religious services
and demanding that churches pay for curial fees..
Furthermore, he created a Public Relations Office as
part of the archdiocese. In addition, he promoted and
obtained assistance from Spain, Italy, Germany, the
United States, the Vatican, and the religious orders
whose headquarters were located stroad.77

In this re2srdt m e c f the most important

economic contributions came from Adveniat (Germany),
which gave $3,375,382.55 (the quetzal was then at par
value with the U.S. dollar). This amount was
distributed among various religious orders, committees,
and representatives of organizations, This funding was
not only used for reconstruction but it also paid for
the purchase of equipment, books, personnel training,
and religious instruction.78

On the other hand, Casariego's secular

friends a1 so becanie a source o f financial and mora 1
support during the reconstruction period. Among them
were W. Widmann, J. Maegli, C. Gonzales Barrios,
P. Aycinena, 6. Lodder, A. Obiols, J.M. de la Riva, and

77 "Boletin eclesiastico de la arquidiocesis," Ano

XII, NO. 43, July, August, September 1976; Ano XIII,
No. 4, October, November, December 1977; Ano XIV, Nos.
50, 51, 52, April-December 1378; Ano XV, No. 53,
January, February, March 1979; Nos..55-56, July-
December, 1979; Ano XVI, No. 57, January, February,
March 1980,
78 ''Boletin eclesiastico de la arquidiocesis," Ano
XIV, No. 49, January, February, March 1978; Ano XV, No.
53, January, February, March, 1979; Ano XVI, No. 5,
April, May, June 1980; Ano XVI, No. 60, October,
November, December 1980; Ano XVIII, No. 66, April, May,
June 1982; Ano XVIII, No. 6, October, November,
December 1982.
K.M. Ordonez. With the support o f these donors,
financing for the reconstruction o f the principal
seminary and two housing projects for poor families was
secured.
The reconstruction period, set in full force
by 1978, coincided with the call t o the episcopal
meeting at Puebla that had offered great hope t o the
liberal sectors o f the church, but Pope John Paul I 1
was t o give it another direction.
It is at this time that the religious who
were left, probably frustrated because they had not
achieved ofFicial sanction for their actions, began a
series of extra-institutional activities such as

peasants taking over churches and land under the

direction of religious groups.
Coincidentally, during the latter part of
Kjell Laugerud's government, on May 29, 1978, there
occurred what is known as the "Panzos Massacre," where
more than 140 peasants were massacred by the national
army. This and other incidents, some of which were not
a s well known but which could have been more important
because they involved larger numbers of people and
covered a vast expanse of territory, produced
repression against the priests. This repression was
manifested by priests being expelled from the country,
disappearing, or being murdered.
In July 1978, General Romeo Lucas Garcia
succeeded Kjell Eugenio Laugerud after fraudulent
elections were held. Romeo Lucas's government was
characterized by pervasive corruption, repression, and
violence. During his term, Amnesty International
declared a boycott against the country and tried to
discourage tourism. an important source of revenue for

Guatemala. Jimmy Carter's administration in the United

States also called attention to the fact that Guatemala
was violating human rights.
It was during Romeo Lucas's government that
the Embassy of Spain was taken over on January 31,
1980. Government troops assaulted the Spanish Embassy,
which had been occupied by a group of peasants, and 39
peasants died under fire. This attack, as well as the
Panzos massacre, was prooF of the brutality and degree
of repression these governments conducted.

Another symptom of this malaise was the

systematization of the repression conducted against the
Guatemalan Catholic Church during the Lucas
administration. At the same time, sharp contradictions
arose within the ecclesiastical hierarchy concerning
the role that the church was to follow in the current
transformation of Guatemalan society.
This conflict also separated certain
conservative sectors within the ecclesiastical
hierarchy from the secular movements. The latter

movements were made up of popular elements, which

differed from the manner in which they had been
organized during Rossell y Arellano's era. Besides,
they were more independent and involved in the process
of soc i a i change.
The various guerrilla factions also unified
their progress and coordinated their operations during
Lucas Garcia's tenure. Militarily, they consolidated
under the Union Revolucionaria Guatemalteca (Guatemalan
Revolutionary Union, URNG) in January 1982.
Politically they united as the Comite Guatemalteco de
Unidad Patriotica (Guatemalan Committee for Patriotic
Unity) in February of the same year.79

79 George Black, in collaboration with Milton Jamail

and Norma Chinchilla, in "Guatemala, the War Is Not
Over: The Road from Ixcan," in NACLA Report on the
Americas, Vol. XVII, No. 2, March/April 1983, pp. 9-
10.
 This was perhaps one o f the bloodiest and
most repressive periods in the history of the country.
Casariego's role during this time demonstrated his
political expertise, as he was able to maintain good

relations with the government. Nevertheless, for many

people this ability was synonymous with disloyalty and
inconsistent with the true role the Catholic Church was
supposed t o assume at that time.
The situation had become so intolerable that
in March 1982 certain army factions overthrew the
government and Efrain Rios Montt, a general and former
Christian Democrat candidate, assumed power. The
nuncio and the episcopal conference congratulated Rios
Montt. They acknowledged "the difficult and arduous

task" o f trying to lead Guatemala in the path o f

democracy, t o aspire t o resolve problems "through the
necessary structural reform" and to attain peace. In
w d e r t o achieve these objectives, the church f'could
not propose technical solutions that were not relevant

t o its function, but offered its experience . . . . " * O

In the same letter the church requested a

8 0 Boletin Eclesiastico, Ano XVIII, No. 66, April,

May, June 1982, pp. 37, 38, and 39.
guarantee of freedom t o "be able t o develop its
mission" and "to be able t o carry out its program of
humanitarian and Christian assistance t o the numerous
victims of violence."81 Through this document, the
Catholic Church prepared the way t o establish good
relations with the new government, which were
considered necessary in order to avoid the persecution
of priests and because Rios Montt, a self-appointed
president, was a member o f a fundamentalist Protestant
church,
Rios Montt embarked on an exacting campaign
against insurgency and at the same time tried t o
eliminate the prevailing delinquency. To this end, the
president increased military action against the
guerrillas and established special court tribunals that
functioned in secret t o prevent persecution o f its
judges - 8 2

Nevertheless, the country's image abroad had

deteriorated, in part because of the publicity
generated by exiled church members. Among these groups
were members o f the Guatemalan Church in Exile residing
- -

Ibid,
82 Joseph Anfuso and David Sczepansk i , Serv i o o
dictador?, p. 141.
in Nicaragua. the World Council of Churches. the United
States Episcopal Conference. and religious oriented
European organizations.
Attempting t o overcome the poor image that
the country had engendered abroad. the Rios Montt
government and Casariego achieved a measure of success
when Pope John Paul I 1 agreed to visit Guatemala in
March of 1982. The Pope's visit to Guatemala was
nevertheless marred by the execution of several
alleged criminals who were condemned to death by the
special court tribunals. The verdict had received so
much publicity that the Pope himself had interceded on
their behalf and warned that he would suspend the trip

if' his plea were 'not heard. Nevertheless. the sentence

was carried out. In spite of this, the Pope arrived in
Guatemala where he was so warmly received that his
attitude changed during the few days of his stay in the
country.
The pressure of the Pope's visit. the fear
for his security. and the whirlwind of activities
during those days took its toll on Casariego. He

suffered another stroke and was obliged t o diminish the

pace of his activities, He survived for a year and
died on June 15, 1983.
The naming of Casariego's successor
preoccupied many people. Of the possible candidates
for the diocesan see, two of Casariego's closest
collaborators had either died or left Guatemala; they
had been his auxiliary bishops for many years, Mario
Martinez de Lejarra and Ricardo Ham. Another,
Monsignor Jose Giron Perrone, was an elderly man. The
last one, a Casariego protege, had distanced himself
from the archdiocese and was considered to lean too

much to the extreme right. His name was Rodolfo

Quezada Toruno. The auxiliary bishops active at that
time were not considered adequate; they were either too
lifeless or too extremist. In the end, the bishop of
San Marcos. Prospero Penados del Barrio, was appointed.
He was a progressive and perhaps the best suited to the .

historical circumstances of the country and of the

Catholic Church as well.
In conclusion, we can affirm that in spite of
the universal church's effort t o adopt a position
compatible with the modern society of the age, the
Guatemalan Catholic Church during the Rossell y
Arellano era paid little attention to that program,
adopting instead an extremely nationalistic and
conservative attitude. This is the reason the renewal
experienced by the Catholic Church during Rossell's
administration was, more than anything, a process of
physical growth and geographic expansion, a process
whose most important characteristic was perceived t o be
the noteworthy influence that the foreign priests

contributed t o it.
During the Rossell era more dioceses were
established, the number o f priests increased, religious
and lay institutions proliferated, and there were more
written publications and radio broadcasts than ever.
Nevertheless, the church, as a product of its time, was
in reality like an empty shell that nourished itself on
a weak membership who sought salvation through worship

and the sacraments.

During the time Rossell was leader of the
church. his relations with the state swung back and
forth between inherited conflict, competition, and
cooperation. An anti-Communist by conviction, he knew
how t o guide this church through ideological paths that

took away the credibility gained by the efforts of a

whole generation of revolutionary leaders who, at some

point in the history of this country, had envisioned a
better destiny for Guatemala. Rossell's anti-Communism
became an influential element that lent its hand to
legitimizing the postrevolutionary governments that

coexisted with the archbishop as long as he was the

leader of the church.
Among the foreign influences that contributed
to the acceleration of the growth process of the
Catholic Church during Rossell's tenure, we have on the
one hand the Vatican, and on the other, the United
States. In the domestic sphere we have the Guatemalan
business elite influencing the revival of the
institution. Therefore, the Vatican as well as the
United States government and the business elites of the
country grouped themselves in support of the anti-
Communist cause; as they defended their interests, they
became the principal force behind the growth of the
Guatemalan Catholic Church during Rossell y Arellano's
tetrr, c f sffice.

The same foreign elements continued their

contribution to the growth of the church during Mario
Casariego's term, except that, in this case, the

contribution went far beyond the increase in the number

of priests or economic resources. Instead, new
programs and development projects, as in the case of
the United States, and the procedures to renew the
church and the liturgy promoted by the Vatican became
effective.
Within this context, the Second Vatican
Council became a special factor leading to direct
change in the growth process of the Guatemalan Catholic
Church. It pressured certain sectors of the church to
adopt ecclesiastical, pastoral, and political postures
that were to be more compatible with the needs and
aspirations of large segments of the Guatemalan

peop 1 e .
When Archbishop Casariego took his turn as
leader of the Catholic Church, he maintained
cooperative relations vis a vis the state.

Essentially, Casariego, as well as the various

governments with whom he dealt, shared basically the
same emphasis on the need for economic development set
within the structure of an emergent capitalism and the

need to get the church to cocperate as mediator within

the development program.
However, the type of cooperation described
above is personal and individual. A large majority
within the ecclesiastical hierarchy was not in
agreement with the government or was directly against
it. Notwithstanding, Casariego. as archbishop and
spiritual leader, used his political expertise t o guide
the institution and the church members in the direction
he wanted to take. P ~ i i t i c a l l y Casariego's
~ term
evolved amidst constant violation o f human rights
committed by the various governments that were fr i end
to the archbishop, in particular the Lucas Garcia
administration. This period was t o become one o f the
darkest and bloodiest chapters in the history of
Guatema 1 a.
In this respect, it is necessary t o recognize
that during the entire period, Casariego was capable of
maintaining a balance in church-state relations* in
spite of the violence and repression pervading the
times. Now, it is possible that in the search for such

a balance Casariego turned his back on a historical

opportunity that demanded not only the cooperation o f
such a talented man as he was* but required as well a
more sincere and more committed identification with the
peasants and the workers of Guatemala.
 For this reason, at his death we see a
disunited and disoriented Catholic Church, rapidly
losing more members t o the Protestant cause and having
less influence and power t o move about within a
political context that demanded internal cohesiveness,
imagination, or a global conception of what had to be
done and how it could be done as far as religious,
political, social, and economic affairs were
concerned.
 CHAPTER I I I

THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

OF THE REFORMED CHURCH

Before entering into an analysis of responses

given by several different religious elites in relation
t o the normalizing changes proposed by Vatican I 1 and
immediately following an elaboration of events in the
previous chapters, I shall analyze the administrative
structure in which the elites tried t o implement
changes proposed in the above-mentioned responses.
This analysis is of special importance
because factors o f a structural-administrative nature
could, at times. become serious limitations not only

for the development of efficient work at an

ecclesiastical level, but also for the implementation
of certain changing policies. Within this context we
must keep in mind that. in general, structures are not
easily adapted t o renovating efforts or ideas. Also,
in many cases, despite good faith and good will on the
part of reformers, pre-established structures contain
formidable obstacles that disillusion and frustrate
even the most determined.
184
 In addition, an analysis of this type
provides us with pertinent information on a series of
basic data such as the number of priests and their
distribution by diocese and parish. Consistent and
disaggregate figures are difficult, if not impossible,
to obtain from religious institutions in charge of
providing such information.
I have deliberately extended the analysis of
the structural-administrative area of the Guatemalan
Catholic Church despite the fact that the data will
rapidly become outdated because of the continuous flow
of priests. Nonetheless. I consider the critical
situation of the Guatemalan Catholic Church in relation
to the lack of reliable statistics and current
information deserves this effort.
Finally, I have the firm conviction that an
analysis of this kind will provide more material with
which t o evaluate the possibilities and limitations of

efforts carrled out by the Guatemalan religious elite

to bring the church up to d ~ t eat the recommendation of
Vatican I 1 and Medellin.
Within this context. the ffrst area I will
analyze is the decentralization process and the
administrative division of the Guatemalan Catholic
Church, including the results and consequences of these
two aspects. It is necessary to understand that the
Guatemalan Catholic Church slowly decentralized
starting from the colonial period until the beginning
of the 1950s. The Archdiocese of Guatemala, the oldest
in the country, exercised religious authority over all
of Centrai America during the coioniai era. From 1843
to 1921 it covered all of Guatemala; between 1921 and
1950 three more dioceses were created in the country.
After 1950, the structure began to decentralize more
rapidly. For example, between 1951 and 1956, four

dioceses were created, an apostol i c admini strati on, and

a prelature nullius. This comprised a transcendental
step in the decentralization of the Catholic Church
since it marked the possibility of expanding the
church's influence as an institution.1

1 The country is currently divided into the

following: Archdiocese of Guatemala. the Departments
o f Guatemala, Sacatepqeuqz. Escuintla, and Santa Rosa;
Diocese of Quetzaltenango, the Departments of
Quetzaltenango, Totonicapan, and Retalhuleu; Diocese of
Verapaz, the Departments of Alta and Baja Verapaz;
Diocese of Jalapa, the Departments of Jalapa, Jutiapa,
and El Progreso; Diocese of Solola, the Departments of
Solola, Quiche, and Suchitepequez; Diocese of Zacapa,
the Departments of Zacapa, Chiquimula, and Izabal;
Diocese of San Marcos, the Departments of San Marcos
 The rest of the apostolic administrations and
dioceses were created after 1960. The slow initial
development of the church, along with the cultural
values characteristic of an authoritarian and
hierarchical past, worked toward strengthening the
image o f the archdiocese. That, along with the
archbishop, constituted the highest authority o f the
church. Even today, the opinions emitted by the

archbishop are taken by many a s the opinions of the

Catholic Church as a whole, when, in reality, not even
the Episcopal Conference o f Guatemala represents the
official voice of the church. As we have seen, the
ecclesiastical authority belongs t o each bishop in his
diocese where he holds real and absolute power and

where only the Pope can intervene.

To understand more clearly the organizing
structure o f the Guatemalan church, it is necessary t o
dissect each jurisdiction according t o the territory
administered by each bishop, the priests that are under
his administration, the number o f parishes, and the

and Huehuetenango; the Apostolic Administration of El

Peten, the Department o f El Peten and the Prelatura
Nullius del Santo Cristo de Esquipulas, which includes
a town in Chiquimula of the same name.
most significant Ecclesial Base Movements (Movimientos
Eclesiales de Base, MEBs) that operate in each diocese.
It is worth mentioning that for reasons of a
theoretical and practical nature that will be explained
later in detail, I prefer to use the term Movimisntos
Eclesiales de Base instead of Ecclesial Base
Communities (Comunidades Eclesiales de Base, CEBs).
Movimientos Eclesiales de Base are those
lay organizations that, having originated from the
people themselves or as an initiative of the
ecclesiastical hierarchy, attempt to achieve a more
active participation from the lay sector, independent
of social class, Catholic Church activities, or its
involvement in propagating an evangelism that is more
committed to the reality of the country, all falling
within the boundaries of respect for hierarchical
values.2

Ecclesiastical Division (See Map No. 7.)

Currently, the Republic of Guatemala is
divided into 13 separate jurfsdictions, one of which,

2 For a broader explanation of this concept, see pp.

183-192 of this disssertation.
the Prelature Nullius of Santo Cristo de Esquipulas, is
connected to and forms a part of the Archdiocese of

Guatemala because of its natural importance.3 In

addition to the archdiocese, there are eight dioceses,

an apostolic vicarage, an apostolic administration, and

an apostolic territorial prelature. The last three,

despite having a special character, are treated as

dioceses and their respective bishops participate in

the Episcopal Conference of Guatemala with equal status

t o the other bishops.4

Each division administers a defined area in

which the only authority, as I have said, is the

bishop. In addition. each one adopts an internal

organization based on its needs and the personnel it

has t o work with. Generally. the organization
corresponds t o the capacity and particular vision of

each bishop and the programs he plans to promote. This

must be taken into account when making a global

3 After this study was carried out, the Prelature

Nullius of Esquipulas became a part OF the Zacapa
diocese. Bula Pontificia Qui Pro Munere Nostro of his
ti01 i ness John Paul I I , gi v m in Rome on June 24, 1986,
and given in Guatemala on November 8, 1986, according
t o the decree 1040186 of the Nunciatura Apostolica.
On Map No. 1 , the boundar i es of eech diocese can be
seen clearly, as well as the departments that compose
them.
 i
MAP NO. 7 ECCLESIASTICAL OIVISION OF GUATEMALA /, /
I -C'
MAP NO. 7 (legend)

Guatemala (archdiocese)

Quetzaltenango (diocese)

Verapaz (diocese)

Jalapa [diocese)

Solola [diocese)

Zacapa (diocese)

San Marcos (diocese)

Peten (apostolic vicarage)

Quiche [diocese)

Huehuetenango [diocese)

Izabal (apostolic administration)

Escuintla (prelature nullius]

analysis of the Guatemalan church. One cannot speak of
uniformity in criteria, attitudes, and/or
ecclesiastical positions in the nucleus of the
Guatemalan Catholic Church, conditions that obviously
create an image of a fragmented and divided national
church.
The personal position of the bishops is also
key to the participation of priests in ecclesiastic
extension activities that can incorporate areas of

worship and/or sacramental administration or areas more

oriented toward social, economic, and socioeducational
promotion. This would depend on the tolerance with
w h i ~ hthe bishop sees these activities, deciding either
to provide the necessary support or to ignore them.

In other words, the degree of modernization

or conservation in a given diocese will depend a great
deal, i f not completely, on the bishop's attitude. It
will be better directed according to the bishop's
vision and capacity to create a rational,
ecclesiastical government in the Weberian sense of the
term or the search for an efficient ecclesiastic
administration that meets the demands of plans intended
to promote the modernization of the administration. On
the other hand, the guarantee of substantial financial
aid and the incorporation of priests and laymen into
different organizations of the diocese and/or
commissions ordered by the bishop, whether they be
temporary or permanent, are factors that also influence
the creation of a better or worse administration of the

diocese.
Table No. 3.1 shows general characteristics
of area* population* density and the year each diocese
was founded. It also shows concretely that it was not
until the 1950s and the 1960s that the Guatemalan
Catholic Church began an accelerated process of
decentralization. The cited decentralization process
obeyed a series of factors* rather than just the
purpose of making it more efficient to administer vast
territories for apostolic reasons. For example, as I
mentioned earlier, the creation of four dioceses and an
apostolic administration in 1951 was the direct
result of a clash between the Guatemalan Catholic
Church and the revolutionary government of Jacobo
Arbenz Guzman, which* according to the hierarchy of the
time. was caused by fear over the spread of atheistic
international Communism and the cold war that dominated
 TABLE NO. 3 . 1
SURFACE AREA AND POPULATION

NAME YEAR AREA POPULA- DENS I T Y

Guatema 1 a 1534 6,078

(Archdiocese)
Quetzaltenango 192 1 4,868
(Diocese)
Verapaz (Diocese) 1935 11,810
Jalapa (Diocese) 1951 7,204
S o l o l a (Diocese) 1951 5,550
Zacapa (Diocese) 195 1 4,534
San Marcos (Diocese) 1951 3,791
Peten ( A p o s t o l i c 1951 35,854
(Vicarage)
Quiche (Diocese) 1967 8,378
Huehuetenango 1968 7,400
(Diocese
Izabal (Apostolic 1968 9,038
(Administration)
Escuintla (Terri- 1969 4,384
( t o r i a 1 Prelature)

T o t a l f o r country 1 08,889
ideological confrontations between the power blocks on
an international scale. The administrative
decentralization and growth, independent of motives,
also brought about an activation of the church in all
fields, particularly in the interior of the country,
causing the incorporation of a great number of foreign
priests, especially from the United States, within the

national church and bringing in a great amount o f

financial resources and priests, including resources
that undoubtedly contributed t o the process of change
and granth o f the GuaLemalan Catholic Church.
The Archdiocese of Guatemala presents the
most favorable conditions to carry out the apostolSc
task for many reasons: among others, the location of
its headquarters in the capital of the republic, which
unites all infrastructure conditions of an urban,
modern area, thus facilitating the mentioned task. It
follows that a better communications system, a larger
number of priests, parishes. and so forth facilitate

reaching, without great effort, a larger number of

believers. In other dioceses. the situation is not as
favorable. Even though they can count on a good number
of priests, the geographic, demographic, and
 196

infrastructura1 conditions do not a llow for an adequate

penetration, a condition that works against the efforts
to coordinate and to plan strategies of an
ecclesiastical nature.
This makes Table No. 3.2 easier to
understand. In it I have tried to categorize the
diocesan territory based on a criteria of geographic

limitations determined by political and administrative

divisions within the republic. One can observe that
even in the interior of the archdiocese. the situation
is not as uniform as one would think considering its
overall conditions.
In the tzble we can clearly see that although
many dioceses are similar in some aspects, more
profound analysis (number of parishes, for example)
shows us that they differ in population and territorial
extension. a condition that affects the levei of
efficiency that the dioceses could have in their
pastoral activities.
Following this train of thought. it is
necessary to snaiyze, based on crc!er of importance, the
general conditions that each one of the ecclesiastical
divisions presents with regard to the number of
 TABLE NO. 3.2
EXTEN-
SION
POPULA-
TION
DEN-
SITY
NO.
PAR-
I NHAB-
ITANTS
SQ. KM
PAR!SH
. PAR I SH
b!AC.
ISHES PARISH DIOC."
(1) (2 (3) (4) (5 (6) (7)

01) Archdiocese of Guatemala

6,078 1,645,481 270.72 111 14,824 54.75 34.04

1.1 Guatemala
2,126 1,311,192 616.74 83 15,797 25.61 74.77

1.2 Sacatepequez
465 121,127 260.48 11 11,011 42.27 9.90

1.3 Santa Rosa

2 965 194,168 65.48 10 19,416 295.50 9.00

1.4 Esquipulas
53 2 18,994 35.70 7 2,713 76.00 6.30

02) Diocese of Quetzaltenango

4,868 722,291 148.37 30 24,076 162.26 9.21

2.1 Quetzaltenango
1,951 366,949 188.08 19 19,313 102.68 63.33

2.2 Totonicapan
1,061 204,419 192.66 7 29,202 151.57 23.33

2.3 Retalhuleu
1,856 150,923 81.31 4 37,730 464.00 13.33

03) Diocese of Verapaz

11,810 437,610 37.05 23 19,026 513.47 7.05

3.1 Alta Verapaz

8,686 322,008 37.07 17 18.941 510.94 73.91

3.2 Baja Verapaz

3,124 115,602 37.00 6 19,267 520.66 26.08
04) Diocese o f Jalapa
7*204 468,347 65.01

4.2 J u t i a p a
3,219 251,068 77.99

4.3 E l Progreso
1,922 81,188 42.24

05) Diocese o f S o l o l a
5,550 621,862 112.04

5.3 Suchitepequez
2.510 237,554 94.64

06) Diocese of Zacapa

4,534 265,581 58.57

6.1 Zacapa
2,690 115,712 43.01

6.2 Chiquimula
1,844 149,869 81.27

07) Diocese o f San Marcos

3,791 472,326 124.59

08) Apostolic Vicarage o f Peten

35,854 131,927 3.67 15 8,795 2390.26

09) Diocese o f Quiche

8,378 328,175 39.17 19 17,272 440.94

10) Diocese o f Huehuetenango

7,400 431,343 58.58 18 23,963 411.11
1 1 ) Apostolic Administration o f Izabal
9,038 194,618 21.53 13 14,970 695.23 3.99

12) Territorial Prelature o f Escuintla

4,384 334,666 76.33 9 37,185 487.11 2.77

NAT I ONAL TOTAL

108,889 6,054,277 55.59 326 18,571 334.01 100.00

( 1 ) The extensions are taken from the DGE Study,

Economic Ministry, Guatemala: Surface Area, Height and
Distance, according t o department and town, Guatemala,
November 28, 1980.

(2) Based o n a national census. IV Habitation, I X

Population, 1981. DGE, M.E., Republic o f Guatemala,
February 1984.

(3) The density is calculated by dividing the extension

by the population o f each place (.?olumn 1 and column
2).
(4) To calculate the number of parishes, the
information was taken from the bishops' questionnaire
of July 1985 (Appendix 11).

(5) Calculated by dividing the total number of

inhabitants by parishes.

(6) Calculated by dividing the parishes by territorial

extension.

( 7 ) This is t h e percentage o f parishes in relation t o

the national total and the percentage o f parishes per
departmen* of the total o f dioceses, except for
Esquipulas, which falls under special conditions.
* In the following tables, the same sources are used,
except where otherwise indicated.
parishes, priests, land area, and other relevant
aspects that, if necessary, could present a more clear
picture of the possibilities and limitations inherent
in the decentralization process that took place in the
Gustemalan Catholic Church.
In order t o be able t o expand on such an
analysis, in view of the lack of recent and reliable
information on the administrative and religious aspects
that I was interested in investigating, I was led to
use, along with data in Table No. 3.2, the results
obtained from e questionnaire that each and every
bishop responded to in July of 1985. It dealt with the
general conditions of their respective dioceses. (For
a copy of the information requested of the bishops, see
Appendix 1 1 . ) The conclusions of this analysis show us
the following.

a) Parishes
The archdiocese constituted a very special
case within the actual conditions of the Guatemalan
Catholic Church. The archdiocese covered the
departments of Guatemala, Sacatepequez, Santa Rosa, and
the town of Esquipulas, site of the Prelature Nullius
of Santo Cristo de Esquipulas. In spite of the fact
that a1 1 these were in different areas, a1 1 the data
gathered tended to favor the Department of Guatemala
because the greatest number of priests, as well as
catechists and members of religious orders, worked in
Guatemala City. Even though one might think that this
favorable situation could exist in the other
departments, this was not the reality. Only the urban
center of Guatemala City was favored.5 and conditions
in the other towns in the department of Guatemala were
the same as in the rest of the country.
It is necessary to clarify that detailed
information was very difficult to obtain by town* since
the latest available statistics from the Catholic
Church, on a local level, were dated 1967* and current
data were nonexistent. This problem was serious to the
degree that there were cases in which not even
department-wide data were available. Thus, the

5 It is important to note that within the same city

there is an imbalance. The urban center (basically
zones 1 and 2) have a great number of parishes and
chapels that attend to a small area, while other parts
of the city have a maximum of two parishes. There are
cases in which highly poptflated zones that were
recently created do not have even one parish. See
Bruce Calder, Crecimiento y cambio de la iqlesia
Catolica, pp. 107-108.
investigator must accept, many times, the only
alternative, working with data on a diocesan level.6
Thus, while the metropolitan area of
Guatemala contained the largest number of parishes and
priests, the rest of the towns in the department of
Guatemala and the departments that comprised the
archdiocese must have had almost the same
characteristics as the rest of the republic, despite
the fact that the Archdiocese of Guatemala included two
territories that were relatively small in area:
Sacatepequez (425 square kilometers) and Esql~ipulas
(532 Square kilometers). This led to a drop in total
proportions when carrying out a comparative analysis.
In addition, one must take into account that
the Capitania General del Reino de Guaternzla was once
the Department of Sacatepequez, and therefore, its

capital also had a great number of parishes, a factor

that considerably increased the number of parishes and
reduced the total parish density throughout the
department (11,011 people per parish in the

department. 1

6 See Diagram No. 3.

7 From here to number "b," the data for the analysis
can be found in Table No. 3.2.
 This condition of macrocephalia can be
verified if we look at the tctal number of parishes
that corresponded to each territory in the archdiocese
on a percentage basis. Of the total, 77.77 percent
corresponded to Guatemala City; 9.90 percent to
Sacatepequez; 9 percent to Santa Rosa; and 6.30 percent
to the town of Esquipulas. The same results appeared
in an analysis on a national level, in which 34.04
percent of all parishes in the republic ( 1 1 1 parishes)
belonged to the archdiocese; 25.46 percent of the
national total (83 parishes) corresponded .to the
department of Guatemala.
The diocese of Quetzaltenango was another

that presented similar characteristics to those of the

archdiocese in the sense that it was the department
that had the best parish conditions in its
jurisdiction. This diocese covered the departments of
Quetzaltenango, Totonicapan, and Retalhuleu.
Retalhuleu had the most disadvantageous conditions,
followed by Totonicapan, w h i l ~quetzaltenango, being
the diocesan headquarters, offered the best conditions.
On a percentage basis, the diocese of Quotzaltenango
had the following characteristics: the department of
Quetzaltenango had 63.33 percent, Totonicapan had 23.33

percent, and Retalhu leu had 13.33 percent o f t h e t o t a l

parishes i n t h e diocese, which represented 9.21 percent

of t h e t o t a l parishe s i n a l l o f t h e r e p u b l i c , occupying

second p l a c e w i t h S o l o l a i n t o t a l number o f parishes

(30 parishes i n a l l ) .

The diocese o f Verapaz, l i k e the previously

mentioned ones, had b e t t e r c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e diocesan

headquarters, which were i n t h e department o f A l t a

Verapaz, than i n t h e r e s t , which i n t h i s case was t h e

department of Baja Verapaz. O f t h e two departments i n

t h i s diocese, 73.91 percent o f t h e parishes were i n

A l t a Verapaz and 26.08 percent i n Baja Verapaz,

representing a n a t i o n a l t o t a l o f 7.05 percent, o r 23

par ishes.

The diocese of Jalapa was composed o f t h e

departments o f Jalapa, Jutiapa, and E l Progreso. It

was t h e o n l y case i n which t h e diocesan headquarters

had fewer parishes i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e othei' departments

i n i t s jurisdiction. The r e l a t i v e s t a t i s t i c s f o r t h i s

diocese were t h e f o l l o w i n g : Jalapa w i t h 33.33 percent;

Jutiapa w i t h 38.88 percent; and E l Progreso w i t h 27.77

percent o f t h e parishes, r e p r e s e n t i n g 5.52 percent of

the national total (18 parishes).
The diocese of Solola, composed of the
departments of Solola, Chimaltenango, and
Suchitepequez, was the one that had the most equal
conditions for each of its departments. Each of the
departments had 33.33 percent of the parishes (10
parishes per department) that added up to a national
total of 9.21 percent. After the archdiocese, it
shared second place with the diocese of
Quetzaltenango.
The diocese of Zacapa was, like Sololar one
that offered similar conditions for the two departments
that made it up. Both Zacapa and Chiquimula each
represented 50 percent of the parishes (18 parishes),
which represented 5.52 percent of the national total.
Sharp contrasts in their populations and area made them
very different.
The rest of the dioceses, apostolic
administrations. spostolic vicarages, and territorial
pi-elatures covered only one department each. Their
national proportions were as follows: diocese of San
Marcos with 6.75 percent (22 parishes); apostolic
administration of El Peten with 4.60 percent (15
parishes); diocese of Quiche with 5.82 percent (19
parishes); diocese of Huehuetenango with 5.52 percent
(18 perishes); apostolic administration of Escuintla

with 2.27 percent (9 parishes). These statistics

varied from those in the Vatican's Pontifical Yearbook,

which are included later in this chapter for comparison
purposes. Our decision to work with these figures was
based on the fact that they were provided by the
bishops in charge of each diocese* which in the long
run resulted in first-hand sources.8

b. priests9

With regard to priests and their

distribution, the statistics tended to favor the same
dioceses. It is clear, though, that it was not the
result of a planned policy to do SO* but from general
conditions of the country. Therefore, based on general
figures, the analysis showed dioceses within political
conflict zones to be the ones with the lowest
correlations. This can be corroborated by analyzing

See Infra* p. 192, for data contained in the

Vatican's Pontifical Yearbook.
9 In this section, information on territorial
areas and population are from Table No. 3.2. The rest
is from Tables 3.4 and 3.5.
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 in a correlating order from bottom
to top.
Thus, we can observe that the diocese of
Quiche, one of the departments most characteristic of
political violence, presented the least favorable
conditions for the Catholic Church to develop its
pastoral task. It not only occupied second place in

the amount of area each parish had to cover (930.80

square kilometers), but it had the highest absolute and
relative numbers of parishes ( 1 0 end 52.63 percent)
that were not attended by a priest. Thus it follows
that Quiche possessed one of the greatest populations
per priest (36.464 inhabitants per priest).
The diocese of Huehuetenango occupied second
place among the departments with favorable conditions.
It had a relatively large area of 7,400 square
kilometers and a high number of parishes that were not
attended by a priest (8 of the 18 parishes). In
addition, its number of priests was low (15 priests).
Here, as in Quiche, we find ourselves in a conflict
zone, which helps to explain the situation. It had the
least number of priests (7 priests) and the greatest
number of believers to be attended by each priest
 TABLE NO. 3.3

NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER SQ.KM. 7" OF % OF

OF OF OF OF PER PAR- PRIESTS
PARISH- P R I E S T S PARISH- BELIEV- P R I E S T ISHES *
ES ES ERS PER it

WITHOUT PRIEST
PR 1 EST
Guatema l a
111 177 -- 9,296 34.33 34.04 40.87

Q u e t z a ltenango
30 52 1 13,890 93.6 1 9.21 12.00

Verapaz
23 45 -- 9,724 262.44 7.05 10.40

Ja l apa
18 28 -- 16,726 257.28 5.52 6.46

Zacapa
18 24 -- 11,065 188.91 5.52 5.54

San Marcos
22 16 6 29,520 236.93 6.75 3.70
Peten
15 10 5 13,192 3585.40 4.63 2.38

Qu i c h e
19 9 10 36.463 930.88 5.82 2.09
Huehuetenango
18 15 8 28,756 493.33 5.52 3.17

I zaba 1
13 12 3 16,218 753.16 3.99 2.78

Escuintla
9 7 2 47,809 626.28 2.77 1.61

TOTALS
326 433 39 13,892 251.47 100.00 100.00
+ The percentages were adjusted t o add up t o 100
percent.

Chart prepared by author according t o i n d i c a t e d

sources. T o t a l f i g u r e s o f t h e dioceses a r e used
because information on each department was n o t
a v a i l a b l e (based on information gathered f r o m bishops
i n J u l y 1985).
 TABLE NO. 3.4

NUMBER NUMBER INHABIT- BELIEVERS SQ.KM. NUMBER OF

OF OF TANTS PER PER PER PAR ISHES
PARISH- PRIESTS PARISH PR IEST PR IEST W ITHOUT
PR i EST

Quiche
19 9
Huehuetenango
18 15
Escuintla
9 7
Peten
15 10
Izaba 1
13 12
San Marcos
22 16
Solola
30 38
Ja 1 apa
18 28
Quetzaltenango
30 52
Verapaz
23 45
Zacapa
18 24
Guatemala (Archdiocese)
111 177 14,824

TOTALS
326 433 18,571

Sources: DGE, Economic M i n i s t r y , 1984, and b i s h o p s '

questionnaire, July 1 9 8 5 ) .

T a b l e p r e p a r e d by t h e author a c c o r d i n g t o i n d i c a t e d
sources.
 TABLE NO. 3.5

EPISCOPAL PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT

D IV IS ION NATION- TOTAL PAR ISH- PR IESTS PAR ISHES
AL NATION- ES AT AT S/SAC.
TERR I - AL NATION- NATION- DIOCESE
TGRY INHABI- A L LEVEL LEVEL
TANTS

E l Quiche
7.70 5.42
Huehuetenango
6.80 7.12
Peten
37.92 2.18
San Marcos
3.49 7.80
Izaba 1
8.30 3.21
Escuintla
4.02 5.53
Soloia
5.10 10.28
Quetzaltenango
4.47 11.93
Ja 1 apa
6.61 7.74
Verapaz
10.84 7.23
Zacapa
4.16 4.39
Guatemala (Archdiocese)
5.59 27.17

TOTALS 100.00 100.00

Source: DGE, E c o n o m i c M i n i s t r y , 1984 and bishops

q u e s t i o n n a i r e , July 1985.

C h a r t p r e p a r e d by t h e author according t o i n d i c a t e d
sources. The p e r c e n t a g e i n the l a s t column r e f e r s t o
t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e t o t a l number o f p a r i s h e s
i n each diocese and t h e n u m b e r of p a r i s h e s w i t h o u t a
priest i n the diocese.
(47,810), despite being the department that ranked 10th
in the national total with regard t o land area (4,384
square kilometers). The conditions presented in
Escuintla did not display problems 07 a political type,
but rather the fact that it had the youngest
administration in the country.

Next is the apostolic vicarage of El Peten,

which was the department with the greatest territorial
extension (35,854 square kilometers) and the most
sparse population in the entire country (131,927
inhabitants), in addition t o being a conflict zone. It
occupied third place in number of parishes not attended
by a priest (5 of 15 parishes), which influenced in a
definite way the general conditions presented by El
Peten.

The apostolic administration of Izabal also

was deficient, even though its general conditions
resulted from the short time it had been operating.
Its area (9,038 square kilometers) and its number of
priests (12) showed that each one had t o cover an

average area of 753.16 square kilometers and attend t o

an average population of 16,218 inhabitants, a
condition that obviously made the pastoral task more
difficult.
The diocese of San Marcos was also in a
conflict zone, which dictated, as in the previous
cases, unfavorable conditions for the development of
missionary work by the Catholic Church. In spite of
being the diocese that occupied the least amount of
physical area (3,791 square kilometers), each of the
few priests (16 priests) had to attend to an average of
29,520 inhabitants in an average area of approximately
237 square k5lometers. This diocese also had a
relatively high number of parishes that did not have
priests (6 out of 22 parishes).
The diocese of Solola covered towns situated

in a conflict zone. Even though it had more priests

than parishes (38 priests and 30 parishes), there were
problems in reaching everyone, since four of the
parishes did not have priests. Despite being the area
of conflict with the best conditions for developing
pastoral activities, each priest attended to only
16,365 believers and to an average area of 146 square
kilometers because of the scarce amount of believers
and territory. It occupied seventh place among
dioceses that offerea the best conditions for carrying
out the church's pastoral and apostolic duties.

Next was the diocese o f Jalapa, where all of

the parishes were attended by a priest (18 parishes and

2 8 priests), but the area covered by each priest

(257.20 square kilometers) and t h e number o f believers

attended by each one (16,724 believers per priest)

made the labor o f each one more difficult than in other

d i oceses .
The diocese of Quetzaltenango, contrary t o

favorable conditions represented by the number o f

parishes and the large number o f priests (521, occupied

ninth place, basically because it had one unattended

parish (probably a fringe area o f a conflict zone). in
my judgment, this was indicative that no diocese met

all conditions for the development o f pastoral work.10

The diocese o f Verapaz, in spite o f its area

(11,816 square kilometers) and a relatively low number

o f parishes (23). was in a favorable position because

l o In considering the number o f priests, one must take

into account the figures from t h e field work and shown
in Appendix 1 concerning the principal activities that
priests carry out, since these could be different from
parish t o administrative duties of the church. This
directly influences parish activity and the attention
that each parish could receive. This is also true of
the other dioceses. See Appendix I.
it had a large number-of priests (45 priests) in

relation t o the number o f parishes. In addition, the

area that had t o be covered by each one and the number

o f believers attended by each were relatively low

(10,820 square kilometers and 9,724 believers).

The diocese of Zacapa, like the Archdiocese

o f Guatemala, met its needs in the number o f priests

attending parishes. Zacapa seemed t o have more

favorable conditions than other dioceses. As I said in

the beginning, the criteria that I have used t o

determine conditions was based on comparisons o f the

general characteristics found in Tables 3.4 and 3.5.

F i na 1 1 y, as I have stated, the Archdiocese of

Guatemala, for all the reasons previously listed, was

t h e one that offered the best conditions for carrying

out its pastoral role.

in presenting a general view o f the

relationship between parishes and priests, only four of

all the dioceses in the country, including the

archdiocese, the administrations, the apostolic

vicarages, and the territorial prelatures, completely

filled their parishes; in other words, at least one

priest attended each parish. These four were the

Archdiocese of Guatemala, and the dioceses of Verapaz,
Jalapa, and Zacapa. Meanwhile, the rest of the
dioceses, administrations, apostolic vicarages, and
territorial prelatures had at least one unattended
parish. The total number of vacant parishes in each
diocese was as follows: diocese of Quetzaltenango, 1;
terr i tor ia 1 pre 1 ature of Escu i nt 1 a, 2 ; aposto 1 ic
administration of Izabal, 3; diocese of Solola, 4;
apostolic vicarage of El Peten, 5; diocese of San
Marcos. 6; diocese of Huehuetenango, 8; diocese of
Quiche, 10. (See Table No. 3.4)
The fact that these parishes were not
attended is not directly related to the quantity of
priests that were under the administration of any given
diocese, administration, apostolic vicarage, or
territorial prelature. If we looked at the correlating
Figures of priests and parishes i n each diocese, we
would see that the number of priests did not
necessarily coincide with the number of parishes that

shou 1 d be attended. l

l 1 This situation, as we have already seen, is the

result of other factors such as the priests' principal
occupation in the diocese in which he carries out his
duties and the favorable or unfavorable conditions that
a parish offers for the execution of parish duties with
 The global figures were as follows:
Archdiocese of Guatemala, 1 1 1 parishes and 117 priests;
diocese of Quetzaltenango, 30 parishes and 52 priests;
diocese of Verapaz, 23 parishes and 45 priests; diocese
of Jalapa, 18 parishes and 28 priests; diocese of
Solola, 30 parishes and 38 priests; diocese of Zacapa,
18 parishes and 24 priests; diocese of San M ~ ~ c o s22
,
parishes and 16 priests; apostolic vicarage of El
Peten, 15 parishes and 10 priests; diocese of Quiche,
19 parishes and 15 priests; apostolic administration of
Izabal, 13 parishes and 12 priests; the territorial
prelature of Escuintla, 9 parishes and 7 priests. (See

Table No. 3.4.112

If we compare these figures with the parishes

that do have priests, we find that there were some
dioceses (Solola and Quetzaltenango) that theoretically

had enough priests. Nevertheless, they had vacant

parishes because not all of the priests in a diocese
dedicated their work to attending to parishes; that is

regard to geographic location, sociopolitical

conditions of the zone, and/or the definition of
interest areas for pastoral attention by the bishops in
charge of each apostolic jurisdiciton.
12 For a graphic picture of the number of priests per
parish, see Tables 1.1 and 1.2.
to say, as pastors; they either had and/or were
dedicated to other activities such as teaching in
seminaries, administering in the curia, serving as
chaplains, and so forth. This was valid for all the
dioceses, since the fact that all parishes were
attended did not mean that the priests did not have
other activities. But the variation in these cases was
basically caused by the fact that the principal
activity of the priests in the parishes correlated with
parochial attention, that is, as pastor, coadjutor,
church administrator, or chaplain.
In the rest of the dioceses, apostolic
admi ni strat ions. apostol i c vicarages, and terr i tor i a 1

prelatures in which there was a deficit (San Marcos, El

Peten, Quiche, Huehuetenango, Izabal, and Escuintla),
this was caused by the fact that there were more
parishes than priests to attend them, except, as we
indicated, in the dioceses of Solola and

QuetzaJtenango.
In general, we can affirm that the Guatemalan

Catholic Church was deficient, considering the number

of parishes not attended by pastors. They constituted
39 of the total 326, or 11.96 percent. The percentage
for each diocese and apostolic administration in some
cases surpassed 50 percent of the parishes. We can

look at these percentages in each diocese as follows:

diocese of Quiche, 52.63 percent; diocese of

Huehuetenango, 44.44 percent; apostolic vicarage of El

Peten, 33.33 percent; diocese of San Marcos, 27.27

percent; apostolic administration of Izabal, 23.07

percent; territorial prelature of Escuintla, 22.22

percent; diocese of Solola, 13.33 percent; and diocese

of Quetzaltenango, 3.33 percent. (See Table No. 3.5)

These figures were highly significant since

they pertained to places that covered very extensive

areas in some cases and contained varying geographic

conditions. However, in general, they were zones that,

away from the departmental capital, were difficult to

reach. Also some of them were located in the areas of

greatest political conflict. Many priests had t o

abandon their parishes in these areas because of a wave

of uncontrolled violence that did not exclude the

Catholic Church. In this respect, it is sufficient to

mention the case of the diocese of Quiche. During the

most conflictive period (the Lucas Garcia administra-

tion), the bishop ss wel! as his pr!ests had to leave
since the region offered no guarantees for them to
develop their apostolic and missionary work.13 The
figures and earlier observations quantified and
depicted in a more concrete way the problem of the
Catholic Church in Guatemala. Moreover, the parish-
priest relationship was a key variable t o a more clear
comprehension of the administrative problem of the
Guatemalan Catholic Church. It showed little presence
o f the church on a national level and limitations
blocking its development, considering that
decentralization had not been reflected in an effective
presence throughout the country.

C) Administration
In addition t o the aforementioned problems,
the decentralization process o f the church also caused

a marked administrative deficiency in the Catholic

Church, which derived from the fact that each diocese,
apostolic administration, and apostolic vicarage
maintained a type o f autonomous self government in
which the only visible hierarchical authority was the

'3 Phillip Berryman, The Relinious Roots of Rebel lion,

pp. 204-205.
bishop. He controled all the administrative

mechanisms, although he could delegate them to the

auxiliary bishops, priests, and members of religious

orders under his administration by means of a

suborganizations that closely resembled pontifical

communions of the Vatican. Such commissions were

directly responsible for the diocese's operation and

generally were headed by the bishop himself, although,

on occasion, someone else was in charge.

According t o the latest statistical

publication issued by the Guatemalan Catholic Church in

1967, "Guatemalan Church Guide" ("Guia de la Iglesia en

Guatemala"), in sections referring to archdioceses and

dioceses, curias, and the different commissions, one

can see tha2 bishops, priests, auxiliary bishops. and

other clergy participated on more than one commission

and had various responsibilities in the curia, which

had a direct influence on their efficiency.14 Being

in charge of various jobs implies that there was a

heavy work load, which was detrimental to efficiency.

14 "Guia de la iglesia en Guatemala" ("Guatemalan

Church Guide"), without date or publishing house (ca.
1967), pp. 53-59, 178-179, 244-2461 297, 319, 331-3321
389-490.
On the other hand, in general, t h e people in charge
were responsible for parish activities as pastor or
coadjutor, which was another tendency leading to
administrative inefficiency. A heavy work load
situation was the result of the conditions we analyzed
earlier. A reduced ecclesiastical population
fundamentally impeded the clergy from fulfilling
strictly pastoral obligations such as administrative
tasks at the parish level as well as at the diocesan
level.

If we take into account that each bishop and

priest regularly had large areas o f territory to cover
or a large number of believers t o attend in his
respective jurisdiction, he had very little real time

t o dedicate t o administrative areas. In addition, it

is necessary t o consider that administrative problems

presented by the Catholic Church responded t o
innumerable variables rather than simple administrative
variables.
Thus, for example, in order to measure the
efficiency o f each diocese in particular, we would have
t o take into account the degree of internal
decentralization and the bishop's capacity t o delegate
activities, t o organize diocesan commissions, a s well
as the curia with more rational criteria that promoted
efficiency and e liminated a heavy work load distributed
among a few peop le in order t o involve, a s much as
possible, those laymen willing to donate time t o the
work of the church. Although many of these aspects
were taken into account by the Catholic Church, in the

case of Guatemala, more emphasis wes placed on the

people involved than on the organization. Thus, for
example, when the Prelature Nullius of Santo Cristo d e

Esquipulas was created, the Archbishop of Guatemala and

the Prelate o f Esquipulas, Monsignor Prospero Penados
del Barrio, said,
To govern his diocese or particular church,
the bishop must necessarily be able t o count
on the intimete collaboration of the priests,
who are his intimate and indispensable
collaboratars in the governing of the church;
he must have constant communication with
them. because they are his arms. The priests
are the heart of the bishop and should
transmit their teachings and services t o
the believers they have been assigned t o in
their parishes. He governs with the
immediate collaboration o f nuns, these
generous and valiant women that, leaving
everything for Christ, consecrate the service
of their brothers. Also, the bishop avails
himself of these generous and valiant
Christians who listen t o his call and, in a
particular way, sanction him t o transmit the
message of the church t o the rest of their
brothers; priests, bishops, united with the
 Pope, who in the name of Christ, govern all
the church.15

However, the problems exist, despite the fact

that there actually are a great number of technological
means that the church could use t o correct and to face
the administrative problems that confronted it. The
Guatemalan church has become a prisoner of empiricism
and has become bogged down in anachronistic systems
that impede its progress toward an administrative
modernization and lead t o repercussions in its pastoral
obligations. For example, the Catholic Church did not
have up-to-date statistics, especially with regard t o a
series o f relevant issues such as the number o f

priests, parishes, activities they carry out, and the

internal organization o f dioceses and apostolic
administrations. Not one diocesan organization, not
even the Episcopal Conference of Guatemala, had
reliable information that allowed one t o get t o know
the church through statistics. The figures I received
from sach diocese and apostolic administretion on the
number of priests and parishes were different from

l 5 Boletin Eclesiastico de la Arquidiocesis

(Ecclesiastical Bulletin o f the Catholic Church), Year
20, No. 74, April, May, June, 1984, p. 12.
those we found in the 1985 Pontifical Yearbook with

regard to the number of priests as well as parishes.

(The yearbook did not have any information on
activities carried out by bishops, such as internal
organization.16

I decided, as was mentioned earlier, to work

with the information provided by the bishops of each
diocese, apostolic administration, apostolic vicarage,
and territorial prelature, since, in my opinion, the
bishops in charge of these areas had access to more
realistic information about the issues under study.
Nevertheless, to compare, I have included the figures
from the Pontifical Yearbook. (See Table No. 3.6.)
If we compare the figures from Ci-rart No. 6
with those in Table No. 3.3, we see a certain increase
in relation to the number of parishes (22 parishes) and

priests (222 priests), but in a more significant manner

in relation to the latter. Nonethelzss, the
aforementioned numerical increase was not significant
for the purposes of this investigation because, just as
I said earlier, the preponderance of parishes and

16 Annuario Pontificio for 1985 (1985 Year1

Pontifical Yearbook), Citta of the Vatican. :ibrera
Editrice Vaticana, 1985.
priests that belonged t o the archdiocese of Guatemala
continued t o be obvious in comparison with the rest of
the dioceses, administrations, vicarages, and
territorial prelatures of the country.
Thus, although the figures from the
Pontifical Yearbook also show in absolute and relative
numbers that there was an increase in the number o f
priests and parishes in the archdiocese o f Guatemala
compared t o figures obtained from the questionnaire
completed by the bishops, such an increase is not
contrary t o our argument, but instead reinforces a
condition of administrative macrophalia and scarcity of
priests, in addition t o proving a general deterioration

of other dioceses, administrations, apostolic

vicarages, or prelatures.
Thus, we can observe that by comparing both
graphs, the percentages that refer to the number o f
parishes and priests increased or decreased
proportionately t o the increase or decrease in the
number of parishes and priests that they have. In this
way, for the diocese of Quiche. the information in the
Pontifical Yearbook reported a lower proportion of
priests (from 9 t o 5 ) and parishes (from 19 t o 171,
 TABLE NO. 3.6

SECULAR
(DIOCESAN) REGULAR TOTAL
DIO- PAR ISHES PR IESTS PR IESTS PR IESTS
CESE NO. % NO. % NO* X NO. %

G u a t e r n a 1a
127 36.50
Quetzaltenango
30 8.62
Verapaz
26 7.47
Ja 1apa
18 5.17
Solola
34 9.77
Zacape
18 5.17
Sen Marcos
22 6.32
Peten
15 4.31
Q u iche
17 4.89
Huehuetenango
20 5.75
Izaba 1
12 3.44
Escuintla
9 2.59
TOTALS
348 100%

Source: 1985 P o n t i f i c a l Y e a r b o o k , Vatican City,

L i b r e r i a E d i t r i c e V a t i c a n a , 1985.

T h e p e r c e n t a g e s w e r e a d j u s t e d t o add up t o 100%.
making the conditions for this diocese even more
unfavorable. This information helped the diocese of
Huehuetenango, since its number of priests increased
from 15 to 16 as well as did the number of parishes,
from 18 to 20. The apostolic vicarage of El Peten
maintained its position with no variations since its
number of priests (10) and parishes (15) was the same.
The territorial prelature of Escuintla dropped in the
number of priests from 10 to 7 and stayed the same in
the number of parishes (91, which implied a worse
condition for exercising a good pastoral mission. The
apostolic administration of Izabal decreased in its
number of priests (from 12 to 11) and its number of
parishes (from 13 to 1217 SO that the general
conditions remained the same. The diocese of San
Marcos was one of the most affected by the information,
since its number of priests declined from 16 to 10,
while its number of parishes stayed the same (221,
signifying deteriorated general conditions. The
diocese of Solola, which, as we saw, was one of the
dioceses with more priests than parishes, fell under
reverse conditions* with more parishes than priests.

The number of priests fell from 38 to 33 and parishes

rose from 30 to 34. Its general conditions would also
be adversely affected since the number of parishes not
attended by priests would increase; with 30 parishes
and 38 priests, there would be parishes without
attention. In an inverse situation, conditions would
supposedly get worse. The correlation stayed the same
in the diocese of Jalapa between the first-hand
information we gathered from the bishops and that
contained in the Pontifical Yearbook. The diocese of
Quetzaltenango showed a decrease in the number of
priests from 52 to 44 and the number of parishes did
not change (30). Its conditions would supposedly
suffer slightly. The diocese of Verapaz showed a drop
in the number of priests from 45 to 42. as well as in
the number of parishes from 23 to 16, indicating
worsened pastoral conditions. The diocese of Zacapa
showed a drop in the number of priests from 24 to 19.
while its number of parishes stayed the same, also
indicating worsened general conditions. And, finally,
the Archdiocese of Guatemala was favored by an increase
in its number of priests from 177 to 427 as well as its
parishes, from 1 1 1 to 117, meaning an improvement in
its general conditions in contrast to the other
dioceses, administrations, apostolic vicarages, and
prelatures.
This comparative analysis showed evidence
that this difference in the data provided by the
bishops through our questionnaire and that found in the
Pontifical Yearbook reflected enormous technical and
administrative errors in collecting and processing
informational data, whether it was by the bishops or by
those in charge of such a task. Beneath it all, there
is a possible explanation for the differences. For
example, the number of parishes could have increased
because parochial buildings in the capital could have
been taken into account. Their number could have
decreased because a parish located in a conflict zone
was abandoned for a long time and/or deteriorated to
the point of being incapacitated. Concerning the
increase in the number of priests, it is very likely
that ths information provided in the Pontifical
Yearbook counted those dedicated to another type of

activity that was not necessarily r~ligious, including

professionals and those dedicated to administrative
tasks.
The confusion in information that we referred
t o earlier obviously influenced the internal workings
of each diocese and apostolic administration, since the
bishop could not form a precise image of what was
happening. And if this took place with the b ishop, it
was also possible with the priests. In addit ion, these
figures were not fixed statistics, but underwent
constant changes that could require a permanent
adjustment in the plans, policies, and actions that a
bishop decided t o adopt in any given moment.
This series of administrative problems
abviously obliged the bishops and priests t o adopt a
certain attitude with respect to the internal
modernization of the Guatemalan Catholic Church. In
this area, authors such as Bruce Calder recognize two
basic positions: the progressive and the conservative.
The most progressive and/or modern are found among the
foreign clergy, the products of a better academic and

ecclesiastical formation, better salaries (since they

receive their wages from the original dioceses of their
capitulary houses), better financial support t o carry
out thei r own special projects, and knowledge of and
contact w ith various financial agencies abroad such as
the Catho lic Relief Services (CRS) in the United
States, the Oxford Committee for Family Relief (OXFAM)
in Great Britain, and the Organizacion Miserior de 10s
Obispos Alemanes, as well as the Organizacion Vaticana
~dveniat.17
A progressive or conservative attitude toward
formal modernization of the Catholic Church does not
necessarily imply a correlation with political
attitudes that priests may adopt. It is possible to
find a bishop or priest that is very concerned with

modernizing his diocese or parish who, politically,

could be a traditionalist, a progressive,a rebel, or a

The Catholic Church in Guatemala is not a

completely monolithic institution. Within it, we find

a modern sector at work and another, whether it i s
because of simple conformism or a lack of resources or
capacity, that maintains itself within the traditional
boundaries of administrative activity. In this way,
the functioning of a diocese and/or apostolic

l 7 Bruce Calder, Qycimiento v cambio de la Iqlesia

Catolica Guatemaltecg* pp. 59-62.
1 8 :I , I I a .b , p V I V ~ ~W I r vI be ti~ur.ouy;-~iy~
.t
e/ip;ained in the
next chapter. Also, for a better idea of the
hetergeneity of the political position, see Appendix
I.
administration is also determined by the following
practice. If a bishop is reluctant t o accept
innovative attitudes, priests in his diocese that
promote them (whether local foreign) will not be able
to do anything except either follow the bishop's plans
or abandon their missionary task because of
incompatibility. The latter has rarely occurred in

Guatema 1 a.
However, since the bishop has a powerful
position, he prefers to recruit clergy that agree with
his way of thinking and acting. If that is not the
case, the bishop allows them to act as long as it is
acceptable t o him. As one bishop said in relation to
the foreign missions, these "guests are paying their
own costs and without them, there would not be priests
in these areas. (Therefore), they should be given the
freedom t o act in the way they see best."l9

It must be taken into account that in order

to be able to serve a diocese or apostolic
administration in Guatemala, these priests signed a
contract written up by the bishop of their original

l9 Bruce Calder, Crecimiento y cambio de la Iglesia

Catolica Guatemalteca, p. 151.
diocese, in the case of the diocesan priests (in this
case, we are referring basically t o the foreign
dioceses that sent priests t o Guatemala), or by the
superior and/or administrator o f the order. In the
case o f regular priests* they drew up a contract with
the respective bishop or apostolic administrator based
on terms that generally allowed either of the parties
t o rescind a t any given moment. This allowed a fairly

large amount of flexibility so that any conflicts that

might arise could be easily solved without leading t o
violent clashes or ruptures. Based on the interests o f
the orders and the foreign dioceses, this arrangement
allowed for priests t o be moved rapidly. They only
had t o inform the bishop o f the changes taking place

and the bishop could report t o the superior of the

bishop that he needed to change a priest that he did
not think suitable. The order or foreign diocese did
not have t o ~ i t h d r a wfrom the territory.20

20 This situation suggests in itself a great mobi 1 ity

o f the foreign priest in Guatemala, mobility that can
lead t o diverse political situations. perceptions, and
attitudes by the priests. To better understand this
topic, see the corresponding section in Appendix I,
referring t o the years spent in the country and the
expectations of continuing in the country. See also
p. 523 and following o f this text.
 Returning to the correlation between a modern
or conservative attitude in the administrative plane
and the political attitudes of bishops and priests, we
note that their political attitudes do not necessarily
relate directly to their attitudes about administrative
modernization. A modern attitude about structure,
methods of work, and action often coincides with a
politically progressive attitude, but not always. In
the same way, a conservative attitude in relation to
structure* methods of work, and action indicates
generally a conservative political attitude, but not
always. These correlations are not as simple as they
might seem. These considerations seem to corroborate
Levin's argument that the religious elite do not
consider a series of topics in strictly political or
social terms, but their perception is imbued with
religious concepts that mix the political and the
social. Under these conditions there are, at times,
great differences between the general beliefs of the
priests (religious, political, social) and their

particular actions.21

2 1 Daniel H. Levine, Re1 iqion and Politics in Latin

America, p. 10.
 If it is true that progressive or modern
attitudes about change adopted by priests and bishops
put them in a position to take on a more radical
religious obligation, being formally involved in a
change toward modernization of the internal structure
of the Catholic Church does not signify support for
change within the social, political, or economic
structure of society. Nonetheless, there are a good
number o f bishops and priests who center their pastoral
work on emphasizing what has been called, doctrinally,
the preferential option for the poor; pushing the
Movirnientos Eclesiales de Base with a greater sense of
political obligation and seeing the hierarchy as
carrying out more of a service function, as much for
the religious community in general as for society, as
opposed t o an authoritative function.

