THE PHILIPPINES: Gloria "in Excelsis"

Author(s): Paul A. Rodell

Source: Southeast Asian Affairs, (2002), pp. 215-236
Published by: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)
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Southeast Asian Affairs 2002, pp. 215-36

THE PHILIPPINES
Gloria inExcelsis

Paul A. Rodell

Philippine political life always holds the potential for theatre and volatility, but

going into 2001 no one could have predicted the momentous events that
would soon rock the nation. By year's end, the Philippines had seen more
drama than most other countries witness in a decade.
In January, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, who is often referred to by
a
his nickname "Erap", was overthrown by massive uprising that quickly became
known as "People Power 2", named after the first People Power revolution that

toppled Estrada's friend, Ferdinand Marcos, fourteen years earlier. By April,

Estrada was arrested on charges of economic plunder, a crime punishable by
death, and his enraged supporters among the poor of Metro Manila took to
the streets. Their effort to overthrow the new government of President Gloria
was soon dubbed EDSA 31 and a showdown occurred in the
Macapagal-Arroyo
early morning of 1 May outside Malacanang,
hours the presidential palace,
which only narrowly fell short of success. Elections later that month reinforced
the new President's regime even ifher hold on power continued to be tenuous
as her allies gained only a slim majority in the important Philippine Senate.
to the political excitement was the investigation of numerous
Adding
an Estrada
charges against Senator Panfilo Lacson, loyalist and the former
head of the erstwhile Presidential
Anti-Organized Crime Task Force. However,
because of poor evidence and unreliable witnesses the charges have remained
unproven. The year was also filled with rumours of possible military coups and
bomb threats, some supposedly linked to individuals close to Lacson, and ad
hocmilitary groups whose origins can be traced to the last years of the Marcos
Meanwhile, the criminal case against Estrada degenerated over questions
regime.
about the competence and reliability of the judges and after the Supreme
Court mandated changes, the proceedings were to early 2002.
postponed
Even as May's election ballots were still being tallied and disputed, the
notorious Abu Sayyaf guerrilla group staged another mass kidnapping. By
was isolated on
year's end the crisis was not resolved, but the Abu Sayyaf gang
Basilan Island by a large and determined military force, despite serious initial

Paul A. Rodell is an Assistant Professor in the Department of History of Georgia

Southern University, and Executive Director of theAssociation of Third World Studies.

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216 Paul A. Rodell

difficulties and charges of military corruption and collusion with the kidnappers.

Additionally, the horrifying events of 11 September thrust the Abu Sayyafs

activities on to the world stage and the President gained substantial U.S. military
and economic support as she lined up solidly behind George W. Bush's "War
on Terrorism". in December Nur Misuari, governor of the Autonomous
Finally,
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and former guerrilla leader of the
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), led a brief unsuccessful revolt after

being manoeuvred out of power. Misuari fled toMalaysia where he was

promptly
arrested, an ignoble end to a once dynamic leader.
One bright spot was the economy that seemed to be making something of
a rebound after the costly Estrada years. By the end of 2001, there were some

hopeful signs of better times ahead. In addition, the Supreme Court rendered
a important decision in the Marcos era cocofund levy case. WTiile
potentially
the final settlement of this case probably lies in the distant future, lesson to be
drawn from the mixing of politics and business in the Philippines should not
be overlooked.

Through all the political, judicial, economic, ethnic, and military problems,
President Macapagal-Arroyo has stood like an island of stability and maturity.
She has done especially well in foreign affairs even while her domestic agenda

proceeds in fits and starts, and the economy barely holds steady. Her ruling
coalition has held together, the military is loyal, and her approval rating remains

respectable, and has even increased among former Estrada voters.

Ousting Erap
In October 2000, Luis "Chavit" llocos Sur's governor, and scion of
Singson,
that province's powerful political family, broke from his crony and political

ally, Philippine President Joseph Estrada. Singson's break soon took on more
seriousness than a simple political parting of the ways when he declared that
Estrada headed a national gambling syndicate and skimmed a percentage of
the profits from jueteng, a low-tech numbers game played mostly by the rural
poor.
As an acknowledged co-conspirator, Singson's testimony gained
instantaneous credibility and before long, additional revelations emerged
alleging that the President siphoned off tax revenues from the tobacco

industry, manipulated the stock market for friends, and was connected to

smuggling operations. Furthermore, damaging reports by the Philippine

Center for Investigative Journalism identified a series of mansions Estrada
built for his numerous mistresses, the shady business practices of family
members, and his associations with Mark Jimenez, a fugitive extradited from
the United States, and former Marcos crony Lucio Tan, among other shadowy
characters.2

In an unprecedented move, the House of Representatives gathered the

necessary votes to require the Senate to initiate impeachment proceedings.

Malacanang's allies were unsuccessful in attempts to block the hearings, and

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The Philippines: Giona inExcelsis 217

soon Filipinos were riveted to their television and radio sets as witnesses detailed
the process of collecting and delivering pay-offs and even how Estrada signed
the name Jose Velarde on bank records for his false accounts into which the
monies were deposited. Even as the legislators debated points of evidence and
cross-examined witnesses, an "Erap Resign" movement soon
spread throughout
the metropolitan area and to a number of provinces. Prominent in the
demonstrations wereformer presidents Coraz?n Aquino and Fidel V. Ramos,

along with outspoken Manila Archbishop Cardinal Jaime Sin. Despite the
defection of dozens of lawmakers from Estrada's party, and the resignations of
his trade secretary, five senior economic advisers, and Vice-President Gloria
from her Cabinet of secretary of social welfare, an
Macapagal-Arroyo position
informal tally showed supporters in the Senate were in the
that the President's

majority, making impeachment unlikely. The only hope was the possibility that
one or more of the Estrada senators might bolt to the
opposition.
Theproverbial straw that broke the camel's back, came on 16 January
2001 when the senators voted on whether or not to open an envelope alleged
to contain key bank account documents. An earlier envelope had already

produced damning evidence about the Velarde account and it was believed
that the second would definitively prove Estrada's guilt. The debate before the
vote was particularly acrimonious and when the hands were shown all hopes
that one or more of the President's supporters might cross the political divide
were dashed. The vote was a close 11 to 10. This bitter defeat for the

impeachment proponents was made worse when Senator Teresa Aquino-Oreta

an
danced impromptu jig to taunt her out-voted foes. Unfortunately for her
and Estrada, all of the Philippines saw her as it was
disrespectful display
broadcast on national television. Senate President Aquilino Pimentel, Jr.
immediately announced his resignation from his position and with the loss of
his respected and impartial leadership, the team of prosecutors walked out.3
The proceedings were dead. Filipinos would vent their frustrations in massive
street demonstrations.

