People vs. Lizada (G.R. Nos.

143468-71, January 24, 2003, 396 SCRA 62)

FACTS:

The petitioner willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force,

violence and intimidation attempted to force himself on Analia Orillosa, his
stepdaughter, by embracing, kissing, and touching her private parts. He then
proceeded to remove her skirt and panty and placed himself on top of her and tried
to insert his penis into her vagina. This allegation was repeated four times in
multiple occasions. However, medical examination revealed that Analia’s hymen
was intact, and the other parts of her vagina was not injured due to an insertion of
average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection. The testimony of Rossel,
also proved that no insertion of penis happened because the petitioner stopped after
he saw her. Hence, petitioner was charged for four counts of qualified rape. RTC
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged against him and
sentenced to Death Penalty for each and every case as provided for in the seventh
paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner
averred in his brief that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and that the testimony of Rossel was not taken into consideration in the
decision. He thereby contends that his violation is of acts of lasciviousness and not
of attempted rape.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the accused is guilty of acts of lasciviousness and not of

attempted rape.

HELD:

No, the accused is guilty of attempted rape and not of acts of lasciviousness.
As stated in art. 6 of the RPC There is an attempt when the offender commences
the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance. It is established in the law that the
essential elements of an attempted felony are 1.) The offender commences the
commission of the felony directly by overt acts; 2) He does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony; 3) The offenders act be not stopped
by his own spontaneous desistance; 4) The non-performance of all acts of
execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance. In
this case, the accused can be convicted of attempted rape. He commenced the
commission of rape by removing his clothes, undressing and kissing his victim and
lying on top of her. However, he failed to perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own
spontaneous desistance, which is by the timely arrival of the victim’s
brother. Thus, his penis merely touched Analia’s private organ. Accordingly, as the
crime committed by the appellant is attempted rape, the penalty to be imposed on
him should be an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum.

Manzanaris vs. People (G.R. No. L-64750, January 30, 1984, 127 SCRA 201)

FACTS:

Atty. Selso Manzanaris, petitioner, is the Clerk of Court of the First Instance
Court of Basilan since 1963 and the custodian of all the records of the said court. A
criminal case against Geronimo Borja for malversation of funds in a property with
Title No. 877 that was used as a property bond was filed in the said court. When
Manzanaris discovered through his subordinate that the original title for the said
property was not existing in the Register of Deeds, he ordered his subordinate to
deliver the owner’s copy to Borja for the administrative restitution without court
order. Borja signed a receipt saying "Received from the Clerk of Court Selso M.
Manzanaris OCT No. 877 to be reconstituted in the Register of Deeds… After
reconstitution to be returned to the court”. Trinidad Borja (wife) was able to
reconstitute the Original Certificate of Title No. 877 in November 1974 but the
Certificate was not turned over to the court. On June 11, 1975, the building of the
CFI of Balisan was burned along with all the records and documents of the court.
In 1981, Atty. Filoteo Jo, filed a motion with the court to borrow the Certificate
Title No. 877 which was denied because this was among those burned in the fire
based on the certification submitted by Manzanaris. Atty. Jo, later informed
Manzanaris that the said title was in the possession of Trinidad Borja, who
successfully reconstitute the same. Manzanaris remembered that the title was
delivered to Geronimo Borja for reconstitution and repeatedly asked Trinidad
Borja to return the reconstituted title to the court. The latter, however, can longer
find it in the files of her deceased mother, who is the registered owner. Petitioner
admitted having removed Title No. 877 from the custody of the court and having
delivered the same to Geronimo Borja for the its administrative reconstitution after
he had found out that the original of said title in the Office of the Register of Deeds
was missing. In his defense he insisted that delivering the said title to Borja lawful
and in the best interest of the State, since the unreconstituted certificate of title,
given as property bond of the accused Borja, was absolutely inefficacious for such
purpose.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner committed infidelity in custody of documents.

