1. ILOILO COLD STORAGE CO. vs.

MUNICIPAL COUNCIL- Nuisance

“City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance
which has not theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial
determination.”

FACTS:
Plaintiff is the owner of an ice and cold storage plant. Nearby residents made complaints
regarding the smoke that the plant emits saying that it was very injurious to their health and
comfort. The defendant made investigations and later on passed a resolution which demands
that the smokestacks of the said factory be elevated or else the factory operations will be
closed or suspended. Plaintiff opposed by filing for injunction.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the resolution alone issued by the municipal council is sufficient to label and
abate the supposed nuisance in this case?

RULING: NO.
There are two kinds of nuisances: nuisances per se and per accidens. The former are
recognized as nuisances under any and all circumstances. The latter are such only because of
the special circumstances and conditions surrounding them. The former may be abated even by
private individuals however the latter is different; it needs a determination of the facts which is
a judicial function.

The question of nuisance can conclusively be decided, for all legal uses, by the established
courts of law or equity alone, and that the resolution of officers, or of boards organized by force
of municipal charters, cannot, to any degree, control such decision. City Council cannot, by a
mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has not theretofore
been pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial determination.

In the present case it is certain that the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a
legitimate industry, beneficial to the people and conducive to their health and comfort. The
resolution is obviously not enough to abate the property of the plaintiff.

It is clear that municipal councils have, under the code, the power to declare and abate nuisances, but it is equally clear that they
do not have the power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can they
authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation, or use is not such.
These things must be determined in the ordinary courts of law.
 2. MONTEVERDE VS. GENEROSO

FACTS:

 Plaintiff Tomas Monteverde owns a parcel of land, with a Torrens title obtained in 1921,
situated in Santa Ana, Davao.
 Said land is bounded on the northwest by Agdao River, which has a branch known as
the Tambongon Creek. This creek is navigable and runs through Monteverde’s land, and
as such is of public ownership.
 For fishpond purposes, Monteverde constructed two dams across the Agdao River and
five dams across the Tambongon Creek. These dams in the Agdao River were
destroyed by order of the district engineer of Davao because allegedly, those dams are
nuisances and thus, their action was just to safeguard the public health.
 To prevent the contemplated action with reference to the Tambongon Creek,
Monteverde sought in the Court of First Instance of Davao to obtain an order of
injunction in restraint of the provincial governor, the district engineer, and the district
health officer, but in this attempt Monteverde was unsuccessful in the lower court.

ISSUE:
Is a provincial governor, a district engineer, or a district health officer authorized to
destroy private property consisting of dams and fishponds summarily and without any
judicial proceedings whatever under the pretense that such private property constitutes a
nuisance?

RULING:

 No. The Court ruled that no law expressly empowers the provincial governor to order the
removal of obstructions and the destruction of nuisances in a navigable stream. On the
contrary, the law specifically grants to the municipal council the power by ordinance or
resolution "to declare, prevent, and abate nuisances."
 The Court discussed that Nuisances are of two classes: Nuisances per se and per
accidens. As to the first, since they affect the immediate safety of persons and property,
they may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. But if the nuisance
be of the second class, even the municipal authorities, under their power to declare and
abate nuisances, would not have the right to compel the abatement of a particular thing
or act as a nuisance without reasonable notice to the person alleged to be maintaining or
doing the same of the time and place of hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide
whether such a thing or act does in law constitute a nuisance.
 The subject dams falls in the second category above-mentioned. And as such, it cannot
be ordered destroyed without undergoing the due process of law as mandated under the
Philippine Laws.
 3. Hidalgo vs. Balandan

FACTS:

Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages in the sum of P2,000 for the death of their son,
Mario. Petitioner was the owner of an Ice plant, who had in their premises 2 tanks filled of water, 9 feet
deep. The factory was fenced but Ingress and egress was easily made because the gates were always
open and there was no guard assigned in the said gate. Also the tanks didn’t have any barricade or fence.
One day when Mario was playing with his friend, they saw the tank inside the factory and began playing
and swimming inside it. While bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later,
already as a cadaver, having died of ‘asphyxia secondary to drowning.’ The lower decided in the favor of
the parents saying that the petitioner is liable for damages due to the doctrine of attractive nuisance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in this case?

RULING: NO.

The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that “One who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise
ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of
tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises.
American Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to
bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial
feature other than the mere water and its location. In the case bar, the tanks themselves cannot fall
under such doctrine thus the petitioners cannot be held liable for Mario’s death.
 4. Sitcon vs. Aquino

FACTS :

This decision stems from six (6) different suits. All of the petitioners implead Aquino (the City Engineer
of Manila) as respondent so that he may be enjoined from causing the demolition of their respective
houses situated in different areas along public streets in Manila inasmuch as these constitute public
nuisances. All of the petitioners occupied the subject parcels of land initially entirely without consent.
However, all of them subsequently paid concession fees or damages for the use of the land with the
agreement that such payment and consent shall be without prejudice to an order to vacate. The time
came when the City Engineer demanded that petitioners vacate the occupied streets. Unheeded, he
threatened to demolish the houses. Petitioners contend that by virtue of arts. 700 and 702, the power
to remove public nuisances is vested in the District Health Officer, not in the City Engineer.

ISSUES:

Is there a public nuisance? Does the City Engineer have authority to cause the abatement of the
nuisance?

HELD:

There is a public nuisance. This case falls on art. 694 par. 4, classifying as a nuisance the obstruction of
free passage of any public highway or street. It is public because it affects a community or
neighbourhood. The constructions in fact constitute nuisances per se, obstructing at all times the streets.
As such, the summary removal of these may be authorized by statute or ordinance.

Aquino, as City Engineer, is vested with authority to effect the abatement of the nuisances through
demolition. By virtue of the Revised Charter of Manila, such duty, among others, was placed upon him.
Arts. 700 and 702 must yield to this provision not only because it is later law but also because of the
principle that special provisions prevail over general ones. Moreover, an ordinance authorized the
action sought to be taken by respondent.
 5. VELASCO VS. MERALCO

Doctrine: Noise may constitute a nuisance but it must be of such character as to produce actual
physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities.

FACTS:

Velasco bought three (3) adjoining lots. He sold two (2) of these to Meralco and maintained the last one
as his residence. Meralco constructed on their lots a sub-station at a distance of 10-20 meters away
from appellant’s house. The company also built a concrete wall at the sides along the streets but put up
only an interlink wire fence (previously a sawali wall) on the boundary with appellant. An unceasing
sound emanates from the substation, caused by transformers. Such, appellent contends, constitute a
nuisance which has worsened his health condition and has lowered the value of his property. Several
witnesses came forth but their testimonies were vague and imprecise. Resort was made to a sound level
meter. The audible sound from different areas in Velaso’s property was measured in terms of decibels. It
was found that the sound exceeded the average intensity levels of residences.

ISSUE:

Can there be a nuisance caused by noise or sound?

HELD:

Yes. Several American decisions are cited showing that noise is an actionable nuisance. In fact, Kentucky
v. Anderson dealt with noise emanating from electrical machinery and appliances. The determining
factor, however, is not just intensity or volume. It must be of such character as to produce actual
physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities. However, appellant’s testimony
is too plainly biased. Nor are the witnesses’ testimonies revealing on account of different perceptions.
Consequently, sound level meters were used. As stated above, the sound exceeds average residential
decibels. Also, the testimonies of appellant’s physicians (which were more reliable since they actually
treated him, unlike the appellee’s) point to the noise as having caused appellant loss of sleep, irritation
and tension weakening his constitution. Notable lastly is the fact that in the Kentucky case, where the
nuisance was ordered abated, the average reading was 44 decibels while in the instant, the readings
include 52, 54, and 55. The decision goes on to discuss the proper award of damages. But Meralco was
ordered either to transfer the facilities or reduce the produced sound to around.
 6. FARRALES v CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO
No. L-24245. – April 11, 1972

