The 2004 Philippine Elections: Political Change in an Illiberal Democracy

Author(s): JOHN L. LINANTUD

Source: Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 27, No. 1 (April 2005), pp. 80-101
Published by: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)
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 Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 1 (2005): 80-101 ISSN 0219-797X

The 2004 Philippine Elections:

Political Change in an
Illiberal Democracy

JOHNL.UNANTUD

This article, based on an analysis of the 2004 elections, argues

that illiberal democracy in the Philippines rests on strong
foundations. On one hand, bad government, armed men, and
the mainstreaming of military activism and People Power
have deepened theilliberalstrain ofpolitical culture since the
ouster of strongman Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. On the other
hand, the reassertion of democratic nationalism by prominent
institutions and public opinion, and new technologies and
types of representation, have reinforced a democracy that
rests on relatively solid footing even though itmay often
appear on thebrinkof collapse. Public religion illustratesthe
complexity of these issues. If one defines "liberal" as seeking
to change the status quo, the Catholic Church has become one
of the country's most liberal institutions because it has
challenged a frequently abusive and kleptocratic state for
secure elections and basic rights.

Introduction

In such an atmosphere of fraud, I feel so disheartened and disgusted.

? Faith-based American observer on the
2004 Philippine elections
(Sy and Aravilla 2004).
There was so much violence ... and people seemed to accept the fact
that people got killed.
? German observer
(Sy and Aravilla 2004).

80

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The 2004 Philippine Elections 81

Even with the violence and the continuing problems, we still believe
that the election was credible.
?
Philippine National Police (Esguerra, 2004).
If we could have such elections in Afghanistan, it would be
tremendous.
?
Afghan observer [Philippine Star, 19 May 2004).

Who is right?Is thePhilippines a democracy?This article argues

yes, but only after accounting for the differences between democracy
and liberalism and recognizing that democracy, while not ideal, has
made considerable headway since the ouster of strongman Ferdinand
Marcos. Since 1986 elections have again become the primary mechanism
to determine who controls government, the fundamental characteristic
of a democratic state.
Elections also reveal the values of the broader political culture.
Using the 2004 polls as a window of analysis, theprimaryargumentof
thispaper is thatthegrowthofdemocracyhas outpaced thatof liberalism
since 1986, an imbalance that has created illiberal democracy. Granted,
a focus on elections may overlook groups that seek to bypass or leave
the state, in particular Islamic separatists and non-government
organizations (NGOs). Moreover, this study analyses the conduct more
than the results of the voting, under the assumption that the struggle for
a new political order deserves as much attention as partisan rivalry.
Illiberal democracy in the Philippines rests on strong foundations.
Hardly any of the institutionsor attitudes discussed in this paper
are simultaneously democratic and illiberal in every sense. Yet bad
government, political violence, and People Power have generally
undermined due process, while the reassertion of a democratic national
identity, the rejection of authoritarian government and communist
revolution by public opinion, and new institutions have helped
democracy rebound from the Marcos era far more quickly than has
liberalism.
Religion warrants special attention. In the Philippines, the struggle
between state and society centres on the Catholic Church. If one defines
"liberal" as seeking to change the status quo, it has become one of the
country's most liberal institutions by challenging the state for fair
elections, the rule of law, and human rights. On the other hand, Church
activism impedes the comprehensive realization of secular politics,
one of the key components of Western theories of development. The
remainder of this article attempts to buttress these ideas. First, it reviews
the conceptual differences between liberalism and democracy. Second,
it shows that elections have become less violent and fraudulent since

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 82 John L. Linantud

theMarcos era. Third, it explores illiberal democracy, as evidenced by

the conduct of the elections, and concludes with a summary of the
national imbalance between democracy and liberalism.

Liberalism and Democracy

The observers quoted above raise legitimate questions. To seek

meaningful answers, it is useful to review the often overlooked
differencesbetween liberalismand democracy.The philosophical roots
of liberalism stemfrom theEuropean Enlightenment's challenge to a
political order dominated by a small elite of monarchs, warlords, and
clergywho ruled throughpractices such as the divine rightof kings,
reasons of state, investiture, and indulgence. Democracy, which is
often traced to ancient Greece and Rome, is the ability of people to
govern themselves. It gained a foothold in theWest at about the same
time as liberalism, and since 1945 has become the West's primary
method of deciding changes in state leadership.
Liberalism and democracy have progressed unevenly across
different regions andissues, and are still evolving. For developing
countries moving away from authoritarian rule, such as the Philippines,
political change in the direction of liberalism or democracy must start
at a basic level. According to theWestern example, liberalism should
begin with the replacement of arbitrary or ill-defined state power with
"constitutional liberalism", in particular the rule of law and due process,
state protection of fundamental political, human, and property rights,
and the legal separation of church and state.Highly charged debate
over what constitutes "fundamental" rights, of course, is part of the
development of liberalism itself. At a minimum, basic political rights
include assembly, speech, and protection from unlawful execution,
threats, harassment, and violence. Democracy, in turn, startswith civilian
government, universal suffrage, and the election of public officials,
especially the national executive and legislature.
Both constitutional liberalism and democracy promise relief from
lawlessness and dictatorship. In theory, liberalism strengthens
democracy because questions of corruption, fairness, and individual
rights help determine the legitimacy of elected regimes. In turn,
democracy should strengthen liberalism by making the state accountable
to the public, especially if a majority has reached a consensus on a
particular issue.
But since liberalism and democracy are in fact separate, observers
have imagined four ideal type regimes. First comes liberal democracy,
where public officials must follow the constitution and elections
determine who controls the state. Second is illiberal autocracy, the