HELD:

No, it is held in the Supreme Court that to warrant guilt of the crime of
infidelity in the custody of documents, the act of removal should be coupled with
criminal intent or illicit purpose. This calls to mind the maxim “Actus non facit
reum, nisi means sit rea” which means that a crime is not committed if the mind of
the person performing the act complained is innocent. To constitute a crime, the act
should be accompanied by a criminal intent. As a general rule, if the accused is
proved to have committed the criminal act charged, it will be presumed that it was
done with criminal intent, but in this case, the act committed is not criminal. Thus,
petitioner is acquitted of the crime charged.

Relucio vs. Civil Service Commission

(G.R. No. 147182, November 21, 2002, 392 SCRA 435)

FACTS:

Petitioner, Evelyn M. Relucio is a Community Affairs Officer IV of Iligan

City. She claimed that her father, the late Alberto Mansueto, Jr., was a World War
II veteran who served with the rank of Sergeant. During the lifetime of Alberto
Mansueto, Jr., he, and after his demise, his wife, Elena Crespo-Mansueto, tried to
seek official confirmation of his military service with the Philippine Veterans
Board (now Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, PVAO).  Unfortunately, the
Mansuetos failed to obtain said confirmation and recognition of Alberto Mansueto,
Jr.s, military services. Meanwhile, on April 3, 1982, Executive Order No. 790 was
issued granting and extending the veteran preference rating in civil service
examination to any one child of a veteran. Thus, petitioner filed a petition to avail
of said preference rating in civil service examination. Aware that the military
service of her father was not yet officially recognized by the PVAO, she presented
the affidavits in support of her application. Acting on petitioner’s application, the
PVAO issued Master List No. 274, stating that Alberto Mansueto, Jr., was a World
War II Veteran with the rank of private. Based on said Master List and
Certification, the CSC granted her the benefit of 10% additional veterans
preference rating and a Career Service Professional Eligibility. After some time,
CDC made verifications regarding truthfulness of claims of being children of
veterans, CSC found that petitioner was misrepresentation and filed charges
against petitioner for dishonesty and falsification of official documents. In her
answer to the Formal Charge, petitioner claimed good faith and admitted that her
father, before his demise was unable to complete all the papers and documentation
in support of his claim that he was a World War II veteran. CSC found her guilty
and she appealed to CA, however, was denied due to substantial and procedural
reasons. On January 2001, PVAO granted petitioner’s father full military veteran
status.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner is guilty for dishonesty and falsification of official

documents.

HELD:

No, Under Section 23, Rule XIV, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
provisions of Book V, of E.O. NO. 292, dishonesty and Falsification of official
document are grave offenses punishable with dismissal from service. Dishonesty
connotes a disposition to lie, cheat or defraud. On the other hand, the elements of
falsification are as follows:1) the offender makes in a documents statements in a
narration of facts; 2) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the
facts narrated; 3) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and, 4) the
perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of
injuring a third person. The rule is that "there can be no conviction for falsification
of a public document if the acts of the accused are consistent with good faith..."
Thus, the maxim, actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not committed if
the mind of the person performing the act complained of be innocent. In this case
petitioner was undoubtedly in good faith when she claimed that she was a daughter
of a World War II veteran. Aware that her father’s veteran status was not yet
confirmed, she submitted affidavits of the superiors and contemporaries in the
military of her father to prove that he indeed served during World War II. In fact,
on the basis of said affidavits, the PVAO recognized her father’s services and
consequently issued Master List No. 274 dated March 30, 1987 and Certification
No. 22413A dated March 24, 1987, stating that Alberto Mansueto, Jr., was a World
War II Veteran with the rank of private. Moreover, one of the elements of the
offense of falsification is lacking in the instant case. The subsequent confirmation
and recognition of the veteran status of petitioner’s father on 2001 proves that
when she declared that he was a veteran, she was stating the truth. Petitioner
should, therefore, be exonerated from the charges filed against her. Consequently,
payment of her back salaries is in order. Pursuant to current jurisprudence, a civil
service employee terminated from the service and later found innocent of the
charges is entitled to back salaries limited to a period not exceeding five years.

