N
Narrative
Michelle Scalise Sugiyama
University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, USA
Synonyms
Fiction; Storytelling
Definition
Representational format used to organize, store,
and retrieve episodic information.
Introduction
Narrative is a representational format used to
organize, store, and retrieve episodic information.
As such, it is distinct from associated phenomena
such as storytelling and fiction. Narrative includes
any representation of a series of interrelated
events, such as episodic memories, dreams, fanta-
sies, plans, gossip and, of course, stories. The
function of narrative can be inferred from its
structural components, upon which there is wide-
spread cross-disciplinary consensus: Cognitive
psychologists and literary scholars alike agree
that narrative requires a protagonist, setting, caus-
ally and temporally linked actions and events, and
conflict and resolution. Collectively, these
# Springer International Publishing AG 2016
T.K. Shackelford, V.A. Weekes-Shackelford (eds.), Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_3316-1
components illuminate the type of information
that narrative organizes and stores.
Narrative Structure and Function
Arguably, the most essential component of narra-
tive is causally and temporally linked actions and
events (Scalise Sugiyama 2005). In a narrative,
something happens: An event occurs or an action
is performed that precipitates a subsequent series
of events. Events are changes in the state of affairs
(Rumelhart 1975) and can be external (e.g.,
changes in the physical environment) or internal
(e.g., changes in mental state; Mandler and John-
son 1977). Actions are events caused by sentient
beings (e.g., a boy throwing a ball at a window,
causing it to shatter), as opposed to those caused
by physical forces (e.g., an earthquake shaking a
window, causing it to shatter). Because actions are
behavior, and behavior is caused by mental states,
narratives that involve sentient beings typically
feature internal as well as external events.
Significantly, virtually all narratives involve
sentient beings, or characters (Scalise Sugiyama
2005). Characters, in turn, are agents – entities
capable of having goals and capable of acting on
those goals. Thus, narrative represents goal-
directed action: events that agents cause to happen
and agents’ reactions to things that happen.
Although dreams and memories may appear to
lack this focus on agency, the individual
experiencing the dream or memory is always an
2 Narrative
implied agent, because dreams are actual or imag-
inary events experienced or observed by ego, and
memories are recollections of actual events expe-
rienced or observed by ego. Overwhelmingly, the
agents that populate narrative tend to be human.
Although animal characters are common in myth,
folklore, and cartoons, they are almost always
anthropomorphized: They may retain or be
constrained by some of their nonhuman attributes,
but they are endowed with a human psyche and
human traits (e.g., bipedal locomotion, opposable
thumbs, speech) that enable them to manipulate
and interact with the environment in a decidedly
human manner. Bugs Bunny is a case in point:
Although he retains his classification as “prey
animal,” he reasons, talks, walks, and manipulates
objects as humans do. In myth, characters often
take the form of inanimate entities and
phenomena – e.g., celestial bodies, weather, topo-
graphical features – but like animal characters,
they exhibit human intentionality and behavior.
In sum, narrative exhibits a pronounced bias
toward human-centered action. Even Kafka’s
“Metamorphosis,” in which Gregor Samsa has
lost most of his human attributes, is about a
human being with a cockroach body, not a cock-
roach with a human mind.
Because happenings play out in a physical
universe, another key component of narrative
structure is setting or the set of environmental
conditions under which actions and events tran-
spire (Scalise Sugiyama 2005). These conditions
include topography and climate, physical laws
and natural phenomena, and objects and their
locations relative to one another. Because the
human physical environment typically includes
people, setting also has a social dimension,
which includes such human-generated phenom-
ena as laws, ideology, religious beliefs, norms,
and manners. As in real life, the physical and
social conditions that obtain in a given narrative
world constrain the kinds of events and actions
that can occur.
The last critical component of narrative is con-
flict and resolution, which arise from obstacles to
goal-directed action (Scalise Sugiyama 2005). An
obstacle is a problem that must be solved in order
for a goal to be achieved. For example, Cinderella
is initially prevented from attending the ball by
her lack of proper attire and transportation. In
order to attain her goal, she must solve these
problems. Resolution represents the outcome of
conflict: It tells us whether or not the solution
deployed by the protagonist solved the problem
and whether or not the protagonist attained
his/her goal.