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The 2004 Philippine Elections 83

worst of both worlds, where a strongman or ruling clique is accountable

to neither law nor the public. Third is illiberal democracy, where
elections decide who governs, but fundamental rights and freedoms are
either not fully delineated or protected. Some argue that liberal
autocracy, the fourth option, offers the best chance for developing
countries to establish a foundationof political order and the rule of
law (Zakaria 2003).
The Philippines has learned to rejectthatformula.Indeed,many of
the problems facing the country are the legacy of Ferdinand Marcos,
who claimed to be a reformer after declaring martial law in 1972 but
became an illiberal autocrat, largely unaccountable to the electorate
and therule of law, even aftertheend ofmartial law in 1981. Beforehis
ouster after the disputed presidential election of 1986, politics had
reached a fever pitch through high-level abuse of power, violence,
communist insurgency, and popular mistrust of government.

The 2004 Elections

The 2004 elections continued the consolidation of democracy under
the 1987 constitution. With approximately 17,500 positions at stake,
theydwarfed theelectoral regimesofneighbouringcountries.The polls
were the sixth for national offices since 1986, and the third consecutive
for president, a notable accomplishment considering the January 2001
People Power II against President Joseph Estrada during his impeachment
trial and the abortive People Power III reinstatement of Estrada weeks
before the May 2001 by-elections.
Philippine elections are stillunsafe: nearly 1,000people have been
killed orwounded in the last threenational polls during arguments,
vendettas, and assaults on partisans, candidates, and canvassers. Such
incidents violate the democratic norm of popular sovereignty, the ability
of citizens to choose their leaders and contest public office, and liberal
norms ofhuman rights,especially therightto live freefrom threatsand
intimidation. To deter such attacks and reassure the local citizenry, the
Commission of Elections (Comelec) replaces local authorities with
national officials and military officers in the most volatile "hot spots".
The 2004 polls, however, showed that election security has
improved on several fronts. First, casualties have declined. In 1971, the
last before martial law, over 900 people died before election day. In
1984 and 1986, the final two polls of the Marcos regime, over 300
people perished. In 2004, the death count before election day totalled
117, including 29 candidates (Papa and Esguerra 2004; Mendez and
Laude 2004). Over three elections in 1998-2004, moreover, Comelec
took-charge of 13 provinces nationwide and 3 cities of Metro Manila,

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 84 John L. Linantud

TABLE 1
Violence in Philippine National Elections, 1998-2004

Year Election ViolentIncidents Casualties

^Ele^^PosiUo^^
1998 Presidential 269 13 229
2001 By-election 267 23 404
2004 Presidential 192 19 329

Total , 962
728
Sources: Manila Bulletin, 20 May 2004, p. 12; PNP News Release No. 04-0508 "PNP
Assures No Disruption of Canvassing", 25 May 2004, http://www.pnp.gov.ph,
accessed on 12 July 2004.
No res: The by-election included half the Senate, the hill House of Representatives, and

regional and local offices. Casualties include dead and wounded. Each election
filled about 17,500 positions, the figure used for column five.

The 2004 elections decided thepresidency, 12 of 24 Senators, 24 party list and

212 single-member district House seats, 79 Governors, about 1,600 mayors and

vice-mayors, and thousands of positions on provincial, town, and neighbourhood

councils.

The Philippine National Police (PNP) classifies election incidents separately

from criminal, personal, and insurgent acts and publishes updated statistics

throughoutan election though the press often fails to specify the phase in
question. For the 2004 elections, candidate filing began in December 2003, the

presidential campaign in January, and campaigns for other positions later. The
PNP also provides a summary report before election day, which omits incidents
that occur during voting and canvassing. With these caveats, Table 1 uses a PNP

briefing on incidents before, during, and after the elections of 1998 and 2001,
and a PNP post-election update for the 2004 polls.

down from 26 provinces and 11 cities in the four elections of

1987-95.
Second, the polls continued the relocation of the most violent
disputes from north to south. The island of Luzon, a traditional
stronghold of private armies and communist insurgents, has become
more stable. In 1998-2004, Comelec controlled 2 Luzon provinces
compared to 6 in 1988 alone. In contrast, Mindanao and theAutonomous
Region inMuslim Mindanao (ARMM) accounted for 6 of the 13 provinces
directed by Comelec in 1998-2004.1 In 2004 over half of nationwide
deaths, 60, occurred in Mindanao (Pareno 2004).
Third, the number of local elections postponed because of violence
or bad weather has declined. In 2004, Comelec recorded failures in
less than two dozen total precincts, barangays (neighbourhoods), and
towns compared to 10 entire provinces in 1988, 22 municipalities in
1992, and 1municipality and 353 precincts in 1995 (Linantud 1998,
pp. 301-5). Again, most of the difficulties in 2004 occurred in the

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The 2004 Philippine Elections 85

south. Yet election violence, while lower compared to the late Marcos
era, has slightly increased in recent years, and by-elections are still
more deadly than presidential the latter are better
campaigns because
able to smooth over local disputes. As memories of authoritaiian abuses
fade, constitutional liberalism and democracy will increasingly depend
on the contemporary institutions and attitudes discussed below.

