SAND2015-20841C

Chemical Safety and Security

Jennifer Gaudioso, PhD
March 2015
Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the
U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. Programmatic Review 5326579.
Chemical Safety Incidents
Catastrophic process incidents:
 1976 Seveso Italy
 1984 Bhopal India
 2005 Texas City Texas

More recently:
 2012 - Lac-Mégantic rail disaster
 42 confirmed dead (5 missing and
confirmed dead)
 1 km blast radius
 >30 buildings destroyed
 Downtown area contaminated by crude
oil
 2013 – Hube Global Chemical Plant
Seoul, Korea
 8 tonnes of hydrofluoric acid released
 5 workers killed (18 severely injured)
 3,000 people exposed Abandoned Bhopal Plant
 Contaminated crops and sickened Photo credit: AP/Saurabh Das
livestock (200 hectares)
 Chemical Security Incidents
Aum Shinrikyo
 Technical Expertise
 Synthesis Accomplished
 Delivery Methods
 Disruption of Tokyo subway system

Viktor
Yushchenko
(Ukraine) -
before and
after in 2004
Dioxin
Chemical Safety and Security (CSS)

 Chemical Safety
 Preventing and protecting
against chemical laboratory
accidents

 Chemical Security
 Preventing and protecting
against the intentional
misuse of chemicals,
people, or equipment for
non-peaceful purposes

Goal: Safe and Peaceful use

of Chemicals

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 How are chemical safety and
chemical security related?

Both Ensure Protection of:

 Workers
 Plant facilities
 Plant processes
 Community
 Environment
 Economy
Evolution of Risk Management

Change in approach to incident causation:

 1950s to 1970
 Technical factors
 1970s to 1990s
 Human factors
 1990s to present time
 Organizational factors

Reference: International Civil Aviation Organization, Safety Management Manual, 2009

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Chemical Management Benefits

 Reduces cost of:

 Raw materials
 Hazardous waste disposal
New Waste
Chemical
 Facilitates plant sustainability

 Protects the environment

 Improves security
 Theft
 Sabotage
Risk Basics: Safety and Security

 Risk management
 Applies to both Chemical Safety and Chemical Security

 Safety Incident  Security Incident

 Spill
 Accidental exposure
 Uncontrolled reaction
 Theft or diversion of dual-
use chemicals
 Intentional release
 Sabotage

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Safety and Security Risk
Characterization
 What are the benefits of characterizing risks?

 Can risks ever be reduced to zero?

 What does it take to reduce Chemical Safety and

Security risk?
 Are resources for risk reduction limitless?

 Risk reduction measures should always be applied in a

graded manner
 Protect diamonds like diamonds and pencils like pencils

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Risk Basics: Reduction

 Types of Chemical
Safety and Security
Controls
 Administrative
 Operational
 Engineering
 PPE

 Decrease likelihood

 Decrease consequence

Risk = f (Likelihood, Consequence)

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Chemical Risk Assessment:
Overview of the Process
1. Assess Processes and Threats

2. Identify Hazards

3. Characterize S&S Risks

4. Are Risks Acceptable?

5. Implement Additional
Yes No Control Measures

Proceed with work and

6. Follow up with periodic repeat of steps 1-5

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Chemical Security Risk Assessment:
Dual Use Chemicals
Example: Cyanide
Legitimate use Misuse
 Mining and metal plating  Poison and precursor to
industries HCN, a CW agent
 Popular with criminals and
terrorists because it is
relatively easy to obtain

 USA, 1982, cyanide added

to Tylenol capsules
 Killed 7 people
 Led to tamper-proof
packaging

"Tylenol Crisis of 1982." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. 22 Nov 2007, 06:04 UTC. Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. 28
Nov 2007 <http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Tylenol_Crisis_of_1982&oldid=173056508>.
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Therence Koh/AFP/Getty Images
Chemical Security Risk Assessment

 Main points
 Likelihood of a security threat scenario may be higher than you
think
 Out of chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological materials,
chemicals are used maliciously the most often

 Consequences can range from low to high

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Cradle-to-Grave Risk Management:
Life Cycle of Chemicals
Control and accountability of chemicals at all times,
from procurement to disposal as waste

Storage/ Chemical
Inventory Use

Delivery/ Waste
Receipt Management

Legacy/
Recycling
Waste Disposal

Ordering/
Procurement

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Key Principles: CSS Controls

 Involves all CSS controls

 Administrative
 Develop CSS policy and programs
 Institute a chemical procurement program
 Operational
 Standard Operating Procedures
 Substitution (Using less dangerous chemical)
 Scale down (Procure and use a smaller amount of dangerous
chemical)
 Engineering
 Isolate or enclose the process, hazardous material or worker
 PPE
 Last line of defense, for emergency or non-standard operations
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Conclusions
 Risk is a function of Likelihood and Consequence
 Applies to both Safety and Security
 Facilities need to be safe, secure, and productive
 Assessing and characterizing Chemical Safety and Security risks
at all points in the life cycle of chemicals allows controls to be
applied in a graded manner
 Larger efforts toward reducing high risks
 Smaller efforts toward reducing low risks

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