FACTS:
● Farrales is the holder of a municipal license to sell liquor and sari-sari goods
● To construct a permanent building, the city demolished the temporary building where she had
her stall
 Farrales was ordered to move her goods to another temporary place until the completion
of the construction
o She did not like the location she was assigned
 Farrales built a temporary shack on the cement passageway at one end of the Rice
Section of the Baguio City Market instead of installing her temporary stall at the assigned
place
o She did not seek prior permit or permission from any city official
 The police threatened to demolish the shack
● Farrales sought an injunction with the CFI of Baguio
 CFI refused to issue an injunction unless she could show proper permit
 Farrales was unable to show said permit so the police demolished her shack
o After bringing the materials and goods to Baguio City Hall, the police delivered
them to Farrales
o Farrales cited the police for contempt
● September 19, 1956: CFI of Baguio denied Farrales’ petition
 CFI’s order was final in character since no appeal was filed
 To evade the effects of res judicata, Farrales amended her complaint, so as to include the
policemen involved in the demolition as Defendants
o She argued that the proper procedure should have been for either the City
Engineer or the City Health Officer to commence legal proceedings for the
abatement of this “nuisance”, pursuant to the Charter of the City of Baguio
● The CFI held that the shack was a “nuisance”
 The police properly demolished the shack, as it was built in defiance of orders from City
Hall officials
 The police need not wait for orders from the City Engineer or the City Health Officer to
act
o They can clear the passageway on their own responsibility
● On appeal, the CA certified the appeal to the SC as only questions of law were involved
● Farrales’ Argument
 The shack put up by her inside the premises of the Baguio City Market was not a nuisance
 If it were a nuisance at all, it was not a nuisance per se
o Rather, it was a nuisance per accidens, which could be abated only after the
corresponding judicial proceeding
ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:
1. W/N Farrales’ shack was a nuisance – YES
 ●Farrales did not have a permit to put up the temporary stall in question in the place where she
built one
● The shack’s location on the cement passageway at the end of the Rice Section building
constituted an obstruction to the free movement of people
● The photographs marked as Exhibits 3, 4, 6 show that what Farrales built cannot be considered a
temporary stall
 It was merely a lean-to, improvised with pieces of used scrap iron roofing sheets
 It was not a “building” within the meaning of the Charter of the City of Baguio, which
Farrales relied upon
o It is the Charter that vests the City Engineer with the power to cause buildings,
dangerous to the public, to be made secure or torn down
2. W/N Farrales should be awarded damages due to the demolition of her shack – NO
● Article 702 of the Civil Code states that “the District Officer shall determine whether or not
abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the best remedy against a public nuisance”
 However, in this case, the failure to observe this provision is not in itself a ground for the
award of damages in favor of the appellant and against the appellees
● According to Art. 707 of the same Code, a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall
be liable for damages in only two cases:
 (1) if he causes unnecessary injury, or
 (2) if an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance
● In this case, the plaintiff is clearly not entitled to collect damages
 There was no unnecessary injury was caused to the appellant
 There was no judicial declaration that the alleged nuisance was not really so
o After conducting a hearing, the trial court found that it was in fact a nuisance
 The denial of her petition for injunction upon her failure to produce such a
permit was in effect an authority for the police to carry out the act which
was sought to be enjoined
o Thus, it may be said that the abatement thereof was not summary, but through a
judicial proceeding

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
 7. Timoner vs. People

• Mayor fenced public nuisance.

• Abatement of public nuisance without judicial proceedings, municipal mayor not criminally
liable when he acted in good faith in authorizing the fencing of a barbershop for being a public nuisance
because it occupied a portion of the sidewalk. Art 699 authorizes the abatement of a public nuisance
without judicial proceedings.

• Grave coercion is committed when a person who without authority of law, shall by means
of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel to do something
against his will either it be right or wrong.

• Elements:

That any person be prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to
do something against his will, be it right or wrong.

That the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, either by material

forceor such display of it as would produceintimidation and control the will of the offended party

That the person who restrained the will and liberty of another had no right to do so, or, in other words,
that the restraint was not made under authority of law or in the exercise of a lawful right.

Facts:

The Court of Appeals found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave
Coercion penalized under Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner was the mayor of a town
and by the recommendation of the Municipal Health Officer, he barricaded some establishments and
stalls which protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway and who were not complying
with certain health and sanitation requirement. The petitioner then filed a complaint against the owners
of the stalls saying that these stalls constituted public nuisance as well as nuisance per se. The owners of
the stalls charged the petitioner with the offense of grave coercion.

Issue: W/N the conviction of the court of appeals that the petitioner committed grave coercion is
correct the complainants were public nuisance.

Decision:

The court is in agreement that the complainants were public nuisance for affecting a considerable
number of persons in their neighbourhood.
Petitioner, as mayor of the town, merely implemented the aforesaidrecommendation of the Municipal
Health Officer. Having then acted in good faith in the performance of his duty, petitioner incurred no
criminal liability.

Grave coercion is committed when "a person who, without authority of law,
shall by means of violence, prevent another from doing something notprohibited by law or compel to do
something against his will, either it be right or wrong." The third element being absent in the case at bar,
petitioner cannot be held guilty of grave coercion.

8. ESTATE OF GREGORIA FRANCISCO v CA [GR No. 95279 (July 25, 1991)]

Quick facts: Quonset used for copra storage demolished by virtue of Ordinance No. 147 which states
that structures that do not conform to the Zoning regulations should be relocated and failure to do so
would entail condemnation or removal at owner’s expense.

Facts:

A Quonset in Basilan – constructed in 1944 by the American Liberation Forces; purchased by Gregoria
Francisco (died in 1976) in 1946; stands on land owned by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) – was
ordered demolished by the Municipal Mayor, Valencia.

Proc. No. 83 issued by Pres. Quirino declared land for the exclusive use of port facilities.

January 10, 1989: PPA issued to Tan Gin San, the husband of deceased Francisco, a permit to occupy the
building for a year, until December 31, 1989.

May 8L Mayor notified Tan Gin San by mail to relocate or remove his Quonset by virtue of Zoning Ord.
147 stressing the “clean-up campaign on illegal squatters and unsanitary surroundings along Strong
Boulevard.”

May 19, another notice was sent. May 24: demolition was ordered by Mayor.

Petitioner filed with RTC suit for a Writ of Prohibition with Injunction and damages.

RTC: denied writ, upheld power of Mayor to order demolition without judicial authority

Sept. 6: Quonset was completely demolished

CA (1st decision): reversed TC; Quonset not a nuisance per se; Mayor needed judicial decision

CA (2nd decision): reversed itself; deficiency (lack of judicial declaration) cured when petitioner filed the
petition for prohibition and was heard on oral argument.

Issue: WON Mayor could summarily, without judicial process, order the demolition of petitioner’s
Quonset building.

Held/Ratio:

NO. There is no doubt that the Quonset is a non-conforming structure as per the Municipal Ordinance;
and that in the event that an immediate relocation of the building cannot be accomplished, section 16
of the Ordinance provides that “… the non-conforming use may be condemned or removed at the
owner’s expense.”

This provision does not empower the Municipal Mayor to order a summary removal of the structure. If it
does, it must be struck down for being in contravention to the requirements of due process.

Violation of the ordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor to avail of extra-judicial remedies.

The Local Government Code imposes upon the Mayor the duty “to cause to be instituted judicial
proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances.”

NOT ABATEMENT OF NUISSANCE (police power) without judicial proceedings.

1. Only applies to nuisance per se – affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may
be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v Generoso).
2. Storage of copra in the Quonset is a legitimate business, cannot be said to be injurious to rights
of property, of health or of comfort of the community.
3. If it is a nuisance per accidens, it must be proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose.

Sanguniaang Bayan cannot DECLARE a particular thing as a nuisance per se – can ONLY BE adjudged by
judicial determination.

Judgment set aside. CA (1st decision) reinstated, remanded to RTC to determine just compensation for
petitioner for the demolished Quonset.
 9. TAMIN VS. CA- Abatement of Public Nuisance

FACTS:

Petitioner municipality represented by its mayor Real filed in the RTC a complaint for the ejectment of
respondents. It is alleged that the municipality owns a parcel of residential land located in Zamboanga
del Sur and the said parcel of land was reserved for public plaza under PD 365 and that during the mayor,
the municipality leased the area to the defendants subject to the condition that they should vacate the
place in case it is needed for public purposes and the defendants paid the rentals religiously until 1967.
They refused to vacate the said land despite the efforts of the government since money is allocated for
the construction of a municipal gymnasium within the public plaza and such construction could not
continue because of the presence of the buildings constructed by the defendants.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the municipality has a cause of action for the abatement of public nuisance under
Article 694 of the Civil Code.

Held:

Yes based on the definition of a nuisance provided for in the CC which states that “Art. 694. A nuisance
is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property or anything else which: … hinders or
impairs the use of the property.”

Article 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood
or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon
individuals may be equal.”

Article 699 provides for the following remedies against public nuisance:
1. A prosecution under the penal code or any local ordinance
2. civil action
3. abatement without judicial proceedings

In the present case, the municipality chose to file a civil action for the recovery of possession of the
parcel of land occupied by the PR. Under the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan has to
first pass an ordinance before summarily abate a public nuisance.
Considering the facts in the complaint is true then the writ of possession and writ of demolition would
have been justified. A writ of demolition would have been sufficient to eject the private respondent.