The Hungarian Revolution of 1956

Teknyős Fanni
Cold War and the US

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the USA

Introduction
- The 1950s: cold war confrontations began around the world that the USA had to deal
with
o Basic strategy: containment policy
o The USA’s approach was changing during these years
o 1952: Dwight D. Eisenhower elected President
o He also wanted to prevent Soviet expansion, but at the same time avoid
confrontation with the USSR when no immediate interest of the nation is at
stake → this policy determined the USA’s actions in 1956
- In 1956, two significant, concurrent events influenced international relations the most:
The Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Revolution
o Suez Crisis: signified the end of innocence for Western Alliance (there were no
perfect symmetry anymore)
o The Hungarian Revolution: shows that the Soviet Union dares to involve force
to maintain its sphere of interest if it has to
- Hungary had been victim of the Russian expansionism since the era of Peter the Great
→ history repeated itself during the communist rule → Stalin completed his plan of
gaining back all tsarist territory that was lost after WW1 + also added the “satellite
orbit” of Eastern European countries
- Soviet-style planning was intolerable on the long run (even in the USSR + problems in
Eastern Europe from the beginning) → population was unsatisfied everywhere
o Disadvantageous for both:
 Eastern European nations felt their traditions were threatened & they
felt like minorities
 Eastern Europe consumed resources and attention of the USSR
- Stalin: total control needed
- Successors of him were in a dilemma about control
o Repression in EE would cause tension with the West
o But liberalization might lead to the collapse of the system
- 1955: new approach → Soviet leadership is willing to live with nationalism as long as
the leadership of the given country remains communist
- USA: passive attitude + the concept of liberation
o 1952, Presidential Campaign: Dulles – “A Policy of Boldness” (in Life)
 Eastern European nations are held captive whereas the US is the leader
of freedom → it’s the USA’s task to encourage liberation
 Meaning of liberation
 Dulles shares the views of Acheson who supported Tito, but
with slight changes (more idealistic view of “liberation”)
 In practice, liberation means the encouragement of the Titoist
model (not democracy)
 Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty: to keep the principles of
freedom alive in Eastern Europe & encourage nations to stand
 up in an explicit manner; although not official, but people
couldn’t really understand the difference → misconceptions
about the elusive messages
The events of 1956
- February 1956: Khrushchev’s speech at the Twentieth Party Congress
o Revealing Stalin’s crimes
o Discrediting communism
o Nationalism needed (Polish, Czech, Hungarian communists distinguished)
- During the Suez Crisis, the SU faced two other important issues: Poland & Hungary
- Poland:
o June: riots in Poznan bloodily suppressed
o October: Stalinist leaders of the Communist Party’s Central Committee against
nationalism + Gomulka back as first secretary
o October 13, 1956: Gomulka’s first Politburo meeting
o Soviet Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky is dismissed
o Proclamation that Poland pursues national road to socialism
o Moscow was against it → Khrushchev visited Warsaw with his Politburo
colleagues (wanted to intervene militarily)
o Polish leaders informed the Soviet General Secretary → not party-to-party
meeting → delegation not received at Communist Party Headquarters
o Last moment: Khrushchev changed his mind about military intervention
(October 20)
o October 22: Gomulka’s installation as general Secretary of the Communist
Party, but with the promise that the socialist system will be preserved &
Poland’s membership in Warsaw Pact remains
The Hungarian Revolution & the reaction of the USA
- The same cycle of Soviet oppression went down in Hungary as in the other occupied
countries
- The antecedent events of the revolution:
o Since 1940s: Hungary governed by Mátyás Rákosi, an orthodox Stalinist
o 1953: Stalin’s death → Rákosi summoned to Moscow → Beria replaced him
because he was Jewish
o Rákosi was replaced by Imre Nagy, a reform communist
o 1955: because of orthodox communists, Nagy was dismissed + expelled from
the Communist Party; Rákosi as Prime Minister
o Stalin’s successors: supported reform more so Nagy could survive and even
challenge the SU’s right to intervene in domestic affairs
o Rákosi was replaced again → Ernő Gerő (he was close to Rákosi)
- The course of the revolution:
o October 23: public outrage in Budapest (sympathy protest for Poland became
an uprising)
  Students’ demands beyond the reforms achieved in Poland (e.g.
freedom of speech, trial for Rákosi and his people, departure of Soviet
troops, Nagy’s return to office)
 Nagy’s first appearance makes the crowd disappointed (he is still a
reform communist who wants a communist system) → but for
Hungarians, there is too late for reforms, radical change needed
 During the course of the uprising, Nagy was transformed by the passion
of the people and by the vision of democracy
o October 24:
 Full-blown revolution
 Soviet tanks were entering the fray; they were set on fire, and
government buildings were seized
 Nagy as the new Prime Minister (Mikoyan and Suslov arrived in
Hungary to assess the situation)
o October 28:
 Soviet visitors reached a conclusion: settle for a Titoist Hungary
 Soviet tanks began to withdraw from Budapest
 It could not calm down the crowd
 They wanted a multiparty system, the departure of Soviet troops from
all parts of Hungary and the withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact
- The USA’s reaction to these events:
o The USA didn’t expect such a big uprising and it wasn’t able to handle two
crises at the same time (Suez + Hungary)
o It was torn between wanting to help Hungary and the fear of giving the Soviets
reason to intervene with a forward policy → it stayed silent instead, but this
way, the USSR was never warned about the costs of repression
o October 27: US appeal to the UN’s Security Council about the Hungarian
revolution which wasn’t taken seriously
o Radio Free Europe: urging Hungarians to step up and reject any compromise
 October 29: greeted Nagy’s installation
 October 30: the abolition of the one-party system and forming a
coalition government didn’t convince the radio
o The Eisenhower Administration
 Wanted to reassure the Soviets about America’s intentions
 Inflammatory pronouncements
 October 27: Dulles’ speech: the USA lures for Hungary to get out of
the Soviet interest sphere; it is enough to pursue the Titoist model and
to leave the Warsaw Pact
 The USA has no selfish interest in Hungary → interpreted as
arbitrariness
 October 31: Eisenhower’s speech
 Hint about penalties for Soviets in case of repression
 Influenced by the Soviet’s claim about their troops in Eastern
Europe
 USA hopes for an end to Soviet dominance, but it cannot do
anything about it
  USA doesn’t want new governments to be military allies, just
friends who are free
 The USSR wasn’t convinced that the US has no interest in
Hungary
- Meanwhile in Hungary matters had spun out of control
o October 30: seizing the Communist Party’s office + massacre
 Afternoon: Nagy announced the formation of the new government
(multiparty system) and he began negotiations with the Soviets
 The Soviets gave the impression that they accept Nagy’s proposition →
October 31: official statement (Pravda & Izvestia): the stationing of
foreign troops in fellow communist countries require the approval of
the host country and the entire Warsaw Pact
 → Eisenhower interpreted this act positively, but he missed two
important factors
 withdrawal of Soviet troops is complicated → veto for SU
 the Soviets claimed that the troops were only protecting the
‘socialist achievements” of the people
o November 1: Nagy declared Hungary’s neutrality and the withdrawal from the
Warsaw Pact → announcement on the radio
o Nagy asked for the recognition of Hungarian neutrality from the UN, but got
no reply
o The world community was indifferent to Nagy’s statement and neither the US,
nor the European allies paid attention to his message
o November 4: Soviet troops suppressed the Hungarian revolution
 Few days earlier, János Kádár (General Secretary) mysteriously
disappeared → returned with Soviet troops (200,000 Soviet & Warsaw
Pact troops with 5,500 tanks)
 Pál Maléter, military leader of the revolution got arrested
 Imre Nagy managed to escape to Yugoslavia
 Cardinal Mindszenty, an important figure of resistance against
communism escaped to the American legation
 The UN finally turned to the Hungarian case, but there was no
resolution
 The bloody suppression claimed approximately 20,000 Hungarian and
3,000 Soviet lives
Conclusion & Evaluation of the USA’s and the United Nations’ approach
- A question arose after the Hungarian tragedy: could a more forceful Western
diplomacy have prevented this to happen?
- It is hard to believe that the US State Department didn’t even consider that the Soviets
would possibly intervene militarily
- The USA set high expectations towards itself which it didn’t live up to during the
revolution
- Although the USA was against warfare, it didn’t explore other options besides war →
there was a gap between the proclamation and the actual support; democracies
shouldn’t have gone to war, but rhetorics should have been more effective
- The Americans gave no explanation and advice to Hungarians (e.g. on how to
consolidate their gains)
- Communication between the USA and the SU happened mostly by public statements
o It would have been important to warn the SU about the costs and the major
political and economic consequences
- The USA and its allies acted as if they were bystanders, however, reaction would have
been needed
- The Soviet Union paid no price
- There were huge and serious differences in the way Suez and the Hungarian problem
were treated
o Whereas Britain and France were judged in the case of Suez, the SU’s actions
weren’t (by the Nonaligned)
- The Nonaligned:
o Different approach (neutrality was not about passive foreign policy anymore,
they were active, promoted agendas and formed an alliance)
o Loud complaints, but could profit from tensions
o Feared SU more than USA, so usually sided with communists
o November 16: Indian Prime Minister, Nehru: they didn’t align with the USA
because resolution was improperly worded + Hungary’s sovereignty was in
danger – wasn’t true
- December 18: Dulles’ explanation of USA’s reasoning + reassuring Soviets about its
peaceful intentions – there was no desire to surround the USSR with a cordon sanitaire
o Surprising statement
o Contrary to containment (surrounding USSR with states capable of stopping its
expansion)
- March 13, 1957, Australia, press conference: Dulles apologizing + defending USA
based on law
o No obligation towards Hungary to help militarily
o Missing the point (this was not a legal issue)
- There was an inevitable gap between the USA’s principles and its national interests –
Suez vs. Hungary proved that
o Leaders didn’t want to risk American lives for Hungary (military action
inevitable)
o In case of Suez, there was no immediate risk
- Suez vs Hungary introduced a new era in Cold War
- SU managed to preserve its presence in Eastern Europe + found a way to bypass
containment
- Democracies’ positions declined in the Middle East
- Socialist system: failure for SU – couldn’t make the public fully accept it
- Hungary: Kádár moved towards Nagy’s plans, but gradually (except from withdrawal
from Warsaw Pact)
o A generation later, the system went bankrupt
o 1956: contribution to the suffering of another generation
Sources:
Kissinger, Henry. 1994. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster
McMahon, Robert. 2003. The Cold War. A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford
University Press
Winkler, Allan M. 2000. The Cold War. A History in Documents. Oxford: Oxford University
Press
https://www.britannica.com/event/Hungarian-Revolution-1956