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Academic Dishonesty: Honor Codes and Other Contextual Influences

Author(s): Donald L. McCabe and Linda Klebe Trevino


Source: The Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 64, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 1993), pp. 522-538
Published by: Ohio State University Press
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DonaldL. McCabe
LindaKlebeTrevino

AcademicDishonesty
HonorCodesandOtherContextual
Influences

Researchand media reportshave establishedthe


continuedpervasivenessof academic dishonestyamong studentson
America'scollegecampuses[12, 13, 22, 25, 26, 33, 46]. While some
collegeshave respondedwithacademicintegrity classes and increased
efforts to convincereluctant
facultymembers to reportstudentcheaters
[13],thereis a renewedinterestin theconceptof"community" as an ef-
fectivefoundationforcampusgovernance.For example,theCarnegie
FoundationfortheAdvancement ofTeaching'sspecialreport,Campus
Life:In Searchof Community, concludes,"Whatis needed,we believe,
is a larger,moreintegrativevisionof community in highereducation.
a place whereindividuals
accepttheirobligationsto thegroupand
wherewell-defined governanceprocedures guidebehaviorforthecom-
mongood" [10, p. 7].
Derek Bok, in Universitiesand theFutureof America,echoesthis
theme:
needto consider
[U]niversities thelargercampusenvironment beyondthe
Anobviousstepinthisdirection
classroom. istohaverulesthatprohibit
ly-
ing,cheating,
stealing,
violent
behavior,
interference
withfreeexpression,
or
otheractsthatbreakfundamentalnorms.Suchrulesnotonlyprotect the

wouldliketo acknowledge
Theauthors thesupport
oftheRutgers
Graduate
School
of ManagementResearchResourcesCommittee,
ExxonResearchand Engineering
Company,andFirstFidelity
Bancorporation.
DonaldL. McCabeis associate at theGraduate
professor SchoolofManagement,
Rutgers, ofNewJersey-Newark,
TheStateUniversity andLindaKlebeTrevino
isasso-
ciateprofessor
at theSmealCollegeof Business ThePennsylvania
Administration,
Park.
StateUniversity-University
Journal
ofHigher Vol.64,No. 5 (September/October
Education, 1993)
0 1993bytheOhioStateUniversity
Copyright Press

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AcademicDishonesty 523

ofeveryone
rights inthecommunity;
theyalsosignaltheimportance
ofbasic
andstrengthen
moralobligations habitsofethical
behavior
[5,pp.84-85].
Bok offersthe honorcode as perhapsthe mosteffective approachin
mattersof academicintegrity, but acknowledgesthat,"the pervasive
competition forgrades;thesize,diversity,
andimpersonal natureofmany
largeuniversities;
theirlack of anyhonorcode tradition;and thewide-
spreaddistasteforaccusingone'sclassmates"combineto workagainst
such an approach[5, p. 87]. Althoughthehonorcode tradition dates
back overa century,theviabilityof suchcodes on today'scampusesis
open to some question[12]. Small, relatively homogeneouscampuses
have generallygivenwayto large,culturally diverseinstitutions
which
lack anyapparentsenseofcommunity or commonpurposeamongstu-
dentsotherthangetting a credentialand a job.
Despitethefundamental natureof thisquestion,thereis a surprising
paucityofempiricalresearchwhichaddressestheeffectiveness ofhonor
codes.The studydiscussedhereattempts to helpfillthisgap bycompar-
ing academicdishonesty in collegesthathave honorcodes and those
thatdo not. The fewstudiesthathave addressedthe effectiveness of
honorcodes[7, 9] havegenerally considered code effectiveness
indepen-
dentof context.We believethatit is importantto acknowledgeand
understandthe complexityof the social systemswithinwhichhonor
codesareembeddedand thefactthatothercontextual factorsmaybe as
importantor moreimportantthantheexistenceof an honorcode by
itself.Thus thisstudyextendsbeyondpreviousworkby studying the
effectivenessofhonorcodeswithina morecomplexsocialcontext.

Honor Codes in Context


AcademicDishonesty
Dependingon one'sdefinition ofacademicdishonesty, thedatacollec-
tionmethodsemployed,and othervariables,priorstudiesreportthat
anywhere from13to 95 percentofcollegestudents engagein someform
ofacademicdishonesty [12, 17,20,21,26,30,31,42]. A majordichotomy
thatseparatesthesepriorstudiesis thelevelof analysis.One streamof
researchhas focusedon individual differences
thought to be predictive
of
cheatingbehavior,suchas gender[45],gradepointaverage[1,22],work
ethic[15], TypeA behavior,competitive achievement-striving[35], and
self-esteem [44]. In contrast,otherstudieshave concentrated on the
institutionallevelof analysisand examinedsuch contextualfactorsas
honorcodes[7, 8, 9], faculty responsesto cheating[26],sanctionthreats
[33,42], and sociallearning[33].

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524 Journalof HigherEducation

Althoughthe"individualdifferences" approachhelpsto understand


individuals'predispositions to cheat,the findingsare not particularly
usefulto theuniversityadministrator searching institutional
foreffective
responsesto issuesof academicdishonesty. By investigatingcontextual
factorsthatmaybe associatedwithacademicdishonesty and thatare
opento administrative influence, thestudydiscussedheremakesan im-
portantcontribution to ourunderstanding ofthiscomplexissue.In ad-
ditionto addressingtheimportant questionofhonorcode effectiveness,
itexaminestheroleofa numberofrelatedcontextual factors,including
thedegreeto whichacademicintegrity policiesare understoodand ac-
cepted,theenforcement ofthesepolicies,and theperceivedbehaviorof
peers.Amongpreviousstudiesthathaveinvestigated contextual factors,
we are aware of onlyone [6], conductedthirty yearsago, thatreaches
beyonda singleclassroomor university and considerstheeffectiveness
of honorcodes alongwithothercontextual variables.Thus thisstudy,
whichinvestigatestherelativeinfluenceof multiplecontextual factors
acrossstudentsat thirty-one institutionsof higherlearning,makesan
important contribution to theextantliterature.

TheInfluenceof Honor Codes on AcademicDishonesty


Althoughstillin a significant
minority,honorcodes can be foundin
an increasing ofhigher
numberofinstitutions education[18,41]. Sheldon
Steinbach,generalcounseloftheAmericanCouncilon Education,was
recentlyquotedas saying,"Honorcodes look liketheyare in a stateof
revivalon America'scollegecampuses"[41]. This renewedinterest in
honorcodes impliesthe beliefthatcodes can influenceacademicdis-
honesty,and thelimitedempiricalresearchavailablesupportsthisbelief.
For example,Campbell[8] comparedcheatingamongstudentsunder
an honorsystemand a proctorsystemat thesameuniversity and found
thestudentsunderthehonorsystemwereless likelyto cheat.Canning
[9] conductedan experimentinfivesociologyclassesbeforeand afteran
honorsystemwas established.Studentswereprovidedtheopportunity
to cheatby gradingtheirown papers,withoutknowingthatduplicates
had been previouslymade and gradedbytheinstructor. The incidence
of cheatingwas reducedafteran honorsystemwas implemented and
was reducedbynearlytwo-thirds afterhavingthehonorsystemin place
forfiveyears.A surveyof medicalstudents[7] governedby an honor
code attheUniversityofAlabamaSchool ofMedicinemeasuredstudent
perceptionsofand adherenceto thecode. Ninety-two percentofthere-
spondentsreported thattheyhad notobservedanycode violations, sug-
However,thelackofa non-codecomparison
gestingcode effectiveness.
groupmakesitimpossibleto attribute thelowlevelofacademicdishon-

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AcademicDishonesty 525

estyto the code in thisstudy.One study,conductedin 1964,directly


comparedacademicdishonesty at code and non-codeschools[6]. This
studyfoundthatschoolswithtraditional honorsystems - thosewhere
studentspledgeto abide by an honorcode and takeresponsibility for
detection and sanctioningofacademicdishonesty whenitoccurs- had
thelowestrateof academicdishonesty.
In general,previousresearchhas donelittleto developthetheoretical
underpinnings oftheproposedinverserelationship betweenhonorcodes
and academicdishonesty and to explainwhystudentsare expectedto
cheat less when governedby an honorcode system.At least several
plausibleexplanationsare possible.First,in mosthonorsystems,stu-
dentspledgeto abidebya code thatclarifies expectationsregarding ap-
propriate and inappropriate
behavior.Thus,wrongdoing is moreclearly
definedunderhonorcode systems.Whenthedefinition ofwrongdoing
is madeclear,itbecomesmoredifficult forpotentialcheaters to rational-
ize andjustifycheatingbehavior,and theincidenceof cheatingmaybe
loweras a result.Second,honorcode systems shifttheresponsibility for
controlof academicdishonesty fromfacultyand administrators to stu-
dents[6]. In mostsystems, studentsare givenresponsibility forthede-
tectionofviolatorsand forthejudicialaspectsofthesystem, suchas de-
termining guiltand assigningpenalties[6, 32]. Researchby Schwartz
[38] suggeststhatindividualsmustascriberesponsibility to the selfif
moralnormsare to be activatedand to influencebehavior.Therefore,
cheatingmaybe lowerunderhonorsystemsbecause studentstakere-
sponsibility foracademicdishonesty. Finally,studentsgovernedby an
honorsystemarefrequently givenprivileges suchas unproctored exams.
It is likelythattheywouldbe willingto complywithan honorsystemto
preservesuch valued privileges.Thus, cheatingmay be lowerunder
honorcode systemsbecausestudentswishto protecttheprivileges the
systemprovides.
1: Honorcodesare associatedwithdecreased
Hypothesis academicdis-
honesty.
Becausecodes varyextensively in theircontentand implementation,
othercontextual factorsmayinfluence academicdishonesty beyondthe
mereexistenceofa code. For example,thehonorcode maybe adminis-
teredbyfaculty, byadministrators,by studenthonorcommittees, or by
somecombination ofthesegroups.At someuniversities, studentseither
signa generalpledgenotto cheator arerequiredto signa specificpledge
ofhonoron individualtestsand majorwritten assignments. At otherin-
such as Princeton,Smith,BrynMawr,and Rice,ifstudents
stitutions,
observean honorcode violation,theyareheldresponsible forreporting

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526 Journalof HigherEducation

it [4]. Some honorcodes,suchas theone at theUniversity of Virginia,


are also tied to severesanctionsystemsrequiringexpulsionfor any
seriousviolation[41]. At theotherextreme, an institution
mayhavean
honorcode thatis detailedin thestudenthandbookbutis relatively un-
knownto studentsand facultybecauseit is not a livingcomponentof
theinstitutionalculture.Also,itis possibleforinstitutionsofhighered-
ucationto createa strongclimatesupportive ofacademicintegrity with-
outactuallyhavingan explicitcode.
Given the complexityof social systemsand the variationsamong
honorcodes,itis relevantto ask thequestion,howimportant arehonor
codesrelativeto othercontextual factors?Thisstudyprovidesan oppor-
tunityto examinetheindependent contributionsof a numberof such
contextualvariablesand theirrelativecontributions in a multivariate
context.
OtherContextualInfluences on AcademicDishonesty
Understanding and acceptanceof academicintegrity policies. Aca-
demicintegrity policiescan differ intheircontentand inthe
significantly
mannerin whichtheyare communicated. As a result,important differ-
ences are likelyto be foundin the understanding and acceptanceof
thesepolicieson different campuses.For example,althoughit maybe
unlikelythatstudentsand facultywouldnotknowoftheexistenceof a
formalcode, its specificprovisionsmaybe poorlycommunicated and
understood.Thus, studentsand facultywillbe less likelyto adhereto
policiesthat theyeitherdo not know about or do not understand.
Further,researchdemonstrates thatfacultymembersmaybe reluctant
to followinstitutional policieswhentheyobservea studentcheating,
preferringto settlethematter"one-on-one" withthestudent[4, 26, 34].
Finally,studentsmayviewacademicintegrity policiesas "justanother
hurdleto be overcomeon theroad to a career"[18, p. 33]. Thus,com-
binedfacultyand student understanding and supportoftheinstitution's
academicintegrity policiesmaybe moreimportant thanthesimpleexis-
tenceor nonexistence ofan honorcode.
2: Academic
Hypothesis willbeinversely
dishonesty tounderstanding
related
andacceptance
ofacademic
integrity
policies.
Enforcement of ethicalguidelines.Whetheror not an explicithonor
code exists,academicdishonesty maydependuponthesanctionsystem,
particularlyhow effectivelyacademicintegrityrulesand guidelinesare
enforced.Deterrence theorysuggeststhatformisconduct to be inhibited,
wrongdoers mustperceive,first,thattheywillbe caughtand, second,
thatseverepenaltieswillbe imposedforthemisconduct [19].The under-

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AcademicDishonesty 527

lyingcognitivemechanismis the expectationof punishment and the


notionthatindividualswillbehavein waysthatmaximizerewardsand
minimizecosts. Tittleand Rowe [42] foundthatthe threatof being
caughtand punishedsignificantly deterredtestcheatingamongcollege
students.More recently,Michaelsand Miethe[33] foundthattheper-
ceivedprobabilityof punishment and theperceivedseverity of punish-
mentwereinversely correlatedwithcheatingin an honorcode setting.
Becauseacademicdishonesty can oftenbe concealedfromfaculty mem-
bers,students'perceptionsabout the certainty of being caughtmay
depend upon the likelihoodthat anotherstudentwould reportthe
misconduct.Such peerreporting of academicdishonesty is partof the
explicithonorcode atmanyeducational institutions
where"nontoleration
clauses"oftenobligeand occasionallyrequirestudentsto reportviola-
tions[18].

3: Academic
Hypothesis willbeinversely
dishonesty totheperceived
related
ofbeingreported
certainty bya peer.
Deterrence theoryalso suggeststhat,all else beingequal, an increase
intheseverityofconsequences fora deviantactshouldreducethenumber
ofindividualswillingto riskit [47]. If thepenaltyis severeenough,the
potentialconsequencesmaysimplyoutweigh thepotentialrewardofthe
misconduct. Not surprisingly,
priorresearchindicatesthatthislogicap-
pliesto studentperceptionsconcerning theseverity
of penaltiesforacts
of academicdishonesty [33].

4: Academic
Hypothesis willbeinversely
dishonesty related
totheperceived
ofpenalties.
severity

Behaviorofpeers. Academicdishonesty mayalso be influenced by


students' perceptionsoftheirpeers'behavior.Thisproposedrelationship
is supportedby sociallearningtheory[2] and thenotionthatunethical
behavioris learnedthrough theinfluence ofexample[37] orthrough the
acceptanceand reinforcement ofcheatingin peergroups.For example,
studiesofacademiccheatinghavefoundfraternity/ sorority
membership
increasescheatingbehavior[1, 21, 39]. Althoughfrequently explainedin
termsof opportunity structures mayalso be ex-
[21, 39], thesefindings
plainedin termsof social learningtheoryand differential association
theory.
Social learningtheory[2] emphasizesthatmuchofhumanbehavioris
learnedthroughtheinfluenceof example.Individualslearnby observ-
ingotherpeople'sbehaviorand itsconsequences forthem.Thus,accord-
ing to social learningtheory,seeingreferent otherscheatsuccessfully

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528 Journalof HigherEducation

shouldincreasethetendencyof theobserverto behavein similarways


[2].
Hypothesis5: Academic willbe positively
dishonesty to perceptions
related
ofpeers'academicdishonesty.
Beyond these hypothesizedbivariaterelationships, administrators
dealingwithacademicdishonesty issuesneedto understand therelative
influencesof the independent variables(existenceof an explicithonor
code,understanding and acceptanceof academicintegrity policies,cer-
taintyof beingreported, severityof penalties,and peers'behavior)on
academicdishonesty. Thus, an important contribution of thisstudyis
the opportunityit providesto explorethe relativeinfluencesof these
contextualvariables.

ResearchProcedures
Sample
The hypothesesweretestedusinga sampleof 6,096 studentsfrom
thirty-oneU.S. collegesand universities.
Initialsampleselection focused
on thirty-three institutionsthat had participatedin a conferenceon
honorsystemsheldat PrincetonUniversity in 1988,and fourteen insti-
tutionswithhonorcodesultimately indicated a willingness
to participate.
Theseinstitutions weregenerally smalland highlyselectivein theirad-
missionspolicies,and we identified non-honorcode institutions with
similarprofiles.
Seventeen ofthethirty-eightnon-codeschoolscontacted
also agreedto participate.The institutional
characteristicsofthesecode
and non-codeschoolssuggestthatthetwogroupsare comparablewith
regardto bothsize (meannumberof students = 3441 fornon-codeand
3407forcode institutions) and academicselectivity (mean SAT score=
1236fornon-codeand 1249forcode institutions). The onlysubstantive
differenceis the inclusionof five all-femaleinstitutions in the code
schoolsampleversusnoneamongthenon-codeschools.However,all of
theanalysesdiscussedbelowwerereplicatedon thereducedsampleof
twenty-sixcoeducational and no substantive
institutions, differenceswere
foundbetweenthetwosetsof analyses.
Data Collection
At twenty-eight
ofthethirty-one surveysweremailedto
institutions,
a randomsampleof500 students in thefallof 1990.Threeschoolsasked
to includetheirentireseniorclass in thesurvey.Thus, 15,904surveys
weremailedin total.Respondentswereasked to completethe survey
anonymously and return it by mailor to specialcollectionboxessetup

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AcademicDishonesty 529

at a centralcampuslocation.A totalof6,096surveyswerereturned for


an overallresponse rateof 38.3 percent.The return rate at honorcode
schools(41.4 percent)was significantlyhigherthanat non-codeschools
(35.7 percent).Eighty-eight percentofrespondents wereseniors,9 per-
centwerejuniors,and theremaining3 percentcould not be classified.
The profilesofrespondents on gender,ethnicity,and mixofmajorswere
comparedwiththeirrespectiveinstitutional profiles(based upon pub-
lishedfigures and additionaldata providedbyourinstitutional contacts).
Witha singleexception, thesecomparisons suggestedthattheprofiles of
respondents closelymatchedtheirrespective profiles,
institutional les-
seningconcernsabout potentialnon-respondent bias in the sample.
However,thereis evidenceof some genderbias. Based on available
demographic profilesforeach school,we wouldhaveexpecteda female/
maleratioof55/45amongrespondents. However,femalesreturned sur-
higherrate,fortheactualfemale/male
veysat a significantly ratioamong
respondents was 62/38.The primaryeffectof thisbias towardhonor
code institutionsand womenis to understate theactuallevelofcheating
in the overallsample,because the resultsindicatethatcheatingis less
prevalentin each of thesegroups.However,separateanalysesforthe
code versusnon-codeand thefemaleversusmalesegmentsofthesam-
ple suggestthatthesebiasesdo notmaterially affectthenatureofthere-
lationshipsdiscussedhere.

Measures
Academicdishonesty. The dependentvariablewas a compositemea-
sureconsistingoftwelvetypesofself-reported academicdishonesty: us-
ingcribnoteson a test;copyingfromanotherstudent duringa test;using
unfairmethodsto learnwhatwas on a testbeforeitwas given;copying
fromanotherstudentduringa testwithouttheirknowledge;helping
someoneelseto cheaton a test;cheatingon a testin anyotherway;copy-
ingmaterialand turning itin as yourownwork;fabricating orfalsifying
a bibliography;
turning inworkdonebysomeoneelse;receiving substan-
tial,unpermittedhelpon an assignment; collaborating on an assignment
whentheinstructor askedforindividualwork;copyinga fewsentences
ofmaterialfroma publishedsourcewithoutfootnoting it. Respondents
to the
wereasked identify frequency with which they had engagedin
each ofthesebehaviorson a four-point Likertscale (fromnever= 1 to
manytimes= 4). A compositemeasurewas constructed by calculating
thetotalnumberofself-reported and thismeasurehad a scale
violations,
Cronbach'salpha of0.794. (All relationshipswerealso evaluatedusing
thetestand non-test cheatingcomponentsof thismeasureas separate

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530 Journalof HigherEducation

dependentvariables.No substantivedifferences werefoundbetween


theseanalysesand themoregeneralresultsdiscussedhere.)
The compositeacademicdishonesty measurecould rangefrom12 to
48 forany individual,with12 representing no self-reported academic
dishonesty ofanykindand48 representing frequentacademicdishonesty
acrossall ofthecategories described.The scoresforthisvariableranged
from12to 45 withan overallmeanof 15.29and a standarddeviationof
4.21. However,theacademicdishonesty variablewas highlyskewed,and
inspectionof theresidualsin subsequentregression analysessuggested
thatthe standardassumptionsof normality wereviolated.Thus a log
transformation [11] oftheacademicdishonesty variablewas used in all
analyses.(The residualsin theregression
statistical analysesemploying
this log transformation are normallydistributed.) This transformed
measureof academicdishonesty had a mean of 2.70 and a standard
deviationof0.23.
Explicithonorcode.A dummyvariablewas utilizedto signify whether
an individualinstitution employedan explicithonorcode. The workof
Melendez[32] was usedto definetheminimum codecriteria:unproctored
examinations, an honorpledge,studentreportage (non-toleration), and
of
theexistence a courtorpeerjudiciary.Administrators atparticipating
institutionsprovidedthedata neededto makethedetermination and,in
everycase,theyagreedwiththeauthors'classification oftheirinstitution.
Understanding/acceptance ofacademicintegrity policy.Understand-
ing/ acceptance of the academic integritypolicywas measuredwithfour
itemson the studentsurvey.These itemsaskedtherespondent to rate:
"the averagestudent'sunderstanding of [the institution's]
policieson
academichonesty," "thefaculty'sunderstanding of thesepolicies,""the
faculty'ssupportofthesepolicies,"and "theeffectiveness oftheinstitu-
tion'spolicieson academichonesty"on a four-point Likertscale from
verylow to veryhigh.Cronbach'salphaforthisscalewas 0.824.
Certainty of beingreported.Studentperceptions of thecertainty of
beingreportedweremeasuredby a singlefour-point Likert-scale item
thatasked"how likely(veryunlikelyto verylikely)is it thatthetypical
studentat [theinstitution] wouldreportsuchviolations?"
Severityof penalties.Studentperceptionsof the severityof their
school'spenaltiesforacademicdishonesty weremeasuredusinga single
four-point Likert scaleitemwhichaskedrespondents to ratethe"severity
ofpenaltiesforcheatingat [theirschool]"fromverylow to veryhigh.
Peers'behavior.The measureof peerbehavioremployedherecon-
sistedof threeitems:studentperceptions of how frequently (neverto
very oftenon a five-pointscale) eitherplagiarismor testcheatingoc-

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AcademicDishonesty 531

curredat theirschooland an objectivemeasureoftheactualnumberof


times(neverto manytimeson a four-point scale) the respondent
had
observedanotherstudentcheatingon a testor exam. Due to thediffer-
encesintheunderlying metrics each ofthecomponents
ofthesevariables,
was standardizedbeforecombiningthemintothepeers'behaviormea-
sure.For each component, z scoreswerecalculated,thethreez scores
werecombined,and a constantvalueof 10was added to thesumofthe
z scoresto createthepeers'behaviorvariable.This measurehad a mean
of9.99 and a standarddeviationof 2.43. Cronbach'salphaforthescale
was computedto be 0.715.

Findings
A t-testwas used to comparethe meansof code and non-codere-
spondents on theacademicdishonesty variable.As predicted(hypothesis
1),self-reportedcheatingwas significantlyhigheramongstudents in the
non-codesamplethanamongthoseinthehonorcodesample(t = 26.073,
p < 0.0001). The academicdishonesty means were2.62 in the honor
code sampleand 2.77 at thenon-codeschools.(The meansfortheun-
transformed measureof academic dishonesty were 14.00 and 16.56,
respectively.)
As detailedin table 1, academicdishonesty was significantly
corre-
latedwith:(1) theunderstanding/ acceptanceofacademicintegrity poli-
cies (hypothesistwo); (2) the perceivedcertaintyof being reported
(hypothesisthree);(3) the perceivedseverity of penalties(hypothesis
four);and (4) theperceptions of peers'behavior(hypothesis five),sup-
portingall ofthehypothesized bivariaterelationships.
The moreinteresting policyquestionis therelativeimpactofeach of
theseindependent variableson cheatingbehavior.To examinethisques-

TABLE I
of StudyVariables
Intercorrelations

Measure N M S.D. Intercorrelations

1 2 3 4 5 6
Code 6079 0.50 0.50
Certaintyof beingcaught 6036 2.05 0.73 0.46
Understanding of policy 5784 11.40 2.47 0.42 0.43
Severityof penalties 5884 3.00 0.79 0.31 0.31 0.51
Peers'behavior 5993 9.99 2.43 -0.43 -0.42 -0.49 -0.31
Academicdishonesty 5904 2.70 0.23 -0.32 -0.27 -0.25 -0.12 0.51

NOTE: Allcorrelations
aresignificant
atp < 0.001.

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532 Journalof HigherEducation

tion,a multipleregression modelwas constructedwithacademicdishon-


estyas thedependentvariableand existenceof an explicithonorcode
(enteredas a dummyvariable),the understanding/acceptance of aca-
demicintegrity policies,thecertaintyof beingreported, theseverityof
penalties,and peers'behavioras theindependent variables.The model
was significantand,withtheexceptionoftheunderstanding/ acceptance
of policymeasure,all of the independent variablesmade statistically
significantcontributions to thefinalmodel.Peers'behaviorhad by far
the strongestinfluenceon academicdishonesty. These resultsare re-
portedin table2.
Post hoc analysis.Giventheimportance ofpeers'behavior,a crucial
issue may be to understandhow the widerinstitutional contextinflu-
encesthisvariable.Althoughwe didnothypothesize theserelationships,
a post-hocmultipleregression analysisoftherelationbetweentheper-
ceptionof peers'behaviorand othercontextualfactorsprovidessome
insightto guidefutureresearchand policyconsiderations. As shownin
table3, thisanalysisindicatesthattheunderstanding and acceptanceof
academicintegrity policieshas the strongestassociationwithstudents'
perceptions oftheirpeers'behavior.

Discussion
The correlational data (table 1) supportthehypothesesthatacademic
dishonesty is positivelyassociatedwithperceptions of peers'academic
dishonesty,and negatively associatedwiththeunderstanding ofacademic
policies,the certainty
integrity of beingreported,and the severityof
penalties.Further,a t-testfoundsignificantly lowerself-reportedaca-
demicdishonesty amongstudentsat honorcode institutions.

TABLE 2
Regressionof Peers'Behavior,Code, Severityof Penalties,Certainty
of BeingReported,
and Understanding of Policyon AcademicDishonesty

Variable
Explanatory b Beta p

Constant 2.234
Peers'behavior 0.045 0.468 0.0001
Code -0.006 -0.126 0.0001
Severityof penalties 0.020 0.067 0.0001
Certaintyof beingreported -0.017 -0.052 0.0001
Understanding of policy 0.002 0.020 0.1895

NOTE: N = 5466.R2= 0.2850,Adjusted


R2= 0.2844,F(5,5461)
= 435.37,
p < 0.0001.

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AcademicDishonesty 533

TABLE 3
Regressionof Understanding of Policy,Code, Certainty
of BeingReported,and Severity
of
Penaltieson Peers' Behavior

ExplanatoryVariable b Beta p

Constant 15.489
Understandingof policy -0.296 -0.299 0.0001
Code -1.098 -0.225 0.0001
of beingreported
Certainty -0.625 -0.187 0.0001
of penalties
Severity -0.095 -0.031 0.0155

NOTE: N = 5606. R2 = 0.3383,AdjustedR2 = 0.3378, F(4,5602)= 716.03,p < 0.0001.

The multivariate analysisfoundthattheperception ofpeers'behavior


was themostinfluential contextualvariable,suggesting thatsociallearn-
ingtheorymaybe particularly usefulforunderstanding academicdis-
honestybehavioramongcollegestudents. The stronginfluence ofpeers'
behaviormaysuggestthatacademicdishonesty notonlyis learnedfrom
observing thebehaviorofpeers,butthatpeers'behaviorprovidesa kind
ofnormative supportforcheating.The factthatothersarecheatingmay
also suggestthat,in sucha climate,thenon-cheater feelsleftat a disad-
vantage.Thus,cheatingmaycometo be viewedas an acceptablewayof
gettingand stayingahead [18]. Considerthefollowingcommentsfrom
studyrespondents: "[Academicdishonesty] is rampantat, . . . so much
so thattheattitude seemsto be everybody does it- I'l be at a disadvan-
tageifI don't";"If othersdo it,you'rebeingleftbehindbynotpartici-
pating";"It'sthe'90's;yousnooze,youlose";"Whenmostoftheclassis
cheatingon a difficult exam and theywillruinthe curve,it influences
you to cheat so yourgradewon'tbe affected."
An important implicationofthisstudyforfutureresearchand forthe
managementof academicdishonestymay be that any movementto
adopthonorcodes is ill conceivedifitis undertaken as thesolesolution
to theacademicdishonesty problem.Academicdishonesty is a complex
behaviorinfluenced bymultiplevariablesbeyondthemereexistenceof
an honorcode.
The post-hocanalysissuggested thatan institution'sabilityto develop
a sharedunderstanding and acceptanceofitsacademicintegrity policies
has a significantand substantiveimpacton studentperceptions oftheir
peers'behavior,themostpowerfulinfluenceon self-reported cheating.
Strivingformutualunderstanding of thesepoliciesmaybe extremely
important. Thus,programsaimedat distributing, explaining, and gain-
ingstudentand faculty acceptanceofacademicintegrity policiesmaybe

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534 Journalof HigherEducation

particularly useful.As suggestedelsewhere [33],theseprograms mayin-


cludethesigningofhonorpledges,reminders abouttheseriousness and
consequencesof academicdishonesty, and statements in coursesyllabi
aboutacademicmisconduct.
Interestingly,in thepresentresearchone of the lowestratesof self-
reported academicdishonesty was foundat a non-honor codeinstitution.
However,thisinstitution is strongly committed to the conceptof aca-
demichonor,makingit a majortopicofdiscussionin itsstudenthand-
book and at orientation sessionsforincomingstudents, whereitgoesto
greatlengthsto ensurethatitspolicyis understoodand thatacademic
honoris theobligationofeverymemberofthecampuscommunity. At
the otherextreme,one of the higherincidencesof unethicalbehavior
was foundat a schoolwitha long-standing honorcode. However,stu-
dentsreporteda low level of understanding and acceptanceof the
school'spolicyand theofficialwithprimary responsibilityforadminis-
tering this
thehonorcode supported finding bysuggesting theinsti-
that
tutionhas diminished itsefforts in communicating and implementing its
code in recentyears.
In thefinalanalysis,themostimportant questionto ask concerning
academicdishonesty maybe how an institution can createan environ-
mentwhereacademicdishonesty is sociallyunacceptable,thatis,where
institutional expectations areclearlyunderstoodand wherestudents per-
ceivethattheirpeersareadheringto theseexpectations. Althoughthere
are no simpleanswers,one alternative maybe Kohlberg's[27, 28] sug-
gestionthatschoolsshouldbecome"justcommunities." Schoolsorgan-
ized aroundthe"justcommunity" conceptaregoverneddemocratically,
and students participatein thedevelopment ofa socialcontractthatde-
finesnorms,values,and members'rightsand responsibilities. The un-
derlying assumption is thatthe institutional in
climatecreated these"just
communities" willprovidetheconditions thatarenecessary formoralde-
velopmentand behavior[23, 36]. Althoughmoreresearchis neededto
determine whether "justcommunities" can actuallydiscourageacademic
in
dishonesty highereducationsettings [24],thedata reported heresug-
gestthatthisconceptdeservesfurther study.
In additionto themoreobjectivesupportoffered forthisposition,itis
instructive to look at studentcommentsfromhonorcode schoolsthat
seemto have achievedsomesharedsenseofresponsibility foracademic
dishonesty amongtheirstudents. For example,in responseto a question
whichprobedmotivations fornotcheating, thefollowing responseswere
notunusual:"I liketherespectI getat [theinstitution] and wouldn'tdo
anything to jeopardizethat";"Peerpressure- youwouldfeelveryem-

