Parties and Elections in Philippine Politics

Author(s): A. B. VILLANUEVA
Source: Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 18, No. 2 (September 1996), pp. 175-192
Published by: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25798332 .
Accessed: 08/06/2014 10:08

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Contemporary Southeast Asia.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 112.209.1.124 on Sun, 8 Jun 2014 10:08:05 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Volume 18, Number 2, September 1996

Parties and Elections in

Philippine Politics

A. B. VILLANUEVA

One of the legacies of theMarcos regime is the proliferation of

political parties competing to win elections and control the
government. It is uncertain if this development will lead to a
multi-party system because only two of the six major parties
share control of the legislative branch. The appearance of a
two-party system can also be seen. This gives credence to the
view that the party system in the Philippines is still evolving.
Regardless of what will eventually arise, there is no evidence
on which to base the speculation that the weak, undisciplined,
non-ideological nature of these parties will change. In the elec
tion system, the role ofmoney has a decisive influence on voting
outcomes, so do voting blocs that are regionally and religiously
based. Voting turn-outs are high largely due to popular inter
est in politics, but voting outcomes do not always reflect the
people's choice if irregularities in the election process occur
and "goons, guns and gold" determine the results.

Introduction

Filipinos hold the dubious distinction of having had threedifferent

party systems since the birth of their democratic republic in 1946. For
almost a quarter of a century, competition between the Nacionalista
and Liberal parties for local, provincial and national office provided a
semblance of a two-party system. Although there was alternation of
power from one party to the other, the parties were very much alike in that
they had the same sources of support and they had virtually identical pro
grammes and policy goals. The hope for a genuine two-party system
175

This content downloaded from 112.209.1.124 on Sun, 8 Jun 2014 10:08:05 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 176 A.B. Villanueva

was dashed when martial law was declared by President Ferdinand

Marcos in 1971. This virtually immobilized all political parties. While
opposition parties were held in a state of suspended animation formore
than a decade, Marcos launched his movement for a new society under
the banner of the Kilusang Bayan Lipunan, popularly known as the
KBL, which became the only political group thatdominated Philip
pine politics until the election of 1978. During that election, the Laban
party,organizedbyNinoy Aquino fromhis prison cell,put up candidates
for the Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly).1 Soon all opposition
parties coalesced under the umbrella of UNIDO (the United Independ
ent Democratic Opposition) with Salvador Laurel as the leader. The
snap election of 1986 further united all opposition groups to support
the presidential ticket of Corazon Aquino and Salvador Laurel. However,
the only bond that kept the alliance together was their disdain forMarcos
and their opposition to his authoritarian rule. Once Marcos was out of
power, the alliance broke up into independent political parties with
their own leadership, political agendas, and organization. Against this
background, some students of politics have observed that the seeds of a
multi-party system have germinated. Ithas replaced the one-party system
of theMarcos era.
Filipinos have an election system inwhich voters choose their Presid
ent for a limited term of six years. Under the 1987 Constitution, the
President is prohibited from running for a second term. Since voters
could split their vote between the candidates for President and Vice
President, the election of a President from one party and a Vice-Presi
dent from another is a possibility, as itwas before martial law. Except
formembers of Congress, who are elected by 204 districts, the President,
Vice-President, and Senators are chosen at large by direct popular vote.
Voter participation in the election process does not include the nomina
tion of candidates because the primary system is not one of the country's
institutions of democracy. The nomination process is left to the political
parties through their conventions and slate makers. In this article, it
will be argued that party development, after the restoration of Filipino
democracy, appears to be evolving in the direction of a multi-party sys
tem.It isuncertain ifthiswill eventuallybloom fully.The partysystemis
still evolving and changes are taking place. Itwill also be argued that
thepolitics of election in thePhilippines is dominatedby an elite group
from the upper socio-economic strata with adequate resources to run a
political campaign. Moreover, the chances of success in election con
tests are enhanced by ethno-linguistic ties and cohesive regional and
religious voting blocs. Finally, there is always the spectre of possible
irregularities in the voting process.