In short, narrative is organized around the
actions taken by a focal agent in pursuit of a
specific goal, problems encountered in the pursuit
of that goal (including the opposing goals of other
agents), and solutions deployed to solve those
problems. Experimental evidence supports the
claim that narrative is organized around goals,
complications, solutions, and outcomes. Studies
have found poor recall for passages containing
actions without complications or complications
without resolution (Mandler and Johnson 1977).
For example, Owens et al. (1979) found that
knowledge of a character’s motives improves
recall of story actions and events. These findings
suggest that events and actions are input into and
retrieved from memory according to the goals
they advance or impede.
When the components of narrative are com-
bined, we end up with a representation of human
goal-directed behavior and the set of conditions
(including constraints and obstacles) under which
it unfolds (Scalise Sugiyama 2005). The basic
structure of narrative, then, is SETTING +
AGENT + GOAL + ACTION + OBSTACLE +
SOLUTION + OUTCOME. Humans appear to
make sense of narrative by ascertaining the goals
of the characters and using them as a schema for
interpreting and organizing the characters’ actions
and feelings. This strategy mirrors the structure of
the agency system, which uses intentional
schemas (inference systems activated under spe-
cific conditions) to interpret and predict the
behavior of agents in terms of goals (Csibra
et al. 2003). By the end of the first year of life,
infants evince use of an intentional schema com-
prising three representational elements: the
agent’s action, the goal state implied by the action,
and the constraints of reality on possible actions
(Csibra et al. 2003, p. 128). Experiments show
that infants are also capable of discerning
Narrative
contingent action or the modification of behavior
in response to events or the actions of others. For
example, infants look longer when an animated
box continues to use a detour after an obstacle has
been removed from its path (Csibra 2008). This
suggests that infants expect agents to adjust their
behavior in response to a change in conditions
relevant to the goal-state (in this case, removal
of the obstacle).
The representational elements of the agency
system map neatly onto the components of narra-
tive structure: “agent’s action” maps onto AGENT
and ACTION, “goal state implied by the action”
maps onto GOAL, “the constraints of reality on
possible actions” maps onto OBSTACLE and SET-
TING, and SOLUTION maps onto contingency.
Narrative structure thus appears to emerge from
cognitive mechanisms dedicated to tracking the
goal-directed actions of agents in the world. Spe-
cifically, narrative appears to be a representational
format that guides input and organization of knowl-
edge about problems encountered – or that might
be encountered – as agents pursue their respective
goals. The AGENT component specifies the person
or type of person (e.g., male/female, child/adult,
married/single) who encountered the problem in
question, the GOAL component specifies the
objective and motive of the agent, and the
ACTION component specifies the measures taken
by the agent to achieve this objective. The SET-
TING component stores information about features
of the local environment relevant to the agents’
goals and is closely related to the remaining com-
ponents: OBSTACLE specifies the nature of the
environmental constraint(s) that impeded attain-
ment of the agent’s goal, SOLUTION specifies
local strategies for surmounting the obstacle, and
OUTCOME stores information about the effective-
ness of solutions. In short, narrative structure
“mimics the format in which experienced events
are mentally represented and stored in memory”
(Tooby and Cosmides 2001, p. 24). Indeed, the
agency system and narrative structure may effec-
tively be the same thing: Each is dedicated to
representing contingent relationships between sets
of goal-directed actions. What we experience as
“narrative” may simply be outputs of the agency
system that rise to the level of consciousness.
3
Narrative, Storytelling, and Fiction as
Discrete Phenomena
As a format for organizing and storing episodic
information, narrative is distinct from associated
phenomena such as storytelling and fiction. The
ability to represent goal-directed action is not
unique to humans: We may assume that all ani-
mals capable of agency are equipped with agency-
detection systems (Barrett 2005). However, one
thing that distinguishes humans from other ani-
mals in this regard is the ability to access other
people’s narrative representations. Once language
evolved, humans were able to share the narratives
in their heads with conspecifics, and storytelling
was born (Scalise Sugiyama 2005, 2011). This is a
key point: Storytelling is interactive, narrative is
not. Although all stories are built on a narrative
framework, not all narrative is storytelling: Many
memories, dreams, and fantasies never leave the
confines of the mind. Thus, in contrast to narra-
tive, storytelling is a behavior, a by-product of
adaptations for (among other things) agency-
detection, communication, cooperation, and the-
ory of mind.
The fact that storytelling is a human universal
(Scalise Sugiyama 2005) begs the question: What
is gained by engaging in this activity? The answer
lies in the function of episodic memory, the
human memory system dedicated to storing per-
sonal experience. This system is hypothesized to
provide the raw material for generating plans. As
Schank explains, “Figuring out how to behave in a
new situation is most certainly helped by being
reminded of an old situation that is like the new
situation. The old situation then becomes a guide
to follow or even a guide to what not to do” (1990,
p. 24). It has long been noted that experience is
retrieved from memory as stories (Schank 1990).
Moreover, the structural parallels between mem-
ories and plans are striking. Both consist of
agents, setting, and actions: A memory is a series
of causally and temporally related actions that
occurred in the past, and a plan is a series of
causally and temporally related actions that can
be taken to bring about a desired goal-state in the
future. The content of plans is thus believed to
derive in large part from our memories of past
4 Narrative
events: To make a plan, the mind consults past
experience, gathers details relevant to the target
goal, and assembles them into a series of actions
tailored to attaining that goal (Schacter
et al. 2007). This hypothesis is supported by neu-
roimaging data showing that the same brain
regions are activated by the tasks of remembering
the past and imagining the future, and by clinical
research showing that memory impairment com-
promises patients’ ability to imagine future sce-
narios (Schacter et al. 2007). It follows that, if
plans are built out of personal experience, then
the greater and more varied one’s experience, the
greater the variety of plans one can generate
(Scalise Sugiyama 2011). The benefit of storytell-
ing, then, is that it enables individuals to expand
their episodic memory by acquiring experience
vicariously: When we engage in story worlds,
we observe the experiences of other agents and,
in so doing, make them our own (Scalise
Sugiyama 2011). As virtual experience, storytell-
ing may also increase the audience’s sample size
of actions and consequences, which may provide
emotional and frequency inputs useful for the
calibration of relevant decision-making mecha-
nisms (Tooby and Cosmides 2001; Bechara and
Damasio 2005).
Because storytelling involves information
donation, it can be characterized as a form of
cooperation. The benefit of storytelling for the
audience is straightforward: Like all forms of
teaching, it greatly reduces the costs of knowledge
acquisition. Learning through direct experience is
expensive: An individual must spend consider-
able time and energy seeking out experiences
that will provide the needed information, and fur-
ther time and energy on the experience itself.
Moreover, trial-and-error learning can be danger-
ous: She who learns from others that moose are
dangerous during the rut has a better chance of
surviving than she who learns this from personal
experience. Social learning is also more predict-
able: An individual who relies on trial-and-error
learning might not encounter the requisite learn-
ing experience by the time it is needed or when
free from a more urgent task. Thus, like other
forms of social learning, storytelling reduces risk
and frees up time and energy that can then be
invested in other important activities. It also expo-
nentially increases the amount of knowledge that
can be acquired in a lifetime: Through storytell-
ing, humans can tap the knowledge of all the
individuals in their social network, as well as
past generations. Finally, by preventing knowl-
edge from being lost when a person dies, the
transmission of stories across generations enables
human societies to accumulate and maintain large
stores of information (Scalise Sugiyama 2011).
The benefits that accrue to the storyteller can be
understood in terms of kin selection and social
exchange. Telling stories to close kin may
increase their chances of surviving and/or
reproducing, thereby helping copies of the story-
teller’s own genes. Sharing stories with nonkin
may motivate reciprocal behavior toward the sto-
ryteller, in the form of information or other valu-
able resources (Cosmides and Tooby 2005).
Storytelling can also be characterized as a form
of manipulation – specifically, as the strategic
deployment of episodic representations to influ-
ence the beliefs and behavior of others (Scalise
Sugiyama 1996). One drawback of being a highly
social species is the ample opportunity group liv-
ing provides for individual interests to come into
conflict. Thus, there are times when a person can
benefit from persuading others to modify their
goals and behavior in ways that serve his/her
interests. Stories are a highly effective means of
disseminating information strategically, because
both the timing and the content of the story can
be tailored to the task at hand (Scalise Sugiyama
1996). For example, storytelling can be used to
reinforce social norms by illustrating the rewards
of compliance and the costs of deviance. The
trickster genre is a case in point: Across forager
societies, these stories are used to model antisocial
behavior and the negative consequences of engag-
ing in it. With its implicit message that what
befalls the trickster will befall other rule-breakers,
this tactic provides a nonconfrontational means of
chastising and threatening transgressors (Scalise
Sugiyama 2011). Stories can also be used in con-
junction with precautions, as seen in the use of
monster stories by foragers to compel obedience
from children (Scalise Sugiyama 2011). Infor-
mants report that they use these stories to
Narrative
discourage children from wandering off, crying at
night, and depleting food stores. The monsters in
these stories specifically target refractory chil-
dren, and their predations are described in grue-
some detail, which may serve to intensify the
attentional salience and emotional valence of the
precaution.
On this view, gossip is a subset of storytelling.
As a means of exchanging social information and
managing reputation (Dunbar 1996), gossip
involves both cooperation and manipulation. And,
like memories and plans, gossip consists largely of
representations of goal-directed action – in this
case, who did (or said) what to whom and to what
effect. What distinguishes gossip from other types
of storytelling is its focus on local social informa-
tion: Gossip involves the exchange of narratives
that reference agents, happenings, and entities in
the participants’ local environment. These repre-
sentations are used strategically to provide alliance
partners with beneficial information and to shape
the beliefs and behavior of the gossip’s social net-
work in ways that serve his/her interests (Dunbar
1996; Scalise Sugiyama 1996).
Because narrative representations can be
nonveridical, the terms narrative and story are
often used interchangeably with fiction. This has
led to confusing claims that literature is an adap-
tation. The term fiction refers to nonveridical rep-
resentations intended to be understood as such
and thus includes painting, sculpture, pantomime,
and fantasies (Tooby and Cosmides 2001).
Clearly, then, not all instances of fiction are
instances of narrative or storytelling. Nor are all
stories fictions. Fiction is a by-product of our
evolved capacity to reason counterfactually – to
think about things that aren’t present, haven’t
happened, or don’t exist. Counterfactual reason-
ing, in turn, is the bedrock of improvisational
intelligence (the ability to invent solutions to
problems), which was critical to our species’ col-
onization of the foraging niche (Tooby and
DeVore 1987; Cosmides and Tooby 2000). As
with other key human traits (e.g., bipedal locomo-
tion, language), the importance of this faculty is
indicated by its ontogenetic precociousness: The
ability to understand pretense emerges by
15 months, and the ability to participate in pretend
5
scenarios emerges between 18–24 months (Onishi
et al. 2007). The agency-detection system begins
developing even earlier, possibly by the sixth
month of life (Csibra 2008).
Conclusion
Narrative, fiction, and storytelling are manifesta-
tions of the highly developed ability in humans to
acquire, generate, exchange, and apply information
(Tooby and DeVore 1987). The foraging niche is
characterized by the use of complex techniques to
extract nutrient-dense resources (Kaplan
et al. 2007). Use of these techniques is supported
by a wide range of knowledge and skill sets, which
are impossible to acquire through trial-and-error
learning alone (Boyd et al. 2011). Thus, occupation
of the foraging niche is highly dependent on infor-
mation exchange. Narrative is a format for
representing actual episodic information that, in
conjunction with the capacity for counterfactual
reasoning, enables humans to generate hypothetical
(i.e., fictional) episodic information. Combined,
these two faculties enable the representation of
possible chains of goal-directed actions. Like emer-
gency drills, fictional narratives are simulations that
enable humans to rehearse possible problems and
test possible solutions. Language enables humans
to exchange veridical and nonveridical narrative
representations – to “recreate situations for others
and to convey to them what has been found to be of
interest and of value” (Biesele 1993,
p. 42) – exponentially increasing the ability to man-
age risk. Like slings, nets, and baskets, the genera-
tion and exchange of stories has “made possible the
‘carrying’ and thus the sharing of adaptively signif-
icant information” (Biesele 1993, pp. 42–43),
which in turn has greatly facilitated occupation of
the knowledge-intensive human ecological niche.
Cross-References
▶ Agency System
▶ Counterfactual Reasoning
▶ Cultural Transmission
▶ Episodic Memory
6 Narrative
▶ Foraging Niche
▶ Gossip
▶ Improvisational Intelligence
▶ Mental Time Travel
▶ Pretense
▶ Social Learning
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