MPWT19-14391

SRU Reaction Furnace Waste Heat Boiler Tube Failure Causing Unscheduled Shutdown

Qasem J. Al-Hassan
Saudi Aramco, Consulting Services Department
Al Midra Blvd
Dhahran, Eastern Province, 31311
Saudi Arabia

Iyad A. Al-Buraiki
Saudi Aramco, Consulting Services Department
Al Midra Blvd
Dhahran, Eastern Province, 31311
Saudi Arabia

ABSTRACT

A sulfur recovery unit (SRU) train in a gas processing facility went under an emergency shutdown due to
the failure of a reaction furnace waste heat boiler (WHB) tube. The failed tube had been in service for
approximately 18 years. The failed tube was subjected to a number of metallurgical laboratory
examinations in order to determine the damage mechanism and root cause(s) of the failure. Examinations
included visual inspection, scale analysis, chemical analysis, metallographic examination and
mechanical testing. The examination revealed internal corrosion thinning in the tube which led to rupture
since the tube could no longer withstand the pressure. Metallographic examination revealed spheroidized
microstructure indicating that the tube experienced high metal temperature. This is suggesting that
something was impeding heat transfer between the tube and water. Scale analysis results from a sample
collected from the tube internal surface indicated the presence of iron sulfide corrosion products. Based
on the aforementioned findings, it was concluded that the corrosion thinning was caused by sulfidation.
Sulfidation is one of the potential damage mechanisms in WHB tubes and is caused by reactive sulfur
species as a result of the thermal decomposition of sulfur compounds at high temperatures (above
500oF). Failure contributing factors as well as corrective actions to prevent recurrence of such failure are
discussed in this paper.

Keywords: Sulfidation, Sulfur Recovery Unit (SRU), Reaction Furnace, Waste Heat Boiler (WHB)
 INTRODUCTION

Waste heat boilers (WHB) are an integral part of sulfur recovery units (SRU) and are widely used in the
oil and gas industry to improve energy efficiency. Failures in these boilers often not only affect the WHB,
but they also impact the entire processing unit or train. A failure in an SRU WHB could lead to an
emergency shutdown of multiple units and result in loss of production.
One of the potential damage mechanisms affecting WHB in SRUs which could lead to failure is sulfidation
corrosion. Sulfidation occurs due to the reaction of the sulfur species in the gas with the tube material at
high temperatures. In normal operation, heat transfer between the process gas and the boiler water
prevents this corrosion from occurring. However, for any reason the metal temperature of the tube
increases to high levels, the corrosion process accelerates.

BACKGROUND

During normal operation of an SRU at a gas plant, boiler feed water was found to be leaking to the
process side in the SRU Reaction Furnace WHB due to tube failure. This led to an unscheduled shutdown
of the unit. Design specification and operating conditions of the failed tube are shown below:

• Tube Material of Fabrication: Carbon Steel (ASTM A178 Grade A)

• Size:
• Thickness:
• Length:
• Inlet Tube sheet Material:
• No. of Failed Tubes:
• Tube Side Service Environment:
• Shell Side Service Environment:
• Length of Service:
• Failure Location:
• Plant/Unit:
• Equipment Type:
• Equipment Style:
• Tube Design Temperature:
• Tube Design Pressure:
• Tube Side Operating Temperatures:
• Tube Side Operating Inlet Pressure:
2.5 inch (6.35 cm) Outer Diameter
0.370 inch (9.40 mm) - measured
20 feet
Carbon steel with refractory liner and ceramic
inlet ferrules
2 Tubes
Boiler Feed Water/Steam
Reaction Furnace Gas
18 Years
Reaction Furnace WHB Bottom Tube (1 meter
away from inlet side at 10-12 o’clock position)
Gas Plant/Sulfur Recovery Unit
Waste Heat Boiler (WHB)
One pass, horizontal, fixed tube sheet exchanger
700 oF (371 oC)
15 psig
In at 2,282 oF (1,250 oC) / out at ~750 oF (399 oC)
6.3 psig
 Figure 1: Schematic drawing illustrating the failure location.