The conservative bishops and prirsts,

although they maintained a modern attitude within their
respective dioceses and p. !shes, could take on a
contrary political attitude. However, they tended t o

define themselves as apolitical, only concerned with

the elements of worship and doctrines and with the
defense of the church's unity, observing the principle
of hierarchy. Although for some this seems to be
apolitical, it is nothing more than an implicit
political attitude t o maintain the status quo and a
tacit recognition of the reigning state of affairs.
Rarely did they speak out against the repressive wave
and/or the violation of human rights or. much less.
openly criticize the government of the reigning
eccncaic and socfa! system.22

In order t o understand the Guatemalan

Catholic Church more thoroughly, it is necessary t o
make the following distinction. The contrary could
lead t o the error o f considering a part of the problem
as the whole when, in reality, it is composed of two
aspects: 1 ) the political attitude of bishops and

priests; and 2) their attitude concerning internal

changes within the church. An analysis allows us t o
see in a more realistic fashion the g m e r a l tendency

that the church can adopt during a certain period. and

based on that decision, the dominant tendency or that

which has dominated throughout the history of the
institution.

22 In Appendix I , there are exampl es of some more

significant tendencies of the Archdiocese of
Guatema 1 a.
 On this basis, we can affirm that the
Guatemalan Catholic Church, as I have said in earlier
chapters, is not an institutional unity that responds
to one line of common policy. Within the church, there

are a series of divisions, a product of the motivations

and expressed doubts of bishops as well es priests,
that differ among themselves. This constitutes an
almost insoluble problem because, as has been seen,
there is no guiding organization in the Guatemalan
Catholic Church on a national leve1.23 Nonetheless,

the Episcopal Conference, for example, does present an

opportunity for bishops to discuss on an equal basis
the general and specific problems in each diocese
and/or administration, apostolic vicarage, and

territorial prelature. It also allows them t o exchange

experiences about their catechetical and pastoral
labor, and if necessary, to make declarations about
problems that affect the church i tse 1 f or of a general
nature in order to clarify their POS itions regarding
problems that affect the life of the nation.24 Given

23 In relation to this topic, Appendix I shows a

fairly clear idea, even though the study refers only t o
the Archdiocese of Guatemala.
24 The €pi scope 1 Conference recognized the archbishop
and bishops as equal participants. That is, each has
the autonomy with which the bishops act, not even the
decisions adopted by the Episcopal Conference and made
by consensus are obligatory for anybody.
Returning t o the idea of heavy administrative
work loads, there are similar problems in the nucleus
of the Episcopal Conference. For example, in reviewing
the 1979 diocesan directory of Quetzaltenango, the
section dedicated t o the Episcopal Conference clearly
showed that the work was distributed unequally. There
were apostolic administrators who had posts on as many
as four commissions, in addition t o being members o f
the directory o f the Episcopal Conference and of its
permanent Episcopal Council, and also posts they held
in their own dioceses. For a clearer image, posts held
by two bishops in that era will be described: those of
Monsignor Rodolfo Quezada Torun025 and Monsignor Luis

Manresa Forrnosa.26 Monsignor Quezada was vice-

president of the Episcopal Conference, member of the

one vote on issues that pertain t o its operation.

Auxilliary bishops from different dioceses also
participate in the organization and can even occupy
directory posts.
2 5 Monsignor Quezada Toruno is currently bishop of
Zacapa.
Monsignor Manresa current 1 y is rector of the
Catholic Rafael Landivar University in Guatemala City.
permanent Episcopal Council, Episcopal Conference
delegate to CELAM, and president of the Episcopal
Conference's committee of catechists and liturgy. He
also was a member of the following committees: Accion
Social y Caritas, Seminario y Vocaciones, and the
Comision Iglesia-Estado, in addition to being coadjutor
bishop with right to succession in the diocese of
Zacapa. Monsignor Manresa was head of the Episcopal
Conference's committee of reliaiosos and a delegate
bishop to CONFREGUA. As bishop of Quetzaltenango, he
was president of the Consejo Presbiterial, president of
the Comision Diocesana de Pastoral, advisor to the
Comision Diocesana de Religiosos, and president of the
Cornision Diocesana de Musica Sacra.
Independently of what the mentioned
activities signify with regard to administrative
responsibility, there is no doubt that a bishop in
charge of a diocese, as well as his auxiliary bishops,
is directly responsible for its operation. Therefore,

greater administrative and pastoral efforts should be

concentrated there. In case the results are negative,
it is reflected in activities that are not adequate for
the dioceses. It is within this structural,
organizational, and administrative area that we can
understand the poss ibilities and 1 imitations of groups
such as the Comunidades Eclesiales de Base, in relation
to their participation as instruments of change in
Guatema 1 a.
It is necessary t o clarify that in Guatemala
the majority of bishops, priests, and members of
religious orders refer to Lay Apostolate Movements
(Movimientos del Apostolado Seglar) instead of
Comunidades Eclesiales de Base. This preference
apparently has no substantive implication and, on the
surface, wculd seem t o be a problem of semantics.
However, its implications are more profound and
encompass a problem of conception.
Within its nucleus, the Guatemalan Catholic
Church has traditionally promoted the organization of
small groups of believers with specific goals,
especially in the area of worship, even though there
are a few with a social purpose. Nevertheless, not all
of these groups can be considered Comunidades

Eclesiales de Base, not only because of their function

and projection, but also because of their origins.
They are the creation of the ecclesiastical hierarchy.
 In contrast with the majority of these
groups, the essential function of the Comunidades

Eclesiales d e Base is change and social direction, and

their origin lies within the religious comnunity,
offering new ministerial services, ggallowingpriests
and members o f religfous orders t o rediscover the
pastoral sense o f consecration and growing into one o f
the Latin American church's more promising forces."27

Thus, the Comunidades Eclesiales de Base are self-

promoted community organizations that free the
potential forces o f their members t o serve as
conscientious vehicles that, in trying t o serve as an
example for the rest, are capable o f carrying the
message o f the church and the Christian testimony t o
the nucleus o f the family, their comnunity, their work,
and all spheres o f their lives.
In Guatemala the hierarchy as well a s the
priests and the members o f religious orders refer t o
the Movimiento del Apostolado Seglar. including within
that concept all groups and organizations independent
o f their function. projection, or origin. They only

27 CELAM. '*Fe Cri st iana y compromi so social "

("Christian Faith and Social Obligation"), Department
of Social Action, Mexico City, 1982.
have to maintain formal ties with the church. The
Comunidades Eclesiales de Base are included within
these, creating a slightly distorted image of reality,
since these communities exercise a dynamic action as
pastoral agents of change within the pastoral life of
the diocese. This is not the case in the majority of
the Movimientos del Apostolado Seglar. The Comunidades
Eclesiales de Base are included w i + h i n 1 m^r?

wide-sweeping movement (in this case, the Yovimientos

del Apostolado Seglar) without differentiating in the
least. One could think that all of the movements are
agents of change and pastoral, or conversely, that the
Comunidades Eclesiales de Base, as part of the
Movimiento del Apostolado Seglar, maintain the same
characteristics as the majority of the groups that do
not appear to be agents of change and pastoralism.
If we add to this the fact that the number of
organizations characterized as Comunidades Eclesiales
de Base is, in absolute and relative terms, low, we are
confronted with a practical and conceptual problem that
demands the use of a concept that will allow us to
analyze the Comunidades Eclesiales de Base without
losing sight o f similar groups.28

The term Movimiento del Apostolado Seglar

implies the recognition of all movements within the
nucleus o f the Guatemalan Catholic Church. Their
widespread existence makes it difficult t o identify and
specify the most significant elements that play a
preponderant role in the process of change within the
nucleus o f the Catholic Church. In addition, it is a
term that is t o o neutral, which could better be applied
t o a certain number of groups and organizations. But
using it would mean, in some cases, distorting the
character o f others that tend t o be Comunidades
Eclesiales de Base, strictly speaking, a s we will see
throughout this exposition.
To use the concept of Comunidades Eclesiales
de Base for all of these movements, according t o the
interpretation of the hierarchy and clergy of
Guatemala, would signify the reverse problem. A s we

28 According t o a Jesuit priest, the Comunidades

Eclesiales de Base were promoted in some towns in
Guatemala by a team of Catholic pastoral agents in
1969. They began a disintegrating and declining stage
in 1977. Ricardo Falla, Esa muerte que nos Race vivir
(This Death that We Must Live), Estudio d e la Religion
Popular, Latin American Theology Collection, Vol. 3,
UCA/Editores, El Salvador, 1984, p. 215.
have seen, the organizing arm of the movements is, for
the most part, the hierarchy itself, and they do not
have a function and projection as agents of change and
pastoralism. Therefore, the use of the concept of
Comunidades Eclesiales de Base would have t o be
clarified according to the groups and/or organizations
to which we are referring.
To solve this practical and conceptual
problem with the consideration that there is a
notorious absence of a numerous and influential group
of Comunidades Eclesiales de Base, I have decided to
adopt an intermediate term that will allow us to
analyze the role carried out by other similar large
movements as well as the few comunidades de base that
exist in the country, even though they have a different
projection. Therefore, I have decided t o use the term
Movimientos Eclesiales de Base.
Such a term allows US, within the Guatemalan
context, the possibility of analyzing both kinds of
organizations without the necessity of forcing the

analysis, since this term is not as wide-reaching as

the Movimientos del Apostolado Seglar. The Guatemalan
context, as we have already said, is characterized by
the scarce number of Comunidades Eclesiales de Base
movements and organizations that, despite not being
strictly communities of this kind, possess and/or
assume some social function. The use of the term
Movimiento del Apostolado Seglar would imply the
recognition of organizations such as Opus Dei, Amigos
del Evangelio, Sociedad Biblica Catolica, and
Asociacion de Senoras de la Caridad de San Vicente de
Paul that, although important, are not within the
ecclesiastic, renovating spirit of the church. In
addition, it is not as limited as the term Comunidades
Eclesiales de Base that, if used, would exclude a
series of organizations classified in separate groups
because they are organizations of the hierarchy.
Therefore, the Movimientos Eclesiales de Base
are those lay organizations that, independent of their
origin, aim to promote a more active role by the
lay sector in the activities of the Catholic Church,
always maintaining respect for hierarchical valces and
promoting a gospel that is closer to the socioeconomic

rea lity of the country.

Within the context of the Guatemalan

ecc lesiastical life, lay organizations supported by the

Catholic Church are many and varied. Among them are
three principal groups:
a) Those that are interested in strengthening
traditional spiritual principles (e.g., Hija de Maria,
Legion de Maria, Apostolado de Oracion, and
Hermandades);
b) Those that are categorized as reformist
and developmentalist in function can be divided into
two different groups: 1 ) those dedicated to promoting

wide-reaching social projects (e.g., Cooperativas

Parroquiales, Junta Parroquiales de Administracion de
Obras Sociales, Clinicas Parroquiales, Comites Pro-
Construccion de iglesias); and 2) those that carry out
a social, reformist ecclesiastic function within
organizations dedicated t o strengthening family and
social relations, with some of them focusing on
individual and collective Christian obligations (e.g.,
Cursillos de Cristiandad, Encuentro Matrimonial,
Movimiento Familiar Cristiano, Encuentro Familiar,
Movimiento de Renovacion Carismatica Catolica, and
Encuentros de Promotion Juvenil;

c) Organizations in which members are

involved as agents of change and support for the
church's pastoral mission and based on a liberation
theology that focuses on changing social structure
(e.g., Accion Catolica Rural, Catequistas. Monitores,
Celebradoes, and Delegados de la Palabra).

It is obvious that these are not the only

movements in existence, Far example, in the
A v a k A :
"I &a n
A ~ Q S ~
u a wC%,
mateITaa a ens, 4-L---
a s , s *.a---
n=l s SOKS 40

different types of groups (see Appendix I); and in the

combined dioceses within the entire ecclesiastical
province of Guatemala, there were 74 different groups
that, of course, included the ones in the archdiocese.
The increase was caused by the fact that the
confraternities as well as the brotherhoods took on
different denominations in different towns and

villages. One can see that in order to compare

dioceses, it is necessary to resort to a system that
would allow for that. In other words, we took the most
representative movements of the dioceses based on the
importance given to them by the bishop. Therefore,
in the information requested of the bishops in July of
1985 was a question referring to the most important

movements that had some relevance or significance in

their dioceses. (See Table No. 3.7.)
 TABLE NO.' 3.7

MOVIMIENTOS
ECLESIALES DIOCESES
DE BASE (01) (02) (03) (04) (05) (06) (07) (08) (09) (10) (11) (12)

Cursillos de
Christiandad
Encuentro
Matrimonial
Movimiento Familiar
Cristiano
Caminantes
Por un Camino Mejor
Catequistas
Apostolados de la
Orac ion
Legion de Maria
Renovacion Caris-
matica Cristiana
Encuentro Promocion
Juveni l
Tercera Orden Fran-
ciscana Seglar
Accion Catolica
Grupo de Maestros
Pastorales
Juven i l es
Neo Catecunenndo X X
Delegados de 3a
Pa 1 abra x*** X

Notes :
Y The archdiocese has catechists, not in the capital, but in Sacatepequez and Santa
Rosa.
** Even though Accion Catolica is in the capital, it operates in rural areas.
*** Oelegados de la Palabra are only found in Santa Rosa.
* * * * Years ago, this group was very strong, especially in the Department of Chimaltenango.
Many of its members emigrated or distanced themselves for polltical reasons. The
group no longer exists.
* * * * * As in the Diocese of Solola, this was a very strong group. However, it ceased t o
exist for the same reasons.
Dioceses correspond t o the following column numbers: OI=Guatemala; OZ=quetzaltenango;
03=Vers1paz; 04=Jalapa; 05=Solola; 06=Zacapa; O7=San Marcos; 08=E1 Peten; 09=quiche;
IO=Huehuetenango; Il=Escuintla; 12=Izabal.
The Movimientos Eclesiales de Base were selected t o the importance given t o them by the
bishops in the July 1985 questionnaire. Undoubtedly, there are innumerable Movimentos
eclesiales de Base in the country, but for methodological reasons, we will only analyze
those considered important by the bishops.
 In the same table, we find that the highest
correlations of movenlents per diocese were found in the
Archdiocese of Guatemala (13 of 16) and in the diocese
of Verapaz ( 9 of 16). The correlation continued with
the dioceses of San Marcos, Quiche, and Zacapa ( 5 of
16); Huehuetenango ( 4 of 16); El Peten and Escuintla (3

of 16).
In addition, regarding representation of
movements in the dioceses, we find that the Cursillos
de Cristiandad were established in 1 1 of the 12
dioceses; Catequistas in 9 of the 12 dioceses;
Renovacion Carismatica Catolica in 6 of the 12
dioceses; Encuentro Matrimonial, Movimiento Familiar
Cristiano, and Pastorales Juveniles in 5 of the 12
dioceses; Apostolado de Oracion, Legion de Maria,
Encuentros de Promocion Juvenil, Delegados de la
Palabra, and Accion Catolica in 4 of the 12 dioceses;
Caminantes and Tercera Orden Franciscans Seglar in 2 of
the 12 dioceses; and Grupo de Maestros in 1 of the 12
dioceses. I include this because f e w groups operate in
the apostolic administration of El Peten, and by
omitting it, I would be giving a false impression of
the number of movements in the territorial prelature.
 If in other dioceses there are other
movements such as brotherhoods, confraternities, and
parishes, the bishops did not give them importance in
their responses t o the questionnaire, which could
indicate that the Catholic Church actually is more
interested in m a v e m ~ n t sthat have a national rather

than a local orientation. In addition, movements

interested in strengthening traditional and spiritual
sentiments exist on a 3 t o 16 ratio--Apostolado de
Oracion. Legion de Maria, and the Tercera Orden
Franciscana. Apparently, these were the mvernents
given least importance by bishops, and represented

11.43 percent of the total.

The reformist developmentalist organizations

were distributed on a 7 t o 16 ratio--Cursillos dc
Cristiandad, Encuentro Matrimonial, Movimiento Fzziliar
Cristiano, Por un Camino Mejor, Renovacion Carismatica
Catoliza, Encuentros de Promocion Juvenil, and
Movimiento~Neocatecumenado. These same organizations
were directed at strengthening family and social
relations with an individual and collective Christian
obligation and represented 52.85 percent of the total.
Curiously, the bishops did not place any importance on
movements dedicated to promoting projects of a social
scope. a circumstance that can probably be attributed
to the economic and political crisis that characterized
the country; at the time the information was requested,
these movements were not practical.
The movements in which members were involved
as true agents of support and change of the church's
pastoral mission had a ratio of 6 to 16--Caminantes,
Catequistas, Accion Catoiica, Grupo de Maestros.
Pastorales Juveniles, and Delegados de la Palabra. But
as was seen earlier. their representation within the
dioczses and within reformist developmentalist
organizations was low. except in the case of
catechists. These organizations represented 35.72
percent of the total movements.29

Thus, the promotion of certain movements will

reflect more or less defined attitudes within the
hierarchy concerning a modern or conservative approach

29 Thi s percentage. as we 1 1 as the previous 1 y-

mentioned ones, are measured based on the sum of all
movements in all of the dioceses divided by the total
of national movements (spiritual, development-
reformist, and change and pastoralism) in any given
category. This better explains the general tendencies.
within the Guatemalan Catholic Church according to the
promotion of one or another movement.
to the modernization of the church's internal working
methods, structure, actions, and political position as
traditionalists, developmentalists, revolutionaries, or
rebels. Nonetheless, we must keep in mind that the

most important sign t o focus on is the individual

attitude of the bishops or priests.
In relation t o the aforementioned, we can say
that promoting a movement of a completely traditional
and spiritual character responds directly t o a
conservative attitude toward the modernization o f work
methods, structure, and actions, and reflects a
conservative political attitude. The support of

reformist developmentalist organizations or movements

corresponds directly t o an internal attitude o f
modernizing work methods, structure, and action.
However, politically it could indicate different
orientations such as those o f the traditionalist,
developmentalist, revolutionary, or rebel.
Nevertheless, they probably most clearly reflect a
developmentalist political position, since this group
best combines elements of spiritual strengthening with
modern attitudes through the Movimientos Eclesiales de
Base .
 Finally, organizations that in reality can
respond t o groups with a minimum of formal
organization or, conversely, as in the case of Accion
Catoiica, count on a strong national organization and
hierarchies! support, with goals of promoting true

agents of change and political support for the pastoral

mission incline toward being revolutionaries or rebels
and correspond equally t o internal attitudes of
modernization even though they could clearly correspond
t o some extent to a developmentalist political
position.
Now we once again find that the attitude o f
the church as a whole is not homogeneous but the result
of a lack of internal conformity. Nonetheless, based
on the previous comments and correlations represented
by the movements, we can say that the Guatemalan

Catholic Church, since the death o f Casariego, has

tended t o place itself within a political position of
development. Its efforts t o modernize are rather
significant.
There is no doubt that because of their
pastoral importance, organizations dealing with the
promotion o f agents of change and support for the
pastoral mission should occupy a primary place within
the general objectives of the church. As Pope John
Paul I 1 indicated Sn a speech during his Ad Limina
Apostolorum visit t o the Guatemalan Episcopal
Conference,
"Speaking of this topic (catechists), I can
do no less than offer a deserved eulogy and
encourage the numerous laymen, catechists and
delegates of the word, and ministers o f the
Eucharist that contribute so much to
maintaining the faith in their ecclesiastic
area. With much consolation I have seen that
in your five-year relations each community
has its catechist or celebrator of the word.
They are the true arms of the parish and
constitute the true spinal column of your
pastoral labor."30

Here, it is necessary to remember that in the

past these groups signified a possibility for the
Guatemalan Catholic Church to group large contingencies

of laymen spread al: over the national territory,

especially in the rural areas, and to form the church's

largest geographic extension. I mention this because

the violence that characterized the activities of the
last military regimes, with fear and frustration.

Ad Limina Apostolorum visit of the bishops o f the

ecclesiastical province o f Guatemala, Editorial
Gutenberg, Guatemala, November 1983. The five-year
relations (quinquenales) are reports o f all available
data on their activities* prepared by each diocese for
the Vatican.
reduced the actual members of these groups. who were
fundamentally catechists and delegates of the Word, and
consequently reduced the number of places they
attended.
In the Pope's previously cited speech. he
cotmented ,
I realize the difficulties that this
(violence and human rights violations) has
created at times for ecclesiastic duties
and the suffering caused within the
episcopate to the point that some pastors
have been painfully removed from their
respective communities; just as I am aware
of the large list of priests and members of
religious orders that have paid with blood
or with grave kidnappings and unjustified
tribute to blind violence in their testimony
of faith and set- lice to their people.31

Thus, it is beyond a doubt that such a situation has

contributed directly to weakening these groups that,

based on our understanding, most accurately reflect a

Comunidad Eclesial de Base because they are "one of the
sources of the ministries entrusted to the laymen.
community animators, catechists. missionaries."3Z

These two groups--catechi sts and de 1 ebates of

the word--fundamentally were transformed into true
centers of consciousness building and politicization.

31 Ibid.. p. 17.
32 CELAM, Fe Cristiana y cornpromiso social.
In addition t o being distinguished leaders o f their
communities, they received pastoral instruction that
oriented them regarding principles of presacramental
doctrines such as preparing godparents, baptisms,
teaching doctrine, first communion, and prematrirnonial
preparations. In addition, they received training in
attending t o the sick and t o people close t o death, in
the case of catechists, and interpreting scriptures and
celebrating the word (a type of mass without
administering communion), in the case o f celebrators
and delegates o f the word. Their work put them in
direct contact with communities and allowed them t o
realize what the real conditions of life were, which
moved them t o promote not only worship activities, but

t o get involved in the sociopolitical problems o f the

comunity.33 Nevertheless, as was mentioned
previously, the wave of violence prohibited and
eventually destroyed the possibilities that these
groups had t o work and expand. The wave of violence
lasted from 1977 t o 1981, a period characterized by a

systematic repression of the Guatemalan Catholic

33 Later in this study, we will see how some of them

worked with revolutionary priests in the expansion o f
liberation theology.
Church.
Even today, in places where these movements
were strong, there is fear among the population as well
as the clergy that such groups will once again gain

strength, A priest, who asked not to be identified,

said, "We cannot, based on what has happened, continue
promoting these organizations in areas o f political
conflict, since experience has shown us that when a new
wave o f institutional violence breaks open, the first
t o be scrutinized are our catechists and delegates of
the word."34 That is t o say, until an atmosphere of
security is created, these groups will be minimized.

Even the Pope, in his homily of March 7, 1983, in the

city of Quetzaitenango, referred t o this fear or
concern, stating
That no one ever again pretends t o confuse
authentic evangelism with subversion and
that ministers o f worship can exercise their
mission with security and without obstacles
in all of the country.35

It is therefore evident that the impetus that the

Movimientos Eclesiales de Base might have will be in
direct relation t o security conditions in existence for

34 Interview with a diocesan priest,

35 Prensa Libre, March 8, 1983.
their operation, especially for those who are involved
as agents of change and support for the pastoral
mission.
Followi~gthe previous analysis of the
Guatemalan Catholic Church, we can conclude in general
terms that in the specific case of Guatemala, the
organizing and administrative structure of the church,
far from constituting a contributing factor toward the
implementation of the changes suggested by Vatican 1 1 ,
constituted a limiting factor. Within this context,
the administrative decentralization process of the
Guatemalan Catholic Church was not capable of achieving
a presence of that institution throughout the country,
but conversely caused a macrophalia in which the

central point was the Archdiocese of Guatemala.

Thus, with regard to the possible

implementation of a process of change, this

macrocephaly constituted a serious limitation since the
concentration of priests and parishes in the capital
city facilitated a lack of coordination and communica-

tion between all of those bishops and priests dedicated

A-
LU
-----I-:--
PI Gacl, I 1 1 9 a fie* zvai-,gel i riii whsse pi- i n t i : p ~ :actor was

a Christ who completely identified with the poor.

 In addition, this macropha!y and the
inequality of conditions that characterized the
Archdiocese of Guatemala in relation to the rest of the
dioceses prompted different perceptions among priests
of the most remote dioceses with regard to the social
and political problems of their respective dioceses and
the country as a whole. This situation created
individual doubts and motivations that made it
extremely difficult to reach a consensus and state of
cohesion in attitudes toward a process of change and
the form in which it could be implemented.
We arrived at the conclusion that the
implementation of a process of change in different
dioceses and parishes of the country will depend more
on the personal motivation and perception of the bishop
or priest in charge than on policies emanating from the
Vatican, the archbishop, or the Episcopal Conference.
Another element that leapt out from the

analysis was the administrative inefficiency that

seemed to characterize the operation of the Guatemalan
Catholic Church, an inefficiency that translated not
only into a lack of information and reliable and up-to-
date statistics, but aiso into a lack of time for the
priests t o dedicate t o pastoral activities related to
the implementation o f a process of change. If we add
t o this the traditional scarcity of priests in the
country, we will easily understand why the religious
elites failed in their attempt to convert the
Guatemalan Catholic Church into a much more influential
church, with stronger ties t o the interests of the
popular classes in Guatemala.
The previous analysis of the Movimientos
Eclesiales de Base provided evidence for the argument
that the Guatemalan Catholic Church lacked the
necessary structure on a popular level t o transmit and
implement a new evangelisms a condition that definitely

obliged the church t o continue t o depend on the status

quo at the expense of a constant loss o f influence.
Thus, the lack of structure on a popular level
constituted another limitation in the efforts o f the
religious elite in Guatemala t o identify their church
with the true poor of the country.
With regard t o the Movimientos Eclesiales de
Base, it is necessary t o recognize that the minimal
penetration o f the church in this sense did not obey
only questions of a structural-administrative order,
but external factors such as the systematic political
violence, a factor that took the lives o f 12 priests
and hundreds o f catechists and delegates of the Word
during a period of four years.
Another important consideration concerning
the previous analysis is that it reflects the reigning
confusion in the correlation that should exist between
religious beliefs and political activity, a confusion
that results in disunion, incoherence, apathy, fear,
and conformism.
Finally, the results gave the impression that
the administration, with its lack of efficiency, did
not have directed objectives, which recalls Bruneau's
metaphor of a new model of Christianity that resembles
an empty shell, an impression that ultimately pointed
toward the fact that the Guatemalan Catholic Church has
grown a great deal and changed very little.
Thus, incomplete decentralization,
administrative inefficiency, and the lack of popular
structures are all factors o f a structural
administrative character that have definite influence
in restricting the efforts of change that have been
made by some of the country's religious elite over the
past t w o decades.
 CHAPTER IV
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH'S
TRADITIONAL RESPONSE TO CHANGE

Mario Casariego's appointment as Archbishop

of Guatemala in December 1964 coincided with a time of
great activity that developed within the body of the
universal Catholic Church. For this reason, when
Casariego assumed the leadership of the Guatemalan
church, he found an institution that, even though it
had ovsrcome the trauma caused by independence and the
liberzi revolution, still had not been able to extend
its influence beyond its traditional ties to the status

quo.
Until Casariego's appointment, the Guatemalan
Catholic Church had been able to grow economically but
maintained a conservative position with respect to
social problems. Ideologically. it identified itself
in full compliance with the capitalist model of
economic development. in spite of this attitude,
Casariego's arrival coincided with a change in the
perception of events throughout the world. This
perception had inflzenced the universal church to adopt
267
a more flexible position concerning pastoral work and
the liturgy. The church a l s ~wanted t o become involved
in attending t o the basic needs of the marginal
majorities.
The reputation that the church had acquired,
its role in the external world, as well as the demand
for a change in values and attitudes, was spread by
several foreign priests throughout the country. These
priests arrived in Guatemala during the 1960s and
brought with them a cultural baggage full o f secular
specializations such a s sociology and psychology. They
started questioning the values of the social, economic,
and political systems of Guatemala.

The political instability of the country at

that time and the contrasting economic disparity became
favorable and receptive soil for the ideas of change.
It chailenged the moral teachings and the institutional
survival of a church that had been traditionally weak
and had remained associated with the status quo.

In reality, the subhuman living conditions of

a large majority of the Guatemalan population were

questioning the viability of a religious practice that

did not envision a social perspective from a more
egalitarian point of view. Such conditions were also
evidence that the institutions and structures of the
Guatemalan Catholic Church were incapable o f
implementing any action directed toward promot ing and
accelerating the pace of change due t o interna 1 and
external pressures.
On the other hand, internally, Casariego's
nomination coincided with the period when the
Guatemalan Catholic Church was in the midst of a full
process of decentralization and growth. This
circumstance was an obstacle t o the organization and
coordination between the various dioceses of the
country because the process of growth and decentraliza-
tion was occurring within a context of preoccupation
with the purely physical aspects of expansion (meaning
more churches and more dioceses) rather than with
ecclesiastic and institutional cohesiveness and
coordination. Consequently, one could speak more about
the existence of an abundance of dioceses and churches
within the country than about an integrated national
church.

The decentralization period was reinforced at

the same time by the emphasis Vatican I 1 placed on the
importance of the independence of bishops from the
archbishop. This caused further divisions and was
responsible for the loss o f influence that Casariego
suffered when he had t o confront the bishops who had
gathered around the Episcopal Conference. Therefore*
the Guatemalan Catholic hierarchy was responding in a
different and contradictory manner to the internal and
external pressures.
The complex structure guiding relations
between religious orders and the dioceses and relations
between the latter and the Vatican were evidence that a
wide and divisive breach had opened within the Catholic
Church that went beyond the relatively weak consensus
concerning the essence of spiritual values in general.
This series of social* economic, and political
pressures at the internal level plus the cultural
pressures brought from abroad along with the
administrative deficiencies of the Guatemalan Catholic
Church--in the physical rather than the developmental

context--provoked a crisis within the authority and

structural differentiation of the inner workings of the
Guatemalan Catholic Church. This crisis was reflected

on the one hand in the various approaches that these

elites used in their relations with the state.
i postulate four positions that ere

characteristic of the degree of compromise presented by

the Guatemalan religious elites involving the process

of change proclaimed by John XXIII and the universal

church. These positions were the traditional, the
developmental, the rebellious. and the revolutionary.
As I formulated this typology, I adopted a
position compatible with theoretical needs, which
attempts to explain the various attitudes of the
religious Catholic elites concerning change as seen
within a historical and institutional framework.
Consequently, this typology is not an end in itself,
but an instrument of analysis that does not pretend to
be a general typology of universal value. Its value
rests in the limitations of the Guatemalan religious-
institutional context that took place in a definitive
period of history.

This typology differs from Vallier and

Sanders. It was not elaborated as a response t o a

special concern for the concept of economic development
and the progressive separation OF the church from its
direct political participation, a corollary of that
concept. In addition, unlike Vallier, it emphasized

those aspects concerning the attitudes and mentality o f

the various elites that formed part o f the Guatemalan
Catholic Church fnstead o f concentrating on the
functioning of its organization.
The typology differs from that of Vallier
in that a separation between church and politics in
Guatemala does not function as an analytical tool in
measuring the various answers given by the
ecclesiastical hierarchy t o the call for change
requested by Vatican I 1 and Medell in. Never-theless,
since it is difficult t o develop both concepts through

a set o f combined typologies, as Levine suggested, I

have chosen one typology that is essentially political.
This political characteristic implies that the call for
change promulgated by the universal church, which we

classify as modernist, provoked different responses ana

attitudes in the political order that was presented by
the Guatemalan religious elites. These attitudes did
not necessarily correspond pclitically t o the
ecclesiastical concept of change proposed by Vatican I 1
and Medell in.

In relation t o these ideas, it is necessary

to clarify that the groups that are being analyzed in
this typology, the traditional, the developmental, the
rebellious, and the revolutionary, were all in one way
or another supportive of change, even though as we have
suggested they were quite different from each other in
relation t o the manner by which they intended t o
confront change and in relation to the theological,
liturgical, and educational tools used t o this end.

The Traditionalists
This category is very similar t o Vallier's
category that he called "political." The members of
such a group sought the support and protection of the

church by means of resources extraneous t o the

institution. They firmly believed in the classical
principles o f authority and ecclesiastical hierarchy.
They did not agree with the concept that the church
changed; instead they supported the idea that the
church developed. They interpreted this development as
synonymous with becoming up-to-date, believing that the
institution silo~idmodernize siowly and calmly.
On the other hand, this development model,
when transferred t o the economic area, coincided with a
traditional scheme of economic development based on
classical capitalistic principles. This circumstance
obligated the supporters t o adopt an extremist anti-
Communist political and economic attitude. Further-
more, they viewed the social problem in a superficial
manner and saw themselves a s mediators. Instead of
finding solutions, they attempted to justify and cover
up the economic and social inequalities existing in the

country.
When the capitalistic scheme was, in turn,

transferred t o the religious realm. it held that sin

was an individual concept. It denied the possibility
that sin could be incurred collectively. Finally, this
position of defense and dependence on the status quo
forced the group to adopt political positions that were
contrary to the best interest o f the dispossessed
Catholic majority. Thus a breach was created
eliminating any possibility for adopting attituaes tiid
were more compatible with the national reality.
In Guatemala, Archbishop Mario Casariego
became the representative of this position. The same
position was defended and supported by other bishops,
clerics, and secular clergymen. Nevertheless, these
groups never became an important organization.
Structurally, their support for Archbishop Mario
Casariego's positions and attitudes was not well
defined. This was the reason their existence faded
away and their attitude was no more than a discrete
adherence t o everything the archbishop expressed. Due
to Mario Casariego's strong leadership vis s v i s the
weak structural organization of the religious and lay
groups who could have supported his political response
t o the call for change by the universal church, it is
impossible to analyze in detail other groups that
formed part of this analytical category.

Nevertheless, the lack or weakness of other

representative groups within the traditional line does
not invalidate their existence. This is true if we
consider that Monsignor Mario Casariego was a strong
personality and the fact that within the country, in
spite of the presence of various bishops and an
Episcopal Conference, the personality and influence of
said archbishop as well as his political pronouncements
and religious valuss continued t o command the respect
of the Guatemalan majority.
 276

The Develomnentalists
This category coincided in a certain manner
with the developmental category of Sanders. Its
adherents emphasized an economic and social development

doctrine more compatible with the basic needs of

Guatemala. Their preoccupations went beyond the
traditional emphasis on charity as the remedy that
would alleviate the miserable living conditions of
Guatemalans, especially those of the rural areas.
Likewise* the members of this group
contributed to the reorganization process of the
Guatemalan church by allowing laymen to participate
actively in small Christian groups whose objectives
were to assist in the progressive process that leads to
change. They conducted these activities with great
respect for the principles of authority and ecclesias-
tical hierarchy.
The elites who supported this trend were well
aware of the need for the process of change and wanted
to contribute to this in a positive way. To comply
with this view* they resorted t o public denunciation.
The act of denunciation has also become known as the
prophetic mission of the church, the purpose of which
is t o denounce oppression and injustice existing within
an authoritarian and dictatorial political context.
When the Catholic Church assumed this role, it became
the mouthpiece of the oppressed, the tortured, and the
exploited. Therefore, the adoption o f such a stand
implied that the church was more preoccupied with the
inner meaning of its mission than with the autward
manifestations of religious practice.
In this respect, we must clarify that because
this type o f denunciation generally has political and
social connotations, the group tried t o associate
itself with the church as a revolutionary or subversive
institution. Nonetheless, this was the product of a
misconception because there is a basic difference
between the political role of any political party and
the prophetic role of the church. This difference lies

in the fact that the activities o f the church, unlike

those of other institutions, are fundamentally oriented
toward God as well as toward man.
In response t o a much broader and more
tolerant view. the group accepted in greater or lesser
degree some Marxist analytical categories, and instead
o f searching for a confrontation with the Communists,
il
would rather find areas of common interest with them
around which they could unify their efforts.
In Guatemala, this position was represented
mainly by the Episcopal Conference and, t o a lesser
extent, by the Conferencia de Religiosos de Guatemala
(Guatemalan Conference of Members o f the Religious
Orders, CONFREGUA). These two groups reflected a
serious attempt t o promote change within Guatemalan
society; they followed the developmental alignment and
were respectful of the ecclesiastical hierarchy.

The Rebellious
This category included a particular and

special group existing within the religious world o f

Guatemala. The word "rebellious" may lend itself t o
much confusion; it may also be used to identify the
members of this group as being associated with
attitudes similar t o those of Camilo Torres, for
example. Nevertheless, we would like t o point out that
the word rebellious will be used here in a less violent
and questionable context, clearly different from the
revolutionary one.
Therefore, the attitude of the members of
this group was more than just an attitude of rebellion
against the economic and social system o f Guatemala.
It was also a rebellious sentiment against the
principles of archepiscopal and episcopal authority at
the local level. They went further than supporting
structural change within Guatemalan society; they
wanted that type of change to occur at the center of
the Guatemalan church. From that perspective, they
questioned the traditional values of authority and
hierarchy, basing their contentions on a solely

nationalistic policy.
In theological terms, their proposal had no
enduring basis. Perhaps this was due t o the lack of
information and contact between the majority of those
who defended a similar policy and the revivalist
theological currents of the era. This, however, did
not hinder them from participating actively in the
political arena. They believed the ecclesiastical
hierarchy also should have become involved.
This group maintained a favorable attitude
toward change. Though they clearly defined themselves
as non-Marxists, they did not step up t o confront that
ideology. After a conscier.tious analysis of the group,
we can readily see that they were attempting to
support the Guatemalan clergy in relation t o the
foreign clergy. They also held that, in the long run,
the Guatemalan people would triumph.
Domestically this "sui generis" category was
represented by the Confederacion de Sacerdotes
Diocesanos en Guatemala (Confederation sf Diocesan
Priests of Guatemala, COSDEGUA). Their organization
did not last very long and was involved at one time in
developing behavioral patterns similar to such groups
as the Sacerdotes del Tercer Mundo (Priests of the
Third World) in Argentina, Onis in Peru, and Golconda
in Colombia.

The revolutionaries
The members of this group interpreted the
call from Vatican I 1 and Medellin in a radical way.
They were disappointed with the inefficiency of the
developmental model. Their option was to implant a
structural change in society by violent means.

Following the Marxist doctrine. they questioned the

value and relevancy of the Catholic pastoral activity

in Guatemala. The followers o f this position were

conscious of the urgent need for change and tried t o
promote a more active participation among the popular
masses in the activities on behalf o f the process o f
change. This participation demanded the direct

activism of the priests in political affairs, by legal

or illegal means.
The influence o f liberation theology was also
felt within this group. It constituted the theoretical
rationalization that reflected a traditional liturgy
and theology as an important pillar of its objectives
in the struggle against a system perceived as
oppressive. This option represented a decision that
several priests made individually and without
representing the orders t o which they belonged. These
priests decided that the revolutionary road was their
only option if they were t o improve the living
conditions of the Guatemalan people.
Thus there were several priests and nuns who
tried t o implement the revolutionary option in the

country, including Thomas Melville and Marian Peter,

from the Maryknoll order; Fer.nando Hoyos, Enrique
Corral, and Luis Eduardo Peilecer Faena, Jesuits; and
possibly some members of the Congregation of the Sacred
Heart and the Immaculate Conception of Mary.
Here it is necessary to point out that this
group, as well as the rebels, never gathered enough
members t o become a majority within the religious elite
groups in Guatemala. Furthermore, even if it is true
that their attitude represented a different and
possibly just alternative for the church as well as for
the Guatemalan society, instead of promoting
development, it restrained development by creating such
a violent reaction from the state that it practically
left the Guatemalan Catholic Church voiceless during
the period of 1978 to 1981.

The Traditionalists
When Casariego became appointed Archbishop of
G~-jtemala,he rose to the the position of most
important personality--though not the most relevmt
figure--of the Guatemalan Catholic Church, a position
he maintained until his death in 1983.1 Casariego's

Mario Casariego was born in Spain in 1909. His

parents died when he was a child, and for this reason
he was brought to Guatemala by an uncle who later died
and left him alone. His situation caused John XXIII to
call him "I'orfanello." Later, a Guatemalan-Salvadoran
family took care of him and educated him. From the
beginning he was inclined towa-d the priesthood,
personal relations with the state during hiz tenure as
leader of the Catholic Church in Guatemala can best be

entered the Somasca order in El Salvador, and was

transferred to Italy in 1929. His first duties as a
priest were carried out in El Salvador. However,
Casariego kept in contact with his friends in Italy,
especially those at Bergamo. These contacts included
the friendship of a friend who later became John XXIII.
During his stay in El Savador. Casariego
distinguished himself as a fund raiser for the support
of Somascan programs and organized pilgrimages to Rome.
These activities kept him in close touch with the
Salvadoran society as well as with Vatican authorities.
He established and maintained contact with the
governments of Guatemala, Costa Rica, and the United
States.
In September 1958, during the last months of
Pious XII's term. he was appointed Bishop of Pudenciana
(Numidia, Africa). This appointment was confirmed by
John XXIIl. In November of that year, Archbishop
Rossell, who had been Casariego's friend since
childhood (in reality Rossell was Casariego's
protector), requested his appointment as his auxiliary
bishop. In February 1959 Casariego arrived in
Guatema 1 a.
The appointment as auxiliary bishop to
Rossell was probably due t o Rossell's need for a
trustworthy assistant who could help him manage the new
influx of priests and clergy whose numbers increased
the manpower as well as the problems of the Guatemalan
church, and who were threatening t o curtail Rossell's
influsncz.
During his term as auxiliary bishop.
Casariego contributed t o the increase of the secular
apostolate by supporting the existing organizations and
founding new ones. He became chaplain o f the military
school, which later helped him maintain good relations
with the military generations. He also got along very
well with foreign newsmen and diplomats. Casariego
received many foreign and Guatemalsn decorations, and
became general assistant of the Somascan Order for
Latin America. In 1962, when Archbishop Rossell's
health ws beginning to fail, Casariego was appointed
described as cooperative. Primarily, the archbishop
and the Guatemalan government shared the same view:
that the need for economic development was pre-eminent
and that it should be channeled through a capitalistic
structure. This was t o be accomplished through
cooperation, which placed the church more in the role
of a mediator than that of a prophet.
Unlike Rossell, the growth and
decentralization process characteristic o f the Catholic
Church at the time prevented Mario Casariego, as was

mentioned previously, from exercising absolute control

over the decision-making process and the direction that
the Guatemalan Catholic Church was to take in relation
to ecclesiastical affairs. Nevertheless, Casariego was
undoubtedly a talented politician. By means o f
threats, persuasion, and alliances of convenience, he
was able to lead the majority within the religious
community, guiding them in the direction he thought
convenient.
Although Casariego's political participation

coadjl.ltor archbishop with the right of succession. On

December 10, 1964, when Rossell died, Casariego became
archbi shop. See data From His Excel l ency and Rev. Mr.
Mario Cardena l Casar i ego, i n Cartas pastoral es Y
discursos, 1969-1975, Vol. 1 1 1 , Guatemala, Imprenta
was nonpartisan, his intervention in the political
arena gained him the trust and credibility that he
needed and found in the national political system as
well a s in the high authorities of the Catholic Church
in Rome. For this reason, he was able t o remain in the
position of archbishop for 19 years.
Casariego's traditional attitude,
unfortunately, was contrary to the church's desire to
update itself. The call would have placed the
archbishop in a very difficult situation. On one hand,
as a traditionalist, any serious attempt leading to
change seemed t o him inadequate or suspicious. On the
other hand, his traditionalism commanded respect and
allesiance t o the Pope and a council that was promoting
important changes within the ecclesiastical order.
Casariego's attitude concerning such aaaiornamento was
cautious. He chose t o deal with the agenda proposed by
the universal church through Vatican I 1 in a

conventional manner.
Casariego's first pastoral communications
were concerned with traditional topics such as charity
(March 1965). vocations and the seminary (May 19651,

Iberia, Talleres Gutenberg, n.d., pp. 383-388.

and the family (May 19661.2 Among these, the most
interesting one is the first because of its variety of
topics and the views presented therein. It also stands
as a reflection of Casariego's traditional position,
This letter shows Casariego's preoccupation with the
belief that the lack of ecclesiastical personnel was
detrimental to the church. He insisted on educating
lay assistants so that there would be more religious
schools and associations. He was also concerned with
the church's artistic patrimony and seemed happy at the
prospect that religiosity and devotion were growing in
Guatema 1 a.
Following his traditional inclination,
Casariego emphasized that charity was the indispensable
requirement for life to develop amidst peace and
tranqcility:
..,even at times when violence and strife
reign: "in everything which is needed there
must be unity, in what appears doubtful,
free discussion, liberty...and throughout
a1 1, charity.lW3

2 Mar i o Casar i ego, Cartas pastora 1 es y d i scursos

1965-1967, Vol. I, Escuela Tipografia Emiliani, San
.
Salvador, El Salvador. 1967, pp. 7-83.
3 Mario Casariego, "En la caridad sere el consuelo de
todos," Primera Pastoral, Guatemala, March 3. 1965, in
Cartas pastorales y discursos, Vol. I, p. 10.
 In t h i s same pestorai cs~xinication,he
reaffirmed his traditional attitude: "It is not the
church's business t o involve itself in the technical
aspects of the social problem. Her mission is t o
address the consciences and urge them t o comply with
their duties toward others."4

Further on, we perceive once more the same

emphasis on traditional values such a s salvation and we
can also glimpse a call for resignation in the face of

poverty.
If at present there is nothing in America or
our Guatemala that demands urgently the study
and application o f suitable means in order
for the masses o f workers and peasants to
achieve the human dignity for which they
yearn and longr we must also add that the
desire for this dignity and human ascendency
has to be achieved upon a cultural as well
as a moral basis, showing responsibility and
capability in the performance of one's work,
more than in a material or economic base.
Many times it is not low salaries that cause
the ruin o f families, but moral disorder, the
lack of ideals and thoughtless use of money.
Among us, the fabulous waste spent on
alcoholic beverages is proof o f what is
important for the dignity o f the needy, which
is that they should have a clear conscience
and comply with their duties....5

His traditional position was affirmed in

Ibid., p. 19.
5 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
Casariego's adherence to the "Chair of Saint Peter,"
reflected in the text of the pastoral, which he
considered t o be the link that united the whole church.
Therefore, the first of his pastoral communications
could be considered, in a sense, as his plan of action
as archbishop.
Casariego's traditional conservative posture
was also reflected in his relations toward the priests
working in Guatemala, regardless of whether they were
foreign or Guatemalan. Throughout his tenure,
the archbishop always sought for the priest and the
clergy to behave in a decorous fashion according to
their position. This was not an easy task in an era of

change where more emphasis was placed on depth than

forma lity: "...we are obligated to lead a pure and

saint ly life, so as to set an edifying example ...."6

Very often he reminded the priests in his
letters of exhortation how a clergyman or religious

person should dress inside and outside the home:

It is true that the habit does not make a
monk, but it is also quite true that the
priest performs a public service job.
Therefore, all the faithful must recognize
6 Mario Casariego, "Vocaciones y seminario," Segunda
Pastoral, Guatemala, May 30, 1965, in Cartas pastorales
y discursos, Vol. I, p. 48.
 him immediately. Whoever disguises the
fact that he is a priest is someone who does
not wish t o serve the Holy Church nor its
faithful, no matter how much he talks about
social concerns.7

He a lso scolded the priests because they did not attend

spir itual retreats or did r& pray.8 Casariego
attributed great importance to prayer, especially
personal prayer, a "traditional way toward
perfection."g

Personally, Casariego saw no conflict between

charity, which for him was synonymous with concern for
others, and prayer. In this relation he cited Jesus
Christ as an example.10 Nevertheless, during his term
as archbishop he had several problems with the clergy
from-the dioceses as well as with the regular clerics,
not uncommon during a difficult period of change when
many clerics had chasen other alternatives than

prayer.
Casariego did not have as many difficulties

with the female orders, which demonstrated less

Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 86.

8 Ibid.
9 Mario Casariego, "Mensaje dirigido a 10s seminarios
de Guatemala en el inicio del curso del ano santo de
1975," Guatemala, January 1975, in Cartas Pastorales y
Discursos, Vol. IV, p. 12.
1 " Ibid.
independence and self-sufficiency from the bishops;
the case of the revolutionary ~arykno'llnun, Marian
Peter, was an exception.11

In 1967 the relations between Casariego and

members of some religious orders started t o
deteriorate. Among the better known occurrences we
find the case o f two Maryknoll members, Thomas Melville
and Marian Peter, who were expelled from the country
for their subversive attitudes. In this case,
Casariego was discrete; he left t o the Maryknoll
superiors the task o f controlling their subordinates.
Officially, between praise and expressions of
gratefulness, Casariego lauded the work o f t h e
Maryknoll order in the country, but stated his doubts
concerning the cultural capability of the two members
of the order in question. He made statements.to the
effect that Melville and Peter were not representative
of the type of religious persotrs that the country
des i red.
What kind o f priest or nun does our
ecclesiastical province need? The priest
who has not adapted t o his country o f
origin? Someone whose harsh and difficult
l 1 "Boletin d e la Union de Superiores Generales," in
La Carta, Guatemala, July 1981. Organo de divulgacion
de CONFREGUA
 character makes him unacceptable t o his own
people? Will it be th= rules of the
hierarchy set t o regulate the liturgy as
the pastoral work?
When a priest's vocaticn is undergoing a
crisis, when his spirit is resentful and
bitter and he then comes t o work as a pastor,
he will only disappoint his religious
brothers and scandalize the faithful t o whom
he should offer an example with his life and
testimony t o Christ.12

It is quite possible that Casariego, as a

member o f a religious order and conscious that
Guatemala needed missionaries, wanted t o prevent the
government from taking repressive action against the
Maryknoll order. If the government had done so, it
could have provoked the withdrawal not only of the
Maryknoll missionaries but also that of other religious
orders.
Later, when a member of the Maryknoll order.
Hugo Gerberrnann, was consecrated Bishop of Huehuetenan-
go in 1968, Casariego made it clear that the church's

relations to that order were excellent and stated,

May the missionaries o f Maryknoll receive
our praise because they plowed deeply the
Mario Casariego, "Discurso a 10s religiosos y
religiosas en presencia del venerable Episcopado
Guatemalteco," Guatemala* February 28, 1968, in Cartas
pastorales y discursos, 1967-1969, Vcl. 1 1 , Escuela
Tipografica Emiliani, San Salvador, El Salvador, 1969,
 new land, amidst sweat and tears. We hope
that very soon the second part of the psalm
will become a reality and that they may
"reap copious fruits accompanied by festive
songs. 13

Another serious problem that Casariego had to

confront concerning other priests was his relation t o

the priests o f COSDEGUA, a group that falls within our

rebel category. In July 1970, the group organized

several hundred Christians who protested and demanded

the resignation o f Mario Casariego. They accused him

of being an incompetent foreigner and a drug addict.

Subsequently, Casariego answered and appealed t o the

group's conscience, asking them t o retract their

opinion.

...
one more time I call on all of them and
their followers, those who call themselves
"born again Christiansw--1 wish they were
so in their spiritual and supernatural life--
your Archbishop appeals to you with all his
authority t o retract such a dangerous
attitude for the benefit of your own souls.
Do not become a scandalous rock within the
people of God.14

13 Mario Casar i ego, Di scurso "A1 eregi rse

canonicamente la nueva diocesis de Huehuetenango,"
Guatemala, July 28, 1968, in Cartas pastorales v
discursos, Vol. 1 1 , p. 313.
l 4 Mario Casariego, "Comunicado del Senor Cardenal
Arzobispo a 10s fieles de la arquidiocesis," Guatemala,
August 14, 1970, in Cartas pastorales y d i s c u r ~ ,Vol.
1 1 1 , pp. 117-118.
 Nevertheless, the group continued t o persist.

A few days later, Casariego responded forcefully:

...I would have preferred to remain silent
after hearing all the damaging false state-
ments (but) they are placing me in a position
where I have t o say some words of guidance.
I have had...gteat consideration and
patience, which some have erroneously
interpreted as weakness.... This group of
priests has scandalized the Catholic people.
They have disoriented them, divided and
separated them by informing them with lies.
They have created tension and have indis-
posed the public.... In spite of the fact
that they have been given time to reflect...
(they continue) defying the ecclesiastical
authority, education, and urbane manners....
This did nct bother them, even when they
received a brotherly and charitable letter,
sent by this country's presbytery.15

In this type o f message, Casariego reinforced

his conservative position and his fear that should the

group attract more members and become a strong

movement, anarchy would result. Nevertheless,

Casariego did not entirely close off the opportunity

for dialogue, although his offer to carry on a dialogue
was interpreted by many as one that would be conducted
by only one participant.
...No one doubts the need for sincere
dialogue, and we are ready t o hold one, but
Mario Casari ego, "Mensa je del Senor Cardenal
Arzobispo Metropolitan0 a1 pueblo de Guatemala,''
Guatemala, August 14, 1970, in Cartas pastorales y
discursos, Vol. 1 1 1 , pp. i20-121.
 we will never have a dialogue where traps are
set or one that degenerates into defamatory
attitudes or abusive insolence. You cannot
dialogue with a person who represents
authority by insulting and offending his
person. We must remember that a dialogue
cannot be held without respect of each
party's opinion. Disrespect and destruc-
tion can harm the very principle of
authority. We have wanted and we still want
t o hold a dialogue...but never through
pressure groups....
if contempt persists, the Prelate will be
responsible for continuing the
(restrictions). Even more SO, when he is
sorry for the spiritual damage committed
against the faithful who have been
deceived.16

Four years later, in 1974, one of the leaders

from COSGEGUA, Father Jose Maria Ruiz Furlan, known as
Father "Chemita," became a candidate for mayor o f

Guatemala City. Casariego took advantage .of this

occasion and stated his opinion concerning the
participation of priests in politics. He delivered a
pastoral sermon whose central topics were the elections

and the citizens' responsibility to participate. He

gave some advice concerning the political role of the
church, saying that

...the church is not an ally of any political

party, because it would be at a disadvantage
if it were t o divide its children, since its
holy mission is t o unite.... (The church)
16 Ibid., pp. 122-123.
 is above party politics and fulfills its duty
when it addresses the Catholic conscience and
opinion in Guatemala, so that the faithful
may prepare themselves for the elections...
and can pray for God's peace to come....l7
Concerning the particular case of Father
Chemita as a candidate, Casariego tried to disconnect
his political participation from the Catholic Church.
... (The Ecclesiastical Authority) formally
and respectfully requests the citizens and
all institutions involved in the electoral
process to keep in mind that the name and
moral influence of the Catholic Church in
Guatemala is not involved in the case of the
Reverend Mr. Jose Maria Ruiz Furlan. The
church is far from wanting to become mixed
up in the struggle concerning electoral
politics. In addition, it does not wish to
become a toy to the obscure forces who might
wish her to do so.18

Casariego's performance was ironic. because

if anyone was a political activist, it was he.
Nevertheless, his political activity was different from
Chemita's because it was conducted by him, personally
as an individual, behind the scenes and devoid of

Mario Casar i ego, "Exhortac i on pastora 1 de 1

Arzobispo Casariego, con ocasion de las proximas
elecciones generales de la republica. la recta y firme
postura de la iglesia con relacion a1 presente momento
politico,'' Guatemala, January 15, 1974, in Cartas
pastorales Y discursos, Vol. 1 1 1 , p. 329.
la Ibid., pp. 329-330. In spite of the polemics
carried out w i t h Chemita, later on both the archbishop
and he reconciled. When Casariego died, Chemita
participated in the funeral.
part i sansh i p .
Years later, in 1982, Casariego again reacted
violently. In this particular case, it concerned the
problem of the Jesuit Luis Eduardo Pellecer. Pellecer

had been kidnapped by government forces; then he

appeared live and addressed the public in a press
conference where he acknowledged his participation in
one of the most important guerrilla groups in the
country. It has been affirmed that when Casariego
found out about Pellecer's political activities, he
pushed him and cried, "Judas, Judasv*to his face. He
repeated the epithet again before the Guatemalan
press. 19

Guring his term, Casariego paid little

attention to the social problem. Although he regularly
wrote of the country's social problems in his pastoral
letters and publications, it is evident that the
principal topic of his writing was religious affairs.
This was evident from the texts written for the
Episcopal Conference, of which he was a member, and
where he placed more emphasis on the social question.
He remained a traditionalist and pointed out

l9 See Fiqaro Magazine, April 3 0 r 1982.

the merits of the church, its charitable works, and its

justice.
... in the Guatemalan Archdiocese there are
numerous examples of unselfishness,
generosity, of the contribution in time and
enthusiasm toward the cause of destitute
children and helpless families who have no
resources.... 20
In spite of the fact that Casariego's
traditional emphasis did not imply finding solutions
structurally related to the problem of oppression and

injustice, this did not mean that he was not sincerely

concerned for the welfare of the poor and the needy.
Nonetheless, his traditionalist orientation
was directed toward individual solutions based on

compassion, charity, and the good will displayed by the

more fortunate who were in better economic and social
positions in the past. Therefore, in his writings we
can clearly observe a tendency to approach the problem
cf social injustice from a t,-aditional perspective.
This approach did not emphasize the transformation of
society as the only option left to attain social and
economic improvements for the masses, but instead

20 Mario Casar i ego, "SsSre 1 s responsab i 1 i dad de!

Cristianb en el mundo social de hoy," Cuarta Pastoral,
Guatemala, October 30, 1966, in Cartas pastorales Y
discursos, Vol. I, p. 95.
stressed the need for equality of opportunity.
We do not measure these differences in
terms of possessions, but on the possibili-
ties that are presented to man for his self
fulfillment, so that his rights, his rest
and his security may be'acknowledged....21

His individual approach, his religious and

political values and attitudes did not permit Casariego

to adopt a more reformist stand, such as the position

taken by some of his colleagues like those in Brazil,
where the bishops responded to the military regimes by
denouncing injustice and defending the interests of the
poor. 22

However, while the Brazilian bishops were

giving special attention to the need that the church
had to rediscover its true prophetic mission, Casariego
was emphasizing the need to maintain a static church.
What was true yesterday continues to be true,
was sinful yesterday continues to be sinful,
what was necessary yesterday for us to live
a Christian life--prayer and the sacraments--
continues to be necessary.... The church
continues to be one, closely linked to its
leader Jesus Christ and its vicar, the Pope.
but some members of this church are
pretending to serve two masters and they are
-- - -- -- -- - - - - -- ---

21 Mario Casariego, "Sobre adviento, la navidad y

tratando topicos del momento que vive Guatemala,"
Decima Quinta Carta Pastoral, Guatemala, December 8 ,
1976, in Cartas pastorales Y discursos, Vol. IV,
p. 95.
22 Bruneau, The Church jn Brazil, p. 69.
 unable to serve either. They also pretend
to follow a false Christianity that envisions
a type of social and political concern that
is contrary and also destructive of the same
Christianism it means to promote.23
Instead of attributing the causes of the
problem t o structural factors. Casariego attributed
them to factors that were vaguely defined and even more
vaguely defensible.
Because of the peculiarity of our tempera-
ment. our ancestral heritage. our deficiently
formed consciences. we are unable to become
an exemplary people concerning social
justice.24

The earthquake that struck on February 4.

1976. made evident one more time Casariego's
traditionalist perception concerning the dimension of

this tragedy. His initial commentaries constituted

full proof of his intention to attribute the origin of
this natural phenomena to God's wrath.

23 Mario Casar i ego. " I nstrucc i on pastora 1 sobre e 1

sacramento de !a confesion con motivo de la cuaresma de
1977." Guatemala. February 23. 1977. in Cartas
patorales y discursos. Vol. IV. p. 113.
L 4 Mario Casariego. Cartas pastorales y discursos.
Vol. 1. p. 94.
 ...I can still hear the words that a dying
man pronounced in my ear when I was assist-
ing him at the hospital on that tragic
morning of February 4. He spoke in the
presence OF other priests and doctors and
said that the tragedy was a punishment from
God because his Holy Mother and our Mother,
the Virgin Mary, had been publicly
humiliated.25

He proceeded t o adopt a veiled utilitarian attitude,

requesting
For the present, the most urgent thing is t o
help mitigate the hunger of our people
themselves; once they have recovered from
this shock, they will give us abundant help
t o reconstruct the temples and the religious
houses. 26

This earthquake also made evident the state

of social disorder in the country. However, since he
was conscious of the potential danger that this
situation could imply, Casariego called for resignation
and warned o f the danger o f violence.
Earthquake movements...are but the reflection
o f the grave concerns that burden the soul.
These have always been there, but now they
are exacerbated; they were born from very
sad realities: physical pain, physical
hunger, bodily sickness, injustice ccmrnitted
25 Mario Casar i ego, "Mensa je a todo el pueblo de
Guatemala pronunciado a traves de la cadena nacional de
radio y television," Guatemala, February 5, 1976, in
Cartas pastorales y discursos, Vol. IV, p. 51.
L b Mario Casariego, "Circular a 10s senores parrocos,
capellanes, religiosos y religiosas que trabajan en el
Arzobispado Guatemala," Guatetmla, February 14, 1976,
Cartas pastorales y discursos, Vol. IV, p. 57.
 against the people; against the natural
faculties of individuals, against the
family, against society; the brutal violence
that is not open to reason (and that is
proclaimed by "intellectuals," as they call
themselves); a savage hatred against liberty
of education; a hatred that leads to the
manipulation of facts and data....27

In a mediating and conciliatory tone he

called attention to the hour of national reconstruction

that "knocks at the door, accordingly, of all the sons

of Guatemala".28 In this respect, Casariego insisted

that the church be considered above all, that it must

be recognized that society is highly disorganized since

many men live amidst evident and immeasurably inferior

economic and social conditions.29

He was extremely preoccupied, nevertheless,

because the following situation had not been duly

recognized.
...Many landlords, businessmen, plantation
owners...contribute beyond the requirements
of the law. They provide positive oppor-
tunities so that their workers receive
more than what is due to them. There are
many 1andowners.and plantation owners who
27 Mario Casari ego, "Creo en la igl esia, santa,
catolica y apostolica," 14th Pastoral, Guatemala, June
29, 1976, in Cartas pastorales y discursos, Vol. IV,
72.
Mario Casar i ego. 15th Pastora 1 , Guatema 1 a, December
8, 1976, in ~arta; pastorales y discursos, Vol. IV,
p i p "
Ibid., p. 94.
 provide, in addition to a salary that is
higher than the minimum wage, medical
assistance and schools for their workers
and families, which improves their situation
and provides for a possible upward
mobility.30

Casariego's views concerning the social

problem and his conservative role a s mediator appeared

continuously in his writings. In 1979 after Puebla

when the message o f John Paul I 1 appeared, his position
became official when he insisted not upon structural

reform, but on the individual's gesture of good will as

a solutior. t o social injustice.