Magsumbol vs. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 207175, November 26,
2014)

FACTS:

Petitioner Magsumbol, together with Erasmo Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria,

and Bonifacio Ramirez was charged with the crime of Theft. In the proceedings it
is stated that the accused, conspiring and confederating together with seven others
whose true names and real identities are still unknown and whose physical
descriptions were not made known by available witnesses, and who are all still at
large, and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and without the
consent of the owner, Menandro Avanzado, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
cut, take, steal and carry away with them 33 coconut trees from the coconut
plantation of the said owner, valued at ₱44,400.00, from the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Ernesto Caringal, it appears that at around 11:00 o’clock in
the morning of February 1, 2002, Caringal, the overseer of a one-hectare
unregistered parcel of land located in Candelaria, Quezon, and co-owned by
Menandro, saw the four accused, along with seven others, cutting down the
coconut trees on the said property. Later, the men turned the felled trees into coco
lumber. Caringal did not attempt to stop the men from cutting down the coconut
trees because he was outnumbered. Instead, he left the site and proceeded to San
Pablo City to inform Menandro about the incident. On February 3, 2002,
Menandro and Caringal reported the incident to the police. On the other hand,
Atanacio Avanzado testified that he authorized his brothers-in-law, Magsino and
Magsumbol, to cut down the coconut trees within the boundary of his property,
which was adjacent to the land co-owned by Menandro. Brgy. Captain Arguelles
testified that on January 28, 2002, Magsumbol, Magsino, Ramirez, and Inanoria
came to his office seeking permission to cut down the coconut trees planted on the
land of Atanacio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is the essential elements, intern and malice, regarding
theft in the case at hand.

HELD:

No, Malice and intent are not present in this case. In view of the conflicting
claims and considering the evidence on hand, the Court cannot determine the
certainty over felled coconut trees and the uncertainty of the exact location of the
coconut trees negates the presence of the criminal intent to gain. The criminal mind
is, of no doubt, absent. It should be considered that Magsumbol and his co-accused
even sought the permission of the Barangay Captain prior to the cutting down of
the coconut trees and the act was done openly, in broad daylight. Actus Non Facit
Reum Nisi Mens Sit Rea—The act itself does not make a man guilty unless his
intention were so. The fact that Magsumbol and his co-accused veered away from
the usual modus operandi of criminals of carrying out their crime covertly to avoid
being discovered substantiate the absence of criminal intent or malice.

Francisco De Guzman vs. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 166502, October
17, 2008)

FACTS:

Complainant Lucia Valdez married Agustin Valdez until their relationship

turned sour and the two separated. Agustin went to the United States of America
and Lucia remained in the couple’s house in La Union. But after the July 16, 1990
earthquake, Lucia and her children temporarily moved out of their residence and
stayed in an apartment in Paringao, Bauang, La Union. During this time, Agustin
learned that Lucia had been selling their personal properties. Alarmed, he asked
Ramon Valdez, his son with another woman, to retrieve whatever was left in their
house as those properties belonged to Ramon’s mother. Ramon went to Lucia’s
house which was then closed and uninhabited. Consequently, Ramon demolished
the north eastern portion of Lucia’s kitchen to gain entry. He then solicited his
neighbors’ help which was assisted by Marlon Gatchalian, Elpidio Picazo, and
petitioner Francisco de Guzman. Mendegoria, the common-law husband of one of
Lucia’s daughters, witnessed the retrieval incident. He saw Ramon and petitioner
bring out chairs, aparadors, mortars, a big frying pan, a wooden bench, and a bed
from Lucia’s house. Mendegoria immediately reported the matter to Lucia, who
then went to the respective houses of Ramon and petitioner. She discovered that
her properties were brought to Ramon’s house, save for the wooden bench which
was left just outside petitioner’s house. Lucia took pictures of her personal
belongings and then reported the matter to the police. In their defense, Ramon
claims that he did not intend to gain from his act and that he was just following the
instruction from his father to take the personal property belonging to his mother.
De Guzman claims that he merely helped Ramon to bring out the properties and
the wooden bench was temporarily placed at his house. Ramon was acquitted while
De Guzaman is not acquitted due to the fact that the prosecution established intent
to gain when petitioner failed to satisfactorily explain how he was able to gain
possession of Lucia’s property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not De Guzman is guilty of Robbery.