The Foundations of Illiberal Democracy

Better election securityhas put thePhilippines on thepath to liberal
more illiberal
democracy. The problem is not that politics has become
since 1986, but that liberalism has not developed at a pace equal to
democracy beyond the basic level of saferelections. This is partly a
legacy of theMarcos era, when too many people became accustomed to
circumventing the law. Though the 1987 constitution respects a host of
rightsand freedoms, in practice theyare oftenviolated or ignoredby
elites, theArmed Forces of thePhilippines (AFP), and insurgents.The
other sources of illiberal democracy, public religion and People Power,
present a major dilemma. Church action has protected both democracy
and liberalism in terms of election security, but challenged theWestern
ideal of the separation of church and state. Moreover, the Church and
other social forces have embraced People Power as a legitimate antidote
to perceived abuses of executive power, a dangerous practice that has
become part of partisan rivalry.

Old Problems

Bad Government
Even if political violence were to disappear, inefficiency, corruption,
and cronyism would still undercut constitutional liberalism. Among
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, the other founders of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Philippines ranked at
or near the bottom in several indicators of government performance in
1996?2002, including the rule of law, regulatory quality, control of
corruption, government effectiveness, and voice and accountability
(WorldBank 2004).Many explanations of thisproblem blame theoft
studied political familieswho defy or undermine the law through
force, fraud, or largesse. This study focuses on manifestations of bad
government from the 2004 polls, in particular incompetence, poor
logistics, human error, and fraud.
Some cases boiled down to incompetence. Comelec decried a

political cultureof "manipulation and fraud" but itselffaced charges of

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 86 John L. Linantud

mismanagement (Aravilla and Calica 2004). The private National

Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel) found no evidence of "massive"
disenfranchisement, but estimates of voters turned away because of
registrationproblems ranged from 900,000 to 2 million (National
Movement forFree Elections 2004).Among themwas retired
Archbishop
JaimeSin, who spearheaded People Power I (Rivera2004).
Outdated logistics also encouraged human error and fraud. On
10May, votersfilled inpaper ballots.After theprecincts closed inmid
afternoon, canvassing teams working in pencil stayed awake through
the night to tally seven different sheets for state authorities, parties, and
Namfrel. Because of the time required to transport official documents
to provincial capitals and Manila, the canvassing for national positions
lasted weeks. Congress declared incumbent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
the winner of the presidential race over Fernando Poe Jr. on June 24.
During canvassing, the public tracked partial returns as ifwatching
a horse race rather than an honest count. The
perception that legitimate
winners might be cheated came from a realistic assessment of the
opportunities for intimidation and irregularities. A major concern was
dagdag-bawas, a set of techniques to pad or shave votes that exploited
the fatigue of honest canvassers and the numerous instances where
certificates changed hands.
According to Namfrel, the impact of fraud on the presidential race
did not match the Marcos era, but that for local offices was "terrible"
(Sy, 17 May 2004). To counter such problems, the private Coalition for
HOPE and Couples forChrist purchased full-pagenewspaper ads that
urged volunteers and Comelec to report dagdag-bawas. On 15 May,
Comelec itself purchased an ad in the Philippine Star that encouraged
its own staff to "respect the sanctity of the ballot" and "protect the
integrity of the elections".
Given the problems related to paper ballots, themost glaring case
of bad government was the failure of Comelec to deploy 2,000 voting
machines imported from South Korea. Though the machines would
not have covered every precinct, they would have reduced the
opportunity for confrontations that often end in bloodshed and started
the process of national automation. But the Supreme Court banned
the project amid charges ofmismanagement (Manila Times, 12 January
2004) As a result the government was forced to recognize the "basic
weakness in the electoral process owing to antiquated systems and
procedures that can be exploited for or ends" (Rivera
personal partisan
and Esguerra 2004).
Automation might not solve vote-buying, though the impact of this
problem remains unclear. In 1998, just 17 per cent of survey respondents
personally witnessed vote buying. In 2001, nearly 60 per cent condoned

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The 2004 Philippine Elections 87

accepting money but voting "according to one's conscience" (Laylo

2001, pp. 24, 39). In 2004, votes for local candidates cost as little as
20 pesos, enough to purchase a small bottle of juice. Even if one
accepted ten times that amount to deliver a household, the payoff
would still be short-lived. One man inMindanao even worried about
retaliationforrefusingto sell his vote (Marfil2004).

The Armed Forces

On balance, the AFP has proven to be a defender of democracy. With
the Catholic Church, its renewed commitment to election security
has helped reduce violence (Linantud 1998). Since 1986, moreover,
a series of coups by a mix of reformers and opportunists has failed
to overcome the defence of civilian government by constitutionalists
led by formergeneral Fidel Ramos. Indeed, thebulk of theAFP has
remained loyal, especially since the bloody but failed coups of
1987 and 1989.
On the other hand, the defence of civilian government has given
theAFP leverage inManila. No coups occurred against President Ramos
in 1992-98, but in 2001 therepudiationofEstradaby theAFP leadership
during People Power II helped forcehim out, despite support forhim
from other military factions. In 2003, a small contingent briefly tried to
oust Arroyo. InMay 2004, current and retired officers were accused of
plottingon behalf ofbothArroyo and Poe, particularlyinMindanao. At
present, only a group led by Senator Gregorio Honasan, a former AFP
officer, is still capable of stagingwell-publicized revolts that by
themselves have little chance of forcing a change in leadership, much
less replacing civilian government (Quilop n.d.; Hernandez 1997).
Though military government now appears unlikely, the AFP and
national police have also fostered a decidedly illiberal "culture of
impunity" where civilian officials fear to charge or prosecute soldiers,
police, or militia with mutiny, harassment, and extrajudicial killings
(Republic of thePhilippines 2003). The AFP has therefore
been able to
challenge Western precepts that oblige the state to respect human rights
even during counterinsurgent and law enforcement operations. This
issue surfaced during the 2004 elections in charges levelled by party
list groups affiliated with the communist New Peoples Army (NPA).
The most popular, Bayan Muna, claimed that over 40 of its members
had been assassinated by government agents since 2001 (Philippine
Daily Inquirer,8May 2004).

Private Armies, Separatists, and Revolutionaries

Even though election security has improved, the 2004 polls demonstrated
that armed groups still influence politics. The worst problems came in

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 88 John L. Linantud

Mindanao and ARMM, home to a volatile mix of strongmen, militias,

separatists, and revolutionaries. Political bosses there have in past
elections caused more bloodshed thanMuslim rebels {PhilippineDaily
Inquirer,2001). During the 2004 polls over 80 groups, comprised of
mercenaries, militia, and moonlighting guerillas, operated in ARMM
(Esguerra and Papa 2004).
Anti-state groups play a large role in the south, and election
security depends a great deal on these conflicts. Many veterans of the
first Islamic army, the Moro National Liberation Front, have joined
ARMM institutions since 1996, but the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
and Abu Sayyaf still seek theirown states. Both claimed to follow a
non-participation policy in 2004 but were involved in several incidents
{Philippine Star, 10 May 2004). Finally, as many as 6,000 of about
8,000 active NPAs operate in Mindanao (Daomilas 2004). In 2004,
communist groups took in 10 million pesos ($182,000) in permit-to
campaign fees (PTCs) including 5million pesos fromEasternMindanao
(Esguerra, 12 May 2004).
The elections featured the dogmatic and practical side of the NPA.
According to its red book, "The study of Philippine historymust be
guided by historical materialism, Marxist political economy, and the
teachingsofLenin on imperialism" (CommunistPartyof thePhilippines
1999, p. 3). The party line in 2004was equally orthodox: "Like all other
reactionaryelections in thehistoryof thepuppet republic, theMay 10
polls serve only to perpetuate the ruling political system and create an
illusion of democracy" {PhilippineDaily Inquirer, 10May 2004). This
ideological fealtyexplains why theNPA once expelled NGOs from
certain locales despite the latter's attempts at poverty relief. But in 2004
the NPA supported several candidates and ambushed others for PTCs,
including an incumbent in the House. It also cultivated support with
acts offrontier justice against local police, politicians, and businessmen.
As part of this campaign, it claimed to have brought order to several
hot spots inMindanao (Gutierrez 2004).
In the long term, revolutionaries promise neither constitutional
liberalism nor democracy. Frustration over abuses of state power has
historically led to rebellion, so the removal ofMarcos in 1986 severely
weakened the NPA. Public opinion has also rejected communist
rebellion much as it has AFP coups. In 2003, half of national survey
respondents agreed that the NPA should be labelled "terrorist" and 23
per cent supported military operations compared to 10 per cent in
1999 (Mangahas 2004 "2003": slide 35; "2002": slide 29). At present,
with no foreignallies to help it overwhelm the state or theCatholic
Church, ithas littlechance of the totalvictory soughtby its leadership.
Especially dubious is the recruitmentof rural child soldiers and

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The 2004 Philippine Elections 89

students from the fast food environs ofManila. Consider the symbolism
of thegraffitiat a bus stop inCavite,where "Happy Aniv. ofCPP/NPA
March 29" (thegroupwas founded in 1969) was painted underneath
a campaign poster for the local Remulla clan. On election day 2004, a
former NPA cadre and then-advisor to the governor, a rival of the
Remullas, was assassinated. Speculation centred on both the Remullas
and the NPA. No matter who was responsible, such acts underscored
the resilience of political violence. But the changes discussed in this
paper have provided a brighterfuturethan simply one dominated by
revolutionaries versus warlords.

A New Framework

VerifyingtheOfficial Canvass
Quick counts and exitpolls have strengtheneddemocracyby providing
a reliability check on Comelec, which lost legitimacy under Marcos. In
1986 thedifferencebetween Comelec, which had Marcos winning the
presidential election, and the Namfrel, whose private tally had Corazon
Aquino ahead, convinced many that Aquino had won the election and
led to People Power I. Since then, various organizations have published
quick counts,but onlyNamfrel is authorized by the state. In 2004 the
triangulationofComelec, Namfrel, and thepublic opinion firmSocial
Weather Stations (SWS) in favour of Arroyo undermined opposition
charges of fraud and contributed to the legitimacy of the elections.