Crowds very quickly and seemed to have done so for reasons

mobilized
that were not
fully appreciated at the time. One clear factor was that the

resignation movement was already well established and necessary alliances and
logistics were already in place. As well, Filipinos take pride in the original
so there was
People Power revolt of 1986 that ousted the Marcos government;
a feeling that going back to the barricades was something that could be done
was even a patriotic duty. But by 2001, the modern media,
successfully, and
and especially contemporary communication an
technology, played
role. Unlike the Marcos years when the media was tightly
unprecedented
controlled, during Estrada's presidency the country's television networks and
its newspapers were free, and the population was already fully informed and
had already considered the evidence against their President. Additionally, the
craze contributed
nation's cell phone textmessaging directly to the mobilization
effort.4 Friends quickly and inexpensively sent textmessages to each other and

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218 Paul A. Rodeil

some
kept the spirit of resistance going through anti-Erap jokes, quite lewd,
and the co-ordination of many thousands of people was greatly simplified. To
a surprising degree,, this was a cell phone text message revolution.
This time Filipinos did not wait
for the Archbishop to call them to the
streets as he had done against Marcos. One hour after the trial broke down,
student protesters gathered noisily on Katipunan Road in front of the Jesuit

university the Ateneo de Manila, a short distance from the main campus of the

University of the Philippines. Then they marched to the EDSA shrine, a giant
statue dedicated to Our Lady Queen of Peace and erected in honour of the
1986 anti-Marcos movement. When they arrived, the area around the shrine
was already filled with protesters from all over Metro Manila. Cardinal Sin
arrived to say mass and address the crowd. This time itwas the
at midnight
Cardinal responding to the people, not they responding to him.
Former President Ramos returned from an overseas trip and marched
from the airport to the demonstration, picking up supporters along the way.
The protesters were also getting support from many other quarters. Businessmen
from the nearby suburban financial issued an especially
district of Makati

damaging pro-resignation statementby eightendorsed

business groups, while
simultaneous demonstrations were staged at a number of locations around the

country from the Batanes islands in the north, to Zamboanga City on the tip
of Mindanao in the south.5 Soon, the area around the shrine was filled with

opposition figures, resigned government officials, and

former Estrada allies.

Especially poignant were the defections of Cavite governor Ramon Revilla, Jr.,
Estrada's godson, and movie star and former girlfriend Nora Aunor who
described how Estrada beat her "like a punching bag".
Many observers soon noted that the crowd at the EDSA shrine behaved
much differently from that which came out to oppose the government in
1986. Even in his last days, Marcos was still feared and there was no assurance
that the small military mutiny the protesters came out to protect would spread.
In 1986, the possibility of violence was very real as soldiers and tanks approached
the city's masses huddled on the EDSA highway. But there was no evidence of
fear among the anti-Estrada rally participants. Instead, the atmosphere was
as the crowd welcomed a
jubilant parade of celebrities and enjoyed a near
continuous concert delivered by some of the country's leading entertainers.
This was a political rally where the youth played a key role both in supplying
numbers and taking initiative. It was as though a new generation was laying its
claim to political participation.
But the story behind the story was the role played by Armed Forces
chief of staff General Angelo Reyes who met with his most trusted officers
on 18 January to evaluate the condition of the military and the possibility
of violence. By the following morning he had decided that he must pre

empt some adventurous officers from moving against the crowd. To do so,
he would have to defect to the opposition and take the entire Armed
Forces high command with him. General Reyes notified Macapagal-Arroyo

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The Philippines: Giona inExcelsis 219

of his plan, and then called Estrada and asked him to resign for the good
of the country. Not receiving a satisfactory response from Estrada, Reyes
spent the remainder of the day lining up the support of the commanding
officers branch of the military. At 4 p.m., he and six of his fellow
of each

commanding officers plus Defence Secretary Orlando Mercado joined the

EDSA demonstrators.6 Erap's fate was sealed.
In a last desperate move, Estrada proposed a snap election in
holding
which he would not stand for re-election. But, with the massive crowd of
demonstrators set to march on
the palace, a team of opposition negotiators
rejected this option and demanded his immediate departure from office. In
his last hours, Estrada decided not to submit a formal letter of resignation
after he heard that the Supreme Court had declared the office of the President
vacant, thus clearing the way forMacapagal-Arroyo'selevation. Instead, Estrada
declared that he was merely taking leave, and vowed to challenge the legality
of anyone else taking over the presidency. At noon on Saturday, 20 January
2001, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took the oath of office as the country's 14th
President, and two hours later, Estrada and his immediate family left the
presidential palace using a back-door route of the Pasig River to avoid the
crowds outside Malacanang's gate.7

New Administration ? and New Direction?

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is the product of a prominent political lineage and
came into office with exceptional
personal qualifications. She was in her early
teens when her late father, Diosdado Macapagal, was elected President in 1961
and in political philosophy she is very much her father's daughter. After

graduating with honours from Manila's prestigious Assumption College, she

attended Georgetown University inWashington, D.C. where she was a classmate
of Bill Clinton. She cut short her U.S. studies tomarry lawyer and businessman
"Mike" and returned to the classroom as a teacher at
Miguel Arroyo, Assumption
while both a master's degree and a doctorate in economics.
College earning
Her political career began
under Coraz?n
government when
Aquino's she
served as a junior minister in the trade department and later became a two
term senator before the 1998 presidential elections. Instead of running against
Estrada for the top position, Macapagal-Arroyo opted for the vice-presidency
which she won
handily, gaining 1.9 million votes more for that position than
her predecessor Estrada polled in his victory.
When revelations were first aired, distanced
Singson's Macapagal-Arroyo
herself from the President and as the Erap Resign movement gained strength
she became a focus of attention
and intense speculation. Never at the forefront
of the opposition, was about appearing too
Macapagal-Arroyo circumspect
eager to assume the Still, it became known that she was
presidency. preparing
for that eventuality, including creating a shadow cabinet during Estrada's
a number of
final days. After taking office, Macapagal-Arroyo quickly made
government to put in her own and remove Estrada
appointments people

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220 Paul A. Rodell

supporters, especially in the Philippine National Police (PNP) headed by

diehard Estrada loyalist Panfilo Lacson. She also identified the nation's economy
as her top
priority. In response to the rapid, bloodless, and hopeful government
transition, the stock market immediately rose and the value of the peso improved
against the U.S. dollar. Soon, too, the government began to prepare formal

charges against Estrada, even as his party started the process of

political
identifying possible senatorial candidates to run against the new government
in the May election.
In the wake of People Power 2, Filipinos again took some justifiable pride
in their latest accomplishment. Note was taken of the prominent roles that the
nation's youth and newly emerging civil society organizations played, and how
"restrictive" legalisms fell before the "essence" of democracy to expunge a
venal regime from the body politic. But, all that being said, disquieting voices
could be heard even while post-Erap celebrations were still going strong.
Commentators reminded their fellow citizens that People Power 2 was necessary
because the opportunities of People Power 1 were never realized. Rather than

rigorously prosecuting Marcos his numerous

and cronies, their court cases
continued to jam the nation's legal dockets and cronies who became wealthy

during the martial law regime were still enjoying their plunder. In fact, Estrada
and many of his closest advisers and active supporters had been associated
with Marcos. Raul V. Fabella, dean of the University of the Philippines School
of Economics, strongly counselled "retribution" as essential for the future health
of the economy and fundamental Philippine democratic institutions. The
commentators further asked whether Filipinos will squander their current
as
did in 1986, or if will cleanse the political
opportunity they they finally
system so that another Estrada does not emerge. Mounting one future People
Power movement after another cannot be a viable solution for bad government
because the economy and the social fabric of the nation cannot be expected
to sustain the
pressure.8