The Divine Master has just told us...that he

gives us peace,...which should be applied t o
our good will. We should then think about
the desire o f our sweet Christ on earth, the
Pope. We all contribute, according t o our
abilities, t o what Christ and his vicar ask
of us: social justice.31

Like his predecessor, Casariego was also

interested in education. However, he was clearly

interested in the type of education that remained

uncritical and that transmitted traditional values.

From that perspective, religious and academic education

30 Ibid., p. 95.
31 Mario Casar i ego, "Pa labras pronunciadas en 1 a mi sa
y Te Deum de la independencia," Guatemala, September
14, 1980, in Cartas pastorales y discursos, Voi. IV,
pp. 287-288.
received Casariego's supp~rt. He promoted radio
schools and transmissions were made in the Indian
languages as well as in Spanish. He joined the fight
against illiteracy and worked for the extension of
education.32 His achievements in this field were
considerable. For example, in 1966, he managed t o have

the Constituent Assembly authorize the state t o

contribute funds for religious education. He also got
the authorization t o establish a new private Catholic
university. Upon blessing the first stone o f the
future university, Casariego availed himself o f the
opportunity t o state anew the traditions! values of
hierarchy and authority.
All the activities of the Rafael Landivar
University must be imbued with a deep sense
of loyalty.... Loyalty t o be given in the
first place t o the ministry o f the church
and allegiance t o the Holy Father, the Pope,
and ecclesiastical hierarchy ....33

During his term, Catholic primary education o f the

parochial type also grew enormously.

32 Mario Casariego, "Con motivo del dia international

de a l f a b e t i z a ~ i o n ,Mensaje,
~~ Guatemala, September 8,
1967, in Cartas pastorales discursos, Vol. 1 1 ,
p . 181-183.
53 Mar i o Casar i ego, llPa1 abras pronunc i ados en 1 a
benedicion de la primera piedra de la Universidad
Catolica Rafael Landivar," Guatemala, January 10. 1975,
in Cartas pastorales y discursos, Vol. IV, p. 4.
 Casariego, like his predecessor, felt
profound respect for traditional values and stability.
For him,
Peace is equivaient t o tranquiiity in the
order of things, the work of justice and
charity. Respect for values in itself and
in others such as: the family and society,
the country and man's community.. . . 3 4

We may observe that respect for these values

coincided with the values that the conservative

national groups supported in the political sphere.

These may be reduced to the motto: God, Country, and
~iberty.35
The topic of violence was seldom analyzed by
the church, especially during the guerrilla struggles
that took place in the eastern part of the country.
Although the rebellion had been taking place for a long
time, it was not until the priesks and persons
connected with the church who were involved in the
strusgle became known that the institution began t o

iook at the problem more seriousiy.

3 4 Mario Casariego, "Sobre el ano santo," 12th Carta

Pastoral, Guetemala, October 1973, in Cartas pastorales
y discursos, Vol. 1 1 1 , p. 312.
33 This motto is used in the country by the Movimiento
d e Liberacion Nacional (National Movement for
Liberation, MLN), a political party that represents the
interests o f traditional-conservative groups.
 Even Casariego suffered from the violence; he
was kidnapped on March 16, 1968. by a group of armed
men. The archbishop remained imprisoned by his
kidnappers untii March 2 0 . when he was set free. The
ecclesiastical curia spoke of the event as "a sad
episode for the church in Guatemala."36 Reacting to
this occasion, the curia called for prudence.
The honorable Curia wishes that in these
difficult times all manifestations
causing disorder be avoided by not crediting
alarming news or spreading rumors that may
cause panic among the citizens. It requests
all religious associations, as well as the
Guatemalan public in general, to act serious-
l y 2nd tc assist the euthorities, giving
them any information that is precise and
true and that may lead them to find
Monsignor Casariego and the person accom-
panying him (his driverl.37

The reasons for the kidnapping were never

explained. The most acceptable version argued that
Casariego was taken by civilian members of the extreme
right that belonged to the anti-Communist peramilitary
group, Movimiento Nacional Anticomunista Organizado
(National Anti-Communist Organized Movement, MANO) and
several military men who joined the organization to

36 Curia Eclesiastica, "El triste episodio de la

iglesia en Guatemala," Guatemala, March 16. 1968, in
Cartas pastorales y discursos. Vol. 11. p. 256.
3 ' Ibid., p. 256.
weaken and discredit the Mendez Montenegro government
in order to depose the president. This is the reason
that the most important military chiefs of the era
(Carlos Manuel Arana, Rafael Arriaga Bosque, and Manuel
Sosa Avila) went abroad t o serve in the diplomatic
corps. Such a fact gives credence to this version of
the story.38 The kidnappers threatened that they
would execute Monsignor Casariego within a 24-hour
period starting at 12:OO noon on March 18, 1968, unless
President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro res igned his
post .39

The public's reaction in general was one of

38 See Louisa Frank, "Resistance and Revolution: The

Development o f Armed Struggle in Guatemala," in
Guatemala, Susan Jonas and David Tobis, eds., North
American Congress on Latin America, NACLA, California,
1974, p. 186. According t o well-informed sources,
among the above-mentioned military chiefs, only Sosa
Avila and Arriaga Bosque were involved in the
kidnapping, not Arana. Casariego was always on good
terms with Arana during the time that he was president.
On the other hand, according t o the same sources, among
those involved in the kidnapping there were Stuardo
Loreczznss p r e s w t c r ~-&= ~ ~ ~ ~ t-
n g s d -----,..
rr\.sr?SC!!&
-& t: '-"=? ?,
"bm

known astrologer, and other prominent politicians.

39 See Cartas pastorales y discursos, Vol. 1 1 . p. 268.
Among the many stories that circulated, one in
particular is of intere~c. It contends that CasarSego
was kidnapped in order co exchange him for several
volumes of his diary, which apparently contained
extremely important confidential information. Today,
these volumes are under the nunciature's custody in
Guatema 1 a.
indifference, in spite of the deep concern manifested
by the ecclesiastical authorities through news
bulletins, radio, and television. The Ecclesiastical
Curia condemned it a s an abominable act. At the same
time, it issued t h e necessary instructions on how t o
proceed in case Casariego was found-40

The indifference t o the kidnapping shown by

the Guatemalan people was evidence of how unpopular
Casariego and the traditional position were among the
popular masses. This circumstance was not unusual,
especially when we take into consideration the fact
that Casariego owed his influence t o the political,
economic, and social support of the dominant
conservative groups.
During the time that he was imprisoned, his
persons1 doctor made public a list of medicines that
the archbishop had t o take. Among them he included the
following: Exidrex, 50 milligrams; Serpasol, 0.1
milligram; Librium, 10 milligrams; and Seconal, 0.1

40 "eeletin de Is Curia Eclesiasticaw; "Aviso a las

personas que se encuentran en la nunciatura apostolica
y en el palacio arzobispal": Nota "A 10s diversos
cuerpos d e bamberos municipales y ~ o l ~ n t a r i o s , "all
documents dated March 18, 1968. In Cartas pastorales y
discursos, Vol. 1 1 , pp. 259, 260, 261.
milligram. As a result of this notice, Casariego was
accused of drug addiction.41 As was mentioned before,

the archbishop reappeared on March 20 of that year

without causing any important reaction, other than the

occasional political jokes characteristic of Guatemalan

humor.
Curiously, even though at that time violence
reigned throughout the country, and in spite of his own
kidnapping, Casariego refused to denounce the
prevailing violence, preferring t o maintain the good
relations he had established with the government and

with the economically and socially powerful sectors.

Therefore, the archbishop's message

concerning his freedom, instead of becoming a

denunciation, became a document that spoke of peace,
love, and political wisdom.
As father and pastor to all Guatemalans, we
cannot speak, nor can we accuse anyone of
this offense committed against our consecra-
ted person. I do not know any of my captors
nor do I know the motive for their action
sgainst me....
This has been one more incident in our pas-
toral life. Whatever is said or speculated
4 1 Dr. Carlos Perez Avendano's message as personal
doctor of Monsignor Mario Casariego, Guatemala, March
17, 1968, in Cartas pastorales y discursos, Vol. 11,
p. 258.
 must be transformed in grace toward our
Lord t o make amends t o him, so that he may
turn his merciful eyes on us at this time of
' Lent, which demands penitence and sacrifice,
so that the peace we are all hoping for will
reign in our dear country, Guatemala.42

It was not until 1970 that Casariego adopted

a stronger position in relation to the violence.
We would like, even for one day, t o remove
our thoughts from the gloomy images of blood
and horror. We cannot believe that those
sadists who are spreading terror and mourning
in the country are sons of Guatemala.43

At this time, Casariego called for peace in

conjunction with an outcry against violence that echoed
the statement of Pau! ?!.
My beloved children, let us leave rancor,
hatred and vengeance. Let us bid farewell
to violence, because none of that reflects
the Christian way.
Must we resign ourselves? W i l l we doubt
that Guatemalans are capable of achieving
just and secure peace within the bosom of
their privileged nation?44

Nevertheless, because of his loyalty to

tradition, he refused to see any s-kt-ucturalcausation

42 Mario Casariego, "Mensaje arzoSispa1," Guaterila,

March 25, 1968, in Cartas pastorales Y discursos, Vol.
1 1 , DD. 278-279.
43 ~ a r i oCasariego, "Mensaje con ocasion de Navidad y
ano nuevo," Guatemala, December 24, 1970, and January
1971, in Cartas pastorales y discursos, Vol. 111,
p. 153.
44 Ibid.
in thr origin of violence; instead he blamed its origin
on various other causesr such as
The grave and painful pressures that are put
upon these promising countries and the
arduous work that must be carried out from
within t o update the minds and activate the
arms that lie in the sensuousness of its
climate and the fecundity of the soil is a
victim to cunning exploitation. All this has
prepared tha way in contemporary times for a
surging development, which is near.... 45

Its causes? Envy and rancor, the instrument

of death in man's hands, the casting of God
t o oblivion. And today other causes have
appeared like drunkenness, material needs,
the school o f the movies and television,
vengeance, the desire for luxury . . . . A 6

He ended by adopting a tone that pretended t o denounce,

but it only presented the traditional perception before
the copious "bloodbath among brothers."47

45 Mario Casariego, "Sobre la iglesia y con ocasion

del dia mundial de Accion de Gracias," 9th Carta
Pastoral, Guatemala, November 22, 1970, in Cartas
pastorales Y discursos, Vol. 1 1 1 , p. 141.
46 Mario Casariego, 15th Carta Pastoral, Guatemala,
December 8, 1976, in Cartas pastorales Y discursos,
Vol. IV, pp. 95-96.
47 Mario Casar i ego, "Exhortac ion pastora 1 con mot i vo
de Cuaresma," Guatemala, February 2, 1971, in Cartas
pastorales Y discursos, Vol. 1 1 1 , p. 163.
 ...
We cannot remain silent.... Certainly,
the church's mission is not to occupy itself
with the technical solution (we should say)
of national problems, or politics or military
and economic planning. However, these
involve the conception o f human life, of
man's rights and obligations that will only
find their last recourse in religion.48

On the other hand, he turned his arsenal

against the revolutionary religious elites. Casariego
said that the evils of violence were fought with "still
worse evils," changing "the order and nature of things

as a radical.remedy," piling "evil upon evil, violence

upon violence"; in addition, "all violence is
irrational and ideological sentiment is its soupy
culture. Many men love t o spread this, men who have
made themselves teachers and leaders of the oppressed
masses. "49

It is interesting t o note here that, contrary

t o the response o f the Episcopal Conference against
violence in the different variations in which it
appeared a s time passed. Casariego wzs repel !ed by-

everything violent (not only political violence, but

any other kind of violence as well), a feeling that was

48 Ibid., pp. 163-164.

, Guatema 1 a,
49 Mario Casar i ego, 1 4th Carta Pastora 1
June 29, 1976, in Cartas pastorales y discursos, Vol.
IV, pp. 72-73.
consistent with his traditional position. This
perception placed violence in contradiction to love,

charity, and Christian sentiment.

In accordance with his conservative position,

Casariego also did not feel any enthusiasm for the

liturgical reforms that came after Vatican 1 1 . In his
first pastoral letter, he admitted that "the faithful
will understand better the active participation they
must undertake," but he made it clear that there were
"no secrets before concerning what was said or had to
be done in the liturgical acts,"50 because there were
plenty of books that enabled the faithful to
part icipate. In the same pastoral letter he argued

that it was more difficult to make changes Mithin the

"par ish" than changes in liturgy, because its "origins
must be learned" and an "aggiornamento" must be applied

to contemporary times to develop a "series of technical

tasks" that cannot be carried out in Guatemala because

that "one of the first tasks is the organization of the

\
laity, who must participate in many apostolic

Mar i o Casar i ego, Pr imera Carta Pastora 1 , Guatema 1 a,

March 3, 1965, in Cartas pastorales Y discursos, Vol.
I, p. 1 1 .
 Another key point of this pastoral letter was
the use of the word "aggiornarnento." Casariego never
used the word "change" except in a deprecatory sense,
because according t o him, change did not exist, only
"aggiornamento."
As I have mentioned before, it is evident
that Casariego clearly understood the serious need t o
update a church that
...today must confront multiple and serious
problems in a world like ours where economic
sccial, technical, scientific, moral, and
religious structures are developing at a pace
never encountered before in the history of
human ity .52
He also understood that if the church was t o

continue transmitting the "power of the doctrine

cf.,+Jesus Ckristql it should "lend an ear t o the needs
of our day" so that the Word and all divine teaching
continues t o be "nourishment for spiritual life," a
"guiding power for hope and enlightenment."53

Nevertheless, it was this perception of how

5 1 Ibid., pp. 16-18.

52 Mario Casariego, "Exhortation arzobispal desde
Rc,ma," Rome, November 21. 1965, in Cartas pastorales y
discursos, Vol. I, p. 147.
33 Ibid., pp. 147-148.
the church was to update itself that defined Casariego
as a traditional conservative. In a letter addressed
to seminary students, he transcribed an article by
Cardinal Pericles Felici, "Three Questions for a
Seminary Student on Aggiornamento, Obedience, and Its
Readings," in which the thoughts, ideas, and manner of
operation of Casariego concerning change can be clearly
seen. In his view, this basically implied acceptance
of the evolution o f the church "and with limitations,
democracy and dialogue."54 He cautioned against
"false prophets" within the council. With regard to
obedience, he stated that "by using a new and more
compatible language with our times, they have again
taught us an ancient wisdom...and have recommended its

observance. "55 Change for Casar i ego meant "renewa 1 ,"

the type of renewal that should be balanced and
sensible and fulfilled in the spirit of faith.56 For
him, the council's documents and the conclusions
arrived at in Medellin could not be

54 Mario Casar i ego, "Carta a 10s seminar i stas con

ocasion de la cuaresma de 197Qp1'Guatemala, !larch 1970,
in Cartas pastorales Y d i ~ ~ u r s o s Vol.
, 1 1 1 , pp. 83-89.
55 Ibid., pp. 84-85.
56 Mario Casariego, "Mensaje a1 pueblo de Guatemala,"
Guatemala, Agust 14, 1970, in Cartas pastorales y
discursos, Vol. 1 1 1 . p. 122.
 ...arbitrarily interpreted, because if
that were so, you would only attain anarchy,
contempt for authority and the teachings o f
the church and definitely, the disorientation
of the people of God....57

Going further as he attacked what he

considered to be the erroneous interpretations from
Medellin, Casariego concluded that the teachings of
Medellin "are not the Gospel"; the Gospel coming from

tt-e mouths of evangelists is unique. Medell in stands

"only for the practice of the Gospel" and the way it
"should be applied as well as the manner by which we
should behave" according t o the Second Vatican Council
in Latin Arnerica.58

Finally, let us remember that Medell in

simply does not command, nor ordain, nor does
anything but advise; but it does not condone
violence. nor any of the other things many
attribute t o Medellin; certainly it cannot
counsel insubordination or t o leave behind
such things as prayer, spirituality and
sacrifice. We must learn Lo interpret it
correctly and not according to our fancy and
choice.59

Repeating the words of Monsignor Eduardo Pironio,

Casariego added,

s7 Ibid.
58 Mario Casariego, "Resurnen de las palabras de sal udo
, el retiro mensual del
a1 Clero de la ~ r ~ u i d i o c e s i s en
19 de enero de 1971," Guatemala, January 19, 1971, in
Cartas pastorales y discursos, Vol. 1 1 1 , p. 161.
sy Ibid.
 ...that a great many people have taken the
Medellin documents and have twisted each one
at their pleasure. This has generated many
contradictions and scandals in Latin America.
Not all of Medellin's recommendations can be
put into practice immediately for many
reasons and in spite of our feelings and the
urge of our spirit, because each country has
lesser or greater problems, accordingly.60
For Casariego, obedience to the aggiornamento was due

on 1 y t o Rome.
We must remember that Rome commands. We, as
well as Medellin, have to obey the commands
of Rome and the council.
The Second Vatican Council must be used to
extend our love and knowledge about the
church. However, we must not be the
council's teachers. We must respect the
legitimate authority.
Casariego was critical of those who had
provoked "exaggerated, enormous and deformeds' tension
in the church.61 He blamed revisionism, "which drowns

the clamor of serenity and balance." This revisionism

was very different from the renewal called for by the

Concerning the problem of change, Casariego's

- - -- -

60 Ibid.
61 Hario Casariego, IvCreo en la santa iglesia
apostolica con ocasion del feliz 75 cumpleanos de su
santidad, el Papa Paulo V," 11th Carta Pastoral,
Guatemala, September 27, 1972, in Cartas pastorales y
c Vol. 111, p. 267.
primary concern was that "novelty and changet1
characteristic of that era would mistakenly lead t o the
belief that nature was changeable or to think that
change rested only in the structures, organizations, or
institutions,
...the error begins when a person
dialectically places this change within the
structures, organizations and institutions,
experiencing an immediate temptation to look
the other way or forget what it is that has
to change, a change that should be most
effective because it is supposed to come out
of the egotism of the community's soul, of
the incoherence of what is being said,
thought and done, I ? is a painful kind of
change, but one that is more beneficial for
the individual, and the ecclesiastical and
civilian societies.63

In this respect, he ins ists that the

Christian doctrine does not and w i l l never change and

neither will the church.64 What was sinful before

continued to be sinful. Finally, he stated that there

were no "social sins," which was the name given to

63 Mario Casariego, " A 1 pueblo catolico sobre el fie1

cornplimiento de 10s sacramentos, con el objeto de
evitar errores que desfiguren las verdades
fundarnentales de la fe catolica y como recuerdo del ano
santo," Instruccion Pastoral, Guatemala, December 8,
1975, in Cartas pastoreles Y discursos, Vol. IV,
p. 25.
Mario Casariega, "Sobre el sacramento de la
confesion, con motivo de la cuaresma de 1977,"
Instruccion Pastoral, Guatemala, February 23, 1977, in
Cartas pastorales Y discursos, Vol. IV, p. 113.
actions that were supposed t o silence the conscience,

because in real life they were personal sins.65

Casariego vehemently blamed individuals

within the laity and the priesthood who immediately

assumed functions that were not assigned t o them and

thus created a confusion in roles.

We have observed the pretention o f some

laymen who have decided t o interpret the
sacred scriptures, the tradition and the
teachings o f the church, but who are unfor-
tunately ignorant o f what the church stands
for and its faith. These laymen try t o pass
a s theologians and teachers in matters where
they are neophytes and are not qualified t o
teach nor have they been awarded with
grace. 66

The crisis suffered by some members o f the

church has made them lose their identity--
laymen who are dogmatic with respect t o
morals and faith and claim papal authority
for their criticism and statements, priests
and religious men who don't want t o remain
a s such, they speak a thousand tongues like
the polyglots, the sociolo~lsts,the
psychologists, the anthropologists, and they
lend themselves t o denounce socioeconomic or
sociopolitical problems, disregarding the
mission that the church entrusted t o
them. 67

65 Ibid.. p. 114.
66 Hario Casariego, '*Hornilia en la Misa Crismal del
Jueves Santo," Gautemala, April 7, 1977, in Cartas
pastorales Y discursos, Vol. IV, p. 124.
b ' Hario Casariego, "Sobre el recrudecimiento de la
violencia y la necesidad de una actuation madura y
libre de 10s laicos," Instruction Pastoral, Guatemala,
August 15, 1977, in Cartas pastorales y discursos, Vol.
i V , p. 137.
 In relation to the environment in which the
Latin American church lived during the Casariego
period, we must recognize that while he was Archbishop
of Guatemala, the Latin American church was undergoing
some difficult years, especially during the period of
1966 to 1972. This era witnessed a series of inter-
ecclesiastical conflicts, rebellion* division* poor
relations with national governments, confrontation,
persecution, and violence. Nevertheless* in the
particular case of Cardinal Casariego, one cannot say

that there was a confrontation between the religious

elites under his leadership and the powerful sectors of
the country such as business and the army. It should
be mentioned that relations between Casariego and

international capitalism were excellent. This

extremism is confirmed by the fact that he blessed not

only the Coca Cola bottling plant, but also other

plants that were subsidiaries of powerful transnational
companies such as the Johnson Products and Squibb,
S.A.* pharmaceutical plants and the Productos Clark de
Centroamerica, S.A., factory, a subsidiary of Philip
Morr i s .68
- - - - - - - -- -- --

68 Texts of these bl essi ngs by Mario Casari ego may be

 Casariego's relations with the army as an
i nst itution were also excellent. On one occasion, he
stated that if he had not been a religious man he would
have become a soldier. We must remember that Casariego

did become Chaplain of the Army, a circumstance that

permitted him to make contacts with the majority of the
important officers and to participate in rraany
activities related to the army. For example, he
inaugurated the stadium for the army and the
polytechnical school69, where he stated,

He who can accomplish everything and who is

above all limitations looks favorably upon
our efforts and achievements; one of these
is your polytechnic school, oh high army
command and glorious national army!70

Concerning his relations with the state, as

we have mentioned before, the Archbishop remained close
to two chiefs of state and four presidents with whom he
had to coexist. These relations may be catalogued as

found in Cartas pastorales y discursos, Vol. 11,

Guatemala, July 28, 1967, August 30, 1967, February 8
and 15, 1968, respectively, pp. 169, 172, 249, and
250.
69 Mario Casar i ego, " I nagurandose el estadio del
ejercito," Discurso, Guatemala, August 10, 1979, in
Cartas pastorales Y discursos. Vol. 1 1 , p. 171.
IUMario Casariego, "Benedicion de las nuevas
instalaciones de la escuela politecnica." Guatemala. - -

May 15 , 1977, in Cartas pastbra 1 es y di kcursos , Vol

IV, p. 108.
cooperative, according to Bruneau's categorization.
During this period in history, 1964 to 1983, relations
between church and state were closely tied t o the
personal relationship of Archbishop Mario Casariego
(which included the values and attitudes he
represented) with the army chiefs and the presidents
with whom he dealt. This was why the objectives of the
archbishop, who advocated social welfare and justice
and the advancement of education. coincided completely
with those of the various governments with whom he
collaborated. This fact reaffirmed the relationship of
cooperation between the institution he represented and
the state.
In this respect, Enrique Peralta Azurdia,
Julio Cusar Mendez Montenegro, Carlos Manuel Arana
Osorio, Kjeil, Eugenio Laugerud, Fernando Romeo Lucas
Garcia, and Efrain Rios Montt were none other than
representatives of the state whom Casariego endeavored
to cultivate because he desired to improve the church's

influence and importance in the nation. Un-tcortunately,

these efforts were practically an individual activity
that prevented the possibility of the church as
an institution from returning to the influential
position it had exerted during the liberal revolution
of 1871. On the contemporary scene. this position had
already been attained by the churches of Brazil and
Chi le.
Therefore, upon Casariego's death. we find a
church that, in spite of having achieved a degree of
consensus in relation to its role in Guatemala, did not
have the power or the organization or the necessary
mechanisms t o decisively influence the orientat ion of
important events at the national level in pol it ics or
in economics.
Mario Casariego was a capable politician. As

leader o f the Guatemalan Cathoiii Church. he surrounded

himself with the most powerful and influential
political actors, which gave him the capacity t o
conduct political maneuvers that permitted him to keep
his enemies at a distance and t o lead the church down
the traditional path he desired. By pursuing this

line. Casariego gained influence for himself as an

individual, but not for the institution that he
represented.
Casariego was able t o sort out the challenges
and critical opinions gathering around his person,
including the confrontations that came from within the
Episcopal Conference and those that originated among
the group o f diocesan priests from COSDEGUA, the
Melvilles, and other priests whose ideology was

revolutionary. His political ability became evident

after he was liberated from his kidnapping. Not only
did he pardon those who had planned the kidnapping, but
he also managed t o maintain a good relationship with
President Carlos Arana Osorio who, according to some
sources, was an accomplice in the kidnapping.
Casariego was convinced of the correctness of
his position and was not about to lead the Guatemalan
Catholic Church along the route of a more compromising

position within the process of structural change, as

several laymen and religious individuals contended.
Until the end of his life, Mario Casariego continued t o
point out the need t o uphold an ecclesiastical point of
view based on faith and charity, a view that perceived
progress t o be the product of individual efforts and
good will and not a collective endeavor that demanded
deep structural changes within Guatemalan society. In
accordance with his ecclesiastical position, Monsignor
Casariego is remembered by many of his followers and
admirers as an immensely charitable person who worked
on behalf of the poor and the dispossessed in the
country.
In retrospect, we can conclude that in the
political sphere, Casariego's strategy in trying to
keep the church an institution separated from the
conflicting national reality gained him the esteem of
the country's conservative society. However, it also
gained him the anger of the religious and political
sectors that supported what they perceived as an urgent

need for change in the economic and social structure of

the country.
Finally, in the religious sphere, in spite of
the religious conflicts caused by the various
interpretations of Vatican I 1 and Medell in, Casariego
remained loyal to his traeitional position and was able
to support his v i e w that the church did not change, but
rather renewed itself. Likewise, he was capable of
maintaining the respect due the traditional vaiues of
obedience and hierarchy.
Casariego remained controversial until his

death, but undoubtedly he became one of the most

important historical figures of the Guatemalan Catholic
Church in contemporary times. This was the result of
his personality and strong character as well as his
leadership qualities, and was the reason the Guatemalan
Catholic Church, as an institution, did not put more
energy and forcefulness behind its response to the
universal church's call for modernization.
Historically, Casariego was responsible for having led

the Guatemalan Catholic Church along the path of a

prudent conservative attitude, which possibly signified
years of backwardness in relation t o the degree of
influence that the Catholic Church as an institution
could have exerted in nationai affairs.
 CHAPTER V

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH'S

REFORMIST RESPONSE TOWARD CHANGE

The bishops' associations, known a s episcopal

conferences in many countries, were organized at the

beginning of the century. In some places, such as

Colombia, they were established as early as 1903.1

Nevertheless, the activities o f the episcopal

conference, a s the collective action of the bishops,

were not enforced until the beginning of the 1960s.

after the Second Vatican Council.

During that council, it was determined that

the authority of the church should be exercised in a

coliegiate manner among the hierarchy and that the

episcopal conferences should promote better

communication and collaboration among bishops, both at

the regional and the national levels. This implied

that the bishops were t o enter into continuous

conversations with the clergy and that pastoral

councils would be organized t o include religious

1 Daniel H. Levine. Religion and Politics in Latin

America, p. 73.
priests snd laymen, which would, in turn, advise the
ep i scopacy. 2

On the other hand, Vatican 1 1 contributed

toward imbuing a higher degree of legitimacy in the
episcopal conferences. For example, in the "Decree

Concerning Bishops,"3 one of the most important

documents o f Vatican 11, special attention was given to
the nature and functions of the Episcopal Conference.
In the same document, an appeal was made to the bishops
for the establishment of collegiate religious
institutions at the national level so that, based on a
harmonious and collective l%adership, they could work
toward finding solutions t o national problems.
The episcopal conferences were to serve in
this manner as contributors to the process of the
institutionalization of a church committed t o the

process of change. However, this perspective entailed

direction more than political and social action.
Consequently, several episcopal conferences became
points of contact between religious ideas and the

2 Brian A. Smith, The Church and Politics i n Chile,

p. 17.
3 Walter M. Abbot, ed., The Documents of Vatican 11,
No. 37, p. 425.
pol itical and social problems existing in -L;!r=
respective countries.
Paradoxically, the strengthening o f these
episcopal conferences contributed t o provoking a crisis
among authorities of the church when structural change
was present at the center o f the institution. They
came t o question the limits of papal and archiepiscopal
authority a s well as the true role of the priest, both
within and without the church, living amidst a society

in crisis.
For example, in Brazil, the Latin American
country where the episcopal nmvement has become highly
distinguished, the National Conferences o f Brazilian

Bishops (CNBB) was founded in 1952 by Dom Helder Camara

with the support of the Holy See, and especially backed
by Monsignor Montini of the Department of State of
Pius XII, Montini later became Paui VI. in that

context* the CNBB was t o coordinate and unify the

Brazilian church, which at that time had more than 110
ecclesiastical units and no leader since Cardinal
Leme's death in 1942.4 In the following years, the

Cardinal Leme was a historic figure within the

Brazilian church. For many, Dom Leme was the axis of
the Brazilian church's move toward an innovative
CNBB organized the church in Brazil and guided it on a
new path toward the attainment of influence.
At the beginning, the CNBB was represented by
Dom Helder Camara and a small group af progressive
bishops (not all of them from Brazil). Hodever, they
spoke in the name of the church and their activity
placed the church in a progressive position concerning
sociopolitical affairs.5
The Episcopal Conference was also important
in Chile, a country where that institution managed to
obtain a position of influence between January 1955 and
1964, a s a product of a younger generation that had the
support of other structures such as the Christian
Democratic party.6 Both Brazil and Chile had strong
leaders who organized the episcopal conferences and who
were experienced in management and organization of
Catholic Action programs; they conducted the activities
of the church toward a position that included social
reform.

perspective during the first half of the 20th century.

See Thomas Bruneau, The Church and Politics in Brazil,
p. 112.
Ibiu-., p. 51.
6 Brian A. Smith, The Church and Politics in Chile,
p. 112.
 In Guatemala, the opportunity was different.
Until 1951, for example, the number of bishops was not
very great, i.e., in 1921 there was only one. The
second diocese was created in 1929, and a third in
1935. This was the reason that there were few
experienced bishops who were knowledgeable
administrators. Methods of communication were few and

difficult, contributing to the poor communication

between dioceses. Another negative factor that d i d not
contribute t o strengthening the association of bishops
was Mariano Rossell y Arellano. Any apostolic or
political action was to be ~~ndertaken
by Archbishop
Rossell, according to the old tradition that the
Guatemalan church wsuld have only one chief, a
condition accepted by the clergy, with few exceptions,
and by the faithful.
Nevertheless, at the time when the directions
from Vatican I I were published the charisms of
Archbishop Rossell was beginning to decline,
contributing to compliance with the instructions for
collective episcopal action that had to be carried out
within certain time limitations.
In 1962, the first pastoral letter was signed
by all the bishops of ~uatemala.7 The publication of
this first letter is important because apart from being
a sign o f unity (the Episcopal Conference had not yet
been founded), it marked the beginning o f a new
attitude that the Guatemalan Catholic Church was about
to assume in relation to social change.
In 1967, when there were more bishops, it
became possible t o organize a formal association of
bishops, resulting in the Guatemalan Episcopal
Conference. That year Archbishop Rossell died and was
succeeded by Archbishop Casariego, who, as stated
before, had become coadjutor archbishop with the right
to succession.
It is necessary t o mention that* in relation
to the above* all bishops who were appointed during the
1950s and the 1960s were members of religious orders;
none were diocesan clergy. This circumstance
contributed to the formation of a group of bishops who

were not the archbishop's dependents* ending the era o f

Carta pastoral del e ~ i s c o p a d oGuatemalteco sobre

10s problemas sociales v el Pelisro comunista en
Guatemala, Guatemala, August 15, 1962. This document
is in the possession o f the author and has been
classified as Episcopal Document 1 (D.E. 1). Other
documents similarly identified as D.E. throughout this
chapter are likewise in the possession of the author.
a central figure in the church. From then on, a
limited collect'ive action existed. During the years
after 1964, however, the publication OF individual
documents, as happened in ather countries, declined in
number in favor o f collective publications. Among such
documents were pastorals letters, communications,
messages, statements, and exhortations.
The first pastoral letter of the Guatemalan
episcopacy was based on "Mater et Magistra," John
XXIII's encyclical issued in 1961, and on the
pontifical speech delivered on May 10, 1962. The
pastoral letter analyzed the socioeconomic situation of
the country and provided data on the population of
G u a t e ~ l aand its relationship t o land ownership. It
commented on the,,poor conditions existing in the fields
of health and education.and insisted on the right to

private property, the sanctity o f human life, the right

to forn associations and unions, and a minimum wage.
Based on the texts of John XXIII, the pastoral letter
was written in a slightly radical tone.
It is urgent that the various job sectors
concretely determine, paying special atten-
tion t o the needs o f the worker, all
individual and family salaries, starting from
a vital minimum wage that responds t o the
 present circumstances.8

At the same time it issued a warning about

the Communist menace and gave advice against those

theories citing Pius IX and Pius XII. As a

counterproposal, the letter advised the finding of

solutions by means o f an agrarian reform that provided

just indemnification and the industrialization of the

country. It also counseled that

... if a solution is not found t o alleviate
t h e disproportion in agrarian property, the
masses will become exasperated and there
wil 1 be violent reaction. They wi 1 1 be
unjust in their conduct, but justified in
their cause.9

It added that for that reason it is "urgent t o d o

something about it. ..."lo

The concern for the social situation and the

C o m u n i s t threat was very similar t o that o f previous

pastoral letters issued by Rossell. There were also

warnings addressed t o entrepreneurs "who are far from"

respecting justice and human dignity in their

businesses. 1 1

The bishops' first attempt was very timid.

D.E. 1 , p. 24.
9 Ibid., p. 28.
10 Ibid.
1 1 Ibid., p. 30.
In the content of this document we can still perceive

Monsignor Mariano Rossell y Arellano's strong

influence. However, there were still a few years

before Mede!lin took place, which eventually did lead

the Latin American episcopacy. At the same time, the

fact that such a letter was signed by Monsignor Rossell

y Arellano did not mean that he identified himself with

the proposal. It should also be remembered that

Rossell y Arellano was living out the last years of his

life. On the other hand, the letter was not an avant-

garde document; much o f its content, especially the

part pertaining t o the Communist threat, reflected the

philosophy o f Mariano Rossell y Arellano.

After the 1962 pastoral letter, the bishops

did not proauce further statements until five years

later, in 1967, when they modified the position o f the

church with respect t o property and in relation t o the

previous statement in their first letter where they

confirmed that "...private property is an institution

that God loves."lZ Therefore, considering that a

revision o f the social order had t o be undertaken

because the "vast masses o f the people are condemned t o

l2 Ibid., p. 9.
poverty and undignified economic conditions" 13 the
bishops concluded that
Within the plan of creation, the benefits of
the earth are destined t o fulfill the needs
of all human beings. And for this reason,
the right of mankind t o use all material
benefits for its sustenance and preservation
is superior to any other right.14

The bishops of other countries had followed

the same direction as the Guatemalan bishops. Like
them, before the discussion on the origin o f injustice
was declared publicly, they supported the premise of
private property, concluding that poverty was the
consequence o f the bad habits of the poor and not o f
the unequal distribution o f wealth.15

The message of the Guatemalan episcopacy,

dated May 1967, was a result of Paul V I P s encyclical
" Popu lorurn Progressio," and was related directly t o the
topic of the social function of property. In other
words , it started at the point when the 1962 pastoral
ended. This message cited Pius XI1 and John XXIII and
stated, in summary, "We clearly state that private

l 3 Mensa je del Epi scopado Guatemal teco, D. E. 2,

Guatemala, May 9, 1967, p. 15.
l 4 Ibid.
l 5 Daniel H. Levine, Re1 igion and Politics in Latin
America, p. 85.
property does not constitute for anyone an
unconditional and absolute right."16
After this message, the topic of private
property was not mentioned again until another message

dictated nine years later, after Medellin, after the

full disclosure of the Vatican 1 1 documents, and after
an earthquake had destroyed extensive sections of the
country in 1976. In this document, aktention was
ca1 led t o the fact that
The laws being enforced at present seem t o
have been passed purposely t o defend above
everything else the intangibility o f private
property, making it difficult t o improve the
distribution of land, which, we must never
forget, has been given by God t o all his
children and not t o a few privileged men.17

The message mentioned circumstances and places where

problems o f violence had arisen because o f the question

o f land ownership, considering that
The serious problem of the ownership of
agricultural and urban land is at the
foundation of all our unjust situations.
It is joined t o the problems we hsve
mentioned before and has created and
maintained a climate o f tension,
insecurity, fear, and repression in our

16 D.E. 2, p. 16.
17 Mensaje del Episcopado de Guatemala, Unidos en la
esperanza, prsencia de la iglesia en la reconstruccion
de Guatemala. Guatemala, July 25, 1976, D.E. No. 4,
p. 22.
 country.18
This did not mean that the Episcopal Conference was
against all types o f private property, but it was
basically opposed t o the large landed estates. On this
account, it stated that "Private property contributes
t o the individual's expression." In addition, it held

that
Private property (or a certain dominion over
external benefits) assure each person an
absolutely necessary place t o exercise
individual and familiar autonomy, which
should be considered as an extension o f
human liberty.19

Consistent in their attitude against the

large estates and citing "Gaudium et Spec" extensively,

the bishops affirmed that
The expropriation of large extensions of
land poorly cultivated or reserved for
speculation, maintaining them uncultivated,
is legitimate, because this practice is
carried out while the majority of the popu-
lation has no iand at all a- owns only
insignificant plots, precisely at a time
when agricultural development i s urgently
needed. 20

As can be observed throughout this document,

the bishops adopted a position that was somewhat

18 Ibid.p p. 23.
19 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
2 0 Ibid,, p. 32.
disposed toward certain structural changes within the
limits of equity. Nevertheless, certain circles in

Guatemalan society did not like this. Later on, in

other messages and documents, the bishops did not refer
again to the topic of private property.
Being preoccupied by the indigent social
situation of the country and following a developmental
view, the bishops found that development in Guatemala
was being restrained by insecurity and violence,Zl and

that its causes were social* as Paul VI had pointed out

in Populorum Progressio. The bishops stated that no
one can deny
-- that our social and economic reality is
greatly unjust and unbalanced;
-- that these vicious structures must be
changed;
-- that above all, what is needed is a total
transformation in the mentality of many cf
our citizens-22

As a result of this unbalanced situation, the bishops

perceived a need for change, a radical change that

needed t o be brought about in all corners of the
country.23 In this respect, they proposed three

formulas for the promotion of change in order to open

the way for de~slspment. They strongly rejected the
violent option a s the first solution because it was not

the best, stating that

many countries that have suffered from
violent revolution...did not reach the
justice they had hoped for; in the majority
o f the cases their situation has become
greatly aggravated. And no one, unless he is
a visionary or a traitor. would wish upon
Guatemala the tragedy that other nations
have experienced under a violent and unjust
revolution.24

At this time, Guatemala was suffering from

guerr i 1 la attacks. At the same time, some o f the
Marykno 1 1 priests were beginning t o collaborate with
the guerrillas as they sought in violence and
revolution the answers t o correcting the problem of

underdevelopment.25
The second option mentioned by the bishops
was the hard line method proposed by those who "were
afraid o f change, mistrusted social transformation and
called for a hard line that maintains things as they
are." In relation t o this, the bishops considered such
.
an "attitude (to be) insens i bl e and su ic i da 1 "26
- - -- - - - -

24 Ibid., p. 10.
z5 See Chapter VI I for a more compl ete ana 1 ys i s
concerning the collaboration o f some priests with the
guerri I las.
26 D.E. 2, pp. 1 0 - 1 1 .
 The third solution to which they were

inclined consisted o f seeking an integrated development

through dialogue in order t o recognize the minimal

aspirations that could be used a s a departure for the

development o f individuals and nations.27 The bishops

proposed several points of action, such a s

concentrating on literacy work, supporting t h e

and increasing protection for the worker.28

The topic of development took on new vigor

with the message, "United in Hope, the church is at

work for the Reconstruction o f Guatemala." Th is was

one o f the most important and most widely discussed

messages. I previously pointed out that "Guatemala

lived under the symbol o f underdevelopment."29

Several causes similar t o t h e ones in 1967 that were

described previously were examined here. The "loss o f

trust" was added30 a s a new solution toward complete

recanstruction that

constituted a n effort where the vital needs

o f Guatemalans would be taken into account,
such as: housing, food, land property,
employment, better salaries, social services,
education, equality o f opportunity for
27 Ibid., pp. 11-17.
28 Ibid., pp. 18-20.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 24.
 everyone.31

The problems continued t o be the same.

Perhaps the documents of the Episcopal Conference
showed a tendency toward finding solutions that were

too generalized t o be applied t o the development of

national problems. This circumstance could possibly be
interpreted to show that the church was only in charge
of denouncing the problems, not proposing technical
solutions. In subsequent publications, the episcopacy
touched on the topic of the consequences deriving from
underdevelopment, but gave no solutions other than
those presented in previous documents.

"United in Hope" was considered a message

that invited radical change, and for this reason it was
attacked by conservative politicians who said, "the
document seems to be too demagogic because its

expositions are confined t o simp12 statements of what

the problems are, but it does not offer solutions t o
any of them."32 The analysis that the bishops made
concerning the economic and social situation in
Guatemala was considered t o be "clearly based in

31 Ibid., pp. 35 and 36.

32 Mario Sandoval Alarcon, see Inforpress, C.A.,
No. 203, Guatemala, August 5, 1976.
Marxist economic theory."33 On the contrary, the
progressive sectors thought that it was a realistic34
and intelligent analysis.35

The government of Guatemala, in a very

diplomatic manner, stated that *'it could be interpreted
as an act of solidarity among the episcopacy toward the
social, political, and economic programs of President
Laugerud" and that the "problems that have been brought
to light...are precisely those that President Laugerud
has outlined and addressed during the past three
years. "36

The publication "United in Hope" became an

attempt to exercise self criticism toward certain
hierarchical and administrative aspects that produced
certain signs of divisiveness that would come to
fruition later. Thus, for example, i n "United in Hope"

(1976) the bishops made a statement concerning the

"serious problems**that were brewing within the church
body and stated that it was "necessary to point out and

3 3 Dr. Manuel A Y ~ u ,La Hora, Guatemala, August 3,

1976.
34-Colom Argueta, I nforpress, C .A.
35 CONFREGUA. Comunicado, Guatemala. July 20, 1976.
~ -

Document in possession of the author.

36 Diario La Tarde, Guatemala, August 3. 1976.
recognize those negative factors that were becoming an

obstacle t o the development of pastoral activity in

~uatemala."37 They explained that the church was

formed by "men who also gave in t o temptation and

weakened when confronted by forces of evi1."38 They

presented as the most painful sign the lack o f unity,

stating that
-- The apparent monolithic unity o f the past
has broken down.
-- We st i 1 1 have not found
a way t o 1 i ve
within a legitimate and healthy pluralism
encased in an effective and uniting
communion.
-- There is no unity in the pastoral
criteria.
-- The life-giving dialogue between pastors,
priests, and the faithful is very weak.
Frequently it is obstructed by divergent
criteria and the human rnisery.39

They also mentioned that there were problems of

incertitude, hopelessness, weariness, and routine. In

addition, there was crisis in the distribution o f

forces o f authority and duplication o f efforts, "...all

o f which pointed t o the lack o f 'closeness' in the

pastoral work that led t o its disorientation."40 This

self criticism made the conservative sectors o f the

37 D.E, 4, p. 25.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., pp. 26 and 27,
40 Ibid., p. 27.
country say, with respect t o "United in Hope," "that if
the bishops could not solve their own church problems,
how could they solve national problems?"41 With
respect t o "United in it must be noted that this
decument was cot signed by M o n s i g m r Mario Casariego
and neither were other important messages that came
from the Guatemalan episcopate.42

This fact again confirmed the differences of

criteria that existed between Monsignor Mario Casariego
and some of the other bishops. After 1978, prior t o
the presidential elections of that y e w , these
differences in criteria came up again when the
Episcopal Conference decided t o prepare an episcopal
letter on faith and politics that was t o be a follow-up
on "United in Hope." It seemed that Monsignor
Casatiego made numerous amendments t o the text of the

letter, through his auxiliary bishop, and because o f

this the letter was not published in the manner the

41 Interview held with Vice-president Mario Sandoval

Alarcon, "La Nacion," Guatemala, July 31, 1976, in
Inforpress, C.A.
42 Concerning "United in Hope," Mario Casariego
- was in
Rome. Even though a copy o f the comunication was sent
t o him, he did not want t o sign it. Another document
he refused t o sign was the important Mensaje de 10s
obispos de Guatemala a1 pueblo de Dios con relacion a
la violencia, D.E. 3, Guatemala, March 20, 1974.
bishops had desired.43
It is worth noting that even though Monsignor
Casariego signed some documents of the Episcopal
Conference, this did not automatically make him a
reformer. This became evident when he refused to sign
the most important document of the Episcopal
Conference, as "United for Hope" was t o become.
Likewise, he refused t o sign the important message,
published in March 1974, that denounced publicly the
government-directed violence.
On the other hand. his attitude in relation
t o the pastoral letter that attempted to follow up
after "United in Hope" corroborated the traditionalist
position held by the archbishop, which was contrary to
the reformist position of several bishops within the

Episcopal Conference.
The topic of underdevelopment was mentioned
again in 1981 through a collective pastoral letter
(after Medell in and Puebla), which stated,
The church discovers in Medellin the painful
conditions of underdevelopment and margin-
ality, produced by structures of social,
economic, political and cultural dependence.
The very same root of underdevelopment is the
43 Phi 1 i p Berryman, The Re 1 i gious Roots of Rebe 1 1 ion,
pp. 187-188.
 unjust dependency. There exist unjust
structures that are maintained by interest
groups, who deny many others an access t o
culture, t o political participation and t o
an improved distribution of the Denafits of
the land.

For this reason Medellin denounces this

reality, qualifying this situation a s sinful.
It condemns institutionalized violence and
demands a radical change in the
structures.44

Curiously, later on it confirmed the

following, which was written under the influence of

Puebla and spoke o f human dignity in relation t o

structural change,

...human beings
ideologies ....
are ahove structures and
The church considers that
all organizations or ideologies who attempt
against the dignity o f human beings must be
rejected.45

Even though Puebla was considered by several

priests and intellectuals t o have been a step backward

from what was achieved by Medellin, the truth was that

the majority of the conclusions reached at Puebla were

no more than those reached at Medellin. Perhaps the

tone of the language that was used was softened a bit.

Therefore. Puebla and Medellin must be considered as

4 4 Conferencia Episcopal de Guatemala, Carta pastoral

colectiva del Episcopado Guatemalteco, Guatemala,
November 14, 1981, D.E. 16, p. 10.
45 Ibid., p. 16.
 347

two complementary phases of the same historical process

tak ing place within the Catholic Church. As a
consequences the text o f the final Puebla document and
the process that resulted in this document clearly

reflected the points o f consensus of a church that had

been divided many times where opposition in
ecclesiastical terms had existed. Poblete's opinion in
this respect said,
Both events mark the culmination o f a process
o f intra-ecclesiastical maturation concerning
the nature o f the church's evrngelizing task
in the different areas in which she carries
out her mission.
But while both events c a n - b e considered as
end points, they can also be seen as begin-
nings. In effect, Medell in is the product
o f the life of the Latin American church.
One cannot understand it without reference
t o that life, which marks it with a dyner;..is
characteristic t o be analyzed later in this
paper.
Ten years after Medellin, Puebla has been
called upon t o perform a similar function.
The church ponders over its rightful mission,
which has a permanent and universal character
but which must also be considered in certain
historical, economic, social, political, and
cultural contexts. Therefore, from the
standpoint of faith, tez~sra:realities are
anaiyzed so that the church's mission will
respond more fully t o its proper identity
and its own being, simultaneausly resulting
in greater service t o the people o f Latin
America.46
46 Renato Poblete, From Medellin t o Puebla, pp. 31-32.
 These changes in the attitude of the bishops

were also perceived in t h e case of the Colombian

bishops. By the end o f the 1950s. the bishops from

Colombia viewed underdevelopment as a consequence of

moral obstacles.47 Nevertheless, in 1969 they were

emphasizing the need for structural change in society

t o promote the social cause48 and openly discussed the

same problems that were present in Guatemala.

Land ownership had always been a topic of

conflict in the majority o f the underdeveloped

countries. In Guatemala there were divergent opinions

in this respect, but generally it was acknowledged that

inequality and injustice in the distribution o f land

did exist.49 (See the following tables.)

47 Daniel H. Levine, Rel inion and Politics in Latin

Am-.-
n...-. .--,
im a . p- @a+
48 Ibid.. D. 89.
49 For a -recent analysis o f the distribution o f land
in Guatemaia, see Richard Hough, John Kelley, Stephen
Miller, Rossell Derossier, Fred L. Mann, and Mitchell
A. Seligson, Tierra y trabajo en Guatemala: Una
evaluacion, AID, Washington, D.C. and Ediciones Papiro,
Guatemala, C.A., 1983.
 TABLE NO. 5.1
LAND DISTRIBUTION I N GUATEMALA
1950, 1964, 1979"

NUMBER OF FARMS AREA I N HECTARES

1950 1964 1979 1950 1964 1979

LESS THAN MD 0;7 HECTARES

74,269 85,083 166,732
0.7 TO MD 1 .4 HECTARES
91,581 98,658 121.351
1.4 TO MO 3.5 HECTARES
99,779 129,115 128,587
3.5 TO MD 7 HECTARES
42,444 52,023 51,798
7 TO MD 22.4 HECTARES
26,916 37,025 40,378
22.4 TO MD 44.8 HECTARES
6,125 6,631 9, 131
44.8 TO MD 450 HECTARES
6 488 7,859 12,297
450 TO MD 900 HECTARES
569 56 1 880
900 TO MD 2,250 HECTARES
358 297 388
2,250 TO MD 4,500 HECTARES
104 56 75
4,500 TO 9,090 HECTARES
32 30 15
9,000 HECTARES AND LARGER
22 9 4
TOTALS

The 1950 census e l i m i n a t e d a l l t h e f a r m s measuring l e s s

than .04 h e c t a r e s ( e q u a l t o one c u e r d a ) , w h i l e t h e 1964
census d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h a l o w e r l i m i t . I n t h e 1979 census,
a l l f a r m s were r e g i s t e r e d b u t t h e i r s i z e s were n o t r e c o r d e d .
However, when t h i s d a t a was compiled, farms measuring l e s s
t h a n .04 h e c t a r e s had not yet keen processed, !t i s
u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h e r e a r e 70,000 f i n c a s o f t h i s s i z e , wh.ch
g i v e a n e s t i m a t e d maximum t o t a l of 3,043 h e c t a r e s o f l a n d .

Sources: R i c h a r d Hough; John K e l l e y ; Stephen W i 1 1 e r ;

R o s s e l l D o r o s s i e r ; F r e d L. Mann; and M i t c h e l A. Sel igsen,
T i e r r a Y t r a b a j o de Guatemala: Una e v a l u a c i o n , A I D ,
Washington, D.C.. a n d E d i c i o n e s P a p i r o , Guatema ia, C.A.,
1983, p. 5 .
 TABLE 5.2
LAND D I S T R I B U T I O N I N GUATEMALA,
1950, 1964, 1979%
(PERCENTAGES)

NUMBER OF FARMS AREA (HECTARES)

SIZE 1950 1964 1979 1950 1964 1979

Less than MD
.7 Hectares 21.30 20.39 31-36 0.77 0.95 1.33

.7 to MD
1.4 Hectares 26.26 23.64 22.83 2.54 2.77 2.75

1.4 to MD
3.5 Hectares 28.62 30.94 24.10 5.70 7.85 6.40

3.5 to MD 7
Hectares 12.17 12.47 9.74 5.32 7.04 5.74

7 to MD 22.4
Hectares 7.72 8.87 7.60 8.36 12.95 11.91

22.4 to MD
44.8 Hectares 1.76 1.59 1.72 5.10 5.90 6.77

44.8 to MD
450 Hectares 1.86 1.88 2.31 21.86 26.53 30.66

450 to MD 900
Hectares .16 1 3 . .17 9.52 10.03 12.81

900 to MD 2,250
Hectares .10 .07 .07 13.32 11.22 12.00

2,250 to MD 4,500
Hectares .03 .O 1 .O1 8.81 4.92 5.43

4,500 to MD 9,000
Hectares -- -- -- 5.28 5.17 2.12

9,000 Hectares and

1 arger -- -- -- 13.43 4.57 2.05

TOTALS 99.08 99.99 100.00 100.01 100.00 99.97

* The 1950 census eliminated all the farms measuring
less than .04 hectares (equal t o one cuerda), while the
1964 census did not establish a lower limit. In the
1979 census, all farms were registered but their sizes
were not recorded. However, when this data was
compiled, farms measuring less than -04 hectares had
not yet been processed. It is understood that there
are 70,000 fincas of this size, which give an estimated
maximum total of 3.043 hecteres of land.

Source: Richard Hough, et ai., Tierra Y Traba.10 en

Guatemala: Una evaluacion, p. 6.
 Thus, for example, in Guatemala an agrarian
law was passed in 1950 that divided the large estates
into small parcels. This law contributed, in part, t o
the fall of the Arbenz government. Subsequently, the
agrarian reform project was cancelled. Nevertheless,
the agrarian problem still existed and was addressed by
the bishops in 1362, although under the influence of
Rossell y Arellano, the statement was very timid.
Because o f an unbalanced situation, the
agricultural sector is the one where one can
perceive the greater social injustices in
Guatemala. It is also the sector that
presents the worst problems in the quest for
solutions.
...Two thirds of the agrarian population
have only 10 percent left to divide among
themselves. In other words, 75 percent of
the peasant families do not own the land
they till or do not own enough land t o live
on.
While some of the large agricultural
haciendas have adopted modern technology and
mechanical means of cultivation...the great
majority of agricultural i n d i b :,# * = I e I : ,- . ~ i n g
,,de,,.
in small towns, villages and hamlets still
use antiquated methods.... 50

in search of a solution t o the problem, and

citing John XXIII in "Mater et Magistra," the bishops

proposed

50 D.E. 1, pp. 25-27.

 ...the planning and practice of a carefully
conceived agricultural and economic policy
that relates t o current taxation, credit
facilities, price regulations, social
security, the promotion o f integrating
industries and the adaptation o f enterprise
structures.
...needed innovations concerning productive
technology, crop selection and administrative
structure.51

Later Onr in 1967, the episcopate was more

aggressive and believed that the "audacious and
innovative reforms of 'Populorum Progressio'" were
urgent because "...it is necessary t o distribute those
properties that are not entirely being cultivated in
order t o give them t o those who are capable o f working
them. "52

Concerning this topic, John XXIII had

suggested that agricultural enterprises should be of a
size sufficient to support a family. In this respect,
the bishops had already given an opinion that "...the
technocrats should be in charge...of finding out the
appropriate measurements for the fam ilia1 and community
holdings. "53
Thus, the idea of establishing familial and

51 Ibid., p. 28.
52 D.E. 2, p. 22.
53 D.E. 1 , P. 30.
community enterprises got the church interested in
promoting cooperatives to avoid the proliferation of
small holdings and t o permit the exploitation of larger
areas. In the agricultural field, the cooperatives of
the Peten region stood out. Some were under the
sponsorship of the bishops54 acd some under the

Protestant churches. They were organized by peasants

who came from the highlands and who owned small plots
that were incapable of self-sufficiency. All this was
done in the name of cooperation: "Cooperatior is the
Christian answer to the sosia! problem, because it
manages t o place capital in the hands of the people.55

The problem of the minifundio or small

holding was closely associated with the problem of
peasant migration. For this reason, the peasant from
the highlands who owned a small plot of land, in order
t o survive, went down t o the southern coast at harvest
time and worked on coffee, cotton, and other
plantations. Concerning this, the bishops stated, "The
poor economic conditions of these peasants forces them
t o migrate at certain times during the year. They seek

54 D.E. 2, p. 21.
55 Ibid., p. 20.
work in other areas where it is not rare...to find them

exploited ...."56

It is true that because o f ignorance &:.-.d

the

1 ack o f ecor~omic resources , the Guaterm 1 an peasant

traditionally has been subjected t o exploitation, not

only by landlords but by moneylenders a s well. This

problem was also attended t o by t h e Episcopal

Conference through the establishment of lending

cooperatives whose objective was t o minimize the

i nterest peasants had t o pay.

In 1976, through "United in Hope," the

bishops again looked at t h e land problem, stating

"...accumulating land by some people to the detriment

o f an immense majority o f the people of a nation is a

sinful injustice, crying out t o the heavens.1157 They

recognized that some efforts had been made in an

attempt to give land t o t h e peasants, but

...such efforts have been, in part, cancelled

or have been distributed in a discriminatory
manner; there has been a lack o f sufficient
technical assistance that could have helped
rationalize the use o f land.58
They affirmed that according t o "Gaudium et

56 Const. Vatican I 1 sobre la inlesia del mundo

actual, Part 1 1 , No. 71.5, cited in D.E. 2, p. 21.
s
- -' D.E. 4, pp. 22-23.
58 Ibid., p. 23.
Spes" exproprietion is a legitimate tool.
It is urgent t o define the use of the soil
and t o administrate it in favor of the
community. Institutions or systems must be
found that open the way for people t o own
land by establishing a clear definition of
public objectives and the rights and duties
of private owners, which are variables that
can occur at any moment or any place.59

Nevertheless, even if the bishops continued mentioning

the unjust distribution o f goods, the need for

equality, and the existing poverty and misery, the

topic of land ownership was never brought up again
after 1976.
In comparative terms, in Brazil the bishops
confronted a similar situation with the land problem.
They anticipated that all the landless peasants would
move t o the cities to live in the slums. so the
Comrrittees for Peace and J u s t i c e of that country and
the Brazilian Episcopal Conference formed a land
commission t o try t o solve the problem. Consequently,
in 1980 several bishops in Brazil confronted
parliamentary commissions t o discuss the land problem

and the manner by which the government was trying to

solve the problem. The Brazilian bishops, as well as

59 Ibid., p. 32.

\
their Guatenalan counterparts, associated the
socioeconomic situation with the land ownership
problem. In this respect, the involvement o f the
Brazilian bishops became crucial since they considered
the land ownership problem t o be tied t o urban
conflicts, the national ecanomic policy, and foreign
investment. which left the lower strata on the margin

With respect t o violence, the reactions of

the Episcopal Conference may be classified into three
types of response: aggressive. defensive, and
mystical. The first type o f response can be perceived
in the message dated 1967, which said,
...something abnormal is happening in our
national life: horrible crimes are committed
daily, robberies, violence, and chaos abound
everywhere.
We cannot remain indifferent while entire
populations are devastated, especially in the
northeastern part of the country, while each
day the number of orphans and widows
increases...when there have been many men who
have been violently taken away from their
homes...and are imprisoned...or sevagely
assassinated.... Me sre profoundly preoccu-
pied when we see that the climate of
insecurity depends more and more an all the
moral, social and economic problems of our

- - -- -- - -

6 0 Thomas Bruneau, The Church in Brazil, p. 85.

 The bishops found that "the exploitation of
violence and the struggle carried out between brothers
was bloodying Guatemala." They attributed the origin
of violence t o the fact that
...men of various ideologies and o f
different cultural, social and economic
backgrounds have taken up arms and are
confronting each other in a deaf, enduring
and bloody battle. What force directs them
to take such a sorrowful attitude? Is it
conducted merely to defend party interests
or because they desire hegemony and power?62

Seven years later, in 1974, the bishops

repeated almost the same phrases when they stated, "It

has been a long time.since we have been suffering

deeply when we see the numerous and varied crimes

comnitted by violence that has covered our beloved

nation Guatemala with blood."63 Nevertheless. this

time they were not looking for the origin of the

61 D.E. 2, pp. 3 and 4. At this point in history, the

guerrillas had a strong armed opposition movement. The
government, through the army and the paramilitary
groups, increased the degree of violence during this
time.
62 Ibid., p. 5.
63 D.E. 3, p. i. This document was not signed by
Monsignor Casariego, nor by Monsigor Luis Estrada
Paetau, nor by Monsignor Rafael Gonzalez Estrada. The
document appears at the end of Arana's presidential
term, a period of extreme violence.
violence; they merely declared it non-Christian and
issued an appeal for peace.
Curiously, the bishops never made any
pronouncements with respect to the active participation
of the two Maryknoll members, who, in 1968, were
involved in political activities that promoted
structural change through armed violence.

Nevertheless* they did present a statement in regard to

Casariego's kidnapping:
...
It is not up t o the church t o judge the
motives that encouraged or gave way to...such
a crime against a high preiate, but the
church must and can say that if t h e motives
of the kidnappers were political, thinking
erroneously that they would obtain an active
reaction from the Episcopate favoring or
disagreeing with a particular sector, said
supposition is absolutely erroneous.64

In 1978 when the Panzos massacre occurred,

where more than 100 peasants were killed by the army
under obscurz c i r c ~ r n s t a f i c e rthe
~ Episcopal Conference
issued no official statements. However, the bishops
and the other members of the church in El Quiche
diocese said that Panzos was not an isolated case.