TABLE 2
The 2004 Presidential Vote (%)

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo Fernando Poe, Jr.

Commission on Elections 40 37

National Movement for

Free Elections 39 37

Social Weather Stations 45 34

Sources: Rows 1 and 3: Mahar Mangahas, "Reviewing the May 2004 Exit Poll", Social
Weather Stations 12 July 2004, http://www.sws.org.ph/, 2 of 5, accessed on
7 2004; row 2: National Movement for Free Elections, "Namfrel
September
Operation Quick Count 2004
Coverage per Tabulated Election Returns" and
"Namfrel OQC Terminal Report: National Tally", 30 June 2004, http://
www.namfrel.org/, accessed on 7 September 2004.
The error margin Stations a
Note: of the Social Weather poll, with sample size of 4,445
voters, is plus or minus 2 points.

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 90 John L. Linantud

Moreover, Namfrel and SWS relied on text, e-mail, and fax in 2004.
This use of cutting-edgetechnologyshould convince officialsthat the
country does have access to the communication systems able to support
some type of automated canvassing.
These practices have also drawn criticism. Namfrel and SWS have
largely ignored volatile local races, and exit polls have confused voters
and raised fearsofdiminished turnoutand efficacy.Charges ofpartisan
bias also flared in 2004, as opposition leaders claimed thatpolls and
quick countshad "conditioned" thepublic foranArroyo victory(Baldo
2004). These charges, and the decline in trust in Namfrel discussed
below, have made agreement between Comelec, Namfrel, and SWS all
the more important for the legitimacy of presidential elections.

Democratic Nationalism
People Power reinvigorated a democratic nationalism based on the
country's heritage as a pioneer of regional democracy. Pride in the
events of 1986 has also deepened in the wake of "People Power"
movements from Seoul and Bangkok to Belgrade, T'bilisi, and Kiev.
Asked why he defended Aquino, for instance, Ramos explained "I did
not riskmy life in 1986 to restoredemocracy tomake thePhilippines
into a banana republic" (Thompson 1992, p. 137).
Elite assertion of a democratic national identity moved forward in
2004. President Arroyo anticipated that the elections would "show to
thewhole world that the democracy in the Philippines is stable and
strong" (Villanueva and Sy 2004). Former President Estrada too hoped
that the "rest of the world" would "praise and admire" them (Tuazon
2004). Namfrel, however, termed the polls a "national embarrassment"
compared to India, which voted at the same time but finished canvassing
in only a fewdays (Tubeza, 22May 2004).
The public has also embraced democracy. States with prior
experience with elections, like the Philippines, have a better chance to
remain democratic after a period of authoritarian government because
of tempered public expectations and negative memories of strongman
rule (Huntington 1993, pp. 208-79). This hypothesis explains surveys
that have shown little authoritarian nostalgia, high levels of efficacy
and idealism regarding voting, and support for automated canvassing
(Mangahas 2004 "2002": slides 10-19; Laylo 2001, pp. 20-25, 62-3). In
2001, 79 per cent of national survey respondents agreed that "democracy
may have problems but it's better than any other form of government"
(Inglehart 2004). In 2003, only 20 per cent preferred authoritarianism to
58 per cent for democracy (Mangahas 2004 "2003": slide 94).
The flirtation with authoritarian government, however, has not
entirely abated. In the 2001 World Values Survey, 49 per cent of

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The 2004 Philippine Elections 91

respondents stated that "having the army rule" would be generally

positive, thehighestfigurefromanypredominantlyChristian state,and
between neighbouring Indonesia (97 per cent),Singapore (17 per cent),
and Vietnam (99 per cent) (Inglehart2004). The armed forcesare also
the second-most trusted national institution, behind the Catholic Church
(Table 3). Yet after the latestAFP mutiny in 2003, strongmajorities
asserted that the mutineers' claims of state corruption and terrorism
did not justify rebellion, even though most respondents believed some
of their charges (Mangahas 2004 "2003": slides 43-44).

New Representation
It is often argued that People Power Imerely restored the pre-Marcos
era of elitist democracy. Of themany changes discussed in this paper,
few better refute this argument than the mobilization of women, a
critical impetus formass participation and democracy. By United Nations
standards, the national gender empowerment rank of 37 out of 177
countries trumps the overall human development rank of 83. Despite
an international reputation for prostitution and trafficking, women
form a greater percentage of legislators and professionals here than in
Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia (United Nations 2004, pp. 221-4).
At the elite level, two women have become president since 1986. At the
grassroots, however, maternal rather than reproductive rights feminism
has made deeper inroads, another challenge to Western liberalism
(Jaquette2001).

TABLE 3
Confidence in National Institutions (%)

/ am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tellme
how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite
a lot of confidence, not verymuch confidence or none at all?

A Great Deal Quite a Lot Not Very Much None at All

Churches 64 81 27
Armed Forces 26 224 49
Press 22 27448
Police 19 327 42
Government 11 3710 42
Source: Ronald Inglehart, et al., World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys,
1999-2001 (computer file), ICPSR version (Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social
Research (producer), 2002; Ann Arbor, ML: Inter-university Consortium for
Political and Social Research (distributor),
2004).
Note:.. Survey was conducted in 2001.