This content downloaded from 112.209.1.124 on Sun, 8 Jun 2014 10:08:05 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Parties and Elections in Philippine Politics 177

TABLE 1
Major Political Parties, Presidential Candidates and Votes in 1992

Political Parties Presidential Candidates % of Votes

Liberal Jovito Salonga 10.16

LabanRamon Mitra, Jr. 14.64
Nacionalista Salvador Laurel 3.4
Lakas Fidel V. Ramos 23.59
Kilusang Bagong Lipunan Imelda R. Marcos 10.32
People's Reform Party Miriam Defensor-Santiago 19.67
Nationalist People's Coalition Eduardo Cojuangco 18.17

SOURCE: on Elections to the President

Report of the Commission and Congress of the
Republic of thePhilippines, Vol. 1 (1992), pp. 17, 61-62.

Party Development and Politics

Although many parties tried to stake their political fortunes in Philip

pine elections during the Aquino interregnum, only six major parties
were recognized by the Commission on Elections in the 1992 presidential
campaign. A seventh political party did not meet the deadline for filing.
Nevertheless, itparticipated in the contest by putting up its own candid
ate who came close to being the second woman to become the nation's
Pangulo or President (see Table 1).
The Lakas-NUCD (National Union of Christian Democrats), whose
presidential standard-bearer won the 1992 elections, was organized by
General Fidel V. Ramos, one of the leaders of the military mutiny that
forced Marcos to go into exile in Hawaii. Ramos ran against former
Speaker Ramon Mitra, Jr.during the presidential nominating process
of the Laban Party. Although Ramos won the presidency in the 1992
election, itwas a pyrrhic victory in that his party was in a minority in
both houses of the legislature. The Laban candidates won overwhelm
ingly in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Moreover, Ramos
won less than one-quarter of the total votes, making him the firstminor
ity President ever elected to that office. Another significant footnote to
this episode was the vice-presidential race. The voters split the ticket

by choosing the Nationalist People's Coalition candidate, Joseph Estrada,

over the Lakas candidate. Thus, the election result of 1992 was divided
among threepolitical parties: Lakas got the presidency, theNPC the
vice-presidency, and Laban took complete control of both chambers of
the legislature. The old Nacionalista and Liberal parties became shadows
of theirpast. They lost theirpopular appeal and are slowly fading into
history. So, too, is the KBL. The People's Reform Party (PRP), founded

This content downloaded from 112.209.1.124 on Sun, 8 Jun 2014 10:08:05 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 178 A.B. Villanueva

TABLE 2
Party Strengths in the Tenth Philippine Congress

Number ofMembers
Political Parties Senate House of Representatives
Laban 27
18
Lakas 2 128
NPC 2 27
LP ? 14
KBL 2 ?
NP ? 2
PRP 1 1
PDP 1 ?
IND 1 2
Total 24 204

Source: Philippine News, 9-15 August 1995, p. A6.

and organized by Miriam D.efensor-Santiago, surprised many political

pundits by securing 19.67 per cent of the total presidential votes, com
pared to 23.59 per cent of the votes received by the winner (see Table 1).
The percentage difference was so small (only 3.92 per cent) that the
losing candidate filed a protest in the Supreme Court.2 The PRP failed
to win a seat in Congress in 1992 but managed to secure one in the
Senate in 1995, unlike Lakas and the NPC which have several seats in
both legislative chambers (see Table 2).
An agreement for change was agreed to by Lakas-NUCD and Laban
in themid-term election of 1995. The alliance was a strategic design to
build a coalition in the legislative branch which would be supportive
of Ramos' programmes and policies. Moreover, Lakas was having diffi
culty in selecting a full slate of candidates to run for the twelve Senate
posts. Likewise, Laban's resources were less than adequate to finance a
national campaign for twelve senatorial candidates of its own. The alliance
was an unholy combination of candidates: Juan Flavier and Francisco
Tatad were on opposite sides in the
family planning issue; Juan Ponce
Enrile and Franklin Drillon were at odds on civil liberties; and Ramon
Mitra, Jr.,and Fidel V. Ramos ran against each other in the 1992 election.
Politics certainly is the art of the impossible for, in this case, it turned
adversaries into strange political bedfellows in a coalition. The key that
unlocked the door was a 50-50 agreement between Lakas-NUCD and
Laban calling for each party to split the ticket equally between them.
As icing on the cake, Lakas promised to contribute PI,000,000 to each