The "EDSA 3" Revolt

The larger problem for Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's new administration
proved
to be more formidable than simply working up the resolve to create a new

society. Perhaps without realizing it, Estrada laid the groundwork for his
initial legal defence when he refusedto formally resign the
presidency,
claiming that he was still the lawful President. Furthermore, he was still

extremely popular among the nation's poor. His political supporters in

Congress also sought to belittle People Power 2 as a fa?ade used by traditional

?lites to eliminate Erap, the defender of the poor, and this message found
a audience.
responsive
In March and, again, in April, the Supreme Court revisited the legality of
Estrada's removal from power. Both times the court held steady and reaffirmed
its original decision, thus clearing the way for formal charges to be brought

against the former head of state. On 25 April, Estrada was arrested at his home

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 The Philippines: Giona inExcelsis 221

in San Juan, Metro Manila, despite the efforts of thousands of Manila's poor
who surrounded the house to protect their hero. The a special
Sandiganbayan,
anti-graft court, charged Estrada with "plunder" to the amount of 4 billion

pesos. The charge does not allow bail and carries a maximum
penalty of
death. After arriving at Camp Crame, the bedraggled-looking former President
was with a name and number plate on his chest in the manner
photographed
of a common criminal.9 The release of this photograph to the media by
unknown policemen acting against explicit orders sparked an instantaneous
reaction among his millions
of supporters in Manila's slums.
Once again, the EDSA shrine became the scene of a huge political throng,
this one in favour of the jailed former President, and, by many accounts,
larger than the assembly that ousted him from power just months earlier.
While the sincerity of the vast majority of the pro-Erap crowd could not be
rumours soon circulated that
doubted, prominent political allies of the former
President were intent on using "EDSA 3"10 to overthrow the Macapagal-Arroyo
government and return Estradato power. Also as possible co
implicated
conspirators were the indigenous church, the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), and
Mike Velarde, leader of a charismatic Roman Catholic movement known as El
Shaddai. Meanwhile, there were reports that some former Estrada
administration officials were co-ordinating logistics such as
feeding the
demonstrators and paying recruits from slum areas. The crowd reached a peak
of a reported 270,000 on 26 April, but declined to about 100,000 two
days later
only to return to its earlier numbers as 1 May approached when a march on

Malacanang palace was planned.11

As the decisive moment drew near, a division within the ranks of the
Estrada loyalists became public with more moderate leaders opposing a march
on the while the INC disavowed any support for direct action.12 WTien
palace
initial skirmishes with police seemed to break the protesters' resolve, Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and the media inaccurately proclaimed the revolt a failure.
However, incendiary speeches by senators Juan Ponce Enrile and Miriam
Defensor-Santiago and others urged the EDSA crowd to take action and they

responded. At 2 a.m. on 1 May, a long line of marchers broke away from the
shrine area and headed for the palace downtown where supporters of the
President attempted to call out their numbers to protect the government.
Police and government forces completely failed in their less than rigorous
efforts to stop the marchers, and by the first rays of the new day the true size
of the massive crowd that reached the palace became clear. Presidential

supporters sought safety in a nearby college campus and anti-riot police were
overwhelmed. It was only in the final approach to the palace that police,
marines, and members of the Presidential Security Group were able to turn
back the enraged mob with tear gas and water cannons. Commercial and
around the Mendiola near the palace suffered heavy
public property Bridge
and many people were injured, but six deaths were
damage thankfully only
reported.13

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222 Paul A. Rodell

In the aftermath of the 1 May riot, Estrada's allies predictably denied

was spontaneous. Gloria
responsibility for the violent march claiming that it
would have none of their protestations of innocence. She
Macapagal-Arroyo
declared a "state of rebellion" and ordered the arrest of eleven opposition
leaders including senators Enrile, Defensor-Santiago, and Gregorio Honasan
Order was as pro
plus former PNP chief Panfilo Lacson. quickly restored
Estrada supporters returned to their homes, and on 5 May the President lifted
her state of rebellion order in response to the concerns of civil libertarians
and for the lack of hard evidence against the accused oppositionist plotters.14
So that soon after People Power 2, Filipinos were again faced with
itwas
to the ferocious violence of the EDSA 3
taking stock of their situation thanks
protesters. Although direct proof is lacking, and may never be found, it was
clear that some key pro-Estrada leaders at least flirted with the idea of using
the anger of Manila's poor citizenry for their own ends, and they probably
aided and abetted the revolt. But, EDSA 3 was based on little more than the

personal anger of its participants and did not have the support of a broad
social coalition representing a variety of civil organizations and political parties,
trade unions, business groups, the vocal Left, or the dominant Roman Catholic
Church. Above all, and despite numerous rumours, the military remained

solidly behind the government.

there were not be
Nevertheless, implications of the 1May riots that could
ignored. The hundreds of thousands of ardent Estrada supporters among
vast a social tinderbox of desperate
Manila's slum community will remain
alienation that will continue to threaten the existence of the Republic unless
reforms are undertaken.15 As well, the seeming willingness of some
genuine
pro-Estrada politicians to destabilize the government indicates how divisive
and desperate Philippine political life has become.

May Elections
No sooner had the debris of the 1 May revolt been cleared than the country
lurched towards non-presidential "off-year" elections on 14 May. Although there
were over 15,000 electoral seats at stake at all levels of government, the greatest
attention was reserved for the critical race for control of the Senate. The two
were the administration's party, the People's
major opposing political machines
Power Coalition (PPC), which fielded a full slate of thirteen senatorial hopefuls,
while eleven Estrada loyalists and others grouped themselves under the banner
of the Puwersa ng Masa (Force of the Masses) (PnM). Two other political
parties had a few more candidates in the contest, and there were seven

independents, the strongest among them being the well-known and respected
news commentator Noli De Castro who was also "adopted" by the PnM.
The PPC lobbied hard for a 13-0 sweep to send a clear signal rejecting
Estrada and his political allies. Initially, the PPC seemed to have good reason
to hope for success. After all, their President proved her resolve in the crucial
hours of EDSA 3, and then vigorously pursued the alleged masterminds behind

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The Philippines: Giona inExcelsis 223

it. Clearly, this President would not allow one coup after another to weaken
her government as had happened to Coraz?n administration.
Aquino's
Meanwhile, the revelations about Estrada's presidency, the disastrous senatorial
vote on the second and the implication of having been behind the
envelope,
failed 1May riot, all seemed to destroy the credibility of the PnM candidates.
Yet, opinion polls from before and after 1 May consistently showed that only

eight of the administration's slate would win seats.

was less interest in the contests for seats in the
Although important, there
House of Representatives. Many seats are firmly held by entrenched incumbents
and the administration did not have as great a worry about controlling the
House as it did the Senate that had to be wrested from Estrada loyalists.
Rather, what interest there was in the race for seats in the House centred on
a block of fifty-three seats reserved for "party-list" representatives.
The party-list system was introduced in Aquino's 1987 Constitution and
sets aside fifty-three seats, an amount to 20 per cent of the House
equal
membership, for organizations of "marginalized" and "under-represented"
sectors of the population. Accredited organizations are required to win at least
2 per cent of the total votes cast for each and no
party-list representative
organization can have more than three seats.
congressional Though designed
to increase access for political outsiders, the party-list system has not been

entirely successful, and in the first party-list election in 1998 only fourteen
sectoral representatives gained the required 2 per cent of the vote.
As early as April, it became apparent that the Commission on Elections
had caved in to powerful vested interests such as the Philippine Medical
Association and the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry who sought
entry into the party-list system in an attempt to elect their own candidates to
the House. Worse still, Estrada's son JV Ejercito and some from
personalities
the deposed administration, including former Flagship Projects Secretary Robert
Aventajado, former Interior Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and former Legislative
Liaison Officer Jimmy Policarpio, attempted to sneak into Congress using the
party-list system. Suspect party-list organizations approved by the Commission
included a group whose acronym spelled out JEEP (a propaganda vehicle
from Estrada's 1998 presidential campaign) and another group called the
"True Marcos Loyalists". Even political parties that had fallen on hard times
and were no longer national power-wielders such as the Liberal and Nacionalista

parties had their candidates approved for the election. These individuals and
groups were far from the labour, peasantry, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, fisherfolk, youth, women, overseas workers, elderly, handicapped,
veterans, and professional by the Constitution as
people designated eligible to
enter their representatives in the party-list system.16
As the vote count emerged, itwas clear that the election held few surprises
at the local level as most dominant provincial families continued to hold sway
over their local bailiwicks, and with very few new names
Congress emerged
and faces. On the other hand, the anticipated drama of the senatorial contest