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 92 John L. Linantud

Since 1998, party-list elections to the House of Representatives

have also expanded democracy by providing representation for
previouslymarginalized groups, including thefarLeft,which had been
banned from the legislature since the 1940s. In 2004, three groups
linked to the NPA won seats, including Bayan Muna, which received
over one million votes (Commission on Elections 2004). Veteran
communists may be in error if they see the party list as a means to
revolution. Granted, since 2001 Bayan Muna has directed state funds to
communist organizations and NPA zones (Laude 2004). But in the
contextof dwindling public support forradicalism, theparty-listcould
push the Left toward the non-violent secular and faith-based NGOs
working foruplift.Asked to explain his support forLeft party-listsin
2004, for instance, a mayor in Mindanao reasoned: "Except for the
armed struggle ... These are the guys who really make the programs for
the poor work" (Cayon 2004).
This recalls another scene from Cavite, where posters for
Anakpawis, the NPA party-list for students, and Senator Rodolfo
Biazon, a leader of the constitutionalist AFP, often appeared side by
side. Admittedly, the larger interests these candidates represent have
not fully embraced the rule of law, and many observers would prefer
that erstwhile guerillas and soldiers not run for office. But in contrast
towarlords and revolutionaries, such images symbolize the opportunity
to incorporate the Left into elections made more plausible by the
party-list.

The Question ofReligion

The secular revolution plays a central role in liberalism. It is often
overlooked that in theWest, the "separation of church and state" has
actually depended on three changes: first, the legal separation of church
and state authority and elimination of clerical authority over law and
policy; second, a decline in faith; and third, the removal of religion
from public life. Contrary toWestern experience, however, religious
politics has prospered in developing states. Filipino nationalism,
moreover, has exhibited a spiritual bent since the Spanish era, when
revolutionaries and outlaws touted millennial themes (Casanova 1993;
Juergensmeyer 1994; Sturtevant 1976). In any country, not just the
Philippines, public faithcarries implications forliberalismbeyond the
rule of law and due process. Even if politics were to become fully
liberal in those areas, secularism could remain incomplete.
In this context, the 2004 elections demonstrated the resilience of
anti-secular attitudes and institutions. On the first count of the separation
of church and state, the barrier between constitutional and clerical
remained stable. There is no state but
authority religion, public schools

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 The 2004 Philippine Elections 93

allow religious education and the judicial systemrecognizes Islamic

law in some cases forMuslims, who may constitute over 10 per cent of
a national population that is otherwise about 90 per cent Christian and
80 per cent Catholic. Separatists have occasionally established illegal
shariah courts (United States Department of State 2004).
On the second count, the country is comparatively religious
(Mangahas 1996). In the 2001 World Values Survey, 87 per cent of
respondents claimed that religion was "very important", the highest
percentage for any predominantly non-Muslim country, and 99 per
centbelieved inGod (Inglehart2004). In 2004, spiritualitytook centre
stage in the Mass for Peace and Credible Elections, where the major
presidential candidates, including President Arroyo, recited "The victory
is not mine to take but yours to give ... Grant us, O Lord, the perfect
expression of thepeople's will in this election" (Sy, 10May 2004).
The third count of the separation of church and state, public
religion, took a variety of forms in 2004. The elections again featured
partisan clerics. The Catholic hierarchy implicitlyopposed Poe, an
actor and crony of Estrada and others linked to the failed People Power
III against Arroyo. The Iglesia Ni Cristo, Independent Catholic Church,
and Catholic El Shaddai Movement endorsed Arroyo, and televangelist
Eddie Villanueva received over one million votes forpresident. Religious
block voting, on the other hand, did not materialize to the degree some
had anticipated (Mangahas, 12 July2004).
Despite these manifestations of faith, the public prefers religious
nationalism to outright theocracy. In the same 2001 World Values
Survey, majorities agreed that "politicians who don't believe in God are
unfit forpublic office" and favoured officialswith "strong religious
beliefs", themost support from any predominantly non-Muslim country.
But most also believed that clergy should not effect "how people vote"
or "government decisions" (Inglehart 2004). This ambivalence explains
why outspoken Catholic leaders failed to prevent the elections of former
General Ramos in 1992 and film star Estrada in 1998, or block state
initiatives on a number of policies (Abad 2001).
In 2004, partisan clerics again overshadowed the ongoing conflict
between church and state that has become a foundation of democracy
and constitutional liberalism. In the West, the religious challenge to
the state helped create the space for rights and liberties. The same
dynamic has coloured the Philippines since the reforms of the Second
Vatican Council, and the rise of the radical Left, compelled the Church
to pursue a centrist agenda of democracy, the rule of law, and human
rights.Though clergydid not challenge the legal separation of church
and state authority, this new mandate placed it in opposition to
Marcos, who called himself a liberal autocrat but became an illiberal