This content downloaded from 112.209.1.124 on Sun, 8 Jun 2014 10:08:05 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Parties and Elections in Philippine Politics 179

of the candidates. Laban also made contributions, but only to itsmem

bers on the ticket, amounting to P802,000 each.
The coalition won nine out of the twelve senatorial posts in 1995.
The outcome of the election was important to both parties. Lakas needed
Laban's support for its legislative initiatives. For its part, Laban needed
financial support from Lakas in order to survive. The political honey
moon was brief, however. Itwas not only over in six months, it ended in
a divorce. One reason why the coalition broke up was the inability of
the Lakas leadership to share power with the Laban leaders in the form
of Cabinet positions in the Ramos administration. Another reason was
the leadership struggle within the Senate in which Senate President
Edgardo Angara, who was also Laban party president, was ousted from
the top of the Senate hierarchy by an alliance of senators from both
parties. Malacanang officials were reported to be involved in this affair.
The straw that finally broke the earners back was the three legislative
proposals by the Lakas leadership:
? a change from a presidential to a parliamentary system so as to allow
Ramos to remain in office, not as President, because this is constitu
tionally not permissible, but as Prime Minister;
?
giving the executive branch more powers tomeet the challenge of
terrorism, which Laban leaders believed to be a threat to civil liberties
and tantamount to a return tomartial law reminiscent of the author
itarian regime ofMarcos; and
? tax to raise additional revenues needed for
expanding value-added
economic development, a move opposed by Laban because of its
nature.
regressive

Lakas leaders tried to salvage the coalition by suggesting the ap

pointment of a number of Laban leaders to some Cabinet posts,3 but the
die was already cast.
Not all Laban party congressmen and senators went along with the
decision of the party's executive committee to break away from the coali
tion. Some Laban mavericks of the Lower House denounced the decision
and criticized the action of the party leadership as arbitrary and undemo
cratic.4 The party's Secretary-General, Representative Hernando Perez
of Batangas, led a move to oust Senator Edgardo Angara,5 the party
president, and Senator Heherson Alvarez called for a party leadership
change.6 Another Laban member, Senator Orlando Mercado, resigned
from the party to protest the decision which, in his view, should have
been made by thewhole party rank and file.7 There was confusion inside
the Laban party organization, but things settled down when rebellious
members saw the handwriting on thewall: any attempt to force a change

This content downloaded from 112.209.1.124 on Sun, 8 Jun 2014 10:08:05 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 180 A.B. Villanueva

in the party's leadership structure would be an exercise in futility because

of a lack of support from party members. Party discipline was invoked
by some Laban leaders, but itwas never applied. Under the Laban con
stitution, party disloyalty constitutes grounds for expulsion, but party
leaders did not crack this whip to bring the renegades into line. Ifused
at all, itwould have had little effect because other political parties were
only too happy to accept new members. After all, as the venerable old
guardofFilipino politics, the lateAmang Rodriguez, aptlyput it,politics
is addition, not substraction. Moreover, party switching is not uncommon
in Philippine politics.8 Politicians change party identification as fast as
they change their clothes. Even if they decide not to find a home in
another political party, they can always stay as guests and run under
the banner of the host. Those with a national reputation and large re
sources are always welcome. Such was the case of Claro M. Recto, a
Nacionalista party leader who was a gadfly in theMagsaysay adminis
tration when he ran for the Senate as a guest candidate of the Liberal
Party in 1955. And itwas with Aquilino Pimental, the founder of the
PDP (Partidong Democratikong Pilipino), who ran as guest candidate
for vice-president of the Liberal Party in 1992. So, too, with Juan Ponce
Enrile, formerly with the KBL but who turned to Nacionalista and later
became a Liberal, running as a guest candidate of the Lakas-Laban
coalition in the 1995 mid-term election. In addition, Ferdinand
Marcos, Jr.,and Rosemarie Arenas were guest candidates of the Nation
alist People's Coalition in 1995. The young Marcos is a loyal KBL
member, while Arenas had no party affiliation at all (see Table 3).

