Natural water table

With the bubbler pool gone, a meltdown was less likely to produce a powerful steam explosion. To
do so, the molten core would now have to reach the water table below the reactor. To reduce the
likelihood of this, it was decided to freeze the earth beneath the reactor, which would also stabilize
the foundations. Using oil well drilling equipment, the injection of liquid nitrogen began on 4 May. It
was estimated that 25 tonnes of liquid nitrogen per day would be required to keep the soil frozen at
−100 °C (−148 °F).[26]:59 This idea was soon scrapped. [87]
As an alternative, coal miners were deployed to excavate a tunnel below the reactor to make room
for a cooling system. The final makeshift design for the cooling system was to incorporate a coiled
formation of pipes cooled with water and covered on top with a thin thermally conductive graphite
layer. The graphite layer as a natural refractory material would rapidly cool the suspected molten
uranium oxide without burn through. This graphite cooling plate layer was to be encapsulated
between two concrete layers, each one meter thick for stabilisation. This system was designed by
Bolshov, the director of the Institute for Nuclear Safety and Development formed in 1988. Bolshov's
graphite-concrete "sandwich" would be similar in concept to later core catchers that are now part of
many nuclear reactor designs.[88]
Bolshov's graphite cooling plate, alongside the prior nitrogen injection proposal, were not used
following the drop in aerial temperatures and indicative reports that the fuel melt had stopped. It was
later determined that the fuel had passed through three storeys before coming to rest in one of a
number of basement rooms. The precautionary underground channel with its active cooling was
therefore deemed redundant, as the fuel was self-cooling. The excavation was then simply filled with
concrete to strengthen the foundation below the reactor. [89]

Immediate site and area remediation

Chernobyl power plant in 2006 with the sarcophagus containment structure

Debris removal
In the months after the explosion, attention turned to removing the radioactive debris from the roof.
[90]
 The worst of the radioactive debris was collected inside what was left of the reactor, however it
was estimated that there was approximately 100 tons of debris on that roof that resulted from the
explosion and which had to be removed to enable the safe construction of the 'sarcophagus' – a
concrete structure that would entomb the reactor and reduce radioactive dust being released into the
atmosphere.[90] The initial plan was to use robots to clear the debris off the roof. The Soviets used
approximately 60 remote-controlled robots, most of them built in the Soviet Union. Many failed due
to the effect of high levels of radiation on their electronic controls; [90] in 1987, Valery Legasov, first
deputy director of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in Moscow, said: "We learned that robots
are not the great remedy for everything. Where there was very high radiation, the robot ceased to be
a robot—the electronics quit working."[91] Consequently, the most highly radioactive materials were
shoveled by Chernobyl liquidators from the military wearing heavy protective gear (dubbed "bio-
robots" by the military); these soldiers could only spend a maximum of 40–90 seconds working on
the rooftops of the surrounding buildings because of the extremely high doses of radiation given off
by the blocks of graphite and other debris. Though the soldiers were only supposed to perform the
role of the "bio-robot" a maximum of once, some soldiers reported having done this task five or six
times.[citation needed] Only 10% of the debris cleared from the roof was performed by robots with the other
90% removed by approximately 5,000 men who absorbed, on average, an estimated dose of
25 rem (250 mSv) of radiation each.[90]

Construction of the sarcophagus

Main article: Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant sarcophagus
To provide radiologocal protection by prevention of airborne contamination, and prevent weathering
of the reactor remains, a containment structure was planned. This was the largest civil engineering
task in history, involving a quarter of a million construction workers who all reached their official
lifetime limits of radiation.[59] Ukrainian filmmaker Vladimir Shevchenko captured film footage of
an Mi-8 helicopter as its main rotor collided with a nearby construction crane cable, causing the
helicopter to fall near the damaged reactor building and killing its four-man crew on 2 October 1986.
[92]
 By December 1986, a large concrete sarcophagus had been erected to seal off the reactor and its
contents.[65] The greater urban decontamination liquidators similarly first washed buildings and roads
with "Bourda", a sticky polymerizing fluid DeconGel, designed to entrain radioactive dust and, when
dry, could then be peeled off and compacted into configurations, akin to carpet rolls, in preparation
for burial.[93] A unique "clean up" medal was given to the workers.[94]

Investigations of the reactor condition

During the construction of the sarcophagus, a scientific team re-entered the reactor as part of an
investigation dubbed "Complex Expedition", to locate and contain nuclear fuel in a way that could not
lead to another explosion. These scientists manually collected cold fuel rods, but great heat was still
emanating from the core. Rates of radiation in different parts of the building were monitored by
drilling holes into the reactor and inserting long metal detector tubes. The scientists were exposed to
high levels of radiation and radioactive dust.[59] After six months of investigation, in December 1986,
with the help of a remote camera they discovered an intensely radioactive mass more than two
metres wide in the basement of Unit Four, which they called "the elephant's foot" for its wrinkled
appearance.[95] The mass was composed of melted sand, concrete and a large amount of nuclear
fuel that had escaped from the reactor. The concrete beneath the reactor was steaming hot, and
was breached by now-solidified lava and spectacular unknown crystalline forms termed chernobylite.
It was concluded that there was no further risk of explosion. [59]

Area cleanup
The official contaminated zones saw a massive clean-up effort lasting seven months. [65]:177–183 The
official reason for such early (and dangerous) decontamination efforts, rather than allowing time for
natural decay, was that the land must be repopulated and brought back into cultivation. Indeed,
within fifteen months 75% of the land was under cultivation, even though only a third of the
evacuated villages were resettled. Defence forces must have done much of the work. Yet this land
was of marginal agricultural value. According to historian David Marples, the administration had a
psychological purpose for the clean-up: they wished to forestall panic regarding nuclear energy, and
even to restart the Chernobyl power station. [65]:78–79, 87, 192–193 Although a number of radioactive
emergency vehicles were buried in trenches, many of the vehicles used by the liquidators, including
the helicopters, still remained, as of 2018, parked in a field in the Chernobyl area. Scavengers have
since removed many functioning, but highly radioactive, parts.[96] Liquidators worked under
deplorable conditions, poorly informed and with poor protection. Many, if not most of them, exceeded
radiation safety limits.[65]:177–183[97]

Investigations and the evolution of identified causes

To investigate the causes of the accident the IAEA used the International Nuclear Safety Advisory
Group (INSAG), which had been created by the IAEA in 1985. [98] It produced two significant reports
on Chernobyl; INSAG-1 in 1986, and a revised report, INSAG-7 in 1992. In summary, according to
INSAG-1, the main cause of the accident was the operators' actions, but according to INSAG-7, the
main cause was the reactor's design. [4]:24[99] Both IAEA reports identified an inadequate "safety culture"
(INSAG-1 coined the term) at all managerial and operational levels as a major underlying factor of
different aspects of the accident. This was stated to be inherent not only in operations but also
during design, engineering, construction, manufacture and regulation. [4]:21,24
Views of the main causes were heavily lobbied by different groups, including the reactor's designers,
power plant personnel, and the Soviet and Ukrainian governments. This was due to the uncertainty
about the actual sequence of events and plant parameters. After INSAG-1 more information became
available, and more powerful computing has allowed better forensic simulations. [4]:10
The INSAG-7 conclusion of major factors contributory to the accident was:
"The Accident is now seen to have been the result of concurrance of the following major factors:
specific physical characteristics of the reactor; specific design features of the reactor control
elements; and the fact that the reactor was brought to a state not specified by procedures or
investigated by an independent safety body. Most importantly, the physical characteristics of the
reactor made possible its unstable behaviour." [4]:23
INSAG-1 report, 1986
The first Soviet official explanation of the accident was by means of presentations from leading
Soviet scientists and engineers to a large number of representatives from IAEA member states and
other international organisations at the first Post-Accident Review Meeting, held at the IAEA in
Vienna between 25 and 29 August 1986. This explanation effectively placed the blame on the power
plant operators. The UKAEA INSAG-1 report followed shortly afterwards in September 1986, and on
the whole also supported this view, based also on the information provided in discussions with the
Soviet experts at the Vienna review meeting.[100] In this view, the catastrophic accident was caused by
gross violations of operating rules and regulations. For instance; "During preparation and testing of
the turbine generator under run-down conditions using the auxiliary load, personnel disconnected a
series of technical protection systems and breached the most important operational safety provisions
for conducting a technical exercise."[34]:311
It was stated that at the time of the accident the reactor was being operated with many key safety
systems turned off, most notably the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), LAR (Local
Automatic control system), and AZ (emergency power reduction system). Personnel had an
insufficient understanding of technical procedures involved with the nuclear reactor, and knowingly
ignored regulations to expedite the electrical test completion. [34] Several procedural irregularities also
helped to make the accident possible, one of which was insufficient communication between the
safety officers and the operators in charge of the test. The main process computer, SKALA, was
running in such a way that the main control computer could not shut down the reactor or even
reduce power. Normally the computer would have started to insert all of the control rods. The
computer would have also started the "Emergency Core Protection System" that introduces 24
control rods into the active zone within 2.5 seconds, which is still slow by 1986 standards. All control
was transferred from the process computer to the human operators.
It was held that the designers of the reactor considered this combination of events to be impossible
and therefore did not allow for the creation of emergency protection systems capable of preventing
the combination of events that led to the crisis, namely the intentional disabling of emergency
protection equipment plus the violation of operating procedures. Thus the primary cause of the
accident was the extremely improbable combination of rule infringement plus the operational routine
allowed by the power station staff.[34]:312
On the disconnection of safety systems, Valery Legasov said in 1987, "It was like airplane pilots
experimenting with the engines in flight." [101] In this analysis the operators were blamed, but
deficiencies in the reactor design and in the operating regulations that made the accident possible
were set aside and mentioned only casually. This view was reflected in numerous publications and
artistic works on the theme of the Chernobyl accident that appeared immediately after the accident,
[26]
 and for a long time remained dominant in the public consciousness and in popular publications.

Soviet criminal trial 1987

Main article: Individual involvement in the Chernobyl disaster
The trial took place from 7 to 30 July 1987 in a temporary courtroom set up in the House of Culture
in the city of Chernobyl, Ukraine. Five plant employees (the former deputy chief engineer Anatoly S.
Dyatlov; the former plant director Viktor P. Bryukhanov; the former chief engineer Nikolai M. Fomin;
the shift director of Reactor 4, Boris V. Rogozhin; and the chief of Reactor 4, Aleksandr P.
Kovalenko) and Gosatomenergonadzor (USSR State Committee on Supervision of Safe Conduct of
Work in Atomic Energy) inspector Yuri A. Laushkin were sentenced to 10, 10, 10, five, three and two
years respectively in labor camps.[102] The families of Aleksandr Akimov, Leonid Toptunov and Valery
Perevozchenko had received official letters but prosecution against the employees had been
terminated at their deaths.
Anatoly Dyatlov was found guilty "of criminal mismanagement of potentially explosive enterprises"
and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment—of which he would serve three [103]—for the role that his
oversight of the experiment played in the ensuing accident.