G.R. No.
L-24693             July 31, 1967 motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO
CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-
appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court
in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of
Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower court held that
it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void."
For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment must be
reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an
attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on
July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a
certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the
second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila
who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power
and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the
necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock
corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest
of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels,
characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national
and city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving
livelihood to not less than 2,500 person and representing an
investment of more than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that
on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-
Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the
City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth
in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would
regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of
Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section
1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose
P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for
second class motels; that the provision in the same section which
would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from
entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or
other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the
prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his
presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the
date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the
length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with
the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data
furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport
number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such
form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence
of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with
such registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also
being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels
and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City
Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is
unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for
being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague,
indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the
right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section
2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and
requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class
and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being
arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to
the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a
dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance
prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in
such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless
accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for
the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such
establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice
every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of
certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character;
and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the
challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the
automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect
causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments,
there is once again a transgression of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a
final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and
unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from
enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the
personal circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the
fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel
business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance
but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional
grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of
action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation,
to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper
exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers not
before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to
privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination, with the assertion
that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to
law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of
the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted
a stipulation of facts dated September 28, 1964, which reads:
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the City of Manila,
while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and general manager of
Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of
Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City
Mayor and chief executive of the City of Manila charged with the
general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and
to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement
of such ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of
operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963,
by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila,
in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending
sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the
ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new
sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent
Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated
February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio
Astorga was submitted with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance
4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto as
Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the
P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the due process
(including herein petitioners) operating in the City of clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the
Manila.1äwphï1.ñët due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular
manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to
safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965,
resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of
wherein stress was laid on the presumption of the validity of the
substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow
challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity to
the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as
the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S.
the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a
powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs." 5 It would
memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced
be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very
by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on
purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be
February 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating
deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals,
in detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations of what they
public safety and the general welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is
considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a
"that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and
prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.7
unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction
issued.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely
enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the
explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex
petitioners association, and referring to the alleged constitutional
to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of
questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The only
prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to
remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with
the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for
the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to
clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal
submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then
haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance
that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision
then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and
passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the
guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and
challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper
guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby
the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of
open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other
Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the
amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that
challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be
characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the
increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage
preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal"
"to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this
and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government."
appeal.
It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from
sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent eloquently for it.
regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to
have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the
condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be
seal of its approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a
allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted
pimp or procurer as a vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and regulating
standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and
the maintenance or operation of public dance halls;9 prohibiting
substantive aspects.
gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte;12 prohibiting playing of
panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of the operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any person from
any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place
challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by where opium is smoked or otherwise used,15 all of which are intended
Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The to protect public morals.
action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set
aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local,
the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and
primarily rest the exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too
circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The
often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given
health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the
notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people
people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection
x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when
and other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of
there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the
such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of
guise of police regulation.2
any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police
power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other
validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The
principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which
of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the
the objection is raised to the question of due process. 16 There is no
American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and
controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a
succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned
standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that
deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be
are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of
valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff
as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged
of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition
ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the
the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates
of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation
of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness
being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on
avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to
the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result
must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action
marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as
freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of
fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the
act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from
considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal
and political thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," 19 decisions
based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society." 20 Questions of due process are
not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or
phrases.21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance
enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers
an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise
of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable
and what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern is
inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public
morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment
of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in the
records, and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to
attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an
alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend
any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment
of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such
features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of
the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged
vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees
provided for by the challenged ordinance for hotels and motels, 150%
for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels being
required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500
yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that
municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for
regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or
restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue
purposes only.22 As was explained more in detail in the above Cu
Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also
incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be
implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of
the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider
discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from
applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must
not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability
of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise
engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important
factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee.
Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue
have frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for the sale of
liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared
unreasonable.23
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court
affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme
Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police power.
Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad
taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities
and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of
subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public
purposes, just and uniform.25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed
by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it has been
explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to municipal
corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of the
operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police
power measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly
close with this pertinent citation from another decision of significance:
"It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of
the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful occupation and means
of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. But
it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage
meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain
conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some
individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business
or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of
the police power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue
occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by
the exercise of the police power embark in these occupations subject
to the disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that
power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the
challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging
house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases
full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again,
such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the
command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the
explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or
oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the
undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative
attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that
every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as
pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One
thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is
plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not
license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by
law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace
and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly
as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right
of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by
general law for the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may
be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order
and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power."28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare,
then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in
order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in
order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state
x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that
there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace
and order and happiness for all.29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation
because of undue deprivation of freedom to contract, People v.
Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy
of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations
affected with public interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that
if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the
standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous
and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights
of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is
wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due
process ground by invoking the principles of vagueness or uncertainty.
It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems to be
the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too
detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners,
however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name,
relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite
and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the
companion or companions referred to are those arriving with the
customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With
him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join
him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the
maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the
discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso which from their
standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of
payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's
or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations
suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness
or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v.
General Construction Co.33 to Adderley v. Florida,34 the principle has
been consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such
a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an
act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the situation before us?
A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to
all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they
omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing
laws as saying what they obviously mean."35

That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due
allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor and
determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged
ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for
constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly
adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.

Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the

injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.