The Politics ofElection

Campaign Finance, Violence, and Irregularities

To run a successful campaign for national office, it is helpful to have
the endorsement and financial backing of a major political party. Also

TABLE 3
Guest Candidates of Political Parties in Senatorial Elections

Political Party Guest Candidate Election Year

LP Claro M. Recto 1955

LP Aquilino Pimentel 1992
NPC Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. 1995
NPC Rosemary Arenas 1995
Lakas-NUCD Juan Ponce Enrile 1995

This content downloaded from 112.209.1.124 on Sun, 8 Jun 2014 10:08:05 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Parties and Elections in Philippine Politics 181

TABLE 4
Campaign Expenditures ofWinning Senatorial Candidates
in the 1995 Election

Senatorial Candidates Total Expenditures in Pesos

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 13,799,320.70

Anna Dominique Coseteng 2,000,000.00
Franklin Drillon 7,726,060.24
Juan Ponce Enrile 19,718,227.52
Marcelo Fernan 10,030,614.64
JuanM. Flavier 4,515,946.41
B. Honasan 6,023,804.35
Gregorio
Ramon Magsaysay, Jr. 5,634,690.21
Sergio Osmena III 13,323,877.00
Raul S. Roco 6,023,804.35
Miriam Defensor-Santiago 9,289,350.00
Francisco Tatad 5,883,049.00
Source: Commission on Elections,
Legal Department.

TABLE 5
Violence and Casualties in Philippine Elections

Violence Related
Incidents Casualties

1986 364 151

1987 234 87
1988 268 149
1992 87
60

Total 447
953

Source: on Elections to the President

Report of the Commission and

Congress of theRepublic of thePhilippines Vol. 1 (1992), p. 41.

helpful are contributions from various sources. A large campaign chest

could enable a candidate to travel to various parts of the archipelago
and to buy political advertisement space on television networks, radio
stations, nationally circulating newspapers and other paraphernalia used
in the election game. When one looks at the total expenditure of each
winning candidate in the 1995 mid-term election (see Table 4), there
appears to be a relationship between the voting outcome and the amount
of money spent. The winners in the 1995 election spent millions of

This content downloaded from 112.209.1.124 on Sun, 8 Jun 2014 10:08:05 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 182 A.B. Villanueva

pesos, ranging from a low of P2,000,000 to a high of P19,000,000. Most

of these funds came from the personal resources of the candidates,
donations from supporters, and contributions from private organiza
tions. If there is any moral to be learned from these figures, it is the role
thatmoney plays in national elections.
There are some disturbing aspects of Philippine elections thatmake
them less than clean, fair and free. Among these are the violent nature
of the campaigns and the irregularities that take place in the polling
booths on election day. An election without violence and casualties
would be a miracle in Philippine political campaigns. As Table 5 shows,
there were 866 violence-related incidents and 447 casualties reported
to the Commission on Elections during the last three elections. One
causal factor stems from the nature of Philippine politics. Politics has
become a preoccupation. Filipinos take politics deep into their hearts.
They cannot live without it. They look at their candidates not just as
persons to be chosen but heroes to be revered and, ifneed be, defended
by any means. Another contributory cause is attributed to some un
scrupulous politicians who are warlords in their districts. Their pri
vate armies, consisting mostly of goons and confidence tricksters, not
only protect their political employer but also terrorize his opponents.
These bodyguards are capable of anything that promotes and protects
the interests of their candidate. A third causal factor is the law enforce
ment system. The implementation of law and order leaves much to be
desired because there are not enough police to guard the sanctity of the
ballot, especially in areas designated as hot spots by the Commission
on Elections. Election watchers from civic groups may be present in
some precincts, but they are like ?
watchdogs they can bark but can
not bite.
Election precincts are the hotbed of irregularities. The long history
of the ballot system and the country's political culture have contrib
uted to this situation. Since the voter writes in the names of candidates
for national, provincial and local offices, unscrupulous supporters of
some candidates stall in the booth so as "to pre
deliberately polling
vent thousands of voters from casting their ballots".9 The practices
of Bawas and Lanzadera complicate the situation. In Bawas, election
canvassers friendly to a candidate take away votes from one candidate
and add them to another. When the official results are reported to
the higher levels of canvassers, they can be further manipulated to
a
help friendly candidate who is in danger of losing an election. The
practice of Lanzadera is vividly described by the Commission on
Elections:

This content downloaded from 112.209.1.124 on Sun, 8 Jun 2014 10:08:05 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Parties and Elections in Philippine Politics 183

A cheating voter is paid by one party to introduce into the system a

fake ballot (or even a genuine but stolen one) which has been filled
up before he enters the polling place. While he accepts the blank
ballot from the BEI (Board of Election Inspectors), he keeps this in
his pocket and instead drops the previously accomplished ballot in
the box. He surrenders the clean ballot to the group outside, to be
filled up again by the syndicate, and to be given out to the next voter
in the chain.10