FAILURE ANALYSIS PROCEDURE

The failed tube was subjected to visual inspection, chemical analysis, hardness testing, metallographic
examination and scale analysis.

Visual Examination
Figure 2 below shows a general as received photograph of the failed WHB Tube. Figure 3 shows a
close-up photograph at the failure location.

Figure 2: As received photograph of the failed tube.

 Figure 3: Close-up photograph at the failure location.

The tube was sectioned and split open at the failure location to examine its internal surface. Examination
revealed excessive thinning at the failure location. Reddish scale was also observed on the internal
surface of the tube, see Figure 4 below.

Figure 4: Photograph showing the tube internal surface at the failure location.
Two ring samples were cut from the failed tube as shown in Figure 5 below. Ring sample #1 was cut
close to the failure location and ring sample #2 far away from an undamaged location. ID and OD
measurements were taken on both rings to determine whether thinning of the tube was from the internal
or external surface. The results are shown in Tables 1 and 2 below. The results showed that the tube OD
remained mostly unchanged where most of the thinning occurred on the ID side of the tube.

Sample #1 Sample #2

Figure 5: Photograph showing the cut ring samples.

Table 1: Dimensional measurements of ring sample #1 near failure location.

Measurement ID (in) OD (in) Thickness (in)

1 – 7 o’clock 2.24 2.48 0.240
2 – 8 o’clock 2.21 2.50 0.290
3 – 9 o’clock 2.22 2.50 0.280
4 – 10 o’clock 2.24 2.49 0.250
5 – 11 o’clock 2.26 2.49 0.230
6 – 12 o’clock 2.27 2.46 0.190

Table 2: Dimensional measurements of ring sample #2 away from failure location.

Measurement ID (in) OD (in) Thickness (in)

1 – 7 o’clock 2.14 2.50 0.360
2 – 8 o’clock 2.14 2.50 0.360
3 – 9 o’clock 2.13 2.50 0.370
4 – 10 o’clock 2.13 2.50 0.370
5 – 11 o’clock 2.13 2.50 0.370
6 – 12 o’clock 2.14 2.51 0.370

Note: Original Nominal Tube ID = 2.13 in, Original Nominal Tube OD = 2.50 in
Chemical Analysis
Positive material identification (PMI) was conducted on the failed tube using optical emission
spectroscopy (OES) and the results are shown in table 3 below. The results showed that the tube
chemistry is in compliance with the standard specification (ASTM A178 Grade A carbon steel).

Table 3: Failed Tube Chemical Analysis Results (weight %)

ASTM A178
Element Failed Tube
Grade A

C 0.084 0.06 – 0.18

Cr 0.019 N.S.
Cu 0.077 N.S.
Mn 0.46 0.27 – 0.63
P 0.013 0.035 max.
S 0.028 0.035 max.
Si 0.067 N.S.
Mo 0.0020 N.S.
Ni 0.028 N.S.
Co 0.0049 N.S.
Fe Balance Balance
*N.S. = Not Specified

Metallographic Examination
Two metallography samples were prepared from the failed tube and examined under the microscope.
One at the failure location whereas the second where taken far away. Examination of the prepared
metallographic samples revealed a spheroidized microstructure, see Figure 6, in the sample obtained
near the failure location indicating exposure to high metal temperature. Similarly, the sample obtained far
away from the failure location also showed spheroidized microstructure but to a lesser degree.
Figure 6: Photomicrograph showing spheroidized microstructure at failure location (2% Nital
etch).

Figure 7: Photomicrograph away from the failure location showing less spheroidized
microstructure (2% Nital etch).
Hardness Testing
Micro-hardness measurements were taken on the prepared metallography samples and the results are
shown in the table below. The results showed a drop in the hardness near the failure location. This is
consistent with the microstructural condition observed at the two locations.

Table 4: Micro-Hardness Measurement Results (500 gf)

Indent No. Sample #1 Hardness (HV) Sample #2 Hardness (HV)

1 146 139
2 150 141
3 138 137
4 138 141
5 145 138
6 147 144
Average 144 140

Scale Analysis
Three scale samples were collected from both the internal and external surfaces of the failed tube and
were analyzed by x-ray diffraction (XRD). The sample locations are illustrated by Figures 8 and 9. The
scale samples consisted mainly of iron oxide with presence of iron sulfide corrosion products in the
internal side of the tube.

Figure 8: Location of collected scale samples

Table 5: Summary of the weight percentages (wt%) for each of the identified phases obtained
from the whole pattern fitting and improved with the Rietveld method
 Weight Percentage (wt %)
Identified Phases
Sample #1 Sample #2 Sample #3

Goethite [FeO(OH)] 60 54 -

Magnetite [Fe3O4] 33 28 91

Hematite [Fe2O3] - - 9

Lepidocrocite [FeO(OH)] 5 4 -

Quartz [SiO2] 1 - -

Iron [Fe] 1 Traces -

Pyrrothite [FeS] - 9 -

Pyrite [FeS2] - 5 -

Figure 10: XRD Phase identification results for sample #1

Figure 11: XRD Phase identification results for sample #2

Figure 12: XRD Phase identification results for sample #3

 DISCUSSION

Examination of the failed WHB tube showed that it experienced corrosion thinning at the leak location.
ID and OD measurements of a ring sample near the failure location indicated that the thinning was mostly
on the ID side (process gas side). The tube thinned to below the minimum allowable thickness then finally
ruptured since it could no longer withstand the pressure. The uniform nature of the thinning in addition to
the presence of iron sulfide corrosion product suggests that the WHB tube failed most likely due to
sulfidation corrosion. Sulfidation typically begins at metal temperatures above 500 oF (260 oC). The
microstructural degradation of the tube indicated that it must have experienced high temperatures. This
coupled with the presence of sulfur compounds in the reaction furnace gas lead to the sulfidation
corrosion.

Sulfidation corrosion occurs in iron-based materials including carbon steel and low alloy steels. It results
from the reaction of the material with sulfur species at high temperatures. Tubes in the reaction furnace
WHB are susceptible to sulfidation since they carry very high temperature gas that contains sulfur
species. However, during normal operation, the presence of water around the tubes results in sufficient
heat transfer between the process gas and the water which causes the corrosion to be very slow, if any.
In case something impedes the heat transfer process or upset conditions in the process result in an
excessive heat flux in the WHB, the corrosion rate will be accelerated.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Based upon the analysis, results and evidence presented above, it was concluded that the failure of
the tube was mainly due to sulfidation corrosion. Sulfidation corrosion caused thinning in the tube
until it could no longer withstand the pressure which caused it to rupture.
2. The material of the tube is not considered a primary factor in this failure. Carbon steel is commonly
used for WHB tube and is considered acceptable for this application.
3. In order to prevent future similar failures, it is recommended to monitor and control process parameter
that could lead to excessive heat input. This includes, but not limited to, reactor temperature, flame
pattern, feed gas rate, fuel gas composition, etc.
4. It is also recommended to investigate the possibility of the presence of barriers that impede heat
transfer in the tubes.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank colleagues who contributed to the testing and examination of the sample,
especially Abbas A. Al-Turaifi.

REFERENCES

1. ASTM(1) A178 / A178M-02 (2012), “Standard Specification for Electric-Resistance-Welded Carbon

Steel and Carbon-Manganese Steel Boiler and Superheater Tubes” (West Conshohocken, PA, 2012)

2. API(2) RP 571 (2011), Damage Mechanisms Affecting Fixed Equipment in the Refining Industry,
American Petroleum Institute, (Washington, NW)