VI.

Ownership of Land Does Not Extend to Minerals Underneath

REPUBLIC v COURT OF APPEALS & DELA ROSA

GR. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988

Facts:

According to respondents Dela Rosa, they acquired the lots 1-5 from one Balbalio and lots
6-9 from Jaime Alberto on 1964. During the trial Balbalio and Alberto claimed that they and
their predecessors-in-interest were already in open, continuous, and exlusive possession of
the parcels of land for a long time and presented as evidence tax declarations and tax
receipts dating back from 1956.

Petioner Benguet opposed on the ground that lots 1-5 or June Bug Mining Claim, to which
they assert their right, were sold to them by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly who
located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 1909. They have been in
actual possession thereof since their purchase on 1934.

Atok Big-wedge opposed on the premise that portions of lots 1-5 and all lots 6-9 were
covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located and registered by Harisson and
Reynolds on 1931 which they claim to have been purchased by them on November
1931and had been occupying since then.

Republic argues that all the land sought to be registered was covered by Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve through Proclamation No 219 on year 1929. Moreover, by reasons of its
nature, it was not subject to alienation under the 1935 and 1973 Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in granting surface rights to De la Rosa and sub-surface rights
to the petitioning mining companies?

Ruling:

Yes. SC held that CA erred in granting the surface rights to De la Rosa and subsurface to
the mining companies reiterating the well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has
rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up
to a reasonable height. SC believes that the rights over the lands were indivisible and that it
cannot be half-argricultural and half-mineral at the same time. The Court held that CA
misinterpreted the provision of the law that “The ownership of, and the right to the use of
land for agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining
does not include the ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may
be found on or under the surface.” This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as
its name implies, is intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule
simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private land
devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than
mining. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever
the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State
to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The
land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including
the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to
be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just
compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.
VII. Foreshore Lands and Reclaimed Land

REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998

Facts:

On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities
and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by
dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish,
provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as
such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of
Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the
reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with
Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.

Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement
between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the
commerce of man, it being a foreshore land.

Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce
of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in
the definition provided by the dictionary.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was
affirmed by the CA with modifications.

Issue:

I. Whether or not the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged area.

II. Whether or not “foreshore land” and the reclaimed area is within the commerce of man.

Ruling:

No. The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the
respondent court that the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged areas. To repeat,
the term "foreshore lands" refers to:

The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet
and dry according to the flow of the tide.

A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore
between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper
limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. (Webster's Third
New International Dictionary)

The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot
broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress
were to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not
so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term “foreshore
lands.”

It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by
Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the
intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.