RODOLFO S. AGUILAR, PETITIONER. VS. EDNA G. SIASAT, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 200169 | 2015-01-28

FACTS:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses) died, intestate and
without debts, on August 26, 1983 and February 8, 1994, respectively.  Included in their estate
are two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of the Registries of Deeds.

In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC of Bacolod City a civil case for
mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat.  The Complaint alleged
that Rodolfo is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses. To prove filiation, he
presented the following, among others:
 
 His school records stating that Alfredo Aguilar is petitioner’s parent;
 His Individual Income Tax Return, which indicated that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar is his
mother;
 Alfredo Aguilar’s Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1, a public instrument
subscribed and made under oath by Alfredo Aguilar during his employment, which bears
his signature and thumb marks and indicates that petitioner, who was born on March 5,
1945, is his son and dependent;
 Alfredo Aguilar’s Information Sheet of Employment, indicating that petitioner is his son;
 Petitioner’s Certificate of Marriage where it is declared that the Aguilar spouses are his
parents; and
 Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry to the
effect that the record of births during the period 1945 to 1946 were “all destroyed by
nature,” hence no true copies of the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner could be issued
as requested.

Petitioner also offered the testimonies of his wife and that of his aunt and sister of Alfredo
Aguilar who confirmed petitioner’s identity, and testified that petitioner is the son of the Aguilar
spouses.  

Petitioner argues that Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof of
filiation and relationship under Article 172 of the Family Code.  The SSS Form E-1 is a
declaration under oath by his father, Alfredo Aguilar, of his status as the latter’s son; this
recognition should be accorded more weight than the presumption of legitimacy, since Article
172 itself declares that said evidence establishes legitimate filiation without need of court action.
He adds that in contemplation of law, recognition in a public instrument such as the SSS Form E-
1 is the “highest form of recognition which partake (sic) of the nature of a complete act of
recognition bestowed upon” him as the son of the late Alfredo Aguilar.

In her Answer, Edna claimed that Rodolfo is not the son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar
spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and
kindness of heart. Petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses. Since
Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited the conjugal
share of the former; that upon the death of Candelaria, her brothers and sisters inherited her
estate as she had no issue. For her evidence, she presented her sister’s affidavit declaring that she
had no issue and that she is the sole heir to her husband Alfredo Aguilar’s estate. 
 
The Bacolod RTC dismissed the complaint and decreed that Rodolfo has no sufficient interest to
be qualified or entitled to the relief prayed for. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision for the
following reasons:
(a) Student record or other writing not signed by alleged father do not constitute evidence of
filiation (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439);
(b) a baptismal certificate, a private document is not conclusive proof of filiation.  More so are
the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that income tax has been paid
and the amount thereof (Labagala vs. Santiago, 371 SCRA 360);
(c) A marriage contract not signed by the alleged father of bride is not competent evidence of
filiation nor is a marriage contract recognition in a public instrument;
(d) The rest of the exhibits tend to establish that plaintiff-appellant has been bearing the
surname of his alleged parents. Use of a family surname certainly does not establish
pedigree;
(e) The SSS Form and Information Sheet of Employment are not sufficient proof to establish
and prove the filiation. They do not constitute clear and convincing evidence to show
filiation based on open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Filiation is a serious matter that must be resolved according to the requirements of the law.

ISSUES:

(a) Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in not taking into consideration the
Petitioner’s exhibit (SSS form) to satisfy the requirement of Article 172.

(b) Whether or not the respondent is a proper party to impugn the legitimacy of the
petitioner.

RULING:

Yes. The CA committed a reversible error in not considering the SSS Form E-1 as a
document that satisfies the requirement in Article 172. It was erroneous for the CA to treat
said document as mere proof of open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation
under the first paragraph thereof, the same being an express recognition in a public
instrument.

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record
of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws.  
 A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioner was born during the marriage of their
parents. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and
founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate. It must be concluded that petitioner has
sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses.  

Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and
relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said
document constitutes an “admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.” Petitioner has shown that he
cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all the records covering the period 1945-
1946  of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed, which necessitated the
introduction of other documentary evidence to prove filiation.  

Filiation may be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a

private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition
in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and
no further court action is required. And, relative to said form of acknowledgment, the Court
has further held that:
 
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules
respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is
made:
 
1)  Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent; and
 
2)  Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.

(a) Yes. The respondent has no personality to impugn his legitimacy and cannot collaterally
attack his legitimacy, and that the action to impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed
pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code. However, the present case is not
one impugning petitioner’s legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that
petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. Finally,
if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses, then he is as
well heir to the latter’s estate.  Respondent is then left with no right to inherit from her
aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar’s estate, since succession pertains, in the first place, to the
descending direct line.

Concepcion vs. Court of Appeals and Almonte (2005)

G.R. No. 123450 | 2005-08-31
Subject: The legitimacy status and filiation of a child is determined by law and not by
the parties; Gerardo, not being the legal husband, has no standing to impugn the
legitimacy of Jose Gerardo; Presumption of legitimacy and how it may be rebutted;
Presumption of legitimacy was not rebutted in this case; The child shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy; Public policy
demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child; The birth
certificate is evidence only of filiation of the child, but proof of filiation is necessary only
when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned; Birth certificate is merely prima
facie  evidence of the facts contained therein; Rights of legitimate child vs illegitimate
child; Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo; Gerardo cannot insist on
visitation rights; Paramount interest of the child.

Facts:

Gerardo B. Concepcion (petitioner) and Ma. Theresa Almonte (private respondent) were
married on were married on December 29, 1989. A year later, on December 8, 1990,
the couple had a child named Jose Gerardo.