64 Guatema 1 an Ep i scopa 1 Conference re 1 ease. "La

conferencia episcopal a1 pueblo de Guatemala informa,"
Guatemala, March 19, 1968, in Cartas pastorales Y
~ ~ S C U ~ S OVol.
S , 1 1 , pp. 266-267.
They considered rather that the massacre at Panzos was
a product of the permanency of the violence that, in
turn, had been generated by factors such as "the
ambition t o possess landsnnexerted by individuals who
wished t o increase thsir socioeconomic and political
power. Likewise, it had been brought about by powerful

citizens who "exploited the working and peasant

classes." In response t o this situation the bishops
protested and demanded respect for human dignity.65

The Panzos massacre story had appeared in the

international press because the Guatemalan government
had officially accused the church o f instigating a
peasant rebellion culminating in such an atrocity. A
group of priests and religious men from the Verapaz
diocese, where Panzos is located, contradicted the
government and gave their version o f the events, which
was publicized throughout the world. Many other groups
united in solidarity with the church's declarations,
including unions,.student associations, and
professional organizations. Among other groups, the
Committee for Justice and Peace came Forth t o present

65 Communication sent to the bishops, priests,

members of religious orders, and the El Quiche Catholic
Action. La Nacion, June 9, 1978.
the ultimate reasons for the massacre, which were that
the landlords and the petroleum companies did not
permit a group of peasants, who had received notice to
come t o Panzos, to meet with the authorities. These

authorities were being guarded by soldiers and ordered

the sol di ers t o open fire on the peasants. 66

Later on, in 1979, the bishops again made a

collective statement against the violence:
In the name of Christ's gospel, we have to
condemn once more this wave of violence as
anti-Christian and anti-evangelical. The
murders, disappearances, terrorist acts,
kidnappings, torture, and other denigrating
acts not only demonstrate total lack of
respect for human dignity, but they also
create among the survivors an atmosphere of
insecurity, pain, and fear.67

Another event that had great repercussions in

the religious world was the tragedy that occurred at

the Spanish Embassy, which took place in January 1980

and in which more than 30 people died in an attempt to
take over the embassy. The group that attempted the
takeover was made up of students, members of religious

66 Abstract from the article. "Masacre de campesinos

en Panzos," VIDA NUEVA 1136, Guatemala (June 1978), 31-
33, published in La Carta, a CONFHEGUA bulletin,
Guatemala, July 1978. More details en the Committee
for Justice and Peace will be given in Chapter VIi.
67 Conferenc i a Ep i scopa 1 de Guatema 1 a, Comun i cado,
Guatemala, March 2, 1979, D.E. 6, pp. 1-2.
orders, and native Indians. This tragedy stirred the
international community, and as a result, Spain broke
off relations with Guatemala. Like Panzos, neither the
events nor the reasons for the tragedy were made clear.
Neverthelzss, the church found itself involved in this
incident because some of the invaders had religious

ties.68 In spite of this, it took 15 days for the

bishops t o respond. When they did, they issued a very
weak and ambiguous document that did not clearly
mention the incident, perhaps because the bishops did
not wish to emphasize a possible connection between the
event and the diocese of El Quiche, which was known to
be close to the guerrillas. A t any rate, the bishops

tried to present a conciliatory and peaceful attitude,

As pastors we have to be profoundly sorrow-
ful for the serious violent situation in
which our country is involved. We are sad
to say that the ideological positions have
become radicalized. Besides, there is great
confusion among the Christian people concern-
ing the church's true mission. We are
grieved, for example, that the words of His
Holiness the Pope are only partially inter-
- -

68 In a pub1 icat ion of a group ca 1 1 ed Frente

Estudiantil Revolucionario (FERG), which presents the
biographies of those who took part in the takeover,
three are distinguished as "heroes and martyrs of the
Christian people," emphasizing that they were
catechists and Christians. FEHG, Presentes en la
- lucha
9 Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala,
Guatemala, February 1980, pp. 112-113.
 preted as they are taken out of the general
context of his teachings.69
In the above mentioned document, they cited
Puebla and John Paul 1 1 several times and also made an
urgent appeal t o all Guatemalans, "...from the gospel
of Christ and united in faith are our common heritage
t o this dear nation, may we in our attitudes convert
ourselves into the makers of peace, love and
justice.70

This fact, along with the Panzos w s s a c r e ,

created a set o f positions and polarization within the
Episcopal Conference. Monsignor Casariego participated
in this activity as a traditionalist and apparently was
supported by the following bishops: Rodolfo Quezada
Toruno, Angelico Melotto Mazzardo, Ricardo Ham Freely,
Rafael Gonzalez Estrada, Jose Ramiro Pellecer Samayoa,
Mario Martinez de Lejarza, and Hugo Contreras
Mart i nez,

On the other side, we have the developmental

position, inclined toward denunciation and the support
of the popular masses. The leaders o f this group were

69 Conferenc i a Ep i scopa 1 de Guatema 1 a, Comun i cad0 ,

Guatemala, February 15* 1980, D.E. 7 * pp. 1-2.
70 Ibid., p. 4 ,
the bishops Luis Manresa and Juan Gerardi Formosa, who
most likely were supported by bishops Victor Hugo
Martinez Contreras, Mario Enrique Rios Montt, Eduardo
Flores, Constantino Luna Pianegonda, and Prospero
Penados del Barrio. There were two bishops, Luis
Estrada Pateac and Miguel Angel Garcia, who were
neutral. Such polarization eventually obligated the
progressive group t o adopt a more definite posture in
relation to the poor and the dispossessed, which caused
Bishop Juan Gerardi t o narrowly escape assassination
and possible expulsion.
In effect, in July 1980, Monsignor Gerardi

had to abandon the diocese o f El Quiche together with a

group o f priests and pastoral agents due t o the
repression that was being conducted against the
population and the priests o f the dioceses o f that
department.71 Afterwards, on November 20 o f that same
year, when Monsignor Gerardi was returning from Rome
after attending a meeting of bishops concerning the
--

7 1 On July 4 and July 10. 1980, two priests of the

diocese o f El Quiche were assassinated: Jose Maria
Gran and Faustino Villanueva. Later, on July 18, an
attempt to assassinate Monsignor Gerardi failed because
he had the good fortune t o have received a warning
before the attempt. Philip Berryman, The Religious
Roots o f Rebellion, pp. 201-205.
fami ly? he was not permitted to snter the country.
Mons ignor Gerardi then had t o accept the asylum offered
to him-by Costa Rica.
In regard to the above? Gerardi's visit t o
Rome had special importance because during this visit
Pope John Paul I 1 had the chance t o hear the story,
from a trustworthy source? of the persecution that was
being conducted against the Guatemalan Catholic

Churcn .
Concerning the denial issued by the
government? which would not let Gerardi enter the
country, the Christian communities of El Quiche stated
that
We know that this government and the army
are persecuting and killing us and that they
did not want Bishop Juan Gerardi t o enter
the country when he was returning from Rome
so that we would not continue to be united in
the struggle for our right to receive the
gospel. They want t o deprive us of having
other pastors like Father Chema or Father
Faustino. who were our teachers.72

Even though Monsignor Gersrdi sought asylum

72 "Open Letter t o the Christian Community of El

Quiche?" Guatemala? January 1981, in Morir o despertar
en Guatemala, Centro de Estudios y Publicaciones (CEP),
Lima, Peru, November 1981. p. 145. Gerardi did return
t o the country and at present is in charge of the
National Catholic Secretariat, an executive branch of
the Episcopal Conference.
elsewhere, it must be clear that he never became part
of what is known as the Guatemalan Church in Exile
(Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio), a group with whom
he did not share methods or radicalism.73

Another progressive bishop, Monsignor Luis

Manresa Formosa of Quetzaltenango, had serious
disagreements with Monsignor Mario Casariego. An
example of the problem was the above mentioned pastoral
letter of adherence t o "United in Hope." In regard to
the letter, Monsignor Manresa decided that its text had
t o be published without the amendments made by
Casariego. Notwithstanding, Manresa was not able t o
get the support of all the bishops of the Episcopal
Conference, and so the text of the letter was amended
by Casariego and published as a "catechesis" for the
bishops, which appeared in a Sunday supplement.
In June 1979, Monsignor Manresa resigned
for reasons of health, according t o him, but it is
possible that the true reason for his retirement was
that he was disenchanted w i t h the Episcopal Conference

73 Personal interview with Monsignor Gerardi, May

1 986.
and the serious disagreements with Ca~ariego.'~
Manresa's resignation exposed the
divisiveness that existed within the Episcopal
Conference, as well as the range of Casariego's power
and his manipulating capacity. On the other hand,
Gerardi's exile gave proof of the limitations within
the prophetic role o f a prophetic church existing
amidst a highly repressive environment.
The church's defensive stage began in 1980.

The following year constituted the period when the

violence directed against priests reached its highest
peak. Thus, for example, in the Department of El
Quiche, two priests were assassinated and other
priests, members of religious orders, and pastoral
agents were being threatened.
In response t o these incidents, the Episcopal

Conference referred t o
Its deep preoccupation for the persecution
o f the church, which is occurring especially
around the diocese of El Quiche....

74 Monsignor Manresa is at present rector of the

Rafael Landivar University. In spite of the fact that
this author asked for an interview several times,
Monsignor Manresa was reluctant t o receive me. In
accordance with trustworthy sources, the leadership of
the opposition against Casariego was exercised by
Manresa and not by Gerardi.
 Its fraternal solidarity with the bishop,
priests, religious men, pastoral agentso and
the faithful of said diocese, expressing
deep sentiment for their suffering.
Due to the seriousness of the situation and
according to a u n a n i m u s petition received
from the Episcopal Conference, the bishop of
the El Quiche diocese will personally convey
the situation that the diocese is experien-
cing before His Holiness, John Paul 11.75
As I mentioned before, the persecution
against the church continued on into 1981. The bishops
were busy almost exclusively during this time with

dedicating their time to denouncing kidnappings,

disappearances, or the assassinations committed against
members of'the church: "...The Catholic Church...
always present in the life of the Guatemalan people...

today more than ever during its history is a victim of

unjust attacks and violznt aggression."76

The conference explained that during that

time 12 priests disappeared or were assassinated and
that "numerous catechists and members of Christian
communities" have suffered violent deaths.Y7 In
addition, as a response to such indications, which

75 Conferenc ia Ep i scopa 1 de Guatema 1 a, Comun i cad0 ,

Guatemala, July 24, 1980, D.E. 9 (only one page).
76 Conferenc i a Ep i scopa 1 de Guatema 1 a, Comun i cad0 ,
Guatemala, August 6, 1981, D.E. 13, p. 1.
77 Ibid.
mentioned that some victims died in combat fighting
against the armed forces o f the government but who
actually were or had been tied t o the church78 and
that some bishops were collaborating with the
subversives,79 the bishops stated,
...that if a priest or a religious person
takes the opinion that, in our view, is
wrong -- on enrolling himself as a member
of any political faction or subversive group,
he ceases t o belong to the pastoral organi-
zations o f the church. Therefore, the
hierarchy is not responsible for his
actions.BQ

This position was ratified later when the

conference defended its position against the

declarations made by a Jesuit priest who had been
kidnapped and later appeared and held a press

We are deeply sorry that a priest has chosen

the path o f subversive violence in order t o
achieve solutions t o the present problems o f
the country, in disagreement o f clearly
defined regulations set by the Catholic
church. As we have repeatedly stated in our
previous comunications, we think that this
option is erroneous and it is painful for us
t o see that a priest is misusing the
spiritual authority he received from the
church and the trust our people have bestowed
78 Ibid.. pp. 2 and 3.
79 Ibid.. p. 3.
80 Ibid.
This Jesuit's case, Father Luis Pellecer Faena,
will be explained in detail in Chepter VII.
 on him because he is a priest besides the
fact that he led these humble people along
the wrong road.82

On another plane, the Episcopal Conference

recognized that some individuals connected t o pastoral

activities were involved in the armed forces of the

opposition movement and requested t o be understood,

stating that "A grave injustice is committed when the

Catholic Church is accused and denigrated because o f

the personal choice some o f its manbers have made.83

Consequently, we see that the bishops had t o

go beyond t h e original plan o f denouncing the violence

and point t o the guilty landlord a s the oppressor in a

plan designed t o defend themselves against the

accusations that some church members had been, in

effect, greatly responsible for the violence in

Guatemala. On the other hand, since some o f the most

infiuential sectors o f public opinion apparently did

not favorthe churc;~at that time, the bishops started

defending themselves a s if t o say "he who is not with

me is aSainst m e , " and they d ~ e l a r s d ,

It is inconceivable that there are Catholics

who attend mass and they even come t o receive
8 2 Conferencia Episcopal de Guatemala, Comunicado.
Guatemala, October 29 1981. D.E. 14, p. 1.
83 D.E. 13, p. 4.
 the Body o f Christ, then they remain
indifferent when their priests are tortured
or their brothers are massacred.84

And they concluded with a reminder that "those who

attempt against the ministers of the church are
exccim~n
i cated .
A t the end o f 1981, there was a third type of
attitude among the bishops concerning the violence
containing a mystical-religious quality that could be
interpreted by some people a s a return t o the
traditionalist position. This type of attitude
perceived violence a s "a rejection of God's loving
plan."86 In this respect, even though the bishops
continued declaring that "urgent and challenging
reforms" were needed, they considered that the church's
mission was t o publicize "the principles of a lov
civilization, in order t o remain faithful t o

~hrist."87 During this period, they revealed the

rejection of violence, probably for reasons of
survival: "we cannot use violent media t o make people
listen to and obey the rrressage of salvetion that we

84 Ibid., p. 6.
85 Ibid.
86 D.E. 16, p. 25.
87 Ibid., p. 27.
 The attitude was questioned by the Guatemalan
Church in Exile, who, when they made reference t o the
stand taken by the bishops concerning the violence,

We understand that their,attitude weighs upon

them traditionall)/ and structural ly...but it
is the Guatemalan people, those who are
being persecuted and massacred, who will
undoubtedly remain as an evangelical
challenge to our pastors ....a9

In a later document, their mystical attitude

again emerged when they evoked theological virtues such
as faith, hope, and charity as a challenge t o an
increased "irrational terrorism."90 This invocation

left the impression of impotence before the violent

situation that was rampant throughwt the country, an
impotence that sought refuge in Jesus Christ "because
only He can manifest to man the exaltation of his
vocation."91 The bishops also exhorted the faithful
to do penance and offer sacraments and acts of devotion
to ask for peace, which was different from the previous

88 D.E. 13, pp. 7-8.

89 Pablo Richard and Guil lermo Melendez, La iglesia de
10s pobres en America Central, p. 241.
yU Conferencia Episcopal de Guatemala, Comunicado,
Guatemala, January 30. 1982, D.E. 17, p. 1.
occasions where little emphasis was placed on prayer.
The human rights campaigns were inconsequen-

tial until the decade o f the 1970s. especially during

the presidency o f Jimmy Carter in the United States.

Previously, this topic only appeared sporadically in

the documents o f the Guatemalan Episcopal Conference,

and was generally mixed in with others. In the

Collective Pastoral o f 1962, t h e right t o life seems t o

be equated with private property,

Next t o the fundamental right t o acquire
enduring possessicn o f earthly goods, every
man has, according t o the nature o f his
being, another right that must also be satis-
fied: the right t o live.92

They explained that the right t o live

responded t o the "capability that every man has to lead

a dignified life in relation t o the basic needs of

human nature: daily sustenance, adequate housing,

forming a family, and proper means t o maintain a wife

and educate the children." They also stated that the

right t o life was above the right t o own property.93

However, by 1974 they were more specific.

The bishops spoke in a message of the need t o respect

9 2 D.E. 1 , p. 10.
9 3 Ibid.
and tfpromotehuman rights" to achieve peace, this time
associating rights with obligations that must be met.
...since all progress and economic and
social development completely loses its
true meaning if the dignity o f humans and
their rights are not duly guaranteed by the
fulfillment of the corresponding
obligations.94

In 1976, in "United in Hope," they considered

human dignity t o be a privilege derived from God and
expressed sorrow that, because of the violence that
existed in Guatemala, "...the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights t o which Guatemala is signatory has been

left s o far behind in oblivion."95

The call t o respect the dignity of human

persons was a recurring theme for the Episcopal
Conference in the next few years. More or less the
same tone of denunciation was maintained in relation to
the violence o f human rights in Guatemala and the
existence of a close tie between respect for human
rights, its promotion, and peace.96 More attention was
given t o this topic in the Collective Pastoral o f April

94 D.E. 3 , pp. 2-3.

95 D.E. 4. p. 30.
96 Conferencia Episcopal de Guatemala, Comunicado,
Guatemala, May 4, 1977, D.E. 6 and May 15, 1980, D.E.
8.
1981. Here they elaborated on the theme and cited the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and John XXIII's
"Pacem in Terris." They concluded by saying that "an
attempt is made against the dignity of man when unjust
obstacles are imposed on him" that restrain him from
fulfilling his life. Referring in many instances t o
John Paul 1 1 , they stated that the law must promote,
defend, and guard human rights. 97 They insisted on
man's obligations because these have the same origins
as rights: the dignity that man has because he was
created in the likeness and image of God.
Much is spoken nowadays about rights, but
people forget t o mention the obligations.
Only someons %ha is t r " 1 y reedy to Fulfill
his personal, fanilial, and s3cial obliga-
tions can demand respect for his rights.98

In general terms, the contents of that

pastoral letter ratified the impression that the

Episcopal Conference had taken a step backward when it

moderated the tone of its prophetic role and converted
itself into the victim of the violence that was so
weakly dentunced. "No one dares speak clearly any more
nor can they express their opinions freely, especially

97 Conferenc ia Epi scopa 1 de Guatema 1 a, Carta pastora 1

colectiva, Guatemala, April 8, 1981, D.E. 10, pp. 4-5.
D.E. 10, p. 9.
on matters concerning politics because they fear that
any comment mi ght cost you your 1 i fe. "99
In relation t o this document, it is
interesting t o note that it was published in 1981, the
same year that there were sc many disappearances and
assassinations among priests. Yet the bishops did not
raise any appeals on behalf of human rights as other
religious institutions were doing inside and o ~ t s i d eof
the country. Instead, they merely continued insisting
on the dignity of man and his possibilities of self
improvement. They adopted a mystical approach in the
same manner as they did when they first started
addressing the topic o f violence at the end o f 1981.
Concerning the problem of injustice, from the
first collective pastoral in 1962, the denunciation
against injustice was explicit and frequently

expressed, "God's revenge calls t o the heavens," but

then it continued* "We d o not blame anyone for the
state of this situation, whose remote causes derive
from generations ago."100 The use of language became

stronger by 1967, when the:' stated "our social and

99 Ibid., p. 61.
100 D.E. 1, P. 8.
 economic reality is terribly unjust and unbalanced."lO1

By 1974 , the new role o f t h e church was

' foreseen, a s well a s the political implications this

step entailed.
We wish t o remind the people o f God that our
pastoral action is beginning t o understand
that the liberating evangelization and the
prophetic judgment o f our church upon society
indeed has political implications.

The further it carries out its inspiring and

prophetic mission, the more it promotes its
social vocation in history; its prophecy,
inspirstion and all its pastoral activity
become deeply engaged in serving God's
chi 1 dren. 102

The verbal denunciations of t h e bishops were

complemented by the revolutionary activity undertaken

by some members of the church and their subsequent

persecution. In confronting this situation, the

bishops reacted and tried t o defend those who were not

compr~mised, b u t they never openly challenged the

government, which was becoming even more repressive

during 1980 and 1981, as was mentioned previously.l03

Although no other organization other than the

Episccpa! Ccnfztence represented the developmental

101 D.E. 2, p. 7.
102 D.E. 3, p. 5.
103 D.E. 13, p. 3.
option, one organization did support the conference in
its prophetic mission, i.e., th Conferencia de
Religiosos de Guatemala (Conference of Religious
Leaders of Guatemala, CONFREGUA). This organization
was initiated in Guatemala at the beginning of the
Second Vatican Council. Its establishment was assigned
by the Apostolic Nunciature of Guatemala t o a Jesuit
priest and by 1961 the organization was already

functioning.
The original objectives o f CONFREGUA were:
1 ) To work so that the religious

congregations achieve a better understanding of

theological, juridical, and apostolic principles
entailed in religious life.
2) To give them appropriate religious and

apostolic instruction.
3) To develop mutual understanding and

assistance among them.

4) To t r y . t o generate more interest in the
spiritual and apostolic work.
5) To cooperate closely with the hierarchy of

the church and the nation.

6) To encourage a fraternal union between
male and female religious persons.
7) To represent them before the legitimate

ecclesiastical and civilian authorities.104

Five years after its establishment,
CONFREGUA's directcrs thought they had accomplished the
rnaJorfty of the objectives that had formed the basis of
the organization's foundation. They h'sd also prepared
a religious census that was quite reliable. During
that period, CONFREGUA had participated in activities
concerned with the search for religious vocations,

spiritual retreats, and workshops designed t o instruct

the faithful and teach them the newly established
guidelines of the church. In addition, during this
same period, CONFREGUA conducted religious instruction
i n the public schools and established an institute of

higher education for nuns, the objective of which was

t o upgrade their academic standards.105

This is the manner in which CONFREGUA

conducted itself during its first years. Its activity
became compatible with the "aggiornamento" guidelines,

lo4 CONFREGUA, Relacion qeneral de CONFREGUA* Casa

Central, Guatemala, Febrtiary 15, 1966, mimeographed,
p. 12. This document is in the possession of the
author.
105 Ibid., pp. 7-13.
as it tried t o entail the cultura'~and spiritual
activities o f the religious personnel with the needs of
modern life in the country. Unfortunately, the records
of CONFREGUA prior t o the 1976 earthquake were
destroyed when their offices collapsed. It was not
possible t o pursue the direction o f that organization
for p w p o s e s o f this study until the years after

reconstruction. Nevertheless, its activities after

1976 were well documented and reflected a prominent

sczial and prophetic character. A great part of the

pages of La Carta, a monthly bulletin published by

CONFREGUA, showed many denunciations o f persecution

conducted against religious personnel who were engaged
i n "preaching the new gospel."

Along this line, CONFREGUA's role appeared t o

have been modified according to the change that was
beirig experienced within the Episcopal Conference, t o
which CONFREGUA, according t o its statutes, was
subordinate, 106 CONFREGUA played a very important role

as it carried out its activities o f denunciation. The

jiocesan bishops, in general, protested whenever

Io6 Estatutos de CONFREGUA, Guatemala, mimeographed, no

date, pp. 3-4. This document is in the possession of
the author.
someone from their jurisdiction was being persecuted,
but the principal voice of protest came from CONFREGUA.
For example, concerning a land dispute that resulted
in a massacre of peasants known as the Chisec Massacre

and conducted by a paramilitary group, CONFREGUA issued

the fo:lowing petition:
We sincerely ask that everyone examine
conscientiously the moral obligation that we
have assumed. If we unite, we can fulfill
our evangelical duty of helping and defending
the poor, because they have no one who can
defend them. In addition, we ask that the
request to send telegrams be conducted in a
massive and representative manner by all the
sectors of the people of God in Guatemala and
thus we will avoid retaliation in the future
against any Christian group.107

In the case of Panzos. CONFREGUA intervened

and protested against the massacre. Likewise, it
defended a Spanish nun, Raymunda Alonso, who had been
expelled because she had participated in political
activities that were "incompatible with her religious
functions." CONFREGUA demanded,
That the government abstain from recurring
t o these kind o f maneuvers (expelling the
Spanish nun) that are not supported by any-
one, conducted against religious persons in
order t o disorient public 3pinion. which has
been demanding justice after the Panzos

lo7 "Matanza en ChisecrW La Carta, February 1976.

 genocide and other simi lar situations. l O8
CONFREGUA's denunciation actions continued until 1982,
when this institution began t o fade from the political
life o f the nation.
In general terns, we can conclude that

CONFREGUA played a role of denunciation under

supervision of the Episcopal Conferencz. The change
that occurred in its orientation and attitude
concerning national problems reflected somewhat those

changes that the conference itself went through.

Consequently, CONFREGUA began as a conference for
religious superiors. Its purpose had been t o promote
unity and cooperation among all the religious persons
from the various orders working in the country. It
ended by adopting a prophetic mission. that of

denouncing the government's behavior.

If the documents published by the Episcopal
Conference are carefully analyzed, we can see that
basically its concern was the same as that of the
Brazilian and Chilean bishops. It was directed at two
fundamental concerns: the social and the prophetic.

O8 CONFREGUA, Comun i cado, Guatema 1 a. June 7, 1987,

pp. 1-2. This document is in the possession of the
author.
 From the social aspect, the actions of the
Guatema lan bishops qualif ied as progressive, even
though they were prudent. Upon reading its
publications, the reader gets the impression that the
group did not anticipate events, but rather reacted
after they occurred. This was contrary, for example,
t o the collective action undertaken by the Brazilian
bishops because that same collective action gave the
church o f that country an social activist role that

called for structural changes in society and in

politics.
In relation t o its prophetic role, if we
understand that denunciation was its main activity,

then certainly that.area o f concern was fully carried

out by the Guatemalan bishops. Nevertheless, they did
not reach a point where they became aggressive and
active, especialjy in their collective actions. Even
though it is difficult t o prove, it is possible that
more than several bishops, as individuals, were
involved in political activism.

In reference t o the above, it is interesting

t o question whether the church may constitute itself as
a force for c h a ~ g eand denunciation, which are the
roles characteristic o f authoritarian or Marxist
governments. Guatemala became a case where the church
was inclined to adopt a negative response. The violent
reactions generated by the prophetic stand of some of
the Guatemalan religious elites practically excluded
the possibility of converting the Guatemalan Catholic
Church into a free institution. On the contrary, the
church became a prisoner of its own prudence in some
cases; in other cases, it was confined by external
pressures.

The EpSscopal Conference, since its

inception, had maintained relatively good relations
with the state, even though by the end of 1981 its
conciliatory and pragmatic attitude helped it not only
survive, but prepared the way for more harmonious
relations with subsequent governments. In the end, the
choice was to decline t o participate in political
affairs, relegating the task t o laymen.
The Episcopal Conference represented, at
Casariego's death, the church's progressive alternstive
t o the call for change. Although it suffered at the
hands of violence, it co.~tinued t o symbolize a
different and progressive choice confronting the
national reality. It tried to establish a new
relationship between religious ideas and the social
needs o f Guatemala, while maintain its respect for
the hierarchy and papal authority.
For better or for worse, the severity of the
violence made the church adopt, around the beginning of
the 1980s. a more moderate and prudent attitude. It
made her become more conciliatory toward the government
and the traditional business elites. Notwithstanding,
this attitude has been recorded in the history o f
Guatemala a s a serious commitment t o endow the church
with a more relevant and important role in political
and social affairs without her having t o participate
directly in politics. This decision, if seen within
the Guatemalan as well as the world context, seems t o
be the most prudent choice if the church desires t o
survive a s a universal institution.
We are able t o conclude that contrary t o the
traditional position held by Casariego, the bishops'
developmental pronouncements called for a process of

change based on structural reforms more than on

superficial or formalized improvements. The

developmentalists supported the adoption of a modern

social doctrine and the restructuring o f the church's
doctrine by establishing pastoral activity through base
communities. This was completely contrary t o the
traditional elitist position whereby the church derived

its influence and control from the business and

political elites o f the zcuntry.
Therefore, while Casariego was promoting
direct participation of the priests by cultivating
propitious contacts among the powerful sectors o f the
country, the bishops, in the end, decided t o delegate
the role o f active political participation t o the lay
movement, which was t o conduct its activity under their
coordination. On the other hand, the developmental
position placed ample emphasis on the need for unity,
solidarity, and denunciation, while the traditional
position did not g o beyond a weak analysis and mildly
criticized the sociopolitical conditions that existed
in the country.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that in spite

of its progressive position toward the process of

change, the developmental position of the bishops
remained within the limits o f the principles o f
obedience and r&spect for the hierarchy, a position
also shared by Casariego's traditionalist posture.
This circumstance then depicted everyone, the
archbishop as well as the bishops, as individuals who
were respectful of the system of ecclesiastical values
in matters of authority and hierarchy.
 CHAPTER VI
THE REBELLIOUS RESPONSE TO CHANGE

Pope John XXIII, in "Mater et Magistra,"

insisted on the need t o improve the material life of
the people in order t o abolish inequality and t o a1 low
laborers to participate in the benefits derived from
the capital and management o f enterprises. On the
other hand, the Pope, on several occasions, indicated
that Christian doctrine was concerned with man's body
as weii as his soul. Such circumstances implied that
in order to fulfill his task, the priest had t o go
beyond the traditional limits set by his spiritual work

and dedicate his efforts t o a new kind of pastoral

activity that sought t o achieve his followers' well

being.
Consequently, many Latin American clergymen
accepted John XXIII's appeal a s something that they
should comply with even though they were conscious that
this implication entailed breaking away from some of
the ancient practices of the Catholic Church. It is
interesting to note that many members o f the upper
echelons in several Latin American countries found this
388
change very difficult, while the younger members of the
lower clergy found a new path in their pastoral
activity and efforts t o effect salvation.
As it sought t o work toward change, some
Catholics began t o rebel against hierarchical
authority, against governments, and against the
prevailing social order. Rebellious groups sprouted
all over Latin America. Some of the best known were
ONIS in Peru, the Third World Priests in Argentina, and
the Golconda group in Colombia. Guatemala was no

exception; here the Conferencia de Sacerdotes

Diocesznos en Guatemala (Conference o f Guatemalan
Diocesan Priests, COSDEGUA), was organized.
The organization of these groups had a common
denominator: they all began as very structured and
formal organizations during 1968 and 1969; they all had
the intention of attending t o social problems; and they
all demonstrated a rebellious attitude against the

hierarchy and eventually against all authority. As

Dodson concluded, all of them were more inclined t o
talk than t o act.1
 3 50

The first case o f the clerical rebel

organ i zat ions was probably the Third World Priests i n
Argentina.2 which had its origin in the worker-priest
experiment that was tried with dubious results i n
France and subsequently was transplanted t o Argentina
during the 1950s. The worker-priest's mission was to
work and live alongside the workers from the industrial

regions in order to learn of their problems and try to

help them. The result was that the majority of these
worker-priests left the priesthood and were converted
t o socialist causes. In Argentina, the majority were

The worker-priests were the link between

local conditions and Vatican 1 1 , hut they learned that
the hierarchy was nct going to accept their suggested
reforms. Eventually, the intransigence o f the priests
and the hierarchy led t o a total swing toward

radicalism by some priests and the formation of a

militant leftist movement. The initial conditions for
the formation of this group began between 1965 and
1967, during a meeting o f bishops from the Third World

2 For a compl ete explanat ion o f the origin and

achievements o f the Third World Movement, see Jirnmie
Dodson, Religious Innovation.
led by Dom Helder Camara. Their message received
complete support from the rebel priests and from that
moment on, they chose t o call themselves a Movement
(because it was not going t o remain static) of Priests

for (not f-om but for) the Third World.

The second group to organize was ONIS in
Peru (Oficina Nacional de Inforrnacion Social, National
Office for Social Information) in 1968. The name is
ambiguous; it does not reflect an organization under
clerical leadership, but its purposes are clear: to
work in the social field. They chose the name o f the
organization as a symbol of the search for an identity
that would differ from that of the Catholic ~hurch.3

The third group organized in Colombia in July

1968 at a meeting held on the Goiconda plantation where

a group of Colombian priests gathered to study

Colombian society, which was dominated by the
privileged classes. The fame of this group was blurred
by the popularity o f Camilo Torres, a revolutionary,

although as Schoultz pointed out, the Golconda group

probably had more potential for pressing the hierarchy

Michael G. Macaulay, Ideoloqi cal Chanqe and

Internal Cleavaqes in the ~ e r u v i a nchurch, Ph.D.
dissertation, University o f Notre Dame, 1972, p. 56.
to conduct some reforms.4 The name of the Golconda
Group o f Priests indicated that its members were
clerics, but its objectives did not.
In the specific case of Guatemala, a similar
group called Confederacion de Sacerdotes Diocesanos en
Guatemala (Confederation of Diocesan Priests in
Guatemala. COSDEGUA) was formally organized at the home
of a diocesan priests who met with other friendly
priests on April 30, 1969.6

According t o my conversations held with

various COSDEGUA members. the promoters and founders of
the organization were Fathers Oscar Orellana,
Gumercindo Cabrera Chupina, and Hector Pineda Flores.
These men distinguished themselves from the other
COSDEGUA members because of their advanced degree of
education. It was never clear just how many priests
were part of COSDEGUA. Nevertheless, the active

4 Lars Schoultz, "Reform and Reaction in the

Colombian Catholic Church," The Americas, Vol. XXX,
NO, 2 , 1973. p. 247.
A diocesan priest is one who does not belong to a
religious order, but who is under direct authority of
the bishop. The term "confederation," which the
organization assumed, was criticized since it implied
that other federations had existed before.
Julius Pater, La verdad sobre COSDEGUA, DSC No. 1 ,
Guatemala, no date. This and other COSDEGUA documents
identified as DDC are in the possession of the author.
nucleus of priests participating in COSDEGUA from its
beginnings was approximately 16 diocesan Guatemalan

priests and one of German origin.'

An analysis of the parishes of these bishops
shows that, possibly with the exception of Orellana and
Cabrera Chupina, who came from a wealthy parish (Ciudad
Vieja, zone 10). the rest had come from very poor
parishes or from parishes located outside Guatemala.
As far as education is concerned, all priests had had

at !==st five yesrs of Latin, three years of

philosophy, and four of theology, the basic

7 The following priests were members of this group:

Father Oscar Orellana (deceased), Coadjutor of the
Ciudad Vieja Parish, zone 10, Doctor of Theology;
Father Gumercindo Cabrera, parish priest of Ciudad
Vieja, zone 10; Father Julian Mendez Hidalgo (Julius
Pater), writer; Father Gonzalo Herrera, parish priest
.
i n San Martin, Jilotepeque; Father Maximiliano
. -. .
Schuhmacher (deceased) (German) par i sh .+r-i%&--aZ 5=~----------~
Pedro, Sacatepequez; Father Carlos Joffre, parish
priest of Ciudad Vieja, Sacatepequez; Father Francisco
Dardon, parish priest from Maria Auxiliadora, zone 5;
Father Salvador Valenzuela, parish priest in San Pedro,
Ayampuc; Father Rafael Rodriguez (deceased), parish
priest from Sanarate, Jalapa Diocese; Father Hector
Pineda, ethnologist, anthropologist, and humanist;
Father Mario Matamoros, parish priest of San Lucas,
Sacatepequez; Father Luis Grajeda, vicar and parish
priest from Chimaltenango; Father Carlos Palencia,
parish priest from Santa Rosa de Lima, zone 5; Father
Gustavo Lara, director of the school Nuestra Senora del
Pilar; Father Cristobal Ramirez, lawyer and chaplain of
the Iglesia riel Carmen; and Father Julio Gonzalez
Celis, parish priest of Parroquia Vieja, zone 6.
requirements needed t o be ordained as diocesan priests.
The average age was between 35 and 40 years old.
As far as COSDEGUA's objectives, one of its
members ascertained that its goal was t o "try t o
implement the recommendations of the Second Vatican
Council."8 Elsewhere, through interviews with other
founders, I learned that the founding of COSDEGUA
responded essentially t o Casariego's appointment as
cardinal in March of that year.
In the opinion of this author, the cardinal's
appointment was serious enough for various diocesan
priests t o want t o congregate around COSDEGUA.
However, the real goal of the group involved the

"social, economic, and intellectual advancement" of the

diocesan priest. In this respect, the enforcement of

the Second Vatican Council's recommendations became a
secondary objective t o be achieved during a long-term
per i od .
It is very important t o understand this
aspect concerning the advancement o f the diozcsan
priest, because traditionally he was relegated to

Jul ios Parker, La verdad sobre COSDEGUA, DDC

No. 1 .
secondary positions or parishes. Furthermore, even
though some o f them would have wanted t o enforce some
o f the changes suggested by Vatican 1 1 , they had no
money with which t o fund such a program. We must take
into account that the problem of change was something
new t o religious activity, something that required
funding, t o which the majority of these priests'
parishes were unable to contribute.9

It is also important t o remember that the

diocesan priest felt oppressed and cast aside by the

foreign priests, especially by the Spaniards, whom he

perceived as colonizers:
The Spanish priest still speaks with a harsh
voice here in Guatemala. He still shakes
his authoritarian finger ko indicate what
has t o be done and the Guatemalan priests
have not been able t o destroy this anachron-
istic phantom.

For a priest t o secure a rich parish can make a big

difference; his financial sources, in collections and '

donations, multiply themselves. At one meeting between

Latin Amerian and North American bishops, the latter
were asked t o send their assistance through agencies
that were already established instead of sending
personal contributions. See David Mutchler, The
Orqanization and Ideoloqy of Church Politics in Latin
America, Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University,
1970, p. 175.
 I insist that in the Guatemalan church there
still persist colonialist customs that have
pervaded without interruption throughout the
centuries. 10

In addition, the Guatemalan diocesan priest

felt lost and aione among the wave of foreign priests
and resources. Some of them were able to carry out
pastoral and social work on a small scale, whenever
they could obtain some of the foreign resources that

were designated for the use of the parish. Ordinarily,

though, their finances relied on sacramental ceremonial
fees and a few donations and alms. This would never
have been sufficient enough for the diocesan priest t o
._______---- -- - --
do s o r n e t h i r z ~ ~ ~ t : ~ : ,:., , ~ LC
~ , cor;duct a socia I act ion
program to improve the material life of the people, as
the new recommendations from the Vatican required.
COSDEGUA's first action was the drafting and
mailing of a letter t o the Pope, which was signed by 53
priests who were requesting the dismissal of Cardinal
Archbishop Hario Casariego. The letter was dated May
27, 1969. Its contents claimed that the cardinal was
not a pastor, but a man who had caused divisiveness.

- -
-

10 Oscar Orellana, Evangelizacion y colonizacion.

Volume I, COSDEGUA, Imprenta La Familia, Guatemala,
1972, pp. 10 and 16.
Besides, he was accused as a drug addict, a politician,
a schemer, a businessman, and a f0rei~ner.11
According t o confidential informtion the
above position was not seen by the Pope, who returned
the letter with a copy for Cardinal Casariego, which
was given t o the apostolic nuncio, Monsignor Gerolano
Prigione, and t o the president of the Episcopal
Conference, Monsignor Lara Mejia.
In January 1970, the priests from COSDEGUA
held a press conference at a church for the purpose o f
announcing the foundation o f COSDEGUA in April of the
previous year. They declared that they had organized
themselves in order t o carry out their church work more
efficiently and that just as there existed professional
organizations, the diocesan priests wished t o join
their efforts and apply them t o the fulfi.llment of

their apostolic mission: "The objectives o f COSDEGUA

were t o encourage the spiritua\, ;ntel\ectua\,economic
and social enhancement of the diocesan clergy."12

- -

1 1 The author was unable t o see a copy of this letter,

but its existence as it has been described was
confirmed by Father Chemita and by Gurnercindo Cabrera
Chupina.
12 Proyecto de 10s estatutos de la COSDEGUA, Article
No. 6, DDC No. 3, Guatemala, no date.
 According t o the Guatemalan newspapers, the
press conference was "somewhat disorderly because the
speakers tended to make long speeches."l3 Neverthe-
less, it was clear t o all those prssent that the
prjests had come together because of
...
the disintegration o f the Guatemalan
diocesan priest and the hegemony exerted by
the foreign priests in the ecclesiastical
life, and the economic, organizational and
educational fields....l4

The members of COSDEGUA used the Vatican I 1

documents, Papal Orders 6, 7, 8 , and 21, as fundamental

doctrine as well as the encyclical, "Gaudium et Spes,"
No. 1 1 . They also cited John XXIII, pointing out that

the people o f Guatemala along with their "oppressive

historylq were challenging the church hierarchy t o
involve itself in finding solutions t o this crisis.
COSDEGUA reinforced their decision based on the message
tf
<
the Secona Conference of CELAM held at Medellin.15

Among COSDEGUA's statements made at its first

13 El Impartial, January 17, 1970, newspaper clipping,

no page number. According t o Julius Pater, some
newsmen became Casariego's agents, and went beyond
their journalistic duties, which were t o cover the
event. They began to attack the members of COSDEGUA
with insults and accusations.
14 COSDEGUA, Pronunciamiento, DDC No. 4, Part I ,
Guatemala, January 16, 1970.
15 Pronunciamiento, Part 1 1 .
declaration during this press conference, some of the
reasons for their organization can be found.

In particular we reject the attitude of

preponderant influence that some foreign
priests and bishops exercise because t 3 ~ y
enjoy the luxury of economic power and
personnel. We also reject and deplor .
disloyalty shown by some Guatemalan priests
and bishops; if judged by their attitudes,
it is apparent that they have betrayed
their country and the church. Therefore, we
would like to clarify that OUR CONFLICT IS
MORE CONCERNED WITH A STRUGGLE ENTAILING
ATTITUDES RATHER THAN N A T I O N A L I T I E S . ~ ~

COSDEGUA concluded its declaration by demanding that

its ideas be respected and that all bishops and priests
be requested to stcldy in aeptn the Medeliin documents
and conform with the doctrine approved by the Latin
American bishops.17

After the pronouncement was distributed and

read. the participants who attended the press
conference came away with the impression that there was
a crisis of authority and obedience. Later, the
attitude professed by the COSDEGUA priests was

criticized by other secular priests who accused them of

becoming scandalous and persistent.18 Other

l6 Ibid.. Part 1 1 1 .
l 7 Ibid.
l 8 El Imparcial, Guatemala, January 20. 1970.
priests.19 bishops,20 and newsmen21 mentioned that

the objectives of COSDEGUA did not seem t o follow the

Vatican 1 1 goals, that the only thing they were

interested in was the promotion o f the diocesan priest,

and that their attitude constituted a challenge t o the

episcopal authority with whom, apparently, they were

unable t o talk.

Concerning this lack of dialogue, COSDEGUA

later said that one o f the causes that had brought them

together was that "they feared the rejection of a

sincere and serious dialogue. w 2 2 They 1 amented the

fact that they were being condemned before they had

been heard.23

Nevertheless, they contradicted themselves

when they told the story o f their activities and

confirmed that

We have conducted a dialogue with the

hierarchy at various times: on Saturday,
May 24, at 10 a.m. fifteen Guatemalan priests
met at the Apostolic hunciature in order t o
hold conversations with the nuncio; on

is Prensa Libre, Guatemala, February 10, 1970, P. 10.

20 Ibid., February 7, 1970, p. 10.
2 1 Ibid., January 22, 1972, Editorial: "Sindicato de
religiosos?"
22 DDC NO. 4, Part I.
23 COSDEGUA, Comunicado, "Sacerdotes guatemaltecos
niegan las declaraciones de 10s obispos," DDC No. 5,
Guatemala, February 9, 1970.
 Wednesday, May 28, at 9 a.m., thirteen
Guatemalan priests met at the National
Catholic Secretariat t o discuss the same
problems with the apostolic nuncio, three
Guatemalan bishops, and the cardinal.24

These contradictions, in addition t o the lack

of facility t o express themselves revealed by the

members o f COSDEGUA and the deception that was shown by

some newsmen, caused public misunderstanding concerning

t h e actions and objectives of COSDEGUA. The

organization argued that "The statements published by

the press concerning our organizations are full of

errors and do not correspond exactly t o what we said,

yet deep inside they d o reflect our thoughts."25

The development of the press conference in

1970 and the presentation of the first COSDEGUA

24 Cited in Reporte sobre la situacion de la iqlesia

Catolica en Guatemala, DOC No. 6, p. 4, o f the
documented appendix. No author, no date. This is a
well-written report, quite unbiased, and well
documented.
25 Jose Maria Ruiz Furlan, Carta a Herbert Froehlich,
DDC No. 7, Guatemala, August 18, 1971; and
Declaraciones de COSDEGUA y de 10s Cristianos
renovados, DDC No. 8, Guatemala, July 10, 1970. The
dialogue problem had also been confronted by the Third
World Argentinian group, who considered that the
hierarchy sustained relations with the government in a
zig-zag manner and this became an obstacle for the
establishment o f a dialogue with the lower clergy, who
felt disoriented. Jimmie Dodson, Reliqious Inncvation
and the Politics of Arsentina, p. 48.
document are of special importance because they marked
the appearance of Father Jose Maria Ruiz Furlan, better
known as "Chemita,w26 who was new t o the political
scene. He added a new dimension t o the policies of
COSDEGUP., attributable t o the personal problems that
existed in this priest's relationship with Cardinal
Casar i ego.
Other groups similar t o COSDEGUA that were
founded in Latin America, unlike COSDEGUA, had
instituted clear and precise objectives that were well
understood. The goals o f these organizations
- - - -- - - --- -

26 Father Chemita was not one of the founders of

COSDEGUA because, a s he told this author, he was not in
Guatemala when COSDEGUA was founded, but was living in
South America. Nevertheless, after the failed press
conference in January 1970, the original leaders of
COSDEGUA tired of carrying the weight of responsibility
and failure and placed the leadership of COSDEGUA in
Chemita's hands.
Father Chemita's personality is that of one
o f the most folkloric and controversial figures in the
religious and political history o f Guatemala. His
style and personal charisma have given him visibility
for many years. He has been subjected t o extreme
criticism and has been the object o f sincere and
effusive testimonials.
Unlike his diocesan colleagues, Father
Chemita, because o f his talents and popularity,
directed a popular but prosperous parish; this fact
exempts him from the possibility that he sought
personal and economic remuneration from COSDEGUA.
Nevertheless, his goals and desire for public order and
his enmity with Casariego gave COSDEGbA a political
slant.
transcended the internal conflicts with the authorities
and pursued the achievement o f substantial change in
the structure of their respective societies.
For example, the Third World Priesthood
movement, or Tercermundistas as they were called,
declared that in the Third World, t o which Argentina
belonged, there were no social fraternal conditions
because the workers were the proletariat and had kept
this position with respect t o the domestic oligarchy
and the international capitalistic imperialism. The
priests believed that the preaching of the Gospel
required a total transformation "from sin t o grace,"

which is to "include man as a whole, physically and

socialiy."Z7 This was relevant t o what the Pope
stated in "Mater et Magistra." In addition, they
thought the priest needed t o fulfill a pastoral role,
t o denounce injustice, and t o this end, the church
should distance itself from the unjust sociopolitical
system and should collaborate with another system that
is deemed more compatible with the needs of the
time.28

27 Jimrnie Dodson, Religious Innovation and the

i t s of A r e n t i n a p. 51.
Ibid., p. 52.
 The ONIS group wanted reforms within the
hierarchy of the church. It also wanted the
transformation of the fundamental structures o f society
at large. ONIS was worried about dependency, a highly
discussed topic addressed t o all those groups who were
dedicated t o social change. They considered two types
o f dependency: first, the one experienced by Latin
America with respect t o the United States; and second,
the one experienced by the oppressed groups with
respect t o the national dominant groups. They sought,

as a consequence, the improvement o f the oppressed

sectors. In stating their objectives, ONIS was clearly
influenced by Paulo Freire's Educacion para la libertad

(Education for Liberty) and the ideas on economic

development o f Roger ~ekemans.29

The priests who were members o f Golconda were

considered Piarxists as a result o f their first
statements, which denounced inequality and the
treatment of the Amazonian Indians. In more precise
terms, this group protested against

...the tragic underdevelopment under which

our country suffers...a product of the
history o f economic, political, cultural and
29 Michael G. Macaulay, ideological Change and
Internal Cleavages in the Peruvian Church, pp. 18-19.
 social dependency on the foreign powers that
exercise their influence through our
el ites.30
According t o the Golconda priests, this situation
demanded a militant pastoral attitude that strove t o
eliminate anything that conspired against human
dignity. They concluded by saying. "Undoubtedly...it
is impossible t o overcome this situation without a true

revolution that removes the leading elites from our

country, since they are responsible for the existence
o f a state o f dependency with the foreign power."31

It is therefore evident that the objective of

these three religious organizations directly demanded a

change in the structure of their respective societies.

COSDEGUA did not want this, as expressed in its initial

declarations. Its attacks were aimed at the hierarchy,

its power, and the episcopal authority.
-.-. - evert he less, it did not disagree with

everything; for example, COSDEGUA agreed with these

groups in some respects. Members blamed history for
the current situation in their countries.32 And they

30 Cited i n Lars Schou 1 tz. "Reform and React ion i n the

Colombian Catholic Church." p. 247.
31 Ibid.
32 DDC NO. 4, Part 1 1 .
blamed these countries' misfortunes on their condition
as colonized countries.
The Guatemalan church will never reach
development unless it leaves behind the mold
o f Spanish evangelization. The existence o f
a religious dependency is an alignment of a
reality that refrains us from being
ourselves.33

A thorough analysis o f the COSDEGUA documents

enables us t o detect COSDEGUA's rebellious attitude in

relation t o four well-defined topics: a) the anomalies

and injustices existing within the body of the

Guatemalan Catholic Church; b) the foreign mentality,

c) Cardinal Casariego; and d) social injustice.

Concerning the above topics, one of the most
important objectives, as I mentioned previously, was
the eradication o f any anomaly and injustice that the
COSDEGUA. . .priests
-
thobght was undermining the church
from within. In fact, one of the first documents that

was obtained in relation to this religious movement

protested the manner in which the finances of
processions were handled.34 A press release signed by

33 DDC No. 2 . p. 10.

3 4 Processions in Guatemala have become the
traditional expression of faith. Anyone who wants to
participate in a procession may d o so upon payment of a
fee in lieu of carrying the saints' images on their
shoulders.
Father Salvador Valenzuela called attention to the

disadvantages experienced by the parish priests of

small towns and marginal shanties as compared to the
parish priests located in the center of the capital.
The latter enjoyed an advantage derived from the social
composition of their faithful and received large sums
of money when processions were held, while the former
had to do what they could with a few pennies. This
document concluded by stating that "processions are a
reflection of class consciousness" and they do not
"unite the poor and the powerfc!."35 The !sck ~f
financial resources made them react against the
archbishop, whom they accused of receiving "millions of
quetzales" through his position as Prelate of the
Esquipulas Sanctuary.36

Another grievance against the church in

Guatemala contended that the appointed bishops were

inefficient. The first victim of this attack, as was
seen before, was the archbishop. However, the members
of the Episcopal Conference were also mentioned.

35 COSDEGUA, Boleti n de prensa, DDC No. 9, Guatemala,

1970.
36 Memorial de inteqrantes del pueblo Catolico a1 Papa
Paulo VI, DDC No. 10, Guatemala, April 29, 1970. (The
quetzal is the official currency of Guatemala.)
~ c c o r d i n gto COSDEGUA, "they were silent when they
should have spoken out and they spoke when they should
have been silent." In addition, they claimed that
"instead of finding solutions t o their needs, each day
they seriously compromised the church concerning
extraneous affa i rs t o its mi ss ion and nature. "37

Their conclusions stated that

If in the search for solutions to internal
church conflicts the bishops resort to the
treaty on crimes and penalties delineated
in the Canon Law instead o f finding recourse
in the Gospel, they will continually lose
their authority, because we the priests do
not believe in the old fashioned mold where
education was attached t o a yoke.38

The bishops, they said, had merely become spectators

more than anything else. in response the bishops

accused COSDEGUA of representing a distarted idea of

nat i ona lism and a violent and defiant attitude against
the leg it imate authority o f the Cathol i c church. 39
In 1971, COSDEGUA also opposed the

appointment of three new bishops (Ricardo Ham Freely,

Mario t4artinez de Lejarza, and Jose Ramiro Pellecer),

37 Ibid.
38 Oscar Ore1 1 ana, Carta abi erta a 1 os part i c ipantes
en la Semana Sacerdotal, DDC No. 1 1 , Guatemala, July
10, 1970.
39 Conf erenc i a EP i scopa 1 de Guatema 1 a, "Comun i cador"
Guatemala, ~ e b r u a r4~, - 1970, in Prensa Libre, p. 12.
stating that they thought these men would not be able
to transform the church and arguing that these
appointments were "excellent" and vfwell-aimedwat
selecting "those who still attempt t o support a twenty-
year-o'ld static system ...."A0 They continued, "even
if the new bishops are Guatemalan priests, we feel that
their way o f thinking is incompatible with the process
of adaptation that is required of a priest."41
With respect t o the previous c o m e n t , the
COSDEGUA members were possibly right; according t o our

classification, none o f the three candidates belonged

t o the progressive group. COSDEGUA considered the new
bishops' appointments t o be a mockery of the concerns
about renewal and the axioms of the new Catholic

church .42
COSDEGUA was not welcomed within the
Episcopal Conference. None of the conference's
members, with the exception of Miguel Angel Garcia
Arauz, Bishop o f Zacapa and a friend and supervisor o f
Oscar Orellana. were happy with the movement. Far

4 O COSDEGUA, Boletin d e Prensa, No. 1, DOC No. 12,

Guatemala, January 1 1 , 1971.
4l Ibid.
42 Ibid.
example, even though the Episcopal Conference was
initially sympathetic to some of its positions,
Monsignor Humberto Lara Mejia, president of the
Episcopa! Conference, declared that "some of COSDEGUA's
demands merited attention; others were
inadmissible."43 He later withdrew his support. One

of the bishops from that era told me that the movement

I
did not seem serious enough, that it sought t o attack
the leading members of the hierarchy, and that the
presence of Father Chemita as a member implied that it
was a political movement that lacked credibility.
On the other hand, COSDEGUArs opposition t o
the bishcprs appointment was probably due to the
chagrin of one of its members who aspired to this
honor. For example, Gumercindo Cabrera himself
explained t o this author that he was once considered
fo;- the post of Bishop o f El Peten, but the nuncio
decided t o use his influence and appoint Estrada
Pateau.
Concerning the injustice perceived within the
church, COSDEGUA pointed t o the dismissal of some
teachers from a Catholic school and the dismissal of a

45 DDC No. 6, p. 6.
chaplain who complained about the procession
coilections. Other protests related t o the change of

personne 1 at the seminary, where the teachers received

lower sa laries than the previous appointees, and the
transfer of one priest to another post that merited a
reduction in salary. Finally, COSDEGUA believed that
all church affairs should be public and discussed in
the open because the church itself was an llaccomplice

along with the systems, institutions and armed forces

engaged in unfair practices."44

In relation t o their position concerning the

foreign menta!ity, the membership argued that their
fight was directed against foreign ideas.
WE ARE NOT AGAINST THE FOREIGN PRIESTS. Our
problem does not involve the problem o f
nationality; it is concerned with ideas. We
oppose all priests and bishops who do not
accept the theories of the modern church.
Their ideas are more important to us than
their nationality.45

...we are deeply concerned with the mental

capacity of the priest and the hierarchy,
not their nationality. From our point of
view, we accept appointees whose national-
ity is foreign, but we want foreigners with
an evolutionary outlook adaptable to

44 C O S D E G U A ~ Comun i cado, Ante las in just i cias dentro

6e la misma ialesia, DOC No. 13, Guatemala, February
1971.
45 DDC No. 8.
 Guatemalan conditions.46
/
Therefore, the problem does not rest in
nationality, but in the way of thinking.
A Guatemalan who possessed many academic
titles and has adopted a foreign mentality,
would be use1 ess to us.47
Nevertheless, in other documents they did
mention the foreign origin of a priest or bishop of
whom they were' critical.
We present these petitions on behalf of
GUATEMALAN priests, and they are not to
include nationalized p r i e ~ t s . ~ 8

How can two foreigners, Casariego, a

Spaniard, and Martinez de Lejarza, Basque,
ask such a thing for a Guatemalan ...?49

...we definitely reject the intervention of

Monsignor Mario Martinez de Lejarza, a
Jesuit foreign Basque priest, in the domes-
tic and political affairs of the
country . . . . S O

These anti-foreign sentiments are best

explained in one of the first publications written by
one of the COSDEGUA members. Here the author is

46 DDC No, 12,

47 COSDEGUA, Comunicado jerarquia eclesiastica
muestrase una vez mas inoperante, DDC No. 14,
Guatemala, A p r l ! 12, ! 9 7 2 .
48 COSDEGUA, Carta abierta a1 Congreso de la
R b l i c a DDC No. 31, Guatemala, March 14, 1972.
Oeclaracion de 10s feliqreses de las conolias de la
parroquia del Santo Cura de Ars, Zone 5 (parish of
Father Chemita), DDC No. 15, Guatemala, July 14, 1970.
50 COSDEGUA, Comunicado ante el despido de las
maestras del Coleqio Nazareth, DDC No. 16.
leaning toward nationalism as a definite solution t o
the serious problems of Latin America.
The church must live the Latin American
reality if it does not want to remain on
the fringes of events.... The condition
of the church in Guatemala is not respond-
ing to our historical era. The preponderant
foreign influence in the episcopacy and the
clergy is an obstacle to our mode of expres-
sion. It does not permit us to act effec-
tively within the Catholic-Guatemalan
context. This healthy type of nationalism is
a sign of the times that the Vatican authori-
ties and their representatives in Guatemala
should read, if they sincerely seek...to
fulfill their mission in the countries of
the third world under divine guidance.
Otherwise...they are harming us and they are
wasting their time.51

This was the line followed by Ivan 1llich52

in his famous article, but COSDEGUA's actions seemed

51 Oscar Orellana, Henemonia extran.iera en la iqlesia

de Guatemala, DDC No. 17, Guatemala, November 19,
1969.
- -~

52 Ivan Illich pointed out the negative facts involved

in the affluence of money and foreign clergy when they
are appropriated to a poor Latin American country. He
stated that the Latin American church, because it
received this type of assistance, tended to convert
itself to a satellite of the policies and cultural
phenorner~a of the north Atlantic area. It created the
habit of needing more and more money instead of
learning to subsist on its own funds. He also
mentioced that the assistance supported an irrelevant
pastoral system, and that in spite of the fact that in
1966 the church attempted to promote social change,
once it achieved the momentum t o effect the change, it
withdrew. See Ivan Illich, "The Seamy Side of
Charity," America, 1967, Vol. 116. No. 3.
weak in comparison and remained mere statements that,

neverthel ess, provoked strong react ions from the

hierarchy and other secular groups.

The (priests from) COSDEGUA have provoked

uncertainty, doubt and divisiveness among
the people o f the Lord. They have distrib-
uted pamphlets that are disrespectful o f
their own authorities. They continuously
contradict each other. What are they looking
for? What are their ideals? Are they after
the foreign priests? Why? They say they
are not allowed t o dialogue--we, a s
witnesses, know this is absolutely false.53

COSDEGUA's phobia against the foreigners

(although one o f its members was a German who became

o n e o f the first priests t o withdraw from the

organization) took on a special coloring that was not

present in other organizations since those were formed

by a great foreign majority. For example, ONIS was

originally founded by Peruvians and three-fourths of

its membership was Peruvian; but in a short time, the

membership included 6 0 t o 70 percent foreign

priests,54 almost all o f them belonging t o religious

orders.55 Curiously enough, ONIS supported a

53 "Publicacion de un grupo Catolico," El Impartial,

Guatemala, February 20, 1970.
54 Michael G. Macaulay, Ideological Change and
Internal Cleavases in the Peruvian Church, p. 69.
5 5 Ibid., p. 70.
nationalistic Peruvian ideology that was implemented by

foreigners.56 This contradicted their early

declarations whereby they demanded that Peru's

liberation be carried out by Peruvians.57 It is

possible that the influence exerted by the foreign

clergy responded t o the paternalistic attitudes they

displayed (as in the case o f the Maryknolls in

Guatemala) when they came t o work in countries that

were less developed than their own.

In the case of the Third World priests, some

o f the initiators o f the movement were European

immigrants. Some, because o f their militant

activities, were deported a s a result of the petition

o f the archbishops.58 When the time came t o organize

the moveme?t and t o compose a political theology, it

was the Argentinians who were in the forefront.

Only the Golconda movement was initiated and

continued by Colombian priests who had studied in

Belgium and France.59 Nevertheless, it should be

56 Ibid., p. 80.
57 Ibid., p. 79.
s8 Jimmie Dodson, Re1 igious Innovation and the
Politics o f Argentina, p. 42.
ay Hugh de la Torre Cabal, The Revolution o f the Latin
American Church, University of Oklahoma Press, 1978,
pp. 54-55.
understood that Colombia was one of the few Latin
American countries where the national clergy was higher
in numbers than the foreign clergy.
While COSDEGUA was attacking the foreign
outlook, other organizations were not referring t o any
other country but the United States and its
imperialism, which maintained Latin America in a state
of dependency. COSDEGUA probably associated the
foreign mentality with the old guard of the hierarchy,
namely Casariego. the Spaniard.
A third characteristic of COSDEGUA's hostile
campaign was its animosity against Casariego.
Following the ietter dated May 17, 1969, the
hostilities between Casariego and COSDEGUA were
renewed. By July 1970, the spokesman presenting the
criticism was Father Chemita, who appeared on
television and addressed the cardinal. Chemita spoke
about what he considered the "excessive secularization

of the Catholic Church in G~aternala.~*60In July 1970,

COSDEGUA invited public expressions and the holding o f

"minutes of silence" that requested the archbishop's
expulsion. This time the invitation was supported by a

60 DDC No. 6, p. 1.
group called "Born Again Christians." a support group
formed around ~ h e m i t a . ~ ~
The protests began on July 6 and took place
at the atrium of the Metropolitan Cathedral. It was
announced that the most important meeting would be held
on Saturday of that week, and would include a national
demonstration. During the demonstration held that day,
Father Chemita accused the cardinal of "perverting the
church, the Catholic religion, and the people of

Guatemala by his steady meddling in national

problems."62

The very same day the Archdiocesan

Secretariat of the Movement for Christian Workshops
(Secretario Arquidiocesano del Movimiento de Cursillos
de Cristiandad) requested that limitations be
established for the demonstration of rebellious

6 1 This group of born again Chri st ians was formed

exclusively by laymen. Some of its leaders were
Guillermo Chinchilla, Jose Angel Toledo Alcantara, and
Sonia de Conde. This group was formed before COSDEGUA
and had as its purpose updating the Second Vatican
Council and Medell in. When COSDEGUA appeared, this
group saw an alternative where it could channel the
grievances that had not been brought to light.
Apparently their role was t o furnish transportation and
people who would attend the demonstrations held in the
cathedral atrium.
G2 DDC No. 6, p. 3.
attitudes against church authorities, because it was

deplorable that "the unity o f the church, which had

been cultivated during the colonial and independence

eras, was now being threatened by priests who were

Guatemalans in the majority."63

After this, there were five more

demonstrations. The last one was held on Saturday,

July 1 1 , and. according t o one organizer, "resulted in

failure" because t h e massive participation from all

sectors o f the country, which they had hoped would

participate, was absent and only 500 people attended.