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 224 Paul A. Rodell

lived up to expectations. As the PPC hoped, Estrada's downfall did affect some
of his allies, and before long itbecame apparent that Miriam Defensor-Santiago
and Juan Ponce Enrile would fail in their re-election bids. But, the voters did
not reject the PnM to the degree that administration candidates
hoped. Estrada's
wife, Loi Ejercito, ran as one of the PnM eleven and she received a
surprisingly
high sympathy vote that soon placed her among the winners. Some of her
party-mates such as Edgardo Angara and Panfilo Lacson did well. It seems that
many Estrada candidates still had voter appeal, especially among the poor who
took their anger out against the administration senatorial bets. Thus, the
political and class polarization evident in EDSA 3 promised to continue through
the PnM senators.
In the end, the 2001 election saw
relatively little violence although there
were the usual of fraudulent vote counts and other irregularities,
charges
including one vote tampering operation captured on videotape. When the
vote count was finished, the early poll predictions by neutral polling
organizations such as the Social Weather Station of an 8-4-1 outcome were
realized as four PnM candidates ? Lacson, and
Angara, Ejercito-Estrada,
? senate seats. were
Honasan, gained They joined by independent candidate
Noli De Castro who emerged as the top vote-getter. Although the PPC did not
get the 13-0 outcome itwanted, the administration still had a slight majority
in the Senate and it easily controlled the House of Representatives. In an
attempt to reach out to opposition supporters, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo also
promised to embark on missions to Metro Manila slums and
"healing"
Mindanao's Christian communities, constituencies that had voted heavily in
favour of PnM candidates.17 The Senate chose close administration ally, Franklin
Drillon, as its leader while the House elected as its Speaker,
overwhelmingly
Jose de Venecia, Jr., who iswell known for his ability to negotiate compromises
and achieve legislative success. Once control of both houses was assured and
with all of her people in position in the executive branch, the President went
before the public in her first State of the Nation address in which she outlined
an ambitious programme for economic recovery and social development.18
In the meantime, the controversy over the party-list system and its abuse
continued, and grew even more intense. On 26 June, the Supreme Court
ordered the Commission on Elections to cease
proclaiming party-list winners
and review the qualifications of those running for office under this method.

Eventually, some elected candidates were denied seats and only a few winners
were declared because the vote count had been so debased
by interlopers that
only a handful of legitimate candidates garnered the required 2 per cent of
the total vote count.19

Philippine Politics: Frivolous and Deadly Serious

As the new Senate and House were
settling down, more political fireworks
began. WTiile many of the charges and counter-charges aired by one side

against the other seem more than a bit exaggerated, the game being played

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The Philippines: Giona inExcelsis 225

was nevertheless serious and in the closing

quite days of the year proved
deadly.
Among the opposition senators, newly elected Panfilo "Ping" Lacson was
an close associate of Joseph Estrada, and had headed the special
especially
police unit, the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF).
During the Estrada presidency, Lacson and the PAOCTF were to
subjected
numerous accusations of criminality, including premeditated murder. However,
itwas not until the new Macapagal-Arroyo administration assumed power that
other police officials were willing to investigate the rumours.
By early August,
Colonel Victor Corpus, head of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, levelled numerous charges against Lacson. Principal among
the charges was that during his tenure as PAOCTF chief, Lacson filled numerous
Hong Kong and U.S. bank accounts, bought homes, and started businesses
with monies from drug smuggling operations. Offered as evidence were a
series of bank account numbers and two former PAOCTF witnesses, Mary
"Rosebud" Ong and Angelo "Ador" Mawanay.

Though seeming to confirm popular belief, it was not

long before the
evidence became suspect. The Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank quickly denied
that the Lacson accounts existed, while the U.S. account numbers did not
match the number for the California banks where
sequences illegal funds were
alleged to be stored. Thecredibility of Corpus' evidence was further
undermined when he produced a picture of Lacson's
supposed Hong Kong
drug lord associate, only to have the photograph turn out to be of a Chinese

Filipino businessman and restaurant owner of the same name.20 The case soon
unravelled and in September the hearings went into a temporary state of
limbo while the government reviewed its case for another assault on Lacson.
Meanwhile, the opposition was not silent. The President and her husband
became the target of various allegations of corruption and abuse of power and
influence. The integrity of the accusers was often questionable, and by the end
of the year, the President seems to have refuted all to her integrity
challenges
and that of her husband.
Whilemany of the charges and the individuals making them give Philippine
politics the appearance of comic opera, the seriousness of the game was
brought
home shortly before the end of the year amid fresh rumours of coup plots.
Since Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo came into power, rumours of coup
possible
plots involving members of the martial law era Reform the Armed Forces
Movement (RAM), the Young Officers' Union (YOU), or agents connected to
Lacson from his days as PNP chief have been heard but always discounted. But
the danger seemed to become much too real on 28 December when military
agents seized nine members of a commando group and 100 blocks of C-4
plastic explosives. All the men were associated with Lacson from his PNP
command. Three on New Year's Eve, Baron Alexander a
days later Cervantes,
self-appointed spokesperson for YOU and agent for National Security Adviser
Roilo Golez who had reported a destabilization conspiracy, was shot once,

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226 Paul A. Rodeil

execution-style, at the back of the head, while he was waiting outside a drugstore
for an appointment.21

Slow Wheels of Sandiganbayan Justice

WHiile Senate witnesses exchanged accusations and alleged conspiracies were
topics of excited coffee shop gossip, the nation's special court for graft and
cases, the Sandiganbayan, was charged with hearing the
corruption
cases against Estrada. The government has had a difficult time
government's
for a number of reasons and eventually no less than the Supreme Court had
to intervene so that the case might proceed with some speed.
The government's task of prosecuting Estrada has been made especially
difficult because a number of his alleged accomplices have fled the country.
In November, acting in response to an extradition request, Federal Bureau of

Investigation agents arrested Estrada confidant and alleged crime boss Charlie
"Atong" Ang in a Las Vegas casino, and his fate is currently being decided in
U.S. courts. Also being sought in the United States for extradition to the
were:
Yolanda Ricaforte, Estrada's alleged auditor for protection
Philippines
money, and former PAOCTF agents Cesar Mancao and Michael Ray Aquino.
At the same time, Dante Tan, who is blamed for a stock market scam involving
the BW Resources company, fled to New Zealand and efforts were made for
a special extradition request. In the meantime, the nation's Supreme Court
defeated a challenge by Estrada's legal team concerning the validity of the laws
he is charged with violating.22
The trial finally began in October, but quickly fell into disarray as

Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena and Associate Justice

Anacleto Badoy began to squabble with each other. The quarrel required the
intervention of the Supreme Court that relieved Garchitorena on 28 November.
The higher court ordered Garchitorena to clear his docket of over 341 pending
cases while on temporary relief from trial duties so that cases going as far back
as ten years may
finally be settled. For example, many of the ill-gotten wealth
cases against the M?rcoses and their cronies are among Garchitorena's backlog
and his lack of progress represents a serious delay of justice. Then, on
11 December, the Supreme Court also placed Justice Badoy on leave until

questions about his neutrality and conduct could be resolved. In both cases,
the justices were replaced by other jurists, but with these changes in personnel,
the trial had to be postponed until January 2002 and questions were already
raised about whether the cases should to new justices
being again be passed
to pre-empt legal challenges by Estrada's lawyers.23
Though originally created to clear the docket of
Philippine
judiciary's
numerous cases officials, the
involving wrongdoing by government
Sandiganbayan has a of worse than the courts itwas
acquired reputation being
intended to supplement. Hopefully, the Supreme Court's late 2001 actions will
break the Sandiganbayan's logjam and restore public confidence in this branch
of the legal system.

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The Philippines: Gloria inExcelsis 227

Rescuing the Economy

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo an economy
inherited in deep trouble. The Estrada
administration's gross mismanagement of the economy and its reputation for
"chicanery" had sent investors fleeing. Before Erap's election, the Philippines
was in a relatively good position: it had avoided the worst of the 1997 Asian
and the government even ran budget
economic downturn surpluses from
1994 1997. All
of these were by late 2000 as the
through gains squandered
peso slid in value against the dollar and predictions were made of huge budget
deficits. Adding to the economic woes is the Philippines' heavy dependence
on the U.S. electronics industry. When the dot com bubble burst, a number
of computer firms drastically reduced their production orders and this seriously
eroded the economy's strength.24
The President scaled back government and appointed a
expenditures
"dream team" of economic officials to strategic positions, but the disruptions
caused by EDSA 3 and the PPC's narrow electoral victory inMay continued to
make investors nervous. By July and August, economic indicators showed
increased a decrease to their lowest levels since the
in exports
unemployment,
1970s, and a peso rate of 52.70 to the dollar. The consequent increase in the
to a overseas
poverty level translated continued exodus of Filipinos for jobs at
an average rate of 2,300 per
day.25
Gradually, however, the economy seemed to be making a subtle turnaround,
and by year's end, the administration could paint a rosier picture. Bolstered
a better than
by expected agricultural sector, the jobless rate had decreased to
9.8 per cent by October, and exports were expected to contract at a lesser rate
than earlier feared. Meanwhile, the government's foreign direct investment
target of 100 billion pesos for the year was reached as early as November, even
as a decrease in borrowings improved the country's indebtedness to US$49.9
billion, down from US$52.4 billion the previous year. The President's efforts
to trim government spending resulted in a smaller deficit than anticipated,
and there were hopeful
projections that the government might actually see a
modest spending surplus for December. Finance Secretary Jose I. Camacho
was confident enough to suggest that there might be a return to a balanced
budget by 2006. Government officials a 3.3 per cent growth in
anticipated
gross domestic product (GDP) for the year, with the possibility of an increase
to 4.5 per cent in 2002. Even though the outlook seemed to be improving,
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo that the country's poor were not likely to
admitted
see a significant improvement in their lives in the near future. As well, in her
10 December address to the National Socio-Economic Summit, she reiterated
her plea for a one-year moratorium on for the sake of the
partisan politicking
common
good.26
That politics remains a primary cause for the Philippine's economic malaise
was reinforced by the example of a mid-December break in the government's
case in the lingering "cocofund levy" issue. On 14 December, San Miguel
chairman Eduardo announced the intended sale of a 15 per cent
Cojuangco

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228 Paul A. Rodell

stake in the corporation to Japan's Kirin Brewer. On the same day, the Supreme
Court finally ruled that a 27 per cent stake in the company that had been

sequestered by the government after the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986

did, indeed, belong to the government. Clearly, the court's rapid decision
came in immediate response to Cojuangco's surprise announcement about his
deal with the Japanese beer maker. However, the root cause of the controversy

lay in a series of presidential decrees issued by Marcos from 1973 to 1980 that
taxed the nation's coconut farmers billions of pesos with
ending the monies

up in a complicated series of interlocking government agencies and banks all

under Cojuangco's control. Cojuangco used the money to purchase seats on
San Miguel's board of directors that he then controlled as chair. The
timing
of the Court's decision was critical since had the deal with Kirin gone through,
the shares of the corporation would have been diluted, thereby weakening the
a condition
government's voting bloc on the board. Additionally, of the sale
would have given Cojuangco control of the Japanese shares, and that would
have further cemented his control of San Miguel.27
It is a mark of Philippine politics that control of the cocofund has pitted
political leaders associated with Marcos against the Aquino, Ramos, and

Macapagal-Arroyo administrations. For the past fifteen years the case has been
tied up in the slow moving courts as the basic nature of the monies
Philippine
was debated. Since the case involves as much as 130 billion pesos, plus control
of San and numerous charges of governmental
Miguel Corporation,
irregularities, there is little likelihood that the case will soon see resolution,

despite the Supreme Court's ruling.

Abu Sayyaf and the War on Terrorism

In the early morning hours of 27 May, a party of Abu Sayyaf gunmen raided
the Dos Palmas beach resort located off Palawan Island, not far from the

provincial capital of Puerto Princesa, and seized twenty resort guests and staff.
The guests included three Americans: a Christian missionary couple working
in the Philippines, and originally from Kansas, and Guillermo Sobrero, a
naturalized American originally from Argentina and residing in California.
The May 2001 raid was reminiscent of the attack in 2000 on a resort inMalaysia
in which the Muslim group captured a number of European tourists. However,

considering the distance of the Muslim southern islands from Palawan, the
no
May 2001 attack was not anticipated. The raiders met resistance and left
behind a stunned and devastated resort staff.28

Although estimates vary, the 2000 raid on the Malaysian resort netted the
Abu Sayyaf between US$15 and US$20 million dollars in ransom. As a result,
their ranks swelled as young men in this extremely poor area of the country

joined the Abu Sayyaf hoping to profit from the kidnapping trade. In addition
to personal the Abu a substantial portion of the
gain, Sayyaf's leadership used
precious year's ill-gotten gains to purchase high-powered boats and sophisticated
automatic weapons, all of which outclass the Philippine military's dilapidated

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The Philippines: Gloria inExcelsis 229

and outmoded equipment. Due to the element of surprise and fast boats, the

kidnappers easily evaded Philippine authorities and brought their victims to

Basilan Island, their home base.
Very soon, however, events took a puzzling and controversial turn when on
2 June the raiders brought their hostages to a hospital in Lamitan town and
took the medical staffhostage as well. Units of the Philippine military, including
?lite Army Scout Rangers and Counter-Terrorist Force, surrounded the hospital
and it appeared that the Abu Sayyaf gang was trapped. All day the kidnappers
and government forces exchanged fire, but that night the entire gang and
most of their original hostages miraculously broke out of the cordon and

escaped into the jungle. Local officials and the nation were incredulous, and
the military's initial embarrassment was when the town priest,
compounded
Father Cirilo
Nacorda, charged collusion between the local military
commanders and the kidnappers. Captured hospital workers told Nacorda
that they saw money change hands as a few wealthy Dos Palmas captives paid
ransom and made a phony escape in the confusion. Eleven members of the
town's volunteer police force corroborated the charges and said that a company
of Scout Rangers abandoned their post at the back of the hospital in the late
afternoon just as darkness was setting in.
The army angrily denied the allegations, and Macapagal-Arroyo spoke in
defence of the military, but she quickly reassigned the commanding officers,
even as the Senate prepared to hold hearings to investigate the accusations.
Four hearing were eventually held in September, but reached no conclusion.
Later in December, additional allegations by Senator Serge Osmena rekindled
the controversy, and defence committee chair, Senator Ramon Magsaysay, Jr.,
promised to reopen the hearings once Osmena was
prepared to present his
evidence. While Nacorda's and Osmena's charges may never be substantiated,
this is not the first time that the military has been implicated as colluding with
the Abu Sayyaf. In 2000 some fifty-three Filipinos had been captured at the
Claretian School of Tumahubong, Basilan, and they told remarkably similar
stories.29

Ten days after their amazing escape from Lamitan, an Abu Sayyaf spokesman
announced that American hostage Guillermo Sobrero had been beheaded.
Not long after, a number of hostages gained their release after paying ransom,
despite the President's "no ransom" policy. For the next fewmonths, thousands
of Philippine troops scoured the island occasionally encountering, and either

killing
or
capturing
some of the gang's members, but the rescue of the

remaining hostages proved elusive.

Events in the south took on a
different complexion after
completely
11 Steptember. Not only did Filipinos react with sympathetic horror at the

savage attack on New York's twin towers, but the long-drawn hostage drama on
Basilan gained international attention. As luck would have it, on 20 November,
the new Philippine President paid a previously scheduled visit to the WTiite
House where she and her American counterpart met for the first time. The

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230 Paul A. Rodell

lady President discussed the hostage situation in Basilan and emphasized the
Abu Sayyaf's radical origins that allegedly included ties with Osama bin Laden's

Al-Qaeda group in Afghanistan. She also pledged to walk "every step of the
way" with the United States in the global war on terrorism. George W. Bush
was elated to have his firstAsian returned to
ally and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
Manila with approximately $4.6 billion in investments, development assistance,
trade commitments, and tariff concessions from the U.S. government and

private companies. Additionally, James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for

East Asian and Pacific Affairs, indicated Washington would consider helping
the Philippines reschedule its approximately $50 billion in debt.30 Most

immediately, the Philippines would receive $100 million in vital military

equipment.
Meanwhile, at home, opposition Congressional leaders asked just what was

expected of the Philippines in return for the American largess.31 In 1991, the
Philippine Senate had voted to terminate the RP-U.S. Military Bases Agreement,
and Filipino sentiments are such that any agreement that looks like a return
to the past will encounter strong opposition. In fact, an American military
visited the as early as October to evaluate the Philippine's
delegation Philippines
anti-Abu Sayyaf operations. Two other groups of "special operations" advisers
visited the southern islands in early December while a third batch arrived in
mid-month. During their visits, these soldiers identified suitable barracks and

training facilities for what was expected to be a much larger group of American
military personnel.32 All these activities raised concerns about Philippine

sovereignty, and when the American trainers arrive in 2002, their presence
and activities are certain to be a subject of keen interest.

Nur Misuari's Last Hurrah

On 19 November 2001, an estimated 600 fighters under the control of
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) governor Nur Misuari
attacked four military installations on the island of Jolo. Although four army

personnel were killed in the first attack on the town of Indanan, that action
was the insurgents' only victory. A little later, a frontal attack on the
headquarters
of the army's 104th Infantry Brigade in the town of Jolo resulted in only one

government death and the loss of forty-eight of the attackers. Soon government
forces all over the island were in charge and the rebels resorted to taking
118 civilian hostages that only prolonged the affair until 28 November when

negotiations finally ended the stand-off. Meanwhile, on 24 November, Misuari

and six of his closest advisers fled the country, but when they arrived in Sabah,

Malaysian authorities promptly placed them under arrest.

Misuari's ill-considered and badly executed rebellion was widely condemned,
even by those who had supported him in the past. Malaysian Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamad noted that under Misuari's leadership of the ARMM, "not
much had been done for the benefit of the people". Mahathir also observed
thatMisuari "spent more time overseas and inManila than to bringing progress

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The Philippines: Giona inExcelsis 231

and development to the people".33 By the end of the year and after working
out procedural matters, Malaysia was prepared to deport Misuari back to the

Philippines where he would be formally charged with rebellion and sedition.

an a leader whose
This was ignoble end for early career was full of promise,
but Misuarihad been under criticism from people even within the MNLF for
some time, and in 2001 events moved to their inexorable conclusion.
At the outset of martial law in 1972, Misuari, a former University of the

Philippines professor, began an armed rebellion that sought independence for

his people. For years the Philippine military was tied down in a
guerrilla
conflict that took a devastating toll on both sides. With the combatants and
an agreement was
civilian population exhausted, signed in Libya in 1976 that
seemed to secure a Muslim autonomous region. However,
thirteen-province
mandated plebiscites in 1977 and 1987 failed to bring the region into existence.

Finally, in 1996a new agreement was reached that created the ARMM

comprising of those provinces and cities that voted to join the configuration.
Though much smaller than what was originally agreed to in 1976, the ARMM
also had a Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD),
and substantial government support was promised. Nur Misuari became ARMM
governor and chaired the SPCPD. Unfortunately, five years later Misuari had
very little social or economic progress to show for his efforts, and there were
numerous reports of corruption while much was made of his supposedly lavish

lifestyle.
of the end came on 29
The beginning April when the MNLF executive
council decided to oust Misuari as its chair and make him a "chair
powerless
emeritus", while they ruled as a body. Although still ARMM governor and
chair of the SPCPD, the loss of his MNLF power base made Misuari vulnerable.
This weakness was clearly revealed when the MNLF began tomake fundamental

independent policy decisions and work co-operatively with theMacapagal-Arroyo

government. For her part, the President exploited the rift in the Muslim ranks
to pursue her foreign policy agenda with regard to neighbouring Malaysia.
During his presidency, Joseph Estrada had joined the worldwide clamour

demanding the release of Malaysia's former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar

Ibrahim from prison. Once the presumed successor to Malaysia's long-serving
Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, the two had a serious falling out after
the 1997 Asian economic downturn, arrested on a variety of
and Anwar was

charges that included allegations of homosexual misconduct. In addition to

publicly supporting his friend Anwar, Estrada avoided visiting Malaysia, and
received Anwar's wife at Malacanang. Not one who easily tolerates
cordially
criticism, Dr Mahathir considered the Philippine President's behaviour blatant
interference in Malaysia's internal politics, and relations between the two
countries cooled
considerably.
Shortly after coming into power, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo chose Malaysia
as the first country to which she would make a state visit. Recognizing that

many of her domestic including the economy and the situation in

problems,

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232 Paul A. Rodell

the southern islands, have regional dimensions, she was intent on repairing
the diplomatic damage that her predecessor had done. Ostensibly, her primary
reason to visit Kuala Lumpur was to secure agreements to promote joint
Philippine-Malaysian development of the southern Philippines. However, during
her 7-8 August visit, she pointedly ignored the jailed former Deputy Prime
Minister and praised Dr Mahathir as "my model of a leader", while speaking
of the strong measures he took against currency speculation in
approvingly
1997.
In addition to achieving and diplomatic objectives, Macapagal
her economic