HELD:

No, it is established in the Philippines laws that to

To constitute robbery, the following elements must be established: 1) the subject is

personal property belonging to another; 2) there is unlawful taking of that property;
3) the taking is with the intent to gain; and 4) there is violence against or
intimidation of any person or use of force upon things. In this case, petitioner was
alleged to have intent to gain for his aaparent failure to explain why Lucia’s
wooden bench was in his possession. Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an
internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender. The
unlawful taking of another’s property gives rise to the presumption that the act was
committed with intent to gain. This presumption holds unless special
circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. The term
"gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit
which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is
performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner’s
consent constitutes gain. We are not convinced with moral certainty that petitioner
had acted with intent to gain. Contrary to the findings of the trial and appellate
courts, the records bear out that it was Ramon, under a claim of ownership, who
had wanted the properties taken out from Lucia’s house. And he had asked his
neighbors to assist him in recovering these properties. Petitioner, like the others
who helped Ramon, was an innocent person who merely acceded to a neighbor’s
request. The only fact that perhaps raises doubt on petitioner’s innocence was the
presence of the wooden bench in his house however it sufficiently explained that
owing to the proximity of his house to that of Lucia’s, Ramon had asked that the
bench be temporarily left in petitioner’s house until he could transfer it. However,
before Ramon could remove it, Lucia had already filed a complaint against them.
Petitioner did not falsely claim ownership over the bench nor did he make any
effort to conceal that the bench was in his possession as it was placed outside his
house. AS found by the supreme court, his acts were consistent with his assertion
that he was merely helping Ramon, whom he honestly believed to be the owner,
take out the properties from Lucia’s home. To stress, petitioner should not be held
answerable for the act charged absent a felonious intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea. A crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act
complained of is innocent.

U.S. vs. Ah Chong (G.R. No. 5272, March 19, 1910, 15 Phil. 488

FACTS:

Ah Chong was a cook at Officers’ quarters, No. 27, Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal
Province and Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy. Officer
house no. 27 was occupied by the two. The door of the room did not have a
permanent bolt or lock, so the occupants had attached a small hook or catch on the
inside of the door and fasten the door by placing against it a chair. In the room
there was but one small window, which there were no other openings of any kind
in the room. Ah Chong was asleep the evening of August 14, 1908 when at about
10:00 pm, his sleep was interrupted by someone trying to force the door open.
Sitting up in bed, Ah Chong called out twice, “Who is there?” but received no
response. Ah Chong was convinced that the intruder was a robber or a thief and
this prompted him to leap to his feet and again called out, “If you enter the room, I
will kill you.” Ah Chong seized a common kitchen knife which he had kept under
his pillow and struck the intruder who happened to be Pascual Gualberto, Ah
Chong’s roommate which was only playing a trick on Ah Chong. Seeing that
Pascual was fatally wounded, Ah Chong called his employers and hurried back to
his room to bind up Pascual’s wounds with bandages. Pascual mortally wounded
with a knife laceration on the stomach died from the injury the following day at the
military hospital. Ah Chong claimed that because of the several robberies that had
transpired at Fort Mc Kinley not long before the incident, he had been keeping a
knife under his pillow as an accessible defense. The trial court ruled the case as a
simple homicide.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ah Chong can be held Criminally liable for the death of his
co- worker.

HELD:

No, it is established in the courts that under such circumstances there is no

criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was
not due to negligence or bad faith. In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if
such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which
under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged "cancels the
presumption of intent," and works an acquittal. the general provisions of Article 1
of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an
essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of
express provisions modifying the general rule, such as those touching liability
resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is
different from that which he intended to commit. The word "malice" in this article
is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct
inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated
therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence,
does not impose any criminal liability on the actor. Since evil intent is in general
an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act
committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves
the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on
his part. "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they
appear to him."

U.S. vs. Bautista (G.R. No. 10678, August 17, 1915, 31 Phil 308)

FACTS:

Defendant, Manuel Bautista was Charged with the crime of assault upon
agents of the authorities and insulting them. He alleges that the evidence adduced
during the trial of the cause was not sufficient to show that he was guilty of the
crime charged in the complaint. Record shows that some time in the month of
November, 1914, an order of arrest was issued for Bautista and placed in the hands
of the chief of police of the municipality of Gerona. The chief of police,
accompanied by another policeman, went to the house where the defendant was
staying for the purpose of making the arrest. Upon arrival at the house, They
questioned the occupants whether or not the defendant was there. Upon being
informed that he was in the house, the policeman who accompanied the chief of
police entered the house without permission and attempted to arrest the defendant
without explaining to him the cause or nature of his presence there. The defendant,
according to the declaration of the chief of police, resisted the arrest, calling to his
neighbors for assistance, using the following language: "Come here; there are some
bandits here and they are abusing me." Many of his neighbors, hearing his cry,
according to the testimony of the chief of police, immediately came to his
assistance and surrounded his house. The policeman further testified that he then
informed the defendant that he came there for the purpose of arresting him, and the
defendant asked him if he had an order of arrest, which question was answered by
the policeman in the affirmative. Said policeman further testified that immediately
after he had notified the defendant that he was a policeman and had an order of
arrest, the defendant submitted to the arrest without further resistance or objection.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Bautista is guilty of assaulting a police officer and resisting

arrest

HELD:

No, it is established in the courts that under such circumstances there is no

criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was
not due to negligence or bad faith. In this case it shows that the resistance given by
the defendant was done under the belief that the persons who had entered his house
were bandits or “tulisans”. It also shows, by the declaration of the witnesses for the
prosecution, that as soon as he had been informed that they were officers of the
law, armed with an order of arrest, he peaceably submitted and accompanied them.
If the defendant believed that those who had entered his house were, in fact,
tulisans, he was entirely justified in calling his neighbors and in making an attempt
to expel them from his premises.

People vs. Bayambao (G.R. No. 29481, October 31, 1928, 52 Phil. 309)

FACTS:

Pambaya Bayambao was the was charged with the crime of murder Pambaya
does not deny having caused the deceased’s death. However, he did it by mistake,
believing that the deceased was a malefactor who attacked him in the dark. He said
that while his wife was cooking, she called out and said that someone has thrown a
stone at their house so he took his revolver checked but did not see anyone. He was
about to go upstairs when he heard a noise and saw figure that rushed at him with
his hands lifted up as if to strike at him because of this Bayambao became
frightened and fired at it because thinking it was an outlaw and his brother-in-law
thought that he was an outlaw too. In their place there are many outlaws and those
outlaws hate Pambaya because he helps the government to collect taxes. Contrary
to the testimony of the wife of the victim, which testified that the accused’s wife
informed the deceased and suggested to go down to who it was. The deceased then
told the accused that there was no one under the house. The accused tell deceased
to wait there for he was going to use his flashlight then accused went down
carrying an automatic revolver in his right hand and a flashlight in the left. The
accused asked the deceased if the hens there belonged to him, and the latter asked
the accused to focus his light there in order to gather all the hens together; that at
this the accused shot the deceased, whose wife peered out of the door and saw her
husband with the accused focusing his flashlight on him and then firing at him
again; that the deceased told Pambaya that he was wounded; that the deceased's
wife upbraided the accused telling him that he did wrong, and asked why he had
shot the deceased; that the accused turned upon her telling her to shut up or he
would shoot her also. However, this was found to be uncorroborated and it was
shown in the record that Bayambao approached the arriving officers to obtain help
which causes the court to believe in Bayambao’s and his wife’s testimonies.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Bayambao is guilty of a crime even if his offence was done
under uncontrollable fear of greater or equal injury

HELD:

No, It is provided under the Penal Code that he was guilty of no crime and
is exempt from criminal liability since he  acted from the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an ill at least equal in gravity, in the belief that the deceased
was a malefactor who attacked him with a dagger in hand. Furthermore, his
ignorance or error of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith, and this rebuts the
presumption of malicious, intent accompanying the act of killing.

People vs. Sitchon (G.R. No. 134362, February 27, 2002, 378 SCRA 68)

FACTS:
 Emilito Sitchon was accused that he willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously,
with intent to kill and with treachery and evident of premeditation, attack, assault
and use personal violence upon Mark Anthony Tabora who is 2 year old son of hi
live-in partner. He mauls and club him on the different parts of his body with the
use of a steel hammer and a wooden stick causing Tabora to die. Sitchon pleaded
not guilty however before testifying he changed his plea to guilty. There are
multiple witnesses who testified in this case. 1) the neighbor, Lylia Garcia who
heard a boy crying so she went up and witness Sitchon beating Mark Anthony
Tabora. She saw that Sitchon hit the child using a wood and banged the head of
Mark until mark was already black and no longer moving. 2) the 8 year old
Roberto who saw what happened, but could not do anything because he is scared
that he might also be beat up. 3) PO3 Javier recovered the broken wooden sticks,
steel hammer, bloodstained t-shirt of Mark and the belt. 4)Feliscima Francisco, the
foresnsic chemist and 5) Dr. Lagonera who conducted a postmortem examination
and found out that Mark suffered many injuries including 3 wounds at the head and
in the anterior chest. It was concluded that the victim died due to "bilateral
pneumonia secondary to multiple blunt traversal injuries" or complication of the
lungs due to said injuries. Sitchon claimed that he was under the in the influence of
drugs at that time. He had hit the child hard without realizing it, until he saw the
boy sprawled on the floor, breathing with difficulty. He dressed and brought him to
a hospital, praying to God that nothing serious would happen. Unfortunately, the
child was already dead. Appellant surrendered to the police.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sitchon is Criminally liable for the crime of murder and not
of simple homicide.

HELD:

Yes, the law provides that one of the aggravating circumstances in felonies
is treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. It is beyond dispute
that the killing of minor children who, by reason of their tender years, could not be
expected to put up a defense, is treacherous. Furthermore, his claim for him being
under influence of drugs cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance
because a plea of guilt must be made at the first opportunity, indicating repentance
on the part of the accused. In determining the timeliness of a plea of guilty, nothing
could be more explicit than the provisions of the Revised Penal Code requiring that
the offender voluntarily confess his guilt before the court prior to the presentation
of the evidence for the prosecution. It is well-settled that a plea of guilty made after
arraignment and after trial had begun does not entitle the accused to have such plea
considered as a mitigating circumstance, to which he only plead guilty after
prosecution rested their case. As his offense was attended by an aggravating
circumstance, treachery, his offense is qualified to murder, however as he is
credited a mitigating circumstance for voluntary surrender, his penalty is the lower
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

(G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988, 157 SCRA 1)

FACTS:
At about 8:00 o’clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno
Urbano went to his rice field at Pangasinan and found out that his palay was flooded
with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano
investigated and saw that Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass, he asked who
was responsible for the overflowing and Javier admitted that he was the responsible for
the opening of the irrigation. Urbano got angry and demanded Javier to pay for his
soaked palay. They quarrel until Urbano started to weild his bolo against Javier and hit
him on his right palm and in his left leg with the back potion of bolo. The daughter of
Urbano embraced him to stop his father for further inflicting Javier. Soon after, Urbano
and Javier had settled, and Javier was brought to a physician. Urbano promised to pay
P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. After a period of time the two appeared
before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement. On November 14,
1980, Javier was rushed to the hospital where he had convulsions. The doctor findings
were a tetanus toxin infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day.
Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on
appeal by the CA. Urbano appealed and filed a motion for new trial claiming that his
delict was not the cause of the death as Javier died 23 days after the altercation, and
that Javier died due to his negligence f going to work with his palm being wounded
ISSUE:

Whether or not Urbano is criminally liable for the wound he inflicted is the
proximate cause of death

HELD:

No, the rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. It is ruled in
the jurisprudence that "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an
action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise
to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but
for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because
of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
circumstances, which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. and since we are dealing with
a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim’s death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however,
leads to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an
efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the
time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
Hence, he is not criminally liable however, he is still civilly liable to the family of
the victim