Sitchon v. Aquino 98 Phil. 458 [1955]
Doctrine:
Houses constructed without governmental authority on public streets and river
beds for they obstruct at all times the free use by the public of said places are
considered nuisance. As such, they may be summarily removed without judicial
proceedings.
The duties vested in the district health officer in case of nuisances may be placed
upon other officers as may be designated by special provision of law.
FACTS:
This decision stems from six (6) different suits. All of the petitioners implead
Aquino (the City Engineer of Manila) as respondent so that he may be enjoined from
causing the demolition of their respective houses situated in different areas along public
streets in Manila inasmuch as these constitute public nuisances. All of the petitioners
occupied the subject parcels of land initially entirely without consent. However, all of
them subsequently paid concession fees or damages for the use of the land with the
agreement that such payment and consent shall be without prejudice to an order to
vacate. The time came when the City Engineer demanded that petitioners vacate the
occupied streets. Unheeded, he threatened to demolish the houses. Petitioners contend
that by virtue of arts. 700 and 702, the power to remove public nuisances is vested in
the District Health Officer, not in the City Engineer.
ISSUES:
Is there a public nuisance? Does the City Engineerhave authority to cause the
abatement of the nuisance?
HELD:
There is a public nuisance. This case falls on art. 694 par. 4, classifying as a
nuisance the obstruction of free passage of any public highway or street. It is public
because it affects a community or neighbourhood. The constructions in fact constitute
nuisances per se, obstructing at all times the streets. As such, the summary removal of
these may be authorized by statute or ordinance.
Aquino, as City Engineer, is vested with authority to effect the abatement of the
nuisances through demolition. By virtue of the Revised Charter of Manila, such duty,
among others, was placed upon him. Arts. 700 and 702 must yield to this provision not
only because it is later law but also because of the principle that special provisions
prevail over general ones. Moreover, an ordinance authorized the action sought to be
taken by respondent.
Velasco v. Manila Electric Co.
Doctrine:
Noise may constitute a nuisance but it must be of such character as to produce
actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities.
FACTS:
Velasco bought three (3) adjoining lots. He sold two (2) of these to Meralco and
maintained the last one as his residence. Meralco constructed on their lots a sub-station
at a distance of 10-20 meters away from appellant’s house. The company also built a
concrete wall at the sides along the streets but put up only an interlink wire fence
(previously a sawali wall) on the boundary with appellant. An unceasing sound
emanates from the substation, caused by transformers. Such, appellent contends,
constitute a nuisance which has worsened his health condition and has lowered the
value of his property. Several witnesses came forth but their testimonies were vague
and imprecise. Resort was made to a sound level meter. The audible sound from
different areas in Velaso’s property was measured in terms of decibels. It was found
that the sound exceeded the average intensity levels of residences.
ISSUE:
Can there be a nuisance caused by noise or sound?
HELD:
Yes. Several American decisions are cited showing that noise is an actionable
nuisance. In fact, Kentucky v. Anderson dealt with noise emanating from electrical
machinery and appliances.
The determining factor, however, is not just intensity or volume. It must be of
such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of
ordinary sensibilities. However, appellant’s testimony is too plainly biased. Nor are the
witnesses’ testimonies revealing on account of different perceptions. Consequently,
sound level meters were used.
As stated above, the sound exceeds average residential decibels. Also, the
testimonies of appellant’s physicians (which were more reliable since they actually
treated him, unlike the appellee’s) point to the noise as having caused appellant loss of
sleep, irritation and tension weakening his constitution. Notable lastly is the fact that in
the Kentucky case, where the nuisance was ordered abated, the average reading was
44 decibels while in the instant, the readings include 52, 54, and 55. The decision goes
on to discuss the proper award of damages.
Meralco was ordered either to transfer the facilities or reduce the produced
sound to around.