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 94 John L. Linantud

dictatoratop a kleptocratic state. As his regime became more abusive,

the Church increasingly used its national organization against him
(Youngblood 1990). Despite some internal schisms, the Church has
remained vigilant against a return to dictatorship, challenged anyone
it fearsmay become another Marcos, and mistrusted secular institutions
like theAFP and the business community. Before the 1998 polls,
for instance, thousands rallied with Aquino and Sin against a
constitutional amendment that would have allowed Ramos to run for
a second term. This consistency, and the malfeasance of others, has
helped it become the most trusted non-state and national institution
in a largely mistrustful polity.
The 2004 elections showcased the extent towhich the vacuum of
trust in other institutions has drawn the Church, and other faith-based
and secular NGOs, into political life.The polls energized groups of
overlapping membership and responsibilities, including Namfrel, the
Parish Pastoral Council forResponsible Voting (PPCRV), theCoalition
forHOPE, The Patriots, and others. In contrast toNamfrel, which relies
on clergy and faith-based staff but presents a secular face, the PPCRV
openly seeks a "political order ingrained with Gospel values" (Parish
Pastoral Council For Responsible Voting 2004). Both urged voters to
reject fraud and terrorism. The PPCRV Ten Commandments of
Responsible Voting, for instance, mixed democratic idealism with
religious nationalism.2
In an ideal world, the burden of election security would fall squarely
on the state. In the Philippines, themost dramatic evidence of the link
between religion, democracy, and the rule of law in 2004 was the
commitment by election watchdogs tomonitor local precincts. Namfrel
and others deployed hundreds of thousands of people to deter trouble,
record irregularities, and work with state authorities to reduce violence.
At one rally, clergy burned symbols of money and armed men to
illustratethe immoralityofvote selling and terrorism[PhilippineDaily
Inquirer, 9 May 2004).
Apart from election security, faith-based groups have emphasized
empowerment and responsibility, both important norms of democracy.
While others blamed failures on poverty or the American legacy, a
Namfrel clergyman frustrated by "dirty politics" concluded "While
we are always complaining about the poor delivery of government
services ... in the end we deserve the kind of political leaders we
have" (Serrano 2004).
Public activism, however, has drawn faith-based groups into
partisan disputes. As in prior elections, Namfrel and Church officials
received death threats. When the quick count showed Arroyo leading
Poe, a politico charged thatNamfrel had "stopped counting after the

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The 2004 Philippine Elections 95

results showed that its candidate was winning" (Diaz 2004). Similar
charges had already chipped Namfrers reputation. Interestingly, in
1998 themore openly spiritualPPCRV was more trustedby thepublic
than Namfrel. In 2001, after the controversial People Power II, barely
half of survey respondents trustedeitherNamfrel or Comelec (Laylo
2001, pp. 1-9).

People Power

People Power, which can be defined as a capital revolt against a

sitting head of state, has become a major focal point for the development
of constitutional liberalism and democracy. Since 1986, it has joined
political leaders, the AFP, Catholic Church, and thousands of people
together to demand a change of leadership. Advocates call it the
victory of the popular will over abuse of power, while critics argue
that it replaces due process with mob rule and a 21st century version
of investiture.
People Power is a legacy of theMarcos brand of illiberal autocracy
in several ways. One is partisan politics. The original anti-Marcos
coalition led by Corazon Aquino, Ramos, and Sin has triumphed in all
three People Power movements: I and II removed presidents Marcos
and Estrada, while III against Arroyo, and AFP coups intended to
spark popular revolts against Aquino and Arroyo in the late 1980s and
2003, failed. Some have argued that People Power II surreptitiously
reversed the 1998 presidential elections won handily by Estrada
(Abinales 2001). The failed putsch against Arroyo in 2001, moreover,
relied on bribes of military officers and protestors and ended with
several deaths (Linantud forthcoming).
The second part of theMarcos legacy in People Power, conversely,
is democratic idealism. In 1994 and 2001, over 60 per cent of survey
respondents answered "no" when asked "If people do not protest or
undertake "people power", can government be relied on to listen to the
grievances of the public, or not?" (Mangahas "2001": slide 16). By this
logic, the difficulty ofmaking the state accountable to ordinary people,
a key component of democracy, has legitimized
People Power.
Third, the public has remained loyal to the religious nationalism
depicted by the EDSA Shrine to People Power I inManila. In 2001, the
crowds that targeted Estrada gathered there after live telecasts showed
his supporters in the Senate attempt to block the introduction of key
evidence during his impeachment trial on charges of corruption. Though
critics charged that the move against Estrada reflected the will of only
a small minority inManila, a majority of national survey respondents
supported his removal, agreed that it reflected the "will of God", and