Arroyo's Kuala Lumpur sojourn the venue for the signing of a

also became
ceasefire agreement between her government and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF). The MILF began in the late 1970s as a secession of some

fighters from Misuari's MNLF. Since the subsequent appearance of the Abu

Sayyaf in the late 1990s, and especially after its year 2000 raid in Malaysia, Dr
Mahathir's government has revisited its previous practice of providing support
for Philippine Muslim insurgents. With January's change of government in
Manila, Kuala Lumpur's leaders have also been receptive to requests to act as
a peace broker. Before Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's arrival, Malaysia served as a
venue to promote reconciliation between the twomainstream insurgent groups,
a big factor that had to be decided first before the MILF was even willing to
consider a ceasefire with Manila. The MNLF-MILF were
signing negotiations
threatened at a number of points, but a final
agreement only was reached

shortly before the Philippine lady President's arrival.34 This agreement,

combined with the one signed by the MNLF during the Fidel Ramos
administration, gave Manila assurance that elections in the ARMM would be
peaceful, and that economic programmes could go forward. As well, the

Philippine military could concentrate more of its resources on the Abu Sayyaf
even as Nur Misuari was further isolated.

Immediately upon her return to Manila, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

announced an earlier decision to reconstitute the SPCPD giving herself the
power to appoint its chair. She then appointed Cotabato citymayor and MNLF
secretary-general Muslimin G. Sema as the new chair replacing Nur Misuari.35
Although Misuari had been consulted in advance about his loss of this powerful

agency and its resources, he was in no position to lodge a complaint.

Days after being relieved as SPCPD chair, Misuari lost another political
battle. On 14 August, a was held
plebiscite throughout Mindanao that allowed
voters to determine, once again, the composition of the ARMM. Misuari and
his remaining supporters had vigorously, but unsuccessfully, opposed the
as a violation of the 1996 peace agreement that created the ARMM.
plebiscite
A greater problem forMisuari was that as part of his opposition to the plebiscite,
he also refused to run for re-election under its auspices.36 When it was
announced that new election would be held on 26 November for the newly
redefined ARMM, Misuari faced the certain loss of his position unless he could

prevent the election. At some

point Misuari made his final and misguided

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The Philippines: Giona inExcelsis 233

political decision to lead an uprising on the 19 November in a desperate effort

to derail the election. His decision led to needless loss of life and cost him his

personal freedom while destroying his reputation. No longer leading a rebellion

to win autonomy for his people, Misuari struck out to preserve his power and

privilege. The armed uprising failed to stop the election that saw victory going
to the administration-backed candidate, Farouk Hussin. As a member of the
MNLF executive council, Hussin had led the move to oust Misuari from the

organization's leadership. As the final votes were being tallied, Hussin promised
that he would not repeat Misuari's mistakes.

Conclusion

Despite a host of continuing problems, 2001 belonged Macapagal to Gloria

Arroyo. As long as the economy continues to show and she

improvement
commits no major political gaffe for the opposition to exploit, her immediate

prospects for 2002 look good. Whether in the Philippine Congress, the economy,
or the Islamic southern islands, made progress on all fronts
Macapagal-Arroyo
and either outmanoeuvred or sidelined her opponents. Some difficulties ahead
for 2002 finishing off the Abu Sayyaf with American
include assistance but
without a nationalist backlash, the case against
creating pursuing Sandiganbayan
Estrada, and dealing with Panfilo Lacson and the remnants of his extra-judicial
PNP unit. A November 2001 survey conducted by the Social Weather Station
showed her with a 53 per cent approval rating which matched the highest
that former presidents Ramos and Estrada ever had in their
ratings
incumbencies. Especially important were the improvements in her approval

ratings among Manila's poor who had formed the bulk of Estrada's supporters.37
This increase is critical because itmay indicate a lessening of the extreme class
differences that Estrada and his political allies attempted to exploit for their
own ends. One can only hope.

Notes
1. EDSA refers to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, a multi-lane highway that rings the
Metro Manila area. It was on that major at the between the entrances
artery spot
to Camp Crame and Fort Bonifacio that protesters gathered in 1986 to protect
mutineers and the ascension of Coraz?n to the
military support Aquino presidency.
2. Sheila S. Coronel, ed., Estrada: Millions, Mansions and Mistresses (Quezon
Investigating
City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2000).
3. Isagani A. Cruz, "The Gathering Storm", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 19 January 2001.
4. See Vicente Rafael, "The Cell Phone and the Crowd: Messianic Politics in Recent
Philippine History", Public Culture (forthcoming) ; currently, the article is available
on-line at
<http://communication.ucsd.edu/people/f_rafael.cellphone.html>.
5. "Stay on Edsa Until Evil Is Conquered by Good", "Business Leaders Back 'People
Power'", "'Shameless' Vote Irks Folks", and "Ramos Calls on Police to
Military,
Support People", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 18 January 2001.
6. "Time's Up for Erap", "AFP Deals Fatal Blow to Estrada Presidency", "Military
Defection: The Inside Story", and "It's Over: 10 Cabinet Men Resign", Philippine
Daily Inquirer, 20 January 2001.

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 234 Paul A. Rodell

7. Sheila S. Coronel, ed., EDSA 2: A Nation inRevolt: A PhotographicJournal/with text

by Sheila S. Coronel (Pasig City, Metro Manila: Anvil Publishers, 2001).
8. "A Better Power, Yes but...", and "We Can't Afford any
Tiglao, Rigoberto, People
More People Power", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 21 and 24 January 2001, respectively.
A. Cruz, "Let's Not Edsa 2", and Raul V. Fabella, "Wither
Isagani Squander
People Power? Only Way Is Retribution",
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 28 January
2001.
9. Seth Mydans, "Former Philippine President Jailed on Corruption Charges", New
York Times, 26 April 2001.
10. A distinction isbeing made in this article between the two "People Power" uprisings
that Coraz?n and Gloria to power as
brought Aquino Macapagal-Arroyo opposed
to the pro-Estrada uprising. While the latter case certainly had a large group of
dedicated the uprising remained a localized event restricted to the
supporters,
EDSA and the Metro Manila area. In fact, a number of
highway pro-administration
rallies took place the country, while no actions were in
throughout pro-Estrada
evidence outside Metro Manila. This third mass action was, thus, much more
restricted and is more known as an EDSA revolt rather than a
properly "People
Power" movement with a national network that that name in its
implies Philippine
context.
11. Amando Doronila and Donna Cueto, "Senator Linked to Junta Plot", Philippine
Daily Inquirer, 28 April 2001. See also, Amando Doronila, "Philippines Sitting on
Edge of Civil War", and Dona Pazzibugan, "Velarde Hints at El Shaddai Support
for Pro-Erap Rally", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 30 April 2001.
12. Amando Doronila, Nazareno, and Dona "Power Grab Fails",
Rocky Pazzibugan,
and Christine Herrera and Andrea T. Echavez, "Iglesia Pulls Out of Edsa", Philippine
Daily Inquirer, 1May 2001.
13. Alcuin Dave Ve ridiano, and Michael Lim Ubac, "Estrada Overwhelm
Papa, Loyalists
on to and Armand .Nocum, and Dave
Cops Way Malacanang", Jerome Aning,
Veridiano, "6 Dead, 113 Hurt inMendiola Battle", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2 May
2001.
14. Dona Z. "Estrada Allies Disown Attack", and Christine
Pazzibugan, Malacanang
Herrera and Armand Nocum, "Gov't Cracks Down on 'Plotters'", Philippine Daily
Inquirer, 1 May 2000; Donna Cueto, Mark Isaiah David, and Carlito Pablo,
"'Rebellion' Declaration Raises Alarm, Questions", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2 May
2001; and Armand Nocum, "State of Rebellion Lifted", Philippine Daily Inquirer,
6 May 2001.
15. Among the more thoughtful comments in the Philippine Daily Inquirerwere Dean
Bocobo, "Common Ground", 30 April 2001; Vicente Romano III, "Poor
Jorge
People Power", 2 May 2001; and Amando Doronila, "Recognizing the Schism in
the Church", 11 May 2001.
16. Editorial, "Stretching the Margin", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 7 April 2001.
17. Martin P. Marfil, "Macapagal Vows Healing Missions", Philippine Daily Inquirer,
22 May 2001.
18. Nati Nuguid, "Can She Deliver?", Philippines Free Press, 4 August 2001, pp. 2-4; 6.
19. Anne Stephanie Cruz, "Only for the Poor", Philippines Free Press, 14 July 2001, p. 12,
and "Maddening Review", Philippines Free Press, 11 August 2001, p. 23, for stories
about the Supreme Court's decision and the Commission on Election's initial review
of the party-listorganizations that eliminated seventeen candidates after the elections
were held. I was given background information on the party-list situation by Akbayan
the Honorable Lore ta Ann "Etta" P. Rosales, in
party4ist representative, August
2001, but all statements and opinions expressed in this article are mine alone as,
too, are any errors. See also, the Philippine Daily Inquirer, 1 July 2001 editorial
"Pretenders", and Rina "Good News, Bad News on Front",
Jimenez-David, Party-List
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 29 June 2001.

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The Philippines: Gloria inExcelsis 235

20. See, Christine Herrera and Carlito Pablo, "The U.S. Trail", and Christine
Money
Herrera, "'Ping Has U.S. Homes, Too'", Philippine Daily Inquirer,August 6 2001;
Antonio T. Carpio, "Ping Stings Victor", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 August 2001;
and Carlito Pablo, Armand Nocum, and Martin P. Marfil, "Kim: I'm Pal But
Ping's
Not a Drug Lord", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14 August 2001.
21. See the Philippine Daily Inquirer reports of Carlito Pablo and Martin P. Marfil,
"Military Grills Ex-Lacson Men Over Seized Explosives", 30 December 2001, and
Christian V. and Carlito Pablo, "Cervantes Waited for His
T.J. Burgonio, Esguerra,
Killer on New Year's Eve", 1 January 2002.
22. Armand .Nocum, to Estrada's Indian
"Atong Ang 'key' Crimes, Says Trader",

Philippine Daily Inquirer, 29 November 2001.

23. See the Philippine Daily Inquirer editorial, "The Weakest Link?", 2 December 2001,
the other stories, Michael Lim Ubac, Taken Out Estrada
plus newspaper's "Badoy
Trial", 12 December 2001, and Volt Contreras, "Estrada Trial to Resume
Suspended
in January", 13 December 2001.
24. Mark Landler, "In Philippines, the Economy as Casualty", New YorkTimes, 9 February
2001.
25. See the following articles in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Clarissa S. Batino, "Gov't
Unlikely to Meet Growth Targets Says ?
Landbank Prexy", 3 July 2001; Raul C.
Dancel, "Filipinos Poorer Due to Crisis NSCB", 4 August 2001; and AFP, "2,300
Pinoys Leaving Daily for Jobs Abroad", and "Slump in June Exports Lowest Since
'70s", 3 August 2001.
26. See the following articles in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, AFP, "RP Jobless Rate
Eases to 9.8 Percent in October", 18 December 2001; Clarissa S. Batino,
"Foreign
Debts Down to $49.9B", 2 July 2001; Donna Pazzibugan and Clarissa S. Batino,
'We Have a Stable Now'", 21 December 2001; and Doris C.
"Macapagal: Economy
Dumlao and Carlito Pablo, Peace and Order Economic Summit",
"Security, Top
11 December 2001.
27. In his Philippine Daily Inquirer columns of 17 and 18 December 2001, Neal H. Cruz
readers a concise historical review of the cocofund See also the
gave controversy.
Inquirer issue of 15 December 2001 forMichael Lim Ubac and Donna S. Cueto,
"SC Ruling on Coco Funds Victory for PCGG, Farmers'", and Gil Cabacungan,
C. Carlito Pablo and Donna S. Cueto,
Jr., Doris Dumlao, "Cojuangco-Kirin Deal
Meant to Keep Hold of San Miguel".
28. I visited the Dos Palmas resort on 14 August and interviewed a number of the
staff. The resort nurse told me that she was for the when her
dressing day
roommate, who worked in the kitchen, burst into their apartment crying
hysterically. She had been taken by the kidnappers, but when brought to the
boat, she was told to go away as they did not have space for her. I also visited
a then being constructed, and talked to a adviser
guard headquarters security
who had come from Manila to the The measures
supervise improvements.
included boats and numerous wielded men
patrol high-powered weapons by
who knew how to use them. Unfortunately, these were not sufficient to
steps
restore confidence in the resort's On the I visited, there were
security. day only
six other guests, and after hosting a beauty contest inOctober the resort closed,
with a promise to reopen in March 2002.
29. See, Jose Torres, Jr., Into theMountain: Hostaged by theAbu Sayyaf (Quezon City:
Claretian Publications, 2001) for the accounts of the 2000 kidnappings. Manila's
press covered the Lamitan events in detail, but of especial note are James Payawal
Saspa, "So That's Why", Philippines Free Press, 25 August 2001, p. 16, and the
Philippine Daily Inquirer editorial of 10 August 2001, "Treason".
30. Sarmiento, Bonanza for Backing U.S. War vs Terror",
Juan Jr., "Macapagal Reaps
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 21 November 2001; and Amando Doronila, "Initial Scrutiny
of the Package", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 23 November 2001.

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 236 PaulA.Rodell

31. Inquirer News Service, "What's the Catch? Solon Asks Macapagal of $4-B US Aid",
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 27 November 2001.
32. Tim Weiner, "American Action Is Held Likely inAsia," New YorkTimes, 10 October
2001. See also France-Presse, "U.S. Soldiers in RP for 'Sensitive'
Agence Special Ops
Mission", in Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14 December 2001.
33. Don Kirk, "Filipinos Fear More Violence as 5 Muslim Provinces Vote", New York
Times, 26 November 2001; and Editorial, "Squandered Opportunities", Philippine
Daily Inquirer, 27 November 2001.
34. Nati Nuguid, "FirstTime Out", Philippines Free Press, 25 August 2001, pp. 8, 10, 12.
35. Donna S. Cueto, "Wanted: New Job forMisuari", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12August
2001.
36. Edwin O. Fernandez, "NurMisuari Makes Self Scarce", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 26
August 2001.
37. Carlito Pablo, "SWS Survey Says Macapagal Rating at 'Record High'", Philippine
Daily Inquirer, 4 December 2001.

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