Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.
1-5
Article VIII – Judicial Department
Sec.1 Judicial power
SANTIAGO VS BAUTISTA
FACTS:
Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days before his
graduation, Ted and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of the honor
students. They filed a Certiorari case against the principal and teachers who composed
the committee on rating honors.. Respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action
was improper, and even assuming it was proper, the question has become academic (bc
the graduation already proceeded. They also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the
part of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board,
exercising judicial functions, under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial
function
ISSUE: W/N judicial function be exercised in this case.
RULING:
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of
judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In
order for an action for certiorari to exist,
Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial functions:
1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a
tribunal for hearing and determination.
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and
render a decision.
3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the
judiciary (or at least the not the legislative nor the executive)
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and
what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.
Judicial power is defined:
•           as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.
•           authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when
the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of
adjudication.
•           The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them.
•           The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.
The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-
judicial bodies in the performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a
LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which
adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring there from is
brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to determine 
Marcos v. Manglapus
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand Marcos petitions the SC for mandamus and prohibition
asking to order respondents to issue travel documents to him and his immediate family
and to enjoin the implementation of the President "s decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.
Issue:
WON the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, in the
exercise of the powers granted in her by the Constitution.
Ruling:
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
Affirmative. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of
specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of "executive power ". The powers of the President cannot be said to
be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power
inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
Even the members of the Legislature has recognized that indeed Mrs. Aquino has the
power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning, as per House
Resolution No. 1342.
Marcos v Manglapus, et. al.
Facts: Same as above, except that Ferdinand has died.
Held: Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his
(or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people.
Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr.
Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this
bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness
or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin
the implementation of this decision.  ------------------
Facts:
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order
the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a "travel documents "to
former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses "to return "in the Philippines is
guaranteed by "the Bill of Rights, specifically "Sections "1 and 6. They contended that
Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because
only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair
their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under "international law, their right "to return "to the
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on "Civil "and Political Rights, which has been ratified
by the Philippines.
Issue:
"Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by "the constitution, the
President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held:
"It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to "travel
from "the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the
right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at
bar is the right "to return "to one's country, a distinct right under "international law,
independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on "Civil "and Political
Rights treat the right to freedom of "movement "and abode within the territory of a
state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and
distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of "movement
"and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant
guarantees the right to liberty of "movement "and freedom to choose his residence and
the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be
restricted by laws protecting the "national security, public order, "public health "or
morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be
arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to
the right "to return "to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the
liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights "treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well
considered view that the right "to return "may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of "International Law "and under our Constitution as part of the law of the
land. "
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the
destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains
achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return
to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
FACTS :
On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouse’s
ten year old daughter and was sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first
time the constitutionality of RA 7659 “ The Death Penalty Law”, and the imposition of
death penalty for the crime of rape. The motions were denied with the court finding no
reason to declare it unconstitutional and pronouncing Congress compliant with the
requirements for its imposition.
RA 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA 7659.
The mode of execution was changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The
Secretary of Justice promulgated the rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177 and
directed the Director of Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary
of Justice and Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution,
contending that RA 8177 and its implementing rules are unconstitutional and void. The
Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City and Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 104
were later impleaded to enjoin them from setting a date of execution.
On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment and mandated the
parties to mantain status quo . Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status
quo and to request for TRO until resolution of the petition.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the RA
in question is unconstitutional and providing arguments in support of his contention.
CHR filed a motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae
alleging that the death penalty is cruel and degrading citing applicable provisions and
statistics showing how other countries have abolished the death penalty and how some
have become abolitionists in practice . Petitioner filed a reply stating that lethal
injection is cruel, degrading , inhuman and violative of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.
ISSUE :
WON R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for
being an undue delegation of legislative power
HELD:
THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO.
8177 TO THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF
CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO
IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.
The separation of power is a fundamental principle in our system of government and
each department has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and
is supreme within its own sphere. A consequence of the doctrine of separation of
powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. In Latin maxim, the rule is :
potestas delegata non delegari potest.” (what has been delegated, cannot be delegated).
There are however exceptions to this rule and one of the recognized exceptions is “
Delegation to Administrative Bodies “
The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director
of the Bureau of Corrections are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations on
the subject of lethal injection.
The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing
complexity of the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention.
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to
fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said
law: (a) be complete in itself – it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate – and (b) fix a standard – the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable – to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions.
Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode of
carrying out the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what
job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its
limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out.
 Info Tech Foundation P v COMELEC
FACTS:
In Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines (lnfotech) v. Commission on
Elections, the Supreme Court (SC) nullified the COMELEC's award to Mega Pacific
Consortium of the procurement contract involving the automated counting machines
(ACMs) for the 2004 national elections. SC found that the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion when it awarded the contract to an entity which failed to establish itself
as a proper consortium, and despite the ACMs' failure to meet certain technical
requirements.
On January 13, 2004, SC promulgated the Decision in lnfotech declaring as null and
void: (a) COMELEC Resolution No. 6074 which awarded the contract for Phase II of
the Comprehensive Automated Electoral System to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC);
and (b) the procurement contract for ACMs executed between the COMELEC and
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI). They found that the COMELEC's failure to
follow its own rules, policies, and guidelines in respect of the bidding process, and to
adequately check and observe financial, technical and legal requirements constituted
grave abuse of discretion. As a result of the foregoing lapses of the COMELEC, they
also directed the Ombudsman to determine the criminal liability, if any, of the public
officials and private individuals involved in the nullified resolution and contract.
As mandated by the Infotech Decision, the Ombudsman initiated a fact-finding
investigation. On January 21, 2004, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. also filed criminal
and administrative complaints against COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr.
and other COMELEC officials with the Ombudsman. Kilosbayan Foundation and
Bantay Katarungan Foundation later filed a related complaint with the Ombudsman
against COMELEC officials and stockholders of MPEI on September 19, 2004. The
Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Ombudsman filed a supplemental complaint on
October 6, 2004. These cases were later on consolidated by the Ombudsman
In the meantime, the petitioners in the Infotech case filed a Manifestation and Motion
dated December 22, 2005, as well as a Supplemental Motion dated January 20, 2006,
alleging that the Ombudsman has yet to comply with SC directive in the Infotech
Decision. Thus, on February 14, 2006, SC issued a Resolution directing the
Ombudsman to show cause why it should not be held in contempt for its failure to
comply with the Court's directive. In compliance with the foregoing Resolution, the
Ombudsman filed its Comment contending that it should not be held in contempt of
court because it has "long acted on the referral, or complied with this Court's 'directive'
in this case, to its full extent." In a Resolution dated March 28, 2006, SC directed the
Ombudsman, under pain of contempt, to submit quarterly reports to the Court starting
June 30, 2006.
On July 13, 2006, the investigating panel of the Office of the Ombudsman reconvened
to carry out further investigation and clarificatory hearings. In all, the investigating
panel conducted a total of 12 public hearings between July 13, 2006 and August 23,
2006, interviewed 10 witnesses, and received no less than 198 documents.
Following these public hearings, the Ombudsman issued a Supplemental Resolution
dated September 27, 2006 which reversed and set aside the June 28, 2006 Resolution,
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
and dismissed the administrative and criminal complaints against both public and
private respondents for lack of probable cause. The Supplemental Resolution stated
that the Investigating Panel "cannot find an iota of evidence to show that the acts of
[the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC)] in allowing MPC to bid and its subsequent
recommendation to award [the] Phase II Contract to MPC constitute manifest []
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence" and that it cannot
establish that any "unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference was extended to MPC
or MP[E]I by [the] BAC in the exercise of its administrative function in the
determination [of] MPC's eligibility and subsequent recommendation made to [the]
COMELEC." In sum, the Ombudsman opined that a finding of grave abuse of
discretion in the lnfotech case cannot be considered criminal in nature in the absence
of evidence showing bad faith, malice or bribery in the bidding process.
The dispositive portion of the Infotech decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL and
VOID Comelec Resolution No. 6074 awarding the contract for Phase II of the AES to
Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC). Also declared null and void is the subject Contract
executed between Comelec and Mega Pacific eSolutions (MPEI). Comelec is further
ORDERED to refrain from implementing any other contract or agreement entered into
with regard to this project.
The Ombudsman maintains that it has the discretion to determine whether a criminal
case, given the facts of the case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, should be
filed. The respondents in G.R. No. 159139, the COMELEC and MPEI, support the
Ombudsman's position. They point to the plain text of the dispositive portion, i.e., the
use of the phrase "if any," which clearly demonstrates the Court's intent for the
Ombudsman to conduct its own investigation and render an independent assessment
based on whatever evidence the Ombudsman gathers.
ISSUE:
This case presents the question of whether the SC conclusion in lnfotech that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion is tantamount to a finding of
probable cause that the COMELEC officials violated penal laws, thereby making it the
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
ministerial duty of the respondent Ombudsman to file the appropriate criminal
complaints.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that:
In view of the constitutional delineation of powers, we reject the petitioner’s
contention that we already made a determination in the Infotech case that a crime has
been committed.
We could not have made such determination without going beyond the limits of our
judicial power and thereby unlawfully impinging the prerogative of the
constitutionally created Office of the Ombudsman. In Infotech, we only exercised our
mandate to determine whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC. However, a finding of
grave abuse of discretion is not necessarily indicative of probable cause. To determine
the latter, the constitutive elements of the crime must first be considered. In the
exercise of our certiorari jurisdiction in Infotech, we only resolved whether the
COMELEC acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner. We never
decided whether the facts were sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the respondents were probably guilty thereof.
Having ruled that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion, it is no
longer necessary to belabor the issue on contempt. Suffice it to say that our directive to
the Ombudsman was simply to determine if there was any criminal liability on the part
of the public and private respondents in G.R. No. 159139. The Ombudsman
sufficiently complied with this directive when she found that, based on the hearings
conducted and documents gathered, probable cause did not exist.
WHEREFORE, the petition docketed as G.R. No. 174777 is DISMISSED. The Motion
dated October 17, 2006 filed by the petitioners in G.R. No. 159139 is DENIED.
Francisco vs House of Representatives
Impeachment; Political Question; Judicial Branch
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
 Facts:
1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives
adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings,
superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th
Congress.
2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which
directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was
referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance
with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on
Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
“sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for
being insufficient in substance.
4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House
Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
“Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.
5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with
the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of
which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint
is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.”
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Issues:
1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint
constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions
of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of
Article XI of the Constitution.
Rulings:
1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of
the judicial power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution
has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is
clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly
unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is
unconstitutional.
1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall
promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on
impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the
very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to
effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly
provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is
the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule
making power, then it would by necessary implication have the
power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without
need of referendum.
3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee
on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3
(5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period following Article
XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by
former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and
referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the
second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice
on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against
the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.
 
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28,
2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General
of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5,
section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Section 2. Creation of Court
MANTRUSTE SYSTEMS VS CA
FACTS:
MSI entered into an 4 interim lease agreement with DBP, owner of Bayview Plaza
Hotel, where it would operate the hotel for a minimum of 3 months or until such time
that the said properties are sold to MSI or other 3rd parties by DBP.
The Bayview Hotel was subsequently identified for privatization under Proclamation
No. 50 and was consequently transferred from DBP to Asset Privatization Trust for
disposition. The DBP notified MSI that it was terminating the interim lease agreement
to effect the disposition of the property. The APT granted the President of MSI's
condition an extension of 30 days within which to effect the delivery of the Bayview
Hotel to APT.
However, MSI sent a letter to APT stating that in their opinion, having leased the
property for more than 1 year the agreement is long term in character and MSI have
acquired preference in buying the property, while emphasizing that MSI has a legal
lien on the property because of its advances for the hotel operations and repairs which
amounted to P12 Million.
APT answered MSI saying that there was no agreement to that effect. The bidding
took place but MSI did not participate. Makati-Agro Trading and La Filipina Uy
Gongco Corporation were awarded the property as the highest bidder for P85 Million.
MSI filed a complaint with injunction on awarding and transfer of the property to the
winning bidders. Trial court granted, but the CA reversed the trial court ruling for
being violative to Sec 1 of Proclamation No. 50:  "No court or administrative agency
shall issue any restraining order or injunction against the trust in connection with the
acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it. Nor shall such order or
injunction be issued against any purchaser of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such
purchaser from taking possession of any assets purchased by him."
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5

The CA rejected the TC's opinion that said proclamation is unconstitutional, rather it

up held that it continues to be operative after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution
by virtue of Section 3 Art.XVIII. It also noted that MSI has not been deprived of its PHIVIDEC V. VELEZ
property rights since those rights are non-existent and its only property right was the
alleged reimbursable advances made to DBP, which it may sue to collect in a separate FACTS:
action. It further held that the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction by the lower
On September 8, 1987, the respondent, Philippine Veterans Assistance Commission
court against APT may not be justified as a valid exercise of judicial power for MSI
(PVAC), filed in the Regional Trial Court a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage
does not have a legally demandable and enforceable right of retention over the said
against the petitioners — the Philippine Veterans Investment Development
property.
Corporation (PHIVIDEC) and PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority (PIA). The complaint
ISSUE: was docketed as Civil Case No. 11157 and raffled to Branch XX, presided over by
respondent Judge Alejandro M. Velez.
WoN the CA erred in not declaring unconstitutional Sec. 31 of Proclamation No. 50,
prohibiting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction by the TC. On November 20, 1987, PHIVIDEC and PIA filed an answer with counterclaim. They
alleged lack of jurisdiction by the trial court over the case for it is allegedly covered by
RULING: the arbitration powers of the Government Corporate Counsel under Presidential
Decree No. 242 of July 9, 1973, Sections 3-b and 6 of which prescribe the procedure
Sec 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any provision of the Constitution.
for the administrative settlement and adjudication of disputes, claims, and
It does not impair the inherent power of courts to settle actual controversies which are
controversies between or among government offices, agencies and instrumentalities,
legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a
including government-owned or controlled corporations, Sections 1, 3-b and 6 of P.D.
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
242 provide:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
branch or instrumentality of the government". (Sec 1 Art. VIII). The power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts belongs to the legislature,
"SEC. 1. Provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, all disputes, claims and
except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
controversies solely between or among the departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and
enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987
instrumentalities of the National Government, including government-owned or
Constitution).
controlled corporations but excluding constitutional offices or agencies, arising from
Courts may not substitute their judgement for that of the APT, nor block, by an the interpretation and application of statutes, contracts or agreements, shall henceforth
injunction, the discharge of its functions and the implementation of its decisions in be administratively settled or adjudicated as provided hereinafter: Provided, That this
connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it. shall not apply to cases already pending in court at the time of the effectivity of this
decree."cralaw virtua1aw library
There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an
administrative agency, except when it violates a citizen's constitutional rights, or "SEC. 3. . . .
commits a grave abuse of discretion, or acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction.
"(b) The Government Corporate Counsel, with respect to disputes or claims or

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Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
controversies between or among the government owned or controlled corporations or
entities being served by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel;"
"SEC. 6. The final decisions rendered in the settlement or adjudication of all such
disputes, claims or controversies shall have the same force and effect as final decisions
of the court of justice."
In an order dated March 15, 1988, Judge Velez denied the motion to dismiss on the
ground that P.D. No. 242 is "unconstitutional for being an act that amounts to an
emasculation and impairment of the judicial power of review of this court and of the
Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution" (p. 36, Rollo).
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of that order which PVAC opposed. In an
order dated June 13, 1988, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration.
On August 5, 1988, petitioners filed in this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with a prayer for preliminary injunction.
On October 5, 1988, we referred the case to the Court of Appeals which has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Supreme Court over special civil actions of certiorari against
regional trial courts.
On October 26, 1988, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of our
resolution. The Court of Appeals eventually returned the case to this Court for us to
resolve the motion for reconsideration.
On May 15, 1989, the First Division issued a resolution ordering the petitioners,
PHIVIDEC and PIA, as well as respondent PVAC, to inform this court, within five (5)
days from notice, whether or not they are Government agencies or Government-owned
or controlled corporations.
In a "Compliance" dated May 31, 1989, PHIVIDEC and PIA manifested that they are
government-owned and controlled corporations created under P.D. No. 243 and P.D.
No. 538, respectively.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Respondent PVAC similarly filed a manifestation on June 7, 1989, stating that
pursuant to Section 1, paragraph (a) of P.D. No. 244, it is a body corporate and politic
composed of the Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, the Administrator of the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, the
President of the Philippine Veterans Bank and three (3) appointive members
representing the veterans group and appointed by the President of the Philippines. It is
obviously a government office or agency.
Since the foreclosure proceeding filed by PVAC against PHIVIDEC and PIA arose
from the interpretation and application of the mortgage contract between them, P.D.
No. 242 applies to the case.
Contrary to the opinion of the lower court, P.D. No. 242 is not unconstitutional. It does
not diminish the jurisdiction of courts but only prescribes an administrative procedure
for the settlement of certain types of disputes between or among departments, bureaus,
offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the National Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, so that they need not always repair to
the courts for the settlement of controversies arising from the interpretation and
application of statutes, contracts or agreements. The procedure is not much different,
and no less desirable, than the arbitration procedures provided in Republic Act No. 876
(Arbitration Law) and in Section 26, R.A. 6715 (The Labor Code). It is an alternative
to, or a substitute for, traditional litigation in court with the added advantage of
avoiding the delays, vexations and expense of court proceedings. Or, as P.D. No. 242
itself explains, its purpose is "the elimination of needless clogging of court dockets to
prevent the waste of time and energies not only of the government lawyers but also of
the courts, and eliminates expenses incurred in the filing and prosecution of judicial
actions." (p. 21, Rollo.)chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The notion that an administrative procedure such as is provided in P.D. No. 242, for
the settlement of quarrels between two administrative offices, departments, agencies,
or government corporations, would "emasculate" the jurisdiction of courts, is
erroneous. In fact, Section 1, subpar. (a), Rule 20 of the Rules of Court makes a pre-
trial mandatory so that the parties to a suit may meet in conference to consider, among
other matters, "the possibility of . . . a submission to arbitration."cralaw virtua1aw
Page 9 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
library
ISSUE: whether or not Presidential Decree No. 242 is unconstitutional.
RULING: P.D. No. 242 is a valid law prescribing an administrative arbitration
procedure for certain disputes among offices, agencies and instrumentalities under the
executive control and supervision of the President of the Philippines. Since PVAC
filed Civil Case No. 11157 against PHIVIDEC and PIA without first passing through
the administrative channel, the judicial action was premature for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, hence, dismissible on that account (Chia v. Acting Collector
of Customs, 177 SCRA 755).
Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to
dismiss Civil Case No. 11157.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The order dated
March 15, 1988 of respondent Judge Alejandro M. Velez is hereby annulled and set
aside and he is enjoined from further proceeding in Civil Case No. 11157 which is
hereby dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
SEC. 3 FISCAL AUTONOMY
Bengzon vs. Drilon G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992
PETITIONERS: CESAR BENGZON, QUERUBE MAKALINTAL, LINO M.
PATAJO, JOSE LEUTERIO, ET AL.
RESPONDENTS: HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of
Department of Budget and Management, and HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM, in her
capacity as National Treasurer
PONENTE: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
FACTS: The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals who are currently receiving monthly pensions under Republic Act No. 910 as
amended by Republic Act No. 1797. 
On June 20, 1953, Republic Act No, 910 was enacted to provide the
retirement pensions of Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals who
have rendered at least twenty (20) years service either in the Judiciary or in any other
branch of the Government or in both, having attained the age of seventy (70) years or
who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. The retired
Justice shall receive during the residue of his natural life the salary which he was
receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation. Republic Act No. 910 was
amended by Republic Act No. 1797 (approved on June 21, 1957)
Identical retirement benefits were also given to the members of the
Constitutional Commissions under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended by Republic
Act No. 3595. On November 12, 1974, on the occasion of the Armed Forces Loyalty
Day, President Marcos signed Presidential Decree 578 which extended similar
retirement benefits to the members of the Armed Forces giving them also the
automatic readjustment features of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595.
Two months later, however, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 644
on January 25, 1975 repealing Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic
Act No. 3595 (amending Republic Act No. 1568 and Presidential Decree No. 578)
which authorized the adjustment of the pension of the retired Justices of the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions
and the officers and enlisted members of the Armed Forces to the prevailing rates of
salaries.
Significantly, under Presidential Decree 1638 the automatic readjustment of
the retirement pension of officers and enlisted men was subsequently restored by
President Marcos. A later decree Presidential Decree 1909 was also issued providing
for the automatic readjustment of the pensions of members of the Armed Forces who
have retired prior to September 10, 1979.
While the adjustment of the retirement pensions for members of the Armed
Forces who number in the tens of thousands was restored, that of the retired Justices of
the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are only a handful and fairly advanced
in years, was not.
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
Realizing the unfairness of the discrimination against the members of the
Judiciary and the Constitutional Commissions, Congress approved in 1990 a bill for
the reenactment of the repealed provisions of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act
No. 3595.  In the explanatory note of House Bill No. 16297 and Senate Bill No. 740,
the legislature saw the need to reenact Republic Act Nos. 1797 and 3595 to restore
said retirement pensions and privileges of the retired Justices and members of the
Constitutional Commissions, in order to assure those serving in the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals and Constitutional Commissions adequate old age pensions even
during the time when the purchasing power of the peso has been diminished
substantially by worldwide recession or inflation. This is underscored by the fact that
the petitioner retired Chief Justice, a retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
and the retired Presiding Justice are presently receiving monthly pensions of
P3,333.33, P2,666.66 and P2,333.33 respectively. President Aquino, however vetoed
House Bill No. 16297 on July 11, 1990 on the ground that according to her "it would
erode the very foundation of the Government's collective effort to adhere faithfully to
and enforce strictly the policy on standardization of compensation as articulated in
Republic Act No. 6758 known as Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989." She further said that "the Government should not grant distinct privileges to
select group of officials whose retirement benefits under existing laws already enjoy
preferential treatment over those of the vast majority of our civil service servants."
ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed
by the Constitution.
RULING: YES. The attempt to use the veto power to set aside a Resolution of the
Court and to deprive retirees of benefits given them by Rep. Act No. 1797 trenches
upon the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary provided in Sec. 3,
ART. VIII of the Constitution. The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments
in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary,
including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages
in other items of the judiciary is withheld.  Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the
Judiciary must enjoy freedom in law.  It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the
fiscal restraints.  The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment
appropriations where augmentation is needed, which is provided for in Section 25(5),
Article VI of the Constitution.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to
former Justices on the ground that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or
“preferential treatment” to retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution
and in effect asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the
Judiciary be repealed.The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the
provisions of 1992 General Appropriations Act are declared valid and subsisting.
What is fiscal autonomy? As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal
autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a
guarantee on full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and
dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess
and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized
by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse
such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the
discharge of their functions.
RE: COA OPINION AM NO. 11-7-10-SC July 31 2012
IN RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED
VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED
CHIEF/ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT
FACTS: In June 8, 2010, the Legal Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of
the Commission on Audit (COA) issued an opinion which found that an underpayment
amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices
purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during
their incumbency in the Court. The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by
the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the
appraisal value of the purchased vehicles.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA erred when it issued its June 8, 2010 opinion?
HELD:  The COA's authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional
bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the
1987 Constitution. This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
Court's fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on
judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these
matters.
One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the
constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. While, as a general proposition, the authority
of legislatures to control the purse in the first instance is unquestioned, any form of
interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciary's fiscal autonomy
amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. If the judicial
branch is to perform its primary function of adjudication, it must be able to command
adequate resources for that purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel the
exercise of) legislative power over the national purse (which at first blush appears to
be a violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion of legislative autonomy) is
necessary to maintain judicial independence and is expressly provided for by the
Constitution through the grant of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII.
In Bengzon v. Drilon, we had the opportunity to define the scope and extent
of fiscal autonomy in the following manner: "as envisioned in the Constitution, the
fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the
Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their
resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require."
SEC. 4 THE SUPREME COURT
Fortich vs. Corona G.R. No. 131457, Aug. 19, 1999
PETITIONERS: HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF
BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO,
BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
RESPONDENTS: HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
PONENTE: Martinez, J.
FACTS: The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike staged by some alleged
farmer-beneficiaries in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform compound in
Quezon City on October 9, 1997 commanded nationwide attention that even church
leaders and some presidential candidates tried to intervene for the strikers' "cause."
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
This case involves a land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned
by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation
(NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The property is covered by a Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 14371 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine
Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational
corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and Growers
Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994.
 In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory
acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38 million.
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated
to DECS, it discovered that the title over the subject property was no longer in its
name. It soon found out that during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals
and the appeal to the President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without
giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title on August 11,
1995 and had it transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT
No. T-50264 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25,
1995, DAR caused the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA)
No. 00240227 and had it registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT
No. AT-3536 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.
NQSRMDC filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon  docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for annulment and
cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others. The RTC
then issued a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on
May 19, 1997, restraining the DAR and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or
wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.
Meanwhile, an Order was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D.
Torres denying DARs motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared that the
March 29, 1996 OP decision had already become final and executory.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene was
filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that they are
real parties in interest as they were previously identified by respondent DAR
as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare property subject of this
case. The motion was vehemently opposed by the petitioners.
In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners claim
that the Office of the President was prompted to issue the said resolution after a very
Page 12 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
well-managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded
in pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the President to come up
with this purely political decision to appease the farmers, by reviving and modifying
the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final and executory in an
Order of 23 June 1997. Thus, petitioners further allege, respondent then Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona committed grave abuse of discretion and acted
beyond his jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November
1997. They availed of this extraordinary writ of certiorari because there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. They never filed a
motion for reconsideration of the subject Resolution because (it) is patently illegal or
contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise to seek reconsideration.
ISSUE/S:
1) Whether or not the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a
petition for review directly with the Court of Appeals in accordance with
Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;
2) Whether or not the petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed Win-Win Resolution before filing the present petition; and
3) Whether or not Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.
RULING/S:
1. In order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is
necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of
jurisdiction.  void.
An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of
its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other
hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued
by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctable only by the extraordinary
writ of certiorari.
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial
functions, including the Office of the President, may be taken to the Court
of Appeals by filing a verified petition for review within fifteen (15) days
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
from notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution, whether the appeal
involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
However, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is
inapplicable considering that the present petition contains an allegation that
the challenged resolution is patently illegal and was issued with grave abuse
of discretion and beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C. Coronas)
jurisdiction when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP
Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long become final and executory. In
other words, the crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not
an error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus,
the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is an
original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the
petitioners have correctly done. The pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof
provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary
cases in which the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person
aggrieved by the assailed illegal act may file a verified petition (for certiorari)
in the proper court. The proper court where the petition must be filed is
stated in Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:
SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to
be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a
lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not
the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is
in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition
shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. But the jurisdiction of
these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the challenged act relates
to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, the petition must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which
exercises jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the
petition shall be filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise
provided by law or the Rules of Court. We have clearly discussed this matter
of concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs. Cuaresma, et. al., through now
Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:
This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts , which may
issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also
shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of
Appeals, although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the
latters competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application
therefor will be directed.  meritorious cases, as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18,
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take
cognizance of the petition filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or the
nature and importance of the issues rose, warrant. This has been the judicial
policy to be observed.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over
the present petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future
litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as
correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed
resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find the assailed
resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their petition first
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
2. The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President
of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7
thereof provides:
SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President
shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after
the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the
parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such
period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be
allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases.
It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply in a
suppletory character whenever practicable. 
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997
declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has
seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost
its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost
its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain
the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary,
which second motion became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution.
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration
is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a
second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally
still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first
motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the
Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office
of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March
29,1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in
gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. we held: Since the decisions of
both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had long
become final and executory, the same can no longer be reviewed by the
courts. It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority,
have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment
within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata The rule of res
judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined
by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts
of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their
jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers.
The orderly administration of justice requires that the
judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of
finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write
finis to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice
system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect
and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who
wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must
immediately be struck down.
3. There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts
but also in connection with litigation commenced in the courts while an
administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat
administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative
ruling and a favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in this case, where
the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction.
The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum
shopping has been laid down in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez and that
is, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present
or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the
other, as follows:
There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case
No. 86-36563 identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions, as well as identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the identity on the
two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other
action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the requisites, in fine,
of auter action pendant.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of
forum shopping. The test for determining whether a party has violated the
rule against forum shopping is where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration. A cursory
examination of the cases filed by the petitioners does not show that the said
cases are similar with each other. The petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR Secretarys order to proceed with
the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject property. On the
other hand, the civil case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment
and cancellation of title issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines,
with damages, was based on the following grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying
for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDCs title, used documents which were
earlier declared null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of
NQSRMDCs title was made without payment of just compensation; and (3)
without notice to NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present
petition is entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks the
nullification of the assailed Win-Win Resolution of the Office of the
President dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long after the
previous two cases were instituted.
US vs. NIXON 418 US 683 (1974)
PETITIONER: United States
RESPONDENT: President Richard Nixon
FACTS: This case occurred in the midst of the Nixon Watergate scandal.  The
prosecutor assigned to the case had subpoenaed the President’s recordings of his office
visits/conversations/phone conversations.  The attorney for the President argued that
the tapes should not be subpoenaed because they were granted executive privilege. 
Furthermore, the President’s attorney argued to the court that the issue was not a
matter for the Supreme Court because it was a dispute within the executive branch; the
Supreme Court can only properly hear cases where there is a dispute between
branches.
ISSUE: Whether the President can quash a subpoena via executive privilege under any
condition.
Page 15 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
RULING: No, held.  Citizens have the right under Amendments 4 and 5 of the
constitution to face their accusers and have fair and speedy trials, even when bringing
claims against the President of the United States.  While the President is not any other
citizen, the court must balance the executive privilege interest with the interest of the
individual citizen under Amendments 4 and 5.  In so doing, the court should review the
privileged material – the tapes in this case – in their private chambers and balance such
interests.  In the instant case, interest claimed by the President was not sufficient to
outweigh that of the individual citizen’s.  Therefore, the tapes were subpoenaed.
PP. vs DY G.R. No.115236-37, Jan. 16, 2003
PETITIONER: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENT: BRYAN FERDINAND DY y LA MADRID and GIOVAN
BERNARDINO y GARCIA
PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
RESOLUTION – la ako mahanap na digested mga bakla
Accused-appellants Bryan Ferdinand Dy and Giovan Bernardino filed separate
motions for reconsideration of our Decision1 which affirmed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5, finding them guilty of rape and acts of
lasciviousness.
In his motion, accused-appellant Dy submits that our decision should have been
merely recommendatory, in view of the provision of Article VIII, Section 5 (2) (d) of
the Constitution which provides that the Supreme Court sitting en banc has jurisdiction
over "[a]ll criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher." He contends that Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89 which provides that death
penalty cases shall be within the jurisdiction of the Court en banc is incongruous and
incompatible with the aforementioned constitutional provision.
The contention is misleading. Under Article VIII, Section 4 (1) of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven
Members. At present, it is made up of three divisions. However, the divisions of the
Supreme Court are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts. Actions
considered in any of these divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in effect, by
the same Tribunal. The divisions are not to be considered as separate and distinct
courts, but as divisions of one and the same court.2
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Accused-appellant Dy further contends that: (1) the sexual intercourse between him
and complainant Mobley was consensual; (2) there is no evidence of rape except for
Mobley’s bare claim; (3) there is no conclusive evidence that Mobley and Tennican
were drugged which caused them to black out and become unaware of what was
happening to them; (4) Bernardino did not commit acts of lasciviousness; and (5) there
is no conclusive proof of conspiracy between the two accused-appellants.
The issues raised by accused-appellant Dy have been exhaustively considered and
discussed in our Decision and there is no need to reassess them or reconsider our
stand.
Bernardino, on the other hand, alleges that: (1) accused-appellants were not accorded
their right to a fair, unbiased resolution of the preliminary investigation when the
reviewing prosecutor unilaterally reversed the findings of the three-man investigating
panel that recommended the dismissal of the charges against them; (2) the right to be
arraigned is not among the rights that are susceptible to waiver or estoppel, thus the
lack of arraignment cannot be deemed cured by their participation in the trial; (3) the
erroneous decision of the trial judge to hold an expedited trial effectively deprived
them of proper preparation for and presentation of an adequate defense; (4) the
evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to establish his guilt with moral
certainty; (5) the trial court erroneously allowed accused-appellant Dy to remain at
liberty even after promulgation of judgment on the strength of the same bail bond
posted by him during trial, while denying accused-appellant Bernardino’s petition for
bail; (6) the legal doctrines cited in our Decision do not apply in this case since the
premises upon which these principles lie are not present herein; and (7) as a matter of
equity, the significant delay in the resolution of this appeal should at least merit our
attention to the peculiar effects of the decision in this case particularly as regards
accused-appellant Bernardino.
We find that the points raised by Bernardino on matters of substance and procedure
have likewise been extensively discussed in our Decision.
However, two points raised by accused-appellant Bernardino must be clarified.
First, the allegation that there was no valid arraignment is misleading and betrays a
lack of comprehension regarding the procedural requirements of arraignment in the
context of the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. In our decision, we stated:
Page 16 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
Concededly, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
may not be waived. Indeed, the defense may waive their right to enter a plea
and let the court enter a plea of "not guilty" in their behalf. However, it
becomes altogether a different matter if the accused themselves refuse to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. The defense
can not hold hostage the court by their refusal to the reading of the complaint
or information.
Second, Bernardino argues that the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar are not
on all fours with the doctrine that findings of fact of the trial court are best left
undisturbed on appeal; and that no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow
examination of her private parts and subject herself to trial and ridicule if she has not,
in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her.
He claims that we should have disregarded the findings of the trial court for the reason
that the haste with which the trial was conducted necessarily casts a cloud of doubt
over the validity of the proceedings; that the conflicting findings of the investigating
panel and the reviewing prosecutor should have alerted us to varying interpretations of
the facts at hand; and that there was no independent proof that complainant was
drugged aside from self-serving documents relied upon by medical experts who did
not examine complainant.
The records show that the proceedings were not hastily conducted. While the
proceedings might have been of short duration than usual, they were nevertheless
conducted with due regard to the right of each party to due process. The trial court
should even be commended for conducting a speedy trial, which should be the rule,
rather than the exception. What is of prime consideration is not the speed by which the
trial was conducted but the manner by which the procedural and substantial
requirements were complied with. The records show that these requirements were
adequately met.
We do not see any irregularity in the conflicting findings of the investigating panel vis-
à-vis those of the reviewing prosecutor. It is the prerogative of the reviewing
prosecutor to overturn the findings of the investigating panel depending on how he
appreciates the evidence.
Bernardino further claims that the principle that no woman would concoct a story of
defloration is largely an interpretation rooted in the Philippine context where in a
number of cases, we have taken judicial notice of the Filipina’s inbred modesty and
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
shyness and her antipathy in publicly airing acts which blemish her honor and virtue.
We do not agree. The outrage and cry for justice of rape victims are universal and are
not limited to or the exclusive prerogatives of any one race or culture.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by accused-
appellants Bryan Ferdinand Dy and Giovan Bernardino are DENIED WITH
FINALITY.
PP. vs Ebio G.R. No. 147750, Sept. 29, 2004
PETITIONER: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENT: GERRY EBIO Y HERMIDA
PONENTE: PER CURIAM
PREFACE
On October 14, 2002, appellant Gerry Ebio was convicted by this Court of qualified
rape and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. The Public Attorney’s Office moved for
reconsideration on the ground that the Court lacked a quorum when the case was
deliberated as it appears that the Decision was signed only by seven (7) justices. In a
Resolution dated September 7, 2004, the Court granted the Motion for
Reconsideration, ruling as follows:
xxx
There is no question that the Court’s Decision in this case was concurred in
by majority of the members of the Court who actually took part in the
deliberations. It was in fact unanimously signed by the seven Justices who
were present during the deliberations. The issue now is whether the seven
constitute a quorum of the 14-member Court.
The term "quorum" has been defined as "that number of members of the body
which, when legally assembled in their proper places, will enable the body to
transact its proper business, or, in other words, that number that makes a lawful
body and gives it power to pass a law or ordinance or do any other valid
corporate act." The question of the number of judges necessary to authorize the
transaction of business by a court is as a general rule to be determined from the
Page 17 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
Constitution or statutory provisions creating and regulating the courts, and as a general
rule a majority of the members of a court is a "quorum" for the transaction of business
and the decision of cases.
The Constitution is clear on the quorum when the Court meets by Division. There
should be at least three members present for the Division to conduct its business. This
may be deduced from paragraph 3 of Section 4 Article VIII. There is no similar
pronouncement, however, when the Court meets en banc. The second paragraph of
Article VIII Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution does not expressly state the number of
Justices required to be present to constitute a quorum of the Court en banc. The
deliberations of the 1987 Constitution are also silent on what constitutes a quorum
when the Court is composed of only fourteen members. In case of doubt in a criminal
case, especially where the death penalty is imposed, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the accused.
Thus, in this case, considering that the life of the accused is at stake, we deem it wise
to resubmit the case to the Court en banc for re-deliberation.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court resolves to RECALL the Decision dated October
14, 2002 and RESUBMIT the case to the Court en banc for RE-DELIBERATION.
FACTS: The appellant, GERRY EBIO, was charged with rape before the Regional
Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon. The private complainant is his 11-year old
daughter, DORY EBIO. When arraigned on June 8, 2000, the appellant, assisted by
counsel de oficio, pled "not guilty." However, at the first hearing of the case on
January 11, 2001, the appellant, through counsel, withdrew his plea of "not guilty" and
changed it to "guilty." To avoid an improvident plea, the trial court inquired on the
voluntariness of his plea, informed him of the meaning of his admission of the crime
charged and the penalty for it. The appellant, however, persisted on his plea of
guilty, thus, a new Certificate of Arraignment, dated January 11, 2000, was issued. On
the same day, the evidence for the prosecution was received.
The Ebios are residents of Tughan, Juban, Sorsogon. Their house has one bedroom
where Cristina and Gerry sleep, together with private complainant’s youngest sister.
The private complainant, her other sisters and their grandmother sleep in the sala.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
The private complainant testified that in the evening of April 21, 2000, she was
preparing to sleep in the sala. Her three (3) younger sisters and their grandmother were
also in the sala, sleeping. Her elder sister, Donna, their aunt and their cousin, went to
church earlier that night, while her mother, Cristina, was in Manila together with her
sister, Dina. The appellant was not yet home at that time.
The appellant arrived in their house at about 10:00 p.m. He proceeded to the room and
fixed the bed. Thereafter, he approached the private complainant and told her to
transfer to the bedroom because they were already crowded in the sala. She obeyed
him because she was afraid he would scold her. The appellant was drunk.
Armed with a six-inch long bladed instrument, the appellant ordered her to undress
and threatened to kill her if she would not comply. Afraid of the threat, she took off
her shorts and panty. Appellant also took off his shorts, mounted her and had carnal
knowledge of her. She felt pain and cried. The private complainant was silent during
the sexual assault because he threatened to kill her if she would talk or shout. After the
assault, she put on her shorts and panty and again lay down. She remained inside the
room, crying.
The following day, April 22, the private complainant reported the incident to her
grandmother. Her grandmother accompanied her to the police authorities. She
executed a sworn statement and a written complaint both dated April 27, 2000,
charging the appellant with rape.
The private complainant revealed that the April 21, 2000 incident was the third
occasion that she was raped by the appellant. The first two (2) defilements happened
when she was ten (10) years old. She was then a Grade II elementary pupil. She related
the incidents to her mother who told her that they would file a complaint against the
appellant. However, they were not able to report the matter to the police.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court gravely erred on convicting the accused of the crime
charged despite his improvident plea of guilty.
RULING: Appellant contends that his plea of guilty was improvident because the trial
court did not strictly observe Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. The rule provides that when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense,
the courts should perform the following tasks: (1) it shall conduct a searching inquiry
Page 18 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea, and (2)
it shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.
Thereafter, the trial court will allow the accused to present evidence, if he so desires.
It is alleged that the appellant did not fully understand the consequences of his plea
because when the appellant was re-arraigned on January 11, 2001, the trial court told
the appellant that he would be sentenced to "reclusion perpetua to death" if he pled
guilty. Allegedly, the penalty could not have been understood by the appellant.
Appellant is clutching on straws. He was convicted on the basis of the evidence
presented by the prosecution and not on his guilty plea.  676, entitled "Approving the 1981 Investment Priorities Plan," on the ground that
It is highly improbable for a daughter to go out in public to falsely accuse her father of
rape if it were not true. It is against human nature for a girl to fabricate a story that
would expose herself as well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor, especially when
her charge could mean the death of her own father.
NEPA vs. Ongpin 171 SCRA 657 (1989)
PETITIONERS: NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION,
ELIZALDE D. DIAZ, JULIO LOGARTA, JR., ENRIQUE ANGELES,
ALFREDO DE LEON AND GEORGE SIBAL
RESPONDENTS: THE HONORABLE ROBERTO V. ONGPIN, in his capacity as
Minister of Trade and Industry and Chairman of the Board of Investments, and
the HONORABLE GREGORIO G. MENDOZA, in his capacity as Treasurer of
the Philippines
PONENTE: PARAS, J.
FACTS: On January 16, 1981 or one day before President Ferdinand E. Marcos
signed Proclamation No. 2045 announcing the lifting of Martial Law in the
Philippines, he, pursuant to his legislative or decree-making power under both
the 1935 Constitution and the transitory provisions of the 1973 Constitution,
issued P.D. No. 1789 otherwise known as the Omnibus Investment Code, revising,
modifying and amending R.A. No. 5186 and R.A. No. 6135, both enacted by the
Congress of the Philippines.
Shortly thereafter or on December 4, 1983, President Marcos issued P.D.
No. 1892, suspending for a period of one year from date of its effectivity the
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
nationality requirement of at least 60% Philippine Nationals for non-pioneer
industries entitled to registration under aforementioned P.D. No. 1789.
Petitioner NEPA, suing as citizens of the Philippines, taxpayers,
businessmen, officers and members of said association, who allegedly stand to be
adversely affected by the enforcement or continued enforcement of the
aforementioned presidential decrees (Rollo, pp. 1-4) filed the instant petition in
this Court, seeking to enjoin public respondents from enforcing said decrees as
well as. The Investment Priorities Plan" actually a memorandum of the Minister of
Trade to the President, consisting of preferred areas of economic activity that are
entitled to investment incentives under P.D. No. 1789 and Executive Order No.
they are unconstitutional; and after hearing declare them as such.
Petitioners maintain the position that the President of the Philippines has
no absolute legislative power during martial law but only limited to the decree-
making power relative to the suppression and prevention of the ground for its
imposition which is manifestly evident from Section 26, Article VI of the 1935
Constitution (Section 15 of the 1973 Constitution)
ISSUE: Whether or not no constitutional question will be heard and resolved unless
the requisites of a judicial inquiry are present
RULING: Yes. It is a well-settled rule that no constitutional question will be heard and
resolved unless the following requisites of a judicial inquiry are present: (1) the
existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party
raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed
upon in order to decide the case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]; Dumlao v.
COMELEC, 95 SCRA 400 [1980]
As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed upon only if and to
the extent that it is directly and necessarily involved in justiciable controversy and is
essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. More specifically, this
Court has ruled: "The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only
when the interests of litigants require the use of that judicial authority for their
protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient." (United
Public Works vs. Mitchell, U.S. 75; 91 L. Ed., 754) "Bona fide suit. Judicial power is
limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. The authority to pass on the
Page 19 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims
under the Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the
Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as necessity in the
determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants. (Tañada &
Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, p. 1138; PACU v. Sec. of Education, 97
Phil. 809-810 [1955]).
Marbury vs Madison 1 Cranch 137 (1803)
Facts
On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace
and sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic
Act. The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal
judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office.
The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of
State John Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author
of this opinion), but they were not delivered before the expiration of Adams’s term as
president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they
were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of Adams’s term. William
Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace.
Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of
mandamus to compel Jefferson’s Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the
commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus “…to any courts appointed, or persons holding
office, under the authority of the United States.”
Issues
1 Does Marbury have a right to the commission?
2 Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?
3 Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine
whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void?
4 Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond
what is specified in Article III of the Constitution?
5 Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Holding and Rule (Marshall)
1 Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.
The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executive’s constitutional
power of appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the
last act required from the person possessing the power has been performed. The grant
of the commission to Marbury became effective when signed by President Adams.
2 Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy. The very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he
receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.
Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the
performance of that duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to
resort to the law for a remedy. The President, by signing the commission, appointed
Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United
States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity
of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal right to
the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a
plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.
3 Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine
whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void.
It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those
who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the
rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of
each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any
ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern
the case to which they both apply.
4 No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction
beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution.
Page 20 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a
state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction.” If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to
apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the
will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If
Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction
where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction
made in the Constitution, is form without substance.
5 No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus.
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of
appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate
jurisdiction.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the
proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although,
therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer
for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that
paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.
Disposition
Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesn’t get the commission.
Angara vs Electoral Commission 65 phil 139 (1936)
FACTS:
In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents
Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of
members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-
elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.
On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect,
fixed the last date to file election protests.
On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest"
against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected
Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified.
On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that
last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution
confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court
therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the
affirmative,
RULING:
In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a
conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on one hand,
and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may
not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does
not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the
people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral
Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were,
conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental
powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in
justiciable and appropriate cases.
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of
Page 21 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."
The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of
its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power
by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative
power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.
Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper
exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and
approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests.
When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935,
confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral
Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been
organized.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of
the election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election
contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot
be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its
constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the
filing of said election protests.
The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the
respondent, Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara,
and that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any
manner toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such
time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby
denied, with cost against the petitioner.
Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance GR 115455 August 25, 1994
FACTS: Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise
known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this
revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as
required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated
as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete
the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways &
Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630.
Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking
out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a
House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”.
Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate Bill.
ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.
HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation
was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to
the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to
the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were
several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the
HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of
amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino
concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant
difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
Tan vs Macapagal 43 SCRA 677 (1972)
FACTS: Petitioners, in a taxpayer’s suit, assails the validity of the Laurel-Leido
Resolution, dealing with the range of the authority of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, would have this Court declare that it is “without power, under Section 1,
Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt
proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form
of government other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution [the
Page 22 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
Convention being] merely empowered to propose improvements to the present
Constitution without altering the general plan laid down therein.” The denial of the
petitioner’s 5-page petition was responded by a 32-page motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Can the Court interpose judicial oversight against a resolution passed by the
Constitutional Convention?
HELD: NO.
The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other departments being left alone to
discharge their duties as they see fit. The judiciary as Justice Laurel emphatically
asserted “will neither direct nor restrain executive [or legislative] action …” The
legislative and executive branches are not bound to seek its advice as to what to do or
not to do. Judicial inquiry has to be postponed in the meanwhile. It is a prerequisite
that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture. At such a time, it may pass on the validity of what
was done but only “when … properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.”
Such a principle applies as well when the inquiry concerns the scope of the
competence lodged in the Constitutional Convention. The judiciary must leave it free
to fulfill its responsibility according to its lights. There is to be no interference. Its
autonomy is to be respected. It cannot be otherwise if it is to perform its function well.
Such should be the case not only because it is a coordinate agency but also because its
powers are transcendent, amounting as it does to submitting for popular ratification
proposals which may radically alter the organization and functions of all three
departments, including the courts. It is therefore much more imperative that the rule of
non-interference be strictly adhered to until the appropriate time comes.
More specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is
no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete
what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until
then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction. That is the command of the Constitution as
interpreted by this Court. Unless and until such a doctrine loses force by being
overruled or a new precedent being announced, it is controlling. That is implicit in the
rule of law. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration cannot therefor be sustained.
PACU vs Secretary of Education GR L-5279 Oct 31 1955
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Facts: The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that
Acts No. 2706 otherwise known as the “Act making the Inspection and Recognition of
private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction” and
was amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared
unconstitutional on the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school and
colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of
Law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty to rear their
children for civic efficiency and 3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of
Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute
towards unlawful delegation of Legislative powers.
Section 1 of Act No. 2706
“It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general
standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the
same shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and
grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly
authorized representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said
schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the
same,”
The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education
before opening a school is not originally included in the original Act 2706. And in
support to the first proposition of the petitioners they contended that the Constitution
guaranteed the right of a citizen to own and operate a school and any law requiring
previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise the said
right On the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative submitted a memorandum
contending that 1) the matters presented no justiciable controversy exhibiting
unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional question; 2) Petitioners are in
estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act and 3) the Act is constitutionally
valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed by the court.
Issue: Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth
Act no. 180 is void and unconstitutional.
Ruling: The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in
the form they seek to obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented
before the court. It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual
Page 23 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has
merely invoke the judicial power to determined the validity of executive and
legislative action he must show that he has sustained common interest to all members
of the public. Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional
arises only when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their
protection against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to the
decision of actual cases and controversies and the authority to pass on the validity of
statutes is incidental to the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under the
constitution and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it
is legitimate only in the last resort and it must be necessary to determined a real and
vital controversy between litigants. Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive
purpose to obtain actual positive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere
academic question to satisfy scholarly interest therein. The court however, finds the
defendant position to be sufficiently sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is to
challenge the regulation not to invalidate the law because it needs no argument to
show that abuse by officials entrusted with the execution of the statute does not per se
demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the litigation the
court conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the
petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the Department of
Education they fail to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally
objectionable for being capricious or pain nuisance. Therefore, the court denied the
petition for prohibition.
Board of Optometry vs Colet GR 122241 July 30 1996
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 8050, entitled “An Act Regulating the Practice of Optometry
Education, Integrating Optometrists, and for Other Purposes,” otherwise known as the
Revised Optometry Law of 1995, was approved into law on 7 June 1995.
On 31 July 1995, the private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila a petition for declaratory relief and for prohibition and injunction, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order. Private respondents alleged in their petition
that:
There were surreptitious and unauthorized insertion and addition of provisions in the
Reconciled Bill which were made without the knowledge and conformity of the Senate
panel;
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
R.A. No. 8050 derogates and violates the fundamental right of every Filipino
to reasonable safeguards against deprivation of life, liberty and property without due
process of law;
R.A. No. 8050 derogates and violates the principle against undue delegation
of legislative power;
R.A. No. 8050 suppresses truthful advertising concerning optical goods and
services in violation of the guaranty of freedom of speech and press; and
R.A. No. 8050 employs vague ambiguous terms in defining prohibitions and
restrictions, hence, it falls within the ambit of void-for-vagueness doctrine which
safeguards the guaranty of due process of law.
When the petition (docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74770) was examined, it was found
out that it merely listed the names of the alleged presidents as well as their profession
and home addresses of Optometry Practitioner Association of the Philippines (OPAP);
Cenevis Optometrist Association (COA); Association of Christian-Muslim
Optometrist (ACMO); and Southern Mindanao Optometrist Association of the
Philippines (SMOAP). They failed to indicate the details as to the juridical personality
and addresses of these alleged associations, except for Acebedo Optical Co., Inc.
ISSUES:
1 Whether or not the private respondents have locus standi to question the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050; and
2 Whether or not they have a valid cause of action for either declaratory relief or
prohibition.
HELD:
1. Only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a
civil action, and every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest. Under Article 44 of the Civil Code, an association is considered a
juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its
members. By failing to provide juridical details in their petition, they cannot therefore
claim that they are juridical entities. Consequently, they are deemed to be devoid of
legal personality to bring an action.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court - a real party in interest is a party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit.
Page 24 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
2. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory. It cannot be
disputed that there is yet no actual case or controversy involving all or any of the
private respondents on one hand, and all or any of the petitioners on the other, with
respect to rights or obligations under R.A. No. 8050. This is plain because Civil Case
No. 95-74770 is for declaratory relief.
The private respondents have not sufficiently established their locus standi to question
the validity of R.A. No. 8050. The conclusion then is inevitable that the respondent
Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he issued a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the implementation of R.A. No. 8050.
SECTION 5 POWERS OF SC
Montesclaros V COMELEC
Petitioners: ANTONIETTE V.C. MONTESCLAROS, MARICEL CARANZO,
JOSEPHINE ATANGAN, RONALD ATANGAN and CLARIZA DECENA, and
OTHER YOUTH OF THE LAND SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as Senate
President and SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL in his capacity as Minority
Leader of the Senate of the Philippines, CONGRESSMAN JOSE DE VENECIA
in his capacity as Speaker, CONGRESSMAN AGUSTO L. SYJOCO in his
capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and
CONGRESSMAN EMILIO C. MACIAS II in his capacity as Chairman of the
Committee on Local Government of the House of Representatives, THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA
SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN, AND ALL THEIR AGENTS AND
REPRESENTATIVES
Ponente: CARPIO, J.:
FACTS
Petitioners, who are all 20 years old, as a taxpayer's and class suit, on their
own behalf and on behalf of other youths similarly situated, filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction. The petition seeks to prevent the postponement of
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
the Sangguniang Kabataan ("SK" for brevity) elections originally scheduled last May
6, 2002. The petition also seeks to prevent the reduction of the age requirement for
membership in the SK.
Petitioners allege that public respondents "connived, confederated and
conspired" to postpone the May 6, 2002 SK elections and to lower the membership age
in the SK to at least 15 but less than 18 years of age. Petitioners assail the alleged
conspiracy because youths at least 18 but not more than 21 years old will be
"summarily and unduly dismembered, unfairly discriminated, unnecessarily
disenfranchised, unjustly disassociated and obnoxiously disqualified from the SK
organization."1
Thus, petitioners pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction -
"a) To prevent, annul or declare unconstitutional any law, decree,
Comelec resolution/directive and other respondents' issuances, orders and actions and
the like in postponing the May 6, 2002 SK elections.
b) To command the respondents to continue the May 6, 2002 SK
elections set by the present law and in accordance with Comelec Resolutions No. 4713
and 4714 and to expedite the funding of the SK elections.
c) In the alternative, if the SK elections will be postponed for
whatever reason, there must be a definite date for said elections, for example, July 15,
2002, and the present SK membership, except those incumbent SK officers who were
elected on May 6, 1996, shall be allowed to run for any SK elective position even if
they are more than 21 years old.
d) To direct the incumbent SK officers who are presently representing
the SK in every sanggunian and the NYC to vacate their post after the barangay
elections.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY
AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED (SIC) WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN THEY INTENDED TO POSTPONE THE SK ELECTIONS.
Ruling. No. It is well settled that the Court cannot also direct the Comelec to allow
over-aged voters to vote or be voted for in an election that is limited under RA No.
Page 25 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
9164 to youths at least 15 but less than 18 years old. A law is needed to allow all those
who have turned more than 21 years old on or after May 6, 2002 to participate in the
July 15, 2002 SK elections. Youths from 18 to 21 years old as of May 6, 2002 are also
no longer SK members, and cannot participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections.
Congress will have to decide whether to enact an amendatory law. Petitioners' remedy
is legislation, not judicial intervention.
In this case This petition does not raise any constitutional issue. At the time petitioners
filed this petition, RA No. 9164, which reset the SK elections and reduced the age
requirement for SK membership, was not yet enacted into law. After the passage of
RA No. 9164, petitioners failed to assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be
unconstitutional. To grant petitioners' prayer to be allowed to vote and be voted for in
the July 15, 2002 SK elections necessitates assailing the constitutionality of RA No.
9164. This, petitioners have not done. The Court will not strike down a law unless its
constitutionality is properly raised in an appropriate action and adequately argued. In
sum, petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit. This
petition presents no actual justiciable controversy. Petitioners do not cite any provision
of law that is alleged to be unconstitutional. Lastly, we find no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of public respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SECTION 5 POWERS OF SC
David V Arroyo
Petitioners: PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD
LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R.
RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER
F.C. BOLASTIG
Respondents: GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA,
HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL
GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE
Ponente: SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
FACTS
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of
the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless
violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all
programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People
Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local
governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested (without
warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines
and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president
of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was made
against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom
suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo
issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to
exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three (3) of
those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of
the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it
violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.
Issue
Whether or not this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5
on the basis of these illegal acts? In general, does the illegal implementation of a law
render it unconstitutional?
RULING. No.
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they
may be abused and misabused135 and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the
manner of application.136 The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined
from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its
Page 26 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
effects in a particular case.137 PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the President’s
calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which
prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing
the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the
citizens’ constitutional rights.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017
is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions
of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as
well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not
authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest without prior legislation.
SECTION 5 POWERS OF SC
Belgica V Ochoa
G.R. No. 208566               November 19, 2013
Petitioners: GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS
JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES
SAN DIEGO, 
Respondents: HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA
JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as
SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by
FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE,
Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACT
Before the Court are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin. Historically, its usage
may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a
multitude of black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast
to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of their well-fed
master. This practice was later compared to the actions of American legislators in
trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their districts. While the advent of
refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to
political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator‘s district and constituents.
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum,
discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature,9 although, as will be later
discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.
Provisions on legislator allocations as well as fund realignment were included in the
2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-President, which was
pegged at ₱200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the 2013
PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies if they
have the technical capability to implement the projects.
 Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects, except for assistance to
indigent patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that he
secures the written concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside-district,
endorsed by the Speaker of the House.
Finally, any realignment of PDAF funds, modification and revision of project
identification, as well as requests for release of funds, were all required to be favorably
endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the issues raised are matters of policy not subject to
judicial review
RULING YES.
Section 5.  paragraph 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states that “The Supreme
Court shall have the following powers:
Page 27 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.”
It is well settled that the 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of judicial power
such that the Supreme Court has the power to determine whether there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality on the part of the government.
In this case, the intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue
dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of the government but rather a
legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court
act upon.
SECTION 5 POWERS OF SC
Joya V PCGG
G.R. No. 96541 August 24, 1993
Petitioners:DEAN JOSE JOYA, CARMEN GUERRERO NAKPIL, ARMIDA
SIGUION REYNA, PROF. RICARTE M. PURUGANAN, IRMA
POTENCIANO, ADRIAN CRISTOBAL, INGRID SANTAMARIA, CORAZON
FIEL, AMBASSADOR E. AGUILAR CRUZ, FLORENCIO R. JACELA, JR.,
MAURO MALANG, FEDERICO AGUILAR ALCUAZ, LUCRECIA R.
URTULA, SUSANO GONZALES, STEVE SANTOS, EPHRAIM SAMSON,
SOLER SANTOS, ANG KIU KOK, KERIMA POLOTAN, LUCRECIA
KASILAG, LIGAYA DAVID PEREZ, VIRGILIO ALMARIO, LIWAYWAY A.
ARCEO, CHARITO PLANAS, HELENA BENITEZ, ANNA MARIA L.
HARPER, ROSALINDA OROSA, SUSAN CALO MEDINA, PATRICIA RUIZ,
BONNIE RUIZ, NELSON NAVARRO, MANDY NAVASERO, ROMEO
SALVADOR, JOSEPHINE DARANG, and PAZ VETO PLANAS,  Museum of Manila and placed in the custody of the Central Bank.
Respondents:PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG), CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., in his official capacity, and/or the
Executive Secretary, and CHAIRMAN MATEO A.T. CAPARAS
Ponente: BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
On 15 August 1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas, representing the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines, signed the Consignment Agreement with Christie's
of New York. According to the agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for
sale at public auction the eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings then found at the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as the silverware contained in seventy-one
(71) cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and such other
property as may subsequently be identified by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to
be subject to the provisions of the agreement.
On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman Eufemio C.
Domingo submitted to President Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA
on the Consignment Agreement of 15 August 1990 to the effect that the authority of
former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of
doubtful legality but the same was refuted by PCGG through its new Chairman David
M. Castro.
However, the Director of National Museum Gabriel S. Casal issued a certification that
the items subject of the Consignment Agreement did not fall within the classification
of protected cultural properties and did not specifically qualify as part of the Filipino
cultural heritage.
On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the
proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.
Hence, petitioners filed a Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from proceeding with the auction sale
scheduled on 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters Paintings
and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan
Issue
1. whether the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for this Court to
exercise its power of judicial review over this case.
2. Whether or not the case shall prosper
Ruling
1. No.
Page 28 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
The general rule is that Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case
is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or
legal question. However, this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal
standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of
a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution,  and
when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the
disbursement of public funds.  Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J.:
It is well settled that a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the
public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set
forth in the Constitution.
In the case above, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by concerned
citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria for a mandamus suit. Petitioners are not after the
fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent officials under the 1987
Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is
constitutionally infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment
and appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most a privilege and is
unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus.
2. No.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of
controversy — one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic
or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of
justice.  A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale,  such
as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin
respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a
particular date — 11 January 1991 — which is long past, the issues raised in the
petition have become moot and academic.
SECTION 5 POWERS OF SC
Macasiano V NHA
G.R. No. 107921 July 1, 1993
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Petitioner:POLICE GENERAL LEVY MACASIANO (Ret.), in his capacity as the
consultant of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Task
Force on Demolition and/or in his personal capacity as taxpayer
Respondents:NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HOUSING AND LAND
USE REGULATORY BOARD and NATIONAL MAPPING RESOURCES
INFORMATION AUTHORITY
FACTS
Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of
Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act
of 1992. He predicates his locust standi on his being a consultant of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on
Operation for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public
Domain (executed immediately after his retirement on 2 January 1992 from the
Philippine National Police) and his being a taxpayer. As to the first, he alleges that said
Sections 28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that serve as
drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures"; because
of the said sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures which
he assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past."1 As a taxpayer, he alleges that
"he has a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully
disbursed."2
Respondent National Mapping and Resource Information Authority alleges that the
implementation of the assailed sections of the Act does not belong to or fall within its
jurisdiction. It disagrees with the petitioner's stand that the said sections are
unconstitutional and avers that Section 28 merely provides for the "humanitarian
approach" towards less privileged, citizens and does not in fact prohibit but
merely discourages eviction or demolition, while Section 44 only covers program
beneficiaries.
On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition. He
maintains that, the instant petition is devoid of merit for non-compliance with the
essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review in cases involving the
constitutionality of a law. He contends that there is no actual case or controversy with
litigants asserting adverse legal rights or interests, that the petitioner merely asks for an
advisory opinion, that the petitioner is not the proper party to question the Act as he
does not state that he has property "being squatted upon" and that there is no showing
Page 29 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
that the question of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. He argues that
Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionality infirm.
ISSUE,. Whether or not the petition is meritorious
1. No.
Judicial power is the "right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse
litigants .The general rule here is that Court will exercise its power of judicial review
only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the
constitutional or legal question. However, this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule
on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the
enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the
Constitution,  and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act
authorizing the disbursement of public funds.  FACTS
It is well settled that a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the
public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set
forth in the Constitution.
In the case above, the petitioner is not likewise a "proper party." As a consultant of the
DPWH under the "Contract for Consultancy . . .," he is not vested with any authority to
demolish obstructions and encroachments on properties of the public domain, much
less on private lands. The consultancy contract limits his duties to the following: "(a)
to organize and train selected DPWH personnel for the different Engineering Districts
in the NCR in the techniques and methods of removing/demolishing illegal
structures/stalls, etc. as well as in crowd control, self-defense and security procedures .
. .; (b) to provide advice to the Secretary and other DPWH officials regarding
prioritization of areas to be cleared of obstructions and encroachments; (c) to conduct
field inspection from time to time of areas recommend for clearing; (d) to provide
advice in developing appropriate standards and techniques in cost effective
implementation of the removal and demolition of obstructions and encroachments . . .;
and (e) to develop operational procedures that will institutionalize demolition
processes." 17 Moreover, the consultancy contract expired on 31 December 1992 and
the petitioner has not manifested that he obtained a renewal or extension thereof.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Nor does the petitioner claim that he is an owner of an urban property whose
enjoyment and use would be affected by the challenged provisions of R.A. No. 7279.
SECTION 5 POWERS OF SC
Mariano V COMELEC
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995
Petitioners:JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al.
Respondents:THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF
MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI
Ponente: PUNO, J.:
A petition for prohibition and declaratory relief was filed by petitioners Juanito
Mariano, Jr. and the others. They are suing as taxpayers. They assail as
unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Makati."1 on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and
450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three
consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8,
Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special
law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision
requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by
Page 30 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
Congress within three (3) years following the return of every
census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not
expressed in the title of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article
VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey
(1990 census), the population of Makati stands at
only 450,000.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION IS MERITORIOUS
RULING. NO.
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the
constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
In the case above, the petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The
petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor
Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in
said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998
elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners
merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the
proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a
petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA,
minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD
and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and
NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and
DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and
represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor,
represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor,
represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T.
CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T.
NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY
NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all
surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ,
KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING,
minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and
THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR
and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors,
represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and
MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA
CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH,
STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents
JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and
FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and
MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE
ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Facts
This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44 children, through their
parents, claiming that they bring the case in the name of “their generation as well as
those generations yet unborn.” Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, seeking to have
Page 31 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and
desist from accepting and approving more timber license agreements. The children
invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in
its capacity as parens patriae. The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's
refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of
humankind-- the natural law-- and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation." The case was dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-
impairment of contracts, so it was brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
Issue
Did the children have the legal standing to file the case?
Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal
standing to file the case based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility”.
Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that
environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal
standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-
impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state
in the interest of public welfare.
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A.
RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO,
vs.
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Office of
the President; RENATO CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Executive
Secretary and Chairman of the Presidential review Committee on the Lotto,
Office of the President; PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE; and
PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Jovito R. Salonga, Fernando Santiago, Emilio C. Capulong, Jr. and Felipe L. Gozon
for petitioners.
Renato L. Cayetano and Eleazar B. Reyes for PGMC.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Gamaliel G. Bongco, Oscar Karaan and Jedideoh Sincero for intervenors.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P.
Blg. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and conduct “charity sweepstakes races,
lotteries and other similar activities,” the PCSO decided to establish an on-line lottery
system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of
funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in
operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, “a multinational
company and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia,” “became interested
to offer its services and resources to PCSO.” As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad
(through its individual nominees) organized with some Filipino investors in March
1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation (PGMC), which “was intended to be the medium through which the
technical and management services required for the project would be offered and
delivered to PCSO.”
Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the
Lease Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO. On 15 August 1993, PGMC
submitted its bid to the PCSO. On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President
announced that it had given the respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate the
country’s on-line lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract
would be submitted not later than 8 November 1993 “for final clearance and approval
by the Chief Executive.”
On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President Fidel V. Ramos
strongly opposing the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious
moral and ethical considerations. Considering the denial by the Office of the President
of its protest and the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that
“only a court injunction can stop Malacañang,” and the imminent implementation of
the Contract of Lease in February 1994, KILOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners, filed
on 28 January 1994 this petition.
Petitioner claims that it is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited
citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders. The rest of the petitioners, except
Senators Freddie Webb and WigbertoTañada and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are
suing in their capacities as members of the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and
Page 32 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
as taxpayers and concerned citizens. Senators Webb and Tañada and Representative
Arroyo are suing in their capacities as members of Congress and as taxpayers and
concerned citizens of the Philippines. The public respondents, meanwhile allege that
the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit, citing the Court’s
resolution in Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi
2. Whether or the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting
lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association,
company or entity, whether domestic or foreign.” is legal and valid.
HELD:
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The
ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-
being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-
productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as
staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the
petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court
hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take
advantage of.
The language of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169 is indisputably clear. The PCSO cannot
share its franchise with another by way of collaboration, association or joint venture.
Neither can it assign, transfer, or lease such franchise. Whether the contract in question
is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not
be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of
the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus
hominisest anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.
Undoubtedly, from the very inception, the PCSO and the PGMC mutually understood
that any arrangement between them would necessarily leave to the PGMC the
technical, operations, and management aspects of the on-line lottery system while the
PSCO would, primarily, provide the franchise. The so-called Contract of Lease is not,
therefore, what it purports to be. Woven therein are provisions which negate its title
and betray the true intention of the parties to be in or to have a joint venture for a
period of eight years in the operation and maintenance of the on-line lottery system.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
We thus declare that the challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided
for in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is,
therefore, invalid for being contrary to law. This conclusion renders unnecessary
further discussion on the other issues raised by the petitioners.
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, JOHN H. OSMENA and RODOLFO G.
BIAZON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications, and EDSA LRT COPORATION,
LTD., respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
FACTS:
In 1989, DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA, a major
thoroughfare in Metropolitan Manila. The plan, referred to as EDSA Light Rail Transit
III (EDSA LRT III), was intended to provide a mass transit system along EDSA and
alleviate the congestion and growing transportation problem in the metropolis. RA
6957 was enacted allowing for the financing, construction and operation of
government projects through private initiative and investment. Accordingly,
prequalification and bidding was made and EDSA LRT Corporation (organized under
HK laws) was recommended to be awarded with the contract. The President approved
the awarding of the contract. Petitioners are senators praying for the prohibition of
respondents from further implementing and enforcing the contract.
ISSUE:
Whether the agreement granting EDSA LRT Corporation LTD, a foreign corporation,
the ownership of EDSA LRT III, a public utility, violates constitution.
RULING:
No. What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches,
rail stations, terminals and the power plant, not a public utility. While a franchise is
needed to operate these facilities to serve the public, they do not by themselves
constitute a public utility. What constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but
their use to serve the public (Iloilo Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Public Service Board, 44
Phil. 551, 557 558 [1923]).
Page 33 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the operation of a
public utility. However, it does not require a franchise before one can own the
facilities needed to operate a public utility so long as it does not operate them to serve
the public.
The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately from the
ownership of the facilities thereof. One can own said facilities without operating them
as a public utility, or conversely, one may operate a public utility without owning the
facilities used to serve the public. The devotion of property to serve the public may be
done by the owner or by the person in control thereof who may not necessarily be the
owner thereof.
In law, there is a clear distinction between the “operation” of a public utility and the
ownership of the facilities and equipment used to serve the public. Ownership is
defined as a relation in law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one person is
completely subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by law or the concurrence
with the rights of another. The exercise of the rights encompassed in ownership is
limited by law so that a property cannot be operated and used to serve the public as a
public utility unless the operator has a franchise. The operation of a rail system as a
public utility includes the transportation of passengers from one point to another point,
their loading and unloading at designated places and the movement of the trains at pre-
scheduled times.
Even the mere formation of a public utility corporation does not ipso facto characterize
the corporation as one operating a public utility. The moment for determining the
requisite Filipino nationality is when the entity applies for a franchise, certificate or
any other form of authorization for that purpose (People v. Quasha, 93 Phil. 333
[1953]).
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS,
ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO,
FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL
V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN.
WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS: 
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA)
wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of
4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of
the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ
its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease,
PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was
filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's
Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's
charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art.
9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has
become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of
Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is
vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek
to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they
were not parties to the contract 
ISSUES: 
Whether or not the petitioners have standing?
HELD:
NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the
petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no
constitutional issues were actually involved.  LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply.
Since the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan
vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case.
The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot
still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit
cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties
involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at
least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding
involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the
one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to
make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a
different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the
petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no
constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the
petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.
G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998
Page 34 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE

PHILIPPINES, INC. and GMA NETWORK, INC., petitioners, YES. [W]e have decided to take this case since the other petitioner, GMA Network,
vs. Inc., appears to have the requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected
by the enforcement of Sec. 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast
companies to provide free airtime to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for
MENDOZA, J.: campaign and other political purposes. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running
to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992
FACTS: presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even
more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioner’s allegation that it will
Section 92 of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 881, as amended, reads as follows: suffer losses again because it is required to provide free airtime is sufficient to give it
standing to question the validity of Sec. 92.
Sec. 92. Comelec time. — The commission shall procure radio and television time to
be known as “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among
the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this
purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of
the campaign.

Petitioners contend that Sec. 92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process clause and the
eminent domain provision of the Constitution by taking airtime from radio and
television broadcasting stations without payment of just compensation. Petitioners
claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale RAMON A. GONZALES, Petitioner, 
of airtime to advertisers and that to require these stations to provide free airtime is to
v. 
authorize a taking which is not “a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon
the use of private property.” According to petitioners, in 1992, the GMA Network, Inc. HON. ANDRES R. NARVASA, as Chairman, PREPARATORY COMMISSION ON
lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free airtime of one (1) hour every morning from CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS; HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary;
Mondays to Fridays and one (1) hour on Tuesdays and Thursdays from 7:00 to 8:00
COMMISSION ON AUDIT; ROBERTO AVENTAJADO, as Presidential Consultant on Council of
p.m. (prime time) and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lose P58,980,850.00 in view
of COMELEC’s requirement that radio and television stations provide at least 30 Economic Advisers/Economic Affairs; ANGELITO C. BANAYO, as Presidential Adviser for/on
minutes of prime time daily for the COMELEC Time. Political Affairs; VERONICA IGNACIO-JONES, as Presidential Assistant/ Appointment Secretary
  (In charge of appointments), Respondents.
ISSUE:

Does GMA Network, Inc. have the standing to bring the constitutional question on the GONZAGA-REYES, J.: 
assailed provision?
FACTS:
HELD: 

Page 35 of 66
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5

Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition of P3 million is “appropriated” for its operational expenses “to be sourced from the
for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing the funds of the Office of the President.” Being that case, petitioner must show that he is a
constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or
Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does
assistants. The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was petitioner presume to make such a representation. 
created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No.
43 (E.O. No. 43) in order “to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or
RAOUL B. DEL MAR, petitioner,
revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.”
vs.
Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds that it is a
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, BELLE JAI-
public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.
ALAI CORPORATION, FILIPINAS GAMING ENTERTAINMENT
TOTALIZATOR CORPORATION, respondents.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality of PUNO, J.:
Executive Order No. 43
FACTS:
HELD:
• PAGCOR requested for legal advice from the Secretary of Justice as to
The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish
whether or not it is authorized by its Charter to operate and manage jai-alai
that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
frontons in the country in relation to Section 1 and 10 of P.D. No. 1869.
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
• The Secretary of Justice opined that the authority of PAGCOR to operate and
the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that
maintain games of chance or gambling extends to jai-alai which is a form of
he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the
sport or game played for bets and that the Charter of PAGCOR amounts to a
creation of the PCCR.  If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any
legislative franchise for the purpose.
“injury” in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon
• On May 6, 1999, petitioner del Mar filed a Petition for Prohibition to prevent
the legislature’s powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the
PAGCOR from managing and/or operating the jai-alai or Basque pelota
Charter by forming the PCCR.  Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect,
games on the ground that the act is patently illegal and devoid of any basis
injury. 
either from the Constitution or PAGCOR’s own Charter.
• On June 17, 1999 however, PAGCOR entered into an agreement with BELLE
Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being
and FILGAME wherein the latter parties would provide all the required
violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the
facilities and requirements for the establishment and operation of jai-alai.
PCCR’s activities.  Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to
• On August 10, 1999, del Mar then filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari
enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.
questioning the validity of the agreement stating that PAGCOR is without
jurisdiction, authority, legislative franchise, or authority to enter into such
Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue
agreement for the operation and establishment of jai-alai games.
when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of
• A little earlier (July 1, 1999), Federico S. Sandoval II and Michael T.
the law or the Constitution. It is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress
Defensor filed a Petition for Injunction. A Petition in Intervention was filed
of its taxing or spending power.  The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of
E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount

Page 36 of 66
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
by Juan Miguel Zubiri alleging that the operation by PAGCOR of jai-alai is
illegal because it is not included in PAGCOR’s scope.
• Petitoners del Mar, Sandoval, Defensor, and intervenor Zubiri are suing as
taxpayers and in their capacity as the members of the House of
Representatives.
• Respondent questions the locus standi or the standing of the petitioners to file
the petition at bar as taxpayers and as legislators because the operation of jai-
alai does not involve the disbursement of public funds.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners have a locus standi or legal standing to file the petition
HELD:
YES. Petitioners have legal standing to file the petition. As stated by the Court,
Respondent’s stance is without an “oven ready” legal support. A party suing as
taxpayer must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation. In essence, taxpayers are allowed to sue
where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose, or where petitioners seek to restrain
respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. The record shown under their agreement is barren of evidence
that the operation and management of jai-alai by the PAGCOR involves expenditure of
public money. The Court also holds that as members of the House of Representatives,
petitioners have legal standing to file the petition at bar. The operation of jai-alai
constitutes an infringement by PAGCOR of the legislature’s exclusive power to grant
franchise. Hence, powers of Congress are being impared, so as the powers of each of
its members.
The states issue is only a “procedural issue” questioning when can taxpayers file a suit.
The substantive issue concerns whether PAGCOR’s legislative franchise includes the
right to manage and operate jai-alai. It was ruled that PAGCOR DOES NOT HAVE
THE RIGHT to operate jai-alai because:
• It was not stated under its scope.
• In accordance with its historical creation, there is a separate Executive Order
which controls the operating of Jai-Alai (controlled by the Romualdezes) in
Manila. PACGOR’s franchise was never given a franchise to operate jai-alai.
• Tax treatment between jai-alai operations and gambling casinos are distinct
from each other.
• PAGCOR is engaged in the business affected with public interest.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
G.R. No. 149036            April 2, 2002
MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner,
vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A.
TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and GIDEON C. DE GUZMAN in his
capacity as Officer-In-Charge, Finance Services Department of the Commission
on Elections, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Herein petitioner Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as “Acting
Director IV” of the EID and was reappointed twice for the same position in a
temporary capacity. Meanwhile, then PGMA also made appointments, ad interim, of
herein respondents Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and
Commissioners, respectively. Their appointments were renewed thrice by PGMA, the
last one during the pendency of the case, all due to the failure of the Commission of
Appointments to act upon the confirmation of their appointments.
Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, issued a
memorandum removing petitioner as Acting Director IV and reassigning her to the
Law Department. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but was denied. Thus,
petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain
in office of herein respondents, claiming that their ad interim appointments violate the
constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the
prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and
members.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were prohibited under the
Constitution
(2) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were temporary in character
HELD: NO.
Page 37 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
(1) While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall be independent”, this
provision should be harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad
interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the
Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the
appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad
interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give
meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear
intent of the framers of the Constitution. The original draft of Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution – on the nomination of officers subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments – did not provide for ad interim appointments. The
original intention of the framers of the Constitution was to do away with ad
interim appointments because the plan was for Congress to remain in session
throughout the year except for a brief 30-day compulsory recess. However, because of
the need to avoid disruptions in essential government services, the framers of the
Constitution thought it wise to reinstate the provisions of the 1935 Constitution on ad
interim appointments. Clearly, the reinstatement in the present Constitution of the ad
interim appointing power of the President was for the purpose of avoiding
interruptions in vital government services that otherwise would result from prolonged
vacancies in government offices, including the three constitutional commissions.
Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of her constitutional power
to make ad interim appointments prevented the occurrence of the very evil sought to
be avoided by the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. This
power to make ad interim appointments is lodged in the President to be exercised by
her in her sound judgment. Under the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution, the President can choose either of two modes in appointing officials
who are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. First, while
Congress is in session, the President may nominate the prospective appointee, and
pending consent of the Commission on Appointments, the nominee cannot qualify and
assume office. Second, during the recess of Congress, the President may extend an ad
interim appointment which allows the appointee to immediately qualify and assume
office. Whether the President chooses to nominate the prospective appointee or extend
an ad interim appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the President because
the Constitution grants her that power. This Court cannot inquire into the propriety of
the choice made by the President in the exercise of her constitutional power, absent
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part, which
has not been shown in the instant case.
In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners,
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting appointments prohibited by Section
1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
(2) An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes
an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
provides as follows:
“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.”
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next
adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the
President.
While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by
law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn
or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee
does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of
appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three
independent constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill
the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments
during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary
or acting capacity. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are
expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess
of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.
G.R. No. 124360 November 5, 1997
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,
vs.
Page 38 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
(1) Prior to 1971, there was no government agency regulating the oil industry
other than those dealing with ordinary commodities. Oil companies were free
to enter and exit the market without any government interference.
(2) Congress enacted R.A. No. 8180 or the “Downstream Oil Deregulation Act
of 1996” under which any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of
crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or
own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such
crude oil or use the same for his own requirement subject only tomonitoring by the
Deparment of Energy.
(3) Full deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry was implemented through
E.O. No. 372
(4) Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of various provisions of R.A.
No. 8180 and E.O. No. 372
(5) Petitioner Francisco S. Tatad seeks annulment of section 5(b) of R.A. No.
8180
which says that:
- Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this
Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of
three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven
percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that
for imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate
on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same: Provided,
further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress.
(6) Petitioners three (3) arguments with regards to section 5(b):
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
(a) Imposition of different tariff rated on imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products violated the equal protection clause
(b) Imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the downstream oil industry
but instead controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the law
(c) Inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates Section
26(1) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject
which shall be expressed in its title
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitions raise a justiciable controversy
(2) Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the subject
law and executive order
HELD:
(1) YES. Petitions no doubt raise a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The petitions
will reveal that the petitioners have raised constitutional issues which deserve the
resolution of the court in view of their seriousness and their value as precedents.
(2) YES. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping
with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the
other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them,
the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of
these petitions.
G.R. No. 138570               October 10, 2000
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a JUNK VFA MOVEMENT, BISHOP
TOMAS MILLAMENA (Iglesia Filipina Independiente), BISHOP ELMER
BOLOCAN (United Church of Christ of the Phil.), DR. REYNALDO LEGASCA,
Page 39 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
MD, KILUSANG MAMBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, KILUSANG MAYO UNO,
GABRIELA, PROLABOR, and the PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
CENTER, petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY DOMINGO SIAZON, DEFENSE SECRETARY ORLANDO
MERCADO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, SENATE PRESIDENT
MARCELO FERNAN, SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, SENATOR BLAS
OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO BIAZON, and SENATOR FRANCISCO
TATAD, respondents.
BUENA, J.:
FACTS:
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a
Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in
the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. In view of the impending
expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the
United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On
September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the
presence of US military bases in the Philippines. On July 18, 1997, the United States
panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt
Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary
Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on “the complementing strategic interests of
the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.” Both sides discussed,
among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for
brevity). Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was
respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada,
through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6,
1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora,
officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification,
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or
legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA
RULING:
No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining
any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners
have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending powers. On this point, it bears stressing that a taxpayer’s suit refers to a case
where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds
derived from taxation.
G.R. No. 141284               August 15, 2000
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR
B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
1. In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like
robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive,
ordered the PNP and the Marine to conduct joint visibility patrols for the
purpose of crime prevention and suppression.
2. Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (LOI 02/2000) which detailed the manner by
which the joint visibility patrols called Task Force Tulungan, would be
conducted. The said task force was placed under the leadership of the Police
Chief of Metro Manila.
Page 40 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed the instant petition to annul LOI
02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and
unconstitutional, arguing that the deployment of marines in Metro Manila is violative
of the Constitution because no emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would
justify, even only remotely, the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work;
hence, said deployment in derogation of Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not IBP has legal standing (locus standi) in case at bar.
HELD:
IBP has not complied with the requisites of legal standing for it has not successfully
established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act. IBP
primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law
and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, the IBP asserts no other basis in
support of its locus standi. The mere invocation is not sufficient to clothe it with
standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry.
Furthermore, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has
sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols.
Neither oit is alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil
liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines.
However, the Supreme Court does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no
standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of
allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial
resolution of the controversy.
Even though IBP has no legal standing in case at bar, Supreme Court emphasized that
it has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement
of legal standing when paramount interest is involved and so brush aside technicalities
of procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.
JUDICIAL REVIEW: STANDING
Macalintal v. COMELEC GR157031 JULY 10 2003
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B.
Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)
suffer from constitutional infirmity.  Claiming that he has actual and material legal
interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly
and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer
and as a lawyer.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 violates the residency
requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution.
(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the constitutional mandate
under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for
President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress.
(3) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review,
revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the
Commission on Elections, promulgate without violating the independence of the
COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.
HELD:
(1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting under
Page 41 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
this Act. It disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as
such in the host country. However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she
executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission
declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of registration. Such affidavit shall
also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to
return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent
resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.
Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement in Section 1 Article
V of the Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for
at least one yr, and a resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6
months immediately preceding an election.
However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that the
Court may have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit
for without it, the presumption of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The
qualified Filipino abroad who executed an affidavit is deemed to have retained his
domicile in the Philippines and presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical
absence from this country. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 does not only require the
promise to resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than
3 years after approval of registration but it also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he
is a green card holder, a temporary visitor or even on business trip, must declare that
he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, he/she must return to
the Philippines otherwise consequences will be met according to RA No. 9189.
Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has exercised
his right to vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to
repeal or modify it if such law is found to be impractical. However, it can be said that
the Congress itself was conscious of this probability and provided for deterrence which
is that the Filipino who fails to return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage.
Accordingly, the votes he cast shall not be invalidated because he was qualified to vote
on the date of the elections.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning, the
Court is prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases. In fine, considering
that underlying intent of the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and
intent of the framers, which is to grant Filipino immigrants and permanent residents
abroad the unquestionable right to exercise the right of suffrage (Section 1 Article V)
the Court finds that Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not constitutionally defective.
(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the
winning candidates for President and Vice President for the entire nation must remain
in the hands of Congress as its duty and power under Section 4 of Article VII of the
Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the winning candidates only for
Senators and Party-list Reps.
(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the
Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope
of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no
option but to withdraw from its usual silence in declaring a provision of law
unconstitutional. 
1. Araullo vs Aquino GR 209287 July 1, 2014
Political Law – Constitutional Law – Separation of Powers – Fund Realignment –
Constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program
Power of the Purse – Executive Impoundment
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the
sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a
stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program
called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP
enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects
instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was
that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive
agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once
withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will
then be reallotted to  other priority projects. The DAP program did work
to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such
growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by
Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that
he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting
in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad
claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of
the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only
realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were
also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation
Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the
Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects,
etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that
“no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.”
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA
(savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution
(power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power
of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI,
Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the
executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was
merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a
program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the
Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no
additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made
by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the
GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers
to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct
appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA
unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did
not happen).  Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s
involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
Page 43 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the
President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by
the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment
should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated
because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to
the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of
funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects
were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is
concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of
these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because
they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the
Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among
other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is
completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to
“savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory
definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for
the transfers.  Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But
under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle
of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the
DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the
DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification
from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded
the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before
unprogrammed funds were used.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act
prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The
DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If
the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more
harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the
DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the
validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to
the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the
appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in
good faith.
————————————-—xxx——————————————
Section V - Powers of the Supreme Court
Political Question
Subject matter that the Supreme Court deems to be inappropriate for judicial review
because discretionary power over it should be left to the politically accountable
branches of government
————————————-—xxx——————————————
I. FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA 668)
Case Digest
CORTES, J.:
Facts:
After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to
Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents
to issue their travel documents and enjoin the implementation of the President’s
decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision
of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode
because only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor, according
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
to the petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has
authorized her to do so.
Issue:
Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines?
Ruling:
The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote
their welfare and advance national interest.
This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace. The
president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is
also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring
domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to
destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only
exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state and instigate more
chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive
actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt
to become serious and direct protection of the people is the essence of the duty of the
government.
The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse
of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under
present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting
their return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.
Section 8, Article V - See ruling below
II. REP. RAUL A. DAZA vs.
REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Cruz, J.
FACTS:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives
proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments in
accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza
was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized,
resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. On the basis of
this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and
giving this to the newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including
therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP. The
petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the
Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the
Commission on Appointments
HELD:
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing
as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of
the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House
of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in
case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within
thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule
by a majority vote of all the Members.
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the
Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in
the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be
permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not
involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts
of allegiance from one political party to another.
The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the
Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant
to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.
III. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. GUINGONA; Panganiban, J
While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a
number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide
that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,”
who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the
defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate
President and House Speaker
Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to
revocation, modification and waiver by the body adopting them
FACTS:
During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were
both nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan
was declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that,
with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority,
he was assuming position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted
for Sen. Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the
losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.” However, senators belonging to the
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus, also a minority – had chosen Sen.
Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of
respondent as Senate minority leader
(2) Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative
procedure
RULING:
The petition fails.
(1) There was no violation. The Court finds that the interpretation proposed by
petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the
Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The Constitution mandates that
the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than
one half of all the members thereof, it however does not provide that the members
who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could
thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the
defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. While the
Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House
Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in
both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall
choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The method of choosing
who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
(2) The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate
President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within
the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court
ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify
its intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on the
interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a
session and therein elect a Senate President. The Court ruled that the validity of
the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not
Page 46 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's
"full discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory constitutional
limitations. Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction
to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to
consider and determine the issue.
IV. Isabelita C. Viniya, Et. al vs. Executive Secretary Romulo
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS
Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked
villages and systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of the village.
As a result of the actions of their Japanese tormentors, the petitioners have spent their
lives in misery, having endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and mental
emotional suffering. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the
Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA and OSG, requesting assistance in filing
a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the “comfort women stations in the Philippines. However, said
officials declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual
claims for compensation have already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with
the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Petitioners also argued that the
comfort women system constituted a crime against humanity, sexual slavery, and
torture. They alleged that the prohibition against these international crimes is jus
cogens norms from which no derogation is possible, as such, the Philippine
government is in breach of its legal obligation not to afford impunity for crimes
against humanity.
ISSUE
Whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not
espousing petitioner’s claims for official apology and other forms of reparations
against Japan.
RULING
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
No. The question whether the government should espouse claims of its nationals
against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political
branches. In this case, the Executive Department has determined that taking up
petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and
could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for
stability in this region. For the Court to overturn the Executive Departments
determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a
coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been
constitutionally committed. In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means
available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been
when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the
individuals behalf. Even then, it is not the individuals rights that are being asserted, but
rather, the states own rights. The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether
its protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease.
The Court fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are
morally reprehensible as well as legally prohibited under contemporary international
law. However, it does not automatically imply that the Philippines is under a non-
derogable obligation to prosecute international crimes. Absent the consent of the
states, an applicable treaty regime, or a directive by the Security Council, there is no
non-derogable duty to institute proceedings against Japan. Even the invocation of jus
cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Even if we
sidestep the question of whether jus cogens norms existed in 1951, petitioners have not
deigned to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens
prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute
perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the
status of jus cogens.
V. Corona vs. The Senate of the Philippines
Walang nalagay si Leo
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
————————————-—xxx——————————————
Section V - Powers of the Supreme Court
Declaration of Unconstitutionality
————————————-—xxx——————————————
I. Serrano Agbayani vs PNB [G.R. No. L-23127 April 29, 1971]
FACTS: Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19,
1944, secured by real estate mortgage. On July 13 1959 or 15 years after maturity of
the loan, defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings for the recovery of
the balance of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against both
alleging that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years
having elapsed from the date of maturity. PNB on the other hand claims that the
defense of prescription would not be available if the period from March 10, 1945,
when Executive Order No. 32 1 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent
legislative act 2 extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be
deducted from the computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps
for the recovery of the loan. The lower court did not find such contention persuasive
and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.
ISSUE: W/N the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the Act extending the
Moratorium Law before the same were declared invalid tolled the period of
prescription (Effect of the declaration of Unconstitutionality of a law)
HELD: YES. In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: “The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to
particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and
official.” 4
The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or executive order prior
to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are
attached. Precisely because of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid
governmental response to the plight of the debtors who were war sufferers, this Court
has made clear its view in a series of cases impressive in their number and unanimity
that during the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No.
342 were in force, prescription did not run.
The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff’s suit is thus manifest. From July
19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings were started by appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short of
fifteen years. The prescriptive period was tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the
effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953, when the decision of Rutter v.
Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years, two months and eight days. Obviously
then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage
obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be availed of as a defense.
ARAULLO, et.al., Petitioners, vs. AQUINO, et.al., Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 209287,et.al. January 3, 2015
(Motion for Reconsideration)
PONENTE: Bersamin
TOPIC: Constitutionality of DAP, cross-border transfer
RULING OF THE COURT:
1.) The Court’s power of judicial review
Page 48 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
Argument: The respondents argue that the Executive has not violated the GAA
because savings as a concept is an ordinary species of interpretation that calls for
legislative, instead of judicial, determination.
Held: Untenable. The interpretation of the GAA and its definition of savings is a
foremost judicial function. This is because the power of judicial review vested in the
Court is exclusive.
Endencia and Jugo v. David: The interpretation and application of said laws belong
exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the
laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is
constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said
law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether
there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give
way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
2.) Strict construction on the accumulation and utilization of savings
The exercise of the power to augment shall be strictly construed by virtue of its being
an exception to the general rule that the funding of PAPs shall be limited to the amount
fixed by Congress for the purpose. Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their
management will also be strictly construed against expanding the scope of the power
to augment.15 Such a strict interpretation is essential in order to keep the Executive
and other budget implementors within the limits of their prerogatives during budget
execution, and to prevent them from unduly transgressing Congress’ power of the
purse.
Pertinent provisions
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution states:
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions
may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
xxxx
Section 38 and Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code provide:
Section 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations. – Except as otherwise
provided in the General Appropriations Act and whenever in his judgment the public
interest so requires, the President, upon notice to the head of office concerned, is
authorized to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted for any
agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act, except
for personal services appropriations used for permanent officials and
employees.
Section 39. Authority to Use Savings in Appropriations to Cover Deficits.—Except as
otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act, any savings in the regular
appropriations authorized in the General Appropriations Act for programs and projects
of any department, office or agency, may, with the approval of the President, be used
to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations: Provided, that the
creation of new positions or increase of salaries shall not be allowed to be funded from
budgetary savings except when specifically authorized by law: Provided, further, that
whenever authorized positions are transferred from one program or project to another
within the same department, office or agency, the corresponding amounts appropriated
for personal services are also deemed transferred, without, however increasing the total
outlay for personal services of the department, office or agency concerned.
Section 38 refers to the authority of the President “to suspend or otherwise stop further
expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in
the General Appropriations Act.” When the President suspends or stops expenditure of
funds, savings are not automatically generated until it has been established that such
funds or appropriations are free from any obligation or encumbrance, and that the
work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized has been
completed, discontinued or abandoned.
Although the withdrawal of unobligated allotments may have effectively resulted in
the suspension or stoppage of expenditures through the issuance of negative Special
Allotment Release Orders (SARO), the reissuance of withdrawn allotments to the
original programs and projects is a clear indication that the program or project from
which the allotments were withdrawn has not been discontinued or abandoned.
Page 49 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
At this point, it is likewise important to underscore that the reversion to the General
Fund of unexpended balances of appropriations – savings included – pursuant to
Section 28 Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code does not apply to the
Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG), which include the Judiciary, Civil
Service Commission, Commission on Audit, Commission on Elections, Commission
on Human Rights, and the Office of the Ombudsman.
RULE MAKING POWER
BUSTOS v. LUCERO 81 PHIL 648 (1948)
SUMMARY:
The lower courts denied petitioner’s motion to cross-examine the complainant’s
witnesses during the preliminary investigation. The denial was based on Section 11,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Rights of the defendant after Arrest) which did not
state that the defendant has the right to cross-examine the complainants witness or
witnesses. Petitioner appealed to the SC via petition for mandamus. The SC denied the
petition ruling that the lower court has the discretion to grant or deny the motion.
Thus, petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration arguing that Section 11 of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court infringes Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
which mandates that the SC cannot promulgate rules that diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Issue: WON Section 11, Rule 108 deals with substantive matters
and impairs substantive rights. NO.
DOCTRINES:
As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes
and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the
procedural law which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a
crime is to be punished. Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially
remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution.
FACTS:
Justice of the Peace of Masantol, Pampanga – the petitioner appeared at the
preliminary investigation after being informed of the criminal charges against him.
He pleaded not guilty.
Petitioner then moved that the complainant present her evidence so that her witnesses
could be examined and cross examined in the manner and form provided by law.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected to petitioner’s motion invoking Section
11, Rule 108, as follows:
Section 11. Rights of defendant after arrest. After the arrest of the defendant and his
delivery to the court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information filed
against him. He shall also be informed of the substance of the testimony and evidence
presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or to present witnesses or evidence
in his favor, he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be
reduced to writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed
by him.
[Note that under the above Rule, it was not stated that the defendant has the right to
cross-examine the complainants witness or witnesses]
The justice of the peace sustained the objection.
CFI – Pampanga. In view thereof, the accused refused to present his evidence, and
the case was forwarded to the CFI-Pampanga.
Petitioner filed a motion with the CFI praying that the record of the case be remanded
to the justice of the peace of Masantol, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine
the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony.
Supreme Court. The motion was denied, and for that reason the present special civil
action of mandamus was instituted with the Supreme Court.
The SC denied the petition for mandamus citing Dequito and Saling Buhay vs.
Arellano:
Section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the peace
to grant or deny the motion to cross-examine the complainant’s witness.
While section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the defendant’s right in the
preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the
authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably
calculated to bring out the truth.
Page 50 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
The defendant cannot, as a matter of right, compel the complainant and his witnesses
to repeat in his presence what they had said at the preliminary examination before the
issuance of the order of arrest.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Supreme Court on the ground
that section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court infringes section 13, Article VIII, of
the Constitution.
The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Section 11 deals with substantive matters and impairs substantive
rights. NO.
RATIO:
We cannot agree with this view. We are of the opinion that section 11 of Rule 108, like
its predecessors, is an adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive right.  would be to abstain from promulgating such rule of procedure which may
Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said
to be synonymous.
Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the
legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations.  procedure which “shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights,” this Court
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights,
or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that
part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective
or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains
redress for their invasion.
As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are
crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished
from the procedural law which provides or regulates the steps by which one who
commits a crime is to be punished.
Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken
in a criminal prosecution.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural.
Tested by this standard, we do not believe that the curtailment of the right of an
accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-examine the witnesses who had given
evidence for his arrest is of such importance as to offend against the constitutional
inhibition.
The distinction between “remedy” and “substantive right” is incapable of exact
definition. The difference is somewhat a question of degree. This being so, it is
inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should step on substantive rights,
and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect such incursion as
does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a
defense, but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage.
DISPOSITIVE:
Motion denied.
J. FERIA, DISSENTING
But even assuming arguendo that it is difficult to draw the line in any particular case
beyond which the power of the court over procedure cannot pass without touching
upon the substantial right of the parties, what this Court should do in that case
increase, diminish or modify substantive right in order to avoid violating the
constitutional prohibition above referred to. 
Because as this Supreme Court is not empowered by the Constitution to legislate on or
abrogate substantive rights, but only to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
cannot step on them in making the rules, and the Constitution must be presumed not to
tolerate nor expect such incursion as would affect the substantive rights of the accused
in any manner.
IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534
 
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952.
The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from
1946 up to and including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in
any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades
shall be included in the computation of the general average in subsequent bar
examinations.”
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced
in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of
1946 to 1955 Bar examinations.  Section2 establishes a permanent system for an
indefinite time.  It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to
take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for
1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect.  The portion that was stricken down
was based under the following reasons:
1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar
from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was
very close to the end of World War II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the
petitions of the said candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine
who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative
power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down
by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to
substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes
to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence,
it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of
an petitioner.  The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter,
supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Javellana v. DILG
G.R. No. 102549 August 10, 1992
Griño-Aquino, J.
Facts:
                Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City,
Negros Occidental. On October 5, 1989, City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed
Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for: (1) violation of Department of
Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 in
relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2
of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the “Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees,” and (2) for oppression, misconduct and
abuse of authority.
Divinagracia’s complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City
Council or Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has
continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that purpose
from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required by DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58
of the same department; that on July 8, 1989, Javellana, as counsel for Antonio Javiero
and Rolando Catapang, filed a case against City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia of
Bago City for “Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages” putting him in
public ridicule; that Javellana also appeared as counsel in several criminal and civil
cases in the city, without prior authority of the DLG Regional Director, in violation of
DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38.
                On August 13, 1990, a formal hearing of the complaint was held in Iloilo
City in which the complainant, Engineer Divinagracia, and the respondent, Councilor
Javellana, presented their respective evidence.
Meanwhile, on September 10, 1990, Javellana requested the DLG for a permit to
continue his practice of law for the reasons stated in his letter-request.
                On September 21, 1991, Secretary Luis T. Santos issued Memorandum
Circular No. 90-81 setting forth guidelines for the practice of professions by local
elective officials.
                In an order dated May 2, 1991, Javellana’s motion to dismiss was denied by
the public respondents. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on June
20, 1991.
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
Five months later or on October 10, 1991, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA
7160) was signed into law, Section 90 of which provides:
Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. — (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than
the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members
who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1)     Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government
unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2)    Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his
office;
(3)    Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedingsinvolving the
local government unit of which he is an official; and
(4)    Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian
member concerned is defending the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of
work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not
derive monetary compensation therefrom.
Issue:
                whether or not DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are
unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority to
regulate the practice of law 
Held:
                No. Petitioner’s contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of
1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the
Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches
upon the Supreme Court’s power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of
law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply
prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the
discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those
instances where the law allows it.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE v.
CABATO-CORTES GR No. 165922, Feb 26, 2010 627 Phil. 543 Legal Fees,
Cooperative Code of the Philippines
FACTS:
Petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative is a credit cooperative
organized under RA 6938, or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines. 
Article 62(6) of RA 6938 exempts cooperatives:
from the payment of all court and sheriff’s fees payable to the Philippine Government
for and in connection with all actions brought under this Code, or where such action is
brought by the Cooperative Development Authority before the court, to enforce the
payment of obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative.
Petitioner, as mortgagee, filed with the RTC of Baguio City a petition to
extrajudicially foreclose a mortgage. Invoking Article 62 (6) of RA 6938, petitioner
sought exemption from payment of the fees.
Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (respondent), denied the request for exemption ruling
that under Section 7(c) of Rule 141, as amended, petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure
are subject to legal fees based on the value of the mortgagee’s claim.
Petitioner’s MR was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner’s application for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt from legal fees
under Article 62(6) of RA 6938.
RULING:
We hold that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 does not apply to petitioner’s foreclosure
proceeding.
Petitions for Extrajudicial Foreclosure  Outside of the Ambit of Article 62(6) of RA
6938
The scope of the legal fees exemption Article 62(6) of RA 6938 grants to cooperatives
is limited to two types of actions, namely: 
(1) actions brought under RA 6938; and (2) actions brought by the Cooperative
Development Authority to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of
cooperatives. 
It is apparent that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner to claim
exemption from the payment of legal fees in this proceeding because first, the fees
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5

imposable on petitioner do not pertain to an action brought under RA 6938 but to a this case manifested the relaxation of an otherwise stringent application of Republic
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act 3135.  Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent for the enactment of the law, that is, to
Second, petitioner is not the Cooperative Development Authority which can claim rehabilitate the offender.
exemption only in actions to enforce payments of obligations on behalf of
cooperatives. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached
upon the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure?

HELD: (YES) Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA , petitioner, vs. HON. FRANK Sec. 5 "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged…." The Supreme
Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is
PERALTA, J: now Their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative
FACTS: departments. The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-
On June 15, 2016, Estipona Gled a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the
Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province
plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or
Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) He issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in promulgated by the Court. The Court was also granted for the the power to disapprove
paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court rules of procedure of special courts and quasi- judicial bodies. But most importantly,
under Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement
separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government. Judge Frank rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In General, the power to
E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court
an Order denying Estipona's motion. Accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA with Congress, more so with the Executive.
No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining
is a "rule of procedure." Indeed, plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, particularly under Rule 118, the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the
Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-
making power that breathes life to plea bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute. It
suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea
bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal cases. The Court
sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of the law, R.A.
No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only
possible in cases of use of illegal drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed.
However, by case law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged
with possession of paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held in People v.
Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in

Page 54 of 66
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
FULL TEXT OF AMENDED SECTIONS 9 AND 11 - A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC - THE
RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO - October 16, 2007
THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO
RESOLUTION
Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson of the Committee on Revision of
the Rules of Court submitting for this Court’s consideration and approval the proposed
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.
This Rule shall take effect on October 24, 2007, following its publication in three (3)
newspapers of general circulation.
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Sec. 2. Who May File. - The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any
qualified person or entity in the following order:
1. Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of
the aggrieved party;
2. Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the
preceding paragraph; or
3. Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known
member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.
The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all other authorized
parties to file similar petitions. Likewise, the filing of the petition by an authorized
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
party on behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the right of all others, observing the
order established herein.
Sec. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed on any day and at any time with the
Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or
any of its elements occurred, or with the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court, or any justice of such courts. The writ shall be enforceable anywhere
in the Philippines.
When issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, the writ shall be
returnable before such court or judge.
When issued by the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, it
may be returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial
Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its
elements occurred.
When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before
such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals
or any of their justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act
or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred.
Sec. 4. No Docket Fees. - The petitioner shall be exempted from the payment of the
docket and other lawful fees when filing the petition. The court, justice or judge shall
docket the petition and act upon it immediately.
Sec. 5. Contents of Petition. - The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege
the following:
1. The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
2. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat,
act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be
described by an assumed appellation;
3. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat
or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting
affidavits;
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
4. The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances,
and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and
conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
5. The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the
threat, act or omission; and
6. The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.
Sec. 6. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge
shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The
clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent
necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and
may deputize any officer or person to serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which
shall not be later than seven (7) days from the date of its issuance.
Sec. 7. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. - A clerk of court who refuses
to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the
same, shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to
other disciplinary actions.
Sec. 8. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a
judicial officer or by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain
a copy on which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served
personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply.
Sec. 9. Return; Contents. - Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of the writ, the
respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which
shall, among other things, contain the following:
1. The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with
violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or
omission;
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
2. The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of
the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or
omission;
3. All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat,
act or omission against the aggrieved party; and
4. If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state the
actions that have been or will still be taken:
1. to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
2. to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person
identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons
responsible;
3. to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or
disappearance;
4. to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well
as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;
5. to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and
6. to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and
the prosecution of the case.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.
Sec. 10. Defenses not Pleaded Deemed Waived. - All defenses shall be raised in the
return, otherwise, they shall be deemed waived.
Sec. 11. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings and motions are
prohibited:
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
1. Motion to dismiss;
2. Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and
other pleadings;
3. Dilatory motion for postponement;
4. Motion for a bill of particulars;
5. Counterclaim or cross-claim;
6. Third-party complaint;
7. Reply;
8. Motion to declare respondent in default;
9. Intervention;
10. Memorandum;
11. Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and
12. Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order.
Sec. 12. Effect of Failure to File Return. - In case the respondent fails to file a return,
the court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte.
Sec. 13. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However,
the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues
and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.
The hearing shall be from day to day until completed and given the same priority as
petitions for habeas corpus.
Sec. 14. Interim Reliefs. - Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final
judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. - The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu
proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or
private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an
organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this Rule, the
protection may be extended to the officers involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend
temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and
conditions that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.
(b) Inspection Order. - The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due
hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other
property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon.
The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported
by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced
disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature
of the information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to
determine the merit of the opposition.
The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of
the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the
inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may
prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order
shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable
reasons.
(c) Production Order. - The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due
hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or
objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to
the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or
photographing by or on behalf of the movant.
The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged
nature of the information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a
hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional
rights of all the parties.
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
(d) Witness Protection Order. - The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu
proprio, may refer the witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the
Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981.
The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies,
or to accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their
safety.
Sec. 15. Availability of Interim Reliefs to Respondent. - Upon verified motion of the
respondent and after due hearing, the court, justice or judge may issue an inspection
order or production order under paragraphs (b) and (c) of the preceding section.
A motion for inspection order under this section shall be supported by affidavits or
testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the defenses of the respondent.
Sec. 16. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may order the respondent who refuses
to make a return, or who makes a false return, or any person who otherwise disobeys
or resists a lawful process or order of the court to be punished for contempt. The
contemnor may be imprisoned or imposed a fine.
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall
establish their claims by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence
as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance
of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary
diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the
performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability.
Sec. 18. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the
time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven
by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs
as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Sec. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the
adverse judgment.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus cases.
Sec. 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases. - The court shall not dismiss the petition, but
shall archive it, if upon its determination it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the
failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives.
A periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by the amparo court that shall,
motu proprio or upon motion by any party, order their revival when ready for further
proceedings. The petition shall be dismissed with prejudice upon failure to prosecute
the case after the lapse of two (2) years from notice to the petitioner of the order
archiving the case.
The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a
consolidated list of archived cases under this Rule not later than the first week of
January of every year.
Sec. 21. Institution of Separate Actions. - This Rule shall not preclude the filing of
separate criminal, civil or administrative actions.
Sec. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - When a criminal action has been
commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ
shall be available by motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available
under the writ of amparo.
Sec. 23. Consolidation. - When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a
petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for
a writ of amparo, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to apply to the
disposition of the reliefs in the petition.
Sec. 24. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights recognized and protected by the Constitution.
Sec. 25. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. - The Rules of Court shall apply
suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule.
Sec. 26. Applicability to Pending Cases. - This Rule shall govern cases involving
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof pending in the trial
and appellate courts.
Sec. 27. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on October 24, 2007, following its
publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.
THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
Section 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act
or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
Sec. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas
data.
However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may
be filed
by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse,
children
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph; or
Sec. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where
the
petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the
data or
information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner.
The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the
Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data files of government offices.
Sec. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. - When the writ is issued by a Regional Trial
Court or
any judge thereof, it shall be returnable before such court or judge.
When issued by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it
may be
returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of
the place
where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place
where
the data or information is gathered, collected or stored.
When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before
such Court
or any justice thereof, or before the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of
its
justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent
resides,
or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered,
collected
or stored.
The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Docket Fees. - No docket and other lawful fees shall be required from an
indigent
petitioner. The petition of the indigent shall be docked and acted upon immediately,
without
prejudice to subsequent submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen (15)
days from
the filing of the petition.
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
Sec. 6. Petition. - A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data should contain:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the
right to life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the
person in
charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression
or
destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act
complained of;
and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.
Sec. 7. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge
shall
immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of
court shall
issue the writ under the seal of the court and cause it to be served within three (3) days
from the
issuance; or, in case of urgent necessity, the justice or judge may issue the writ under
his or her
own hand, and may deputize any officer or person serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which
shall not be
later than ten (10) work days from the date of its issuance.
Sec. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. - A clerk of court who refuses
to issue
the writ after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the same, shall
be
punished by the court, justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other
disciplinary
actions.
Sec. 9. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a
judicial
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
officer or by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy
on which
to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the
respondent, the
rules on substituted service shall apply.
Sec. 10. Return; Contents. - The respondent shall file a verified written return together
with
supporting affidavits within five (5) working days from service of the writ, which
period may be
reasonably extended by the Court for justifiable reasons. The return shall, among other
things,
contain the following:
(a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged
communications,
confidentiality of the source of information of media and others;
(b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the data or
information subject
of the petition;
(i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the nature of such data
or
information, and the purpose for its collection;
(ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security and
confidentiality of the
data or information; and
(iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and,
(c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.
Sec. 11. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may punish with imprisonment or fine
a
respondent who commits contempt by making a false return, or refusing to make a
return; or
any person who otherwise disobeys or resist a lawful process or order of the court.
Sec. 12. When Defenses May be Heard in Chambers. - A hearing in chambers may be
conducted where the respondent invokes the defense that the release of the data or
information
in question shall compromise national security or state secrets, or when the data or
information
cannot be divulged to the public due to its nature or privileged character.
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5

Sec. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings and motions are
prohibited:
(a) Motion to dismiss;
(b) Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and
other
pleadings;
(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;
(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
(f) Third-party complaint;
(g) Reply;
(h) Motion to declare respondent in default;
(i) Intervention;
(j) Memorandum;
(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and
(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order.
Sec. 14. Return; Filing. - In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, justice
or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting the petitioner such relief
as the petition may warrant unless the court in its discretion requires the petitioner to
submit evidence.
Sec. 15. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However,
the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues
and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.
Sec. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the
time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven
by substantial
evidence, the court shall enjoin the act complained of, or order the deletion,
destruction, or
rectification of the erroneous data or information and grant other relevant reliefs as
may be just
and equitable; otherwise, the privilege of the writ shall be denied.
Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful officers
as may be
designated by the court, justice or judge within five (5) working days.
Sec. 17. Return of Service. - The officer who executed the final judgment shall, within
three (3)
days from its enforcement, make a verified return to the court. The return shall contain
a full
statement of the proceedings under the writ and a complete inventory of the database
or
information, or documents and articles inspected, updated, rectified, or deleted, with
copies
served on the petitioner and the respondent.
The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was enforced and complied with
by the
respondent, as well as all objections of the parties regarding the manner and regularity
of the A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
PART III
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
RULE 7
WRIT OF KALIKASAN
Section 1. Nature of the writ. - The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical
person, entity authorized by law, people’s organization, non-governmental
organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any
government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is violated, or threatened withviolation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Section 2. Contents of the petition. - The verified petition shall contain the following:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent or if the name and
personal
circumstances are unknown and uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed
appellation;

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Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5

(c) The environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be violated, the Section 6. How the writ is served. - The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a
act or omission complained of, and the environmental damage of such magnitude as to court officer or any person deputized by the court, who shall retain a copy on which to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally, the rule on
substituted service shall apply.
(d) All relevant and material evidence consisting of the affidavits of witnesses,
documentary evidence, scientific or other expert studies, and if possible, object Section 7. Penalty for refusing to issue or serve the writ. - A clerk of court who unduly
evidence; delays or
refuses to issue the writ after its allowance or a court officer or deputized person who
(e) The certification of petitioner under oath that: unduly
delays or refuses to serve the same shall be punished by the court for contempt without
(1) petitioner has not commenced any action or filed any claim involving the prejudice to other civil, criminal or administrative actions.
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and no such other action or Section 8. Return of respondent; contents. - Within a non-extendible period of ten (10)
claim is pending therein; days
after service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified return which shall contain
(2) if there is such other pending action or claim, acomplete statement of its all
present status; defenses to show that respondent did not violate or threaten to violate, or allow the
violation of
(3) if petitioner should learn that the same or similar action or claim has been any environmental law, rule or regulation or commit any act resulting to environmental
filed or is pending, petitioner shall report to the court that fact within five (5) days damage
therefrom; and of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities
(f) The reliefs prayed for which may include a prayer for the issuance of a TEPO. or provinces.
All defenses not raised in the return shall be deemed waived.
Section 3. Where to file. - The petition shall be filed with the Supreme Court or with The return shall include affidavits of witnesses, documentary evidence, scientific or
any of the stations of the Court of Appeals. other expert
studies, and if possible, object evidence, in support of the defense of the respondent.
Section 4. No docket fees. - The petitioner shall be exempt from the payment of docket A general denial of allegations in the petition shall be considered as an admission
fees. thereof.
Section 9. Prohibited pleadings and motions. - The following pleadings and motions
Section 5. Issuance of the writ. - Within three (3) days from the date of filing of the are
petition, if the petition is sufficient in form and substance, the court shall give an order: prohibited:
(a) issuing the writ; and (a) Motion to dismiss;
(b) Motion for extension of time to file return;
(b) requiring the respondent to file a verified return as provided in Section 8 of this (c) Motion for postponement;
Rule. The clerk of court shall forthwith issue the writ under the seal of the court (d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
including the issuance of a cease and desist order and other temporary reliefs effective (e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
until further order. (f) Third-party complaint;
(g) Reply; and
(h) Motion to declare respondent in default.

Page 62 of 66
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
Section 10. Effect of failure to file return. - In case the respondent fails to file a return,
the court
shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte.
Section 11. Hearing. - Upon receipt of the return of the respondent, the court may call
a photographing by or
preliminary conference to simplify the issues, determine the possibility of obtaining
stipulations
or admissions from the parties, and set the petition for hearing.
The hearing including the preliminary conference shall not extend beyond sixty (60)
days and
shall be given the same priority as petitions for the writs of habeas corpus, amparo and
habeas
data.
Section 12. Discovery Measures. - A party may file a verified motion for the following
reliefs:
(a) Ocular Inspection; order — The motion must show that an ocular inspection order
is
necessary to establish the magnitude of the violation or the threat as to prejudice the
life, health
or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It shall state in detail the
place or
places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits of witnesses having personal
knowledge of the violation or threatened violation of environmental law.
After hearing, the court may order any person in possession or control of a designated
land or
other property to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting or
photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon.
The order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the
date,
time, place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to
protect
the constitutional rights of all parties.
(b) Production or inspection of documents or things; order – The motion must show
that a
production order is necessary to establish the magnitude of the violation or the threat
as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
After hearing, the court may order any person in possession, custody or control of any
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible
things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence
relevant to
the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or
on behalf of the movant.
The production order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the
production and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection or
production and may prescribe
other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties.
Section 13. Contempt. - The court may after hearing punish the respondent who
refuses or unduly delays the filing of a return, or who makes a false return, or any
person who disobeys or
resists a lawful process or order of the court for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the
Rules of
Court.
Section 14. Submission of case for decision; filing of memoranda. - After hearing, the
court shall issue an order submitting the case for decision. The court may require the
filing of memoranda and if possible, in its electronic form, within a non-extendible
period of thirty (30) days from the date the petition is submitted for decision.
Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted
for decision, the court shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the
writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or
neglecting the performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in
environmental destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or
entity to protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or
entity to monitor strict compliance with the decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or
entity to make periodic reports on the execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the
environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioners.
Section 16. Appeal. - Within fifteen (15) days from the date of notice of the adverse
judgment or denial of motion for reconsideration, any party may appeal to the
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The appeal may raise questions of
fact.
Section 17. Institution of separate actions. - The filing of a petition for the issuance of
the writ of
kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative
actions.
IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA , ON
LEGAL AND MORAL GROUNDS, FROM BEING ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN
MINDANAO IN THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS
OLIVER OWEN L. GARCIA, EMMANUEL RAVANERA and TONY VELEZ
vs. ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA AND IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS
[A.C. No. 6052. December 11, 2003.]
Facts:
Petitioner lawyers Oliver L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony Velez filed a
petition seeking the disqualification of respondent lawyer Leonard De Vera from being
elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao in the 16th Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Regional Governor's Elections.
Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-President of Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while petitioners
Ravanera and Velez are the past president and the incumbent President, respectively,
of the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. Petitioners contended that respondent's transfer
from Pasay, Parañaque, Las Piñas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to Agusan del Sur
Chapter is a brazen abuse and misuse of the rotation rule, a mockery of the domicile
rule and a great insult to the lawyers of Eastern Mindanao for it implied that there is no
lawyer from the region qualified and willing to serve the IBP.
Petitioners also submitted that respondent De Vera lacks the requisite moral aptitude
for the position. According to petitioners, respondent De Vera was previously
sanctioned by the Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC
Justices during the deliberations of the plunder law. They further alleged that
respondent De Vera could have been disbarred in the United States for
misappropriating his client's funds had he not surrendered his California license to
practice law.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
Respondent De Vera argued that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present
controversy contending that the election of the officers of the IBP, including the
determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the organization, is
purely an internal matter governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and exclusively
regulated and administered by the IBP. Respondent also averred that an IBP member is
entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter or transfer his chapter membership
under Section 19, Article II and Section 29-2, Article IV of the IBP By-Laws. He also
stressed that the right to
transfer membership is also recognized in Section 4, 139-A of the Rules of Court
which is exactly the same as the first of the above-quoted provision of the IBP By-
Laws.
On the moral integrity question, respondent De Vera denies that he exhibited
disrespect to the Court or to any of its members during its deliberations on the
constitutionality of the plunder law. As for the administrative complaint filed against
him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in California, which in turn
compelled him to surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it
cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for
the position he is aspiring for.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Court has no jurisdiction over the IBP.
2. Whether or not the respondent is disqualified from being elected Governor in the
IBP.
Held:
1. On the issue of jurisdiction, the Court affirmed its right to hear and decide the
present controversy. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution conferred on the
Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP and implicit in the
constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP, including the
election of its officers. The power of supervision over the IBP has been demonstrated
in the past when it looked into the irregularities which attended the 1989 elections of
the IBP National Officers. The Court likewise amended several provisions of the IBP
By-Laws.
2. The Court upheld respondent De Vera in his contention that a member of the IBP is
entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter membership. Section 19 of the IBP
By-Laws allows a member to change his chapter membership, subject only to the
condition that the transfer must be made not less than three months prior to the election
of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer. In the case at bar,
Page 64 of 66
Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5
respondent De Vera's transfer to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is valid as it was
done more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on February 27, 2003.
The Court also ruled that there is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides
that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. The Court
emphasized that the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness
should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by the
Court or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.
In In Re: Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law
Case Hurled by Atty. Leonard De Vera, Respondent De Vera was found guilty of
indirect contempt of court and was imposed a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand
Pesos for his remarks contained in two newspaper articles published in the Inquirer.
The Court held that the statements were aimed at influencing and threatening the Court
to decide in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law. The ruling cannot serve
as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act for which he was found
guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude. Moral turpitude as "an act
of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes
his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty
or good morals."
On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he
was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered
by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. Bare allegations and
unsubstantiated by evidence are not equivalent to proof.
The Court also ruled that petitioners are not the proper parties to bring the suit under
Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws which provides that only nominees can file a written
protest setting forth the ground therefor. Petitioner Garcia is from Bukidnon IBP
Chapter, while the other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from the Misamis
Oriental IBP and are not qualified to run for IBP governorship of Eastern Mindanao
pursuant to the rotation rule enunciated in Sections 37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. The
Court also held that the instant petition was premature as no nomination of candidates
has been made by the members of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao, and
assuming that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to decline the
nomination.
Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura
In re: Atty. Marcial Edillon
A.C. No. 1928. August 3, 1978
FACTS:
The respondent Martial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the
Philippines. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution recommending to the Court the removal of the name
of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues” to the IBP since the latter’s constitution notwithstanding due notice.
The Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution; he submitted his
comment reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. The core of
the respondent’s arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to
pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial
support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is
being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the provisions of the Court Rule and of
the IBP By- Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. The respondent similarly
questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court
but is rather of an “administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.”
ISSUES
Whether the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Whether the provision of the Court Rule requiring
payment of a membership fee is void. Whether the enforcement of the penalty
provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence
infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the power of SC to strike the
name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is valid.
HELD:
1. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of
Edillon’s constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the
lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
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Consti 1. ARTICLE VIII- Judicial Department Section.1-5

Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in
this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program —
the lawyers. But, assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State. 2. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the
Court, to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) —
from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable
fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they
belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 3.
Whether the practice of law is a property right, the respondent’s right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then
a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. But it must be emphasized that the
practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the
inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public
responsibilities. 4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state
that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and
their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent
judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion.

DECISION

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the
respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is
hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court. Respondent disbarred.

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Article 8 Sec.1-5 Case digests of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura