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STRATEGI

C STUDIES
AFGHANISTAN-A
TROUBLED
NEIGHBOUR

SUBMITTED BY: TAYYBA HANIF


Contents
INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................................................2
BACKGROUND.........................................................................................................................................3
POLICY IMPLICATIONS.........................................................................................................................5
EVALUATION...................................................................................................................................8
RECOMMENDATIONS:..................................................................................................................10
Bibliography...............................................................................................................................................12

pg. 2
INTRODUCTION
Pakistan, since her inception, embodied the principle of establishing friendly relations with
Muslim countries in the very foundations of her foreign policy. This friendly narrative grew out
of the speeches of Jinnah in first constituent assembly of Pakistan where he focused on
nourishing cordial ties with all the states of the world in general and with Muslim states in
particular. If we talk about Pakistan and Afghanistan’s relation. Pakistan and Afghanistan are
immediate neighbors having 2240 km common border formally known as Durand Line. Despite
shared geography, ethnicity and faith, I have choose this topic “AFGHANISTAN A
TROUBLED NEIGHBOUR FOR PAKISTAN” because of the change that is happened in
Afghanistan has always affected the region and in general Pakistan. I will discuss the long-term
and current relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the intertwined militancy in the two
countries, and the impact of India, the United States, China, and other regional powers on the
Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship. Stability across both sides of the borders is mandatory for
peace and security in the region. In this particular page I will try to analyze different phases of
Pak-Afghan relations in chronological order with a view to identifying challenges hindering
rapprochement process and continue to enflame the geo-strategic and geo-political environment
amongst two neighborly countries.

BACKGROUND
It is regrettable fact of the history that from the time of Pakistan’s birth, Afghanistan has
maintained an attitude of hostile neighbor and Pakistan has to live with it because neighbors
cannot be changed. The history of Pakistani-Afghan relations is divided into six major stages.

The first stage from the late 1940s to the mid-1950s is characterized by the attempts of the
Afghan authorities to use the fact that Pakistan was an entirely new political entity that appeared
in 1947 after the simultaneous voluntary and forced withdrawal of the colonialists from
Hindustan. The difficulties of the initial stage of the formation of the borders and the territorial
structure of the Pakistani state allowed Kabul to pursue an offensive policy towards the neighbor,
seeking to secure access to the Arabian Sea with support for the separatist (autonomist) in
Pakistan. They were associated at the time with the uprising in the Baluchi principality of Kalat,

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and with the proclamation of the “Free Pashtunistan” in the Waziristan Mountains, the bands of
the Pashtun tribes. The first period was marked by the efforts of the Afghan authorities to get
Pakistan to abandon the border along the Durand Line and from the ownership of the eastern
Pashtun territories to Pakistan. But already in this initial period, Afghanistan’s dependence on
Pakistan was being formed through the supply of goods through the port of Karachi.

The second period lasted from the mid-1950s to the turn of the 1960s and 1970s. Pakistan in
those years basically overcame the initial “growth sickness” and significantly strengthened its
economic and military capabilities. Afghanistan paid attention to relations with India, which
used its contacts with Afghanistan to use it to “pressure” its regional neighbor and rival. After
overcoming the acute crisis in bilateral relations (the early 1960s), a period of relative
equilibrium began, which was not violated even by the wars of Pakistan with India in 1965 and
1971.[ CITATION Sajy7 \l 1033 ]

The third stage covers the 1970s. Pakistan, losing as a result of the events of 1971 its eastern
province, transformed into an independent state of Bangladesh. Afghanistan finds itself in an
intermediate geopolitical space between the Arab states, Iran, Pakistan and the USSR. Since the
mid-1970s, the role of the Islamic factor in regional politics has increased, and Pakistan has
become one of the hotbeds of Islamization from above. In relations with Afghanistan, he uses
Islamists as a force opposing Kabul. Afghanistan tried to play a map of ethnonational separatism
that swept the western (Balochistan) and north-western (Pashtun) provinces of Pakistan, but at
the end of the period, yielding to the demands of Iran and the US, tried to establish a dialogue
with Pakistan, agreeing to negotiate with him on the border.

The fourth stage begins with the turn of the 1970s-80s and ends with the beginning of the 1990s.
This period was the time of the most severe confrontation between the two neighboring states.
The buffer position of Afghanistan was replaced by its full association with the socialist bloc
headed by the USSR. The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which came to power in
Kabul, carried out a policy that was ideologically the opposite of Islamabad’s. Two political and
ideological projects – the socialist (Soviet) and the Islamist ones – collided on the Afghan-
Pakistani frontiers, which in the cold war enjoyed some support from the West. At the same

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time, the PDPA tried to actively use the factor of Pashtun nationalism in Pakistan and supported
the idea of promoting Pashtun statehood to the south up to the Arabian Sea. Pakistan became the
site for the deployment of political organizations that fled from Afghanistan, fighting against the
left-democratic Kabul regime. Official relations between the countries after the introduction of
Soviet troops were interrupted; negotiations on the settlement of the situation took place in the
format of indirect contacts. Pakistan has powerful allies in the form of the United States, Saudi
Arabia,and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). The subversive war that was waged with the
government in Kabul, the grouping of Islamist Mujahideen on Pakistani territory, was crowned
with success after the collapse of the USSR.

The fifth period in Pakistani-Afghan relations takes a decade from the early 1990s to the early
2000s. Pakistan during this period largely played the role of the main arbiter in Afghan affairs,
taking advantage of disagreements in the ranks of Afghan mujahideen, who proclaimed
education. The Islamic State of Afghanistan, and then by the military actions that unfolded
between them and the new grouping, the Islamic Taliban movement. Pakistan’s multiply-
influenced influence on Afghanistan nevertheless did not allow Islamabad to solve the problem
of the border along the “Durand Line” in a suitable way for itself and finally to bury the project
of an independent Pashtunistan. At the same time, neither before nor after this period did
Pakistan project its power on Afghanistan so directly and effectively. Using reliance on Saudi
Arabia, Islamabad achieved exclusively influence on Afghanistan’s domestic and foreign policy
under the rule of the Taliban regime.

The sixth stage began with the elimination of the Taliban in Afghanistan and continued until the
middle of 2010. It should be noted a significant weakening during this period of the impact of
Pakistan on the neighboring country. The main influence there was used at this stage by the US
and its NATO allies. Pakistan had to experience at this stage the grave consequences of the
retreat of the Afghan Taliban and the allied Islamist armed groups into its territory and the
transformation of its northwest not only into the shelter of militants but also into the space of
their sabotage and terrorist activity. Burdened by the emergence of local Taliban militants on its
own land, Pakistan fell into a crisis situation and lost much of its ability to exert direct political
influence on Afghanistan, continuing to indirectly and implicitly influence the situation there,

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providing shelter and assistance to the Afghan Taliban and its allies. The importance of Pakistan
after 2001 turned into an extremely significant one from the point of view of strategic logistics in
the conditions of deployment of a significant grouping of troops of the international coalition in
Afghanistan. Equally significant was the role of Pakistan as a transit territory, providing
Afghanistan with imported goods.[ CITATION Sajy7 \l 1033 ]

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
 Although the outreach to Pakistan by Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has warmed
relations between the two countries, Pakistan’s geostrategic outlook and the limitations of
its selective counterterrorism policies have not resolutely changed.
 Pakistan’s policies toward both militant groups and Afghanistan are determined as much
by incompetence, inertia, and a lack of capacity as by calibrated duplicitous
manipulation.
 Crucially, Pakistan’s willingness to accommodate Afghanistan-oriented militant groups is
motivated by a fear of provoking militants to incite violence in Punjab and threaten the
core of the Pakistani state instead of focusing externally. This paralyzing fear persists
despite Pakistan’s desire to defeat Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.
 China’s increasing activity in Afghanistan might eventually motivate Beijing to put
pressure on Pakistan in a way that it has previously been unwilling to do. Pakistan may
thus face more united international pressure regarding its policies in Afghanistan and
accommodation of militants than ever before.

CURRENT SITUATION
Pakistan shares the border with Afghanistan of 2440 km. The two neighboring countries share
deep historical and cultural links; each has declared itself an Islamic republic and both have
become members of the South Asian Association for regional cooperation. Peace and stability is
essential for both of countries. An unstable Afghanistan will complicate Pakistan’s ability to
refurbish its weak state and economy and suppress dangerous internal militancy.

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INDIAN FACTOR: It is well known that Pakistan has a very hostile relation with India and who
so ever is going to make his relations good with India will be a checkpoint for Pakistan.
Afghanistan has always been focus of India’s regional policy because of its geo strategic
location, its latent hostility towards Pakistan and for economic reasons. India has several
aims in Afghanistan; some of the Indian objectives in Afghanistan are; to contain Taliban
so as to neutralize Pakistan’s help to Kashmir Jihad. Secondly, to support democratization
and pro-India government in Afghanistan, this will contain resurgence of Taliban and
other religious and extremist movements. The Indian reconstruction activities, educational-
cultural contribution to Afghan society, training and weaponry to the Northern Alliance,
clandestine activities of consulates and marginalizing Pushtuns have exacerbated mistrust
between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Despite some efforts in détente in India-Pakistan
relations in the wake of series of confidence building measures, the Indian activities in
Afghanistan pose a threat to Pakistan “strategic depth” policy, its reliance on non-state
actors bear the potential to render Afghanistan again into a proxy battlefield.

ENSUING TERRORISM ON PAKISTAN’S ECONOMY: The rise of violent extremism and


increase in terrorism in Pakistan due to instability in Afghanistan not only caused serious damage to
Pakistan’s economy but has also been responsible for widespread human suffering due to indiscriminate
attacks against the civilian population. This situation disrupted Pakistan’s normal economic and trading
activities which not only resulted in higher costs of business but also created disruptions in the production
cycles, resulting in significant delays in meeting the export orders around the globe. As a result, Pakistani
products have gradually lost their market share to their competitors. Consequently, economic growth
could not picked up as planned. Investment outflow and negative trends of out sourcing of capital in
Pakistan has further added to the woes of dwindling performance of the export-oriented industry. In order
to assess the impact of the incidents of terrorism on the economy of Pakistan during the past several
years,

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[ CITATION Imp15 \l 1033 ]

 REFUGEE DILEMMA: Pakistan, being a neighboring state of Afghanistan has been


serving as a preferred destination for its refugees in times of wars and large scale internal
violent movements. The issue of refugees has been creating problems for Pakistan and
many believe that the deteriorating situation of law and order in the country, the
smuggling of guns and lethal weapons, and the black market of narcotics all have their
roots in the issue of Afghan refugees who have been living and moving freely in Pakistan
for the last 20 years or more. There is also increase in crimes rate, anti-government
activities, which the Pakistani officials says are not solely caused by Afghan refugees.

Afghanistan’s peaceful future depends to a great extent on an auspicious regional environment, with
Pakistan at its core. Conversely, an unstable Afghanistan threatens Pakistan, complicating the latter’s
ability to refurbish its weak state and economy and suppress dangerous internal militancy. But in the
absence of dramatically improved relations with India, Pakistan is likely to prefer an unstable Afghanistan
to a strong Afghanistan closely aligned with India. Pakistan thus retains an interest in not liquidating its
long-term relationship with the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network, a policy that exacerbates
Afghan instability.

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EVALUATION
The issues and problems between Pakistan and Afghanistan cannot be simply
described as bilateral interaction. This relationship has become so complex over the
years that it now touches all the major aspects of Pakistan’s foreign policy and external
and internal security. The political and security fallout of the internal strife in
Afghanistan impacts not only Pakistan but it also causes problems for several countries
in the neighbourhood and beyond. Some countries use this issue to pursue their

regional agendas or use it to, among other things, for Pakistan bashing. Pakistan
cannot view the Afghan problem merely as a bilateral issue because the foreign policy
and security choices that Afghanistan makes, including its policy towards Pakistan, are
shaped by the internal power politics in Kabul as well as by the influence that the US
and India exercise over Afghanistan’s foreign and security policy. The increased
interest of China, Russia, Iran and the states of Central Asia has also to be taken into
account. As the issues of terrorism, stability and peace cannot be settled exclusively at
the bilateral Pak-Afghan level, the Afghan problem should be viewed as a bilateral-
cum-multilateral issue.

After the NATO – U.S forces made their exit from Afghanistan, the country has seen a
staggering dysfunction of the newly elected government. Pakistan welcomed the new in-
charge of the neighbor and extended the hand of cooperation at all levels. The internal
turmoil of Kabul is still a challenge that the Afghan establishment is struggling to cope
with. This has become a headache for Pakistan, as the land is still being used as a safe
haven by the terrorists that are being aided by India. Pakistan still hosts a number of
Afghan citizens, something that the Afghan government has never been thankful for and
instead has returned this brotherly gesture by shaking hands with the enemy, while
Pakistan’s only motive was to help in the rehabilitation of the country. Pakistan needs to
see a stable Afghanistan, on which the government can rely on in terms of stopping the
export of Indian trained terrorists and groups like ISIS. The Afghans need to guarantee
that their closeness with India will not be used against Pakistan which unfortunately has

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not been the case so far. The Afghan insurgents are aligned with home-grown Pakistani
tribal extremists, who in turn are part of a syndicate of sectarian, regional and
transnational jihadi groups. With the support of their Afghan counterparts, Pakistani
tribal extremists are challenging the state’s writ, particularly in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province, bordering
on Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s peaceful future depends to a great extent on an auspicious
regional environment, with Pakistan at its core. Conversely, an unstable Afghanistan
threatens Pakistan, complicating the latter’s ability to refurbish its weak state and
economy and suppress dangerous internal militancy. But in the absence of dramatically
improved relations with India, Pakistan is likely to prefer an unstable Afghanistan to a
strong Afghanistan closely aligned with India. Pakistan thus retains an interest in not
liquidating its long-term relationship with the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network,
a policy that exacerbates Afghan instability.Although Pakistan’s policies toward both
militant groups and Afghanistan are determined as much by incompetence, inertia, and a
lack of capacity as by calibrated duplicitous manipulation. Basically, Pakistan was
willing to accommodate Afghanistan-oriented militant groups was motivated by a fear of
provoking militants to incite violence in Punjab and threaten the core of the Pakistani
state instead of focusing externally. This is paralyzing fear despite desire to defeat
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.

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RECOMMENDATIONS:

As Pakistan seeks to consolidate its fragile democracy, it should seize the moment to improve
relations with its Afghan neighbour. Its biggest challenge comes from within. The civilian
government has to regain control over national security and foreign policy from the military.

Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan have been largely characterized by mutual mistrust and
devised through a narrow security prism. While it will require considerable effort to end deep-
seated animosity, both countries share close ethnic, linguistic, religious and economic ties.

Pakistan’s interventionist policies are also undermining the peace at home. The Afghan


insurgents are aligned with home-grown Pakistani tribal extremists, who in turn are part of a
syndicate of sectarian, regional and transnational jihadi groups. With the support of their Afghan
counterparts, Pakistani tribal extremists are challenging the state’s writ, particularly in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province,
bordering on Afghanistan. Military-led initiatives should be taken to counter such threats, based
on appeasement deals or heavy handed-military operations against Pakistani Taliban factions.

Pakistan, the US and Afghanistan need to evolve a shared approach to deal with terrorism in
and around Afghanistan through a regular dialogue that equally accommodates their security
concerns. Public denunciation of Pakistan by the US or American public statements on the
time frame for Pakistan to take action against the terrorist elements identified by the US are
not going to be helpful.

As different states are manifesting deep interest in Afghanistan and playing their ‘games’ with
reference to the Afghan imbroglio, Pakistan will have to strengthen its multilateral diplomacy
with a focus on winning the confidence of as many states as possible that are directly involved
in the Afghan problem. Time has come to go beyond the oft-repeated statement that Pakistan
has made massive sacrifices in the war on terrorism and that it has suffered more financial
losses than what it received as economic assistance and loans.

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Instead of issuing polemical statements to counter American, Afghan and Indian assertions on
internal strife and terrorism in Afghanistan, Pakistan needs a new multilateral diplomacy that
takes into account the complexity of the Afghan problem and the varied interest of different
states with an unambiguous view of what is possible on long- and short-term bases.

Instead of blowing Pakistan’s own trumpet on Afghanistan, its policymakers should pay more
attention to the imperatives of global politics. They need to make a strong attempt to address
the complaints of other states about Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy, even if these complaints
are based on faulty information. This must be coupled with a cogent and convincing
presentation of Pakistan’s concerns about the situation in Afghanistan, especially the issue of
two-way unauthorized cross-border movement between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Another
issue that needs to be explained to the international community is that New Delhi’s belligerent
approach towards Islamabad complicates Pakistan’s security problems, and slows down its
efforts to manage the tribal areas and the border with Afghanistan.[ CITATION DrH17 \l 1033
]

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Bibliography
(n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.ips.org.pk/security-and-foreign-policy/1080-us-aid-to-pakistan-and-
democracy.html

Impact of War in Afghanistan and Ensuing. (2014-15). Pakistan Economic Survey .

Iqbal, S. (2017,july,7). Historical perspective of Pak-Afghan Relations.

Javaid, U. (2016). Analyzing the Dynamics of Pakistan-Afghanistan. A Research Journal of South Asian
Studies , 137 –147.

Rizvi, D. H. (2017). Pakistan’s Afghan problem. The Express Tribune .

Sial, S. (2014). Pak-Afghan Relations Emerging Trends and.

Sufi, J. K. (2018). Overview of Pak-Afghan Relations.

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