G.R. No. 158182             June 12, 2008 with Calix's permission.
Hernandez ordered petitioner
SESINANDO MERIDA, petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 28
June 2002 and the Resolution dated 14 May 2003 of the
Court of Appeals. The 28 June 2002 Decision affirmed
the conviction of petitioner Sesinando Merida
(petitioner) for violation of Section 68,3 Presidential
Decree No. 705 (PD 705),4 as amended by Executive
Order No. 277. The Resolution dated 14 May 2003
denied admission of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.5
The Facts
Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of
Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court) with
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for
"cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a
lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil,
Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over which
private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco)
claims ownership.6
The prosecution evidence showed that on 23 December
1998, Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra tree
in the Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the matter
to Florencio Royo (Royo), the punong barangay of Ipil.
On 24 December 1998,7 Royo summoned petitioner to a
meeting with Tansiongco. When confronted during the
meeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner admitted
cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the
permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix) who, according to
petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco
in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. Petitioner
showed to Royo Calix's written authorization signed by
Calix's wife.8
On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-
cutting to the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) forester Thelmo S. Hernandez
(Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon. When Hernandez
confronted petitioner about the felled tree, petitioner
reiterated his earlier claim to Royo that he cut the tree
not to convert the felled tree trunk into lumber.
On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez
that petitioner had converted the narra trunk into lumber.
Hernandez, with other DENR employees and
enforcement officers, went to the Mayod Property and
saw that the narra tree had been cut into six smaller
pieces of lumber. Hernandez took custody of the
lumber,9 deposited them for safekeeping with Royo, and
issued an apprehension receipt to petitioner. A larger
portion of the felled tree remained at the Mayod
Property. The DENR subsequently conducted an
investigation on the matter.10
Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon (Provincial
Prosecutor) charging petitioner with violation of Section
68 of PD 705, as amended. During the preliminary
investigation, petitioner submitted a counter-affidavit
reiterating his claim that he cut the narra tree with
Calix's permission. The Provincial Prosecutor11 found
probable cause to indict petitioner and filed the
Information with the trial court (docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2207).
During the trial, the prosecution presented six witnesses
including Tansiongco, Royo, and Hernandez who
testified on the events leading to the discovery of and
investigation on the tree-cutting. Petitioner testified as
the lone defense witness and claimed, for the first time,
that he had no part in the tree-cutting.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Decision dated 24 November 2000, the trial court
found petitioner guilty as charged, sentenced him to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal and ordered
the seized lumber forfeited in Tansiongco's favor.12 The
trial court dismissed petitioner's defense of denial in
view of his repeated extrajudicial admissions that he cut
the narra tree in the Mayod Property with Calix's
permission. With this finding and petitioner's lack of
DENR permit to cut the tree, the trial court held
petitioner liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended.
1
Page
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating
his defense of denial. Petitioner also contended that (1)
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case
because it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco
and not by a forest officer as provided under Section 80
of PD 705 and (2) the penalty imposed by the trial court
is excessive.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated 28 June 2002, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's ruling but ordered the seized
lumber confiscated in the government's favor.13 The
Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's finding that
petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of
cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property without any
DENR permit. The Court of Appeals also found nothing
irregular in the filing of the complaint by Tansiongco
instead of a DENR forest officer considering that the
case underwent preliminary investigation by the proper
officer who filed the Information with the trial court.
On the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals, in the
dispositive portion of its ruling, sentenced petitioner to
14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years of reclusion
temporal. However, in the body of its ruling, the Court
of Appeals held that "the penalty to be imposed on
[petitioner] should be (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal,"14 the same penalty the trial court imposed.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the Court of
Appeals, in its Resolution dated 14 May 2003, did not
admit his motion for having been filed late.15
Hence, this petition. Petitioner raises the following
issues:
I. WHETHER x x x SECTION 68 OF P.D. 705
AS AMENDED PROHIBITING THE
CUTTING, GATHERING, COLLECTING
AND REMOVING TIMBER OR OTHER
FOREST PRODUCTS FROM ANY FOREST
LAND APPLIES TO PETITIONER.
II. WHETHER x x x POSSESSION OF THE
NARRA TREE CUT IN PRIVATE LAND
CONTESTED BY VICAR CALIX AND
PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT OSCAR
TANSIONGCO IS COVERED BY SECTION
80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED.
III. WHETHER PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT
CAN INITIATE THE CHARGE EVEN
WITHOUT THE STANDING AUTHORITY
COMING FROM THE INVESTIGATING
FOREST OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES AS MANDATED BY SECTION
80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED.
[IV.] WHETHER x x x THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE
CASE FILED BY PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE
INVESTIGATING OFFICER AS REQUIRED
BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED
WHO MUST BE THE ONE TO INSTITUTE
THE FILING OF THE SAME.16
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) countered that (1) the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the case even though Tansiongco, and
not a DENR forest officer, filed the complaint against
petitioner and (2) petitioner is liable for violation of
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:17
1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it was
based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and
not by a DENR forest officer; and
2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
The Trial Court Acquired Jurisdiction Over
Criminal Case No. 2207
We sustain the OSG's claim that the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207. The Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure (Revised Rules) list the
cases which must be initiated by a complaint filed by
specified individuals,18 non-compliance of which ousts
the trial court of jurisdiction from trying such
cases.19 However, these cases concern only defamation
and other crimes against chastity20 and not to cases
2
concerning Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Further,
Page
Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an interested
person from filing a complaint before any qualified
officer for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended. Section 80 of PD 705 provides in relevant
parts:
 SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. -
xxxx
Reports and complaints regarding the commission
of any of the offenses defined in this Chapter, not
committed in the presence of any forest officer or
employee, or any of the deputized officers or
officials, shall immediately be investigated by the
forest officer assigned in the area where the offense
was allegedly committed, who shall thereupon
receive the evidence supporting the report or
complaint.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the
complaint or report, the investigating forest officer
shall file the necessary complaint with the
appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a
preliminary investigation of criminal cases and file
an information in Court. (Emphasis supplied)
We held in People v. CFI of Quezon21 that the phrase
"reports and complaints" in Section 80 refers to "reports
and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer
assigned to the area by other forest officers or
employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or
any of the deputized officers or officials, for violations
of forest laws not committed in their presence."22
Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the
Bureau of Forest Development or any of the deputized
officers or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-
cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private
citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property.
Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an
investigation to determine "if there is prima facie
evidence to support the complaint or report."23 At any
rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section
80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from filing a
complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for
petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended. For its part, the trial court correctly took
cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case falls
within its exclusive original jurisdiction.24
Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private
Property Without Permit
Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts25 penalized
under PD 705, provides:
SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or
Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
Without License. - Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without the legal documents
as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the
officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such
officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the
penalty, be deported without further proceedings on
the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in
favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed as well as the machinery, equipment,
implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the
cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber or
other forest products from any forest land without any
authority; (2) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or
removing of timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land without any authority;26 and
(3) the possession of timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations.27 Petitioner stands charged
of having "cut, gathered, collected and removed timber
or other forest products from a private land28 without x x
x the necessary permit x x x " thus his liablity, if ever,
should be limited only for "cut[ting], gather[ing],
collect[ing] and remov[ing] timber," under the second
category. Further, the prosecution evidence showed that
petitioner did not perform any acts of "gathering,
collecting, or removing" but only the act of "cutting" a
lone narra tree. Hence, this case hinges on the question
of whether petitioner "cut x x x timber" in the Mayod
Property without a DENR permit.29
We answer in the affirmative and thus affirm the lower
courts' rulings.
3
Page
On the question of whether petitioner cut a narra tree in
the Mayod Property without a DENR permit, petitioner
adopted conflicting positions. Before his trial, petitioner
consistently represented to the authorities that he cut a
narra tree in the Mayod Property and that he did so only
with Calix's permission. However, when he testified,
petitioner denied cutting the tree in question. We sustain
the lower courts' rulings that petitioner's extrajudicial
admissions bind him.30 Petitioner does not explain why
Royo and Hernandez, public officials who testified
under oath in their official capacities, would lie on the
stand to implicate petitioner in a serious criminal
offense, not to mention that the acts of these public
officers enjoy the presumption of regularity. Further,
petitioner does not deny presenting Calix's authorization
to Royo and Hernandez as his basis for cutting the narra
tree in the Mayod Property. Petitioner has no use of
Calix's authorization if, as he claimed during the trial, he
did not cut any tree in the Mayod Property.
We further hold that the lone narre tree petitioner cut
from the Mayod Property constitutes "timber" under
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. PD 705 does not
define "timber," only "forest product" (which
circuitously includes "timber.")31 Does the narra tree in
question constitute "timber" under Section 68? The
closest this Court came to defining the term "timber" in
Section 68 was to provide that
"timber," includes "lumber" or "processed log."32 In
other jurisdictions, timber is determined by compliance
with specified dimensions33 or certain "stand age" or
"rotation age."34 In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,35 this Court was faced with a similar task of
having to define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 -
"lumber" - to determine whether possession of lumber is
punishable under that provision. In ruling in the
affirmative, we held that "lumber" should be taken in its
ordinary or common usage meaning to refer to
"processed log or timber," thus:
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of
either timber or lumber. While the former is included
in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of
Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the
same section in the definition of "Processing plant,"
which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical
set-up, machine or combination of
machine used for the processing of logs
and other forest raw materials
into lumber, veneer, plywood,
wallboard, blackboard, paper board,
pulp, paper or other finished wood
products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed
log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the
Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or
common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as
"timber or logs after being prepared for the
market." Simply put, lumber is a processed log
or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative
intent to the contrary, words and phrases
used in a statute should be given their plain,
ordinary, and common usage meaning. And in
so far as possession of timber without the
required legal documents is concerned, Section
68 of PD No. 705, as amended, makes no
distinction between raw and procesed timber.
Neither should we.36 x x x x (Italicization in the
original; boldfacing supplied)
We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term "timber"
under Section 68 cannot be taken in its common
acceptation as referring to "wood used for or suitable for
building or for carpentry or joinery."37 Indeed, tree
saplings or tiny tree stems that are too small for use as
posts, panelling, beams, tables, or chairs cannot be
considered timber.38
Here, petitioner was charged with having felled a narra
tree and converted the same into "several pieces of sawn
lumber, about three (3) pcs. 2x16x6 and three (3) pcs.
2x18x7 x x x consisting of 111 board feet x x x." These
measurements were indicated in the apprehension receipt
Hernandez issued to petitioner on 26 January 1999
which the prosecution introduced in evidence.39 Further,
Hernandez testified that the larger portion of the felled
log left in the Mayod Property "measured 76 something
centimeters [at the big end] while the smaller end
measured 65 centimeters and the length was 2.8
meters."40 Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled
and converted to lumber was "timber" fit "for building or
for carpentry or joinery" and thus falls under the ambit
of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Penalty Imposable on Petitioner
Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is
punishable as Qualified Theft under Article 310 in
relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
thus:
4
Page
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of qualified theft
shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next
preceding article x x x.
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall
be punished by:
1. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the
latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one
year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the
total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection
with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or
reclusión temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium
and maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen
is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000
pesos.
3. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum
and medium periods, if the value of the property stolen
is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000
pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisión
correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the
property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed
200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over
5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods,
if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if
the theft is committed under the circumstances
enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding
article and the value of the thing stolen does not
exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the
provisions of any of the five preceding subdivisions
shall be made applicable.
. of prision correcional, as maximum.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not
exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen
is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted
under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty
of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his
family.
The Information filed against petitioner alleged that the
six pieces of lumber measuring 111 board feet were
valued at P3,330. However, if the value of the log left at
the Mayod Property is included, the amount increases
to P20,930.40. To prove this allegation, the prosecution
relied on Hernandez's testimony that these amounts, as
stated in the apprehension receipt he issued, are his
"estimates" based on "prevailing local price."41
This evidence does not suffice. To prove the amount of
the property taken for fixing the penalty imposable
against the accused under Article 309 of the RPC, the
prosecution must present more than a mere
uncorroborated "estimate" of such fact.42 In the absence
of independent and reliable corroboration of such
estimate, courts may either apply the minimum penalty
under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken
based on the attendant circumstances of the
case.43 In People v. Dator44 where, as here, the accused
was charged with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended, for possession of lumber without permit, the
prosecution's evidence for the lumber's value consisted
of an estimate made by the apprehending authorities
whose apparent lack of corroboration was compounded
by the fact that the transmittal letter for the estimate was
not presented in evidence. Accordingly, we imposed on
the accused the minimum penalty under Article
309(6)45 of the RPC.46
Applying Dator in relation to Article 310 of the RPC
and taking into account the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
we find it proper to impose on petitioner, under the
circumstances obtaining here, the penalty of four (4)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to three (3) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21)
days of prision correcional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 28
June 2002 and the Resolution dated 14 May 2003 of the
Court of Appeals with the modification that petitioner
Sesinando Merida is sentenced to four (4) months and
one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3)
years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days
5
Page
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-93-874 March 14, 1995
AUGUSTUS L. MOMONGAN, Regional Director,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
Region VIII, Tacloban City, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE RAFAEL B. OMIPON, 6th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Hinunangan Silago, Southern
Leyte, respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
At around 10:00 o'clock of November 14, 1992, police
officers of the Municipality of Hinunangan, Southern
Leyte apprehended Dionisio Golpe while he was driving
his truck loaded with illegally cut lumber. The truck and
logs were impounded. A complaint was filed against
Basilio Cabig, the alleged owner of the logs. After
conducting the preliminary investigation, respondent
Judge Rafael B. Omipon found that a prima facie case
exists against Mr. Cabig but he ordered the release of the
truck inasmuch as the owner/driver, Mr. Golpe, was not
charged in the complaint.
