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Albert G.

Ambagan Jr vs People of the Philippines


GR Nos. 233442-44
November 28, 2018
I. Ticker
Principal by Inducement

II. Doctrine
Article 17. Principals. — The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act.
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it.
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished. (Revised Penal
Code)

A testimony that an accused made a statement which allegedly initiated the


shootout, such testimony not being entirely credible, cannot sustain the
conviction of said accused as principal by inducement.

III. Facts
• Involved: Mayor Ambagan Jr. (accused), Ronnel Bawalan (witness no. 1),
Patam (witness no. 2) Rene Amparo (one A’s men), Rey Santos (victim)
• A was charged and convicted by the Sandiganbayan with 2 counts of
homicide as principal by inducement (enticement). The prosecution
presented statements from 2 persons who was said to be directly present
during the shooting.
• B said that shooting started after he heard the mayor said "GE, IYAN
PALA ANG GUSTO MO, MGA KASAMA BANATAN N YO NA YAN".
• The second witness this when he said that he instead pushed the mayor
out of the road where the shooting incident occurred and that he did not
hear the mayor saying those words which could have provoked and
initiate the shooting of the victims.
• Evidence provides that R has negative paraffin test which would lead to
the fact that it is not the Mayor's men who initiated the shooting but rather
from the deceased RS.
• The Sandiganbayan convicted A of the crime of double homicide petitioner
moved for reconsideration of the aforequoted ruling.
• The Sandiganbayan, however, would deny petitioner's motion through its
assailed October 31, 2012 Resolution. Hence, the instant petition.

IV. Issue
Whether or not A can be held guilty for double homicide principal by
inducement. No.
V. Decision
This Court is not inclined to believe that petitioner indeed made the
declaration that started the fray(fight). The court a quo failed to take note of
substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of star prosecution witnesses.
These contradictions refer not only to minor details but even to the facts of
important aspect of the case, seriously eroding the weight of the evidence of
the prosecution and casting reasonable doubt on the culpability of petitioner.

The court is not bound by the findings of the Sandiganbayan should it


discover that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are marred with
inconsistencies that are neither collateral nor trivial, but are material and
substantial in matters determinative of petitioner's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

In conclusion, the scant evidence for the prosecution serious doubts to the
guilt of petitioner as principal by inducement. It was not convincingly
established, beyond reasonable doubt, that petitioner indeed ordered his men
to open fire at Santos and Domingo Bawalan. The evidence offered against
him in court does not pass the test of moral certainty and is insufficient
to rebut the presumption of innocence that petitioner is entitled to under
the Bill of Rights. And where there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
an accused, he must be acquitted even though his innocence may be
questioned, for it is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability,
even though strong, that the fact is more likely to be true than the
contrary.

VI. Ratio
when two or more persons are involved in killing another, it is necessary to
determine the participation of each. If they are all principals, all of them may
be principals by direct participation (par. 1); or one may be a principal
by induction (par. 2); and the other a principal by direct participation;
or one may be a principal by direct participation and the other a principal by
indispensable cooperation.

In order that a person may be convicted of a crime by inducement it is


necessary that:   

1. The inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the


commission of the crime; and 
2. Such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the
crime. 

There is a principal by induction or by inducement only if it is shown that the


crime was committed by another who was induced. 
One who only orders or induces another to commit a crime is not a principal
by direct participation, because he does not personally execute the act
constituting the crime. It is the one personally committing the crime in
obedience to that order or because of the inducement, who is the principal by
direct participation.

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