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96 John L. Linantud

tied the legitimacyof theArroyo regimetoPeople Power (SocialWeather

Stations 2002; Mangahas 2004 "2001": slide 11).
How can these apparent contradictions be resolved? From one
point of view, the three People Power movements have been consistent,
pittingblack sheep likeMarcos and Estrada againstold political families
represented by Aquino and Arroyo, military reformers led by Ramos,
cosmopolitan professionals and students inManila, and a Chinch fearful
of a return to illiberal autocracy. This would make them simultaneously
partisan, democratic and idealistic. On the other hand, People Power is
not a liberal device, since its initiation, conduct, and resolution are not
delineated in the constitution. Moreover, each iteration of People Power
has become less spontaneous, idealistic and pure, and more calculated,
realistic and corrupt. Even worse for proponents of liberal democracy,
the assimilation of People Power intopartisan politics might breed a
general refusal to accept the results of any election, no matter how
legitimate, and turn civil disobedience into anarchy without proper
leadership and sobriety.
Not surprisingly, People Power cast a long shadow on the elections
of 2004. Days before the 10May voting, Ramos reiterated the legitimacy
of People Power against "total, massive, willful, state-directed failure"
of elections (Contreras and Papa 2004). These sentiments underscored
the perception that no interested party had ruled out a capital revolt
if "necessary".
The congressional mandate to proclaim the new president by
30 June therefore became the unofficial deadline to challenge, negate,
or circumvent the official canvass through direct action. The opposition
tried to discredit the vote before the first ballots were cast by alleging
that AFP personnel would engineer an Arroyo victory. Truth be told, a
bishop concluded the charges were "not a joke" and a priest at the head
of a national NGO warned of a military coup (Riveraand Marfil 2004;
Frialde 2004). Immediately after the voting, thousands of Poe supporters
gathered to protest Arroyo's lead in exit polls and quick counts, and
Poe claimed that his operations were being sabotaged. From detention,
Estrada hinted "It's about time that people hold protests on the streets
to denounce the massive cheating" but Poe cautioned "Let us hope we
would not have to resort to using People Power" {Philippine Star,
14 May 2004; Dizon 2004).
The uncertainty mounted when Comelec ordered ABC TV, which
had Poe ahead of Arroyo, to stop its quick count on 16 May. The
administration argued that all quick counts but NamfrePs became
illegal once Comelec began the canvass. In the shadow of People
Power, however, many believed that the order was part of a

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The 2004 Philippine Elections 97

government plan to stifle criticism of Comelec, Namfrel, and exit

polls. Media and academic observers questioned the legality of the
order, and aManila archbishop called it "emerging authoritarianism"
(Lacson et al. 2004).
Poe attempted to exploit such fears.Copying the tacticsused by
Aquino in 1986, on 19 May he declared victory and announced plans
for an inauguration. Over a month later, on 29 June, his supporters
rallied in a finaland futileeffortto stop thecongressionalproclamation
of Arroyo as rumours circulated of an assassination plot against the
Speaker of theHouse (Albano 2004).
The attempt to foment People Power failed for two reasons. First,
the traditional victors in People Power backed Arroyo. Second, the
public did not believe that election fraud was total, massive, willful,
and state-directed, in large part because the confluence of the exit polls,
Namfrel and Comelec in favour of Arroyo supported the legitimacy of
the presidential canvass. In response tomedia investigation of opposition
charges, the secretary general of Namfrel even told reporters "You guys
are being taken for a ride" (Tubeza, 17 May 2004). Nevertheless, the
election featured an array of dirty tricks by all sides, and the gag order
was an ill-timed exercise of state power. Since such practices are likely
to continue in future elections, the inability of Poe to inspire a capital
revolt in 2004 was clearly a failure of circumstance rather than a
rejection of People Power itself.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the 2004 polls demonstrated that safer elections have

moved the country, however slightly, in the direction of liberal
democracy. In other areas, the growth of democracy has outpaced that
of constitutional liberalism, an imbalance that has created illiberal
democracy. The country has little choice but to accept elections, since
public opinion has rejected authoritarian and military government,
communist revolution, and theocracy. Even in the unlikely event that
the AFP managed to seize power inManila, under present conditions
domestic opinion would demand a quick return to the ballot.
The barriers to constitutional liberalism, on the other hand, have
been more fundamental than those to democracy. Even if election
violence continues to fall, government inefficiency, corruption, and
fraud would still present serious challenges. The true dilemma, however,
is that the growth of democracy has necessarily impeded certain parts
of liberalism: public faith and religious organizations are simultaneously
a
building blocks of democracy and the rule of law, but barriers to fully

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98 John L. Linantud

secular polity and society.This might arguably satisfythe immediate

needs of thePhilippines, but does not augurwell for
Western liberalism
as a comprehensive national project.
Finally, People Power is at once a blend of partisan rivalry,
democratic idealism, and religious nationalism that symbolizes the
replacement of illiberal autocracy with illiberal democracy. In 2004
People Power did not materialize because elites and residents ofManila
decided itwas not necessary. But since 1986 ithas become a legitimate
antidote to perceived abuses of state power. The goals are democratic,
but the methods are illiberal. If leaders have lost the right to govern,
they should be removed through elections. If People Power continues
to become a partisan device rather than an extraordinary response to an
unusual situation, itwill become increasingly arbitrary itself.

NOTES
1 The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao includes Marawi City and the

provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi. Residents
in national and local polls but also elect a separate Governor, Vice
participate
Governor, and
assembly.
2 "Thou shalt vote according to the dictate of your conscience, Thou shalt respect the
decision of othersin choosing their candidates, Thou shalt seek to know the moral

integrity, capabilities and other personal qualities of the candidates you will vote
for, Thou shalt strive to understand the issues, platform and programs of candidates
and parties your vote, Thou shalt not sell your vote, Thou
seeking shalt not vote for
candidates guns, goons, or gold, Thou shalt not vote for candidates with
using
records of graft and corruption, Thou shalt not vote for candidates just because of

"utang na loob", popularity, or Thou shalt not vote for candidates

pakikisama,
living an immoral life, Thou shalt put the welfare of the country above all else in

choosing the candidate you will vote for."

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John L. Linantud is currently an Assistant Professor of Political Science

in the Department of Social Sciences, at the University of Houston
Downtown, Texas, USA.

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