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AcademicDishonesty 535

barrassedifotherstudents saw it";"as forcheatingon a test,it'ssocially


unacceptable"; "I didmanyofthese'academicdishonesty' thingsin high
school butnotsincearriving
- at [theinstitution] theatmosphere
- is
one of respectforthestudent- and so I haverespectforthesystem";
"Respectfor[theinstitution's] openness/freedom"; "Respectforothers
in the class - cheatingmay penalizethemas well."One respondent
pointedout,"We do not'report'peopleliketheHonorBoardwas some
hitsquad - confrontation on a student-to-student levelis muchmore
common& alwaysthefirstand usuallytheonlysteptaken."We believe
thatAmitaiEtzioni[16] would see thesecommentsas evidencethat
"whena community is intact,thereis littleneedforgovernment of any
kind."
Bycontrast, students at schoolswithhighlevelsofself-reported cheat-
ingoftendiscusstheissueofacademicdishonesty in termsofa 'we'ver-
sus'they'mentality. Cheatingbyus (students) is acceptablebecausethey
(facultyand/oradministrators) 'deserve'itforanynumberofreasons-
unreasonableassignments, thepoorqualityofteaching,and unclearin-
structionson majorassignments werementioned frequently bystudents.
Of course,theconclusionsstatedheremustbe interpreted in lightof
themethodological limitations of thisstudy.For example,becausethis
studyreliedupon cross-sectional surveydata, the observedlinkages
betweentheindependent variablesand academicdishonesty arecorrela-
tional and not necessarilycausal. In addition,althoughwe insured
completeanonymity and confidentiality ofthesurveydata,bias due to
self-reportand social desirability mayhave influenced theresults.For
example,it is possiblethatrespondents at a code institution would be
less willingto admitacademicdishonesty on a survey.Further,given
our sample,we can notgeneralizebeyondsmall,selectiveinstitutions.
Thereis some researchevidenceto suggestthatless cheatingoccursin
smaller, moreselective institutions [6], anditis important forresearchers
to eithermeasureor controlfor(as was done here)theseextraneous
sourcesof variance.However,despitepossibledifferences in absolute
cheatinglevels,thereis no theoretical reasonto believethattheunderly-
ingnatureoftherelationships betweentheindependent variablesand the
dependent variablewouldbe different in larger,lessselectiveinstitutions.
Finally,givenourprimary interest in comparingacademicdishonesty
in code versusnon-codeinstitutions, we believethatthe largemulti-
institution sample used here,that includesan approximately equal
numberofcode and non-codeschools,is a majorstrength ofthisstudy.
The sampleis particularly interesting becausethesmaller,moreselective
institutions studiedhererepresentthe undergraduate institutions of a

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536 Journalof HigherEducation

disproportionate shareof our nation'sleaders.For example,almostone


in five(18.5 percent)of Business Week's 1991 CorporateElite (the
CEOs ofthenation'stop 1000firms)earneda degree[14] at one of the
participating Thus,thisstudyprovidesa uniqueopportun-
institutions.
ityto understand theacademicenvironments thathelpto shapethelead-
ersofthisnation.
Thisinvestigation contributes to a smallbutgrowingempiricallitera-
tureon academicdishonesty and is one offewempiricalstudiesto exam-
ine the role of honorcodes in combinationwithothertheoretically
importantcontextualfactorsin reducingacademicdishonesty. These
contextualvariablesare particularly relevantbecause theyare open to
administrative influence.In responseto the keyquestionabouthonor
codeeffectiveness, thefindings suggestthatthemereexistence ofan hon-
or code is not as important as othersocial contextfactors.Academic
dishonesty is most stronglyassociatedwiththe perceptionsof peers'
behavior.It is influenced to a lesserdegreeby the existenceof a code,
certainty of beingreported, the perceivedseverity of penaltiesand, in-
directly, by the understanding and acceptanceof academic integrity
policies.Althoughadditionalresearchwillbe neededto understand how
thesefactorsoperateand howtheycan be influenced, clearlythefindings
of thisresearchare hopeful.Althoughtheyleave manyquestionsun-
answered,theydemonstrate thatthevisionoftheCarnegieFoundation
thatourcampusesbecomeplaces"whereindividuals accepttheirobliga-
tionsto thegroupand wherewell-defined governance proceduresguide
behaviorforthe commongood" [10, p. 7] maynot be unrealistic. Al-
thoughthetask willbe difficult, thesuccessachievedby severalof the
schoolsstudiedin thissample,code and non-codeschoolsalike,attest
thatit is possible.

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