Dcring that week Catholic groups who were partisan o f

the archbishop and who wanted t o demonstrate were asked

by the cardinal t o abstain from doing so.64 The

leaders o f this group said they "didn't want t o stand

by" if that demagogue (Chernita) Snsulted thern.65

As long a s the conflict lasted, Chernita and

the c3rdinal each had their followers. For example,

there were statements issued by various groups, among

which was one from the circle of studies of the Third

Worldp formed by Catholics who were not involved in

63 Kbid.
64 Prensa Libre, Guatemala, July 8, 1970, p. 16.
65 Prensa Libre, Guatemala, July 9, 1970, p. 9.
apostolic movements. This group offered itself as
mediator in the conflict, saying, "this movement

(COSDEGUA) is nothing but a disease that can be

eradicated in any form. The church needs t o promote

its own dialogue and must recognize all legitimate

diverse opinions espoused by its member~.~'66 They

never achieved any positive results, however.

On the other hand, those who supported the

cardinal also multiplied. A group of "priests born in

Guatemala," among them some clergy and lay associa-

tions, condemned the "rebellious and sch!smaticv

activity of a small group of priests and laymen.67

The nuncio, Prigione, also declared that "those evil

priests who rebel against the bishop" dgserved t o be

thrown out as traitors.68 Finally, the cardinal said,

"If they want a national church, let them organize it

and leave us in peace."69

The Episcopal Conference also felt obliged t o

take some positions according t o the development o f

66 The origin of this group was unknown, although it

is probable that Father Chemita organized it. See DDC
No. 6, p. 5.
6 7 Prensa Libre, Guatemala. July 9, 1970, p. 9.
68 Prensa Libre, Guatemala, July 1 1 , 1970, p. 1 1 .
69 Prensa Libre, Guatemala, July 13, 1970, p. 16.
events and met t o study how to respond t o COSDEGUA.
The conference decided t o suspend Chemita and two other
priests, Oscar Orellana and Gumercindo Cabrera, acd
relieve then o f their ministry. The Episcopal
Conference concluded that the methods that were used
and the total disrespect and open rebellion that
produced "diatribe, calumny and even threats,"

constituted an attempt against church unity and

subverted national order and peace.70

The priests did not accept these sanctions;

Chemita tore up and trampled on the decision and
refused t o move away from his parish. As a consequence
of his action, church membership at his parish
multiplied in the following days.71 The Curia
threatened 1 1 more priests and sanctioned them for
supporting Chemita. Of these, two retracted their
actions !Schurnacher and another priest whose name was
not given). The whole situation turned dramatic when
the cardinal was threatened with death and a bomb
exploded at Chemita's house.
Chemita attempted t o take the case before the

70 DDC NO. 6 , P - 6 -
71 Ibid., p. 7 .
civilian authorities of the republic by petitioning
Congress to expel Casariego from the country "because
he meddled in politics and always tried to be on the
side of those who were in command; he is given t o

intrigue and deceit and fraternizes with one or another

political faction." However. Congress refused t o act
on the grounds of separation of church and state powers
that had been established in the country.72

The July demonstrations were important

because with them began the process of disintegration
of COSDEGUA. During and after this event, Chemita
began t o lose the support of several COSDEGUA members
who viewed his actions a s erroneous and violent.
Gumercindo Cabrera, Julian Mendez Hidalgo, and others
separated from the group at this point. The
deterioration of COSDEGUA was made manifest in a
communication published by Father Gustavo Lara. who
stated the following:
The church and the people o f God were glad of
this deterioration because they knew that
its members were not all that sincere. The
systematic church was happy because it had
known previously that those who had good
will and were guided by a good cause would
end up feeling cheated by the opportunities
and those who were resentful.... When
7 2 Ibid., p. 8.
 COSDEGUA's spirit disintegrated and lost
control of these elements, a schism W ~ S
created between the opportunists and those
who resented the affair: those who made o f
COSDEGUA an instrument t o climb the ladder
to better positions or honors or t o depose
those who were in charge and those who
through COSDEGUA showed their resentment
against some members of the hierarchy. From
there on, there was nothing but what was
called "the carnival o f the church," Mr.
Cardinal, "the tragic week o f the church,"
and other epithets, and for the pseudo-
Cosdeguans, "the minutes o f silence."73

Carlos Palacios, Salvador Valenzuela, Oscar Orellana,

and Rafael Rodriguez stayed with Chemita, although not

for long. Once the public demonstrations were over,
COSDEGUA had no impact on the religious life of the
nation, except for two statements distributed in
September 1970 and February 1971. One petition was

also addressed t o Congress in 1972.

The Cardinal vs. Chemita conflict terminated

in August of that year. Very little was gained by

either side, but the cardinal seemed t o have won in the
end. This confrontation finally ended because the
nuncio exerted pressure so that the church could
present a conciliatory and unified image. On August

16, 1970, Chemita and other priests sent him the

73 Gustavo Lara, Defraudo COSDEGUA a la i ql es ia y a1

pueblo de Dios, DDC No. 18, Guatemala, no date.
following letter:
With the deepest respect merited by a human
being and in accordance with our principles,
we wish t o express our apologies for all
those expressions which were made, especially
those relating t o recent events and which may
have hurt your human dignity.

Hoping that for the good o f the church we may

come t o a closer understanding through a
sincere dialogue, we remain very truly
yours. 74

This gesture, however, did not ameliorate the

conflict between Casariego and Chemita, In December of

that year, the curia issued a communication whereby it

requested Father Chemita's resignation from the

priesthood. Chemita answered by saying he considered

the cardinal's attitude as,

deriving exclusively from the cardinal's
personal decision. That his decision was a
retaliation against th? events that took
place during the month o f July and that ended
in a contract whereby the contending parties
gave their word and pledged their honor so
that the same problems would not occur
again. 7 5
74 Carta d e COSDEGUA a1 Cardenal Mario Casar i ego, DDC
No. 19, Guatemala, August 16, 1970. This letter was
signed by Sumercindo Cabrera, Mario Matamoros, Carlos
Palencia, Salvador Valenzuola, and Jose Maria Ruiz
Furlan, and was probably annotated and copied by Julius
Pater. The following commentary can be read, "They're
bastards, father; if you are a man of faith, hold on; I
wouldn't sign such a resignation, not even before

7 5 Respuesta del presbitero Jose Maria Ruiz Furlan a

un comunicado d e prensa de la curia eclesiastica, DDC
 It must be noted here that conflicts between
bishops and archbishops are natural whenever there is a

case involving an organization tt,at seeks change and

the bishops d o not want or seek such change.76 For

example, in Argentina a bishop started a protest

movement when bishops Jeronimo Podesta and Antonio

Quarracino formed a council. These progressive or

post-conciliar bishops attracted m m y priests and they

all experienced a conflict with the highest man in the

hierarchy, Cardinal Antonio Caggiano. In other cases,

priests were in conflict with their bishop a s happened

in Rosario where the priests requested the bishop's

resignation, but since the bishop was supported by Pope

Paul VI, he dismissed the others from office.77 The

Argentinian movement was characterized by dismissals,

resignations, expulsions, deportations, and

demonstrations, plus many other activities that were

either for or against the government, which, on many

No. 20, Guatemalao December 17, 1970.

76 The solution that the Colombian bishops proposed in
Medellin t o avoid the circle of hate existing between
diocesan priests and bishops was t o liberate the parish
priest, giving him an opportunity t o select his parish.
David E. Mutchler, The Orqanization and Ideology of
Chyrch Politics in Latin America, p. 137.
Hugo La Torre Cabal, The Revolution of the Latin
American Church, pp. 59-64.
occasions, closed ranks with the upper hierarchy and at
other times befriended the rebels, such as the time
when Peronism returned.
The Colombian movement began with the great
conflict between Camilo Torres and Cardinal Luis Concha
Cordoba, who later resigned as archbishop o f Bogota.

The Golconda group was initiated by Bishop Gerardo

Valencia Cano, a member of the new wave, against
Archbishop Anibal Munoz Duque. The Golconda group
protested t h e Pope's visit t o Colombia in 1968.78

Contrary t o the previous situations, ONIS in

Peru had no hierarchical problems, partly because
Archbishop Juan Landazuri Ricketts from Lima approved
the organization from its beginning and later declared
t h , d he shared the concerns of the priests. On the
other hand, the members o f ONIS never disobeyed the
hierarchy and it is probable that the political
conditions of Peru at that time compelled the
government of the young leftist mil.itary men, the
hierarchy, and the religious clergy from O N I S to follow
in the same direction. There was only one case of

dissension between the clergy and the upper hierarchy,

78 Ibid., pp. 52-56.

which occurred when the archbishop of Trujillo expelled
several priests because they had participated in

protest marches. Archbishop Landazuri intervened.

supporting those who had been expelled. After this

incident, the archbishop o f Trujillo never again

opposed the progressive trends.79

The hierarchical reactions, when confronted

with rebellious acts carried out by their subordinates,

were always the same: they forbade them to exercise

their profession. In other words, they were suspended

from their diocese or expelled from the diocese.

Eventually, they asked the lay people t o support the

decision.

In the particular case of Guatemala,

COSDEGUA, which was concerned with social injustice,

stepped forth for the first time in accordance with the

new outlook that the church had presected in regard t o

social improvements and man's liberation. Based on a

petition submitted by several peasants with the request

for a raise fn saiaries, COSDEGUA issued a

communication that was supported by biblical doctrine,

papal doctrine, and the Medell in documents.

79 Ibid., pp. 75-77.

 In this respect, when some finca peasants
went on strike to request an increase in salary,
COSDEGUA supported them.
As we take this step, which can be easily
taken as subversive, any intent that tries
t o improve the condition of our brethren,
let us meditate on the words that the
commander-in-chief said when he assumed the
presidency: "We do not accept the fallacy
that social progress is necessarily the same
a s ~ommunism."80

Several COSDEGUA members were appointed by the peasants

as intermediaries so that they could talk t o the owner

of the finca and the priests held masses for the

peasants.
The second social activity undertaken by

COSDEGUA was to support several teachers who had been

fired from a Catholic school, "...the hierarchy's
attitude is stingy for, a s our folk people say, it
'bargains' with the justice deserved by these six

Guatemalan women who are protected by the courts o f

this country.81
Nevertheless, COSDEGUA members did not
concentrate just on one theme. In the same communica-
-- - -- - - - - -

8 0 COSDEGUA, Cornuni catio COSDEGUA ante e 1 conf 1 i cto de

10s campesinos de Xata, DDC No. 21, Guatemala,
September 6, 1970.
8 1 DDC No. 16.
tion, they addressed other traditional concerns, such
as when they stated that,
We denounce all Catholic schools for their
classicism, their high fees, and the low
salaries they give their teachers. They
have become business enterprises and instru-
ments o f oppression t o the people and they
contribute t o the flight of capital. We
support the cancellation of Catholic school
bonds and denounce and categorically reject
their meddling in the domestic and political
affairs o f the country....
Finally, we take this ooportunity (sic) to
denounce the embarrassing and paternalistic
manner in which the cardinal celebrates his
birthday by giving away leftovers and used
clothes t o the poor, when there are more
appropriate ways t o assist them, such as
fighting against the causes of poverty and
misery.82

From a study of the documents pertaining t o

COSDEGUA, it is clear that their social content was

quite poor, COSDEGUA spent most of its energies

fighting'the hierarchy. Even though it stated that its
objective was t o accomplish the Medell in innovations,
it stayed behind other similar organizations farmed by
priests, For example, the Third World Priests were

explicit about their interests in the social field.

They elaborated a political theology that was t o
examine the political implications of the Christian
faith as it sought, within its faith, liberation from
sin (suffering). Their opinion was that the church.
whose mission was to spread the Gospel "at the time"
and t o interpret a concrete, contingent, and changing
reality, had t o support revolutionary change as the
only alternative that would transform man from a state
o f sin t o a state of grace.83
The Third World priests continued saying that
man was created in the image of God, all men, not just
some. Therefore the master, the dominant individual,
is not God but is rather at the same level as the rest.
For this reason, then, the church needed to awaken the

community's conscience so that the people understood

that they could become self-confident and independent.
They concluded that man and his community must remain
free of liaison with society; that a society of

consumers must not exist nor should there be one of

producers, per se; and that in order t o achieve this,

the means o f production must be socialized and should

be like a human socialism that tends not "to have morz,
but t o "give o f oneself more."84

83 J i m i e Dodson, Reliqious Innovation and the

Politics of Argentina, pp. 79-90.
k54 Ibid., pp. 102-113.
 The activities carried out by the Third World

priests were similar to those of COSDEGUA; that is,

they supported the small farmer and unorganized

laborers. Nevertheless, the Third World movement,

which produced so many theories, was never able to

organize the oppressed classes t o take political

action. Instead, they fell l~nderthe sway of Peronism

because they saw it as a firm base from which they

could project themselves to achieve national socialism.

The most important thing that the Movement of Priests

for the Third World did was to influence the hierarchy

to promote social change.85

ONIS bad a similar theory, seeking chang? in

the structures by means of revolution in order to

create a new man who would live in a new society. Its

first declarations were concerned with the unjust

distribution of land and income, the petroleum problem,

agrarian reform, the labor problems, and their last

statements called for the transformation of the nation

and the creation of a new society. The most important

85 Ibid., pp. 231-238. In April 1969, the bishops

held a meeting where they consulted with economists and
social science experts concerning the possibility of
choosing a more progressive path.
activity of ONIS was when the new military government
of Peru delegated the agrarian reform of the country's
rural area to the progressive priests.86

The Golconda group followed the theoretical

line o f the other groups, but its activities were
similar t o those conducted in Guatemala by religious
orders in more peaceful times: the organization of
cooperatives t o assist productivity and credit
facilities t o help the peasants buy vehicles so that
they could compete more efficiently.
COSDEGUA, however, did not have the human
resources with which t o promote a similar action. On
the other hand, we must remember that priests who
belong t o religious orders are organizers and are
accustomed t o living and acting as a community, whereas
this custom is foreign to the diocesan priests. The
differences in procedures concerning social activities
may be attributed t o this discrepancy.

This, o f course, does not imply that COSDEGUA

was not preoccupied with the problem o f the process of
change and did not take action in this respect.

86 Michael G. Macaclay, Ideoloni cal Chanqe and

Internal Cleavages in the Peruvian Church, pp. 23-53.
 432

Unfortunately, the circumstances and its directors led

the organization down other paths, but undoubtedly the

group did have some c o m i t m e n t t o change. For example,

in July 1970, they referred t o change in a statement

that they thought had originated the problem,

The root of the church's problems at this

time in history throughout the world is found
in the various ideologies. Some individuals
hold a definitive concept of the church and
the priest and others, like us, have a
different opinion. Some people think of the
church a s it was in medieval times and
others, like us, conceptualize a more humane
church which is more suitable t o the modern
era. Some individuals envision a static
church and others, like us, envision a church
incarnate in man's dynamism.87

In comparative terms, the Third World

organization was based upon teams composed o f priests

who would participate in the activities and would

exchange ideas. Its members, more than anyone else,

were of the lower clergy, although there were bishops

among its founders. It had a permanent general

secretariat that was in charge o f promoting t h e ideas

generated by the movement and there were regional

promotion coordinators. The secretary and the

coordinators did not belong t o a board o f directors;

87 DDC No. 8.
they only coordinated, because the ideas were t o be

generated by the bases. Consequently, this was a

decentralized movement, although in reality the

secretariat grew t o include six members. Those who

assumed these positions gave the organizations a

particular quality according t o their interaction with

t h e hierarchy, their radicalism, and their degree o f

militancy.88

The Third World membership consisted o f 8 0

persons in its initial stage. Buenos Aires recru i ted

100 members and the membership throughout the ent ire

country was 2 percent of 5,000 priests. According t o

Dodson, this was not a large number, but the impact of

their theories was great. If they didn't get t o exert

much influence on Argentina's socioeconomic change, a s

they had intended, their influence was felt within the

Argentine church.89

The structure o f O N I S was simple. This was

also a decentralized movement. divided into five

regional groups and composed o f two divisions, one o f

which attended t o labor problems. It was formed almost

88 Jimmie Dodson, Reliqious Innovation and the

Politics of Argentina, pp. 42-43, 61-62.
-89 Ibid., pp. 42-52.
in its entirety by Irish and North Americans. The
second ONIS division was formed by Peruvians, and was

in charge of university relations. The activities

carried out by ONIS were a s follows: daily activity

such es meetings. individual public demonstrations,

denunciation, protest, and public relations.90

According t o Macaulay, the younger members o f

ONIS were the idealists because they lacked knowledge

o f world history.91 Among the members c f ONIS, 8.7

percent were the leadership, leaving 47.8 percent

active members, with a total membership o f 230.92

Concerning the structure and composition of Golconda,

we know that the principal declaration was signed by 50

priests led by one bishop. Later on, subsequent

declarations were signed by 30 additional priests,g3

which signified that their membership was less than

that o f other cauntries in relation t o the number o f

religious personnel living in Colombia, which came to

Michael G. Macaul ay, Ideol oaica 1 Chanqe and

Internal Cleavaqes in the Peruvian Church, pp. 56-59.
9 1 Ibid., p. 67.
92 Ibid., p. 65.
93 Hugo La Torre Caba 1 The Rev01 uti on o f the Lat i n
American Church, pp. 54-55.
approximately 5,000 priests for the year 1970.94

COSDEGUA, according to Chemita, had 44

priests at the beginning. This was probably a high

number in relation to the total number of pr iests in

Guatema la. In 1970 there were 321 religious priests

and 184 diocesan priests, which gave a total of 505.

Nevertheless, COSDEGUA declined during crucial events;

it went down 20 21, and at the end of its existence,

there were only eight members.95

COSDEGUA seemed to have come to an end by the

middle of 1972, although according to one of its older

members, its demise began at the time when the minutes

of silence and demonstrations were held in 1971. In m y

interview held with Father Chemita, he felt that

COSDEGUA was still alive.

In comparison, all the rebel priest

organizations had one thing in common; they were all

urban organizations because they were f o r m ~ d i n the

larger cities, capitals, or industrial centers.

Another common feature was their unofficial

g4 Daniel H. Levine, Religion and Politics in Latin

America, p. 73.
y5 Anuario pontificio per l'anno 1970, Vatican City*
Tipografia Poliglota Vaticana, 1970.
disappearance. None was declared dissolved, and yet
they stopped functioning as if they had been.
Likewise, they were all associated, justifiably or not,
with the politics o f the left; some of them outwardly
declared their sympathy toward socialism and used
Marxist analyses in their evaluation of capitalistic

structures. They also declared themselves enemies of

the United States.
In this respect, COSDEGUA never adopted a
Marxist or leftist ideology, in spite of the fact that
it was in communication with some of the international

r e l i g i o ~ ~organizations
s that were mentioned
previously.96 Some COSDEGUA members maintained

contact with Echanges et Dialogue, an avant-garde

- -- -- -

96 It i s difficult t o determine the exact date when

COSDEGUA initiated contacts abroad, but at the time
when Chemita was challenging the cardinal in 1970, he
said he was being supported by several countries.
During October and November of 1970, Chemita traveled
t o Spain. He was paid by a European organization in
Amsterdam, where he attended an assembly o f disputing
priests. His trip was reported in two European
newspapers, Le Monde in Paris and L'Unita (a
publication of the Communist party) in Italy. These
newspzpers published two articles concerning Chemita's
activities and portrayed him as Sigfried fighting
Casariego, the dragon. They compared COSDEGUA t a other
rebel priest associations such as Golconda and the
Priests for the Third World. Prensa Libre, July 9,
1970, p. 9; Le Monde, November 14, 1970 (translation).
religious group located in Paris, France.97 The
COSDEGUA priests were also in contact with the
Federacion Nacional de Consejos de Sacerdotes (National
Federation of Religious Councils, ( N F P C ) . ~ ~In this
manner, through the Latin American Bureau of the
Catholic Conference in the United States, who used the

services of an office called LAB Service, both

organizations kept in contact.
In 1971 the federation expressed solidarity
with the priests who were involved in the process of
change for Latin America,

Through this medium we express our solidarity

with the priests and those who are being
persecuted in Latin America. We agree to
take appropriate actions as representatives
of NFPC concerning any problems.that may
arise.99

At that time, the director of the Latin

American Bureau of the Catholic Conference in the

97 Fathers Gustavo Lara and Gumercindo Cabrera

confirmed that they had had contact with this
organization although they did not provide this author
documented proof of such contacts.
98 NFPC was founded in 1968 in order t o promote
communication with United States priests and to
recommend actions concerning church and national
affairs, in cooperation with bishops, members of
religious orders, and secular priests. Latin American
Bureau, U.S.C.C., press release, DDC No. 22,
Washington, D.C., March IS, 133:.
99 Ibid.
United'States was Luis M. Colonnese, who, in relation
to the persecution of Third World priests, asked the
following: "To provide a small place in the
structures, to pass resolutions, t o declare solidarity
with those who were being persecuted or denounce those

who were responsible for the persecution."100 He

added, "I am ready and so is the Latin American Bureau

(U.S.C.C.1 to assist in whatever I can do."101

COSDEGUA appreciated this support, and in
March 1971, Father Chemita sent a letter addressed to
Frank Bonnike, NFPC president, saying,
The group of priests, members of COSDEGUA
in Guatemala, has received, via the LAB
Service, a resolution presented by the
National Federation of Religious Councils....
As a movement that is being persecuted and
oppressed by power groups who do not want t o
resign their privileges, and their unmeasur-
able ambition who knows nothing about the
welfare of other human beings, we are
extremely happy and thankful for your support
especially at a time when we feel that our
efforts are weak compared with the urgency
demanded by our endeavor.102

- - - - - --

' O0 Lu i s Co 1 onnese, "Memorandum t o so 1 i dar i dad con 1 os

sacerdotes de las Americas," Federacion Nacional de
Consejos de Sacerclotes, DDC No. 23, Baltimore,
Maryland March 1971.
I o 1 Ibic.
1°2 Jose tclria Ruiz Furlan, letter addressed to the
Reverend Frank Bonnike, president of NFPC, DDC No. 24,
Guatemala, March 29, 1971.
 Apparently, this feeling of solidarity was
kept up for some time. For example, by means of the
LAB service, in 1971 COSDEGUA was asked to send a
telegram to General Stroessner in Paraguay, asking him
to free a certain Father Monzon.103 COSDEGUA
immediately answered in the following manner,

The Confederation of Diocesan Priests in

Guatemala (COSDEGUA) requests General
Stroessner of Paraguay, Asuncion, that
liberty be granted to Father Monzon because
it considers this action 3s an unjustified
attitude conducted by the Paraguayan church
in what constitutes an authentic search for
social justice.104

In this respect, COSDEGUA also maintained contact with

priests from Colornbia,lO5 Costa RSts,
Nicaragua,lOT and Ireland.108 Nevertheless, as time

lo3 Lab Service, DDC No. 25, Miau P. 0. Box 6066,

Washington, D.C., 1971.
lo4 COSDEGUA, Tel egrama de COSDEGUA a 1 General
Stroessner, ( f ) Salvador Valenzuela, DDC No. 26,
Guatemala, 1971.
Letter from COSDEGUA to presbi ter Cami 1 o Moncada,
Bogota, Colombia, DDC No. 27, Guatemala, July 2,
1971.
lo6 Letter from COSDEGUA to Rev. B. Javier Solis, Costa
Rica, DDC No. 28, Guatemala, July 5, 1971.
.
l o 7 Letter de COSDEGUA to Rev. P. Arturo D i var , S. J ,
Rector of the Universidad Centroamericana in Managua,
Nicaragua, DDC No. 29, Guatemala, July 8, 1971.
lo8 Letter from COSDEGUA to Rev. P. Donald Hanagan, St.
Patrick's College, Maynooth, Ccunty Kildare, Ireland,
DDC No. 30, Guatemala, August 10, 1971.
went by and COSDEGUA weakened, the institution
gradually lost these contacts.
According t o our comparative analysis, we may
argue that all the above mentioned organizations, with
the exception o f COSDEGUA, acted as a pressure group
and pushed the bishops toward a more prophetic role so
they would denounce the exploitation o f the poor. In
the end, they all were more talk than action.
Analyzing COSDEGUA's situation from its

foundation in April 1969 t o August 1972, one can

conclude that the institution never achieved the degree
o f influence or became recognized as were other
homologous organizations such as ONIS in Peru, Golconda
in Colombia, and the Priests for the Third World in

Argentina.
Amsng t h e basic rsi;scx Cc;r $ h i s :a& of
influence were the deficiency that existed in their
basic theological ideology, which characterized the
majority of their activities and pronouncements; the
lack of economic resources; an ineffective structural
organization incapable o f generating more support for

the group; and their insistence on pursuing goals for

political or economic and personal promotion rather
than employing their energy in the pursuit of social
objectives.
We observed that COSDEGUA did not seem
preoccupied with the national reality, but was more
interested in the economic and social needs of the
diocesan priest concerning the hierarchy and his direct
participation in politics. For example, one o f the
last activities directed by COSDEGUA in 1972 was a
petition sent t o the congress of the republic
soliciting the right for priests to become elected t o

public office,lOg which up t o now had been withheld by

the constitution, according t o the model of the liberal

constitutions of the nineteenth century.

We want t o have a new vision for the priest-

hood that does not center in cast and
privilege, but in service rendered t o the
community where he ministers.
We cannot explain how the upper echelons of
the church's hierarchy, who in the majority
are of foreign birth, continue to meddle in
the domestic politics and problems o f the
country. As foreigners, they would not be
permitted t o act like this in any other coun-
try. On the other hand, the Guatemalan
priest, who is a citizen and is well versed
in the national concerns, is forbidden t o 30
the same.110
- - - --

log COSDEGUA, "Carta abierta a1 Congreso de la

Republics," DDC No. 31.
11° Ibid.
 Another factor that caused the failure of
COSDEGUA was its pervasive nationalism. This
nationalism, on the one hand, did not allow the
organization t o gain new members. On the other hand,
it narrowed the margin o f maneuverability and the
limits of understanding. The lack of both precision
and maturity provoked deep division within COSDEGUA's
ranks that contributed t o its disintegration and the

short life of the organization. Both its leadership

and its members seemed lost in a series of internal
struggles and the various interpretations given to the
role COSDEGUA was supposed t o assume. They were
Fncapable o f attracting other groups that could have
supported them because they shared common grievances
against the Catholic hierarchy.

They were not serious enough and their

attitudes earned them the animosity o f the cardinal
archbishop, the majority of the bishops of the
Episcopal Conference, and the nuncio. This factor
isolated them completely and eliminated all support and
contact with the hierarchy. In addition, the
supporting grouns that were basic t o its survival were

also not strong enough t o generate massive popu!ar

support, as was demonstrated in July. We must add that
as the movement became identified with Father Chemita,
it lost credibility, because it went from a purely
religious process t o a political movement, a
circumstance that made the faithful doubt whether it
was in their interest t o support COSDEGUA.
COSDEGUA in the end was unable t o promote the
teachings of Vatican 1 1 , did not improve the condition

of the diocesan priests, did not manage t o expel the

archbishop, did not get a raise in salaries for the
peasants, nor did it eliminate the appointment o f
bishops who had not experienced a "renewal in their

lives." They only accomplished one thing: they

maintained and promoted the political image of Father
Chemita. In retrospect, COSDEGUA's impact on the
process of change within ~uatemal'ansociety was almost
nil, not only at the internal level o f the church, but
also at the national level.
Its actions within the church, far from
arousing an interest or a change of attitude in its
administration only managed t o strengthen Caseriego's
position. The archbishop surrounded himself with the
support o f the Episcopal Conference, the apostolic
nuncio, and the majority of the clergy who lived in the
country.
Likewise, at the national level, COSDEGUA's
impact was negative. With the exception of a few
instances, CCSDEGUA's e f f c r t s fizzled o u t w i t h t h s
struggle against the archbishop, which circumstance
prevented the movement from dedicating its time to the
implementation of changes promoted by Vatican I 1 and
Medel 1 in.

We must take into account that even if

COSDEGUA had geared its efforts t o the promotion o f a
certain type of change within Guatemalan society, its
efforts would still have been ineffective because the
movement lacked a strong popular base to act as a

foundation for its organization, promotion, and

mobilization. From this perspective, the rebel posture

had little or no influence on the process of

transformation of Guatemalan society. Today this
process, after 16 years, I s still in its beginning
phase.

Finally, it is worth noting that during the

time that COSDEGUA was functloning. its relations with
the state were neither good, normal, nor bad because
COSDEGUA's conflict was not with the state but with the
ecclesiastical hierarchy. Therefore, the state only
played the role o f spectator.
 CHAPTER VII
THE REVOLUTIONARY RESPONSE
TO THE CALL FOR CHANGE

During the excitement created by the Latin

American political environment o f the 1960s. the
numerous expectations generated by the Second Vatican
Council and Medellin, in addition t o the activities o f
Camilo Torres in Colombia and the Melvilles in

Guatemala, established an aura o f credibility for the

notion that it could be possible for the Catholic
Church to become an essential factor in the process of
change within Latin American society by way of
revolution.
The supporters of this thesis rejected the

church's social doctrine because they considered it t o

be a concept immersed in a developmental framework that
was irrelevant t o the urgent needs of Latin America.

That doctrine advocated a gradual change, whereas the

solution according t o those supporting the latter
belief could be found in a more rapid and abrupt

mechanism for achieving the transformation. Those who

defended this perspective wanted the church to
446
transcend its traditional identification with the
values and interests of the status quo so that it could
become the political and religious instrument of the
disinherited of the earth. In the specific case of
Guatemala, the first individuals who defended the
option for violence were Thomas and Marjorie Melville,
members of the Maryknoll mission in ~uatemala.1

The first Ma-yknoll missionaries arrived in

Guatemala in 1943 and settled in the Department of
Huehuetenango. This site was chosen not only because
it was distant, but also because the priests could work
there without interference from the ecclesiastical
authorities or other foreigners.2 Ten years later,
the Maryknoll mission had eight parishes in Guatemala,
along with 22 priests and one brother.3 At that

time, they began the construction o f parochial schools

1 A precedent t o this case was the publication of

Tulio Benites, a Catholic individual who defended the
reforms o f the Arbenz government against the criticism
made by the Catholic hierarchy. Nevertheless, Benites
was not a priest. See Tulio Benites, Meditaciones de
un Catolico ante a reforma aqraria, Editorial del
Ministerio de Educacion Publica, Biblioteca Cultura
Po ular, Vol. 32, Guatemala, October 1952.
4 David Kelly, Maryknol 1 in Central America, 1943-
-
1978, mimeo, Guatemala, August 1980, p. 1.
d o p m e n t is in the possession of the author.
This
Ibid., p. 2.
in Huehuetenango, and the training of catechists who
were essential due to the diversity of dialects that
are spoken throughout the region.
The mission continued t o grow. In 1956, it
had 16 resident priests and in 1958, 35. By 1961 the

Department of Huehuetenango had become a prelature and

in 1969 a diocese. Naturally, the head of the diocese
and its first bishop was a Maryknoll from the United
States named Hugo Gerberrnann.
From 1966 on, the Maryknoll order, due t o a
series o f administrative changes originating at a
meeting of its general chapter, initiated a post-

conciliar period that was much m o m identified with the

needs of the crisis and the role that the priest should

play within it. It promoted theology workshops for the

priests o f the region who wished t o take them.

However, this period also saw many clergy leave the

pr'iesthood, and the consequent shortage of personnel
diminished the expansion process of the mission.
During a period o f two years, 16 missionaries decided

to leave the Central American region; some went back t o

serve in the United States, others resigned from the
order so they could become laymen and eventually
marry.4 Among these were Fathers Thomas and Arthur

Melville and Sister Marian Peter Bradford.

In their book Para quien es el cielo?,5

written jointly by Thomas Melville and his wife

Marjorie (the former Sister Marian Peter), they both

wrote about their arrival i~ Guatemala and the work

they conducted for many years. Thomas Melville had

been assigned t o Huehuetenango and arrived there in

1957 full of hope. There he studied Spanish for

several months and very soon was able t o give sermons

and hear confessions in that language. His book stated

that the region was one o f the most backward areas of

the country. He also described the difficulties he

e n c o u ~ t e r e d in his work. Melville's activities were

not confined only t o the priesthood, because he also

"distributed medicines, sewed stitches over machete

wounds, extracted teeth, mediated in family disputes

which generally involved mothers-in-law o r were

provoked by the misuse o f land."6

Ibid., pp. 17-18.

5 Thomas and Marjorie Melville, Para quien es el
cielo?, Spanish translation by Teresa Pamies from the
first English edition entitled Whose Heaven, Whose
Earth?, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1971.
Ibid,, p. 42.
 The reader of his book feels that Melville
apparently got along with the Indians, although as far

as religious questions were concerned, he was

unbending.7 For this reason, he had serious problems
with some of the inhabitants o f the smaller towns and
ham1 ets.

When a man from another culture and another

faith interferes in the symbolism and reli-
gious practice of a different people who live
in their own territory, it is like trying to
take the earth away from its axis.
There I was in Guatemala, trying t o impose
ideas and practices, which represented not
only the church but also North America, which
I considered superior and I was speaking t o
a people whose basic values, way of life and
points o f view I had not really understood
compl etel y.8

Melville's stay in Guatemala slowly set him

apart from the traditional role as priest; he became
more Oitterested in socioeconornic problems than in
baptism and communion. Eventually, he became
disappointed when he appraised the values and attitudes
not only of the ecclesfastical hierarchy, but also
those of some of the female orders. For him, the
appointments of bishops and nuncios were a "mockery"

Ibid., p. 46.
Ibid., p. 68.
 45 1

and he was very disappointed in them. The sisters of

Asuncion w5i-E the antithesis of the modern church,
...this type o f nuns is obsessed by sex and
they express themselves in an uneasy and
destructive manner. They seem to think that
any contact between men and women is sin.
The nuns were convinced that I was no good as
a priest. I was too familiar with the Indian
women, that I cared for the girls too much,
that I spent too much time learning about the
problems of the marginalized people in the
church and I did not wear a cassock.9

Melville was convinced that the principal

problem of the Indians was that they had no land or
access t o capital, so he founded a cooperative in
Cabrican, Department of Quetzaltenango, which was very

successful. After such an experience, he decided t o

expand the experiment to the Department o f El Peten.10

Nevertheless, the political problems, which

are generally associated with land tenuro, predisposed
him against the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the
government of Guatemala. Subsequently, during a

discussion with Bishop Manresa, because the bishop did

Ibid., pp. 123 and 126.

10 The cooperative movement in the country has its
origins in the support given by various religious
orders such as the Maryknolls and the Congregation o f
the Sacred Heart. This circumstance gave the movement
its beginning, a religious and confessional
orientation.
not want t o transfer a piece o f land t o the Cabrican
Cooperative, Thomas Melville rebuked him by saying,
If these people ever become Communist, God
knows that they will have a good motive in
doing so, because of the way they are
continuously treated by their government and
by their church.11
All o f this made Melville aware that his social
projects would never be successful for political
reasons.
Whst would the future be of the coopera-
tivists when they knew about the bad faith
that reigned within the church and the
government?
The bishops had forbidden us t o organize
workers' unions o f peasant associations
because they affected the country's
structure.12
In addition t o his personal frustration,

Melville was unhappy with the foreign policy of his own

country, and tired o f the governmental policies of
President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro.who, according
to Melville, was too close to the United States and,
besides that, he did not want t o yield the lands o f San

1 1 Apparently the title t o this land was registered

under the name of Monsignor Manresa, because when the
cooperative bought it, it was not a juridical entity.
That's the reason it was registered under Monsignor
Manresa's name. Ibid., p. 186.
l 2 Ibid., pp. 187-185-
Juan Acul (one of the many small towns in Guatemala) as
a property for the peasantry.13
Some of the Indian members of the cooperative
declared that the town should fight if anyone
attempted t o take their lands. Others were
o f the opinion that they should abandon the
colony, while still others thought the
settlers would stay for as long a s was
possible.
Yet, if the Indians of the settlement fought,
they would have been murdered. They would
not have been able t o defend themselves with
their machetes against the government forces
whose arms, advisers, and napalm had been
provided by the United States.14

Undoubtedly all these frustrations left their

mark on Melvi'lle's attitudes and values. He concluded,

after the post-conciliar opening encouraged by the

Maryknoll order, that poverty among the Indians of
Guatemala did not affect his life and that the living
conditions and sufferings o f the people were as foreign
t o him as if he were watching them disappear into thin
air.
It was then that Molville decided t o take
violent action and established contact with the rebel

l 3 According t o some observers, the agrarian law after

1950 had tended not t o award land as property to avoid
it being sold t o other more powerful men, which could
lead t o the formation of larger estates.
l 4 Thomas and Marjorie Melville, Para quien es el
cielo?, p. 196.
leaders o f the Guatemalan guerrillss.15 Nevertheless,
eventually he was denounced by one of the members of
his group and was forced t o leave the country by the
end of 1967. Melville was being urged t o leave by his
own superior, Archbishop Casariego, and by the United

States Embassy. This was a curious end for a man who

in 1957 had arrived in Guatemala with the hope o f
fighting against Communism because he knew that
Guatemala was winning the fight against Communism16

and that his appointment gave him an opportunity to

fight against the godless Communism that was the major
threat against Christian teachings.17

Sister Marian Peter Bradford, later t o be

known as Marjorie Melville, arrived in Guatemala in
1954 and went t o work at a school opened by the
Maryknoll sisters a year before. Like Melville, she
was very enthusiastic because Communism had been
eradicated from Guatemala. Very soon she became
disappointed because she was not assigned to work with
the poor. Instead, she taught English t o wealthy

l5 Ibid., pp. 260-276.

16 Ibid., p. 24.
l7 Ibid., p. 25.
girls.18 She tried t o rationalize her activity,
telling herself that if she taught "the young ladies of
the city who would become the future wives of
politicians and wealthy landowners," she could teach
them not to exploit and subdue the Indians. In this
respect, she commented, "I had clearly stated my own
objective," and "I will not have to be ashamed of
leading a comfortable life" in the city.19

Sister Marian Peter began t o participate in

the Scouting movement and in volcano climbing, going to
Huehuetenango with a group o f girls who were part of
these excursions. Later on she formed a religious
group where she held catechism classes and cinema
sessions, including discussions on racism, Indians, and
ladinos. Afterwards, the Monte Maria School initiated
a school for applied studies t o train teachers. Sister

Marian Peter was annoyed because the students, who were

children from the marginal barrio, were kept separated
from the others and the mothers of the Monte Maria did
not want their daughters t o come into contact with the

other children. So she came to the conclusion that.

18 Ibid.. p. 25.
l9 Ibid., p. 54.
 It was then that I understood the meaning of
their tendency t o destruct any evidence of
hope among the less fortunate. The great
fear o f those who have possessions, I see it
clearly now, was that i f the dispossessed
should ever manage t o open the wall which
separated them, they would start an irrever-
sible movement. The dispossessed would not
be content with humiliating crumbs, they
would not limit themselves t o asking for
alms, but would demand until the end, so that
they and their children would be permitted t o
act as men.20

In 1962, meetings of Catholic teachers were

held to discuss social problems. The principal speaker
was Father Aguirre, a Venezuelan Jesuit who had
organized the petroleum unions in Venezuela. These
social action workshops were conducted t o develop
social conscience and t o show the university students
that it was possible t o consider a career along with
1

the development o f a Christian spirit. Careers were

not t o be sought m l y t o make money, but also t o be
able t o serve others. On her own, Sister Marian Peter
also organized workshops held in homes that covered

topics dealing with the social problems o f the Latin

American poor, the economic doctrines, and the special
encyclicals of the Christian social doctrine. These
workshops were later continued by another Jesuit,

20 Ibid., p. 114.
Father Xavier Zavala, with whom Marian Peter began to
prepare theater plays with a social message that were
enacted by the students of Liceo Javier (a Jesuit
school for students of wealthy families). The purpose
of these presentations was t o provide an opportunity
for the young people t o become acquainted with the
social problems o f their country.
Among the participants, Felipe Ramos was
thought t o be a "possible infiltrated Communist," but
Sister Marian, after many conversations, believed he

was not compromised with any ideology. He was an

intellectual who sought social justice, stating that
"The change in my being had become intensive. I almost
thcught that Christ was present and was at work in the

thoughts o f Felipe Ramos."21 Looking for an active

channel For the workshop students, Father Zavala and
Sister Marian Peter created work groups and planned a
trip t o Huehuetenango For the female students o f Monte
Maria so they could work among the Indians. Felipe
wanted to go with the group because he wanted "to work
with the people in a more direct manner." Concerning
this endeavor, one o f the Maryknoll priests commented,

2 1 Ibid., pp. 155-156.

"He must be a Communist. Only Communists are
self less."ZZ
Another factor that influenced Marian Peter
t o question the traditional ecclesiastical values and
her role as a nun was, like Melville, the post-
conciliar opening of the Maryknoll order.
Consequently, in 1964, Sister Marian went t o New York
t o take a course concerning the teachings of Vatican
11. The course was taught t o all the Maryknoll priests
at their headquarters.
More and more I came to believe that religion
was not only a collection o f doctrines and
ecclesiastical rites, but that it meant
living with the people and sharing with them
the significance o f that religion and its
direction.
We examined the old concepts of God and the
meaning of service. We began to see +h&
Christ never pretended for the church to
become a pyramid of responsibility and
authority as the hierarchy wants it to be.23

Also after reading a document from Vatican I 1

entitled The Church and the Modern World, Sister Marian
Peter asked herself how she could become useful to the

church in Guaterila:
Guatemala is undergoing a revolution, it is
happening and they are fighting against it.
22 Ibid., p. 157.
23 Ibid., p. 158.
 Where do I fit in this scheme? The North
American missions are too far away from the
events. We should become part of them, we
should be Christians first and then North
Americans. How can all this be tied
together724
The repercussions of Vatican I 1 also reached
the Monte Maria School, where Sister Marian Peter tried
to implant some reforms. She and six other sisters
thought that the school should not be continued as a
Maryknoll-sponsored mission because it was inadequate
and not in tune with the reality of the country: "By
then, I was obsessed with the desperate poverty of
Guatemala.'*Z5 In response to the changes instituted
by the council, the nuns discarded their habits and
were permitted to go out alone. Sister Marian began to
teach religion in the public schools, but she had no
intention of "teaching religion in a formal manner.l1z6
In 1965, with the assistance of Sister Marian
Peter, several enthusiastic young people rented a house
that became known as the Center for Social Training
(Centro de Capacitacion Social, CEDECAS), better known
as the "Crater." Here they were t o hold workshops and

24 Ibid., pp. 232-233.

25 Ibid., p. 178.
26 Ibid., p. 181.
discuss Christ and the faith. Eventually this group

began t o make contact with the guerrillas.27 Sister

Marian Peter commented that "I was curious and wanted
t o know something about the guerrilla movement which

had started in 1960.~28 She asked a member o f the

Guatemalan armed forces, a colonel, to give a lecture

at the Monte Maria School and there she obtained much

information about events and the counterinsurgency.

Some time after this, Sister Marian Peter

planned an outing for her students and decided that it

was necessary t o take "a man t o accompany us," and "she

knew Felipe was the best choice." Felipe brought along

a friend, who turned out t o be the famous guerrilla

commander, Luis Turcios.

The army and the police wanted t o apprehend

Turcios dead or alive. The oligarchs knew
Turcios, especially the wealthy ones whom he
had kidnapped and whose ransom he had sought,
according t o his way o f exacting taxes. The
rich in Guatemala are against taxation. The
United Fruit Company had called Turcios a
"red whose feet must be stopped." The CIA
knew Turcios, the Americans were looking for
him. But the Turcios I met was a peaceful
man who was enjoying a twenty-four hour rest,
when he was recovering from the tension
experienced from having Secome one of the
most sought after individuals in

27 Ibid., pp. 198, 199, 202.

28 Ibid., p. 202.
 I went back to my students' school very late
on Saturday night. There I was, as comfor-
table a s the richest girl in Guatemala, with
plenty t o eat and with all the comforts of a
home. But I could not s 1 eep. What was
Turcios doing at that time? I felt uncom-
fortable comparing my limited sacrifices as
a nun with the life o f Turcios who was
dedicated t o the poor and who ran enormous
risks at a great price, which included his
head. I was preoccupied thinking about the
reaction o f my convent if I told them I had
spent the last twenty-four hours with Luis
~urcios.30

Later on, Sister Marian Peter met other

guerrilla leaders and also met with some members of the
Crater, who were anxious t o meet with the guerrillas.
They made an appointment with them and with Father
Melville, who was already in contact with the
guerrillas.31 Like Melville, Sister Marian Peter
suffered from the sad reality of the country; she was
disenchanted and frustrated. The appeals o f Vatican I 1
and the post-conciliar opening o f the Maryknoll order
all led her t o take a radical position irl relation t o
the possibilities for establishing tne process for
change in Guatemala. She resolved to collaborate with

29 Ibid., pp. 206-207.

30 Ibid., p. 208.
3 1 Ibid., p. 221.
the Guatemalan guerrillas.
The guerrilla activity in the country,
however, provoked reaction and repression from some
government-sponsored terrorist groups and in this
manner contributed t o increased violence throughout the
country. This fact precipitated Marian Peter's
decision; she and Melville were in Escuintla (in the
Department o f Guatemala) working with a group o f
peasants and students and decided t o initiate their own
revolutionary movement in the spring o f 1968. "...We

were ready t o go t o the jungle as soon as we would see

a sign of danger in order t o save the lives of the
people who worked with us in revolutionary
projects."32 Nevertheless, as was mentioned before,
someone denounced the group's activities, and Marian

Peter, together with Thomas Melville, had t o leave the

country.33

The efforts of the Maryknolls to lead the

church down the revolutionary path did not find much

32 ibid., p. 263.
33 Later on in Mexico, Peter and Melville married.
Both had prepared a statement concerning their their
wedding, but before it was published, the news about
the wedding became known in the press and only CIDOC of
Cuernavaca published their statement. Ibid., p. 280.
sympathy within their own order or among the religious
elites in Guatemala, though it is possible that some
priests and Maryknoll missionaries agreed with the
Melvilles' proposals. As far as we know, only Father
Blase Bompane, another Maryknoll, joined with Melville
at that time. It was not possible to establish the
names of the laymen who might have agreed with them.
Nevertheless, it can be surmised that some members of
the CEDECAS group were willi~rg to follow the
revolutionary option.
It is possible that some Maryknoll priests
living abroad may have shared the Melvilles' ideas. A
glimpse of this can be seen in an analysis written by
Sister J. Pahl, M.M., on the Guatematan situation,
which stated that
Our real contribution to Guatemala will be
then, when that country has undertaken a
social, nationalistic revolution, whether
peaceful or violent. When Guatemala has
established a true land reform, has nation-
alized all public utilities, mines and
industries, has an educational reform, and
an effective tax reform all for the benefit
of the majority of the population.34

34 Sister Marian J. Pahl, M.M., "A Proposal for

Development in Guatemala," U.S. Foreign Policy.
Fearuary 1966; issued again in The Congressional
Record, April 23, 1968, pp. 3210-3212.
 Later on, the superior of the female
Maryknoll section, Sister Melinda Roper, explained in
1981 t o a reporter from the Washinqton Post that "when

trying t o find out the reason why the people are poor,
you are going t o touch a point in the structure of
society, in t h e political situation, an3 i n the
economic order, which is our field of activity."35

Therefore, we can conclude that by 1967 there were

members of the order who, through the new papal

encyclicals and the change in the orientation o f the

church, had acquired a social conscience directed more
toward change in the structures, without specifying the
medium, and that probably a good number of them,
including members o f the hierarchy, sympathized with
the Melvi 1 les.
Domestically, the Melvilles' attitude did not

cause great controversy in the country. Neither the

press nor the radio talked much about this event; more
than anything, it was the marriage that gave a
melodramatic tone t o the situation. It seemed that the
majority of the Maryknoll fathers in Guatemala knew
nothing about the revolutionary plan o f the Melvilles

3 5 The Washi nqton Post, Apr i 1 19, 198 1.

and did not support them. After the Melvilles left,
the priests issued a comunication saying that the
actions o f the Melvilles appeared candid, impetuous,
individualistic, and romantic.3d

The hierarchy did not attack them, but

neither were they defended. The Christian community

said nothing about the affair or about the topics that

had provoked the Melvilles' rebellion. The government
was not preoccupied with t h e affair, and d i d not even
attempt t o expel the Maryknolls from the country. At
the international level, however, the Melville affair
was well publicized and its implications, while they
invited reflection, constituted very clearly a disputed
question as t o the viability of a revolutionary church
within the secular world.
For example, some time afker the departure of
the Melvilles from Guatemala, an international Catholic
forumr CICOP, met in St. Louis. The meeting became a
forum for attack or defense concerning the Maryknoll
case. It was said that poverty in Guatemala was such

36 According t o the Me 1 vi 1 1 es, the dec 1 arat ion was not

sincere, but was made so that the order would not be
expelled from Guatemala. Thomas and Marjorie Melville,
Para quien es el cielo?, p. 283.
that it became a point of total frustration that made
the Melvilles choose political violence as the only
solution t o the deteriorating social structures.37

Among the forum there was a small group of

participants who requested that the Maryknoll order
remove the suspensions that had been placed upon the
rebeis and asked other Catholics t o support the

pet i ti ons for rev@ l ut ion. Meanwh i 1 e, at th i s same

forum, the founder of the Christian Democrats in
Guatemala spoke against the Maryknoll rebels because,
according t o him, the Guatemalan guerrilla was neither
a military force nor the political ideal of the

majority of the people. In this respect, a Panamanian

delegate suggested that perhaps the actions of the
missionarfes, though well-intentioned, constituted a

paternalistic gesture that had tried to atone for the

sins committed by the United States in Latin
~merica.38

Dr. Ralph Chandler, in the journal

- - -

37 Thi s forum was he 1 d on January 29-3 1 , 1968. See

Francis X. Gannon, llCatholici~mr Revolution and
Violence in Latin America: Lessons of the 1968
Guatemala Maryknoll Episode," in Orbis. Vol. XII,
NO. 49 1969, pp. 1215-1216.
38 Ibid.
Commonweal, explored and analyzed the Melville case
from the point of view of whether missionaries should
or should not participate in the revolutionary
movements o f a foreign country. In the Melville case,
Chandler said that the national hierzrchy had always
been part of politics and that the Melville problem
arose as soon as they became "visible" and when it
became known that their activities were leftist.39

Chandler's information on Guatemala was based on

articles published by or about the Melvilles,40 which
undoubtedly left a strong impression on him and made
him examine a second consideration concerning the
meaning o f "the work o f God" in a c o m t r y like
Guatemala where violence was institutionalized. He
concluded that to oppose the conditions of life that
were violent was t o oppose the government and,
therefore, the right t o take up arms was justified by
this means s o that the unjust social system could be

erad i cated, ,

The Jesuit journal, Central American Studies,

39 Ralph Clark Chandler, "Guerri 1 la Priests: A Few

Kind Words," Commonweal, August 9, 1968,
40 "Maryknoll y guerrillas," editorial, Estudios
Centroamericanos, No. 235, San Salvador, March 1968,
p. 36.
published an editorial on the Maryknolls and the
guerrillas where, after they had admitted that the
Melvilles had developed a charitable and selfless
mission, they adopted an understanding posture:

...It was a step taken under the emotional

abandonment produced by the reality o f
poverty and absndonment which they saw every-
where and which they could not remedy as
rapidly a s they wished. This resolve may
demand a charitable apology from aur part,
but it can hardly be truly justified.
The Jesuit editorial assumed that the Maryknolls had

...an erroneous evaluation o f the efficacy

of this or that attitude, even within the
natural human desire of trying to improve
the life o f those Indians. Their mission
was t o proclaim the Gospel, as they should
act if they want t o conform t o the Christian
spirit hoping that the social discrepancies
will diminish and that the present
structures wi 1 1 be modified with regard to
everything that is unjust in them.41

The editorial analyzed the similar attitudes

of Pope Paul VI and Dom Helder Camara against armed
movements used in "bloody revolutions and guerrilla."
This basically coincided with Ivan Vallier in the sense
that the Christian revolutionaries represented a step
backward more than an advance for the universal

Catholic Church a s they attempted t o influence the

4 1 Ibid.
process o f change and m o d e r n i z a t i ~ n . ~ ~
Both Melville and Blase Bompane (the other
Maryknoll committed t o the revolutionary alternative)
defended t h e m s ~ l v e sagainst the accusations t o which
they fell victim. They argued that they chose
revolutionary action "because they learned it from
Christ's teachings and not from Marx or Lenin." They
defended themselves by blaming the religious hierarchy
for preaching a legalistic Catholicism, without

transferring the significance o f the sacraments to

everyday life. They blamed the government, as well,
for not curtailing the violence o f the right and they
blamed the United States for providing arms t o the

Latin American governments.43

In a well-documented article Francis Gannon

explored Catholicism, the revolution, and the Latin
American violence seen through the Maryknoll

episode.44 He considered that this affair questioned

42 Ivan Val 1 ier, Catholicism, Social Control and

Modernization in Latin America, p. el.
43 Thomas Melville, l'Revolution i s Guatemala's Only
Sol~tion," National Catholic Reporter; Blase Bonpane,
"A Priest on Guatemala," Washinqton Post, Sunday
Outlook section, February 14. 1968.
44 Franc i s Gannon, "Catho 1 i c i sm, Revo 1 ut ion and
Violence in Latin America," pp. 1204-1225.
the future o f missionaries in Latin America, a region
that depended in great part upon the support of foreign
religious orders t o maintain the flow of priests.
Gannon examined the difficulty that Catholics who
proposed violence encountered. He first observed that
the criticism that the former Maryknolls made

concerning conditions in Guatemala did not reflect the

course of development and modernization t h a t was taking
place in Latin America. By analyzing the road taken by
the Guatemalan church since 1945, he argued that there
was little t o defend in the thesis that said that the
church in Guatemala was only preoccupied with the
sacramental. He argued further that by attacking the
system, the Melvilles did not take into consideration
the significant progress achieved by the church in the
country. According t o Gannon, the former Maryknolls
did not adequately measure the pace of economic growth
and social change in Guatemala. They aiso did not take
into account the process o f Latinization that was
greatly advanced and disregarded the economic

transformation brought about by the Central American

Common Market. A second observation made by Gannon

contended that those who favored the revolution were
running against the fact that even the most determined
religious reformer feared violence. This had also been
stated by Dom Helder Camera, especially pointing to the
fact that violence threatened t o destroy the religiaus
and humanitarian values that the church had taught. He
concluded that those who tended t o modernize the church
found that radical solutions were illusory because the
system of values that they wished t o create was not
suff i c i ent 1 y accepted.
Possibly, when the Melvilles adopted the path
leading t o violent structural change, they experienced
an erroneous perception that did not concern their
ob,iectives, but rather the acceptance of their
doctrines by the majority of the Guatemalan people.
Thus, for example, in an article the purpose of which
was to defend his position. Thomz~sMelville wrote, "We
know that we were invited by the masses to participate
in the transFormation of the society."45 In this

respect, Melville had taken approximately 250

individuals t o Peten. This number of people, added t o
the Cabrican population of approximately 7,000

45 Cited in Francis Gannon, "Catholicism, Revolution

and Violence in Latin America," p. 1217.
inhabitants, and the members o f the Crater, who were
few, did not constitute the mass of the Guatemalan
people, even though it may have been a representative
samp I e .
A d i ~ p a s s ~ o n a tanaiysis
e o f the Melvilles'
work could also make us think that possibly neither o f
them, especially Thomas, had been prepared either
culturally or emotionally to work in such an
impoverished and repressive environment as was the
interior o f the Republic o f Guatemala. Fina:ly, it is
my impression that they knew very little of the
difference implied by living like the poor or fighting
for the poor through the guerrillas in a country like
Guatemala. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that both
of them, especially Thomas Melville, made a superhuman

effort t o eliminate poverty in the country as they

followed the Medellin orientation in the sense that
poverty had structural causes and that from that
perspective the solution rested on a change of
structure.
It is possible that the best explanation for
their behavior was heard in the judgment of an
unidectified Maryknoll who said, "those people (the
Melvilles) may be disoriented, but they should not be
considered a s isolated cases nor are they neurotic
cases. The syndrome of desperation increases very
slowly and insidiously among many of us whose lives are
damaged by what seems a fruitless effort intended to
alleviate the terrible misery."46

In any case, the Maryknol 1 affair was a

manifestation that in Guatemala, the revolutionary
option taken up by some members o f the Catholic Church
did not have, at that moment in history, any hopeful
possibilities. Their actions, instead of being a
restraining force, did not accomplish anything other

than t o contribute t o increased repression by the

government authorities.

In the specific case o f Guatemala, the

Melvilles' answer was not the only revolutionary
solution. Years later, after the experience of the
Maryknoll members, other members o f the Jesuit order,
along with people from other re1igious.orders such as
the Congregation of the Sacred Heart and the
Congregation o f the Immaculate Heart of Hary, attempted

46 Thomas Melville and Marjorie Melville, d ~ a r aquien

es el cielo?, p. 282.
in a less emotional manner and with a more coherent and
better organization than that achieved by the Melvilles
when they combined denunciation and action t o find a
way that would lead t o radical and violent change
in the structural problem. We have the case of the
Spanish missionaries from the Sacred Heart who worked
in El Quiche. The history of these missionaries was
less known in the country, but it was a s well
publicized abroad as was the Maryknoll case. Like the

Melvilles, some priests from this order deserted and

became frustrated. eventually adopting the revolution-
ary position. In this respect, the priest Luis
Gurriaran wrote the fo llowing in re lation t o his
experience,
We arrived in a state o f absolute ignorance,
not only about Quiche but about Guatemala in
genera 1 .
For us, the initial confrontation with Guate-
malan reality, the intense misery and
exploitation, was brutal.47
Another priest, possibly Manuel Gonzalez,
alias Fidel Hernandez, commented that

- - - -- -- - - --- -- - -

47 Louisa Frank and Phi 1 i p Wheaton, Indian Guatema 1 a,

Path to Liberation: The Role of the Christian in the
Indian Process, Epic Tesk Force Publication,
Washington, D.C., 1984, p. 29.
 ...one thing that made me furious was the
ignorance which existed among the people who
lived in the capital. They ignored what the
Guatemalan world was all about, they knew
nothing about the Indian world, its roots,
its customs....48
Just like the Melvilles, they were also
imbued with a developmental and paternalistic
conscience. In this respect, Louisa Frank and Philip
Wheaton thought
that (the missionaries) had come t o
evangelize and were imbued with a pater-
nalistic attitude that led them t o look for
ways to "help the Indians" out of abject
poverty. In their minds, this meant, of
course, introducing them t o Western
Civilization. Yet t o their surprise, the
Indians did not want their help.49

4 8 ENIAL, La resietencia y las luchas de 10s indigenas

de Guatemala: El proceso de cambio en las comunidades
indisenas del norte de Guatemala, Testimony of Priest
Fidel Hernandez, 1982, mimeo, p. 35. Gurriarian, as
well a s Hernandez, became part of the Church in Exile
with heedquarters in Nicaragua when Monsignor ~ u a n
Gerardi, because o f the violence, ordered that all
clergy in his dioceses should leave by June 1980. This
Guatemalan Church in Exile was formed by a group o f
Christians, catechists, priests, religious men and
women, and laymen who were involved in clandestine work
or in exile. Sometimes they supported the popular
struggle of the Guatemalan people and sometimes they
denounced it internationally, telling about what i n
their opinions constituted a violation of human rights
committed by various Guatemalan governments (such as
those of Lucas Garcia, Rios Montt, and Mejia
Victores).
49 Luisa Frank and Philip Wheaton, Indian Guatemala.
p. 29.
 One o f the options these priests adopted in
order t o be able t o penetrate the indigenous world and
break their traditional economic pattern was the

establishment of chapels meant to become vehicles for

the formation of the community and located outside the
territorial administrative and traditional
headquarters. Hernandez said that Gurriaran, when he
did this, practically "broko the ecmcmic systemm50

because by establishing chapels in the regions he

managed t o decentralize the system that was always
directed toward the municipal or departmental capital,
the places where the sectors o f exploitation were

concentrated.51 This entire disenchantment with the

development process and the increased armed struggle as
the only option open t o alleviate the desperation and
misery o f the Indlans was perceived by some priests t o
respond t o the fact that the Indians themselves

abandoned the priests when they saw, after the process

of concientizacion (consciousness raising), that even
though such a process had been somewhat able t o
penetrate their traditional and closed religious world,
- --

so ENIAi, La resistencia y las luchas de 10s indisenas

de Guatemala, p. 44.
Ibid.
it was not able t o offer them a major alternative for
progress due t o its structural limitations. This
disillusionment and radicalization can be explained by
the following diagram.
Some Jesuits also took the revolutionary
option, one o f whom, Father Luis Eduardo Pellecer,52

commented in reference t o the tools used in the

awakening o f the consciousness and the mobilization of
the Ind ians toward radicalization that in order to
promote this change they used three basic tools: 1)

1 iberat ion theology, 2 ) the Marxist-Lenin ist analytical

categories, and 3) the a w a k e n i ~ gof the consciousness

and the mobilization of the rural and urban masses by
using the pedagogy of the 0pprcssed.5~ Undoubtedly,

52 Jesuit pr i est Lu i s Eduardo Pe 1 1 ecer was kidnapped

by government forces on June 9, 1981. He appeared 122
days later in September at a press conference that was
or anized by the government.
53 Pel l ecer confessed t o having been an active member
of the guerrilla group belonging t o the Army of the
Poor, and he told the story about his studies, his work
as a priest, being recruited by the guerrillas, and the
activities he had engaged in t o help in the change of
the country's structure. His declarations were not
accepted as valid by the Company o f Jesus in Central
America. Even the provincial father affirmed that
these declarations were obtained for the purpose o f
"justifying religious persecution throughout the world.
which was condemned, and of preparing an even greater
persecution against the Company o f Jesus and the church
in Guatemala." Later on, it was said that Pellecer was
Pellecer's declarations were stated as personal
opinions and did not reflect either the way of thinking
or the manner in which the bulk of the Jesuit cornunity
was conducting itself in Guatemala. Concerning this
episode, I tried t o find some publications from the
Jesuit order in Guatemala that evaluated what Father
Pellecer had said, but this effort was in vain. Gnly
personal statements such as those of the Jesuit
Hernandez Pico and the analytical work o f Father
Ricardo Bendana were found.
On the other hand, it is worth mentioning
here that both the declarations of Father Luis Pellecer

subjected to "brain washing." Pellecer himself

confirmed everything he had said at the press
conference and denied that he was ever tortured or that
he was brain washed. It is possible that the truth
concerning the Pellecer case will never become
completely known. Likewise, we do not know if his
declarations or his later resignation from the Company
of Jesus responded t o a purely personal conviction or
if any other factors influenced his decision, including
the much talked about brain washing. Nevertheless, the
discussion concerning his case is important because it
reveals the contradiction and divisiveness that
occurred in the midst of the Guatemalan Catholic Church
when it tried t o practice the guidelines established by
Vatican I 1 and Medellin. The declarations of Jesuit
Father Luis Eduardo Pellecer Faena, given at a press
conference held in Guatemala, Septembw 30, 1982;
Comunicado de prensa del padre provincial de la
Compania de Jesus en Centroamerica, San Salvador,
October 23, 1981; Henry Woolfe, "Brainwashing in
Guatemala," America, January 9, 1982, p. 14.
DIAGRAM NO. 3 INDIAN RELIGIOUS WORLDVIEW
AND THE THREAT OF THE OUTSIDE WORLD

WESTERN WORLD
DIALECTIC OF
/ \ SELF DEFENSE3

MILITARY

CAPITALISM
lvFV I m p e n e t r a b l e Face o r D e f e n s e o f I d e n t i t y ; Closed
Community

-
"PW P a t h s t o Development I n i t i a t e d by M i s s i o n a r i e s
"B" B a r r i e r s t o Paths

I n d i a n s L e a v i n g V i l l a g e f o r O u t s i d e World/
O u t s i d e World P e n e t r a t e s I n d i a n World

:$When t h e I n d i a n w o r l d [ c o m m u n i t y - v i l l a g e - c u s t o m s )
c o u l d no l o n g e r r e m a i n i s o l a t e d f r o m t h e o u t s i d e w o r l d ,
t h e I n d i a n s g r a d u a l l y opened t h e m s e l v e s t o the
m i s s i o n a r i e s 1 development p r o j e c t s . These "paths1' n o t
only l e t outside i n t o t h e c a p i t a l i s t world, but allowed
t h a t w o r l d t o p e n e t r a t e and t h r e a t e n t h e I n d i a n w o r l d .
By 1973, t h e s e p a t h s were c l o s e d o f f a s " t h e w a l l s went
up again."