Although the Commission on Elections has devised preventive

measures, it is offset by the effects of the political culture of the people.
It is not a trait in the Philippine cultural matrix to be dishonest and
unfair. Nevertheless, when one is a compadre (baptismal or wedding
sponsor of one's child) of a candidate for public office, it is an obligation
to help that candidate win in the community by any means. Likewise,
for the sake of pakikisama (the art of getting along) one cannot risk
social ostracism of friends by refusing to alter the voting outcome in
favour of their candidate. Likewise, one has to do what needs to be
done to reciprocate an utang na loob (debt of gratitude) even if it calls
for some sacrifice, suffering, cutting corners, or crossing the line to avoid
shameful condemnation as an ingrate for not honouring one's social
obligation. Undoubtedly, these customs are unethical and immoral at
best, and illegal and contemptible at worst. But to Filipinos, they are
socially acceptable in the context of their cultural milieu.

Bloc Voting and Voting Behaviour

An interesting theory of Philippine presidential elections that has been
uncritically accepted is the role of ethno-linguistics and bloc voting by
religious groups in influencing voting behaviour.11 In fact, former Presid
ent Diosdado Macapagal attributed his defeat by Ferdinand Marcos in
the presidential election of 1965 to the votes of the clannish Ilocanos in
members of the Iglesia ni
the "Solid North" and the loyal and faithful
Cristo church. The so-called "Solid North" refers to the northern Luzon
provinces whose lingua franca is the Ilocano dialect (see Figure 1).
It includes the Cordillera Autonomous Region, consisting of the prov
inces of Abra, Kalinga-Apayao, Ifugao, Mt. Province and Benguet. The
western part lies at the shorelines of the China Sea and includes the
provinces of Ilocos Norte (the home province of the late Ferdinand Marcos),
Ilocos Sur (the home province of the late President Elpidio Quirino),
La Union, and Pangasinan. The eastern section of the region is at the
of the Pacific Ocean. The island province of Batanes, which is
edge
located between Luzon and Taiwan has also been considered a part of

This content downloaded from 112.209.1.124 on Sun, 8 Jun 2014 10:08:05 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
184 A.B. Villanueva

FIGURE 1
The Philippines

This content downloaded from 112.209.1.124 on Sun, 8 Jun 2014 10:08:05 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Parties and Elections in Philippine Politics 185

FIGURE 2
Provinces in the "Solid North"

1 - Batanes
2 - IlocosNorte
3 - Abra
4 - Ilocos Sur
5 - La Union
6 -
- Pangasinan
7 Benguet
8 -
Ifugao
9 - Mt. Province
10 -
- Kalinga-Apayao
11 Cagayan
12 - Isabela <3
13 -
Quirino
14 -
NuevaVizcaya
9

11

12

This content downloaded from 112.209.1.124 on Sun, 8 Jun 2014 10:08:05 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 186 A.B. Villanueva

the region (see Figure 2). One-tenth or 11 per cent of the nation's voters
come from this region. One study by a political scientist found a cor
relation between the ethno-linguistic variable and the outcome of
presidential elections.12 Another study confirmed this voting phenomenon,
pointing to the presidential elections in the 1960s as prime examples.13
In 1961, 71 per cent of the Ilocano vote helped Diosdado Macapagal
beat the incumbent President Carlos P. Garcia. The Ilocanos voted for
Macapagal, a Pampango, out of respect for his wife, who speaks fluent
Ilocano. But in 1965, Macapagal lost the Ilocano vote. Ferdinand Marcos,
the idol of the Ilocos region, secured 80 per cent of the votes.
In the recent elections, however, the "Solid North" did not vote as
cohesively as itused to. The dam broke in 1992. Fidel Ramos, who was
born in Ilocos Norte and speaks the dialect, lost the region. In a six-way
race, he received only 26.81 per cent of the Ilocano vote. He was beaten
by Eduardo Cojuangco, a Tagalog from Tarlac province and friend of
Marcos, who got 27.29 per cent. Even though this is less than a percent
age point, ithas cracked thewall of the "Solid North". Ramos won 62.5
per cent of the votes in Pangasinan where he grew up, but lost badly in
Ilocos Norte, Hocus Sur and La Union ? the heartland of Ilocandia. It is
fair to say that Ilocanos used the election to punish Ramos forwhat he
did to his second cousin (Marcos) in the notorious EDSA (Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue) demonstration led by military mutineers and joined by
Ramos, then Vice-Chief of Staff of the Philippine Armed Forces, and
Juan Ponce Enrile, who was the Secretary of Defence. Cojuangco's victory
has been attributed to the support of formerMarcos political leaders in
the region. It is important to point out that Imelda Marcos/widow of the
late President, came in third in northern Luzon with 24.74 per cent of
the Ilocano vote, despite the fact that she does not speak the dialect at
all. Her respectable share of the vote reflects the sympathy of the
Ilocanos, whom Marcos loved and who loved him (see Table 6).
The presidential contest in 1953 between Elpidio Quirino and Ramon
Magsaysay further cast doubts on the credibility of the ethno-linguistic
variable in Filipino voting behaviour. Quirino was an Ilocano from the
province of Ilocos Sur. Magsaysay was from the Zambales province,
where the people speak both Ilocano and Zambaleno. The "Solid North"
gave Quirino 54 per cent of the votes but he lost the presidency to his
opponent. He would have won the election if:
? his Ilocano vote had been as overwhelming as itwas when he was
elected in 1949;
? his share of the Ilocano vote was comparable to theMacapagal votes
in 1951 and theMarcos votes in 1965; and
?
Magsaysay did not speak Ilocano.