Regional Director Augustus L. Momongan of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources filed
the instant complaint against respondent Judge alleging
that his order releasing the truck used in the transport of
illegally cut forest products violated Presidential Decree
705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Section
68 and 68-A1 and Administrative Order No. 59, Series of
1990.2 Complainant claims that respondent Judge has no
authority to order the release of the truck despite the
non-inclusion of Mr. Golpe in the complaint. The truck
should have been turned over to the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office of San Juan,
Southern Leyte for appropriate disposition as the same
falls under the administrative jurisdiction of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Office.
In his comment, respondent Judge explained that after
conducting the preliminary investigation, he found that
Golpe, the owner of the truck, is principally engaged in
the hauling of sand and gravel and the delivery of hollow
blocks. On his way home after delivering hollow blocks
in Barangay Sto. Niño II, he met his friend Cabig who
requested him to load sliced lumber and deliver the same
at Brgy. Lungsod-daan, Hinundayan to be used for the
construction of a barangay high school building. They
were apprehended when the truck had a flat tire. After
changing the tire, both the lumber and the truck were
ordered deposited at the police station of Hinunangan.
Respondent Judge observed that Golpe has a lesser
participation in the crime of illegal logging and, being a
mere accessory, he might be utilized by the Acting Chief
of Police as prosecution witness against Cabig. More
importantly, the fact that the complaint charged only
Cabig, respondent Judge, in the exercise of his sound
discretion, ordered the release of the truck owned by
Golpe.
The Memorandum of the Office of the Court
Administrator recommended that a formal investigation
be conducted. An excerpt from its Memorandum states:
We find the explanation of respondent unsatisfactory.
While he is authorized to conduct preliminary
investigation in all cases of violations of P.D. 705, as
amended, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines, Sec. 68-A thereof provides
that it is the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative who may order the confiscation and
disposition of the forest products illegally cut,
gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and
all conveyances used either by land, water or air in
the commission of the offense and to dispose of the
same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations
or policies on the matter.
There may be some facts that are not extant in the
records which can only come out during a formal
investigation to better establish clear culpability or
6
exoneration over the respondent.
Page
In view thereof, and to give respondent an
opportunity to clear himself, it is respectfully
recommended that this matter be referred to Acting
Executive Judge Leandro T. Loyao, Jr., RTC, Branch
26, San Juan, Southern Leyte, for investigation, report
 and recommendation within sixty days from receipt
of the records.3
In the Resolution of November 8, 1993, the Court
resolved to refer the case to Acting Executive Judge
Leandro T. Loyao, Jr., RTC, Branch 26, San Juan,
Southern Leyte, for investigation, report and
recommendation, within sixty (60) days from receipt of
the records.4
During the first two hearing dates, complainant was
unable to attend but sent his representatives, DENR
lawyer Constantino Esber and legal assistant Romeo
Gulong. Respondent Judge appeared with his counsel.
However, on the third hearing date, respondent Judge
failed to appear as he suffered a stroke and was
hospitalized. Thereafter, DENR counsel Esber
manifested that their office has filed a motion for
reinvestigation and for the turnover of the jeep to the
PNP and subsequently, to the DENR. He also manifested
that the complainant is submitting the administrative
matter for resolution and recommendation without
adducing evidence against respondent. Respondent's
counsel did not object to complainant's manifestation.
The counsel of both complainant and respondent jointly
agreed to submit the case for appropriate action.
The Investigating Judge's confidential report, in part,
states:
In view of this development in the
course of an intended investigation this
investigator could not elicit additional
facts than are found in the records,
whether inculpatory or exculpatory.
Respondent was given an opportunity to
explain the unfavorable circumstances
against him but he was overtaken by a
serious illness. So much was expected
from the complainant to supply the facts
not extant in the records, but he lost
interest in substantiating his April 1993
report to the Supreme Court. In fact, he
was submitting this administrative
matter for resolution without adducing
evidence against respondent.
Except for the 21 January 1994 motion
for reinvestigation of DENR counsel
Esber which sought for the inclusion of
jeep owner and driver Dionisio Golpe in
the criminal information, there is
nothing new that can be added to the
facts found by the Honorable Deputy
Court Administrator as reflected in his
Memorandum for the Honorable Chief
Justice dated 12 October 1993.
There being no actual investigation
conducted, no additional facts could be
reported and consequently, there is no
basis for a recommendation on the basis
of facts.
This investigator can only recommend
appropriate action by the Supreme Court
on the basis of the facts already extant in
the records with a prayer for
consideration of respondent plight
especially so since on account of this
investigation his health has deteriorated
and may affect his efficiency output as a
judge. Perhaps, allowing him to bow out
of the service with honor and
corresponding benefits.5
During the pendency of this case, respondent Judge filed
for disability retirement. His application was approved
but his pension was not released pending the outcome of
this case.
We find respondent Judge's order to release the truck
owned and driven by Mr. Dionisio Golpe legally
justifiable, hence, he is not subject to any disciplinary
sanction.
According to the Revised Penal Code, Art. 45, first
paragraph: "[E]very penalty imposed for the commission
of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the
proceeds of the crime and the instrument or tools with
which it was committed." However, this cannot be done
if such proceeds and instruments or tools "be the
property of a third person not liable for offense." In this
case, the truck, though used to transport the illegally cut
lumber, cannot be confiscated and forfeited in the event
accused therein be convicted because the truck
owner/driver, Mr. Dionisio Golpe was not indicted.
Hence, there was no justification for respondent Judge
not to release the truck.
Complainant is correct in pointing out that based on
7
Pres. Decree No. 705, Sec. 68-A and Adm. Order No.
Page
59, the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized
representative has the power to confiscate any illegally
obtained or gathered forest products and all conveyances
used in the commission of the offense and to dispose of
the same in accordance with pertinent laws. However, as
complainant himself likewise pointed out, this power is
in relation to the administrative jurisdiction of the campaign against illegal logging. It behooves all the
DENR. concerned agencies to seriously strive for the attainment
of the constitutionally-declared policy to "protect and
We do not find that when respondent Judge released the advance the right of the people to a balanced and
truck after he conducted the preliminary investigation healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
and satisfied himself that there was no reason to continue harmony of nature"7 in order to preserve our natural
keeping the truck, he violated Pres. Decree No. 705 and resources for the benefit of the generations still to come.
Adm. Order No. 59. The release of the truck did not
render nugatory the administrative authority of the WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED.
DENR Secretary. The confiscation proceedings under
Adm. Order No. 596 is different from the confiscation SO ORDERED.
under the Revised Penal Code, which is an additional
penalty imposed in the event of conviction. Despite the
order of release, the truck can be seized again either by
filing a motion for reinvestigation and motion to include
the truck owner/driver, as co-accused, which
complainant has done as manifested before the lower
court or by enforcing Adm. Order No. 59. Section 12
thereof categorically states that "[t]he confiscation of the
conveyance under these regulations shall be without
prejudice to any criminal action which shall be filed
against the owner thereof or any person who used the
conveyance in the commission of the offense."

Petitioner is of the opinion that under the circumstances,

respondent Judge should have turned over the truck to
the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of San Juan, Southern Leyte for
appropriate disposition. No doubt, this would have
simplified matters and prevented the present situation
from occurring wherein one government official files a
complaint against another. Under Sec. 4 of Adm. Order
No. 59, if the apprehension is not made by DENR field
offices, deputized military personnel and officials of
other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forest
products and their conveyances shall notify the nearest
DENR field offices and turn over said forest products
and conveyances for proper action and disposition. A
period of about two weeks lapsed from the time the
seizure was made before a complaint was filed. During
this period, the apprehending policemen had enough
time to turn over the logs and the truck to the nearest
DENR field office for proper action and disposition
since the duty to turn over the truck to the nearest DENR
field office rests on the officials apprehending the illegal
logs. There being no mandatory duty on the part of
respondent Judge to turn over the truck, he should not be
8

visited with disciplinary sanction when he did not refer

Page

the same to the DENR field office in San Juan, Southern

Leyte.

The Court takes this opportunity to enjoin the National

Police, the DENR, the prosecutors, and the members of
the bench to coordinate with each other for a successful

G.R. No. 92285 March 28, 1994
PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC., petitioner,
vs. HON. DEMETRIO M. BATARIO, JR., Presiding Judge
Branch 48, Regional Trial Court of Manila, COMMISSIONER
OF CUSTOMS and
A. J. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
PETITIONER PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is
a Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It
grows gubas trees in its plantations in Agusan and Mindoro
which it supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for
production of matches. In consonance with the state policy to
encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree
plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry
Code1 confers on entities like PTFI a set of incentives among
which is a qualified ban against importation of wood and
"wood-derivated" products.
On 5 April 1989, private respondent A. J. International
Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4) containers of
matches from Indonesia, which the Bureau of Customs
released on 12 April 1989, and two (2) more containers
of matches from Singapore on 19 April 1989. The
records do not disclose when the second shipment was
released.
On 25 April 1989, upon request of PTFI, Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the Department of Natural
Resources and Environment issued a certification that
"there are enough available softwood supply in the
Philippines for the match industry at reasonable price."2
On 5 May 1989, PTFI filed with the Regional Court of
Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with
prayer for a temporary restraining order against
respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to
enjoin the latter from importing matches and "wood-
derivated" products, and the Collector of Customs from
allowing and releasing the importations. It was docketed
as Civil Case No. 89-48836 and raffled to respondent
Judge Demetrio M. Batario, Jr. PTFI prays for an order
directing the Commissioner of Customs to impound the
subject importations and the AJIC be directed to pay
petitioner P250,000.00 in actual damages, P1,000,000.00
in exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
On 14 June 1989, AJIC moved to dismiss the complaint
alleging that:
(a) The Commissioner of Customs under Sec. 1207 of the
Tariff and Customs Code and not the regular court, has
"exclusive jurisdiction to determine the legality of an
importation or ascertain whether the conditions prescribed by
law for an importation have been complied with . . . . (and
over cases of) seizure, detention or release of property affected
. . . . ;"3 (b) The release of subject importations had rendered
injunction moot and academic;4 (c) The prayer for damages
has no basis as the questioned acts of the Commissioner are in
accordance with law and no damages may be awarded based
on future acts;5 and, (d) The complaint for injunction cannot
stand it being mainly a provisional relief and not a principal
remedy.6
PTFI opposed the motion to dismiss. On 28 July 1989,
AJIC's motion to dismiss was denied. However, on 8
February 1990, on motion for reconsideration by AJIC
and despite the opposition of PTFI, the Court
reconsidered its 28 July 1989 order and dismissed the
case on the ground that it had "no jurisdiction to
determine what are legal or illegal importations."7
In this present recourse, PTFI seeks to set aside the 8
February 1990 order of respondent court and prays for
the continuation of the hearing in Civil Case No. 89-
48836. PTFI claims that what was brought before the
trial court was a civil case for injunction, i.e.,
"restraining the entry of safety matches into the country .
. . for the purpose of securing compliance with Sec. 36
(l) of the Forestry Code" and for damages, "to seek
9
redress of its right which has been clearly violated by the
Page
importation of safety matches . . . . (which) is a denial to
the petitioner of the protection and incentive granted it
by Section 36 (l) of the Forestry Code . . . ." 8 PTFI
asserts the inapplicability of the procedures outlined in
R.A. No. 1125 relative to incidents before the Court of
Tax Appeals because the instant action is not a protest
case where the aggrieved party is not an importer. It then
argues that since it could not avail of the remedies
afforded by the Tariff and Customs Code, resort to the
courts is warranted, citing Commissioner of Customs v.
Alikpala.9
On the formal requirements, we hold that the claim of
public respondent that the petition was filed late has no
basis. The records revealed that PTFI received the
assailed order of 8 February 1990 on 20 February
1990, 10 hence, it had until 7 March 1990 to file petition
for review on certiorari. On that date, PTFI filed a
motion for extension of fifteen (15) days within which to
file the petition.11 On 19 March 1990, this Court granted
PTFI a thirty (30)-day non-extendible period to file its
petition,12 thus resetting the new deadline for the petition
to 6 April 1990. On that date the petition was filed.
Petitioner anchors his complaint on a statutory privilege
or incentive granted under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the
Revised Forestry Code. The only subject of this
incentive is a ban against importation of wood, wood
products or wood-derivated products which is to be
enforced by the Bureau of Customs since it has, under
the Tariff and Customs Code, the exclusive original
jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases13 and, in
fact, it is the duty of the Collector of Customs to exercise
jurisdiction over prohibited importations. 14
The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l),
of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of
the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the
Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs
to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis. To allow the
regular court to direct the Commissioner to impound the
imported matches, as petitioner would, is clearly an
interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases. An order of a judge
to impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based on his
determination and declaration of the invalidity of the
importation, hence, an usurpation of the prerogative and an
encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In
other words, the reliefs directed against the Bureau of
Customs 15 as well as the prayer for injunction against
importation of matches by private respondent AJIC 16 may not
be granted without the court arrogating upon itself the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs.
The claim of petitioner that no procedure is outlined for the
enforcement of the import ban under the Tariff and Customs
Code, if true, does not at all diminish the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Customs over the subject matter. The enforcement
of statutory rights is not foreclosed by the absence of a
statutory procedure. The Commissioner of Customs has the
power to "promulgate all rules and regulations necessary to
enforce the provisions of this (Tariff and Customs) Code . . .
subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Finance."17 Moreover, it has been held that ". . . . (w)here the
statute does not require any particular method of procedure to
be followed by an administrative agency, the agency may
adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions." 18
But over and above the foregoing, PTFI's
correspondence with the Bureau of Customs19 contesting
the legality of match importations may already take the
nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of
which would preclude the court from interfering with it
under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
In Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Peña, 20 we held that —
. . . . under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine
of primary
jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of
the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to
comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute
administered (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar
Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954].)
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized
administrative boards or commissions with the special
knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine
promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual
matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of
discretion, has become well nigh indispensable . . . .
Moreover, however cleverly the complaint may be
worded, the ultimate relief sought by PTFI is to compel
the Bureau of Customs to seize and forfeit the match
importations of AJIC. Since the determination to seize or
not to seize is discretionary upon the Bureau of Customs,
the same cannot be subject of mandamus. But this does
not preclude recourse to the courts by way of the
extraordinary relief of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court if the Bureau of Customs should gravely
abuse the exercise of its jurisdiction. Otherwise stated,
the court cannot compel an agency to do a particular act
or to enjoin such act which is within its prerogative,
except when in the exercise of its authority it gravely
10
abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. In the case at bench,
we have no occasion to rule on the issue of grave abuse
Page
of discretion or excess of jurisdiction as it is not before
us.
The petitioner's claim for damages against AJIC being
inextricably linked with the legality of the importations, must
necessarily rise or fall with the main action to bar the question
that "(e)very importation of matches by said defendant is a
denial to plaintiff of the protection and incentives granted it by
Sec. 36 (l) of the Forestry Code," 21 merely indicates its
reliance on the illegality of the importations for its prayer for
damages. In other words, if the importations were authorized,
there would be no denial of the plaintiff's protection and
incentives under the Forestry Code. Necessarily, the claim for
damages must await the decision declaring the importations
unlawful.
In Rosales v. Court of Appeals, we categorized a similar
case for damages as premature since "(t)he finality of the
administrative case which gives life to petitioners' cause
of action has not yet been reached."22 The pendency of
petitioner's request to the Bureau of Customs for the
implementation of the ban against the importation of
matches under the Forestry Code is impliedly admitted;
in fact, it is apparent from the correspondence of counsel
for petitioner that the Bureau is inclined to sustain the
validity of the importations. 23 Hence, as in Rosales, the
order of the trial court granting the dismissal of the civil
case must be upheld.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No.
89-48836 dated 8 February 1990, the same AFFIRMED and,
consequently, the instant petition for review is DENIED.
G.R. No. L-46772 February 13, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON
(BRANCH VII), GODOFREDO ARROZAL AND
LUIS FLORES, respondents.
Felipe B. Pagkanlungan for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition seeks the annulment of the order of the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Quezon in Criminal Case No. 1591, entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Godofredo, Arrozal, Luis Flares and
twenty other John Does," dismissing the information
filed therein.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The private respondents were charged with the crime of
qualified theft of logs, defined and punished under
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines,
in an information which read:
That on or about the 28th, 29th and 30th
days of July 1976, at Barangay
Mahabang Lalim, Municipality of
General Nakar, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Godofredo Arrozal and
Luis Flores, together with twenty (20)
other John Does whose identities are
still unknown, the first-named accused
being the administrator of the Infanta
Logging Corporation, with intent to
gain, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously enter the
privately-owned land of one Felicitacion
Pujalte, titled in the name of her
deceased father, Macario Prudente,
under Original Certificate of Title No.
6026, and once inside, illegally cut,
gather, take, steal and carry away
therefrom, without the consent of the
said owner and without any authority
under a license agreement, lease license
or permit, sixty (60) logs of different
species, consisting of about 541.48
cubic meters, with total value of FIFTY
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIVE
PESOS and FIFTY TWO CENTAVOS
(P50,205.52) including government
charges, to the damage and prejudice of
the said owner in the aforesaid amount.
Contrary to Law.
Lucena City, 7 January 1977.
(p.17, Rollo).
On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to
quash the information on two (2) grounds, to wit: (1) that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2)
that the information does not conform substantially to
the prescribed form.
On April 13, 1977, the trial court dismissed the
information on the grounds invoked (pp. 32-42, Rollo),
11
The reconsideration sought was denied on August 9,
Page
1977 (p.42, Rollo).
On October 15, 1977, this petition was filed directly with
this Court, raising the following questions of law: (1)
whether or not the information charged an offense; and
(2) whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the
case.