In December 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa
annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine years before he married Ma.
Theresa, or on December 10, 1980, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage
was never annulled. Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive.

Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She,
however, averred that the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at
all.

The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa's marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting
when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous.
It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child
was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.

Ma. Theresa moved for reconsideration to remove Gerardo's visitation rights. Gerardo
opposed the motion and insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of
'Concepcion' as Jose Gerardo's surname.

Applying the "best interest of the child" principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresa's
motion and affirmed Gerardo's visitation rights.

Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA initially affirmed
the lower court's ruling. However, upon motion for reconsideration of Ma. Theresa, the
CA reversed its earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma.
Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage. The CA reasoned that Ma.
Theresa was legitimately married to Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was
born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child - under the law - is the legitimate child
of the legal and subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao. Therefore,
Gerardo can claim neither custody nor visitorial rights over the child Jose Gerardo.
Further, [Gerardo] cannot impose his name upon the child.

The CA brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose
Gerardo was their son. It instead invoked Article 167 of the Family Code: "The child
shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress."

Hence, this petition.

Held:

The legitimacy status and filiation of a child is determined by law and not by
the parties

1.  The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family
Code is clear— A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is
legitimate.

2.  As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167
of the Family Code provides: “The child shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.”

Gerardo, not being the legal husband, has no standing to impugn the
legitimacy of Jose Gerardo

3.  Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no
standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa's husband
Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose
Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right
of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and
Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus
never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

Presumption of legitimacy and how it may be rebutted

4.  The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage,

particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis
of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt
that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the
child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved,
unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.

5.  The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of

physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child.

6.  To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to
make marital intimacy impossible. This may take place, for instance, when they reside
in different countries or provinces and they were never together during the period of
conception. Or, the husband was in prison during the period of conception, unless it
appears that sexual union took place through the violation of prison regulations.
Presumption of legitimacy was not rebutted in this case

7.  Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in
Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City.
Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart. Not only did both
Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all was
presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these circumstances,
the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not
such as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.

8.  Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the

assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such
evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the
issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.

The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy

9.  Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresa's statement in her answer to the petition for
annulment of marriage that she never lived with Mario. He claims this was an admission
that there was never any sexual relation between her and Mario, an admission that was
binding on her.

10.  First, the import of Ma. Theresa's statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her
legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration - an
avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate - is the very declaration that is
proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. An assertion by the mother against the
legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a
valid marriage.

11.  Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there
was never an instance where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that
there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was that she never
lived with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened between them. The
fact is that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material to Jose
Gerardo's conception and birth. Thus, the impossibility of physical access was never
established beyond reasonable doubt.

12.  Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresa's statement is to allow her to arrogate unto
herself a right exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs. A
mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence,
Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardo's legitimacy.

Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation
of a child

13.  Gerardo's insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in
the trial court and in the appellate court does not hold water. The fact that both Ma.
Theresa and Gerardo admitted and agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was
immaterial. That was, in effect, an agreement that the child was illegitimate. If the
Court were to validate that stipulation, then it would be tantamount to allowing the
mother to make a declaration against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to the
denial of filiation of the child by persons other than her husband. These are the very
acts from which the law seeks to shield the child.

14.  Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
child. Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to
exploit his defenselessness.

The birth certificate is evidence only of filiation of the child, but proof of
filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned

15.  The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo's birth certificate is misplaced. It has no
evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial
court. The rule is that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been
formally offered.

16.  Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his
birth. Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence of
the filiation of a child, as the status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of
filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when
the status of a child born after 300 days following the termination of marriage is sought
to be established. Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under
attack as it could not be contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or,
in extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this
case was improper and uncalled for.

Birth certificate is merely prima facie  evidence of the facts contained therein

17.  In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie  evidence of the facts contained
therein. As prima facie  evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted
by more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the
truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested parties. Between the
certificate of birth which is prima facie  evidence of Jose Gerardo's illegitimacy and the
quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable
doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is
also more conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the
purpose of the law.

Rights of legitimate child vs illegitimate child

18.  It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would doggedly press for Jose
Gerardo's illegitimacy while claiming that they both had the child's interests at heart.
The law, reason and common sense dictate that a legitimate status is more favorable to
the child. In the eyes of the law, the legitimate child enjoys a preferred and superior
status. He is entitled to bear the surnames of both his father and mother, full support
and full inheritance. On the other hand, an illegitimate child is bound to use the
surname and be under the parental authority only of his mother. He can claim support
only from a more limited group and his legitime is only half of that of his legitimate
counterpart. Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his
legitimacy.

Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo

19.  As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his
father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil
Code on surnames. A person's surname or family name identifies the family to which he
belongs and is passed on from parent to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his
surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.

20.  The matter of changing Jose Gerardo's name and effecting the corrections of the
entries in the civil register regarding his paternity and filiation should be threshed out in
a separate proceeding.

Gerardo cannot insist on visitation rights

21.  In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of

the Family Code grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his
children. Such visitation rights flow from the natural right of both parent and child to
each other's company. There being no such parent-child relationship between them,
Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.

Paramount interest of the child

22.  Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, is clear and unequivocal:

Article 8. Child's Welfare Paramount. - In all questions regarding the care, custody,
education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.

23.  Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the
Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:

Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.

24.  The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to
provide protection to those of tender years. Through its laws, the State safeguards
them from every one, even their own parents, to the end that their eventual
development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be impeded,
distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this
case, the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage.