Running Head: THE PARADOX OF ELECTORAL ECONOMICS.

The paradox of electoral economics.

Name.

Institution.

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Africa fell into political instability in later decades of the 20th century. Robert H. Bates

considers state collapse as “state implosion" in which a country turns itself "into an instrument of

predation". Electoral systems fail to balance proportionality with direct transparency. Economic

methods for maximizing proportional representation can be used to formulate an alternative to

traditional types. Coercion is privately supported in stateless societies, aggression employed to

engage in predation, and to protect against it. Violence leads to pure redistribution; being

harmful, this contributes most often to a loss of social welfare (Bates, R. H., & Block, S. 2018).

Violence can also be socially beneficial; it can be used to protect property rights, thus creating

opportunities for constructive action. To explore how force can be a source of welfare, the

authors are developing a model of a stateless society in which the rights of people to the result of

their labor protected if they possess coercive capacities. The outstanding balance predicts

significant turnout under appropriate circumstances, and higher participation for the distinct

underdog helps counter the presumed leader's anticipated advantage.

The turnout theory works well, based on instrumentally inspired actors. Change of the

government, the end of decades of autocratic rule, and the advent of autonomous courts are

among the main changes brought on by those reforms. Bates came up with the state theory which

characterizes Africa's instability as a way of systemic and forces which limit private and public

agent choice. The paradox here is that violence is necessary in the political order. The use of

legal law is also seen as a Westphalian state prerogative. Africa is moving in; private people and

lobbyists are using excessive force to regulate income generating means (Diaz-Cayeros, A.

2016).

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Bates points out that is anyone would like to make instability in Africa, must be brought into

the picture. The author interprets the African politics as a game. There are three groups–the

kings, the managers, and private people vying for resources and development as they engage

over time. There are two preferences: exploitation/predation and wealth creation found in the

book. Equilibrium achieves reasonable decisions taken by people that through a political order,

they will form a state. Through escaping into a world where life is all too easy, Bates makes

quick work of these problems. Through focusing on preference, the book departs on theoretical

and empirical grounds from current theories of State failure in Africa.

His book, State Failure in Late Century Africa, departs from a contemporary treatment and

studies on his subject. Bates concerns are more of economically based, instead of probing

rebelled motives or nature of the organizations involved. He examines why the Government

impoverish its citizens, why they would over extract wealth from them as well as alter

distribution of income from citizens making the economy political unsustainable. By examining

this, Bates explores various ways in which incumbent regimes are prepared in the economic

forces. This study focuses on the paradox involved in this economic forces and offer new

perspectives in democratization.

When Things Fell Apart works under the' failure' model, which means work is based

exclusively on negative results as it describes African politics. Bates criticizes cross-border and

cross-continental state growth research because Africa presents almost unprecedented cases of

political instability and chaos. Africa provides a specific model of state collapse, and social

instability is a practical problem that can be addressed without transnational analyzes shedding

light on the creation of states in the world over time (Bates, R. H., & Block, S. 2018).
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Analysis of sub-national tensions by Bates is rather interesting as he shows how African foster

opportunistic actions through a negative agitation on certain issues. Nevertheless, in its

understanding, the book does not offer a solution for disorder or describe situations of a

democratic order in a hegemony. To be logically and empirically established as a' failure,' a state

must first have existed at full capacity. The idea is that if the country provides a positive impact

in Africa, analysis of 'things falling apart' will include certain other things built simultaneously.

For example, a study of the State's historical development in Africa may have validated Bates '

thesis. Examining does not form any part of a colonial system that must be reinvented in form off

a public debate.

The book When Things Fell Apart, provides an interesting platform for readers who much

involve themselves in politics. . It offers a comprehensive study of an international weak state

and how this countries have the capacity to exploit internationally. In stressing judgment as well

as concluding to the right decisions, Bates neglects the weakness or relative strength of these

specialists involved in aggression' of the diplomatic relations of rulers of vulnerable states and

the results of diplomatic negotiation (Bates, R. H., & Block, S. 2018).

The debate can be limited to various reasons as to why the African Governments could be most

cynical about systematically discriminating against rural producers in this undoubtedly unwanted

manner. Assuming that groups are actively trying to maximize their material short-term gains, it

quickly follows that this' exploitation' of agriculture must be because African governments

control their people. These exploitative policies serve short-term material interests. He applies a

third to these two fundamental determinants of the governance process, but evidently without

understanding the tension it produces.

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New discoveries and foreign direct investments trigger further in a fast growing economy.

Bates suggest that caution should be warranted since exploration of natural resources faces

obstacles. Higher levels of personalized wealth lead to more authoritarian rulers and regime.

More natural resources increases chances of government corruption cases, whereas more

personalized natural wealth for example petroleum incomes, led to rivals within each other.

Conflicts arise from regions dominated from marginalized groups based on ethnic or wealth. The

government has no possession of a monopoly of violence while citizens possess arms which they

should revolt.

He also' assumes purposeful conduct through a political action involved, and that the

achievement is a social objectives is among the key goals of governments'. However, it is paired

with similarly blunt claims that those in narrow-mindedness drives the ruling coalition.

Moreover, the application lies in its strong understanding in any theoretically feasible strategy

has a non-hypothetical possibility of occurrence until some politically viable alliance has gained

support. Although this represents a triumph over purely economistic methods, there is no

improvement in political discussions that are said to have an essential starting point. Bates '

unwillingness, despite his expectations, to deal sensibly with the topic of complexity is clearly

reflected in the description of Africa's history.

The foreign market is viewed as a given, the vagaries of which need to be investigated

objectively until the Government came up with an Agricultural policy. An incredibly paradox of

this is Africans are denounced for false believing that peasants should bear burdens placed by

modernized programs. Despite the fact that some prices have gone down, farmers would now get

less income than they had more than four years ago.
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This' coincidence' definitely merits some reflection and analysis when it comes to the risks

faced by fragile economies that rapidly integrate. Bates distinguishes what he has contributed

with that of a political economists group. The transition are primarily dictated by foreign

political and economic powers in third world countries. The unique forms these powers impact

them are profoundly affected by African states. Scientists should pay close of local public and

private actors to make free choices and give higher weight to choices that shape the effect of

external conditions on local societies ' structures. This assertion does not seem objectionable as it

stands. Still, Bates uses to exclude external dimensions, though these internal powers can be

evaluated and be fully understood independently.

Africa’s internal coalitions cannot be evaluated without taking into considerations positions of

foreign investors. The external forces are significant and their effects increases when the

economy become dependent on survival credit from foreign countries. If they are eft out, a

resulting image that would make policy decisions a mistake. Removing any likelihood of

political pressures could result to a reasonable market force that could attract other investors.

Bates argues that some small government shortened the time horizons of politicians and

lessened incentives to act good for the public. Stealing from the public to earn survival of power

for their own destabilizes the economy as well as the entire politics. The different ethnic groups

start to fight for scarce resources with various rebellious groups that emerged in the countryside.

Bates suggests that the democratization wave is unlikely to promote political stability since

incumbents react to new threats by holding their power with more violence and corruption.

Once the policies have become beneficial, societies regulate easily as they involve themselves

in a nationally and systematic deviation from all international markets. If the big players in the
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market control the prices for their own purpose, external forces certainly pose significant,

systemic impacts on the politics and policies of Africa. Indeed, those' internal' factors outlined by

Bates will usually prove substantial, but their effect will be inextricably interwoven with these

other factors in every case.

Political -economic formation suffered two sharp shocks, namely the economic recession

resulted from oil crisis, and external pressure to democratize the geo-political realignments after

the end of war. The overall size of revenues of the authoritarians’ rulers was eroded, leading to a

financial crisis of the state, with the result that public employees began to pay themselves,

through corruption or pillage. The return to multiparty politics resulted to popular protests and

pressure by creditors who presented a considerable increase in political risk for those in power.

It resulted to an increase temptation for those in power to engage in corruption cases as well as

having the feeling that being bigger than others. The reason behind this is because the economies

of Africa are, more than others, based on the production of precious commodities which lend

themselves more easily to private capture than other forms of public revenue. When states began

to fail, local conflicts acquired a national significance, causing a rapid spread of insecurity at the

local level. This resulted to a marginalized economy where one group did not wnt to associate

with another.

African societies ' most significant challenge is to establish stable political coalitions capable of

establishing and maintaining policies which represent general interests in a complex, aggressive,

and unpredictable foreign environment. One of the biggest weakness of Bates approach to

economics, is that it obscures a central problem, since it isolates influences from external factors.

In ethical neoclassical form, the world serves the national and individual interests in equal
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measure. Bates argued that productivity and social benefit that farmers should receive less since

other groups used power to serve their own interest.

Bates states that farmers ' political influence is usually significantly seen when farmers who can

have political attention since they have some economic power deserve to rule. Nevertheless, he

recognizes affluent farmers are members of the anti-peasant or anti-agricultural coalition. They

may also be the most potent spokespersons in defense of legitimate agricultural interests, in other

situations. The suggestion that' farmers' have a shared general interest not discussed in view of

its fundamental importance to the claim. (Antweiler, W. 2019).

This denies how international prices are used in exclusion of the study of domestic political

coalitions from the international dimension. As a source of investment surplus, Bates highlights

well all virtues of revenue obtained from minerals and indicates that this will relieve the burden

on agriculture. He uses the previous debate on how rent could be obtained from mining. He

considers political alliance issues that could be a scissor crisis occurring in the mining industry.

He never explains the surplus production from the mining sector could be beneficial to residents.

He assumes tradeoffs which he argues they arise when the surplus is intended for a specific

purpose.

Bates applies the game theory approach to provide a survey of current approaches. However,

the issue with the model of modeling disorder is to simplify reality but what remains in existence

is in a stereotype condition that confuses the ordinary state behavior compared to the entire

world. Given the weakness, the Bates uses qualitative policy research in Africa. This helps the

reader have a notion of African exceptionalism and should not be used to reinforce it. Qualitative
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analysis is needed as an essential tool for research to create useful models for political analysis

(Diaz-Cayeros, A. 2016).
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References

Antweiler, W. (2019). Electoral economics: Maximizing local representation under

proportionality. Economics Letters, 182, 109-113.

Bates, R. H., & Block, S. (2018). Political institutions and economic growth in Africa’s

‘Renaissance’. Oxford Economic Papers, 70(2), 327-352.

Diaz-Cayeros, A. (2016). The political logic of poverty relief: Electoral strategies and social

policy in Mexico. Cambridge University Press.