Source: L o u i s a F r a n k and P h i l i p Wheaton, Indian

Guatemala, p . 38.
Faena, as well as those of Father Luis Gurriaran, alias
Fidel Hernandez, must be taken as the statements of
people who had been seriously compromised, by one or
another reason, i n the process of radical change that
was taking place in the country. For this reason the
statements must not be considered impartial

declarations. Nevertheless, in spite of their bias,

they were useful t o this work because they helped us

understand the process of radicalization that was

experienced by some priests and the influence this had
on the awakening o f the consciousness and the
mobilization of hundreds o f Indians at a definite
historico-political moment.
According t o Pellecer, liberation theology
became the framework of action that was characteristic

of some members of the Jesuit religious order. It

presented, in the first place, a cew version o f Christ
who appeared as a revolutionary rebel completely
identified with the needs o f the people and who was

portrayed a s the enemy of capitalism.54 This theology

was t o eventually advance toward revolutionary

54 Father Luis Eduardo Pellecer Faena, press

conference, supra p. 148.
solidarity guided by the priests along with the
aspirations o f the people. In this respect, Jesuit
Father Juan Hernandez Pico stated that
...
we are creating a movement that is greater
than that of Christian solidarity. It is
broader: we are incorporating with revolu-
tionary solidarity.... We are cresting this
this solidarity movement precisely because we
recognize in the struggle process of our
countries a sign o f biberation which comes
from the call of God summoning the people who
are developing it.... Today the demand for
loyalty concerning the struggle for power as
in the struggle for the structuring o f a new
society, is present not only at moments o f
triumph . . . . 5 5

On the other hand. according t o Pellecer, the

Christ of the poor offered. besides the rupture with
its traditional alliance t o the rich, a concrete plan

and a mission that consisted o f establishing heaven on

earth. The members of this group deficled heaven as a
socialist and egalitarian kingdom and stated khat
everyone should contribute t o the building o f that
kingdom because a great deal of strength and ability

were needed. 56

Following the line of Pellecer's arguments,

55 Juan Hernandez Pico, "Reflexion teological sobre la

solidaridad," in Morir y despertar en Guatemala,
161-162.
PkFather Luis Eduardo Pel 1 ecer Faena. press
conference* Supra p. 402.
the second tool used by the revolutionary priests was
Marxism, as an analytical method and a revolutionary
method that not only explained poverty and injustice on
the basis o f social class differentiation, but also
assisted radical Christians even more in their struggle
t o attain power.57

In this attempt, it is evident that the

revolutionary religious elites were trying t o
reconcile, at the utopian level, such elements as faith
and science. They sought t o substitute humanistic
dialogue, which implied a common aualism in which
Marxism as science and Christianity as faith coexisted
peacefully, for the classic relationship of total
rejection that existed between Marxism and
Christianity.

Those who supported this orientation directed

their labor toward the masses of the poor, in the urban
as well as rural areas, and were very successfu~ when
they spread a simplified and adaptable doctrine
congruent with the expectations and the capabilities of
the humble people t o perceive this doctrine. They made
of these people an army of soldiers o f the faith, whose

57 Ibid.
guide was a Christ who fully identified with them, the
poor.
The channel of publicity for this new gospel,
in the religious plane, was the catechists and
representatives of the Word who, as men committed t o
their country, were considered agents promoting change.
This transformation proccss, which occurred in the
catechists a s agents for development directed toward
radical political activism, undoubtedly became a
process that took several years, during which time many
different solutions t o the Indian problem were tried.
Originally conceived as a lay movement whose

function was to offer religious assistance t o

ameliorate the heavy load of the priestly work, these
groups, in the hands of committed priests, fulfilled a
much more transcendental role. They achieved a certain
degree o f cohesiveness among the peasants who were
given, at the same time, a sense of identity and
permanence through the various specific religious
activities.

The questioning factor among the catechists

was considered subversive by the government, and they
suffered persecution and death. In this light, we
should mention that one of the most famous catechists
was Rigoberto Menchu, born in a small Quiche town, who
died tragically when the Spanish Embassy was taken.58

Once the elements of the awakening of

consciousness and religious unity were established, it
became necessary to add a political organization
component that would disseminate the notion of the need
to obtain the winning of popular rights and the need to
organize in order to achieve these rights. Thus, in

February of 1976. the Committee for Peasant Unity

(Comite de Unidad Campesina, CUC) was formally
established.59 Nevertheless. many priests were

58 In memory of thi s catechist, the group

Revolutionary Christians Vicente Menchu, an
organization of the masses that became part of the
Popular Front January 31 (FP31) dedicated to
confront repression and incorporate the mass of people
dedicated to armed revolt. See Morir Y despertar en
Guatemala, p. 23.
It is difficult t o know if some Jesuits or another
order or religious congregation were the founders of
CUC. Concerning this, the Jesuits have denied being
responsible for the establishment of CUC, just as they
denied founding or directing the FECAS and UTC of El
Salvador, but according to ex-Jesuit Pellecer, the
order had t o accept the support given to the CUC,
especially so that it could achieve wot-Id fame. In
Guatemala, the CUC was hardly known until the incident
of the seizure OF the Spanish Embassy took place, which
was directed by a group that opposed the government and
was formed in part by four sections of CUC. Sn the
majority, CUC was formed by Indian peasants, although
many poor ladinos were a:so enrolled. The exact number
incapable o f providing the leadership. Frank and

Wheaton expressed the following opinion.

Much of the conscientization process had

taken place within a religious context,
because the church had t h e most extensive
network for reaching people and because
religion is so central t o the life o f the
Indians. Yet, when the campesinos began
looking for more political solutions, the
church and its structure were not in a
position t o provide leadership.60

The opinion of one of the catechists who was

a member o f the CUC seemed t o support this argument.

Many different groups worked in my village.

Catholic Action was the largest, but there
were also community improvement committee
evangelical and Protestant organizations.
When CUC was formed, we n o longer talked
about religion. but about exploitation,
about the struggle for equality, frzedom
for workers, better wages. People from all
the groups could relate t o that.61

Whether it was successful or not, the use of

this group t o develop and accelerate the process o f

change in the rural area fit perfectly with the

o f the membership was never known; however, in 1977

they were able t o mobilize 100,000 individuals a s they
marched in support o f the miners from Ixtahuacan, a
region in the Department o f Huehuetenango. See
statements from Father Pellecer, Fisaro, April 24,
1982, p. 37; Debemos Hablar, published by the Company
o f Jesus in El Salvador, May 1977; and FERG, Presrntes
en la lucha, pp. 103-112.
6u Louisa Frank and Philip Wheaton, Indian Guatemala,
p. 46.
6 1 Ibid.
theoretical needs that the priests had within the
revolutionary scheme. This meant assuming the
leadership role in the organization of their followers
toward political action, guided by a new vision of
Christian Catholicism and a vision of the future that
implied the theory (liberation theology) and its
practice (political organization).
In my opinion, one o f the factors that
possibly contributed t o the taking of the revolutionary
path by certain members of the Jesuit order (besides
Pellecer, there were at least three other Jesuits who
became part of the Guatemalan guerrillas, including
Fernando hoyos, who died in combat in 1978; Enrique
Corral; and Donald Mac-Kennal) was the decision made by
the Company of Jesus t o advocate a new strategy for the
spreading of a different dimension of Christian
humanism that was more compatible with the requirements
of the time and the orientations of Vatican 1 1 . This

strategy was adopted during the celebration of its

X X X I I General Congregation, which took place in Rome

during 1974 and 1975. At the end of this celebration,

they pledged "under the flag o f the crossw to fight for
social change, in the struggle for faith, and in the
struggle for justice that this same faith demanded.62
For the Jesuits...the promotion of justice
in this world becomes a challenge which we
cannot avoid: it implies a radical r u ~ t u r e
with those who use money and power t o
sustain injustice and it comes t o us as the
crucial strusqle of our time.63
According t o Pellecer, in order t o promote
this new dimension of Christian humanity, the Jesuits
were dedicated t o influencing other active
organizations in Latin America. With this purpose,
ties with CONFREGUA were drawn closer. They also
approached the Maryknolls, the Belgian religious
orders, the Hoiy Family in Guatemala, the Dominicans in
Panama, the Salesians in Nicaragua, as well as
others. 64

When this situation was analyzed

retrospectively, it seemed evident that the members of
the religious orders who took the revolutionary path
knew how to penetrate the life o f the rural Indian.
Unlike the Melvilles, they respected their rites and
myths and adapted Catholicism t o the needs o f the

62 Company of Jesus in El Salvador, Debemos hablar,

.PP.
. 30-47.
63 Ibid., p. 33.
64 Figaro, April 24, 1982, p. 40.
dispossessed.65 On the other hand, their
possibilities for success concerning this approach was
fully rewarded because they were able t o take immediate

action on the solution o f economic problems due t o the

fact that several priests apparently had access t o

financial resources from religious organizations

residing abroad.

In addition, unlike the Melvilles, these

religious orders did not relegate the aspect o f

conscientization and organization at the urban level t o

others.66 In the case o f the Jesuits, they

established a CIAS agency (Centro de Informacion y

65 This was contrary t o the type o f struggle the

church had been involved in many years before when it
fought against Indian tradition, fighting against the
manner in whfch saints were worshipped, against the use
o f alcohol as part of religious feasts, against
smoking, against parents exercising pressure on the
marriage o f their children, against the bride's dowry,
a fight which resulted in the destruction o f the Indian
cornmun i ty. Sergio Montufar, Vom Compl izen zum Opfer
der Aufstandsbekampfunq, mimeograph, 1983. This
document is in the possession of the author.
66 Guatemala has approximately 7.5 mi 1 1 ion
inhabitants, the majority o f whom belong t o the rural
population; but in reality a great number o f people
reside in Guatemala City, which is constantly receiving
peasant imnigrants who arrive with the hope of
improving their economic situation. The city houses
one-fourth o f the country's inhabitants, and those who
come from the outside end up living under miserable
.
cond it i ons
Accion Social, Information and Social Action Center),
an affiliate of the office that the Jesuiks founded
called CLACIAS (Conferencia Latinoamericana de 10s
Cenkros para Investigacion y Accion Social, Latin
American Conference for Investigation and Social Action
Centers). The Guatemalan CIAS was part of the
Northern 1 region, whose coordinator was Father Luis
Aleman. This region included Mexico and the Antilles

and was financfally dependent on donations from North

American and German agencies.67

Internationally, the high authorities of CIAS

were, at that time, Fathers Sily and Poblete, and
Father Bigo was one of the directors of C L A C I A S . ~ ~

This organization was important; in Colombia, for

example, it rivaled Carnilo Torres for the leadership of
the trade unions. In this respect, Bigo explained how

the CIAS groups could be effective.

We must not forget the value of these action
movements. The very same leaders need and
request orientation during the serious crises
their countries are experiencing.... We do
not lack principles, only formulations: in
planning, political economics, the structure

- - -- -
-

67 David Mutchler, The Organization and Ideology of

Church Politics in Latin America, p. 86.
bu Ibid.
 o f industry, political reform, birth control,
etc. What we need is what Marxism has: a
global view of change.69

The CIAS office in Guatemala was located in a

poor section o f Zone 5. There, a group of Jesuits
lived a s an example o f humility and poverty. There was
a good library where the) presented lectures and

caurses, and the group had approximately 12 active

Jesuit members. Eventually, the "Community of Zone 5,"
as they called the CIAS office, became so involved in
political activity that it had t o be dissolved.
Apparently some of the Jesuits had to continue working
in other countries, especially in Nicaragua. Others
joined the guerrillas.
Another organization that had an important
role as a platform for Christian thinking and a
significant public image that supported the popular
demands of the Guatemalan people was the ecumenical
organization called Comite Pro-Justicia y Paz
(Committee for Justice and Peace). Apparently this
committee began t o function formally in the beginning

of 1978. with its origin probably due to the

69 David Mutchl er, "Adaptat ion o f the Roman Cathol i c

Church t o Latin American Development," p. 95.
frustration felt by a group of laymen who saw,
according t o them, that the church remained silent
before the repression, the social and economic
conditions prevailing in the country. According t o
them, this committee represented
the vocal organ of the Christian religious
and intellectual movement, the priests and
laymen involved in popular struggle...the
denunciation of the various forms o f re-
pression and the solidarity maintained with
popular organizations which were the central
objectives o f this committee...which repre-
sents a new voice within the church uniting
denunciation, reflection and involvement.70
The efforts toward conscientization and

organization were eventually fruitful and for a long

period of time in the northeastern region of the
country (Quiche and some parts o f Huehuetsnango and
Alta Verapaz, which had frontiers with Quiche), where
the revolutionary religious elites worked, became the
bastion o f armed political opposition in Guatemala.
These places became known as "liberated territory."
Concerning this, one priest described how some Indian
members from CUC joined the guerrillas:

7 0 Morir o despertar en Guatemala, p. 24. When the

repression escalated in 1979, the members of CUC as
well a s those o f the Committee for Justice and Peace
became clandestine; others quit fighting and left these
organizations.
 I watched the Indians in the area. People
did not rush t o join the guerri?las. They
did not take the decision lightly. People
gradually began t o speak of the CUC, o f the
EGP, of the guerrilla groups, but not much.
I could feel it, clearly, the people came and
went, but they still didn't know what t o
think. "We don't trust anyone," is all they
would say. Until they realized that this
movement was for them. Then, suddenly, from
one day t o the next, I felt as if I was on a
raFt with no solid ground underneath. This
was a clear example of their sense of comrnu-
nity, of a collective decision by the
community t o take a definitive step. That
was the way. 71

The same process is narrated in the following

manner in another publication:
Drawing both on Indian c o m u n a l traditions
and reinterpretation o f thb Gospel in light
of people's experience and sufferings, a
qualitatively new "popular church" has
emerged. It has taken on a dynamic of its
own, operating with a great degree of
autonomy from official cburch structures and
cutting across denominational lines.
Particularly since religious personnel have
been forced t o leave some regions of the
country, the "catech i sts" and "Da l ega'trs o f
the Word," female and male lay leaders who
emerged from local church organizing activi-
ties, have become communities' principal
religious and political leaders. The base
communities of this popular church played an
important rcle in the formation o f the
Committee of Campesino Unity, and later
became the foundations of support and sources
of new combatants for the guerrilla move-
ment. Of course, like so many aspects o f the

Louisa Frank and Phi 1 i p Wheaton, I ndian Guatema 1 a,

p. 66.
 Guatemalan revolution, born and bred in
partial. or total, secrecy, the full story of
the popular church will not be known until
conditions permit its telling.72
In the urban areas the success of the
ecclesiastical revolutionary position was less evident
and the discovery by the army o f a series o f guerrillas
living in the city possibly ended the organization and
conscientization o f the urban population.73

According to Pellecer, an important factor

that contributed t o the partial success of the
revolutionary group in the rural area was the financial
and public relations support of the international
organizations that the group knew it could count on.
Among these supportive organizations there was one, for
example, that promoted ideas. This was the CENCOS

(Centro de Comunicacion Social, Center for Social

Comunication) in Mexico, whose director of Christian
workshops was Jose Alvarez Icaza and the CIDOC (Centro
Intercultural de Docurnentacion, Intercultural

7 2 Jonathan L. Fried, Marvin Gettl eman, Deborah T.

Levenson, and Nancy Peckenham, eds., Guatemala in
Rebellion: Unfinished History, p. 219.
There is no reliable information concerning the
organization of the members involved in the activity of
religious personnel at the urban or rural level, or of
the impact o f religion in the radicalization process of
the workers.
Documentation Center) founded by Ivan Illich in
Mex i co. 74
According to Peliecer, Amnesty International
gave its support. In the United States, public opinion
became influenced by several pressure groups who were
close to liberal Jesuits and other high officials who
were sympathetic to the cause. For example, the Center
of Concern from Boston, directed by Jesuit Simon Smith,
supported all their projects.75

Apparently, the financing arrived through

such European institutions as Caritas (Italy); Cabemo
(Holland); Brut Fur die Welt, Miseroer, and Adveniat
(Germany); Catholic Relief Services (United States);
Christian Aid (Canada); Development et Paix (France),
which are Catholic organizations, and some Protestants
like Novib and the National Council of Churches.76

In retrospect, when the achievements and

74 Fiqaro, April 24, 1982, p. 39.

75 Ibid.
7 6 Fiqaro, April 24, 1982, p. 40. Pellecer never
mentioned how much money these organizations
contributed. It was impossible for this author to find
anything about it because unfortunately these
orgenizations delivered their money directly to each
diocese. Consequently, there was no central control
over the incoming funds. On the other hand, the
bishops were reluctant to speak abaut finances.
failures of the revolutionary religious elite are
analyzed? we can state that in broad terms the gradual
disenchantment that some of the Latin American
religious elites suffered made them substitute a
framework of action based on consensus with a framework
of action based on conflict. Within this context, the

inefficiency of the development model used in the

liberation of the earth's oppressed led them to a
profound process o f reflection and revision. This
process became, on the one handr an interpretation of
the gospels viewed from a perspective of social
cocflict and exploitation and, on the other hand, the

adoption of a leadership role in the organization of

laymen who were to assist the religious elite in
destroying the oppressive structure and constructing a
new social order.
In the specific case of Guatemala, far from
achieving its objective, the revolutionary option taken
up by some religious elites brought forth not only the
scarce resources of the Catholic Church with which t o
assist in the process of change througn radical

measures, but also showed the degree of divisiveness

that existed within the bosom of the national Catholic
Church , On the one hand, the adoption of these
postures by some members of the Catholic Church did
nothing but corroborate the fact that there were
institutional, administrative, economic, political,
religious, and also practical factors that limited the
possibilities for the church to support and partic i pate
directly in violent revolution.
On the other hand, the difficulties imp1
in trying to reconcile Christian humanism with
atheistic humanism and the impossibility of converting
religious abstractions into political realities were
evidence of the fact that if the Catholic Church wanted
to survive as an institution and assist in the process
of change in Guatemala other than through the
revolutionary alternative, it would have to find
another route.
In Guatemala, the direct participation of
these religious men in a process of change achieved by
violent means clearly showed that violence was not the
best choice for a Catholic Church that desired to
collaborate and influence the structure of a more,just
society. Its political behavior not only was a setback
to the censolidation of an authoritarian regime, but
also contributed t o the releasz of a polarization of
forces that almost precluded any possibility that a
political and economic model based on consensus would
work.
In addition, within the religious arena, the
participation of these priests in an armed struggle t o
overthrow an unjust system accentuated even more the
Guatemalan Catholic Church's internal divisions, which
left the church in a state of exacerbated confusion.

On the other hand, because of its action, the flow of

priests and support from abroad dwindled, practically
paralyzing the process o f physical growth that had been
characteristic of the church before these groups
appeared on the scene;
Finally, and even worse, these religious

elites contributed to the creation of expectations in

certain segments of the population that were never met,
creating a frustrating social situation. It also had a
negative impact on the factors that could have led the
Guatemalan society through a slower, perhaps more
secure, path toward democratization and development.

It is evident that the religious elite were

not directly responsible for the origin, partial
 4 98

triumph, and final failure of an armed rebellion that

desired the radical change of all structures supporting
an unjust social, economic, and political system such
as that found in Guatemala. However, it is evident
that the leaders o f the armed political opposition in
the country derived great benefit from the talents and
theoretical and administrative capabilities of such
peop!e as the Jesuit community and members of other

orders who believed in an urgent need t o reverse a

process based on poverty and exploitation such as
existed among the majority of the Guatemalan
population.

The revolutionary-religious elites did not

take into account the existence of a series o f
limitations present in political activism. Besides

those limitations inherent in the institutional

complexity o f an organization such as the church, there
were other obstacles such as traditional conservatism,
the personal interests of the members of the hierarchy
and their degree of involvement, the financial aspect,

the lack of priests and clergy, and the relationship

between church and state.

Nevertheless, the church's decision and

participation constituted at this time a historical and
transcendental fact that produced enough opinions with
which to elaborate a detailed and thoughtful analysis
that, in the end, should lead us t o find an option
other than violence with which t o solve the serious
problems that prevail in Guatemalan society. In this
regard, it is evident that the Catholic Church has a
very important role in society; but it is also evident
that the accomplishment of that role through direct
political participation is not the best alternative,
and is even less acceptable if the violent option is
considered because that option also victimizes members
of the Catholic Church family.77

'17 The negative balance involving the intervention of

religious personnel in the failed revolutionary attempt
was the following For the period of 1978 to 1982:
1 ) One expelled bishop (Gei-ardi from El Quiche)
2) T w o bishops threatened (Rios Montt from Escuintla
and Flores from the Verapazes)
3 ) T w o bombed convents (Uspantan and Morales) in Quiche
and Izabal
4 ) Six priests expelled (two from the capital, one from
Huehuetenango, two from Quiche, and one from the
Verapazes. Among them were Gregorio Barrientos,
Sor Alonzo Queralt, and Carlos Stetler)
5 ) Twelve murdered priests, including:

NAME DATE ORDER NATIONALITY

Guillermo Woods 9-76 Maryknol 1 U.S.
Hermogenes Lopez 6-30-78 Diocesan Guatema 1 a
Jose Ma. Gran 6-4-80 Sacred Heart Spa i n
Conrado de la Immaculate Heart
 Cruz 5- 1-80 of Mary Philippines
Wa 1 ter Immaculate Heart
Voordeckers 5-12-80 of Mary Belgium
Faust i no
Villanueva 7-10-80 Sacred Heart Spa i n
Juan Alonzo 2-15-81 Sacred Heart Spa i n
Car 1 os Ba 1 vez 5- 1 6-8 1 D i ocesan Spa in
Marcelo Maruzzo 7-2-81 Franciscan Italy
Carlos Perez 8-2-81 Jesuit Spa i n
Stan1 ey Rother 7-27-81 Diocesan U.S.
John David
Troyer 9-17-81 Diocesan U.S.
6) One priest who died in combat (Fernando Hoyos)
7) One religious priest who died in combat (Raul Josef
Leger)
8 ) One secular missionary who died in combat (Rodrigo
Mart i nez
9) One kidnapped priest (Luis Pellecer Faena)

In addition, there were hundreds of catechists and

Delegates of the Word who were assassinated or
disappeared.. From Compendio 1980-1982, Iglesia
Guatemalteca en Exilio, mimeo, Managua, Nicaragua,
August 1984, pp. 43, 47.
 CONCLUSION

As noted above, during the last two decades

the interest of academics who have analyzed the role
played by values and religious institutions within the
process of structural transformation of Latin American
societies has increased considerably. This particular
interest in Latin America stemed, undoubtedly, from the
fact that this continent experienced major changes in
the symbols of religious structure during recent times.
For this reason some sectors of the Latin American
church followed the suggestions of Vatican I 1 and the
papal encyclicals and began to re-orient the structures
as well as the activities of the Catholic church in
order t o modify its behavior, its values, and the

attitudes of church members. At the same time, these

sectors wanted to make the church aware of the needs,

struggles, and hopes of the dispossessed.

A question raised by these academic inquiries
has been whether religion and the Catholic church can
contribute as agents for change in Latin American
societies. It continues to be a valid and
controversial point for discussion. In this regard,

50 1
and in retrospect of the results obtained in this
study, the author cannot do otherwise but agree with
Brian Smith's position that the church in Latin America
can become a moderate force for change and that, in the
last resort, this institution can play an important
intermediary role between the old and the newer values
of the continent.
Yet, it is evident that any success achieved

by the Catholic Church in these matters will depend to

a great extent on the particular conditions of each
country. In the specific case of the Guatemalan
Catholic Church, we can confirm that the

particularities of the country, including the religious

leadership itself, as well as the structural and
administrative factors within the Catholic Church,
constitute serious limitations t o the aspirations that
members o f this institution have for becoming a
moderate or important agent for change and social
development in the country.
Consequently, this investigation rejects as a

general proposition Ivan Vallier's argument that the

Catholic Church can hecome a most important factor in
the process of change within Latin American societies
as long a s it specializes its functions and achieves
the necessary structural differentiation t o accomplish
this specialization.
In this sense, one o f the principal premises
put forth by Vallier, the development o f the Catholic
Church* is not concomitant t o the process o f societal
development, but is rather a prerequisite. His thesis
is not relevant t o a Guatemalan Catholic Church.
Although it has grown substantially over the previous

century, it has not been able t o develop along the

functional and structural lines suggested by Vallier.
Therefore, concerning the possibilities that
the Guatemalan Catholic Church can convert itself into
an agent for change* this author believes that such

possibilities are very limited. I do not dany,

however, that there is some possibility that in the
near future the church, as an institution, can play a
moderate role in this regard, especially if we take
into consideration that during a new attempt t o
institute democracy in the country, the Guatemalan
Catholic Church can become a progressive force within a
society that is also undergoing change.
The previous consideration leads us to
challenge the viability o f the developmental approach
in the light of the Guatemalan experience of the past
20 years. In broad terms, the Catholic Church
attempted t o initiate and influence institutional
development. Although the institution has represented
a new concept of order, including the symbols and

normal principles that are legitimate t o fundamental

change, it has done so in such a manner that the
process o f continuity remains strong, a fact that
precludes any other qualitative leap.
I suggest that this approach contrasts with
Guatemalan reality, because after having analyzed the
Guatemalan Catholic Church, one can only conclude that
what this country nesds is a profound structural

transformation. Currently, religion and the Catholic

Church cannot play a leading role, because the
Guatemalan Catholic Church a s an institution is not
able to adopt such a radical posture without provoking
a schism within itself and perhaps a rupture with the
universai church.
On the other hand, if the church is t o

become an agent for change and development, it must

avoid any partisan political participation. It appears
that the church must maintain itself above the
political arena f f it wants to promote social
integration and political stability. This is not to

deny that there is an ongoing debate as to how the

Catholic Church should participate as an institution in
the politfcal processes of the various societies where

its presence is felt.

In this regard, our investigation of the
Guatemalan Catholic Church confirms the argument of
Levine that religion and politics are two concepts that

cannot be separated in the Latin American world.

Therefore, the developmental focus has no value in
Guatemala, a country where even tbe decision not to
participate directly in politics, an option open to the
ecclesiastical hierarchy, has a political connotation.
Gustavo Gutierrez's statement, therefore* seems most

cogent :
We discover...that the policy of non-
intervention in political affairs holds for
certain actions which involved ecclesiastical
authorities, but nct for others. In other
words, the principle is not applied when it
is a question of maintaining the status quo,
but it is wielded when, for example, a lay
apostolic movement or group of priests hold
an attitude considered subversive t o the
established order.1
1 Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation:
 Consequently, the analysis of Guatemala and
its situation leads t o a rejection o f Vallier's
argument concerning the advantages o f his "pastoral
radicalism" proposal where the priest avoids using his
religious position as a means t o cbtain social or
political influence. According t o Vallier, the
religious precepts taught by the priests should be non-
partisan in the sense that they transcend specific

political movements and thus rise above any political

conf 1 i ct .
However, the Guatemalan case shows that the
relative influence of the religious elites in certain
areas o f the nation's life comes from their
participation through individual political commitments
or else through the manipulation or the cultivation of
political alliances when they are needed. O f course,

we must not forget those priests who are d e d i c a t ~ dto a

serious pastoral work involving denunciation,
testimony, and solidarity. This pastoral labor, even

though its character may be very religious, will always

History. Politics and Salvation, translated and edited

by Sister Caridas Inda and John Eagleson, Maryknoll,
Orbis Books, 1973, p. 65.
carry pol itica 1 connotations in Guatemala. This shows
that in countr ies like Guatemala, which are
characterized by repression and injustice, it is
practically impossible'for the Catholic Church to
isolate itself from the state and society and to
withhold the adoption of political postures and
attitudes.
The above mentioned relationship leads us to
view another theoretical and relevant aspect, the
influence of the religious elites on the process of
change and development. We should mention that, even
if our investigation did not study elites in general,

the behavior of certain religious elites was analyzed

within the historical institutional context of our
subject.
Religion and politics are two modes of
behavior that necessarily involve influence and
dependency that have developed since the beginning of
the Guatemalan state. Both politics and religion have
supported each other and have gathered to themselves
both legal and mteriai support. They have claimed
credibility and legitimacy in a process involving
a variety of relationships such as coalition,
conflicts, competition, and intra-institutional
cooperation, a process that, in itself, carries
elements of repression and accommodation.
This is why we believe that church-state
relations in Guatemala, up t o the beginning of the
decade o f the 1950s, were plagued with classic
conflicts over influence and power in relation t o
matters pertaining to education, control of the
schools, regulation o f cemeterres, matrimony and

divorce, and birth control.

It is not until the '60s that religion,
though the activities of a small number o f priests,
became a major political problem as it transformed
itself into the motivating force for political action.
Consequently, at this time the threat t o the Guatemalan
state is not reflected in a Catholic Church bound by
the old causes. Rather, the church threat to the
present political structure comes from those clergy who
are demanding basic structural changes t o care for the
basic needs of a dispossessed and hungry population.
This is a new type of activist and revolutionary
Catholic Church threatening t c emerge profoundly
committed not only to religious doctrine, but t o
political practice as well.
Nevertheless, this possibility seems very
remote at the present time, according to results
obtained from various priests of the Archdiocese of
Guatemala (see Appendix I ) . Through this
investigation, we can clearly see that there is little

attraction within the clergy for Liberation Theology in

the country.
In the case of Guatemala in particular, the
study of political behavioral patterns of the various
political elites within the institution of the church
and occurring within the last 20 years provides enough
evidence of the existing limitations to the general
process of chanae, especially when it i s orornoted by
elites belonging to an institution whose character is

universal, such as the Catholic Church has been.

The universal character and the extreme
organization of the Catholic Church has given the
institution an opportunity to play an important role as
a political factor in Latin America from colonial times

to the present. Nevertheless, its international scope

and its institutionalization have created a highly

stratified organization that prevents any attempt to
promote rapid drastic and radical change that would
affect the behavioral patterns of its members.
It is from this perspective that we must

understand the failure of the revolutionary religious

elites in their daring attempt t o identify the Gospel
with a specific political strategy. If we examine the

Guatemalan example, we will note that generally it is

the members of religious orders who act as individuals
and are willing t o risk everything, including thelr
lives, when they take the revolutionary or radical
option and not the church as an institution. This fact
supports my previous assertion that the institutional
church will never become the leader of structural
change in countries like Guatemala, simply because its
universal character and need t o survive prevent it from
assuming such radical postures.
Finally, the birth, growth, and almost
complete disappearance of the revolutionary elites in

Guatemala are evidence o f the arguments of Donald Smith

that the involvement o f religion and the church in the
politization of the masses is an important process, but
one of short duration for societies such as Guatemala,
characterized by their encounter with a full orocess o f
modernization.
On the other hand, the activity of the

religious elites in Guatemala must be analyzed in the

light of a particular process o f development that has

occurred in the country during the last 20 years. This

process o f development may be defined a s a superimposed

development. where some economic and social changes

occur. but the basic distribution o f wealth and power

remain t h e ssme.

It has been postulated that the seculariza-

tion process is an important characteristic of the

process o f modernization. 'In this regard, the

Guatemalan expea-ienceshows that secularization alone

did not become a determining factor in promoting change

and social development. Therefore, the secularization

o f public life in the country and the attitudes adopted

by certain priests in relation t o change became

isolated elements promoting change and modernization

amidst a political and social structure that remained

politically and economically unjust and inefficient.

Consequently, a s a challenge t o the

secularization of public life. we find traditional

patterns o f behavior and loyalty confused and over-

lapping. There is a fusion of political functions at
the governmental level of the various state powers, and
there are obstacles to popular organization and
participation. When all these factors have to confront
the secularization of public life in the country, there
is no doubt that they are unable t o guarantee the
beginning of a process toward change in Guatemala.
For this reason, even though the abrupt
changes that occurred during the 1940s and the 1950s at
the national and international level obligated the
religious elites t o modify their traditional focus
entailing influence and leadership, such modification

was not deep enough to produce fundamental change in

the social and economic structures 9f Guatemala.
Concerning this matter, the reality of
Guatemala supports Bruneau's argument that Latin
America has had a non-evolutionary development process
where social and economic change does take place, but
does not have a major effect on the established social
structures. This prevents any possibility for

specialization and structural differentiation required

by those who believe that the church may and should
take a leading role in the economic and social
development of Latin America.
Another interesting aspect t o be considered
in a study of the behavior of the country's religious
elites is the divergence in attitudes and constant
conflicts that have characterized its internal affairs
during the past 20 years. For this reason, the various
perceptions of the sociopolitical reality in Guatemala,
as well as a diversity o f interests and motivations,

kept the principal religious elites fighting each

other, whether discreetly or openly. This produced a

lack of coherence and direction, resulting in an
absence of consensus with respect t o the meaning of a
process o f change and the best way to implement it.
On the other hand, this absence of a sense of
direction, the divisiveness, and the poorly undzrstood
pluralism are nothing but the reflection of a national
society where conflict and division prevail. As a
consequence of these discrepancies, the process of .
change promoted by some religious elites in the country
was neither abrupt nor profound* as was expected by

those who thought the Catnolic Church could possibly

transform the structures of a society in crisis.
This concl us ion reinforces David ilutch 1 er's
contention that the Catholic Church' is so divided that
it is not in a position to offer leadership in matters

of change and development. However, the causes of this

division in Guatemala are different from those stated
by Mutchler, who places special emphasis on a division
that has caused several religious elites to raise funds

abroad with which t o implement their own programs aqd

projects. In Guatemala, this division Is caused not so
much by financial-theological reasons, but rather by
the ecclesiastical structure of the church and the role
it must play in a situation such as that found in
Guatemala.
To this end, we can confirm that the majority
of thsse elites lost more time propagating their own
interpretation of the Gospel as a result of Vatican I 1
and Medellin than in finding a point of consensus to be
able to implement a basic program destined to identify
the church with the poor and the disinherited in the
country.

Another important aspect related to the study

of attitudes among certain religious elites is the
analysis of the possibilities of a successful prophetic
role for the church in an authoritarian and repressive
context. As we mentiocad previously, this prophetic
role was assumed especially by the Guatemalan bishops
through the Episcopal Conference, which was prominent
during General Lucas Garcia's administration.
In this respect, the Guatemalan experience
supports the hypothesis that the prophetic role exerted
by the Catholic Church within an authoritarian and
repressive milieu, has very little success in achieving
the decrease or the end of repressive policies. On the
contrary, they may contribute t o the turning of that
same violence and repression against the institution
itself. Therefore, the period in Guatemala when the
church adopted a prophetic role coincided with the most
repressive and violent period against the institution.
This tragic period left 12 priests dead and hundreds of
catechists and delegates o f the Gospel either tortured,
assassinated, or among the disappeared.
This violent wave undoubtedly encouraged a

more cautious attitude and a less challenging

confrontation on the part of the church throughout the
country. This position was confirmed by the results of
a questionnaire circulated among various priests in
which the majority of those interviewed were inclined
to a developmental position within the church, one
removed from political extremism (see Appendix I). In
this regard, I consider that the developmental
approach in the Catholic Church of Guatemala has good
probabilities of strengthening itself in view of the
current propitious political climate and the demise of
Archbishop Mario Casariego.
This leads us t o analyze another important
aspect, the relevance of individuals t o the
politization of religion and the great degree of
influence, whether positive or negative, that these
individuals can exercise on the church's involvement in
the process for change: Dom Leme in Brazil, Gustavo
Perez in Colombia, and Miguel Obando in Nicaragua.
In the specific case o f Guatemala, the
traditionalist posture that Archbishop Casariego
represented and his undoubted leadership probably
became the major obstacle for the Catholic Church a s an
institution t o act in a more progressive manner. For
this reason, the other religious elites in the country
who represented alternative postures were not able t o
overcome his political shrewdness, his capability t o
pull strings and exert influence. They ended up
defeated or bypassed by Mario Casariego.
It is possible that this leadership feature
that produced different results in Guatemala than in
other countries in Latin America faced similar initial
conditions in the political and economic order as well
as in religious and social affairs. Undoubtedly, Mario
Casariego played an important national political role
in restricting the masses from attaining access to the
national political process by using and transforming
ideas and re1 i g ious va 1 ues such as those promoted by
various sectors within the Guatemalan Catholic Church.
Therefore, Casariego assumed a historical
responsibility that created an institution that, even
though it achieved a measure of internal consensus
after his death, still was unable to confront the

demands of a people who had lost faith in a church that

would not support efforts to ameliorate the poverty and
hopelessness of the majority of the Guatemalan
populaticn.
None of the elites in any category within our
typologb- (traditional-ists, reformists, rebels, and
revolutionaries) contributed significantly to the

implementation of real change capable of transfcrming

the church or Gbatemalan society. However, this was
not due to the particular characteristics of the
process of development in Guatemalan society or to the
conflict that occurred between some of these elites,
but responded as well to a series o f historico-
structural factors and the cultural and attitudinal
limitations displayed by the national Catholic
membership.
The first impression one has after analyzing

the structural-administrative aspect of the Guatemalan

Catholic Church is the enormous degree of dependence
upon outside factors existing in the institution. The
Guatemalan Catholic Church is an institution that
depends on foreign boards of directors, money, and
priests, making it extremely vulnerable aild susceptible
to pressure from international forces.
The two leading actors who have had special
influence on the process of growth and modernization of
the Guatemalan Catholic Church have been, as was
previously mentioned, the United Ststes and the
Vatican, which, by means of programs such as the
Alliance for Progress in the economic sphere and the
Second Vatican Council in the religious sphere, have
contributed to the acceleration of the process of
change and growth that began in the Guatemalan Catholic
Church in the 1960s.
The intervention of both factors within the
process of growth and change in the Guatemalan Catholic
Church became an element that did more for limiting the

options of radical and extremist positions within the

Guatemalan Catholic Church. In this respect, the
economic interests of the United Statass based on the
capitalist system. and the religious interests of the
Vatican. based on the permanence of the universai
church as an institution, constituted an insurmountable
obstacles for those who still believed that the
Guatemalan Catholic Church could become the leader of a

revolutionary process.
On the other hand, concerning the dependency
on monetary and human resources* the situation did not
look as if it would change if we considered the period
of economic recession that the country was undergoing
and the economic. social, and cultural shape of'the
national priests who were being trained. Therefore,

the church will continue depending on external

resources for its growth and development, and in such a
case the orientation of this change and growth will
continue t o come from outside.
Another aspect that should be mentioned
concerning the administration and organization of the
church is the fact that the Guatemalan Catholic Church
was poorly prepared as an institution as far as
ideological, conceptual, and structural terms were
concerned, to be able to respond to the call for change
promoted by the universal church.
Ideologically, the determining factor was the
incompetence of the Guatemalan Catholic Church to
identify itself, preferably, with the poor because of
the traditional conservative focus displayed by the
ecclesiastical hierarchy and its alliance with the

status quo. This condition wss clearly perceived by

one observer, who stated that in Latin America the
Catholic Church was still part o f the "conservative
establ i shrnent. ''

On the other hand, in structural terms we .

must remember that the national Catholic Church,
historically, is a product of one of the most profound
liberal revolutions in the Latin American contipent.
This circumstance, in institutional terms, makes the
Guatemalan Catholic Church seem like a relatively weak
entity because its sphere o f influence is limited. Fgr
this reason, when the time arrived t o promote more
meaningful change within Guatemalan society, the
Catholic Church found out that it was depending too
much on the higher and middle strata in the country
and, on the other hand, it lacked the necessary
structures t o obtain and mobilize support on the
popular level. This disparity is further d o c u m e ~ t e d in
the information shown in Appendix I , where the low
number o f church-sponsored base communities established
in the country is described.
If we add t o this a large dose of violence
and repression occurring in a relatively small country,
it will be easier for us t o understand the reasons for

the modest progress shown by the Guatemalan church in

matters pertainicg t o change and social development.
Likewise, the analysis of the administrative structures
shows us a relatively decentralized church ailing from
an enlarged number o f ecclesiastical directors
concentrated in the capital. This macrocephaly

promoted a lack of coordination and a poor flow of

information, in addition to which its forces were
dispersed and its efforts duplicated.
On the other hand, this macrocephaly in the
interior operations of the Guatemalan Catholic Church
has been responsible for the presence of priests in
great numbers in the metropolitan urban areas,
abandoning the rural and municipal areas. This vacuum
was quickly filled by Marxists as well as Protestants,

the latter group having been particularly successful

and enduring, more so than the former.
Consequently. the indiscriminate
decentralization and this administrative inefficiency
created an environment that was poorly prepared t o

effect fundamental changes in the interior Guatemalan

society when it promoted, consciously or ~ n c o n s c i o ~ s l y ,
disunity, heterogeneity, and ambiguity.
A report from the Rand Corporation could not
be more clear in this regard as it states,
Any attempt t o reorient church activities in
a politically consistent direction must cver-
come the diversity of present commitments
(which are the reflection of the varying
social attitudes and political capacities
of a very heterogeneous clergy) as well a s
the bureaucratic inertia of a fragmented
organizational structure.
In fact, when these institutional and social
complexities are combined with political
conflicts within the clergy and with exceed-
 ingly diverse local conditions and national
histories, it becomes evident that there can
be no single "catholic position" on the
practical politics of social and economic
development.2
Finally, it is necessary to remember that the
low degree of success achieved by the Guatemalan
Catholic Church in its efforts to promote change was
due to the fact that the institution had not engendered
deep roots in the conscience of Guatemalan Catholics.
In the majority, Guatemalan Catholics, instead of
feeling a close allegiance t o their faith and religion,
are weekend Catholics or Catholics in appcarance only.
Besiaes, religious practice of many rural Catholics is
characterized by an extensive religious syncretism.

Consequently, in spite of what might

apparently be interpreted as a high degree of devotion
shown by the Guatemalan Catholics, in reality we find
that they lack profound conviction in religious belief
as well as a clcse identification w ith their church and
religious leaders. This factor, as was mentioned
previously, not on ly diminished the ir attempt at

Lufgi Einaudi, Richard Maul 1 in, Alfredo Stepan, and

Michael Fleet, Latin American Institutional
Development: The Chanslnri Catholic Church* The Rand
Corporation, Santa Monica, California. October 1969,
p. 29.
"aggiornamento" but made the church lose members t o
Conununisn and Protestantism.

All of the above lead us t o conclude that, 20

years after the celebration of the Second Vatican
Council, even though the Guatemalan Catholic religious
elites became involved in the promotion of the values
and ideas presented by the council, its results were
very modest in relation t o the expectations that were
created within the religious sphere as well as within

the academic environment.

The policy of accommodation adopted by the
ecclesiastical hierarchy epter a long period of
persecution and hopelessness has permitted the Catholic
Church to survive and surpass a determined point in
history. It was able t o regroup itself for the purpose
o f gaining influence in the pastoral area as well as in

the political area, but did not have significant

advances in relation t o the promotion of structural
change oriented toward a preferential option on behalf
of the poor.

At this juncture in national life, we

predict that in the near future, the Catholic Church
will try t o re-orient its values in a more meaningful
manner, but will not become a leader in the process of
change. Undoubtedly, this church, instead o f
participating directly in politics, will adopt critical
postures affecting the system, but will always adhere
t o the moral perspective. In brief, more than a
revolutionary church, we may anticipate a church that
promotes a process of gradual and continuous change,
just as Monsignor Mario Casariego would wish if he were
a1 ive.
 APPENDIX I

Until now, when we have referred t o the

responses o f the different religious elite t o the so-

called change initiated by Vatican 11, we have referred

basically t o Archbishop Casarieso, the bishops o f the

Episcopal Conference, the Confederation of Diocesan

Priests o f Guatemala, and particular cases of certain

religious orders and priests that pertain t o them.

Nevertheless, conscious that these responses

might not be representative of the perception and the

interests o f the clergy that work in the country, we

decided t o carry out a survey o f 89 priests in the area

covered by the Archdiocese o f Guatemala in a limited

attempt t o transcend the world of the archbishops,

bishops, influentials, and notables.

Another reason that motivated us t o carry out

this survey was the argument that if the elites are in

charge o f promoting the process of change in countries

like Guatemala for historical, cultural, and economic

reasons, in the religious aspect it is the priests who,

in the end, are responsible for c a r ~ y i n gout the

change. The~rFore. it was extremely important for us

526
t o have a general idea about the reception and

disposition o f the clergy in general t o assume

political and religious positions that conform with the

typology that we elaborated for t h e effect.

Using a series o f variables relative t o

religious as well a s economic and political areas and

hierarchic61 and administrative considerations, we

proceeded t o carry out the mentioned survey. Even if

it was practically impossible t o determine which

percentage o f the priests interviewed identified

themselves with each o f the political categories

established in our typology (traditionalists,

reformists, rebels, and revolutionaries), we were able

t o determine with clarity two important aspects r e l a t ~ d

t o our work: the first was that there is a diversity

of political a s well a s religious attitudes within the

G ~ a t e m a l a nCatholic Church that are susceptible,

without much effort, t o being applied t o any o f the

categories created by the author for that purpose.

There is a diversity of attitudes that, on t h e other

hand, reflect disunity and a lack o f coordination in

the nucleus o f the country's Catholic Church. A second

issue o f importance is the fact that although we do not
know how many priests are traditionalists, rebels, or

revolutionaries, we are sure that the majority lean

toward the developmentalist perspective.

One aspect that attracted our attention was

the small number of Theology of Liberation followers

there seems t o be among the priests interviewed, a

condition that makes us believe that traditionalist

ideas a s well a s values still exercise a strong

counterweight against innovative ideas and values that

are currently politically and religiously active.

In addition, in carrying out the survey, we

included a series o f questions t o gather general

information o n the interviewees, such a s their age.

order, studies, etc., with the goal o f determining i f

there was a correlation between these variables and the

attitudes o f the priests on religious and political

materials; we found, unfortunately, !ittle relation

between these variables and the priests' attitudes,

with the exception o f age. We found that the younger

the priests. the more they tended t o support change and

social development.

Finally we recognize that the analysis

carried out is somewhat extensive. Nonetheless, we

justify it because of the lack o f total information
that exists in the country on the topic being dealt
with, with the hope that the data we obtained will
serve as a basis for future comparative analyses
carried out on this topic in the country.

ANALYSIS OF THE WORKING FIELD

a) Universe and example

This analysis will try t o complete our study,
based fundamentally on the field work carried out t o
detect the diverse attitudes and positions that the
clergy o f the country maintains with respect t o the
development and social change of Guatemalan society.
Throughout the study, it is clearly demonstrated that,
far from constituting a homogeneous circle* the nucleus
o f the Guatemalan Catholic Church is home t o a
diversity o f perceptions and attitudes of an

ecclesiastic and political nature. The perceptions and

attitudes o f a political nature fit, without great
effort, within the typology constructed t o that effect
by the author.
Even if it is true that the present study
takes as a base the clergy located in the Archdiocese
of Guatemala, it is considered that in general the
results are not in disagreement with what goes on in
the Guatemalan church on a global level, since the
apparent heterogeneity of the universe (priests) tends
t o homogenize itself with a series of easily
definable variables such as their order, age, country
of origin, level of education, etc., a condition that

will be reflected not only in the knowledge and

experience in relation to the socio-historic situation
o f the country, but also in attitudes concerning social
change and development in Guatemalan society and the
administrative and structural modernization of the
institution itself.
As was seen in Chapter 1 1 1 , the Ecclesiasti-

cal Province o f Guatemala, is divided into three

jurisdictions, t o which the Prelatura Nullius del
Santo Cristo de Esquipulas belongs and forms a part of
the Archdiocese of Guatemala. That i s t o say that only
12 of the same dioceses act independently and are

distributed throughout the national territory. These

dioceses, inciudiny the Prelacura Nullius de
Esquipulas, are attended by 433 priests1 that are

distributed among 25 orders working in the country.

It is worth mentioning that the diocesan

clergy were treated a s another order, not because the

study deals with specific orders such a s the Jesuits or

Franciscans, but because, in spite of constituting an

independent category that has a great deal t o do with

the formation o f the national clergy, it could not be

analyzed in an independent way for practical reasons.

It is necessary t o take into account that the

diocesan clergy is formed at the explicit request of

the bishop, who provides all o f his assistance so his

candidates can enter the diocesan seminary and/or any

other national or foreign seminary, even though the

latter is administered by a specific order.

Nonetheless. he o r the graduated candidates do not

formally belong t o t h e order from which they received

their formation, the statutory regulations d o not

pertain t o them, nor d o they depend on the prior or the

superior o f the order. Instead, they return t o their

diocese with their bishop, who acts as their superior.

The figure is taken from the work in Chapter 1 1 1 ,

Table No. 3.4.
They cannot leave their diocese for any reason apart

from abandoning their habits.

One of the basic reasons for determining the

location of the sample is the fact that the

distribution of priests in the different dioceses, as

well as their distribution by orders, is considerably

uneven. Thus, with regard to the first aspect. we have

the following: the territorial prelature of

Escuintla has 1.62 percent of the priests; the diocese

of Quiche has 2.08 percent; the apostolic vicarage of

El Peten has 2.31 percent; the apostolic administration

of Izsbal has 2.77 percent; the diocese of

Huehuetenango, 3.46 percent; the diocese of San Marcos,

3.70 percent; that of Zacapa, 5.52 percent; that of

Jalapa, 6.47 percent; that of Solola, 8.78 percent;

that of Verapaz, 10.39 percent; that of Quetzaltenango,

12.01 percent; and the Archdiocese of Guatemala, 40.87

percent.
In addition, the distribution of priests in

the different orders is as follows: Trinitarios, 0.29

percent; Preciosisima Sangre Missionaries, 0.29

percent; ne la Caridad Missionaries, 0.58 percent;

Josefinos, 0.58 percent; Benedictines Devetanos, 0.87
percent; Redentoristas, 1.15 percent; San Cayetanos,

1.72 percent; Sagrado Corazbn Missionaries. 1.72

percent; Mercedarios, O.M., 1.72 percent; Agustinos

Recolectos, 2.01 percent; Claretianos, 2.59 percent;
Somascos, 3.16 percent; Carmelitas Descalzos, 3.16
percent; Franciscanos Capuchinos, 3 . 1 6 percent;

Benedictinos, 3.16 percent; Paulinos, Congregacion de

la Mision, 4.88 percent; Inmaculado Corazon de Maria,

6.32 percent; Orden de 10s Predicadores, Dominicos,

8.34 percent; Jesuitas, S.J., 8.62 percent; Maryknoll*

M.M., 8.62 percent; Salesianos. S . D . B . , 12.35 percent;

and San Franciscanos, 24.71 percent, Both situations

presented serious problems at the time of desizning the

sample, since the distribution o f priests in the

different dioceses as well as the distribution

according t o order were important to the analysis.

With regard t o the number of nstional

diocesan priests, separate statistics do not exist in

any o f the sources that were consulted. The orily

source that has related information is the 1985

Pontifical Yearbook, but it includes foreign priests as

well as national diocesan priests. The relationship of

this type of clergy to the regular clergy (that belong

to an order) based on total numbers is as follows:
Diocesan* 29.31 percent; and regular clergy, 70.69
percent (see Map No. 6. Chapter 11). In addition, the

sheet soliciting information from the bishops (Appendix

1 1 1 ) also did not request separate information on the
issue. A sample that will encompass the national total
would have t o be based on the distribution of priests
per diocese and take into account the percentage weight
that each diocese has in tire national =ontext.
Nevertheless, if we look at the absolute figures that
correspond t o each diocese. we realize that such a
situation would create the following problems:
1. In the interior o f the country, in the
headquarters of each diocese (generally the
departmental capital)* the work would be made more
difficult by the fact that a majority of priests are
not in the diocesan headquarters, but attending t o
their pastorai duties in churches that have been

assigned to them in their respective municipalities.

2. According t o the distribution of the

percentage sample on a national level. there could

arise a case in which a priest in a particular town had
t o abandon his pastoral headquarters because o f diverse
reasons. Exchanging one priest for another would call

for an adjustment in the sample in order not t o change

the information. 9

3. Finally, with regard t o the previous

point, there do not exist reliable statistics that

determine the location o f each priest, but information

o f a general nature provided by different

ecclesiastical organizations, one o f which, the

Confederacibn de Sacerdotes de Guatemala (CONFREGUA),

is the only one that has specific information on their

distribution in different orders; it is necessary t o

add t o this that the mobi lity o f the orders is severe;

that is, they suffer cont inuous changes in the number

of priests and locations, a situation that tends t o

make the problem worse.

The analysis o f these problematic situations

made us desist at first in attempting t o work with a

national semple. We know beforehand that this makes a

scientific study o f the generalizations that could be

obtained impossible. Nevertheless, there were more

problems involved in using a national sample than the

validity o f the conclusions we could have reached.

Therefore, we proceeded t o work with a simple sample

taken at chance, of all the churches in Guatemala City,
and in each one of these, t o proceed t o interview two
priests. The total number of churches in the sample
was 44. However, this procedure failed because there
was not more than one priest in many of the churches
chosen for the sample, which also led t o a large margin
of error.

Thus we decided on another method that could

serve to reach our objectives, the reasons for which we
will explain later. This formula consisted of taking
100 percent of the churches located in Guatemala City

(83 total) and interviewing one priest in each church.

However, the real number o f priests interviewed was 89,

since the interviewers who collaborated with the author
interviewed six extra priests, which we do not think
affects the sample. To proceed in this way, we took
into account the following criteria:
1. In general, all the orders that work in
the cauntry haye administrative headquarters in
Guatemala City, not because they depend directly on
the archdiocese, but because that is where the best
means of communication with foreign countries are
located, as well as better possibilities to interweave
a series of relations that allow for a better

development o f the order.

2. In this case, the archdiocese gives the
administration o f t h e church t o the orders, a situation

that permits the location o f the priests in their

respective orders.
3. It was also taken into account that the

data and information would serve for a generalization

only in the case o f Guatemala City. However, it we

look at the specific weight that this has with respect

t o the national total, we see that this corresponds t o

34.i34 percent o f the total churches and 40.87 percent

o f the total priests. The latter figures refer t o the

total in the archdiocese, but as w e have seen in

Chapter 1 1 1 , the situation tends t o favor the capital

city more than the other departments included in the

archdiocese.* Therefore, we would be able to have a

general view and t o prove if our typology really was

functional.

4, Finally, we must point out that working

with a sample o f this type considerably reduced our

cost in time and money, resources that were already

See Chapter 1 1 1 , Table No. 3.2.

scarce.

b) Structure of the Questionnaire

The structure of the questionnaire responded,

basically, t o an attempt t o focus on those areas that

were considered important in determining the principal

attitudes of the priests that would allow us, based on
the same, t o infer the positions held by the clergy o f
Guatemala City with respect to the development and
change of the global society.3

Important areas were considered, each of

which allowed for collecting specific information on
each area, and, in addition, when being correlated
with another, allowed a more precise organization.
Thus, the following areas were defined:
1 ) Main work

2) Priest vocations

3) Theology of Liberation
3.1 Knowledge of Theology of Liberation

Observe that the orientation is toward determining

positions on issues of development and change o f the
global society since aspects of internal administration
were dealt with profoundly in Chapter 1 1 1 .
 3.2 Utility that Theology of Liberation
offers for the development of
pastoral work

3.3 Image that Theology of Liberation

presents for the Catholic faith and
reaiiky aF Latin America
4 ) Knowledge of the organized priest groups

5) Economy

Who dominates the Guatemalan economy?

What groups should have a major
participation in the national

economic 1 ife?
Does foreign investment benefit
Latin America?
What control should the Guatemalan
government exercise over foreign
capital ?
6) Individual and political rights; the

problem of violence:
6.1 Is the use of violence justified?

6.2 Should syndicates and individuals

have more freedom?

6.3 Are human rights violated in
 Guatemala?
6.4 Is there freedom of association?
6.5 Should there be a system of active
political parties with free
elections?
7) Is there an official union between the
church and state?
8) Opinion on the birth control program

9) Is there currently a crisis o f authority

in the church?
9.1 Is there a crisis o f authority?

9.2 Is celibacy a problem for you?

10) General characteristics of the priests
interviewed:
Diocese they belong t o

Religious order they belong t o

Age

How many years they have been

exercising their ministry?
Country of origin?
How many years of work in the
country?
How much longer you plan t o work
 in the country?
10.8 Country in which you received your
formation as a priest?
10.9 Other studies in addition t o
priesthood?

C) Field Work

The field work was scheduled t o be carried

out from March t o June 1985. However, for different
reasons, it was not possible t o finish until the end of
July of the same year.
1.1 Limitations o f those interviewed
It must be pointed out that despite the

process of a democratic opening that was underway

during the mentioned time period, the clergy, as well
as many other sectors of Guatemalan society, believed
that this process was not authentic and could, in case
of a reversal, damage these sectors even more. Thus,
the attitude of many of those interviewed was one of

fear, an attitude that was taken into account at the

time o f analyzing the results of the work.
1.2 Limitations of the Interviewers
In addition, it should be mentioned that the
author carried out the majority of the interviews (50
interviews) and the rest (39 interviews) were carried
out by an investigation team contracted to do so. The
interviews lasted only a half hour and there was no
problem with locating the priests, since all interviews
were carried out by a previously arranged appointment.

1.3 Technical Limitations

Even though the author tried at all times to
have sufficient technical support, it was not possible
to apply information techniques for processing the data

since there are few institutions, such as SPSS, that

have specialized languages for social investigations.
Access t o them was made difficult since hours for their
use were f i ! led threugh t h e m i d d l e a f !986, Therefsre,

it was necessary t o choose a combined manual and

mechanical process that prohibited a greater depth of
statistical analysis, which would have been possible to
obtain if the SPSS had been used. Consequently, many

of the percentages appear adjusted in some cases; in

others, the real percentages are shown since the
machives that were used do not adjust the figures or

approximate them to obtain 1'00 percent.

d) Analysis of Information

1) Main Work

With regard t o the main work, we find that

40.44 percent of those interviewed are pastors; 23.59

percent teach; 15.73 percent are pastoral specia 1 ists;

10.11 percent dedicate themselves to duties outs ide of

those contemplated; 4.49 percent are receiving some

form of educational training; 3.37 percent are church

administrators (=haplains or assistants); and only 2.24

percent of those interviewed dedicate themselves to

profess ional activities.