This content downloaded from 112.209.1.124 on Sun, 8 Jun 2014 10:08:05 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 TABLE 6
Presidential Votes inNorthern Luzon Provinces and Cities
(In per cent)

Presidential Candidates
Province Cojuangco Laurel Marcos Mitra Ramos

Abra 39.59 .28 38.72 5.42 8.47

Baguio City 26.58 1.82 9.15 6.82 14.35

Batanes 16.85 .80 1.43 11.17 28.17

Benguel 13.26 .60 4.33 30.05 21.21

Cagayan 25.23 .38 45.18 10.97 10.69

Ifugao 7.10 1.08 20.08 16.65 32.32

Ilocos Norte 21.71 .38 68.59 1.79 3.51
Ilocos Sur 32.57 .69 38.61 12.40 7.54
Isabela 43.77 .86 21.20 6.73 13.17

Kalinga-Apayao 18.22 .84 23.02 22.23 12.65

La Union 43.96 .84 27.88 3.38 10.41
Mt. Province 10.52 1.20 3.64 13.71 39.35
Nueva Vizcaya 29.89 .70 20.18 18.28 15.61

Pangasinan 20.30 .35 8.07 3.67 62.58

Quirino 21.74 1.78 14.08 26.38 20.75

Total 27.29 .64 24.74 8.75 26.81

SOURCE: Commission on Elections, Records and Statistics Division, 1992.

This content downloaded from 112.209.1.124 on Sun, 8 Jun 2014 10:08:05 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 188 A.B. Villanueva

TABLE 7
Quirino's Votes inNorthern Luzon in the
1953 Presidential Election

Provinces and Cities % of Total Votes Cast

Abra 71
Baguio City 46
Batanes 46
Cagayan 71
Ilocos Norte 58
Ilocos Sur 76
Isabela 41
La Union 75
Mt. Province 31
Nueva Vizcaya 39
Pangasinan 46
SOURCE: Jorge R. Coquia, The Philippine Presidential Election
of 1953 (Manila: University Publishing Co., 1954).

Itcan be stated that,in the lightof thevotingdata inTable 7, there

seem to be multiple cracks in the "solid North" through which some
Ilocano votes flowed, potentially decreasing the chances of electoral
victory of their favourite son.
The religious variable in Filipino voting behaviour is another in
triguing piece of the puzzle. This variable has two sub-sets: the bloc
votes of the Iglesia ni Cristo and the Catholics. The Iglesia voting bloc
is estimated to be 700,000 voters, who follow the admonition of their
leader Erano Manalo.14 It is said to be themost cohesive voting bloc but
there has been no scientific empirical study done to substantiate this
phenomenon. It is also said to be the swing vote in presidential elections.
The vote of this religious bloc could make the difference between victory
and defeat for any candidate. Macapagal blamed the Iglesia vote for the
failure of his 1965 quest for a second term.15 In non-presidential elections,
however, the influence of the Iglesia vote needs to be qualified. Consider
the mid-term election of 1995. Erano Manalo, the high priest of the
Iglesia hierarchy, endorsed seven candidates of the Lakas-Laban coalition,
three from the Nationalist People's Coalition and two from the Reform
Party-Independent Alliance.16 When the winners were proclaimed by
the Commission on Elections, all the Lakas-Laban can
Iglesia-endorsed
didates won, but two who were not endorsed by the Iglesia also won.
Only one of the Iglesia-endorsed candidates of the Nationalist People's
Coalition won. The two candidates of the Reform Party-Independent

This content downloaded from 112.209.1.124 on Sun, 8 Jun 2014 10:08:05 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Parties and Elections in Philippine Politics 189

alliance backed by the Iglesia also won. It could be suggested that this is
an aberration in Iglesia voting behaviour, but the causal factors respons
ible for the deviation calls for some research.
The Catholic vote is the biggest voting bloc in the nation because
most Filipinos belong to the Catholic Church.17 They constitute about
85 per cent of the total population. According to some political pundits,
whoever is endorsed by the Church gets the Catholic vote. However,
is flawed because
nothing has been further from the truth. This theory
the Church hierarchy does not endorse candidates. The Church is access
ible to any candidate who comes to visit with the Cardinal. It gets
involved in social issues that are matters of concern to the Church,
such as population-control policies through family planning and tax
in the form of expansion of the value-added tax.Whoever gets
policies
the Church's support is a matter which individual priests and nuns
have to decide, not the hierarchy. As towhether the Church's endorse
ment is crucial to an electoral success, there is no empirical evidence
to validate this view. One could argue that, even if such endorsement
occurs, its effect on voting behaviour is of little or no significance. For one
thing, many Catholics do not go to church regularly or attend Sunday
mass where important messages of the church are delivered from the
are are more honoured when
pulpit. Even if endorsements made, they
they are breached than when they are observed. Even the prelate of the
church, Cardinal Sin, does not necessarily do what he says. In 1992, he
endorsed Ramon Mitra, Jr., for President but voted for Fidel Ramos,
who was a Protestant. He must have regretted his decision when Presid
ent Ramos presented a legislative agenda that included family planning
to control population growth, which is increasing at an alarming rate,
well beyond the of the nation to sustain. Cardinal Sin urged
capacity
the faithful to oppose this policy initiative.18

Conclusion
A proliferationofpolitical partieshas emerged in thePhilippines since
the demise of the one-party system in 1986. These parties have come
into being under the leadership of a younger generation of politicians
committed to the use of democratic institutions as instruments of polit
ical change. Although the number of parties is still growing, itwould
be inappropriate to conclude that a multi-party system is evolving. This
would be hard to defend since it rests on shaky grounds.A multiple
party system does not necessarily follow from the existence of six major
when only two of these parties have any chance of
political parties
elections. It would be more defensible to conclude that the
winning

This content downloaded from 112.209.1.124 on Sun, 8 Jun 2014 10:08:05 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 190 A.B. Villanueva

partysystemin thePhilippines is stillevolving.Whether itwill develop

into a two-party system, which is hoped for by some in the media, or
bloom into a multi-party system is uncertain at this stage of party devel
opment. Philippine politics is so volatile and in such a state of flux that
predicting the shape and formof theparty systemwould be a difficult
undertaking. With the lop-sided, overwhelming domination of the Laban
Party in the Senate, how could this bode well for a truly genuine two
party system? Likewise, with no programmatic differences between Laban
and Lakas-NUC, how can one argue that a two-party system is evolving?
Filipinos live in an open political system. Their level of participation
in the electoral process ismuch higher than that of their counterparts
in the United States. More than 70 per cent of the voters go to the polls
? a reflection of their interest in and commitment to demo
(see Table 8)
cracy. Whether or not the voters have reached a level ofmaturity essential
to theviability and stabilityof theirpolitical institutionswill be the
subject of debate for some
time. Itmust be pointed out that the occur
rence of violence and irregularities in some elections hardly reflects a
high level ofmaturity. When one examines the presidential elections of

TABLE 8
Voting Turnout by Regions in the 1995 Election

Percentage of Vote by Gender

Regions Male Female Both Sexes

National Capital Region 56.52 56.95 56.75

Cordillera Autonomous Region 74.81 74.01 74.42

Region I 80.12 79.02 79.57

Region II 72.31 72.02 72.17

Region III 71.00 72.11 71.55

Region IV 70.68 72.06 71.37

Region V 75.92 77.68 76.81

Region VI 74.93 76.64 75.79

Region VII 75.62 77.06 76.35

Region VIII 74.92 76.54 75.75

Region IX 67.32 67.31 67.32

Region X 75.41 76.82 76.10

Region XI 66.14 67.58 66.83

Region XII 60.25 70.35 70.30

National Average 70.33 71.07 70.69

SOURCE: Commission on Elections, Records and Statistics Division, 1995.