On the first issue, the People alleged that, contrary to the
allegation of the private respondents and the opinion of
the trial court, the information substantially alleged all
the elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs as
described in Section 68 of P.D. 705. While it was
admitted that the information did not precisely allege
that the taking of the logs in question was "without the
consent of the state," nevertheless, said information
expressly stated that the accused "illegally cut, gather,
take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent
of said owner and without any authority under a license
agreement, lease, lease, license or permit, sixty (60) logs
of different species. . . ." Since only the state can grant
the lease, license, license agreement or permit for
utilization of forest resources, including timber, then the
allegation in the information that the asportation of the
logs was "without any authority" under a license
agreement, lease, license or permit, is tantamount to
alleging that the taking of the logs was without the
consent of the state.
We agree with the petitioner.
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or
collecting timber or other products
without license.— Any person who shall
cut, gather, collect or remove timber or
other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public lands, or from private
lands, without any authority under a
license agreement, lease, license or
permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft
as defined and punished under Articles
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code. . . .
When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
(Rule 117, Sec. 2 [a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency of
the Information hinges on the question of whether the
facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, meet the
essential elements of the offense defined in the law
(People v. Segovia, 103 Phil. 1162 [1958]; People v.
Abad, L-55132, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 57).
The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are:
1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected or removed
timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or
other forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed
belongs to the government or to any private individual;
and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing
was without authority under a license agreement, lease,
license, or permit granted by the state.
The Order dismissing the complaint concluded that the
information was defective because:
. . ., it is noted that the Information
alleges that the cutting, gathering and
carrying away of the logs were done
without the consent of the owner of the
land. While the prosecution admits that
timber is a forest product that belongs to
the state, the information, however, fails
to allege that the taking was without the
consent of the latter, for which reason
the Information is patently defective. (p.
39, Rollo)
The failure of the information to allege that the logs
taken were owned by the state is not fatal. It should be
noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken
not from a public forest but from a private woodland
registered in the name of complainant's deceased father,
Macario Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a
license agreement, license or lease does not make the
state the owner of all the logs and timber products
produced in the Philippines including those produced in
private woodlands. The case of Santiago v. Basilan
Company, G.R. No. L-15532, October 31, 1963, 9
SCRA 349, clarified the matter on ownership of timber
in private lands. This Court held therein:
The defendant has appealed, claiming that it should
not be held liable to the plaintiff because the timber
which it cut and gathered on the land in question
belongs to the government and not to the plaintiff,
the latter having failed to comply with a
requirement of the law with respect to his property.
The provision of law referred to by appellant is a
section of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended, which reads;
"Sec. 1829. Registration of title to private forest
land. — Every private owner of land containing
12
timber, firewood and other minor forest products
shall register his title to the same with the Director
Page
of Forestry. A list of such owners, with a statement
of the boundaries of their property, shall be
furnished by said Director to the Collector of
Internal Revenue, and the same shall be
supplemented from time to time as occasion may
require.
Upon application of the Director of Forestry the
fiscal of the province in which any such land lies
shall render assistance in the examination of the
title thereof with a view to its registration in the
Bureau of Forestry."
In the above provision of law, there is no statement
to the effect that non-compliance with the
requirement would divest the owner of the land of
his rights thereof and that said rights of ownership
would be transferred to the government. Of course,
the land which had been registered and titled in the
name of the plaintiff under that Land Registration
Act could no longer be the object of a forester
license issued by the Director of Forestry because
ownership of said land includes also ownership of
everything found on its surface (Art. 437, New
Civil Code).
Obviously, the purpose of the registration required
in section 1829 of the Administrative Code is to
exempt the title owner of the land from the payment
of forestry charges as provided for under Section
266 of the National Internal Revenue Code, to wit:
"Charges collective on forest products cut,
gathered and removed from unregistered private
lands. — The charges above prescribed shall be
collected on all forest products cut, gathered and
removed from any private land the title to which is
not registered with the Director of Forestry as
required by the Forest Law; Provided, however,
That in the absence of such registration, the owner
who desires to cut, gather and remove timber and
other forest products from such land shall secure a
license from the Director of Forestry Law and
Regulations. The cutting, gathering and removing
of timber and the other forest products from said
private lands without license shall be considered as
unlawful cutting, gathering and removing of forest
products from public forests and shall be subject to
the charges prescribed in such cases in this chapter.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, while it is admitted that the
plaintiff has failed to register the timber in his land
as a private woodland in accordance with the oft-
repeated provision of the Revised Administrative
Code, he still retained his rights of ownership,
among which are his rights to the fruits of the land
and to exclude any person from the enjoyment and
disposal thereof (Art. 429, New Civil Code) — the
very rights violated by the defendant Basilan
Lumber Company.
While it is only the state which can grant a license or
authority to cut, gather, collect or remove forest products
it does not follow that all forest products belong to the
state. In the just cited case, private ownership of forest
products grown in private lands is retained under the
principle in civil law that ownership of the land includes
everything found on its surface.
Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as
defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the failure
of the information to allege the true owner of the forest
products is not material; it was sufficient that it alleged
that the taking was without any authority or license from
the government.
Anent the second issue raised, Section 80 of Presidential
Decree 705, provides:
Sec. 80. Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions. — A
forest officer or employee of the Bureau shall arrest
even without warrant any person who has committed
or is committing in his presence any of the offenses
defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and
confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and
equipment used in committing the offense, and the
forest products cut, gathered or taken by the offender
in the process of committing the offense. The
arresting forest officer or employee shall thereafter
deliver within six (6) hours from the time of arrest
and seizure, the offender and the confiscated forest
products, tools and equipment to, and file the proper
complaint with, the appropriate official designated
by law to conduct preliminary investigations and file
informations in court.
If the arrest and seizure are made in the forests, far
from the authorities designated by law to conduct
preliminary investigations, the delivery to, and filing
of the complaint with, the latter shall be done within
a reasonable time sufficient for ordinary travel from
the place of arrest to the place of delivery. The
seized products, materials and equipment shall be
immediately disposed of in accordance with forestry
13
administrative orders promulgated by the
Department Head.
Page
The Department Head may deputize any member or
unit of the Philippine Constabulary, police agency,
barangay or barrio official, or any qualified person
to protect the forest and exercise the power or
authority provided for in the preceding paragraph.
 Reports and complaints regarding the commission of
any of the offenses defined in this Chapter, not
committed in the presence of any forest officer or
employee, or any of the deputized officers or
officials, shall immediately be investigated by the
forest officer assigned in the area where the offense
was allegedly committed, who shall thereupon
receive the evidence supporting the report or
complaint.
If there is a prima facie evidence to support the
complaint or report, the investigating forest officer
shall file the necessary complaint with the
appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a
preliminary investigation of criminal cases and file
an information in Court.
The above cited provision covers two (2) specific
instances when a forest officer may commence a
prosecution for the violation of the Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines. The first authorizes a forest
officer or employee of the Bureau of Forestry to arrest
without a warrant, any person who has committed or is
committing, in his presence, any of the offenses
described in the decree. The second covers a situation
when an offense described in the decree is not
committed in the presence of the forest officer or
employee and the commission is brought to his attention
by a report or a complaint. In both cases, however, the
forest officer or employee shall investigate the offender
and file a complaint with the appropriate official
authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation
and file the necessary informations in court.
The circumstances in the instant case do not fall under
any of the situations covered by Section 80 of P.D. 705.
The alleged offense was committed not in the presence
of a forest officer and neither was the alleged
commission reported to any forest officer. The offense
was committed in a private land and the complaint was
brought by a private offended party to the fiscal.
The trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter because the
information was filed not pursuant to the complaint of
any forest officer as prescribed in Section 80 of P.D.
705. We agree with the observation of the Solicitor
General that:
. . ., the authority given to the forest officer to
investigate reports and complaints regarding the
commission of offenses defined in P.D. No. 705
by the said last and penultimate paragraphs of
Section 80 may be considered as covering only
such reports and complaints as might be brought to
the forest officer assigned to the area by other
forest officers or employees of the Bureau of
Forest Development, or any of the deputized
officers or officials, for violations of forest laws
not committed in their presence. Such
interpretation becomes cogent when we consider
that the whole of Section 80 deals precisely with
the authority of forest officers or employees to
make arrests and institute criminal actions
involving offenses defined in the Decree. (p.
26, Rollo).
Likewise, the Solicitor General was correct in insisting
that P.D. 705 did not repeal Section 1687 of the
Administrative Code giving authority to the fiscal to
conduct investigation into the matter of any crime or
misdemeanor and have the necessary information or
complaint prepared or made against persons charged
with the commission of the crime.
Sec. 1687. Authority of fiscal to conduct
investigation in criminal matter. — A provincial
fiscal shall have authority, if he deems it wise, to
conduct an investigation into the matter of any
crime or misdemeanor. To this end, he may
summon reputed witnesses and require them to
appear and testify upon oath before him. . . .
With the exception of the so-called "private
crimes" 1 and in election offenses, 2 prosecutions in
Courts of First Instance may be commenced by an
information signed by a fiscal after conducting a
preliminary investigation. Section 80 of P.D. 705 did not
divest the fiscals of this general authority. Neither did
the said decree grant forest officers the right of
preliminary investigations. In both cases under said Sec.
80 namely, 1) after a forest officer had made the arrest
(for offenses committed in his presence); or 2) after
conducting an investigation of reports or complaints of
violations of the decree (for violations not committed in
his presence) — he is still required to file the proper
complaint with the appropriate official designated by law
to conduct preliminary investigations in court. Said
section should not be interpreted to vest exclusive
authority upon forest officers to conduct investigations
regarding offenses described in the decree rather, it
14
should be construed as granting forest officers and
Page
employees special authority to arrest and investigate
offenses described in P.D. 705, to reinforce the exercise
of such authority by those upon whom it is vested by
general law.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The
questioned order of the trial court dismissing the
information is SET ASIDE. Criminal Cases No. 1591 is
reinstated.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-44649 April 15, 1988
DAYLINDA A. LAGUA, MANUEL P. LAGUA,
HONORATO ACHANZAR and RESTITUTO
DONGA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Davao City, Branch I, CONSTANCIO
MAGLANA and the EASTCOAST
DEVELOPMENT ENTERPRISES, respondents.
Wilfred D. Asis for petitioner.
Carlos A. Carbonilla for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for mandamus originated from a complaint
for damages which was instituted by the petitioners
against the private respondents for closing a logging
road without authority.
In their complaint, the petitioners, alleged, among
others:
In Paragraph 5(a):
a) On 1 January 1976, Atty. Ernesto Nombrado, legal
counsel for defendants, issued a memorandum to the
Chief Security Guard of Defendant Eastcoast directing
the latter to prevent the passage of Plaintiff Laguas'
hauling trucks loaded with logs for the Japanese vessel
(there were no other trucks hauling logs at that time)
on the national highway loading towards where the
vessel was berthed. In compliance with this directive,
the security force of Defendant Eastcoast closed the
road to the use by plaintiffs trucks and other
equipments and effectively prevented their passage
thereof while the vehicles and trucks of other people
were curiously not disturbed and were allowed passess
on the same road. It resulted that the loading of logs on
the M/S "Kyofuku Maru" was discontinued. A xeroxed
copy of this Nombrado memorandum, the original of
which is however in the possession of defendants, is
hereto attached as Annex "C" and made an integral
part hereof.
In Paragraph 5(b):
b) Upon representations made to Indalecio L.
Aspiras, Acting Station Officer-in-Charge, BFD
Lambajon Forest Station, and in response to plaintiff
Laguas' complaint, a letter dated 2 January 1976 was
addressed by Aspiras to the Resident Manager of
Defendant Eastcoast with instructions to open and
allow Plaintiff Laguas' trucks and machineries to
pass that road closed to them (but not to others) by
Defendant Eastcoast. A xeroxed copy of this letter is
hereto attached as Annex "D" and made a part
hereof. Accordingly, Sagrado Constantino, Resident
Manager of Defendant Eastcoast, issued an order to
15
their Chief Security Guard for the latter to comply
with the Aspiras letter. These events, however, took
Page
the whole day of 2 January 1976 so that
notwithstanding the lifting of the road closure no
hauling of logs could be made by Plaintiff Laguas on
that day.
In Paragraph 5(c):
 c) When Plaintiffs Laguas were already resuming
the hauling operations of their logs towards the
Japanese Vessel on 3 January 1976, again that same
road, only the day before ordered by the BFD to be
opened for use and passage by plaintiffs, was closed
to them by Defendant Eastcoast's security men upon
a radio message order of Defendant Maglana. Even
the vessel M/S "Kyofuku Maruwas" ordered by
Defendant Maglana to untie her anchor contrary to
existing laws, rules and regulations of the Bureau of
Customs and the Philippine Coastguard. A xeroxed
copy of the Maglana message, the original of which
is in the possession of the defendants, is hereto
attached as Annex "E" and made an integral part
hereof.
And in paragraph 5(d):
d) Given no recourse in the face of the blatant and
illegal closure of the road in defiance of BFD orders
to the contrary by the Defendant Eastcoast through
the order of Defendant Maglana, Plaintiff Laguas had
to depart postpaste to Mati, Davao Oriental, from
Baganga where the shipment and the road closure
were made, to seek the assistance of the PC thereat.
Thus on 5 January 1976, Provincial Commander
Alfonso Lumebao issued a directive to the PC
Detachment Commander at Baganga to lift the illegal
checkpoint made by defendants. A xeroxed copy of
this directive is hereto attached as Annex "F" and
made a part hereof. (Rollo, pp. 57-58)
The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on two
grounds, namely: (1) lack of jurisdiction, and (2) lack of
cause of action.
The private respondents extended that as the acts
complained of by the petitioners arose out of the
legitimate exercise of respondent Eastcoast Development
Enterprises, Inc., rights as a timber licensee, more
particularly in the use of its logging roads, therefore, the
resolution of this question is properly and legally within
the Bureau of Forest Development, citing as authority
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705. The private
respondents also argued that petitioner Daylinda Laguas
has no capacity to sue as her name was not registered as
an "agent" or "dealer" of logs in the Bureau of Forestry.
On August 3, 1976, the trial court issued the questioned
order dismissing the petitioners' complaint on the basis
of the abovementioned grounds. It ruled:
The Court agrees with the defendants
that under the law, the Bureau of Forest
Development has the exclusive power to
regulate the use of logging road and to
determine whether their use is in
violation of laws. Since the damages
claimed to have been sustained by the
plaintiffs arose from the alleged illegal
closure of a logging road — in the
language of the defendants on page 3 of
their motion to dismiss. The simple fact
is there was an illegal closure of the
national highway affecting the private
rights of the plaintiffs who sustained
damages and losses as a consequence
thereof — the question whether or not
the road was illegally closed must first
be determined by the Bureau of Forest
Development. If the said Bureau finds
that the road was legally closed, an
action for damages may be filed in
Court. Otherwise, no civil action would
prosper, for there would be no tortious
act. (Rollo, pp. 58-69).
xxx xxx xxx
After the logging road was closed for
the first time, more so after the second
time, by the defendant Eastcoast
Development Enterprises, Inc., the
plaintiffs should have asked the Bureau
of Forest Development to determine the
legality or illegality of the closure since
they wanted to file, as they did file, an
action for damages based on the alleged
illegal closure. The fact that the letter of
January 2, 1976, directed defendant
Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc.
to open the road does not necessarily
mean that the Bureau of Forest
Development had found that the closure
was illegal. There must be a positive
finding that the closure was illegal. ...
(Rollo, p. 60)
xxx xxx xxx
As an attorney-in-fact, Daylinda A.
16
Lagua is not entitled to, and cannot
Page
cannot claim, damages in her personal
capacity. For she could not have
sustained damages as a result of the
alleged illegal closure of the road in her
personal capacity while acting in her
representative capacity. So if she and
 her husband sustained damages, it must
have been because their legal rights
were violated by a tortious act
committed by the defendants other than
the alleged illegal closure of the road.
But as stated elsewhere in this order,
even the plaintiffs admit that the
damages they claimed to have sustained
arose from the alleged illegal closure of
the logging road. Assuming, however,
that another tortious act violated the
legal rights of the Laguas, still they
could not joint Achanzar and Donga in
this complaint for there would be
misjoinder of parties. (Rollo, pp. 61-62)
Hence, this petition for mandamus which we will treat as
a petition for certiorari in the interest of justice.
The petitioners maintain that since their action is for
damages, the regular courts have jurisdiction over the
same. According to them, the respondent court had no
basis for holding that the Bureau of Forestry
Development must first determine that the closure of a
logging road is illegal before an action for damages can
be instituted.
We agree.
P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its
order does not vest any power in the Bureau of Forest
Development to determine whether or not the closure of
a logging road is legal or illegal and to make such
determination a pre-requisite before an action for
damages may be maintained. Moreover, the complaint
instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based
on the alleged illegal closure of the logging road.
Whether or not such closure was illegal is a matter to be
established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to
be disproved by the private respondents. This should
appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It
is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of
Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of
a passage way, much less award or deny the payment of
damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside
a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Forest Development. As we have held in Ateneo de
Manila University v. Court of appeals (145 SCRA 100,
110):
The issue in this court was whether or
not the private respondents can recover
damages as a result of the of their son
from the petitioner university. This is a
purely legal question and nothing of an a
administrative nature is to or can be
done (Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA
230; Tapales v. University of the
Philippines, 7 SCRA 533; Limoico v.
Board of Administrators. (PJA) 133
SCRA 43; Malabanan v. Ramonte, 129
SCRA 359). The case was brought
pursuant to the law on damages
provided in the Civil Code. The
jurisdiction to try the case belongs to the
civil courts.
The private respondents, in their memorandum filed with
the respondent court, alleged that the logs of petitioner
Achanzar were cut down and removed outside of the
area granted to the latter under his Private Timber
License No. 2 and therefore inside the concession area of
respondent company's Timber License Agreement. This,
apparently, was the reason why the respondent company
denied to the petitioners the use of the logging road. If
we hold the respondents to their contention that the
Bureau of Forest Development has the power and
authority not only to regulate the use or blockade of
logging roads but also to exclusively determine the
legality of a closure of such roads, why then did they
take it upon themselves to initially close the disputed
logging road before taking up the matter with the Bureau
and why did they close it again notwithstanding the
Bureau's order to open it after the petitioners had duly
informed the said Bureau of the closure? To use the
Bureau's authority which the respondents ignored to now
defeat the court's jurisdiction would be totally
unacceptable. We, therefore, find that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
Anent the legal capacity to sue of the petitioners,
spouses Laguas, we affirm the trial court's ruling that
since they were mere agents of petitioners Achanzar and
Donga and were suing in their own behalf, they did not
have the capacity to sue for damages. They are not the
real parties in interest. However, the complaint can still
be maintained. It cannot be dismissed because the real
parties in interest, Achanzar and Donga were also
plaintiffs. Thus, the trial court should have ordered only
17
the dropping of the names of the spouses Laguas
Page
pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court but not the dismissal of the complaint.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. The questioned order of the
respondent court is SET ASIDE and this case is ordered
remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits

SO ORDERED.

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