It seems that necessary here to clarify that

the main work shou Id not be confused with academic

and/or professiona 1 preparation. Therefore* w e will

see* in the context referring to studies, there is a

strong academic preparation among those interviewed,

but that does not allow the clergy to assume other

functions within the scale of occupational roles on an

academic professional level. Instead, it puts him in

the service o f his principal role, which is pastoral

activity.
In addition, it can be observed that there is

a marked emphasis in what are pastoral functions.

That is, 59.54 percent of those interviewed (numerals

1.2, and 3) are, in one way or another, c m n e c t e d t o

such a function, whether it be because they are

parsons, administrators, or pastoral specialists (see

Table No. 1).

TABLE NO. I

Main Work Freq. Acum.

Freq.
1. Pastor 36 36
2. Pastoral Specialist 14 50
3. Church Administration 3 53
4. Dedicated t o teaching 21 74
5. Being educated 4 78
6. Professional 2 80
7. Others 9 89

2. Priestly Vocations

With regard t o the problem o f a lack c f

priestly vocations, 26.96 percent o f the priests

considered that there was n o such problem. Meanwhile,

the rest, 77.04 percent, did see the problem in some

way, even though their points o f view about the

problem were different. This can be seen in the
following Table. (See Table No. 2)

TABLE NO. 2
Opinion Freq.
Loss o f moral values 3
Disintegration and lack o f 8
family orientation
Families don't live t h e Catholic 6
re1 igion
Lack o f generosity with God 3
Lack of Catholic orientation 5
towards education
Too little personnel for promo- 5
ting the faith
Repression towards catechists 3
and delegates o f the Word
Too little effort in searching 8
for vocations
Social distractions: consumer 7
society, herodism, alienation, etc.
Lack o f identity Church-Youth 4
Promotion directed t o the middle 2
and upper classes
Are influenced by t h e vows made 2
Little culture, lack o f conscience 2
Ignorance, lack o f information 7
There is no problem 24

We can group these answers into a smaller

whole o f the causes o f t h e problem; thus, in the first

group, those who answered with options 14, 12, 10, 8,

6, 5, and 3 seem t o judge t h e problem from the church's

point of view. That is t o say, in one way or another,

the church and/or its members are responsible for the

lack of vocations. On the other hand, we have a second
group that looks at the problem from a more social
point of view. That is t o say, for them the problem
seems t o lie more in the church-society relationship
and not solely in the first relationship. Their
responses include numerals 13, 1 1 , 9, 7, and 2. A
third, more reduced group gives the problem a moral-
theistic focus and is composed o f those who responded
to the options numbered 1 and 4.
Finally, we have those whr) did not think
there was a prablem. option 15. We can also see in
these groupings that not all the responses have the

same intention. For example, it can be seen that in

group 2 (which emphasizes the social aspect) there are
those who strongly cri\:icize the church (see answer 1 1 )
as well as the society (see answer 9). There is one,
however, that faces the problem on a political level by
saying that the lack of vocation is related t o the
repression that catechists and delegates and
celebrators of the Word have been subjected t o (see
answer 7).
3. Theology of Liberation

3.1 Knowledge of Theology o f Liberation

With regard t o knowledge the priests have
about Theology of Liberation, we find that their
answers constitute value judgments in relation t o the
that particular theology instead of an analytical view.
(see Table No. 3)
TABLE NO. 3

Knowledge o f the Thealogy o f Liberation Freq. %

An Evangelical-theological focus
o f the Latin American social reality
New focus on the gospel, a
materialistic emphasis
Proposal for liberating man from
exploitation
Marxism, by association o f ideas
False ideological tendency
Useless and harmful
Valid and applicable t o Guatemala
Positive in its orientation towards
social justice and understanding o f
real ity
Identifies Christ with the poor
It is not something separate from
the church, but a part of it
The Pope does not agree, it is
Commun i st
Does not recegniza the social
doctrine of the church, uses the
Marxi st method
Modernizes religion and breaks
tradition
It is a manipulative theology
It is extremist and can lead t o danger 2
Does not know or does not answer 9
 In these answers, we can also observe the

differences in motivation for each case. In any case,

a reclassification o f them can be made in the

following manner: a ) a positive political attitude

toward Theology o f Liberation; b) a positive

theological-evangelical emphasis toward liberation

theology; c) an impartial attitude toward liberation

theology; d) a negative theological-evangelical

emphasis tcward Theology o f Liberation; e) a negative

political attitude toward Theology o f Liberation; and

f) those who did not know or did not answer the

question. In the first group mentioned, we can group

answers 3, 8, and 9; in the second, answers 7, 2, and

1; in the third, answer 10; in the fourth, answers 5,

6, 13, and 14; in the fifth, answers 4, 1 1 , 12, and !5;

and finally, a special category: those that refused t o

express their opinion and/or simply did not answer the

question. The absolute and relative weight that each

one of these groups has within the sample is a s

follows: group b), 32 priests that represent 35.96

percent; group a), 27 priests that represent 30.35

percent; group e), 12 priests that represent 13.48

percent; grcup f), 9 priests that represent 10.11

percent; group d), 7 priests that represent 7.86
percent; and group c), 2 priests that represent 2.24

percent.

It is convenient t o mention, and this will

be seen throughout the study, that the attitudes o f

those interviewed did maintain a certain degree of

coherence, but there was a manifestation of diversity

in the degree o f intent, which could be the

result o f t w o factors: first, a different personal

view o f the problem being dealt with; and, second,

fear t o answer truthfully.

3.2 Use o f Theology o f Liberation for

pastora 1 work

The analysis of this variable includes two

parts, o n e about the utilization properly said, and the

other one, the reason of that utilization. Thus, we

then have the case that a large number of those

interviewed consider it important for their work,

independent of this, 49.43 percent. Those who use this

theology sometimes represent 5.61 percent, which could

indicate that there are 55.04 percent that, in any

given moment, make use o f it; 29.21 percent do not use

it; and 15.73 percent did not know or did not answer
the question. The information is presented below.
(see Table No. 4)
TABLE NO. 4

Utilizes tbe Theology of Liberation Freq. %

in his work
1. Yes 44 49.43
2. No 26 29.21
3. Sometimes 5 5.61
4. Does not know, does not answer 14 15.73
In general, it can be said that the

methodolog ical use of Theology o f Liberation puts

priests in an advanced position, since the
pontificat ion o f John Paul 1 1 , and the strong
controversy that emerged between liberation theologists
and official theologists of the Catholic Church has
divided into two groups: officialists and non

officialists.
We characterize t h e situation this way
because, in our judgment, the consequent practice o f
liberation theology can lead t o progressive, and even
revolutionary, positions. However, if this is true, it
is not always the case. There are those who use
Theology of Liberation only in the formal, pastoral

sense, making the church's fight for the poor and the
political and social obligations secondary, as we
shall see at the end o f this analysis.
Thus we can observe that when those
interviewed were asked t o explain why they responded
the way they did to the previous question, their
responses were as follows (see Table No. 5).

TABLE NO. 5

Why? Freq. %

All should be liberated, not just

the poor
Have t o be careful when using it
It makes Christian conscience on the
social injustice, based on reality
Silences the transcendence of man
Because it is necessary t o save man
i ntegra 1 1 y
It is not approved by the church
Valid according t o Eastavo Gutierrez
Prompts towards abandoning the ties
of man with materialism
Has valid reasoning
The problem is the method
It identifies with those who suffer:
the poor and the needy
Provides more liberty t o get along
with people
Social work is the government's
responsibility
I only try t o do good
It is populist, not ecclesiastic
I continue beins traditionalist
It is a pastoral guideline
It helps against underdevelopment
Because it is a part of the church
Because it demands austerity, iiving
together, and communicating with the
poor
21. Useful, but not of generalized 1 1.12
application because of the degree of
repression
22. Disunites the church 1 1.12
23. Can lead down the road to violence 2 2.24
24. Has no relation to the work 4 4.49
25. Does not know or does not answer 1 13.48
As in the previous questions, this one can

be reclassified into six groups as follows: a)

positive political attitude toward Theology ~f

Liberation, responses 3, 1 1 , 18. and 21; b) positive

pastoral attitude toward Theology of Liberation,

responses 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 17, and 20; c) moderate

attitude toward Theology of Liberation, responses 1,

10, 14, 19, and 2; d) a negative pastoral attitude

toward liberation theology, responses 4, 6. 16, 22, and

24; e) negative political attitude toward Theology of

Liberation, responses 13, 15, and 23; and f ) those that

refused to answer the question, response 25.

In absolute and relative numbers, the groups

are as follows: group a), 25 priests that represent

28.08 percent; group dl, 17 priests that represent

19.10 percent; group b), 16 priests, 17.97 percent;

group c), 14 priests, 15.73 percent; group f)r 12

priests, 13.48 percent; and group el, 5 priests, 5.61

percent. If these groups are compared with those

analyzed in point 3.1, differences'can be seen, even
though the grouping norms followed the same criteria.
We consider that these differonces are the result of
different personal views on focusing the problem or, as
we had pointed out, fear of answering truthfully.
In addition, crossing previous variables

with these will give us a clearer picture of the

problem. Therefore, the corresponding table was
created, using only the codes o f each response, which
precede the answers in Tables 4 and 5 (See Tzble
No. 6).

Thus, in group a), we find there is a

coherence between one and another response, in 3, 1 1 ,
18 and 21. since within the positive political attitude

toward Theology of Liberation we find use of the same,

representing 24 priests and 27.58 percent. However,
there is one who uses it sometimes and represents 1.14
percent. In the same way, there is coherence within
group e); in.answers 13, 15,,and 23, we find four
priests, 4.59 percent, who have a marked negative

response toward Theology of Liberation that coincides

with a negative political attitude toward the same,

even though one did not comment on the use, or i.14
 Table No. 6

-- - -

Usefulness : Some-
Why usefulness : Yes X : NO X : times % : * % :

: 01. ALL should be Liberated, not only the poor : 2 2.3 : - - - . - - - -- ..

:
:
02.
03.
Care rmst be taken when using i t
Uake c h r i s t i a n consciousness over the social unjus
:
:
2
18
2.3
20.7
:
:
3
- . . -.
3.4 : . - -
- . . - .
. .
t i c e based on r e a l i t y
: 04. Silences the trascendency o f the man .: 2. 1
- - . .-
1.1 : -. .. -- --. ...
:
:
05.
06.
Uhy i t i s necessary t o save the man's i n t e g r i t y
I t i s not approved q the church .: 2- 2.3
- ..
2.3 :
:
7
- -- :... 1.-
8.0 . . _- . ..
:
:
07.
08.
Valid according t o Gustavo Gutierrez
Inpulses the man t o abandon the t i e s with
materialism
: 2 2.3 : - - . _
1.1 :
-
: 09. There are v a l i d plans : 3 3.4 : - - : 2
1
2.3:
1.1 :
--.
.
..
: 10. The problem i s the method : 1 1.1 : 2 2.3 :
: 11. I d e n t i f i e s with the ones that suffer: poor : 4 4.6 : - - : 1 1 . 1 : - . .
and necessitated
: 12.
.. 2 2.3 - - . -- - - - - :
-- .- - . -. ..
Gives more l i b e r t y t o deal u i t h the persons : :
: 13. The social uork corresponds t o the g o v e r m t
-. . . 1 1.1 :
- : -
:
:
14.
15.
1 only t r y t o do well
I t i s populist not ecclesiastic .. .. . .
-
1
1
1.1 :
1.1 : - -. ... 11 1.1 :
:
:
:
16.
17.
18.
I keep on being t r a d i t i o n a l
I t i s a pastoral feature
I t helps the underdevelopnent
:
:
1
1
1.1
1.1 :
:
:
3
-
-
-- .. ---
3.4:
-. .. -. .. ..
1.1 :

:
:
19.
20.
Because i t i s p a r t of the church
Itisademandofausterity, livingtogetherand
:
:
1 1 . 1 :
1 1.1 :
-
- - . -
- ..
. . -
- : - - :
- - .
commrvlication u i t h the poor
: 21. Useful but not o f generalized application due t o : 1 1.1 : - - . . -_ . . - .
grade o r repression
- .
:
:
:
22.
23.
24.
Divides the church
I t can lead t o violence
I t bears no relationship u i t h uork
.. .-. -- ..-.. 321 3.4
1.1 :
2.3 :
:
- - .
-- .- .: .
-
1
- .
. .
1.1 :
: 25. Does not know or does not answer . . - : 11.1: - - : 10 11.5 :

Total : 43 49.4 : 26 29.9 : 5 5.7 : 13 14.9 :

* Does know o r does not answer

 555

percent; the other groups b), c)* dl, and f), because
o f their same characteristics, will be distributed in

two o r more variables, 2, 9, 10, 16, 24, and 25. There

are cases in which there is only one response, whether

affirmative or not, sometimes, do not know o r do not

answer. These cases are: answers 1, 5, 4, 7, 8. 12,

14, 17, 19, and 20. The important thing t o note thus

far is that in spite o f the fact that there is

sufficient coherence in positive attitudes a s weil as

negative ones toward liberation theology, they

represent only 32.17 percent, while the rest represent

67.83 percent, having lost the information o f two

priests, making a total of 8 7 and not 89 as in the

other tables.

3.3 Does Theology o f Liberation give a valid

image o f the Catholic faith and the reality

of Latin America?

In this question, we find almost t h e same

position held with regard t o the use o f liberation

theology. The most significant fact is the absolute

and relative weight o f those interviewed who refused t o

answer, because in this case it dropped considerably

(see Table No. 7). The distributior, shown in the

mentioned table is a s follows.

TABLE NO. 7

Does the Theology o f Liberation give

a valid image o f reality and the faith
Freq. 9.
1. Yes 44 49.43
2. No 21 23.59
3. Sometimes 17 19.10
4. Does not know, does not answer 7 7.86

Thus* we see that 49.43 percent consider

that Theology o f Liberation does offer a valid image of

the Catholic faith and o f the reslity in Guatemala and

Latin America, Another 19.10 percent affirms that

only in part; 23.59 percent deny such validity; and the

rest, 7.86 percent, refused t o answer the question.

Also, as in the previous qusstion, we found the real

significance o f those reasons lizs in the "why." The

following table sums up these attitudes. (See Table No.

TABLE NO. 8

Why? Freq. %
01. Valid evangelicalry and socially 2 4 26.96
for Latin America
02. The problem is its method, subject 12 13.48
t o easy manipulation
03. Not o f the faith, o f reality 3 3.37
04. Can generate violence 3 3.37
 It is a guide t o conscience
It is relative
It supports economic liberation
only
Distorts reality, takes the faith t o
a Marx i st ana 1 ys i s
According to the Pope, has positive
values, but one must be faithful t o
the gospel
It helps in t h e mission o f following
Chr i st
Only some consider it is so, the
majority of us are traditionalists
It is sectarian, ideological, not of
the majority
Does not know or does not answer

Using the same grouping categories a s in

point 3.2, we have a), which includes response 1; b ) ,

responses 5 and 10; c), responses 4, 7, 8, and 12; and

f ) , response 13. The absolute and relative weight of

each one is described as follows: group c), 25

priests, 28.08 percent; group a), 24 priests, 26.96

percent; group f ) , 13 priests, 13.48 percent; group el,

10 priests, 11.23 percent; group dl, 7 priests, 7.86

percent. A correlation o f coherence that we made in

point 3.2 based on a cross o f variables can also be

made in this case. (See Table No. 9.)

Here we have that those who answered in the

first option, responded positively, which shows a

great coherence t o group a); and equally, group 3)

(options 4, 7, 8 9 and 12) has a 100 percent negative
correlation. in any case. it must not be forgotten
that the degree of depth between this question and the
previous one is different since the one in point 3.2 is
meant t o observe the practice o f theology liberation,
while that o f 3.3 is intended t o observe the degree of

validity, but more on a theoretical level than a

practical one. Therefore. if we compare both
percentages of coherence in positive and negative
aspects, point 3.3 shows a greater number of priests
(37 percent) involved in relation t o question 3.2. in
which the percentage of priests involved is 25.8
percent. This is the result of the fact that it is not
the same t o put a theory into practice as it is t o give

an opinion on its validity. It all seems to indicate

that, based on the data that the previous results give

us. although the opinion that could be obtained on the

knowledge, usefulness for work, and the image it
provides on the faith and social reality, the Theology
of Liberation is somewhat prejudiced and distorted.
All those interviewed evidenced some degree o f

knowledge, however idealized it might be, of this

theology.
 Table No. 9

Cross between: Does catholic f a i t h o f f e r a v a l i d i m g e o f the Latin American r e a l i t y ?

With: Yhy?

Offer a v a l i d image o f faith... : Some- : Total o f :

*v? : Yes X : No X : times X : ** X : the row :

I t i s evangelical and s o c i a l l y v a l i d f o r L a t i n America : 24 27.0 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 24 27.0 :

The problem i s i t s methodology, i t ' s easily manipulated : 2 2.2 : 4 4.5 : 5 5.6 : 1 1 . :2 13.5 :
Not o f the catholic faith, but o f r e a l i t y : 0 0.0 : 1 1.1 : 2 2.2 : 0 0.0 : 3 3.4 :
I t can generate violence : 0 0.0 : 3 3.4 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 3 3.4 : .
I t i s a guide of conscience : 5 5.6 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 5 5.6 :
It i s r e l a t i v e : 2 2.2 : 2 2.2 : 4 4.5 : 1 1.1 : 9 10.1 :
I t suppports only the e c o m i c l i b e r a t i o n : 0 0.0 : 1 1.1 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 1 1.1 :
I t d i s t o r t s r e a l i t y and takes f a i t h : 0 0.0 : 2 2.2 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 2 2.2 :
t o a marxist analysis
: 09. According t o the Pope there e r e p o s i t i v e values, : 3 3.4 : 0 0.0 : 1 1.1 : 0 0.0 : 4 4.5
but one must he f a i t h f u l t o evangelism
: 10. It helps obtain a t o t a l cunnitment t o the mission : 6 6.7 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 6 6.7
o f following Christ
: 11. Only p a r t considers i t t o be so : 1 1.1 : 3 3.4 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 4 4.5
: 12.' I t i s sectarian, ideological and not of the majority : 0 0.0 : 4 4.5 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 4 4.5
: 13. Does not know o r does not answer : 1 1.1 : 1 1.1 : 5 5.6 : 5 5.6 : 12 13.5

Total o f the Colum : 44 49.4 : 21 23.6 : 17 19.1 : 7 7.9 : 89 100 * :

* The percentages were adjusted t o add up t o 100%

** Does not know o r does not answer
 In addition, within the group that f o c o ~ s e s
on
the positive political aspects of the Theology of
Liberation (a) there are those whose responses
contained more of a social denunciation than others in
the same group. Likewise, in the opposite group (e)
that emphasizes the negative political aspects o f the
Theology of Liberation, there are some positions that
are more radical than others, even though there is
more uniformity. At this point of the analysis, the
essential factor would seem to be the official
position of the church. By means of the papal
hierarchy and authority, there has been a hardening
stance toward such theology, and therefore, most
practitioners of the Theology of Liberaticn in Latin
America have tended t o select a more socializing

political alternative in which, in addition to a

profound change in structure, they demand a revaluation
of humanistic and Christian principles. Even though
this process has taken place in Latin America, in
Guatemala, because of the narrow political boundaries,
the necessary political space has not existed for the
open development of this type of position in society.

And the church, in the meantime, has not been able to

carry out the resolutions with Vatican 1 1 and Medellin
because o f the reasons we have seen throughout this

work. Therefore, a very small part o f the clergy

studied Theology o f Liberation with the intent o f

putting it in practice.

Just a s we have said, some pr iests who were

concerned about increasing the standard o f living for

th'e peasants, started a series o f organ izational and

communal activities for this purpose, during an

especially explosive time in the countryside.

However, they encountered the resistance o f

the governing sectors, eventually facing a repression

that led t o the death of some o f them. This made some

o f them abandon their habits and join the armed

movement against the government,

However, we are interested in emphasizing

the fact that the repression against church members in

the count,-yside created a larger flow of solidarity

and information that allowed various priests t o come

into contact with certain pastoral guidelines on the

Theology of Liberation and the justness o f some

activities that were promoted by this sector of the

clergy. Nonetheless, the hierarchy remained distant

from the situation, at least those of the archdiocese.
In this respect, the Theology o f Liberation, more than
being a group position amongst the Guatemalan church,
was from the beginning, and is t o this day, holding an
attitude of individual commitment; from there o n one
can observe very little uniformity concerning the
priests' opinion on this matter.4

Another situation that works against greater

success for the Theology of Liberation is the

opposition currently carried out by the Vatican,

motivated, perhaps, by the fact that the present Pope

comes from a socialist country in which the church

confronts different types of problems and persecution,
which makes it difficult for the Church t o identify
with any type o f socialism.5

Another argument that can justify this situation is

the scarcity o f ecclesiastic base communities a an
integral part o f a liberating and politically
compromised theology. This is caused by the fact that
generally in these communities one finds the necessary
social catalyst for the growth and development o f this
theology t o the extent that its practice is not
circumscribed t o a purely theoretical exposition, but
is reflected in the context of the ecclesiastical and
political praxis. See supra, Chapter 1 1 1 .
Up t o the date of this work, the document "L ibertad
Cristiana y LiberacionW had not beenpublished. The
Theology of Liberation achieves a certain level of
recognition from the Vatican in this document.
 Nonetheless, at this eminently political
level, it is a complex situation, since the social
structures and miserable conditions of life that affect
a large majority o f the Latin American population will
continue promoting actions by the clergy to solve
and/or alleviate the situation. The rise of

rebellious and revolutimary activities will continue

possibly t o a degree that this clergy clashes with the
pre-established interests and the degree of repression
launched against them. In other words, the practice
o f the Theology of Liberation could be abandoned and
the clergy can, as a whole, join the practice of the
Catholic Church's official theology. Nonetheless, the
poor and the deprived will have t o do something.
Several hypothetical judgements can be made with this
afffrmation, which will simply be stated since they

were not included in this study.

a ) We would have a situation that would tend
t o favor and t o strengthen the church's conservative
and developmentalist groups if, priests in practicing
thechurch's official theology in working with the poor
and deprived, linked themselves t o governmental and
non-governmental organizations, whether they be
national or foreign, and implemented developmental or
transformational plans that do not clash with the

interests o f dominant economic sectors, and that these

sectors allow them t o work, and if the government does

not exercise pressure and/or repression against members

of the church and its bases benefited by the church's

projects.
b) We would have a situation that would tend

t o favor and t o strengthen rebellious and

revolutionary positions in the clergy, if, in

practicing the Catholic Church's official theology

toward working with the poor and deprived, the priests

clashed with the interests o f dominant sectors and the

government exercised pressures and/or repression

against members o f the church and the bases o f people

benefited by their projects, even though the priests

linked their actions with government and non-

governmenta 1 organizations, whether they were national

or foreign, and implemented developmenta 1 and

transformat ional plans. That is, the po 1 itical

position that is derived from a theological position

(as we have seen, could be Theology of Liberation or

the official theology that the church pretends t o

promote), it is a variable that depends on the social
conditions in which it is practiced and within the type
of social conscience that results from its practice.
This allows us to conclude for this study, and
particularly in reference to the Theology of
Liberation, the number of priests that link this
theological position with a revolutionary or rebellious
political position. That is, most of its practitioners
seem to circumscribe t o its practice only in the
pastoral, methodological aspect, leaving to one side
the methodology of analyzing the social reality and the
social obligations derived from that. Contrarily, the
antagonistic group, or the one that does not practice
the Theology of Liberation, maintafns a consequent
attitude regarding theology as well as social
obligations. That is to say, in one as much as fn the
other, they express a conservative position, even
though some might identify themselves with a
developmentalist position.

4. Knowledge of Organized Sacerdotal Groups

Basically, this part of the questionnaire
was limited t o the knowledge the interviewees had about
'the organization and their possible agreement or
disagreement with positions it adopted, allows us to

see t o what point COSDEGUA's message penetrated in the

clergy, and, if a concrete position toward COSDEGUA
can be inferred from their responses. Even though the
results of this variable were strongly diminished
because only 40.45 percent responded to an option, it
seems important to us to include it. It seems that

because of its relative importance, COSDEGUA abandoned

a cause that nobody will raise again. The table of
responses is as follows.
TABLE No. 10

Do you agree with the positions Freq. 7.

adopted by COSDEGUA
1. Yes 8 8.98
2. No 25 28.08
3. Partially 3 3.37
4. Does not know, does not answer 53 59.55
The results of a cross in variables between
these and the "why," the results can be observed in
Table No. 1 1 . These results can be grouped according
to certain criteria that allows us to determine the
following: a: positive attitude; b) intermediate
positive attitude (there is an implicit type of
criticism); c) attitude resulting from lack of
 Table No. 11

Cross betueen: There was a group c a l l e d Cosdegua

Do ycu agree u i t h the majority o f the p e t i t i o n s adopted by Cosdegua
W i tL: Why?
- -

Agree u i t h the Cosdegua p e t i t i o n s : Par- : Total o f :

Why? :Yes X :No X :tially% : ** X : therow :

: 01. Agrees on some terms : 4 4.7 : 0 0.0 : 2 2.4 : 0 0.0 : 6 7.1 :

: 02. Agree u i t h the hierarchy : 0 0.0: 1 1.2: 0 0.0: 0 0.0: 1 1.2:
: 03. L i t t l e camxnication in t h i s regard betueen the p r i e s t s : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 1 1.2 : 1 1.2 :
: 04. The ideas uere good, I don't knou what they wanted : 0 0.0 : 2 2.4 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 2 2.4 :
: 05. They wished t o overthrou hierarchy, i t ' s b e t t e r : 0 0.0 : 7 8.2 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 7 8.2 :
t o have a dialogue
: 06. I n general i t s principles and goals were good, krt : 1 1.2 : 1 1.2 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 2 2.4 :
i t s directors acted deviated
: 07. I t w w l d u n i t e the guatemalan clergy : 1 1.2: 0 0.0: 0 0.0: 0 0.0: 1 1.2:
: 08. There are feu guatemelan p r i e s t s : 0 0.0 : 1 1.2 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 1 1.2 :
: 09. They were searching f o r more commitment, krt there was : 2 2.4 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 2 2.4 :
: disobedience t o t h e i r superiors
: 10. I t would disunite the church and d i v i d e the c l e r j y : 0 0.0
..: 6 7.1 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 6 7.1 :
: 11. They were too n a t i o n a l i s t i c : 0 0.0 : 3 3.5 : 1 1.2 : 4 4.7 : 8 9.4 :
: 12. 1 d i d not become acquainted u i t h i t : 0 0.0 : 3 3.5 : 0 0.0 : 14 16.5 : 17 20.0 :
: 13. Does not know or does not answer : 0 0.0 : 1 1.2 : 0 0.0 : 30 35.3 : 31 36.5 :

Total of the colunn : 8 9.4 : 25 29.4 : 3 3.5 : 49 57.6 : 85 100 * :

* The percentages uere ajusted t o give 100%

** Does not know or does not ansuer
knowledge; d) intermediate negative attitude (does not

agree, but there is no direct criticism either); e )

negative attitude and, f ) does not know or does not

answer. In group a) we find option 7; in group b ) ,

options 1, 6, and 9; in group c), options 3, 4, and 12;

in group d), options 2, 8, and 11; in group e ) options

5 and 10; and in group f) option 13. A table

containing these characteristics is as fo:lows (See

Table No. 12).

TABLE No. 12

Type of Attitude Yes No Par- * Total

tial ly

a) Positive 1 0 C 0 i
b) Intermediate positive 7 1 2 0 10
C) Lack of knowledge 0 5 0 15 20
d) Intermediate negative 0 5 1 4 10
e) Negative 0 13 0 3 13
f) Does not answer or 0 1 0 30 31
does not know

* Does not answer or does not know

In accordance with this table, a simple view
shows a great coherence between two extreme positions,

independent o f the number of those interviewed who

responded since the positive as we11 as the negative

attitude, are represented. with 100 percent in

affirmative and negative answers. Nonetheless, the
keys t o explaining its failure as an organized group
are found, perhaps, in attitudes b) and d) which, in a

critical way, focus on its position. except in the

case o f response 2, in which there is a strong

identification with the hierarchy. On the other hand,
this leads us t o believe that because o f the global

confrontation of the clergy, a particular movement,

whether it tries t o unite just the national clergy

and/or the foreign clergy or a sector o f the clergy,

that has certain characteristics (for example, the

practice of the Theology o f Liberation), whether it is

partial or tries t o involve all of the clergy, or

whether it is formal or not, has few chances of

success.
A situation that could contribute t o the low
number o f priests that answered this question is the
high level of mobility among the secular clergy,

especially among those coming from abroad. It is

possible that few priests remain from the era in which

COSDEGUA made history.

5) Economy
5.1) Does a small group dominate the economic
life of Guatemala?
This question sought to bring us closer, in
a general way. to the opinion of the interviewees on
situations that are still evident to them. Nonethe-
less, its importance lies in the possibility of
disccvering the intention of each case, just as we
have been pointing out in this variable as well as
others. The table responding to the question: "Do you
believe that a small group dominates the economic
life of Guatemala?" follows (See Table No. 13).

TABLE NO. 13
Do you believe that a small group Freq. 7.
dominates the economic life of
Guatema 1 a
1. Yes 76 85.39
2. No 3 3.37
3. Does not know, does not answer 10 11.23
Based on this table, we can aFfirm that a
marked majority within the clergy believes that the

wealth is concentrated in very few hands. Now, the

criteria expressed as to the ltwhy", correlated with

the previous question, i s shswn i n Tstle No. 14.

 We can observe here that options 1 and 7
respond t o a global view of the economic problem,
focusing not only on the interior of the country, but
giving it an international perspective a s well. In
other words, in reality, a small group within the
country can partially dominate the national economic
life, but the economic decision is international. The
economy is dependent on and carried out through foreign
and national monopolies. The absolute and relative
weight o f those who answered the alternatives is
comprised OF 10 priests, representing 11.23 percent.
The rest of the views on the economic

problems are o f partial nature. In other words, they

look at the problem from an internal point o f view,
even though there are other factors that must be taken
into account. Thus there are 18 priests that
represent 20.22 percent that emphasize production
factors (ownership of the means of production and means
o f work are the owners of the wealtn: and there are
those who responded t o options 4 and 5. Others
emphasize extra-economic factors such as government
support of a few powerful businessmen. On this latter
issue, six priests, representing 6.74 percent responded
 Table No. 14

Cross between: Do you think there exists a small group that dominates economic l i f e i n Guatemala?

Do you think there :s a small group.. .? : Total of :

Wv? : Yes X : No X : ** X : the row :

: 01. ;he economic d6cision i s international, we have

sn independent economy. : 2 2.3 : 1 1 . : 0 0.0 : 3 3.4 :
: 02. I t i s evident that a small group dominates the econcmy. : 25 28.4 : 1 1.1 : 0 0.0 : 26 29.5 :
: 03. I t i s not one group, but several small groups : 3 3.4 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 3 3.4 :
that sustain power.
: 04. They are the owners o f the means o f production and : 14 15.9 : 0 0.0 : 1 1.1 : 15 17.0 :
work, they are very few.
: 05. They have taken over the wealth o f the country. : 3 3.4 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 3 3.4 :
:
:
06.
07.
A feu have a great deal u h i l e many have nothing.
Through national and foreign monopolies.
. .: 8
7
9.1
8.0
:
:
0
0
0.0
0.0
:
:
0
0
0.0
0.0
e
:
8
7
9.1
8.0
:
:
: 08. The governent supports a few businessmen. : 3 3.4 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 3 3.4 :
: 09. Since there i s no s i g n i f i c a n t middle class. : 2 2.3 :. 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 2 2.3 :
: 10. According t o the s t a t i s t i c s . : 5 5.7 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 5 5.5 :
: 11. Does not know or does not enswer. : 4 4.5 : 1 1.1 : 9 10.2 : 14 18.8 :

Total o f the Colum : 76 86.4 : 3 3.4 : 10 11.3 : 89 100.0 :

* Note: Error i n introducing the data.

** Does not know or does not answer.
t o options 8 and 3. Another 2.24 percent, representing
2 priests. considered -ocial factors within the

internal perspective, such a s the non-existence of a

strong middle class that could soften and/dilute the

unequal distribution o f wealth, at least a little.

They are represented by option 9. In additftn. t h e r e

is another type o f internal perception, which the

opposition between wealthy and poor, in which the

wealthy, which are few, have a lot; and the poor. whom

are a lot. have little. This perception is represented

by eight priests. or 8.89 percent that responded to

option 6. Finally, the extensive group, 31 priests

representing 34.83 percent also agree with a n internal

perception, but this time motivated by evidence of the

acts, evidence based on direct observation and

reflected by responding t o option 10. The group

representing those who did not know or refused t o

answer was comprised o f 14 priests, representing 15.73

percent that answered option 1 1 .

5.2 In whose possession should the majority o f

Guatemala's large companies lie?

Table No. 15 shows sums up the positions that

the interviewees showed in this regard.
TABLE NO. 15
In whose possession should the Freq.
majority of Guatemala's large
companies lie?
1. The State 2
2. The Laborers 6
3. Cooperat i ves 25
4. Private Ownership 20
5. Mixed Ownership 19
6. Other type of ownership 6
7. Does not know or does not answer 11

In this table, we can see more clearly the

possible rclation that could exist with regard t o the

position maintained by the clergy with r e s ~ e c tt o

change in the global society. On the other hand, we
have that most of those interviewed showed they agreed

with intermediate forms o f ownership, that lie between

private and state ownership. Thus, for example, those

that opted for cooperative ownership and mixed

companies represent 49.43 percent o f the interviewees,

~ h i l ethose that support a traditional form o f private

ownership represented 22.47 percent, and those that in
one form or another are in favor of a radical change in

ownership, which would happen if it pessed i?to the

hands of the state or workers, represent only 8.89

percent; with 6.74 percent that did not specify any

type of ownership, but did not choose any type

contemplated in the options in the question either.

The tendency towards the intermediary forms

of ownership illustrates an attitude that does not

agree with the status quo but does not demand its

abolition or a violent rupture either. On the other

hand, such responses could explain the fact that the

Guatemalan clergy is classified most as a reformist.

In our opinion, two factors combine in the country to

strengthen this reformist position. First, the unjust

distribution of wealth that is proved by a large gap

between those that have and have not. Second, the fact

fact that the majority o f the foreign clergy comes from

countries in which development has been achieved along

with a strong dosage of support for private property.

However, development has also generated a series o f

social conquests that a1 low workers better living

conditions that affect the global development of

society. Therefore, we can affirm to the degree that

this economic development is not reflected in an

improvement OF the workers' standard o f living, it is

very possible that these, a s in other sectors, identify

themselves with more radical and violent options

destinedo according t o them, t o improve their living

5.3 Do foreign investments benefit Latin America?

O f those interviewed, 57.30 percent said

foreign investment does benefit Latin America; 21.34

percent said it does not; 10.11 percent considers that

sometimes it does; and 11.23 percent did not give an

opinion. The corresponding table is as follows. (See

Table No. 16)

TABLE No. 16

Do foreign investments benefit Freq. 7.

Latin America?
1. Yes 51 57.30
2. No 19 21.34
3. Sometimes 9 10.11
4. Does not know, does not answer 10 11.23
The importance o f this question e m e ~ g e s ,

fundamentally, from the problems currently confronted

by Latin American countries, a s a result of its

enormous foreign debt. In the case o f Guatemala, the

situation has not reached the explosive point as in

- - -- -

In general, the point o f view maintained by this

work is that the clergy in Guatemala, in its majority,
identifies itself a s developmentalist in political
terms, which is shown on an analytical level with this
fieldwork. O f course, the already mentioned limitation
that it was carried out only in the archdiocese exists,
but that limitation does not contradict the proposed
hypothesis.
other countries. Nevertheless, this does not mean that
the problem does not exist. In addition, it should be

taken into account that within the boundaries o f the

developmental concept o f the economic process, foreign

investment has a fundamental role, while it is

considered t o be a negative element and t o distort

development according t o non-developmental concepts.

For a more global view, we crossed this variable and

the previous one, a cross that couid provide better

possibilities o f analysis. The table is as follows (See

Tab1 e No. 17).

TABLE No. 17
Ownership Yes % No X Some- % * 7..
times
1. State 0 0.0 2 2.3 0 0.0 0 0.0
2. Workers 2 2.3 3 3.5 1 1.2 0 0.0
3. Mixed Ownership 13 15.1 3 3.5 2 2.3 1 1.2
4. Private 16 18.6 2 2.3 2 2.3 0 0.0
5. Cooperatives 9 10.5 9 10.5 2 2.3 5 5.8
6. Another type 5 5.8 0 0.0 1 1.2 0 0.0
7. Doesn't know/ 5 5.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 3-5
no answer

TOTAL 50 55.1 19 22.1 8 9.3 9 10.5

* Doesn't know or did n3t answer

Independent o f the ~ b s o l u t enumbers that each

position represents, we can see thst 100 percent (a
percentage taken from the total o f the rows) o f those
who consider that the majority o f the large companies

should be in hands o f the state, said that foreign

investment did not benefit Latin America; o f those who

consider that they should be in the hands o f the

workers, 33.33 percent said that foreign investment did

benefit Latin America; 50 percent said no and 16.66

percent said that it was sometimes beneficial. O f those

who said they think companies should be run by

cooperatives, 36.0 percent said that foreign investment

was beneficial, another 36.0 percent said it was not,

and 8.0 percent said it was sometimes, and 20.0 percent

said they did not know or did not answer. Of those who

believe that ownership should be in private hands, 80.0

percent said it agreed that foreign investment was

beneficial; 10.0 percent said it was not, and another

10.0 percent said it was sometimes. Of those who said

companies should be run by mfxed ownership, 68.42

percent said that foreign investment was beneficial,

15.78 percent said it was not and another 10.52 percent

said it was sometimes, and 5.26 percent said they did

not know or did not answer. Of those who said that

ownership o f the majority o f large companies should

fall under a category other than those mentioned, 83.33

percent said that foreign investment was beneficial,
16.66 percent said it was sometimes beneficial. Of
those who did not know or did not answer the question
of ownership, 62.5 percent said that foreign investment
was beneficial and 37.5 percent considered it was
sometimes.
Based on the preceding breakdown, , we can
see that a strong coherence exists between the
variables: ownership of large companies in the country
and the benefit of foreign investment. That is t o say,
among those who agreed with the intermedizte ownership
forms (cooperatives and mixed) cf privzte property and
forms that were against it, whether ownership passes
into the hands of the state or the workers, 50.0
percent said that foreign investment was beneficial,
while 27.27 percent said it was not, 9.09 percent said
it was sometimes and 13.63 percent aid not know or did
not answer. Thus, we can conclude, as we said in the
context, that the express approval of foreign
investment corresponds with a conception of the
economic development process just as those who
supported intermediate forms o f ownership. It is true
that this position o f support for foreign investment
is not expressed only by those who believe in

intermediate forms, but also by those who believe in

traditional private ownership. In this case, the slant

is a little different since those who support the

traditional private ownership believe that this foreign

aid should be channeled fundamentally towards

strengthening private ownership, and not with sights

towards a developmental type of process. Therefore, we

see here that 80.0 percent think foreign investment i s

beneficial; 10.0 percent think it is not and also 10.0

percent think it is sometimes. Based on a more

profound analysis, we consider that those whc support

another type o f ownership d o so, not because.the given

alternatives did not consider a type of non-fundamental

ownership, but because o f not wanting t o make a

commitment. If we look at the weight o f the opinion on

foreign investment benefits, we find that 83.33 percent

said that there are benefits, and 16.67 percent said

they were sometimes, and there was no opposing

opinion. Among those who supported state or worker

ownership, we that 25.0 percent said they agreed that

foreign investment is beneficial, while 62.5 percent

said no and only 12.5 percent said it was sometimes

beneficial. Just a s those who did support one type of

ownership, o f those who refused t o answer or said they

did not know, 62.5 percent a p p r o v ~ dthe benefits o f
foreign investment while 37.5 percent did not

coherently know or answer. Not one o f the interviewees

said he was opposed t o foreign investment. The

representative table follows (See Table No. 18).

TABLE No. 18

Ownership Yes % No 7, Some- Z * 7'.

tines
1. Intermediate 22 50.0 12 27.27 4 9.09 6 13.6
2. Private 16 80.0 2 10.00 2 10.00 0 0.0
3. Workers or State 2 25.0 5 62.50 1 12.50 0 0.0
4. Another type 5 83.3 0 0.0 1 16.66 0 0.0
5. Doesn't know/ 5 62.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 37.5
no answer
* Doesn't know or did not answer
Note: The percentages refer t o the total o f the row.

5.4 In your opinionp t o what degree should Latin

American governments exercise control over foreign

foreign investment?

As we pointed out in number 5.3, the topic of

foreign investment has become controversial because of

its implication in the development of foreign debt,

and, i n addition, in the fact that it has not resulted

in an integral development for the entire population.
Thus the majority of interviewees said they agreed that
control over foreign investment should be greater. The
corresponding tabie follows (See Table No. 1 9 ) .
TABLE No. 19

Should there be control over

foreign investment? Freq. 9.
1. Yes 42 47.19
2. NO 2n 22.47
3. Sometimes 7 7.86
4 . Does not know, does not answer 20 22.47

NOW* the degree of control does not

necessarily correspond t o whether one is or is not in
agreement with such an investment. All would seem t o
indicate that independently of opinions the priests
have towards foreign debt* this debt is taken as a
fact. These responses are shown in the following table
(See Table No. 2 0 ) .
If we look at the row o f those who think

that foreign investment is beneficial, 5 6 . 8 6 percent

thought that there should be stronger control. 2 5 . 4 9

percent said there should be little control, 13.22

percent said that there should be no control. and 3 . 9 2
percent did not know or refused t o answer. Among those
who did not agree with the benefits of foreign
x x x x
investment, 68.42 percent said they thought there
should be stronger control, 26.31 percent said they

thought there should be little control, and 5.26

percent did not know or refused t o answer. Among those

who said that foreign investment was beneficial

sometimesp 1 1 . 1 1 percent said there should be little

control, and 88.89 percent did not know or refused to

ezswsr.
Finally, among those who refused t o answer or

did not respond t o the question about the benefits o f

foreign investment, 10.0 percent said there should be

little control, and 90.0 percent consequently did not

know or did not answer. Here we can see a great

concern by the priests over fore ign investment, s ince ,

as we have said. forei gn i nvestment pres.ents an

extremely complex problem for Latin America. In

addition, it also would seem that not even government

control would be a guarantee, al~d, therefore, not for

the benefits of such an investment efther. If we

analyze the corresponding table, the cross between

those who should have means of ownership and control

investment, we see that those who believe the large

companies should be in the hands o f the state (Table

No, 2 1 1 all said that state control o f investment '

should be quite strong. There are those who said

ownership should be in the hands o f the workers, some

said that state control should be quite strong (2 out

o f 6 ) . little (2 out o f 61, and did not know or did not

answer (another 2 out of 6). Among those who opted for

cooperative ownership 10 o f 25 said state control

should be quite strong; 4 said that there should be

little control; 5 said there should be no control, and

6 did not know or did not answer. In addition, of

those who favored private ownership, 8 o f 20 said

control should be quite strong, 7 said there should be

little control, 2 said there should be no control, and

3 did not know or refused t o answer. Among those who

supported mixed ownership, 13 o f 19 said there should

be quite strong control, 4 said there should be less,

and 2 refused t o answer or did not know, Among those

who opted for another type o f ownership, 3 o f 6 said

control should be stronger, 2 said it should be less,

and one refused t o answer or did not know. Finally,

among thsse who refused to answer or did not know in

what hands ownership should lie, 3 o f 8 said there

should be stronger control, and 5 refused t o answer or

did not know.

TABLE No. 21
Ownersh i p Stronger % Little % None Z
1. State 2 2.3 0 0.0 0 0.0
2. Workers 2 2.3 0 2.3 0 0.0
3. Cooperatives 10 11.6 4 4.7 5 5.8
4. Private 8 9.3 7 8.1 2 2.3
5. Mixed 13 15.1 4 ' 4.7 0 0.0
6 . Other type 3 3.5 2 2.3 0 0.0
7. Doesn'tknow/ 3 3.5 0 0.0 0 0.0
no answer
* Doesn't know or did no? answer
The preceding analysis allows us to

provisionally conclude that the clergy's predominant

economic view was developmentalistr although this did
not exclude the existence sf traditional and
revolutionary positions. Nonetheless, it must be
clarified that in this sense it was riot possible to
probe the clergy with more concrete questions, since
the situation affecting the country made it difficult
for the interviewees t o be more explicit and clear with
their responses.
Why did we decide that the predominant view
was developmentalist? To begin with, most,forms of
ownership supported by the majority of the priests
interviewed were forms that, being intermediate between
state and private control, pointed fundamentally toward

creating conditions that would allow for a better

distribution of wealth and an opening up of the
internai market without affecting the economic system
as a whole. That is t o say, there were forms o f
ownership that could exist perfectly in a capitalistic
system and that, instead of restricting possibilities
in such a system, tended t o modernize and humanize it.
Second, we can see that for a great majority, the idea
of economic development is not conceivable without t h c
supposed benefits tnat the foreign system would bring.
N=metheiess, a great majority thought that this
investment should be controlled very efficiently by the
government. This alone did not condition the practice
of state control, since, on the other hand, many of the
loans and aid received from abroad were granted under
quite strict conditions, and in many cases, they tried
t o compromise national sovereignty and independence;
therefore, we see responses that say state control
should be exercised. However, in the latter sense, we
can also see that there was a considerable number who
proposed little control or none. We think the path
that foreign aid has taken in many cases has not been
prec i se 1 y the best.
We must also note that another clearly
defined position is the conservative one; in other
words, those who showed tacit support for the status
quo, who agreed with the traditional form of private
ownership, who supported foreign investment. Although
there were those who said that foreign investment
should be quite strongly controlled, the majority said

there should be little control or rone at all.

Finally, a more radical economic position can
be detected, although it is vague. Logically, those
who should be categorized in this section were those

who supported state ownership or ownership by the

workers. But, in this case, the situation was not that
simple. For example, those who supported state
ownership could be expressing a revolutionary,
sccialist position or a fascist type o f state control.
The opposite would occur among those who supported
ownership in the hands of the workers. However, in
this case* a more sentimental attitude could exist than

a conseq~efi-Lial,political attitude toward a

revolutionary ideology. Despite these observations, we
think that there is an orientation toward the
revolutionary path, though not significant numerically,
but one in which consequential attitudes can be seen in
some cases. However, it is difficult to explain in
more detail because of the lack of direct questions.

6. Violence, Syndicate Freedom, Human Rights,

Freedom of Association and Elections.
This section of the questionnaire is one of
the most dense, since the ex,isting conditions in the
country allowed the revelation of significant attitudes

to be taken into account in the global analysis.

6.1 Are there situations in which the use of violence

can be justified?
In general, it can be said that the majority
of priests interviewed, representing 50.05 percent,
considered that violence cannot be justified. There

were a few who, while not justifying it, said it is

inevitable or can be explained if nnt justified; they

represented 2.24 percent.

Among those who justified it there were very
different motivations, including the political. Some
o f them j u s t i f i e d v i o l e n c e when t h e r e was hunger

(2.24%). i n cases o f u n j u s t a g g r e s s i o n (4.49%). because

o f l a c k o f work (1.12%). a g a i n s t t y r a n n y and u n j u s t

s t r u c t u r e s (15.73%). Others J u s t i f i e d it f o r t h e i s t i c

reasons, f o r instance, when f i g h t i n g f o r t h e Kingdom o f

God (2.24%); o t h e r s j u s t i f i e d it when t h e r e was no

o t h e r s o l u t i o n (5.61%); o t h e r s when a p p l i e d t o

a c h i e v i n g j u s t i c e (1.12%); o t h e r s o p t e d f o r a t y p e o f

o p p r e s s i o n o r o t h e r methods i n which t h e moral and

p h y s i c a l d i g n i t y o f t h e p e r s o n was n o t p u t i n t o danger

(2.24%). And, finally, t h e r e were t h o s e who d i d n o t

j u s t i f y p o l i t i c a l violence, e x c e p t i n cases o f s e l f

defense (3.37%). The complete t a b l e i s a s f o l l o w s (See

Table No. 22).

TABLE No. 22

Are t h e r e s i t u a t i o n s i n which t h e Freq. "1.

use o f v i o l e n c e can be j u s t i f i e d ?

01. Not j u s t i f i e d 49 55.05

02. When f i g h t i n g f o r t h e Kingdom 2 2.24
o f God
03. When t h e r e i s hunger 1 1.12
04. Against u n j u s t aggression 4 4.49
05. A t most, r e p r e s s i o n o r a n o t h e r 2 2.24
method i n which t h e p h y s i c a l
and moral i n t e g r i t y o f a p e r s o n
i s n o t endangered.
06. Sometimes it i s i n e v i t a b l e 1 1.12
 When there is no work, rebellious- 1 1.12
ness begins
In self defense, but not in 3 3.37
politics,
If used against a tyrant or 14 15.73
against unjust structures
Not justified but explained 1 1.12
When there is no other solution 5 5.6 1
When it is for justice 1 1.12
Does not know or does not answer 5 5.61

Given the violent situation that has affected

the country, it was logical that this problem was very

real, although, as we have said, the motives varied in

t h e opinions expressed by the priests.

6.2 Should trade unions and individuals have more

freedom?
In this question, we see that priests started

t o become cautious with questions they might consider

compromising. In many other countries, a question

like the one we used in reference t o trade unions and

individual freedom would not be a problem t o answer. To

demand freedom for unions or any other kind o f

organization signifies a strovg identification with

popular sectors and implies a deviation from t h e

official and political conventiorality and from some

right wing sectors that see syndicate and communal

organizations as a very threatening enemy t o defeat.
Rcwever, in Guatemala, it does not turn out

that way. O f the total, 67.41 percent refused t o

answer the question. Another 29.21 percent said that

labor u n i o ~ sa63 ffidfviduals should nave rnore f r ~ e d a m ,

and 3.37 percent said no. The complete table is as

follows (See Table No. 23).

TABLE No. 23

Should trade unions and individuals Freq. %

'
have more freedom?

1. Yes 26 29.21
2. No 3 3.37
3. Does not know, does not answer 60 67.41

When a cross is made between this variable

and the "why," we see that the motivation is the

follcwicg (Sse Tsble No. 24).

There are those who, in their response, also

connoted that such union freedom did not exist (see

alternatives 2 and 6), although among them was one who

did not agree thet there should be more freedom. The

rest, in one way or another, supposed achievements in

case it did exist (see options 1 and 3 ) . or why such

freedom should be respected (see options 4, 5, and 7).

Finally, there were those who supported a controlled
freedom. In other words, they favored freedom, but
with necessary means of control so that it did not go
overboard (option 8). The situation presented by this
cross is that there was a strong perception among the
clergy that union freedom and individual freedoms were

seriously compromised and that it was necessary to

return t o a regime that respected syndicate and
individual rights (if that regime ever existed t o begin

with). As we shall see, we concluded that this way of

thinking did exist among the priests, based on a
control question we included.
6.3 Are human rights violated in Guatemala?

For many years, international human rights

organizations have been observing Guatemala. There
have been many voices of condemnation, interna1:y as
well as externally, that have denounced the official
policy, characteristic o f military regimes, of using
systematic methods of repression and violence against
the civilian population, trade unions, intellectual
and academic sectors, a systematic repression that
also affected the Catholic Church, its priests, and
believers of different ecclesiastical baseline
 Table No. 24

Cross betueen: Do y w think that the sindicates and individuals should have more liberty?
With: Why?

More Liberty t o sindicates and individuals : Totalof :

Why: : Yes X : No X : X : therou :

: 01. There i s more freedom o f thought : 2 2.2 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 2 2.2 :

: 02. I t ' s not a matter o f more L i k r t y but o f Liberty i t s e l f : 6 6.7 : 1 1.1 : 0 0.0 : 7 7.9 :
: 03. There m s t be more Liberty t o inprove t h e i r functions : 4 4.5 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 4 4.5 :
: 04. Freedom of association m s t be respected : 3 3.4 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 3 3.4 :
: 05. For the same r i g h t t o express and organize : 3 3.4 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 3 3.4 :
: 06. Sindicate l i b e r t y does not r e a l l y exist, althw!lh : 4 4.5 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 4 4.5 :
i n theory i t does
: 07. International Lau demands i t that uay : 1 1 . 1 : 0 0.0: 0 0.0: 1 1 . 1 :
: 08. Controlled l i b e r t y : 2 2.2 : 0 0.0 : 0 0.0 : 2 2.2 :
; 09. Does not knou o r does not ansuer : 1 1.1 : 2 2.2 : 60 67.4 : 63 70.8 :
. .
Total of the Colum : 26 20.2 : 3 3.4 : 60 67.4 : 89 100.0 :

* Does not knou or does not answer

organizations.such as celebrators o f the Word,
catechists, and others. Therefore. it is logical that

the great majority said that there were human rights

violations in Guatemala. Of those priests interv i ewed ,

74.15 percent said there were human rights violat ions,

2.24 percent said there were not, 4.49 percent sa id the
human rights violations were relative, and 17.97

percent did not know or refused t o answer. A complete

table follcws. (See Table No. 25)

TABLE NO. 25

rreq. %
1. Yes 66 74.15
2. No 2 2.24
3. It's relative 4 4.49
4. Does not know or does not answer 16 17.97
We can analyze the reasons given for the

violation o f rights in connection with the question o f

"why" and the previously cited question on human rights

violations in the following table (See Table No. 26).

Independently o f whether or not they agreed

that human rights were violated, we find two opposing

positions: one, they saw the problem from the point o f

 Table No. 26

: Total of :
: Yes X : No X : Relative : X : the row :

: 01. There i s e uar a i d the guerillas have money t o

sustain themselves
: 1 1.13
:
: 1 1.13 : - - .- - : 2 2.27 :

: 02. Like a l l urderdevelcped countries : 1 1.13 --: - . -

-- .. -
-- .. -- -- : 1 1.13 :
: 03.
: 04.
There are so many kidnappings and murders
Not only i n violence but i n the
: 16 18.18
: 9 10.22 -:
: -- . - - : 16 18.18
: 9 10.22
:
:
: 05.
l i v i n g conditions
I t i s evident : 22 25.00 : - - . - - .. -- - : 22 25.00 :
: 06. They are inproving : 2 2.27 : I
: 2 2.27 : -
1.13
-- :
..-- --- .. -- - : 3 3.40 :
: 07. Not only the goverrment, but others as well
: 1 1.13 : - -
.: 4- - . - --- : 2 2.27 :
: 4 4.54 : -
: 08. Dishunanization end loss o f f b i t h : 1 1.13 :
: 09. They k i l l because they don't agree with the goverrment
.- - . - -- : 4 4.54 :
: 10.
: 11.
D i f f i c u l t t o determine
Does not know or does not answer : 8 9.10 : - - . - 4.56- : 2 2.27
: 14 15.90
: 6 6.81
: 22 25.00
:
: '
- -

Total o f the c o l u m

* Does not know or does not answer

view that it was the government that violated them (see

option 9); two, they distributed the bldme between the

government and antigovernment organizations (see

options 1 and 7). (By antigovernment, we are referring

t o armed political opposition since groups can also

exist that oppose the government but maintain a

nonviolent position). In reality, both groups are not

very significant numerically, but we consider that they

are very significant groups when generalizing, since

some maintain a conservative position and others,

conversely, an advanced revolutionary position.

The conservative position existed not only as

a means t o justify opposition t o the armed revolution-

ary option, but it also justified, at the expense o f

revolutionary groups, human rights violations and,

based on thist exempted the government from violations.

There were othsr groups of priests who linked human

rights violations not only with violence, kidnappings,

and assassinations, but also with a broader

perspective, including the living conditions of the

population (see option 4). This, in our judgement, is

a more globalizing stance on the problem o f human

rights since it includes not only human, but economic,

social, and cultural rights a s well. The latter
concept has been popular within nongovernmental,

international groups that defend human rights, a

concept through which traditional coverage o f rights

extends t o include protection o f the right t o work, the

right t o culture, education, improved economic living

conditions, and so forth.

Another grGup identified the violation of

human rights within boundaries o f defending

r <*
the right

o f life, arguing that in Guatemala there were many

assassinations and kidnappings (option 3). which was

evidence that such rights a r e not respected, although

there was no direct accusation o f who committed the

violations. We can add t o this group those that said

human rights violations were evident (see option 5).

It is worth noting that, in general, the press, whether

it be televised, printed word, or transmitted by radia,

informs abundantly on the acts o f violence that take

place in the capital and in the interior o f t h e

country, a s well a s gathers denunciations made by

family members o f those who are disappeared or

assarsrnated (specifically the Grupa de Apayo Mutuo,

GAM, llsui generis," a group composed o f family

members o f the disappeared. GAM members congregate in
the Metropolitan Cathedral (in front of the National

Palace) and other places (the Supreme Court o f

Justice) and carry out a permanent denunciation o f the

abuse their family members were subjected t o and

demand a n explanation from the government. We think

that these situations exhibit a latent concern from

numerous sectors, including the priests, about the

possibility o f human rights violations. In addition,

it also makes possible improvements in the almost

imperceptible situation (see, for example. the group

that considered the human rights situation t o be

improving (option 6 ) . Of the three who responded in

this way, two said that human rights continued t o be

violated and only one said no. It should be noted

that international pressures toward the government in

this area have lessened t o the degree that they

approach a democratic process. The first step has been

the convocation and election o f a national constituent

assembly that will be followed in the near future with

elections for president, congress, and mayors in a

free, democratic vote thet will include the

participation o f the majority o f ideological-political

currents spanning from social democratic through .

Christian democratic t o center right and to the

traditional right.' Among the rest of the positions,
it is worthwhile to point out that there is one (see
option 2) that attributed the violence to conditions of
underdevelopment; another that represented a theistic-
moralizing position toward the dehumanization and loss
of faith (option 8 ) ; another group of six priests who
said that the violations were difficult to determine

(see option 10); and finally, six did not know or did
not answer (see option 1 1 ) .
In conclusion, we can say that there is a
general view that human rights violations do exist,
although, as we have been saying throughout this work,
the priests' perceptions vary.

6.4 According to your criteria, does freedom

exist i n the country?
This is the control question we included in

reference t o the one on labor union freedom. We can

see that the parameters of the priests' responses

At the time of this writing, the presidential

elections had not been carried out. They were won by
the Christian Democrats in a run-off vote.
indicate that most of the union freedom and freedom of

association are seriously limited* whether they

responded that it did not exist or that it was

relative* except for percentage differences found in

the first question (see question 6.2) due t o the low

number of priests who answered it. Although some

believe that freedom of association and union freedom

do exist, some seem to be more in agreement with the

idea that its existence is relative. A table that sums

up their attitudes follows (see Table No. 27).

TABLE No. 27

Does freedom of association exist

in the country?
Freq. %
1. Yes 32 35.95
2. No 35 39.32
3. It's relative 8 8.98
4. Does not know or does not answer 14 15.73
It is significant that a great number of

priests said there was freedom of association, 35.95

percent, although, as we will see, their reasons end up

being contradictory; 39.32 percent said that freedom

of association does not exist; 8.89 percent said it is

relative; and 15.73 percent did not know or refused to

answer. Crossing this question with the question of a

reason for this situat'ion, we come up with the follow-
ing table (see Table No. 28).

Those who said there does exist freedom o f

association did so for different reasons, including

contradictory ones. In our opinion, this was caused by

an incorrect understanding o f the question o r because

they did not take into account their previous answers.

We could say t h e same for those for whom freedom o f

association did not exist, but o n a smaller scale.

Thus, we have 16 priests who said freedom of

association should be because there are various

organizations in operation (see option 2 ) or because,

juridically, t h e law allows for it (see option 10).

They represent 18.0 percent. Ten priests said yes, but

that freedom o f association was conditioned, whether it

be because o f obedience t o certain norms (see option

l), because the right exists theoretically, but not in

practlce (see option 3). or because this right exists

only for "white" associations that do not contradict

certain sectors (see option 8). These priests

represent 1 1 - 2 percent.
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 Finally, there were two whose responses are
very contradictory since they alluded to political
reasons against it, but responded that freedom of
association does not exist. The truth is that we did
not find any reason that explains this behavior. For
example, one said yes, but also said that they are not
allowed to work freely, that they'are persecuted, and
that their leaders are assassinated. He represents
1.1 percent. The other says yes, that the powerful
are opposed to organization, also representing 1.1
perrent.

Among those who said that the right of

association does not exist, we found, as we did among
those who said it does exist, that there is a group
that conditions its response. There is one who says it
does not exist because certain norms must be obeyed
(see option 1 ) ; others, because the right does exist in
theory but not in practice (these refer rnxe to the

latter part of the response than to the first part as

seems to be the case with those.! who said that the
right does exist) (see option 3); others, because this
right exists only for white associations. Here, as in

the previous case, it seems that this led them to

affirm that the right does not exist, while for the
others, the fact that they (the white syndicates) do
exist led them t o affirm the opposite, that the right
does exist (see option 8). Those who agreed with the
latter opinion are 8 priests, representing 6.7
percent.
The rest gave political reasons that, t o a
certain degree, can be considered antigovernmental.
Some, 14 priests representing 15.7 percent. s a i d that
the organizations were not allowed t o operate freely,
some were persecuted and their leaders assassinated and
there was repression. Another said that the powerful
sectors opposed organization. In this case, although
it is not explicit, the reference is considered t o be
made t o popular organization. One priest supported

this position, representing 1.1 percent; others assured

us that nonconvenient associations were dissolved,
including three oriests who represent 3.4 percent.
Others said there was fear and that the association was
conditioned. They include four priests who represent
4.5 percent. Others s u p p o r t ~ dopinions of third
parties, including two priests who represented 2.2
percent and said there does not exist such a right
based on the media. Among those who said that freedom
of association is relative were four priests who
represent 4.5 percent; they said it exists in theory
but not in practice. One priest, who represents 1.1
percent, said it is relative because they are not
allowed t o operate freely. And another, also
representing 1.1 percent, said it is re!ative because
freedom only exists for white associations that do not
contradict certain sectors.
Among those who did not answer the question
of **why,**
we find four priests, representing 4.5
percent, who said yesr freedom of association does

exist; five priests representing 5.6 percent said it

did not; 2.2 percent, 2 priests, said its existence is
relative; and 15.7 percent did not answer or did not
know (14 priests.)
In conclusion, we can affirm that in regard
t o the opinion on freedom o f association, 48 priests,
or 53.93 percent (independently o f whether or not they
said freedom existed) said, t o a greater or lesser
degree, that the country's situation in this respect is

critical.
6.5 Should there be free elections and active
political parties?
Based on the data, 80.89 percent of those
interviewed said they were in favor of a political
system that included free elections and active
political parties, and, that it would be important for
the country; 2.24 percent said no, and 16.85 percent
did not know or did not answer the question. The
following table sums up this topic (see Table No. 2 9 ) .

TABLE No. 29
Should Guatemala have a form of
government with free elections
and active political parties? Freq. .7'

1. Yes 'v 66 74.15

2. No 2 2.24
3. It's relative 4 4.49
4. Does not know or does not'answer 16 17.97
Those who turned out t o be more interesting
t o analyze were those who were opposed, since this
situation could originate from t w o very different
points of view: first, a clear antisystem intent;

and second, the intention to maintain the existing

political status quo, which at the moment of carrying
out this work was a de facto military regime. However,
it is obvious that there could be intermediste
positions without necessarily invalidating the previous
affirmation. For a more clear idea of the priests'
attitudes toward elections and political parties, see
Table No. 30, which also includes a correlation with
the "why" question.
We can see in this table that the priests'
intentions were varied with regard to why the
government should allow elections and active political

parties. Nonetheless, we can detect that there were

some who emphasized participation, understood as the
capacity each citizen has to freely express his
political inclination at the ballot by means of a vote.
Among them are those who said there should exist a
participatory plurality (see option 01). and those who
affirmed that the country is democratic and, therefore.,
the right t o freely elect authorities does exist
(option 05). A total of 16 priests, representing 18.0
percent, said there should exist a form of government
with elections and active political parties.
A second group emphasized the benefits such a
situation could bring, independently of whether they
are internal or external benefits. They included those
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who t h i n k t h a t such a s i t u a t i o n would p r o j e c t a b e t t e r

image abroad (see o p t i o n 141, and would be an o p t i o n i n

p a c i f y i n g t h e country ( o p t i o n 1 5 ) . L i k e the previous

group, all i n t h i s group seemed t o i n d i c a t e t h a t a

system o f government w i t h e l e c t i o n s and a c t i v e

pulit;rl;ai per, L ; ~ sshou I d p y l s t ( 4 p r i e s t s w h o

represent 4.5 percent.

A t h i r d group favored t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s o f t h e

democratic system i t s e l f , t h a t is, without p u t t i n g

major emphasis on t o p i c s t h a t c o u l d become r e l e v a n t

with i t s practice. Therefore, t h e r e a r e some who

considered t h a t it i s necessary (see o p t i o n 02); o t h e r s

t h a t it would g i v e more importance t o democracy (see

o p t i o n 04); others, because it i s a c o n d i t i o n f o r

democracy (see o p t i o n 07); others, because it i s

expected (see o p t i o n 10); others, it responds t o t h e

c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y o f our people (see o p t i o n 1 1 ) ;

others, because it i s every man's r i g h t (see o p t i o n

16). A l l a f f i r m e d t h a t a regime o f f r e e e l e c t i o n s and

a c t i v e p o l i t i c a l q a r t i e s should e x i s t , a t o t a l o f 40

p r i e s t s who r e p r e s e n t 40.44 percent.

A f o u r t h group p u t more emphasis on aspects

o f a p o l i t i c a l nature; t h a t i s , t h e i r responses
indicated more concrete political attitudes. We have
those who spoke from an elitist position that

represents popular inclinations, even though they were

not very well illustrated (see option 03); others

considered respect for ideologies as indispensable (see

option 06); others said it would contribute t o

political education o f the people (sqe option 08);

others, because they considered that the democratic

system is the lesser of the evils (see option 09);

others said that a transitory, honest dictatorship is

necessary--one composed o f strong state direction and a

governing army (see option 12); others said t h e system,

independent a s it is, is not the cause o f the problems,

and that the important factor is t o have an honest

government (see option 13); others considered that

since Guatemala has never had free elections o r active

political parties* they are therefore necessary (see

option 17;; o f t h e 18 priests that gave the preceding!

answers* 1 1 or 12.35 said that there should be a form

of government with elections and active political

parties; two said no, representing 2.24 percent; and

another two did not know or did not answer the

question, also representing 2.24 percent.

 Finally, there was a group that said it did

not know or did not answer a s t o why there should be a

government with elections and active political parties

(option 18). There was one who said it was necessary,

but did not give a reason. The rest refused t o answer

or did not know and composed a total o f 14 priests that

represent 15.73 percent.

In general, in this section, we can note

that there are coinciding points of view between the

priests concerning the presented problems. However, it

is also clear that there are different positions

concerning the motivations o f each one. Thus, in

relation t o human rights, as well as freedom of

association and elections, there is a great level of

coincidence in their responses. We have 74.15 percent

who said human rights violations do exist in Guatemala;

39.32 percent said that freedom o f association does not

exist in the country (it must be noted that 8.98

percent said the freedom was relative); 80.89 percent

said Guatemala should have a form o f government that

includes elections and active political parties (see

tables 25,-27 and 29). This coincidence is caused,

according t o our analysis, by the situation affecting

the country at the time the study was carried out.
Despite the fact that the de facto military regime was
pledged t o establishing a democratic process* the
wounds of so many abuses, assassinations, and
disappearances were still fresh. The Catholic Church
did not escape this situation* a condition that also

gave rise t o a certain degree of silence from many of

those interviewed, evidencing signs of fear.
We must point out that one of the worst
problems of the spiral of violence that affected the
country was accusation9 which places anyone on the
defensive. When one confronts a situation that could

seem compromising, he prefers not to give an opinion.

This silence became clear when we reviewed the figures
on labor union freedom (Table No. 23). The revision
showed us that the percentage of priests who refused to

answer or said they did not know was relatively high

(62.41 percent).

Although the quantity of motivations makes

it difficult t o pinpoint, we can affirm that within
the clergy there is a tendency t o advocate certain

democratic values that would allow for a lzrger degree

of social harmony and greater organization of the
population, whether it be cultural and c o m u n a l
organization or the organization of trade unions, as
well a s a more concrete political expression through

participation in the political parties of their

preference. This tendency was supported by all,
independent of whether they were traditionalists
(although there was the case of one who supported the
continuation of a regime of reigning force),
developmentalists, rebels, or revoiutionaries. This,
in our opinion, is the result of the reigning
political situation in the country and the small amount
of political space for the free play of ideas. the
violence, the restrictions on labor union and popular
organizations. as well as the stance taken by the
church in Latin America against injustice and
repression. All are factors that led to the search
for a more just and democratic society.
The road seems t o be one of representative
democracy, although we do not discard the possibility
that within the clergy there are authoritarian
positions that are antisystem and/or prosystem; that
is, positions that back a revolutionary dictator or a
conservative dictator, even though they are minimal.
Those that favor a democratic and liberal development

politically evidently constitute the majority.

We can affirm that, politically, there is a

clear tendency toward an intermediary position between

revolution and the conservative status quo. However,

the final development of this tendency will depend, to

a large extent, on the achievements of the democratic

government that is installed. If there are no

significant achievements in the generation of

intermediary structures that allow the participatior. of

the population in solving its most close-to-home

problems of an economic, sacial, and political nature,

and based on the extent to which the state establishes

itself as the guarantor and protector of the rights and

freedoms of all, it is probable that the antisystem

tendencies will resurge and take on force within the

church.
It is worth mentioning that, as it happened

in the Theology of Liberation, the objective conditions

begin to express themselves, whether in favor of or

against the process of change, even though the church

officially, as an institution, does not promote or

support attitudes. In addition, i f we make a detailed
 616

analysis of the responses as t o why Guatemala should

have a form of government with elections aod active
political parties, we find that there is not a clear
and strong conviction about the advantages o f a
democratic system, even though the majority support it.
Conversely, there is a vague image of its true
contents, which could be caused by the fact that at the
time the study was carried out, the democr-atic process
was moving slowly and there was a lack of confidence in
many sectors that it would be completed and that the de
facto military government would fulfill its guarantee
of real, free, and democratic elections. We think that

these factors conditioned, to a great extent, the.

attitudes of those interviewed.8

7. Church-State Union
Most of the priests interviewed said that
there was not an official union between the church and
the state in Guatemala. They represented 75.28
percent, while those that said there was a union

As we mentioned before* the process of a democratic

opening ended with clean and free presidential
elections in which Christian Democrat presidential
candidate Vinicio Cerezo was elected.
constituted 16.85 percent, and only 7.8 percent refused
t o answer or said they did not know. The absolute and

relative numbers are presented as follows (See Table

No. 31).
TABLE NO. 3 1

There is a union between the

Church and the State; d o you
think it is convenient? Freq. %

1. Yes
2. No
3. Does not know or does not answer 7 7.86
Among those who affirmed that there is an
official union, there were contradictory responses

concerning the reasons for the union. Thus, we have

one who said that there is no official union* just good
relations; two said they are separate institutions,
despite answering yes. Finally, we have another who
affirmed that the church should be free t o fulfill its
prophetic missian, For a general panorama, we will
look at Table No, 32, which contains a cross between
"why" and the question related to the existence of an
official union between the church and state.
We have here various groups. Among them is
one that said there is no official union* only good
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52
relations. It included 3 4 priests representing 38.2
percent; continuing in order o f importance, 12 priests

that represented 13.5 percent said there was not an

official union, nor should there be; anotkier 13.5

percent, including the same number o f priests, said

they were separate institutions. Nine priests

representing 10.1 percent said that there currently

exists a union between the church and the state and

that it is convenient; 3 priests, or 3.4 percent,

defended a total separation; another 3, 3.4 percent,

said there is confluence and dialogue; 2 others said

that there is no union because o f the persecution that

the church has suffered (2.2 percent); while 1 priest,

1.1 percent, said the union had been disintegrating t o

the degree that the church has tended t o represent the

people; another, also 1.1 percent, said that the church

has tended t o represent the people; another, also 1.1

percent, said that the constitution o f the church did

not allow such a union; 2, or 2.2.percent. said the

church should be free t o Sulfill its prophetic mission;

finally, 7 priests, 7.9 percent, said they did not know

or did not answer.
 In general terms, after analyzing the
preceding tables related to church-state relations, we
can see that as a whole, the priests saw that church-
state relations at the time of the study were
satisfactory despite the fact that there was no
official union between the institutions. Thus, it is
worth mentioning that Metropolitan Archbishop Prospero
Penados del Barrio has played an important role in that
he was very involved in the democratization process
being carried out by the government. This has given
groups within the church the possibility to continue
their criticisms, especially in reference to the
violation of human rights.
In its participation with the
democratization process, the church has not been alone.
Other institutions, political parties and pressure
groups have cooperated in the development of the
process. Nonetheless, in 1982, a very important

factor influenced the good relations between church

and state. It is important to remember that with the
coup d'etat of March 23, 1902, a general who was also a
religious fundamentalist became h e d of the government.
For the first time, the non-Catholic Church could not
count on the president to support it, and was relegated
t o a secondary place. Previously, a majority of the
government leaders. even those who maintained strong
repression against members o f the Catholic Church, were
careful not t o attack it directly (in addition t o
always denying their participation in the aforesaid
acts o f repression). Furthermore, many of them
presented tt-emselves t o the ~ e o p l eas convinced

Catholics. in the case of General Hios Montt, even

though he did not make verbal attacks against the
Catholic Church, he established in his style of
governing a Sunday dialogue that was transmitted by all

the media, especially by radio and television. He said

it openly at times, and disguised at others*
pronouncing what seemed to be proselytizing exercises
in favor of religious fundamentalism.
Consequently, the Catholic Church saw its
power threatened. and it was at this time that there
was more tension between the church and the state.
After the fall of Rios Montt, conversely, there was
more institutfsnsi cooperationT especially in the area
referring t o a democratic opening. In our opinion,
55.05 percent o f those interviewed generally perceived
good relations between the church and state, whether
they reflected an official union, good relations,
confluence and di'alogue. or the convenience of a union
(options 1, 3, 5 and 10); those who said they should be
separate institutions, either because the church's
constitution does not allow it or because the church
should be free to fulfill its prophetic mission,
constituted 16.85 percent (see options 4, 7 and 8 ) ;
those in a more questioning position and with a more

political orientation were those that affirmed that the

union has been deteriorating t o the degree that the
church has grown closer t o the people or that such a

union cannot exist because of the persecution suffered

by the church. These represented 3.37 percent (see
options 6 end 9). Finally, we kave those who did not
know or did not answer (option 121, represnting 7.9
percent.

8. Birth Control

Birth control programs form part of a policy

directed at halting the demographic explosion in
underdeveloped countries, with the purpose of improving
the population's living conditions. Nonetheless, they
have become conflictive because of their political

implication, since they generally are programs under

the auspices o f international organizations. Also, in

a place like Guatemala, they have been frequently
applied in a negative way, without necessarily

receiving authorization from the interested parties.

In addition, accusations in certain indigenous

communities o f mass sterilization have mad2 the topic

even more conflictive. In countries such as Guatemala,

the church and the universities (especially the state

university have led the campaign against these

programs. O f course, it is important t o know why there

is such opposition, since it can be an eminently

religious position, or, conversely, a political

position. For our study, this is important.

Looking at the corresponding table, we can

see that 84.26 percent o f the priests thought that the

government o f Guatemala should oppose birth control

programs backed by the United States gover,iment or

international organizations; 11.23 percent o f the

priests said no; and 4.9 percent did not know or did

not say (see Table No. 33).

 TABLE No. 33
Do you think the Government of
Guatemala should oppose birth
control programs backed by United
States or international
organizations? Freq. %

1. Yes 75 84.26
2. No 10 11.23
3. Does not knowt or doesn't answer 4 4.49
With regard t o the "why" (see table No. 34),
we find s group that says these programs (those
promoted by the United States and international

organizations) are harmful and unnatural, and that

there are other contraceptive methods approved by the
church, representing 21.3 percent of the interviewees.
This group saw the problem from the church's point of

view. Others maintained a point o f view based on human

dignity. In other words, their answers showed concern

about attempting against life (see options 3 and 6);

srd that the people should have the opportunity to make

their own decisions (see option 51, that the best is

responsible parenthood, which implies an education in

that respect (see alternative 8); that it should be
authentic (see option 9); that the control should be
reascnable and cot imposed (see option 10); and that in
any case, only the most essential should be accepted
and t h e r e s t should be l e f t t o t h e people as a whole

(option 11).

Those who supported t h i s view c o n s t i t u t e d

38.2 percent o f t h e p r i e s t s interviewed. Others saw

t h e problen: frcz =n economic and d e w g r a p h i c p o i n t o f

view, f i n d i n g t h a t these programs a r e n o t advantageous

f o r t h e c o u n t r y (see o p t i o n 4 ) ( r e p r e s e e n t i n g 4.5

percent o f those i n t e r v i e w e d ) . This response c o u l d be

s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d by t h e argument t h a t i n Guatemala's

case, t h e n a t i o n a l t e r r i t o r y has an average d e n s i t y o f

55.59 i n h a b i t a n t s p e r square k i l o m e t e r , even though

t h e r e i s a h i g h demographic growth r a t e . I n real

terms, t h i s means t h a t t h e r e i s n o t a sharp demographic

problem and t h a t o t h e r v a r i a b l e s t h a n demography a r e

causing t h e poor l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n

(see Table 3 . 1 ) . There a r e those who saw t h e problem

from a demographic p o i n t o f view, which i n d i c a t e s t h a t

these programs can be used as long as t h e y a r e based on

n a t u r a l methods ( a l t h o u g h t h e r e i s one who was opposed

t o t h a t ) t o a v o i d a demographic e x p l o s i o n (see o p t i o n

2). They represented 6.7 percent o f those interviewed.

They, i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e preceding ones, thought t h e

demographic problem was severe. Possibly, some o f t h e

factors that feed this perception are based on the
literature that has been distributed in this light,

pointing out the disadvantages o f a demographic

explosion for development, .or it could be that they

have this idea because there is no uniformity in the

distribution o f the population throughout the territory

(see the same table mentioned above); in addition, this

perception is more marked when dealing with priests

intet-viewed in the capital, which, in addition t o the

natural growth rate o f approximately 2.0 percent, is

affected by heavy migration from the countryside,
sparking disorganized growth and generating a series of

marginal populations affected by the consequential

social problems. Therefore, they might maintain the

view that the demographic problem is severe.

Finally, there were others who have a more

political view o f the problem, who think that birth

control should be considered a national question.

Therefore, the intervention of another government is

considered brazen interventionism and/or the

application o f these programs should not be a condition

for lending money t o the Guatemalan government (see

option 14 and 1 5 ) . These are 13 priests who represent

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,
14.6 percent. Others saw these programs as

manipulations w i t h p o l i t i c a l ends, and t h e r e were two

whc saw t h i s as a way t o f o r c e t h e government and

d e s t r o y t h e people, p r e v e n t i n g t h e p o p u l a t i o n from

growing so t h e people can be more e a s i l y defeated

( o p t i o n s 7 and 1 3 ) . The l a t t e r reasons were, perhaps,

deeper w i t h regard t o t h e i r p o l i t i c a l intent o f

o p p o s i t i o n t o b i r t h c o n t r o l programs from a

r e v o l u t i o n a r y perspective, even though t h e y o n l y

reprezented 2.2 percent o f t h e t o t a l , f a l l i n g under t h e

p o l i t i c a l perspective, which i s 24.7 percent o f the

p r i e s t s interviewed.

As i n previous questions, we f i n d t h z t t h e r e

a r e v a r i o u s c o n t r a d i c t o r y responses. I f taken i n t o

account w i t h regard t o t h e general question, t h e r e was

one who s a i d t h a t t h e y a r e harmful programs (see

option l ) , b u t t h a t t h e Guatemalan government should

n o t oppose them; another thought t h a t government should

oppose them, b u t answered o p t i o n 2, which says t h a t

these programs a r e made t o a v o i d demographic explosion;

another s a i d t h a t these programs a r e a n a t i o n a l

q u e s t i o n and t h a t t h e i r i m p o s i t i o n i s i n t e r v e n t i o n i s m

(see o p t i o n 4 ) . However, he thought t h e government

should n o t oppose these programs. As i n t h e previous

questions, we t h i n k t h a t t h e r e was n o t a f u l l

understanding o f what t h e second q u e s t i o n s i g n i f i e d and

t h a t t h e y marked an o p i n i o n w i t h o u t t a k i n g i n t o account

t h e i r preced i n g responses.

9. I s t h e r e a c r i s i s o f a u t h o r i t y i n t h e church?

T h i s p a r t i s composed o f two quest ions

d i r e c t e d toward d e t e c t i n g r e b e l l i o u s a t t i t u d e s among

t h e c l e r g y toward t h e h i e r a r c h y ; one focuses on t h e

e x i s t e n c e o f t h e mentioned c r i s i s and t h e o t h e r on t h e

c e l i b e c y problem.

9.1 Do you t h i n k t h e r e i s a c r i s i s o f a u t h o r i t y

i n t h e church?

With r e s p e c t t o t h i s question, 12.35 percent

s a i d yes, t h e r e i s a c r i s i s i n t h e church; 80.89

p e r c e n t s a i d no, 3.37 percent s a i d the c r i s i s i s

r e l a t i v e o and another 3.37 percent s a i d it d i d ~ o tknow

o r d i d n o t want t o answer (See Table No. 35).

 TABLE No. 35

Do you think there is a crisis

o f authority in the church? Freq. %

1. Yes 11 12.35
2. No 72 80.89
3. It is relative 3 3.37
4. Does not know or doesn't answer 3 3.37

Table No. 3 6 combines the above answers with

"why." Thus, with regard t o why they considered the

situation the way they did, 55.7 percent said there is

no crisis, that the superiors fulfill their task (see

option 1 ) ; 3.4 percent affirm that there is cohesion

(option 2); 1.1 percent said that there is no crisis

because o f organization among the clergy and the

religious orders (option 3); 2.3 percent, 2 priests,

believed that tkere is little communication, but one

said there is a crisis and the other that there is

none (option 4); 3.4 percent thought there was a lack

of docility t o carry out orders (option 5). They

included three priests, two o f which said there is a

crisis and one that said there is not; 8.0 percent

thought that discussion is necessary t o improve the

situation (option 8). This group was composed of 7

priests, of which six affirmed that there is n o crisis

and one that there is; another 2.3 percent affirmed

that with the previous archbishop, Mario Casariego,

there was a crisis but not anymore (option 7); one

priest, 1.1 percent, affirmed that there are dioceses

in which there are crises o f authority, but answered no

t o the general question. It is possible that he is

someone who belonged t o the archdiocese and that this

phenomenon does not exist in the archdiocese* but can

be detected in other areas (option 8); there was 2.3

percent tlsdt said the crisis was just beginning and

that yes, they did detect a crisis of authority in the

church (see option 9); another priest, representing 1.1

percent, said there was a crisis because the bishops

are very conservative (see option 10); 2.3 percent said

the crisis was relative since the bishop has little

time t o be in charge o f the church (they are referring

t o the metropolitan archbishop) (see option 11);

another 2.3 percent said there was a crisis since there

is little priest-bishop contact and because of

different political ideologies (see option 12); and

14.8 percent did not know or refused t o answer (see

option 1 3 ) .
Based on these responses, a1 1 would seem t o
indicate that within the Catholic Church there is a
tranquil climate, and that the rebellious positions
are, to a certain extent, insignificant, through this
does not therefore mean they do not exist. Thus we can
observe opinions against the bishops (see options 12
and 1 0 ) ; others that think the crisis is just beginning
(see option 9); others who see that since the bishop
(archbishop of Guatemala) has little time to have taken
the post, it is still too early to foresee any

development with respect to the crisis. However,

mentioning the fact could give rise to thoughts that

all depends on how the archbishop acts and what his
relaeionship is with his priests so that a crisis does
not erupt. There are others who, without questioning
their own situations, say there are crises in other
dioceses (see option 8); and others who see a lack of
docility in carrying out orders (see option 5 ) . All of
this would seem to indicate, as we said, that the
rebellious attitudes, at least in the archdiocese, are
not expressed. They could increase or gain force,
depending on the different attitudes taken on by the
hierarchy.
am- NM~N-N-N

.................................
u N2

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2:
9.5 Khat is your position with regard t o
cel ibacy?

The corresponding table follows (see Table

No. 37).

TABLE No. 37
What is your position with regard
t o celibacy? Freq.

It is not s prcb!em 12
It is important t o practice 23
cel ibacy
I t seems, usefu 1 3
When I was ordained I offere 8
chastity
It is the irnitatioc o f Christ 4
It is a rule that should be 17
susta i ned
Rebellious priests d o exist 1
Should be studied, it is very 5
problematic
Should be maintained, with 1
comprehension, flexibility and
faci 1 ity t o dispense
Even though I have t o live with 1
it 1 feel it is inhuman
There should be freedom, but 2
optional for t h e diocesan clergy
Should be a personal decision 6
or voluntary
Does not know, o r doesn't answer 6

We observe that 75.28 percent o f the priests

interviewed said they agreed with celibacy (see answers

1, 29 3, 4, 5 and 6); 2.24 percent said celibacy

presented some kind o f problem, although they did

indicate that they agreed with its practice (see

options 7 and 9); 15.73 percent seemed not t o agree

with the practice of celibacy and a questioning

attitude toward the problem could even be detected

based o n their responses (see options 8, 10, 1 1 , and

12); 6.74 percent did not know or did not answer the

quest ion.
The relevance this has for the crisis within

the Catholic Church is that although it does not reveal

expressed attitudes o f open rebellion, it allows us t o

see between the lines that they exist, at least

latently. In addition, it is possible that the priests

were careful in responding, even though they knew the
study was anonymous, in order not t o give the

impression that there were problems within the church,

or t o protect the institution's image.

10. General Characteristics of the priests

interviewed

Nine questions are considered in this

section, which, in our judgment, could give an image of
the composition o f the clergy interviewed with respect
to the orders they pertain to as well as other

variables such as studies, age, years of ordination,

country of origin, years in the country, the amount of

time they will remain and the country or countries in

which they received their sacerdotal formation. A

question about the dioceses they belong to was also

included, although the basis of the sample was not

made accordi.ng to that criteria.

In other words, the sample was not based on

whether or not they belonged to the archdioceses, but

if, at the time of the interview, they were members of

the church that had responded to the questionnaire.

Thus, we prevented the problem that an undetermined

number of priests would be found in the headquarters of

the order they belonged to because of conditions of

pastoral duties, a situation that, in one way or

another, we had to consider. Throughout this analysis,

the number and weight of these in the total sample will

be shown.

10.1 Dioceses to which they belong

Only 48.31 percent of the interviewees gave

information on their dioceses. That is to say that

51.68 percent preferred not t o answer the question.
The dioceses that are represented are as follows: the

archdiocese, t o which 41.57 percent o f interviewees

belonged (37 priests); the diocese of Jalapa, t o which

2.54 percent o f the interviewees belonged ( 2 priests);

the territorial prelature o f Escuintla, which

corresponded t o 3.37 percent o f the interviewees (3

priests); the diocese of Quiche, which corresponded t o

i.12 percent o f the interviewees ( 1 priest).

The archdiocese represents the highest

percentage because khat is where the study was carried

out. In addition, the fact that priests from other

dioceses appeared in the sample only confirmed our

suspicions that, at any given moment, due t o reasons o f

pastoral duty* priests from other dioceses are present

in the headquarters o f the orders they belong to. The

headquarters, as a general rule, are located in the

archdiocese, not because they depend on it, but because

being located in the capital city gi.ves them the

already mentioned advantages. The general table

follows (see Table No. 38).

 TABLE No. 38

Diocese t o which you belong Freq. %

1. Guatemaia
2. Jalapa
3. Escuintla
4. Quiche
5. Does not answer
The high number o f priests who refused t o

answer can be seen here. They could have done so i n

an attempt t o maintain their anonymity with regard t o

the questionnaire and as a sign that they did not want

t o be compromised with the information they were

giving.
The expressed preponderance of the

Archdiocese o f Guatemala in the responses is caused

fundamentally by t w o reasons: one, because that is

where t h e principal study was carried out; and two,

because it, in relation t o the other existing dioceses

in the country, is the one that carries the greatest

absolute and relative weight at a1 1 levels (see chapter

I I ! o f this thesis, especial ly tab les 2.2, 2.3, 2.4,
and 2.5)-

10.2 Religious order t o which they belong

In this question, we also encountered the

problem that a large number of priests refused to

answer, representing 32.58 percent. We have been

discussing the reason behind this throughout the study

and we think that they are repeated in this case. The

complete table follows (See Table No. 39).

TABLE No. 39

Order to which they belong Freq.

1. Paulinos 4
2. Franciscanos 12
3. Salesianos 7
4. Earistas Brothers
5. Compania de JesGs (Jesuits)
-
7

15
6. Carmelitas Descalzos 1
7. Josefinos Missionaries 1
8. Order of Preachers (Dominican) 5
9. Agustinos Recolectos 1
10. Diocesan0 Priests 7
1 1 . Does nst answer 29
Those who were most represented were the
Jesuits, with 16.85 percent (15 priests); following

were the Franciscans with 13.48 percent (12 priests);

the Salesianos and Diocesanos with 7.86 percent each

(7 priests each); the Paulinos representing 4.49

percent (4 priests); the order of the Dominican

Predicators representing 5.61 percent (5 p:-iests); the

Maristas Brothers and the Carmelitas Descalzos with

3.37 percent each (3 priests each); and finally the
Josefinos Missionaries and the Agustinos Recolectos
with 1.12 percent each ( 1 priest respectively). Those

who abstained from answering, a s we already said,

constituted 32.58 percent (29 priests).

10.3 Age

Based on the data, we can see that there is

a young clergy, since 41 o f the 83 priests, or 49.39

percent, who answered the question about their age were

between 23 and 42 years o!d; 2 4 priests, or 28.91

percent, were between 43 and 5 7 years old; and 21.68

percent, or 18 priests, were over 58 years old (see

Table No. 40).

TABLE No. 40
Age Number o f priests Percentage

This factor, in a given moment, could

influence political-ideological attitudes within the

clergy since the degree o f youth would tend t o make

the church a s a whole abandon traditional positions.
In addition, such a factor can also reflect

inexperience in assimilating the new values o f the

church (e.g. liberation theology) a s well as

different political-ideologic31 values. This is

reflected clearly in the attitudes maintained by part

o f the Guatemalan clergy throughout the period of

Archbishop Casariego, an opposing position to that

taken on by the new archbishop Penados del Barrio.

The first tried t o maintain himself within a

conservative position that was not effectively

compromising with the government or the opposition, but

independent o f the circumstances. He looked for or

withdrew support based on its importance t o the church.

Conversely, the new archbishop has clearly shown an

attitude o f support for c!emocrat i r i ng movements

during the de facto government o f Mejia Vfctorzs a s

well a s the current Christian Democrat government, a

position that is supported by a considerable number o f

the young clergy.

10.4 Year in which they were ordained

Based on the data, w e can see that 52.01

percent o f t h e priests answered the question. Thirty-

nine priests are within the 1-15 year range o f being

ordained, while 2 4 percent (18 priests) are within

the 16-30 year range o f being ordained; another 24.0

percent (18 priests) are in the 31 years or more range

(See Table No. 41).

TABLE No. 41
Frequency/
Years ordained No. o f Priests Percentage

Of the total, 84.27 percent answered the

q ~ - s t i o n .35.73 percent abstained from answering, that

is, 75 and 14 priests, respectively. The results of

this table only confirm that there is a lack o f

experienze and a youth that could influence in a more

conservative political attitude, as we already

mentioned.

10.5 Country of Origin

Of those interviewed, 38.20 percent were

Guatemalan; 32.58 percent were from Spain, 20.22

percent did not say what country they were from but

did specify that they were not from Guatemala or from

any of the indicated countries; 5.62 percent did not

answer; one priest representing 1.12 percent were from

Italy; and another two priests, representing 2.24

percent, are from the United States (See Table No.

42).

TABLE No. 42

Country of Origin Freq. 7'.

1. Guatemala 38.20
2. Spain 32.58
3. Italy 1.12
4. United States 2.24
5. Others. 20.22
6. Did not answer 5.61

We can see that the non-Guatemalan pr i ests,

without including those who did not answer, number 50,

representing 56.17 of the total. This confirms the

enormous presence of foreign clergy in the development

of the Guatemalan church, a presence that nonetheless
does not come half way close to meeting the personnel
requirements of pastoral activities. Apparently, this
situation has been improving with time. According to
what was expressed by Archbishop Prospero Penados del
Barrio himself to the investigation, the incorporation
of greater contingents into national seminaries is
increasingiy larger. The phenomenon of incorporating
more sacerdotal vocations in the Catholic Church
apparently corresponded t o the visit o f Pope John Paul
I 1 t o the extent that currently there are many priests

who no longer consider it a problem in Guatemala.

Nonetheless, if such is the case, many years
will pass before the results of the vocational increase
can be seen in terms of a national clerg) that is
trained and highly self-sufficient and that reflects
positively in a quantitative sense as well as a
qualitative one.

10.6 Years in the Country

In relation t o the number of years spent in
the country, we can see that it is low (See Table No.
43).
 TABLE No. 43

Years o f b e i n g
in t h e country Frequency Percentage

1-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
21-25
26-30
31+
D o n o t answer

I f we t a k e i n t o account t h e f r e q u e n c i e s , not

as we have them shown, b u t regrouped i n p e r i o d s o f 10

yesrs, we f i n d t h a t 43.31 percent, r e p r e s e n t i n g 43

priests, have s p e n t between one and 10 y e a r s i n t h e

country, o f w h i c h 27 o r 62.79 p e r c e n t have o n l y been i n

t h e c o u n t r y between one and f i v e years, w h i l e 37.21

p e r c e n t r e p r e s e n t i n g 16 p r i e s t s have been i n t h e

c o u n t r y between s i x and 10 years; 24.71 percent, o r 22

priests, have been i n t h e c o u n t r y between 1 1 and 20

years, o f w h i c h 17 o f t h e 22, o r 77.27 percent f a l l in

t h e 1 1 t o 15 y e a r range, w h i l e t h e r e m a i n i ~ gf i v e

priests, r e p r e s e n t i n g 22.73 percent, a r e in t h e higher

range o f t h e group; t h o s e f o u n d t o be i n t h e 2 1 t o 30

year r a n g e r e p r e s e n t o n l y 10, 11.8 p e r c e n t , or 9

priests, o f w h i c h 55.55 p e r c e n t a r e i n t h e lower 21-25

year s c a l e , and f o u r , or 44.45 percent, are i n the

higher scale of the group; three priests representing
3.37 percent surpass 30 years in the country, while 12,

or 13.48 percent. refused t o answer the question.

This confirms the lack of experience
evidenced in some o f the previous questions, which
leads one t o assume there is a certain lack of
knowledge about history as well as the socioeconomic
and political conditions o f the country, which can lead
t o a mistaken perception o f such conditions, a
perception that could, at any given moment, cause some
t o become frus-krated and desperate and t c choose a
radical path, considering the situation o f the country.

Also, in contrast, it could lead some to adopt an

eclectic position based on the idea that their stay in
the country is not permanent. Thus motivations, in the
long run, would lead t o conformism and t o no social,
political, or ecclesiastical obligations, except in
cases in which the religious order maintained a clear
position in social, political, and ecclesiastical
areas.

10.7 How long do you plan t o continue working in

the country?
 Based on tke results obtained, we can see

that only 27 would stay in the country permanently,

which represents 30.33 percent, while those who have t o

move t o other places, independently o f the amount o f

time they have left in the country, constitute 65.10

percent, or 5 8 priests (See Table No. 44).

TABLE No. 44
How long do you plan t o
continue working in the country Freq. Percentage

1. Permanently 27 30.33
2. Uncertain 52 58.42
3. 5 years o r more 3 3.37
4. 2 years o r more 2 3.37
5. 1 year or more 1 2.24
6. Does not know, does tiot 4 4.49
answer

This situation is evidence that there is a

high degree o f mobility among the clergy, a condition

that has an influence on the internal tendencies o f a

religious as well a s ecclesiastic nature within the

church. This more or less constant change could imply

the incorporation o f new attitudes and currents o f

thought, which could correspond t o conservative

attitudes as well a s revolutionary, rebellious, or

developmentalist ones, making it very difficult t o

pinpoint a general tendency on a global level; that is

to say, a tendency, that in any given moment dominates

the church o n a global level. Nonetheless, with fear

of being mistaken, we could affirm that, based on data

from conversations with different bishops and priests,

the political tendency that dominated in the nucleus o f

the church at the time o f carrying out t h e present

work was developmentalist.

10.8 Country o r countries in which you were educated

for t h e priesthood
The results obtained from this question are

similar t o those from the question about the country o f

origin (Table No. 42). It can be noted in this table

that there is a high number of priests who received

their training in Guatemala (34 priests representing

38.20 percent), although the greatest weight is with

those who have received their formation in foreign

countries, 55.05 percent, corresponding t o 4 3 priests

(See Table No. 45).

 TABLE No. 45
Country(ies) in which you
obtained your priesthood Freq. 7.
1. Guatemala 34 38.20
2. Spain 28 31.46
3 . Italy 8 8.96
4. United States 2 2.24
5. Others 11 12.35
6 . Did not answer 6 6.74

This sitgation could change in the coming

years, the result o f an increasing number of sacerdotal
vocations that are occurring in the country. Mean-

while, the given results in this table confirm the high

level of foreign influence that is characteristic of
the formation and preparation of the clergy that work
in the country.

10.9 Studies apart from the priesthood?

The education level within the clergy in
Guatemala is high if it is considered that 66 priests,

representing 74.15 percent, have studied at a

university level. Of those, 44 have received a degree
and 2 2 have received some university level classes or
are currently taking them (see Table No. 46).
 TABLE No. 4 6
Other studies apart from
priesthood Freq. %
1 . No* only at seminary 14 15.73
2. Informal studies 6 6.74
3. University level classes 22 24.71
4. University degree 44 49.43
5. Did not answer 3 3.37

Nonetheless, as we said at the beginning of

this analysis* the fact that the clergy presents a
high level of education does not mean that its members

wi 1 1 take on new occupational roles* but will basically

pu.t the acqu ired knowledge into practice in carrying
out their pr incipal role of pastoral labor. In
addition, it is worth noting that in several cases, and
despite a high level of education, some of the priests
interviewed by this investigator did not show signs of
preparation that would indicate their level o f

education when considering their way of expressing

themselves as well as their management of concepts and
situations.
 APPENDIX I I

INFORMATION REQUIRED OF BISHOPS

IN JULY 1985

1. Category:
1.1 Archdiocese
1.2 Diocese
1.3. Prelatura Nullius
1.4 Apostolic Administrations

2. Territory covered (by department):

3. Number o f parishes per department (if not

possible, just indicate the total):

4. Number of priests under your administration:

4.1 Nationals
4.2 Foreigners
5. How many parishes in your jurisdiction are not
attended by a priest:
How are they attended:

6. Principle lay apostolate movements that are

organized in your territory:
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6 . 6 Others
 APPENDIX 1 1 1
LIST OF MOVIMIENTOS APOSTOLICOS SEGLAR
(LAY APOSTOLATE MOVEMENTS)
Cursillos de Cristiandad
Encuentro Matrimonial
Movirniento Familiar Cristiano
Caminantes
Por un Carnino Mejor
Catequistas
Apostolado de la Oracion
Legion de Maria
Renovacion Carismatica
Encuentros de Prornocion Juvenil
Tercera Orden Franciscana (Seglar)
Accion Catolica
Grupos de Maestros
Pastorales Juveniles
Neo-Catecurnenado
Oelegados de la Palabra
Cofradias
Grupos de Oracion
Juventud Franciscana
Guardias del Santisimo
Herr~andades
Encuentro de Novios
Movimiento Infantil
Consejos Parroquiales
Soldados de Cristo
H i jas de Maria
Pequenas Hermanas de Maria
Grupos de Visita a Enfermos
Devotas de Santa Ana
Hijas de Maria de Lourdes
Deomincos Seglares
Caballeros de Colon
Cabal.leros Betlemitas
Cooperadores Salesianos
Accfon Catolica Rural
Juventud Antoniana
Mon i tores
Club Social Familiar
Cornites Pro-Construccion
Juventud Obrera Catolica
Source: Information provided by bishops in July 1985.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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La Tarde, Guatemala, August 3, 1976.

Latin American Bureau Service (Lab Service) MIAU, P.O.

Box 6066, Washinston, D.C., 1971, DDC 25.

Le Monde, November 1 4 , 1970.

L'Unita, December 1970.

Primer censo de poblacion del estado de Guatemala

formado por decreto de su asamblea del 12 de

Octubre de 1825. Guatemala: Imprenta Mayor, Casa

de Porras, 1825. Unpublished document, Library of

Agustin Estradas Monroy.

Politica y Sociedad, Universidad de San Carlos de

Guatemala, Guatemala (special number), April

1971.

Prensa Libre, Guatemala, February 4. 1970; February 7,

1970; February 10, 1970; July 8, 1970; July 9,

1970; July 11, 1970; July 13, 1970; January 22,

1972; Piarch 8 , 1983.

Verbum, July 9, 1944.

Washinqton Post, April 19, 1981.

CATHOLIC CHURCH DOCUMENTS AND PRONOUNCEMENTS

Abbot, Walter, ed., The Documents of Vatican 1 1 , New

York City, N.Y.: America Press, Angelus Books,

Annuario Pontificio per 1 'anno 1970, Citta del

Vaticano: Tipograf ia Poliglota Vaticana. 1970.

Annuario Pontoficio per l'anno 1985, Citta cel

Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1985.

Carta pastoral del Episcopado Guatemalteco sobre 10s

problemas sociales y el peligro Cornunista en

Guatemala," Guatemala, August 15, 1962, D.E. 1.

Casariegc, Mario, Cartas pastorales y discursos, 1965-

-
1967, Vol. I , San Salvador, El Salvador: Escuela

Tipografica Emiliani, 1967.

, Cartas pastorales v discursos, 1967-1969, Vol.

11, San Salvador, El Salvador: Escuela Tipografica

Emiliani, 1969.

, Cartas pastorales y discursos, 1969-1975, Vol.

111, Guatemala: Imprenta Iberia, Talleres

Gutenberg, no date.

, Cartas pastorales y discursos, 1975-19e0, Vol.

IV (no date or publisher).

CELAM, "La evangelizacion en el presente y en el futuro

de America Latina," Puebla, Mexico, 1978.

, IfFe Cristiana y compromiso social," Mexico City:

Departamento de Accion Social, 1982.

Colonnese, Luis, Memorandum a la Federacion Nacional de

Consejos de Sacerdotes, "Solidarizacion con 10s

Sacerdotes de las Americas," Baltimore, Maryland,

 March 197 1, DDC 22.

Comunicado de Prensa del padre provicial de la

Compania de Jesus en Centroamerica, San Salvador,

October 23, 1981.

Conferencia Episcopal de Guatemala* Mensaje del

Episcopado Guatemalteco, Guatemala, May 9, 1967,

D.E. 2.

, Comunicado, Guatemala, February 4, 1970, 3.E.

., Mensaje de 10s obispados de Guatemala a1 pueblo

de Dios con relacion a la violencia, Guatemala,

March 20, 1974, D.E. 3.

, Mensaje del Episcopado de Guatemala, "Unidos en la

esperanza, presencia de la iglesia en la

reconstruccion de Guatemala," Guatemala, July 25,

1976, D.E. 4.

?
- Comunicado, Guatemala, May 4, 1977, D.E. 5.
 660

, Cornunicado, Guatemala, March 2, 1979, D.E. 6.

-9 Cornunicado, Guatemala, February 15, 1980, D.E.

7.

, Cornunicado, Guatemala, May 15, 1980, D.E. 8.

-* Cornunicado, Guatemala, July 24, 1980, D.E. 9.

, Carta pastoral colectiva, April 8, 1981, D.E.

, Comunicado, Guaterna la, August 6, 1981, D.E. 13.

, Cornunicado, Guatema la, October 2, 1981, D.E.

14.

, Pastoral colectiva del Episcopado Guatemalteco,

Guatemala, November 14, 1981, D.E. 16.

Cornunicado, Guatemalap January 30, 1982, D.E.

17.
CONFREGUA, Relacion General de CONFREGUA, Guatemala,
February 15, 1966.

9- Comunicado, Guatemala, July 20, 1976.

-* Cornunicado, Guatem=!a, June 7. 1978.

, Estatutos de CONFREGUA, Guatemala, no date.

COSDEGUA, "La verdad sobre COSDEGUA," Julius Fater,

Guatemala, no date, DDC 1.

, Proyecto de estatutos de COSDEGUA, Guatemala, no

date, DDC 3.

, "Defraudo COSDEGUA a la iglesia y a1 peblo de

Dios," Gustavo Lara, Guatemala, no date, DDC 18.

, "Hegemonia extranjera en la iglesia de

Guatemala," Oscar Orellana, Guatemala, November
19, 1969, DOC. 17.

-9 Boletin de Prensa, Guatemala, 1970, DDC 9.

 , Pronunciamento de COSDEGUA, Guatemala, January
16, 1970, DDC 4.

, Comunicado, "Sacerdotes Guatemaltecos niegan las

declaraciones de 10s obispos," Guatemala, February
9, 1970, DOC 5.

, Memorial de integrantes del pueblo Catolico a1

Papa Paulo V I , Guatemala, April 29, 1970, DDC 10.

, Declaraciones de COSDEGUA y de 10s Cristianos

renovados, Guatemala, July 10, 1970, DDC 8.

-9 Declaracion de 10s feligreses de las colonias de

la parraquia del Santo Cura de Aras, Zone 5,
Guatemala, July 14, 1970, DOC 15.

9
-
Carta abierta a 10s participantes de la semana

sacerdotal, Oscar Orellana, Guatemala, July 30,

1970, DOC 1 1 .

, C = ~ t ade COSDEGUA a1 dardenal Mario Casariego,

 Guatemala, August 16, 1970, DDC 19.

, Cornunicado, COSDEGUA ante el conflict0 de 10s

campesinos de Xata, Guatemala, September 6 , 1970,
DDC 21.

, Respuesta del presbitero Jose Maria Ruiz Furlan

a un comunicado de la curia eclesiastica,

Guetemala, December 17, 1970, DCC 20.

I

, Boletin d= Prensa No. 1, Guaterrala, January 1 1 .

1971, DDC 12.

, "COSDEGUA ante las injust i cias dentro de la

misma iglesia," Salvador Valenzuela, Guatemala,
February 1971, DDC 13.

* Cornuoicado "Ante el despido de las macstras del

Colegio Nazareth," Guatemala, February 2, 1971,
DDC 16.

-- , Carta abierta a1 Congreso de la Republica,

Guatemala, March 14: 1971, DDC 15.
 , Carta a1 Rev. Frank Bonike, presidente de la
NFPC, Jose Maria Ruiz Furlan, Guatemala, March 19,
1971, DDC 24.

-9 Comunicado "J~rarquiaEclesiastica muestrase una

vez mas inoperante," Guatemala, April 12, 1971,
DDC 14.

-9 Carta de COSDEGUA a1 presbitero Camilo Moncada,

Bogota, Colombia. Guatemala, July 2, 1971, DDC
27.

, Jose Marie R I J ~ ZFurlan, Carta a Herbert

Froehlich. Guatemala, August 18, 1971, DOC 7.

9 Carta de COSOEGUA a1 Rev. P. Javier Solis, Costa

Rica. Guatemala, July 5, 1971, DDC 28.

-9 Carta de COSDEGUA a1 Rev. P. Arturo Divar, S.J.,

Rector de la Llniversidad Centroamericana en
Managua, Nicaragua, Guatemala, July 8, 1971, DDC
29.
 , Carta de COSDEGUA a1 Rev. P. Donald Hanagan, St.
Patrick College, Maynooth, County Kildare,
Ireland. Guatemala, August I, 197!r DDC 30.

, Telegram de COSDEGUA a1 General Stroessner from

Salvador Valenzuela. Guatemala, 1971, DDC 26.

, Carta abierta a1 Congreso de la Republics.

Guatemala, March 14, i972, DDC 31.

, Evange1izacio:i y colonizacion, Vol. 1, CCSDEGUA,

Oscar Orellana, Guatemala: Imprenta La Familia,
1972, DOC 2 .

I Congreso Nacional de Vocaciones Sacerdotales.

Publicaciones del Seminario Conciliar de
Guatemala, No. 3, Guatemala: Union Tipcgrafica,
September 3-6, 1942.

I 1 Centenario del Arzobispado de Guatemala* Guatemala:

Unidad Tipografica, 1947.

Directorio de la ~rquiaioc'esis,Guatemala, 1981.

ENIAL, La Resistencia y las luchas de 10s indigenas de

Guatemala. !'El proceso de cambio en las

comunidades del Norte de Guatemala, Testimonio del

Sacerdote Fidel Hernandez. Encuentro Indigena de

America Latina, ENIAL, mimeo, Mexico City. 1982.

Estatutos Generales de la Accion Catolica de la

Arquidiocesis de Santiago de Guatemala, Guatemala:

Tipografia Sanchez y de Guise, July 1946.

Guia de la Iglesia en Guatemala, no date or publisher

(ca. 1967).

Iglesia Guatemalteca en Exilio, Compendia 1980-1982,

mimeo, Managua, Nicaragua, August 1984.

John XXIII, Pope. "Mater et Magistra," in The Gospel

o f Peace and Justice: Catholic Social Teaching

since Pope John, Joseph Gremillion, ed.,

Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1976.

 , "Pacem in Terris: Peace on earth," in The
Gospel o f Peace and Justice: ~atho1ic;~ocial
Teaching since Pope John, Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis

Books, 1976.

Kelly, David, Maryknoll in Central America. 1943-1978,

mimeo, G u a t e z ~ l aAugust
~ 1980,

Latin American Bureau, U.S.C.C., Comunicado de Prensa,

Washington, D.C., March 19, 1971, DDC 22.

Paul V I , Pope, "Populorum Progressio," in The Gospel of

Peace and Justice: Catholic Social Teachinq since

Pope John, Joseph kiremillion, ed., Maryknoll,
N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1976.

Reporte scbre la situacion de la iglesia Catolica de

Guatemala, no author or date, DDC 6.

Rossell y Arellano, Mariano, Carta pastoral sobre la

fgnorancia religiosa, Guatemala, February 11,
1940.
 , Exhortacion pastoral con motivo del dia de

Pentecostes, Guatemala, May 25, 1944.

9
- Exhortacion pastoral, "Primera exhortacion a1
civismo," Guatemala, July 14, 1944.

, Pastoral con ocasion de la Cuaresma de 1945,

acerca de la obra de la iglesia Catolica,

Guatemala, February 22, 1945.

, Carta pasto~al, "La justicia social, fundatxnto

del bienestar social r " Guatemala, November 15,

1948.

9
- Carta pastoral sobre 10s avances del comunismo
en Guatemala, Guatemala, April 4, 1954.

Carta pastoral, "La paz, fruto de la justicia y

el amor:" Gnsterz!a, July 29 1954.

Declaracion contra demagogia Comunista y

liberal: La iglesia no busca privilegios,

Guatemala, July 20, 1954.

 , Carta a la asernblea constituyente, Derecho de la

f q i e s i a sn la lesislacion. Guatemala, May 9,

1955.

, Carta a la asernblea constituyente, Contra

requisitos, antidemocraticos sobre el bautismo y

el matrimonio, Guatem~la, December 18, 1955.

r Mensaje a1 pueblo de Guatemala, "En pro del

bienestar social futuro de Guatemala," Guatemala,

October 15, 1957.

Oracion funebre, "El seudo-anticomunismo,lt

Guatemala, July 7, 1958.

, Oracion funebre, "En el segundo aniversario de

la muerte de Castillo Armas," Guatemala, July 26,

1959.

Visita ad limina apostolorum, de 10s obispos de la

provincia eclesiastica de Guatemala, Guatemala,

Imprenta Gutenberg, November 15G3.
BOOKS

Adams, Richard N., Crucifixion hv Power: Essays on

Guatemala National Social Structure, 1944-1966.

Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970.

Almond, Gabriel and Powel Bingham, Comparative

Politics: A Development Approach. Boston:

Little, Brown and Company, 1966.

Alonso, Isidoro Garrido Gines, La igiesia en America

Central y el Caribe. Friburg: Oficina

International de Invostigaciones Sociales de

FERES. 1962.

Anfuso, Joseph and David Sczepansky, Efrain Rios Montt:

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controversial presidente de Guatemala. Zuatemala:

Gospel Outreach, 1984.

Apter, David, The Politics of Modernization. Chicago:

 University of Chicago Press, 1965.

Arevalo, Juan Jose, Escritos politicos y discursos.

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Minis-Lerio de Educacion Publicat Biblioteca de

Cultura Popular, Vol. 32, October 20, 1952.

Bill, James and Robert Hardgrave, 'Comparative Politics:

the Quest for Theory. Washington, D.C.:

University Press of America, Inc., 1981.

Brecht, Arnold, Teoria politics. Barcelona: Ediciones

Ariel. 1963.

Bruneau, Thorns C., The Political Transformation of the

Brazilian Catholic Church. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1974.

9
- The Church in Brazil: The Politics of Religion,
Austin: University of Texas Pressr 1982.
Calder, Bruce, Crecimiento Y cambio de la iglesia
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Estudios Centroamericanos, No. 6, Seminario de

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Chinchilla Aguilar, Ernesto, Blasones y heredades,

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9
- La vida moderna en Centroamerica. Guatemala:
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Collierl David, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin

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Diaz, Vi.ctor Manuel, Guatemala independestista:

Recopilacion de documentos historicos. Guatemala:
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Tipograf ia Nacional , 1935.

Durkheim, Emile, Elements and Forms of Reliqious Life.

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Dussel, Enrique, Historia de la iqlesia en la America

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Einaudi, Luigi, Richard Maullin. Alfredo Stepan, and

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Develo~menk: The Chanqing Catholic Church. Santa

Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, October

1969.

Estrada, Agustin, Datos para la historia ae la iqlesia

en Guatemala, three volumes. Guatemala:

Tipografia Nacional, 1972, 1974, and 1979.

Falla, Ricardo. Esa muerte que nos hace vivir: Estudio

de la religion popular. Coleccion Teologia

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Filisola, Vicente, La independencia de Guatemala.

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Frank, Louisa and Philip Wheaton, Indian Guatemala,

Path t o Liberation: The Role of Christians in the

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Fried, Jonathan, Marvin Gettleman, Deborah Levenson,

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1983.

Gage, Tomas, Nueva relacion que contiene 10s viajes de

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Tams Gage en la Nueva Espana. Guatemala:

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N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1973.

Herrarte, Alberto, La union de Centroamerica traqedia y

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Pineda Ibarra, 1964.

Hollefan, Nary P., Church and "??ate in Guatemala. New

York: Octagon Books, Farrar Strauss and Giroux,

1974.

Hough, Richard, John Kelley, Stephen Miller, Russell

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Papiro, 1983.

Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Chanqinq

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Texas Press, 1982.

Jonas, Susanne, and Dav id Tobis, eds., Guatemala: Una

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Juarros, Domingo, Cornpendio de la historia de la Ciudad

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Langer, William, ed., An Encyclopedia of World History.

Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1948.

Larrazabal, Antonio, Bosquejo estadistico del

arzobispado de Guatemala y obispados

sufrasenaneos, 1984. Guatemala: Anales de la

Scciedad de Geografia e Historia, 1954.

La Torre Cabal, Hugo, The Revolution of the Latin

American Church. Oklahoma City: University of

Ok 1 ahoma Press, 1978.

Levine, Daniel H., Relision and Politics in Latin

America: The Catholic Church in Venezueia and

Colombia. Princeton: Princeton University Press,

1981.

Lujan Munoz, Jorge, Inicio del dominio espanol en las

Indias. Guatema la: Ed itorial Universitaria,

1979.

9
- La independencia y la anexion de Centroamerica a
Mexico. Guatemala: Serviprensa Centroamericana,

1977.

Malinowski, Bronislaw, Maqic, Science, and Relisio~.

Garden City, N.J.: Doub;eday, 1948.

Ha! I c y , James, ed., Authoritarianism and Cor~oratism in

Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of

Pittsburgh Press, 1977.

Marure, Alejandro, Bosquejo historic0 de las

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Ministerio de Educacion Publica, Vol. 36, 1960.

Mata Gavidia, Jose, Anotaciones para la historia patria

Centroamericana. Guatemala: Editorial

Universitaria, 1969.

Mecham, John Lloyd, Church and State in Latin America:

A History of Politico-Ecclesiastical Relations,

revised ed. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of
North Carolina Press, 1966.

Melville, Thomas and Marjorie, Para quien es el

cielo? Mexico City: Ediciones Roca, S.A., 1975.

Spanish version of Teresa Pamies, Whose Heaven,

Whose Earth?. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2971.

Miller, Hubert J., La islesia Catolica y el estado en

Guatemala. 1871-1885. Jorge Lujan Munoz, trans.,

Guatemala: Editorial Universitaria, 1976.

Montufar Rivera, Lorenzo, Resena historica de Centro

America. Guatemala: Tipografia de El Progreso,

Morales, Baltasar, Derrocamiento de una tirania.
Guatemala: Tipografia Nacional, 1958.

Pike, Frederick B . , ed., The Conflict Between Church

and State in Latin America. New York: Alfred A.

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Pye, Lucian, Aspects of Political Development: An

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Editorial Universitaria, 1978.

 680

Salazar, Ramon, Historia de veintiun an?-s-., Guatemala:

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Schlesinger, Stephen and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit:

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Smith, Brian A., The Church and Politics in Chile:

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 York: 0. Appleton and Co., 3 vols., 1896.

Turner, Frederick C., Catholicism and Political

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Woodward, Ralph Lee, Central America: A Nation
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1976.

ARTICLES AND INTERVIEWS

Berryman, Philip, "The Color o f Blood Is Never

Forgotten," in The Relinious Roots of Rebellion:
Christians in Central American Revolutions.
Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1984.

Black, George, ;n collaboration with Milton Jamail and

Norma Chirtchilla Stoltz, l'Guatemala, The War is

Not Over," "The Road from Ixcan," in NACLA Report

on the Americas, Vol. XVI;, No. 2, March/April

1983.

Bonpane, Blese, M.M., "Guatemala: 2% Wealth, 98%

Misery," interview 2 -
, , I
7"-
l l l c
ii-C:---'
t . - L l u l , a ~
*-LL
ic
L ~ L I I ( > ~

Reporter, Vol. 4, No. 14, January 31, 1968.

 , "A Priest on Guatemala,'' Washinston Post, Sunday
Outlook Section, February 14, 1968.

Chandler, Ralph C., "Guerilla Priests: A Few Kind

Words," Commonweal, August 9, 1968.

DeKadt, Emmanuel, "Church, Society and Development in

Latin America," Journal o f Development Studies,
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Drekonja, Gerhard, "Religion and Social Change in Latin

America." Latin American Research Review, Vol. 6,

No. 1, Spring 1971.

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America, NACLA* 1974.
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Vol. 116, No. 3, 1967.

Larrazabal, Antonio, "Bosquejo estadistico del

Arzobispado de Guatemala y obispados

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1-4, March 1953; December 1954.

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Bottomore, ed., Early Writings, New York: McGraw

Hi1 1 , 1963.
-
Melville, Thomas, "Revolution is Guatemala's Only
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No. 14, January 31, 1968.

Montufar, Sergio, "Vom Complizen Zum Opfer der

Aufstandsbekampfung," mimeo, 1983.

Morse, Richardp "Toward a Theory of Spanish American

Governmentr" in Politics and Social Change in
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Mutchler, DAvid, "Adaptation of the Roman Catholic

Church t o L a 5 n American Development: The Meaning

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Guatemala," U.S. Foreign Policy, February 1966.

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for Reflection," Journal of interamerican Studies
and World Affairs* Vol. 219 February 1, 1979.
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Survey," in The Church and Social Chanqe in Latin
America, Henry A. Landsberger, ed., Notre Dame:
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Sanders, Thomas. "A Typology of Catholic Elites?" and

"Religion and Modernization: Some Reflections,"
in Catholic Innovation in a Chanqinq Latin
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, "The Church in Latin America," Foreiqn AffairsT

Vol. 48, No. 2, 1970.

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Smith, Brian. "Religion and Social Change: Classical

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American Research Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1975.

Vallier, Ivan, "Church Development in Latin America: A
Five Country Comparison," Journal o f Development
Areas, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1967.

Vallier, Ivan, "Religious Elites: Differentiation and

Developments in Roman C a t h o l i ~ i s m ,in
~ Seymour
Lipset and Aldo Solari, eds., Elites in Latin
America. New York: Oxford University Press,

1967.

Vekemens, Roger, "Economic Development, Ssrial Change

and Cultural Mutation," in Reliqion, Revolution
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America, William D'Antonio and Frederick Pike,
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Williams, Edward, "Latin Americac Catholicism and

Political Integration, Comparative Political

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-9 "The Emergence of the Secular Nation State and

Latin American Catholicism," Comparative Politics,
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January 9, 1987.

THESES AND DISSERTATIONS

Centeno Cordon, Carlos Enrique, Cooperativas de El

Peten. Master's thesis, Facultad de Ciencias
Economicas, Universidad de San Carlos de
Guatemala* Guztemala, 1973.

Dodson, Jimmie, Reiiqious Innovation and the Politics

of Arqentina. Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana

University, 1974.

Frankel, Anita, Political Development in Guatemala,

1944-1954: The Impact of Foreiqn Military and
Reliqious Elites. Ph.D. dissertation, University

of Connecticut, 1969.

Macaulay, Michael G., Ideoloqical Change end Internal

Cleavaqes in the Peruvian Church. Ph.D.

 dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1972.

Maloney, Thomas, The Catholic Church and the Peruvian

-RevolutSon:
." Resource Exchange in an Authoritarian
Settinq. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas

at Austin, 1978.

Mutchler, David E., The Ornanization and Ideoloqv of

Church Politics in Latin America. Ph.D.

dissertation, Washington University, 1970.

 Jose L u i s Cbna was born in Guatemala on May
28, 1954, the son of Jorge Chea Gonzalez and Herlinda

Urruelz. After c ~ m p l e ~ ihis

n ~ work at Liceo Javier
High School, Guat., ,-- :a City, in 197 1, he entered Rafael
Landivar University in 3uatemale where he obtained his
LGW Degree. From 1979 te 1981, he attended Georgetown
University in Washingtara, D.C., where he received his

Master's degree in !ntet-national Relations. From 1981

to 1983 he studied at t k r iraduate School of the
University of Texas at Ab.-:in in the Institute of Latin
American Studies. From 1 - . - to 1986, he worked as a
program officer at the U7;.:d Nations Development
Program (UNDP) in Guatema.c- City. In 1587 he served as
Vice-Minister of Foreign ,.'"airs of his country and
currently is the arnb~;~ador of Guatemala at the United
Natlons Mission in Gensva, cwitzerland.

Permanent address: 13 C a tl z 0-72

Zona ,
G~at:~.~i~;a City, Central America

This dissertation was type12 b y Mary K. Smith.