This content downloaded from 112.209.1.124 on Sun, 8 Jun 2014 10:08:05 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Parties and Elections in Philippine Politics 191

1953,1961 and 1965 ? all ofwhich were considered clean, honest and
free ? there is substance to the view that Filipino voters have an excel
lent potential for political maturity. The ethno-linguistic factor, as a
determinant of voting behaviour, is generally valid but more verification
is essential. It needs to be redefined and qualified. Deviations from the
norm have taken place as the Ilocano vote in the "solid North" shows.
The religious variable carries some influence as far as the Iglesia voting
bloc is concerned, but the Catholic vote carries very little weight, if at
all. The Catholic vote does not have the cohesion that the Iglesia voters
have. Most Catholic voters are an independent political flock.

NOTES
1. Max V. Soliven, "Laban: An Honoured Name Debased by Too Much Political Flim

flammery", Philippine Star, 11 February 1996.

2. Santiago vs. Ramos, P.E.T. Case No. 001,13 February 1996.
3. Manila 4 February
Chronicle, 1996, p. 10; Malaya, 5 February 1996, p. 1; Today, 5
February 1996, p. 1; and Manila Standard, 7 February 1996, p. 7.
4. Cynthia D. Balana, "Senate Coalition Continues", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 6 Feb
ruary 1996, p. 3;Willie Ng, "Can Ramos Hold the Coalition Together?", Manila Bulletin,
5 February 1996, p. 8; and Petronila Bn. Daroy, "Laban: The Anomaly of Political
Parties", Manila Standard, 7 February 1996.
5. Malaya, 8 February 1996, pp. 1 and 6; Manila Times, 8 February 1996, pp. 1 and 8.
6. Manila Chronicle, 14 February 1996, p. 1, and 15 February 1996, p. 6; Philippine
Star, 13 February 1996, pp. 1 and 10.
7. Manila Bulletin, 7 February 1996, pp. 1 and 22; Manila Chronicle, 7 February 1996,
pp. 1 and 6; Philippine Daily Inquirer, 7 February 1996, pp. 1 and 6;Manila Standard,
7 February 1996.
8. Carl H. Lande, Factions
Leaders, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics,
Monograph Series No.
6, Southeast Asian Studies (Yale University, 1965), p. 50.
9. Report of the Commission on Elections to the President and Congress of the Republic
of the Philippines, 11 May 1992, vol. 1, p. 9.
10. Ibid., p. 34.
11. Mar-Vic Munar, "Hometown Decision", Philippine Free Press, 22 April
Cagurangan
1995, pp. 7-8, 33.
12. Hirufumi Ando, "A Study of Voting Patterns in the Philippine Presidential and
Senatorial Elections, 1946-1965", Midwest Journal of Political Science 13, no. 4

(November 1969): 567-86.

13. Harvey A. Averch, et al., The Matrix of Policy in the Philippines (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1971), pp. 64-65.

14. James Saspa, "The Iglesia Factor", Philippine Free Press, 20 May 1995, p. 7.
15. Diosdado Macapagal, A Stone for theEdifice:Memoirs of a President (Quezon City:
Mac Publishing House, 1968), p. 421.
16. "What Alliance?" Philippine Free Press, 13 May 1995, p. 20.

This content downloaded from 112.209.1.124 on Sun, 8 Jun 2014 10:08:05 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 192 A.B. Villanueva

17. Mar-Vic Munar, "What Catholic Vote?" Philippine Free Press, 1 April
Cagurangan
1995, pp. 14-16, 28.
18. Philippine News, 7-13 December 1994, pp. 1, A-12; and Philippine Star, 18 Feb

ruary 1996, p. 4.

A.B. Villaneuva is Professor of Political Science at Western Illinois

University.

This content downloaded from 112.209.1.124 on Sun, 8 Jun 2014 10:08:05 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions