4911ProcessReq Rev10-041018

Title: PageNo: Total:
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Process Requirements
Document no: 4911E
Processes correspondence:
02.04 Capital Projects, 02.06 Facility Operations, 02.07 Production Operations, 02.09 Modification Projects
Dicipline:
P-Process
NORSOK Standard Reference:

NORSOK P-002 Standard, Process System Design, Rev. 01, Aug. 2014
Level: 3
Doc.No / Rev.No Level No. Owner Rev. date
4911E / 10 3 Manager-Facilities-Engineering 04.10.2018

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Changes:
• Inclusion of requirements for documentation of relief valve and rupture disc (PSV/PSE) sizing.
• Clarification of requirements for Car Sealing. Addition of valves for personal air supply to CSO list.
• Addition of target requirements for produced water quality for discharge. This is moved from
Environmental Care TCD 6429E, which is to be deleted.
• Addition of normative reference to Procedure 6462.

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Table of contents
Additional requirements to NORSOK Standard ............................................................................................... 5

1 General ......................................................................................................................................................... 6
1.1 Purpose ................................................................................................................................................. 6
1.2 Scope .................................................................................................................................................... 6
1.3 Target group and responsibility ............................................................................................................. 6
1.3.1 Target group ................................................................................................................................... 6
1.3.2 Responsibility ................................................................................................................................. 6
1.4 Deviation Management ......................................................................................................................... 6
1.5 Definitions / Abbreviations..................................................................................................................... 6
1.5.1 Definitions ....................................................................................................................................... 6
1.5.2 Abbreviations .................................................................................................................................. 6
1.6 References ............................................................................................................................................ 8
1.6.1 Normative References .................................................................................................................... 8
1.6.2 Informative References .................................................................................................................. 8
1.7 Handling of critical business information ............................................................................................... 8
2 Additional requirements to NORSOK P-002 Process System Design.......................................................... 9
2.1 NORSOK P-002 3.2 Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... 9
2.2 NORSOK P-002 7.4 - Sizing of gas/liquid Two- or Multi-Phase lines ................................................... 9
2.3 NORSOK P-002 7.5.3 - Pressure safety valve lines ............................................................................. 9
2.4 NORSOK P-002 10 - Insulation and Heat Tracing ................................................................................ 9
2.5 NORSOK P-002 7.4 Atmospheric tanks ............................................................................................... 9
2.6 NORSOK P-002 15.3 Regeneration unit and storage........................................................................... 9
2.7 NORSOK P-002 21 Flare and vent (system 43) ................................................................................... 9
2.8 NORSOK P-002 6.4.2 - Relief devices ............................................................................................... 10
2.9 NORSOK P-002 22.1 Oily Water Treatment – General ...................................................................... 10
3 Isolation Requirements ............................................................................................................................... 11
3.1 General Isolation Requirements.......................................................................................................... 11
3.1.1 Design requirements for positive isolation .................................................................................... 11
3.1.2 Design requirements for proved isolation ..................................................................................... 12
3.1.3 Single vs. double isolation ............................................................................................................ 12
3.2 Typical isolation guidelines.................................................................................................................. 13
3.2.1 Vessels ......................................................................................................................................... 13
3.2.2 Control valves ............................................................................................................................... 13
3.2.3 Flare connections ......................................................................................................................... 13
3.2.4 Vent connections .......................................................................................................................... 14
3.2.5 Closed drain connections ............................................................................................................. 14
3.2.6 Pressure instrument connections ................................................................................................. 14
3.2.7 Level transmitters / gauges .......................................................................................................... 14
3.2.8 Pig launchers / receivers .............................................................................................................. 15
3.2.9 Wellheads, flowlines and headers ................................................................................................ 15
3.2.10 Drain and bleed valves ............................................................................................................... 15
3.3 Tie-in isolation Requirements.............................................................................................................. 15
4 Flare & Vent Design .................................................................................................................................... 16
4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 16
4.2 Flare system design ............................................................................................................................ 16
4.2.1 Flare design capacity.................................................................................................................... 16
4.2.2 Flare knock out drum .................................................................................................................... 16
4.2.3 Test separator system- PSVs ....................................................................................................... 16
4.2.4 Control valve failure ...................................................................................................................... 17
4.2.5 Flare headers ............................................................................................................................... 17
4.2.6 Flare recovery and Flare ignition .................................................................................................. 17
4.2.7 Fire PSV in Vapour Service .......................................................................................................... 17
4.3 Blowdown ............................................................................................................................................ 18
4.3.1 General ......................................................................................................................................... 18
4.3.2 Calculations of blowdown rates .................................................................................................... 18
4.3.3 Low temperature calculations ....................................................................................................... 18
4.3.4 Total blowdown rate ...................................................................................................................... 19
4.4 Flare height ......................................................................................................................................... 19

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4.4.1 Radiation constraints .................................................................................................................... 19

4.4.2 Wind loads .................................................................................................................................... 19
4.4.3 Temperature loads ........................................................................................................................ 19
4.5 Noise ................................................................................................................................................... 20
4.6 Acoustic fatigue ................................................................................................................................... 20
4.7 Atmospheric vent system .................................................................................................................... 20
4.8 BAT/Natural Environment Issues ........................................................................................................ 20
5 Safety Analysis ........................................................................................................................................... 21
5.1 General ............................................................................................................................................... 21
5.1.1 Pressure transmitters for leakage protection ................................................................................ 21
5.1.2 Pumps .......................................................................................................................................... 22
5.2 System 300 Water injection systems general ..................................................................................... 22
5.3 System 500 Open drain ...................................................................................................................... 22
5.4 System 530 Chemical Injection ........................................................................................................... 23
5.5 System 560 Hot Oil ............................................................................................................................. 23
5.6 System 650 Diesel .............................................................................................................................. 23
5.7 System 690 Jet Fuel ........................................................................................................................... 24
5.8 System 920 Mud Handling .................................................................................................................. 24
6 Other requirements ..................................................................................................................................... 25
6.1 Bypass around segregation valves (ESDV and XV) ........................................................................... 25
6.2 Car sealing of valves ........................................................................................................................... 25
6.2.1 Valves to be CSO ......................................................................................................................... 25
6.2.2 Valves to be CSC.......................................................................................................................... 26
6.3 Recommended system for annulus bleed on wellheads ..................................................................... 26
6.4 Guideline for choke collapse calculations ........................................................................................... 29
Appendix A - Sketches .................................................................................................................................. 31

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Additional requirements to NORSOK Standard

NORSOK Standard Cross References:
Disclaimer:
"The Technical Control Documents(TCDs) are developed by ConocoPhillips Skandinavia AS (COPSAS).
Although COPSAS has made the TCDs for the sole use by its suppliers and it is exclusively owned by
COPSAS, it is made publicly available. Please note that whilst every effort has been made to ensure the
accuracy of the TCDs, COPSAS will not assume any liability for any loss, cost, expense or claims of any kind
whatsoever that may occur to any party by the use of the TCDs.
The TCDs attached to the external web page are unofficial and uncontrolled versions and are set forth for
information purposes only.
Contractors who have contracts with COPSAS are advised that they shall comply with the binding, controlled
version of the specifications set forth in their contracts with COPSAS, and that they are responsible for
ensuring proper compliance by their subcontractors with such controlled version of the specifications."
For questions, comments or information, please contact:
C.L.H. Wilson - clive.wilson@conocophillips.com (TA Process)
Ø. Servan - oyvind.servan@conocophillips.com (Director Process and Reliability Engineering)

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1 General
1.1 Purpose
These technical requirements cover requirements additional to the NORSOK Process Standards as listed
under Normative References.
1.2 Scope
These requirements are generally to be used for all new Capital Projects and GEM-modification projects
(Greater Ekofisk Modification Projects), as well as minor projects on installations operated by COPSAS in the
Greater Ekofisk area. In some instances, for minor projects and for regular maintenance, where existing worn
out equipment is replaced with new almost identical equipment, then the NORSOK standards may not fully
apply. In these instances, requirements in this document may also be waived.
1.3 Target group and responsibility
1.3.1 Target group

Target groups for this document is discipline engineers, Technical Directors, GEM technical personnel and
Capital Project technical personnel.
1.3.2 Responsibility
REVISED!
Director Process and Reliability Engineering is responsible for this document and for ensuring that it is
updated or revoked when required by organizational or operational conditions.
All persons carrying out or reviewing process design are responsible for ensuring that the requirements of this
document are followed.
1.4 Deviation Management

REVISED!
Deviations from requirements in this TCD shall be approved by the document owner and follow the
requirements in document number 4920 ‘Handling of Nonconformities and Gaps. The document owner shall
be contacted if there is doubt about how the document shall be interpreted.
Shall Shall is an absolute requirement that shall be followed strictly in order to be in compliance with the document.
Should Should is a recommendation. Alternative solutions with the same functionality and quality are acceptable.
May May indicates a method that is allowed within the framework of the document.
1.5 Definitions / Abbreviations

REVISED!
1.5.1 Definitions
N/A
1.5.2 Abbreviations
BAT Best Available techniques
COPENS ConocoPhillips Engineering Numbering System
COPSAS ConocoPhillips Scandinavia AS
CSO Car Sealed Open
CSC Car Sealed Closed
DAL Design Accidental Load
DB&B Double Block and Bleed

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DIB Double Isolation and Bleed

ESDV Emergency ShutDown Valve
GEM Greater Ekofisk Modification projects
GOR Gas Oil Ratio
HIPPS High Integrity Pressure Protection System
HV Hand Valve
LC Locked Closed
LEL Lower Explosion Limit
LO Locked Open
LAHH Level Alarm High High
PAHH Pressure Alarm High High (trip level)
PPS Pressure Protection System
PSV Pressure Safety Valve
PSE Pressure Safety Element (i.e. rupture disc)
SAT Safety Analysis Table
SB&B Single Block and Bleed
TCD Technical Control Document
TA Technical Authority (previously known as TAG/SAG)
TSO Tight Shut Off
UPS Uninterrupted Power Supply
XV Process Sectionalisation Valve

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1.6 References
REVISED!
1.6.1 Normative References

Reference is made to ISO standards only, API Is left out.
ISO 10418, Petroleum and natural gas industries - Offshore production installations - Basic surface process
safety systems, 2003.
ISO 23251:2007 + A1:2008, Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries - Pressure-relieving
depressurizing systems
ISO 28300:2008 Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries – Venting of atmospheric and low-
pressure storage tanks
TCD 2169, ConocoPhillips Engineering Numbering System (COPENS)
TCD 5060, Piping and Valve Specification - Greater Ekofisk Field
TCD 6307, Technical Safety
6462, Planning, Conducting and Follow-up of HAZOP studies in COPSAS
4920, Handling nonconformities and gap
NORSOK S-001, Technical Safety (Edition 4, February 2008)
NORSOK S-002, Working Environment (Rev. 4, August 2004)
1.6.2 Informative References

Procedure 4061, Metocean and Geophysical criteria for Greater Ekofisk area
REVISED!
1.7 Handling of critical business information

N/A

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2 Additional requirements to NORSOK P-002 Process System

Design
2.1 NORSOK P-002 3.2 Abbreviations
In the abbreviation section 3.2 LO and LC. CoPSAS use car sealing for this purpose. Car Sealed Closed
(CSC) and Car Sealed Open (CSO). See chapter "6.2 Car sealing of valves" on page 25.
2.2 NORSOK P-002 7.4 - Sizing of gas/liquid Two- or Multi-Phase lines

For duplex steel piping continuous operation up to 60 m/s is allowable on flow lines.
2.3 NORSOK P-002 7.5.3 - Pressure safety valve lines

This chapter is applicable for both BDVs and PSVs.
Sizing/requirements for downstream lines
In general, the lines downstream the PSVs and blowdown orifice/valve shall be sized for a maximum velocity
of 0.7 Mach. However, for existing installations a higher velocity may be accepted. The following conditions
shall be checked:
• Acoustic fatigue calculations

The calculations shall be based on minimum back pressure, i.e. normal flare operating pressure. This
gives the highest noise contribution from the blowdown orifice/valve and PSVs.
• Back pressure sensitivity
If a flare line is operated at 1 Mach or close to 1 Mach small fluctuations in flow rates affect the back
pressure. Back pressure sensitivity calculations shall therefore be performed.
Low temperature calculations for the piping downstream the blowdown orifice shall be based on normal flare
operating pressure. This is typically applicable for leaking BDV.
For Pilot operated, modulating PSV valves, the up-stream and down-stream pipe to be designed for required
capacity and not rated capacity of the PSV.
2.4 NORSOK P-002 10 - Insulation and Heat Tracing

REVISED!
Code description for insulation classes as defined in ConocoPhillips Engineering Numbering System,
COPENS, TCD. 2169 shall be used.
2.5 NORSOK P-002 7.4 Atmospheric tanks

The above-mentioned paragraph in the NORSOK P- 002 standard has the following requirement: “The design
of the vent and purge shall be according to ISO 28300”.
For CoPSAS purge rates to prevent ingress of oxygen in atmospheric vent stacks or vent pipes from tanks
shall be designed according to ISO 23251 chapter 7.3.3.3.3.
2.6 NORSOK P-002 15.3 Regeneration unit and storage

The use of "Cold Finger" technology is not suitable when glycol dryness in excess of 99.3 wt% is needed.
Gas stripping shall be included for all regeneration packages where glycol dryness in excess of 99.0% is
required.
Dedicated storage for glycol is not required. Transport pods will be supplied for temporary storage during
shutdown and maintenance periods as necessary.
2.7 NORSOK P-002 21 Flare and vent (system 43)

Nitrogen used for purging shall be subtracted from the flare measurements to avoid paying CO2 tax on inert

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purge gas.
2.8 NORSOK P-002 6.4.2 - Relief devices

The above mentioned paragraph in the NORSOK P-002 standard has the following requirement:
Design of pilot operated relief valves used in dirty service (typically well-stream and hydrate forming fluids)
shall include compensatory measures due to the risk of clogging impulse lines and/or the pilot.
On fields operated by COPNO in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea, any relief valve weighing more than
25 kg should be operated by a pilot even in so-called dirty service, such as for instance wellstream. In such
cases the relief valve shall be equipped with a non-flowing pilot. “Remote pick up” and “inlet auxiliary filter” for
the pilot may also be considered in dirty service as suitable compensatory measures.
REVISED!
2.9 NORSOK P-002 22.1 Oily Water Treatment – General

The Company aspirational target for measured concentration of dispersed oil in water is 10 mg/l. A risk-based
environmental cost-benefit analysis of achieving 10 mg/l shall be carried out, using EIF or similar tools.
The feasibility of installing an on-line system for removal of scale and wax shall be evaluated.

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3 Isolation Requirements
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the general isolation philosophy to such extent that the following is
demonstrated:
• Maintenance can be done safely.

• Maintenance can be done with a minimal disruption of the oil and gas processing capacity.
• Tie-in operations can be done safely.
Where a complete train of equipment is to be shut in for maintenance, the isolation philosophy shall be
applied to the total train envelope, not the individual items. Individual equipment items requiring frequent
maintenance may justify additional isolation, to avoid depressurising large volumes.
Maintenance with minimum disturbance is a trade-off between CAPEX and OPEX. This shall be taken into
consideration, especially for minimum-facilities platforms, where a shutdown may be less costly than
additional isolation valves.
Sketches are included in "Appendix A - Sketches" on page 31 to define standardized valve arrangements.
3.1 General Isolation Requirements

REVISED!
To perform maintenance on systems in a safe manner, isolation of equipment or a system is required. There
are two isolation levels:
• Positive isolation, i.e. physical separation by spectacle blind, spade or blind flange/blind hub. The
positive isolation normally requires a proved isolation for a short duration to install the physical barrier.
• Proved isolation by means of valve(s) and bleed(s).
Requirements for installation of positive or proved isolation are described in the sections below. The
requirements depend on the
• operating pressure,
• fluid “hydrocarbon” or “non-hydrocarbon” system
• application
The following systems are classified as “hydrocarbon systems”, based on interpretation of ISO 10418
• System 0xx - Wellheads and flow lines

• System 1xx - Oil/NGL process
• System 2xx - Gas process
• System 4xx - Oil and gas export
• System 510 - Flare, vent and blowdown
• System 540 - Glycol circulation and regeneration
• System 590 - Closed drains
The following systems are not considered to fall under the ISO 10418 definition of “hydrocarbons systems”,
but shall still be treated as such for isolation requirements.
• System 530 - Chemical injection (including pressure equalization)

• System 920 - Mud handling (if receiving process fluids such as stimulation fluids, produced water and
oil or for connection to wellhead)
Other systems are classified “non-hydrocarbon systems”. Reference is made to TCD 2169, ConocoPhillips
Engineering Numbering System (COPENS) for further system descriptions.
Where “non-hydrocarbon systems” are connected to a “hydrocarbon system”, protection of the “non-
hydrocarbon system” should be given special consideration due to risk of backflow of hydrocarbons.
3.1.1 Design requirements for positive isolation

Positive isolation is required for maintenance of all mechanical equipment in “hydrocarbon systems” which
can be entered.

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Some “non-hydrocarbon systems” in lower pressure classes need special consideration, e.g. heating medium
and steam.
Positive isolation is achieved by one of the following arrangements:
1. Remove a spool piece and insert a blind flange

2. Insert a spade
3. Rotate a spectacle blind
Generally, spectacle blinds or spades shall be used for positive isolation. In order to set the positive isolation,
the required proved isolation shall be in place. This is further detailed in Section "3.1.3 Single vs. double
isolation" on page 12.
Removable spool pieces and installation of blind flanges shall be used when the piping connected has to be
removed in order to perform maintenance. This type of isolation is normally used for pumps, compressors and
heat exchangers.
The location of spades, spectacle blinds and removable spool pieces shall be shown on the P&IDs. Positive
isolation can not be achieved purely by valve isolation.
Blind flanges, hubs etc. which are installed to achieve positive isolation shall have a safety bleed plug.
3.1.2 Design requirements for proved isolation

REVISED!
Single isolation (single block and bleed “SB&B” arrangement) is an isolation provided by means of a single
block valve and a bleed valve. See Figure A.1 in "Appendix A - Sketches" on page 31.
Double isolation (double block and bleed “DB&B” arrangement) is an isolation provided by means of two block
valves and a bleed valve between the block valves. See Figure A.2 in "Appendix A - Sketches" on page 31.
In some services where double block and bleed arrangements are required, double expanding gate valves or
DIB valves may be used. Recommendations are given in the Valve Selection Manual in TCD 5060section 5.
Bleed valves in “hydrocarbon systems” (except for high pressure mud handling systems) shall be equipped
with a safety bleed device, ref. TCD 5060. Pressure monitoring of the isolation shall be done via the bleed
valve.
Actuated valves (XVs, ESDVs and HVs except fail open valves) may be used for isolation and shall be driven
to their fail-safe position and isolated from their power source. Manual isolation valves shall be of a type
capable of being locked shut, e.g. by the provision of lugs for padlocking and car sealing. Valves used for
control purposes shall not be used for maintenance isolation purposes.
3.1.3 Single vs. double isolation

Tables 2 and 3 give the requirements regarding installation of single vs. double isolation.
Table 2 gives the requirements for use of proved isolation only. This is typically used in the following
applications:
• Isolation of flow lines (production, gas lift, gas injection and water injection)
• Isolation of pig launchers and receivers
• Isolation towards pressure transmitters
• Isolation towards level glasses
• Isolation of equipment where positive isolation is not practical (typically filters, cyclones, coalescers,
small bore equipment such as hydraulic, chemical injection and sample systems)
Table 2 Requirements for proved isolation only. Used for work against a pressurised system when the
work area in periods will be left unattended.
Process System Pressure Isolation
Hydrocarbon system PAHH < 10 barg SB&B
PAHH ≥ 10 barg DB&B
Non-hydrocarbon system Design pressure class 150 and 300 SB&B
(up to approx 50 barg)
Design pressure class 600 and above DB&B

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(above approx 50 barg)
Table 3 gives the requirements for the proved isolation prior to installation of the positive isolation. This is an
operation of short duration and hence short exposure.
This is typically used in the following applications:
• Parallel process trains (pumps, compressors, separators, heat exchangers etc.)

• U/s PSVs (activity is of short duration when valve is removed and blind installed)
• U/s and d/s control valves (activity is of short duration when valve is removed and blind installed)
• Tie-in valves
Note: If work is planned on a system with isolations according to Table 3, without installing the positive
isolation, Table 2 shall be applied.
Table 3 Requirements for proved isolation prior to installation of positive isolation
Hydrocarbon system Design pressure class 150 and 300 SB&B (Note 1)
(up to approx 50 barg)
Design pressure class 600 and above DB&B
(above approx 50 barg)
Non-hydrocarbon system All pressure classes SB&B (Note 1)
Note 1: SB&B is sufficient since installation/removal of blind, spacer or spool piece is an operation of short
duration (not to be left unattended and to be performed within a work shift = 12 hours)
Isolation from the flare system requires SB&B, due to normal low operating pressure in the flare system.
3.2 Typical isolation guidelines
3.2.1 Vessels
For vessels where entering is required for maintenance, spectacle blinds or spades/spacers (positive
isolation) are required on all nozzles connected to live systems, including nozzles to PSV(s), vent header and
closed drain. Instrument nozzles and nozzles not permanently connected to live systems need not to be
isolated by spectacle blinds or spades/spacers. The isolation shall be located as close to the vessel nozzle as
practical.
3.2.2 Control valves

Where bypass over a control valve is required, the arrangement shall be according to Figure A.3 or A.4 in
"Appendix A - Sketches" on page 31. When double block and bleed valve arrangements are required (ref
Table 3 in Section "3.1.3 Single vs. double isolation" on page 12), double expanding gate valves or DIB
valves should be used. Whenever a control valve is removed, blind flanges shall be installed on the piping
system. If tight shut-off of bypass is required, an isolation valve shall be installed upstream the bypass
throttling valve.
3.2.3 Flare connections

PSV arrangements are shown in Figures A.5 and A.6 in "Appendix A - Sketches" on page 31.
Single isolation valve and bleed shall be provided downstream all PSVs. The outlet isolation valves from
PSVs shall always be CSO.
For a single PSV, it is not recommended to install an isolation valve upstream the PSV, unless there are
overriding maintenance requirements.
For multiple PSVs, requirements for isolation are given in Table 3 in Section "3.1.3 Single vs. double
isolation" on page 12. The inlet isolation valves shall be CSO for valves in service and CSC for spare valve.
Whenever a PSV is removed, blind flanges shall be installed on the piping system.

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Emergency blowdown shall be arranged with one blowdown valve, orifice and car sealed open block valve,
see Figure A.9 in "Appendix A - Sketches" on page 31 The block valve may also be installed upstream of the
orifice, provided the risk of changing the orifice size is small. The piping downstream of the blowdown valve
shall be in low temperature pipe class if required according to blowdown calculations. The low temperature
pipe class shall start minimum 1 meter upstream of the blowdown orifice. The orifice, downstream reducer (if
applicable) and block valve should be installed flange to flange to avoid an additional high pressure / low
temperature pipe spec for acoustic fatigue.
To enable maintenance of segments without an emergency blow down line, a manual depressurisation line
shall be considered, ref. Figure A.10 in "Appendix A - Sketches" on page 31. A manual depressurisation line
should also be included in parallel with the emergency blow down line where required to enable flare gas
recovery.
Rupture discs shall be implemented as in Figure A.12 in "Appendix A - Sketches" on page 31.
For a closed flare system, the bursting disc at the knock out drum gas outlet shall be able to be replaced or
maintained without process shut down. Single isolation valves are required upstream and downstream
bursting disc. Bleeds are required upstream the rupture disc.
For maintenance of the flare system, total process shut down and total depressurisation is required. For
maintenance of the knock out drum positive isolation by spectacle blinds are required.
3.2.4 Vent connections

For connection from atmospheric vessels to the vent system a single isolation valve should be considered
based on the frequency of maintenance and low pressure. All permanent connections to the vent system from
a pressure vessel shall be provided with a double block and bleed valve arrangement and an orifice, see
Figure A.8 in "Appendix A - Sketches" on page 31. The orifice shall be sized to protect downstream system in
case of accidental opening of block valve at operating pressure. The valve upstream the orifice shall be TSO.
There shall be a dedicated connection to the atmospheric vent system on each deck level in the process area
for connection of high-pressure hoses required for maintenance bleed operations. The hose connections are
used during maintenance operations that are infrequent, typically vent from a valve body during an isolation
job.
3.2.5 Closed drain connections

REVISED!
Permanent connections to closed drain installed to perform drainage prior to maintenance shall be in
accordance with Figure A.7 in "Appendix A - Sketches" on page 31.
All pressure drain connections shall be equipped with a spectacle blind to avoid accidental draining of
pressurised liquid/gas. The spectacle blind shall normally be in closed position. For compressor casing drains
and pig launchers/receivers in multiphase or liquid service, that require frequent pigging, the spectacle blind in
the closed drain connection shall be shown in open position on the P&IDs.
The same requirement is valid for oil metering packages. In such packages it is also acceptable to combine
several closed drains into a common header. The common header shall be provided with an open valve at
skid edge, in case of maintenance of drain valves inside the metering package.
The drain connection shall be fully rated up to the closed drain header. The pressure break is normally on the
header, provided the header line size is significantly larger (typically two line sizes) than the drain connection
line size.
For lines that are permanently open to the closed drain system, drainage from such systems shall not
negatively affect other users of the system (back flow). This is achieved by installing larger closed drain piping
or sizing dedicated line(s) to closed drain flash tank or similar.
3.2.6 Pressure instrument connections

All connections to pressure transmitters shall follow Table 2 in Section "3.1.3 Single vs. double isolation" on
page 12. The preferred solution is a modular valve with this functionality.
3.2.7 Level transmitters / gauges

Isolation towards the equipment on which level transmitters/gauges are installed, shall follow Table 2 in

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Section "3.1.3 Single vs. double isolation" on page 12.

Level instruments and level gauges should be permanently connected to the closed drain system. The
connection shall be provided with a double block and bleed arrangement, ref. Figure A.11 in "Appendix A -
Sketches" on page 31 Due to frequent use, the spectacle blind shall be shown in open position on the P&IDs.
For infrequent drainage, a flexible hose can be used, hence the connection shall then be a single piping block
valve and blind flange with integrated bleed.
There is no requirement for permanent connection to flare.
3.2.8 Pig launchers / receivers

During pig handling and maintenance of the pig launchers / receivers the pipeline is in operation, hence
double block and bleed arrangements are required (ref Table 2 in Section "3.1.3 Single vs. double isolation"
on page 12.).
Since pig launchers / receivers are not in continuous operation, a single PSV is sufficient where required.
3.2.9 Wellheads, flowlines and headers

All connections from wellheads to production and test headers shall be equipped with a double expanding
gate valve with bleed.
The master and wing valves ensure double block towards the wells for choke removal.
Double block and bleed arrangements shall be provided for isolation of production wells from the gas lift and
gas injection manifolds.
Double block and bleed arrangements shall be provided for isolation of the wells from the water injection
manifold.
3.2.10 Drain and bleed valves

Drain and bleed valves on piping and equipment shall have a double barrier with bleed towards the
atmosphere. The first barrier shall be a block valve and the second a plug or blind flange. This may be
achieved with;
• modular isolation and bleed valve and plug or blind flange

• isolation valve with blind flange with safety bleed plug
• isolation valve with safety bleed plug
This is also applicable for bleed valves on isolation arrangements for all pressure classes and services:
• Single block and bleed valve arrangement (SB&B)

• Double block and bleed valve arrangement (DB&B)
• Vent on valve body where this is required
3.3 Tie-in isolation Requirements

To avoid having a shutdown due to tie-in of new facilities, tie-ins are normally prepared during a regular
shutdown, and the final tie-in performed later. The normal method for this is by installation of an isolation
valve, bleed and positive isolation towards the new facility/system.
See "Appendix A - Sketches" on page 31, Figure A.13 for single isolation and Figure A.14 for double isolation.
When double isolation is required (ref Table 3 in Section "3.1.3 Single vs. double isolation" on page 12) one
should aim for one valve with double block and bleed functionality (double expanding gate valve or DIB valve).
The use of tie-in isolation valves shall as far as possible be part of the required process design avoiding
additional valves simply for tie-in purposes.
For flare, vent and closed drain systems, where valves are not necessary for normal operation, they shall be
avoided. After tie-in to these systems the valves shall be locked open.

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4 Flare & Vent Design

4.1 Introduction
Existing Flare, Vent and Blowdown documentation concerning existing installations should be used as basis
for further work and evaluations.
The purpose of the Flare, Vent and Blowdown Systems is to provide safe discharge and disposal of gases
and liquids resulting from:
• Short time spill-off flaring from the oil stabilisation systems or gas train. Long term production flaring is
not regarded as a design case. (BAT)
• Relief of excess pressure caused by process upset conditions, fire and thermal expansion
• Relief due to mal-operation of the wellhead isolation valves with 100% open choke
• Relief due to choke valve collapse (see Chapter "6.4 Guideline for choke collapse calculations" on
page 29)
• Blowdown either in response to an emergency situation or as part of a normal procedure prior to
maintenance.
• Planned blowdown of the subsea pipelines.
• Venting from equipment operating close to atmospheric pressure/ final venting prior to maintenance.
• Well start up and clean-up operations
4.2 Flare system design

The flare system may consist of a HP and a LP system or a combined system.
4.2.1 Flare design capacity

REVISED!
The design capacity of a flare system shall be analysed with respect to all relieving cases described in ISO
23251 chapter 4 and 5.
All cases considered and the applicable relief rates shall be documented, in addition to the controlling case.
These details shall be included in the Flare, Vent and Blowdown Report for the relevant platform and the
report linked to the PSV in SAP.
Additional requirements are:
• Failure of sequence in connection with sequential blowdown shall not lead to rupture of flare system,
ref NORSOK S-001 section 11.4.1.
• Simultaneous relief from more than one topside shall be analysed e.g. spill-off flaring and/or
depressurisation from other topsides cannot be disregarded.
4.2.2 Flare knock out drum

For new build, sizing shall be according to NORSOK P-002 section 21.2 and ISO 23251 section 7.3.2. For
modification projects liquid accumulation time may be challenged based on actual valve closing times.
To avoid overfilling the knock out drum with seawater/cooling or heating medium via rupture discs, the
following preventive shutdown actions should be included:
• The rupture discs should be equipped with burst detection that closes the valves on seawater/cooling/
heating medium inlet and outlet.
• The above-mentioned valves should be closed upon LAHH (ESD). In addition, trip seawater/cooling
medium/heating medium pumps if vital systems are not affected. If the pumps are not tripped, other
preventive actions shall be implemented.
If the lines from rupture discs are routed to the closed drain flash tank, need for the same preventive actions
shall be evaluated.
4.2.3 Test separator system- PSVs

Sizing case of PSVs for protecting the test separator/system is dependent on operating procedures, as more

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than one well can be on stream simultaneously. Other cases such as choke valve collapse and valve mal-
operation may become the design case.
4.2.4 Control valve failure

A control valve that fails in an open position gives a higher rate to downstream equipment than designed for.
Where the downstream equipment is rated for a lower pressure, its relief valve shall be sized for this higher
rate, or the fluid handling capacity shall be demonstrated to be sufficient.
For level control valves that fail in open position, high-pressure gas can pass to the downstream equipment.
This case is called gas blowby. The gas blowby case may be the governing one for the PSV on the
downstream equipment. Where significant hydrocarbon liquid/water volumes are present and the vessel may
overfill, the PSV is also sized for liquid blowby. To ensure conservative calculations that are valid throughout
platform operating time, all gas, hydrocarbon liquid and water blowby cases are calculated with blocked
outlets unless it is demonstrated not to happen. ISO 23251section 5.10.4 elaborate this in more detail and
shall be used to determine the relief rates.
Relief rate for control valve failure is designed based on the following conditions:
• PAHH is used as upstream pressure or settle-out pressure where applicable.

• Relief pressure (set pressure + 10%) of the downstream PSV is used as downstream pressure.
• In early project phases, the actual maximum Cv value is used to calculate the relief rate. When
resulting in large relief rates, credit for pressure drop in equipment and piping should be taken into
account when more accurate pipe routing and vendor information is available, typically in FEL3 and
detail design. Such credit shall be described in the system manual as input to future modifications.
Dynamic effects may also be taken into account.
• If a manual valve is installed in the bypass, the largest Cv of the bypass valve or installed control
valve is used. Manual isolation valve upstream the control valve and the manual bypass control valve
may need a type of interlock system or car sealing, to avoid simultaneous gas blowby through control
valve and manual bypass.
4.2.5 Flare headers

Caution should be taken during design when connecting flare headers into a more complex flare system with
more platforms inter-connected. A HAZOP focused on interconnecting flare systems, including previous
experience with larger flare systems should be performed. E.g. consequences of a major leak in the flare
system.
The flare headers shall slope minimum 1:100. This requirement shall be met throughout the lifetime of the
installation.
4.2.6 Flare recovery and Flare ignition

Flare gas recovery systems shall be considered for all new installations. Flare recovery systems are described
in ISO 23251 section 7.4.
Flare ignition by use of a reliable ballistic flare ignition system is commonly installed in combination with a
closed flare system. Both the flare recovery and the flare ignition systems are patented solutions: use of them
shall be handled in a technically and commercially correct manner. The patent number for the flare recovery
system is 177161 (“Anordning ved gjenvinning av overskuddsgass i et olje/gassbehandlingsanlegg”). For the
ignition system, two patents shall be evaluated: patent no. 312565 (“Fremgangsmåte og system til tenning av
brennbare fluider”) and patent no. 179762 (”Fremgangsmåte, anordning og tennorgan for antennelse av
brennbare gasser for eksempel fra en fakkel på et flammetårn”)
4.2.7 Fire PSV in Vapour Service

Vessels in vapour service cannot be protected against fire by use of a relief valve, as the vessel will normally
fail due to high temperature with or without the presence of a relief valve. Vessels in vapour service do not
need a relief valve, if fire is the sole reason for having a relief valve according to the design code. The vessel
shall be protected by blowdown and firefighting as required by the piping code.

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4.3 Blowdown
4.3.1 General
The blowdown system is the primary means to reduce escalation in case of fire. The blowdown time should be
reduced as much as possible to limit the duration of gas fires on the platforms and rapidly reduce the internal
pressure in hydrocarbon segments and thereby limit the need for passive fire protection.
For modifications of existing installations, the existing requirements with respect to blowdown time may be
valid if in accordance with safety requirements.
The blowdown valves shall fail open. If a common failure can cause opening of blowdown valves on more
than one installation/fire area, the design pressure of the flare system or any source shall not be exceeded
upon such failure. Blowdown valves supplied by common systems such as UPS, instrument air or hydraulics
may open simultaneously.
Simultaneous blowdown of two installations due to human error shall not lead to rupture of the flare system or
any of the sources i.e. the test pressure of the flare system or any of the sources shall not be exceeded.
If one or more installations with a common flare system have automatic blowdown upon confirmed fire (signal
from two fire detectors), it is of high importance that the flame detectors on the other installation(s) do not
detect stroke of lightning or the flame from the flare (directly or indirectly). This may lead to simultaneous
blowdown.
Later revisions of ISO 23251 (section 5.20.1) do not include requirements for blowdown time. According to the
referred Guideline for Protection of Pressurised Systems Exposed to Fire, it is indicated that a pressure
reduction to 7 barg within 8 minutes reduces the need for passive fire protection.
The duration of fires and the heat fluxes from pool and jet fires are defined in the DAL specification. The
defined duration of jet fire in the DAL specification has to reflect the obtainable blowdown time. Until the heat
fluxes are defined, the global heat flux defined in NORSOK S-001 section 4.7 could be used for preliminary
calculations.
The blowdown line from liquid filled blowdown segments shall be taken from a highpoint in the segment.
Emergency blowdown valves are required for all enclosed volumes which contain more than 1000 kg of oil or
300 kg of gas/condensate. In addition to shutdown valves, volumes may be trapped by e.g. control valves,
check valves and in some cases manual valves. These valves should be located such that additional
blowdown valves are not required. Trapped volumes shall be minimised. For modifications on existing
installations, the original design requirements regarding hydrocarbon content in enclosed volumes are valid.
The emergency blowdown rates shall be based upon a global heat flux defined in the DAL specification and
on the initial conditions given in chapter "4.3.2 Calculations of blowdown rates" on page 18. For study
purposes where the heat flux is unknown a value of 100 kW/m2 may be used.
4.3.2 Calculations of blowdown rates

When sizing the individual blowdown rates the following initial conditions should be used:
• Normal liquid level in vessels and piping.

• Normal operating temperature.
• Maximum operational pressure (PAHH).
• Maximum settle out pressure where applicable. This is typically valid for compressors and piping with
choke valves.
If necessary pressure trip settings (PAHH) maybe optimized to minimize sections requiring blowdown.
4.3.3 Low temperature calculations

The low temperature calculations shall be performed in accordance to requirements given in NORSOK P-002
section 4.3.3. Maximum pressure prior to depressurization is PAHH.
In addition, dead legs at stagnant conditions shall be analyzed. These may be cooled to minimum ambient
temperature at operating pressure and thereby result in lower temperature during blowdown. The initial flow
rate from these conditions also gives a higher flow rate than the calculated emergency blowdown rate. This
effect shall be accounted for. Such evaluations should typically be performed for (but not limited to) high

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pressure gas systems such as gas lift and gas injection.

Special attention should be paid to start-up operation following a blowdown, where warm gas is not available
to heat up the process segments during pressurization.
The minimum design temperature calculations shall be based upon initial temperature equal to the minimum
ambient temperature.
4.3.4 Total blowdown rate

REVISED!
The individual blowdown orifices/valves shall be sized for PAHH and fire. Adding all the PAHH blowdown
rates together would give an unreasonably high flare load. A scenario where all segments are operated at
PAHH is not likely. In order to achieve a more realistic total flare rate, the following approach should be used.
• The flow rate from the segment with the highest peak rate shall be based on PAHH pressure and the
flow rate from the other segments shall be based on normal operating pressure. It is important to
emphasize the blowdown orifice/valve shall be sized for PAHH. It is only the initial pressure that shall
be reduced.
4.4 Flare height
4.4.1 Radiation constraints

REVISED!
The basis for the radiation constraints is given in ISO 23251, sect. 6.4.2.3, table 9 - Recommended design
thermal radiation for personnel. The acceptable exposure time for personnel has become more stringent
compared to previous revisions.
In case a cold vent is the preferred solution, the termination shall be verified with respect to acceptable LEL
(lower explosion limit) and heat radiation in case of unintended ignition, ref NORSOK S-001 section 11.4.3.
According to the referred table above, the maximum radiant heat intensity is 1.58 kW/m2 where personnel with
appropriate clothing may be continuously exposed. The relevant solar radiation for the North Sea is 0.5 kW/m 2
and the maximum heat radiation from the flare shall be decreased correspondingly. This criterion shall be
used for flaring scenarios (planned or un-planned) when personnel are intended to proceed performing their
duties.
For wind speeds above 15 m/s the effect of solar radiation is disregarded. This velocity is set so high to cater
for cases where people may be leeward of the wind (e.g. performing activities in leeward during continuous
flaring) and credit for cooling effect not be accounted for.
4.4.2 Wind loads

REVISED!
Radiation levels increase at higher wind-speed towards the facility, due to the effect of flame deflection. A
maximum wind speed of 20 m/s at flare tip shall be used based on the following arguments.
• With high wind speeds, the cooling effect on human skin is significant and people can therefore
tolerate higher heat radiation. This more than compensates for increased radiation due to the wind
deflection of the flare plume at wind speeds in excess of 20 m/s. This effect is also valid for flare
radiation on structures.
• With high wind velocities (hurricane equates to 32.6 m/s and small storm to 20.8 m/s according to the
Beaufort scale) the air contains a seawater mist which absorbs the heat of radiation well. The air
humidity is also much higher than the values used in the calculations as the high wind velocity results
in good mixing of seawater and air. According to procedure 4061 chapter 10, the minimum relative
humidity is 28% and this value shall be used in the calculations.
• Upon large flaring, the acceptable exposure time is limited. It is assumed that personnel have been
instructed to leave exposed areas and not seek leeward of the wind in such cases.
4.4.3 Temperature loads

In addition to radiation levels, the temperature increase due to flaring shall be analysed to ensure that the

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maximum design temperature of exposed surfaces is not exceeded.

The surface temperature of the flare structural elements and piping is input to material selection of the upper
part of the flare stack.
4.5 Noise
REVISED!
The maximum allowable noise level during emergency flaring is addressed in NORSOK S-002 section 4.3.2
and 5.5.2 and shall be followed.
Special attention shall be given to noise generated by lines across bridges as the bridges are evacuation
routes.
Additionally, all control valves in lines routed to the flare systems should have low-noise trims and blowdown
orifice plates should be multi-hole types unless process conditions and/or physical factors do not allow this.
4.6 Acoustic fatigue

The flare systems should be designed to avoid the risk of rupture due to acoustic fatigue by use of a thick
walled piping (dedicated piping class). This piping class is not required for the header downstream the flare
knock out drum.
4.7 Atmospheric vent system

The Atmospheric Vent System shall collect and dispose blanketing gases and small amounts of hydrocarbons
during maintenance work.
The Atmospheric Vent header shall have a low point, which shall be continuously drained, preferably to the
reclaimed oil sump via the reclaimed oil sump vent line.
The Atmospheric Vent System shall be continuously purged with inert gas to prevent air ingress and formation
of explosive gas mixtures. Installation of flame arrestors shall be approved by COPSAS. An O2 analyser is
required when flame arrestor is not installed. Bird screen is required at termination point.
The termination point of the atmospheric vent header shall be verified with respect to acceptable gas
dispersion and heat radiation in case of unintended ignition.
4.8 BAT/Natural Environment Issues

Gases containing hydrocarbon shall be routed to the flare system and recovered or burned unless back
pressure is too high e.g. atmospheric tanks and final venting.
It is BAT to stop inflow prior to opening of the blowdown valves as this reduces the total amount of gas sent to
flare. A time delay sufficient to close the relevant sectionalisation valves should be implemented in design.
Spurious blowdowns should be prevented. This should be addressed when selecting flame detectors and
location of these.
Nitrogen is used for continuous purging of the flare tips and flare headers downstream the quick opening
valves in a closed flare system. Fuel gas back-up should not be installed. However, for an open flare system,
fuel gas back-up for the nitrogen purge is acceptable.
A closed flare system reduces the emissions to the atmosphere and may enable recovery of gas from e.g. the
following sources/activities:
• flash gas from the produced water system, glycol regeneration and closed drain flash tank
• primary compressor seals
• valve leakages
• depressurisation prior to maintenance.
• testing of barriers e.g. down hole safety valves
• annulus bleeds
• depressurisation after pigging operations

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5 Safety Analysis
Safety Analysis shall be performed according to ISO 10418, including requirements in TCD 6462 for systems
falling under the category "recovery of hydrocarbon resources". All protection devices for these systems shall
be in the process shutdown system (PSD) system.
This applies to the following systems:
• System 0xx Wellheads and flowlines

• System 1xx Oil/NGL process
• System 2xx Gas process
• System 4xx Oil and gas export
• System 510 Flare, vent and blowdown
• System 540 Glycol circulation and regeneration
• System 590 Closed drains
The following systems are not considered to fall under the ISO 10418 definition of "recovery of hydrocarbon
resources", but each one shall be evaluated according to ISO 10418 with regards to the potential for
undesirable incidents:
• System 370 Injection water export/import risers, flowlines and pipelines (towards wellhead injection
point)
• System 500 Open drain (hazardous)
• System 530 Chemical injection (including pressure equalization)
• System 560 Hot Oil
• System 650 Diesel fuel
• System 690 Jet fuel
• System 920 Mud handling (if receiving processing fluids such as stimulation fluids, produced water or
oil, or for connections to wellhead)
All protection devices for these systems shall be in the PSD system.
For systems other than those mentioned above no documented safety analysis is required. It is however
recommended to use the protection principles of ISO 10418 to protect against undesirable events. All
protection for such systems shall be in the process control system (PCS).
For system numbers and description refer to Company numbering system, Technical Control Document 2169
"ConocoPhillips Engineering Numbering System (COPENS)".
5.1 General
5.1.1 Pressure transmitters for leakage protection

REVISED!
Pressure transmitter low-low PALL(PSL in ISO 10418) for leakage detection shall be omitted when a gas
detection system detects a leak faster, ref. ISO 10418 section B.2.3.3.
This requires adequate gas detection as outlined in ISO 10418 and NORSOK S-001 “Technical Safety”.
The general philosophy is not to install PALL trip functions for leakage detection. PALLs have proven to be a
very poor device for leak protection. They need to be bypassed during start-up. This is often included in the
control system, but if not, it needs to be done manually. This results in reduced respect for safety devices as
they need to be bypassed during start up or when systems are not running. The leakage rates need to be
substantial to trigger the PALL function. The leakage also needs to be very close to the detection device to
work.
In addition the facilities shall be equipped with adequate containment systems and drain to the open drain
systems that will handle such spills in any case.
The increased use of high alloy materials also reduces the risk of catastrophic pipe failure. Leaks will typically
be pin-hole corrosion or leakage in flange gaskets or similar; all being far too small to be detected by the
PALL.
PALL function solely for leakage detection shall not be installed:

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• For gaseous media with adequate gas detection system

• For all liquid service
The only location to retain the PALL trip function for leak detection is for subsea pipelines on systems as
defined in section "5 Safety Analysis" on page 21.
5.1.2 Pumps
REVISED!
Ref. ISO-10418 safety analysis table B.17 “Safety analysis checklist (SAC) - Pumps” and section B.9.2.2.1.
Requirement for PSH (high pressure)
The requirement for PSH (PAHH) if the pump discharge pressure exceeds 70% of the maximum allowable
working pressure of the discharge piping, may be omitted providing the following conditions are confirmed:
Pump incapable of generating head greater than the maximum allowable working pressure of discharge
piping at the following conditions:
• Maximum suction pressure (upstream component PSV pressure, max. liquid level)
• Maximum fluid density for the system
• Pump at maximum head on the pump curve
Any change in impeller size shall be subject to a management of change process to verify that this is
acceptable. During design the selected impeller size only shall be considered.
Requirement for PSL (low pressure)
Not required unless pump feeds into an export pipeline.
Requirement for FSL (low flow)
Only necessary for high duty/expensive pumps which may be damaged by low flow. For other pumps other
strategies should be used to detect low flow, for example:
• Verify reduction in level of upstream tank after a predetermined time step

• Minimum flow valves (for example combined minimum flow and check valve)
• Upstream PSL to detect blocked inlet
• For small inexpensive and non-critical pumps, allow failure of pump
High duty/expensive pumps fitted with permanent strainers shall have differential pressure monitoring with
high alarm across the strainer.
It is difficult to prepare an exact interpretation of “high duty/expensive pumps” and “inexpensive and non-
critical pumps”. Common sense shall be applied.
5.2 System 300 Water injection systems general

The water injection system is normally a high flow system, with high pressure, where it would be natural to
perform a SAT analysis, even though it is not considered a production system.
5.3 System 500 Open drain

The purpose of SAT analysis of the hazardous drain system is to ensure normal protection of tanks and
pumps. Due to the nature of open drains, i.e. no pressure and liquids with very limited flash potential, the
focus shall be on process safety and not leak detection. Typical fire area segregation is by means of liquid
seals and dipped inlet pipes to tanks to prevent backflow to other systems.
Table 4 Safety analysis, Hazardous open drain tanks:
SAC ref. Device SAFE Checklist
No.
Vent Vent installed to safe emission site
LSH Not normally required*), however high and low alarms should be installed on level
control transmitter
*) may be required if liquid is transferred from other sources

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SAC ref. Device SAFE Checklist

No.
Overflow Liquid overflow installed
LSL LSL installed to stop drain pumps and heater (if installed)
TSH (if heater is TSH installed on heater
installed) High and Low temperature alarm on heat controller
Table 5 Safety analysis, Hazardous open drain pumps:

SAC ref. Device Checklist
No. SAFE
PSH Not required if pumps discharges to an atmospheric system.
PSL Not required
PSV 1) PSV installed
2) Pump incapable of generating head greater than the maximum allowable working pressure of
discharge piping.
FSV Check valve installed
TSH Normally not required due to low power pumps in on/off mode transferring liquids to another
atmospheric vessel/system.
FSL Not required. Use level in tank during pump out as detector. Alarm to be raised if level does not
change after a predetermined interval.
5.4 System 530 Chemical Injection

Chemical injection systems may consist of many different types of system. Typical examples are:
• Chemical low rate dosage to process streams (scale inhibitor, corrosion inhibitor, biocide, emulsion
breaker, demulsifier, flocculant, drag reducer etc.)
• Batch treatment with high dosage (scale inhibitor, corrosion inhibitor etc.)
• Pressure equalization system (glycol/water based system used to pressurize wellhead and general
testing)
• Methanol Injection packages
The following recommendations are given for these systems:
• High rate injection systems and methanol injection. Use SAT analysis and protection according to ISO
10418.
• Low rate systems, no SAT analysis is required. Follow the principles of ISO 10418. Focus should be
on back pressure, stop pumps when d/s system is shut down and tagged PSV for pumps.
• For low rate poisonous chemicals, the extent of SAT analysis to be determined on a case by case
basis.
• Pressure equalization system. No need for SAT analysis. The system should be protected according
to the principles of ISO 10418. Pumps to stop on low level (PSD) and overpressure protection with
two barriers (normally PSV and PSD pressure transmitter).
5.5 System 560 Hot Oil

Analyzed according to ISO 10418 as a hydrocarbon system.
5.6 System 650 Diesel

REVISED!
The diesel system usually has challenges towards filling operations (overflow), and shall be equipped with
valves to shut off inflow in accordance with ISO 28300. Overflow lines shall also be transferred to a
secondary holding system (raw diesel storage, non-hazardous/hazardous open drain tanks or similar) to add
an extra barrier towards overflow to sea, except where drain capacity is so small that overflow to sea would
occur in any case.
Lines containing diesel shall to the extent possible be fully welded in required areas to reduce number of
leakage points.

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Table 6 Safety analysis, Diesel storage tank:

SAC ref. No. Device SAFE Checklist
Vent Vent installed to safe emission site (ISO 28300 for sizing)
LSH LSH installed
Overflow Liquid overflow installed
LSL LSL installed
Regarding the diesel transfer pumps, use SAT table in ISO 10418 (Table B.17). PSL downstream pump, not
required. FSL not required. Minimum flow valve required for continuous operated pumps.
5.7 System 690 Jet Fuel

The jet fuel system is similar to the diesel system, but with lower flash point of the fluid. Suggest using the
same approach as for the diesel system.
If the system is manually operated and supervised, the need for instrumentation according to ISO 10418 is not
relevant.
5.8 System 920 Mud Handling

If this is a system for drilling fluids only, no documented safety analysis is required, and the protection devices
should be in the PCS system.
If connected to a hydrocarbon system, safety analysis according to ISO 10418 is required. This could, as an
example, be where slurry tanks receive fluids from the processing facilities (sand/slurry jetting) for reinjection.
The protection should then be in the PSD system.

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6 Other requirements
6.1 Bypass around segregation valves (ESDV and XV)
Bypass around ESD valves shall fulfil the specifications applicable for the ESD valve itself including
acceptance criteria with respect to internal leakage (Ref TCD 6307 2.10.4.2). Bypass on pipeline ESD valves
shall be avoided. For bypass around XV valves, a manual, CSC valve should be used, unless there is a
compelling operational reason to use a remotely operated valve.
6.2 Car sealing of valves

REVISED!
A manual valve that may introduce a safety hazard if left in the wrong position shall be car sealed in its correct
position. Operation of the manual valve shall not be possible without breaking the car seal.
All valves with car seal shall be marked as either CSC or CSO respectively on the P&ID. All valves with car
seal shall also be tagged accordingly in SAP with the correct classification under the functional location of the
valve, to ensure that the PM programs for checking of car seals are automatically updated.
When the car seal status of a valve is changed or a valve that shall be car sealed is added/removed, both the
P&ID and SAP shall be updated accordingly.
Car sealing is not implemented for isolation valves on transmitters, except those with a shutdown function.
The instrument discipline check the position of such valves as part of the normal maintenance program for the
transmitters. Piping valves for pressure transmitters with a shutdown function shall be CSO, tagged and
shown on the relevant P&ID.
6.2.1 Valves to be CSO

REVISED!
• Isolation valves for all input signals to critical systems such as HIPPS/PPS and fire water.
• Piping valves that secure 2 independent protection systems for a process segment. For example any
piping valves between the process segments if the secondary pressure protection function of one
segment (PSV etc.) is located in the downstream segment.
• Piping valves that in open position prevent overpressurization of piping, process segments and other
equipment. Examples are:
a. Piping valves in the flare, vent and blowdown systems

b. Isolation valves downstream PSVs and PSEs
c. Isolation valves upstream PSVs and PSEs that are in service
d. Pneumatic/hydraulic instrument valves that may prevent fail to safe operation of safety critical valves
such as ESDVs, PMVs, BDVs, and XVs
• Piping valves that during normal operations secure the supply of blanket gas/purge gas.
• All valves that if closed might negatively affect the firefighting systems. Typical examples are:
a. Piping valves in the fire water ringmain.

b. Piping valves between the ringmain and automatic firefighting systems.
c. Piping valves between fire pumps and ringmain.
d. Piping valves between ringmain and the structure water filling system.
e. Piping valves in distribution lines for foam.
f. Isolation switches between start engine and start battery for the fire pumps.
g. Piping valves for the diesel supply to the fire pumps (i.e from day tank to fire pumps).
h. Piping valves between skid and supply network for water and Inergen systems.
• Piping valves in the flare, vent & blowdown systems.

• Piping valves that secure diesel to the emergency generators (i.e from day tank to generator).
• Piping valves in supply lines to emergency showers and eye washing stations. PS. Car seal check for
these valves that are not on the P&ID and/or have a tag i SAP shall be included in the equipment’s own
PM-program.
• Piping valves in the instrument air system that are necessary for supply of air for personal breathing
apparatus. These valves shall also have a tag plate stating that they are part of the breathing air system.

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6.2.2 Valves to be CSC
• Isolation valves upstream PSVs/PSEs that are normally out of service/as back-up. NB. P&ID and SAP-
data shall not be changed when the active PSV is put as passive and the ”backup-PSV” is put in service
as part of normal PSV maintenance.
• Pneumatic/hydraulic instrument valves that can prevent fail to safe position of safety critical valves such
as ESDVs, PMVs, BDVs, and XVs.
• Piping valves on drain lines from segments/tanks with significant volumes/pressures that normally would
be blinded, but because of maintenance needs the blind is open (ex. Tanks/pig receivers/…).
• Minimum one of the isolation valves on bypass lines for ESDVs.
• Piping valves that prevent oxygen from entering any hydrocarbon systems.
• Valves in the test lines for the firefighting systems.
6.3 Recommended system for annulus bleed on wellheads

The annulus bleed design for a well depends on several factors.
• Gas lift vs naturally flowing wells

• Manned platform vs unmanned platforms
• Ability of entering the platform
• Subsea X-mas trees vs dry X-mas trees

• Well design
• How robust is the well?

• What is the risk of leaks?
The final solution shall be subject to a multi discipline review between Well operation, Process and Safety
Engineering.
Annulus bleed operations have previously been done by use of flexible hoses. For gas lifted wells hose
connections shall be minimised for annulus A. The A annuli often contain the largest gas volumes on a
platform and bleed operations are regularly required for barrier testing. Fixed piping and the possibility for
automatic shut in of annulus A in case of an incident shall be included in the design. A typical solution for
annulus A bleed is described below. The system is intended installed on new facilities to avoid use of hoses
for this kind of operations. Other solutions having the same functionality may be used.

27 36

28 36
System description
The system uses the gas lift flow line as a bidirectional line for gas lifting and for depressurizing the A annulus.
This unidirectional flow is possible due to the Hydraulic Annulus Surface safety Check Valve (HASCV). A
crossover line is added to an annulus bleed manifold located at the edge of the wellhead area, similar to the
gas lift manifold. This manifold is connected to the production and to flare system. The high pressure gas is
routed to the production system to recover as much gas as possible. The final depressurization is routed to
the flare pressure via the closed drain flash tank or similar.
Well service may also require the option of connection a service pumps to the system for filling of the annulus
with seawater prior to acid stimulation operations.
The HASCV shall be minimum 2.5” which requires a wellhead A annulus flange of 2-9/16” for this purpose.
This is necessary to avoid the valve being the restriction during the depressurization/pressurization.
The valve in blue on the sketch is for connection of a leak metering skid (LMS). This allows gas lift valve
testing without fully depressurizing annulus A. This is a recommended option depending on platform concept.
The annulus A pressure monitoring is done via a pressure transmitter (VRPT) located in the spare A annulus
nozzle. This VRPT pressure transmitter does not require a valve, as the transmitter is completely sealed from
the outside (full pressure rating).
A VR (valve removal) tool is required to remove the HASCV and the VRPT. Space shall be allowed for this in
the wellhead area.
Other considerations
For annulus B and annulus A for wells without gas lift, bleed via hoses may be an acceptable solution. This is
depending on the platform concept and the well design.
If hoses are use the following items shall be considered.
• Distance between annulus connection and flare/closed drain connection shall be within one hose
length. Interconnection of hoses shall be avoided.
• There shall be a double block and bleed arrangement both for the annulus and the flare/closed drain
connection.
• Choking of pressure shall be performed downstream the hose.
The operating philosophy shall also a part of the evaluation. An unmanned platform with a possible extensive
mobilization time might trigger the need for a remotely operated bleed system.
Independent of the bleed solution the annulus pressure and temperature shall be monitored.

29 36
6.4 Guideline for choke collapse calculations

Causes for choke collapse and measures to reduce the consequences of a collapse are described in API 521
4.4.8.6. ConocoPhillips is aiming for collapse free chokes. This is typically achieveable d for chalk reservoir,
but due to material selection it is difficult to achieve for sandstone reservoirs. Use of collapse free chokes
shall be agreed with ConocoPhillips.
Choke collapse and mal-operation of chokes are potentially severe events which require dynamic simulations
to determine the effect and pressure build up. Key items for the simulations are described below:
• Calculation of shut-in pressure
• The shut-in pressure shall be calculated based on reservoir pressure, flowing wellhead pressure,
GOR, water cut, well geometry and geothermal gradient, well heat transfer and a typical steady
• Important to select realistic values. For instance, a high GOR and high reservoir pressure is not
necessarily a realistic combination.
• A multiphase simulator is required for the shut –in calculations:
• Establish a steady state production rate

• Shut-in the well from steady state conditions to calculate the shut-in pressure.
• Model the required topside piping including buffer volumes in vessels and piping and PSVs
• Start the choke collapse/mal-operation simulations by opening the choke valve or wing valve.
Apply Cv for an intact choke or a collapsed choke depending on the case. Assume cage to be completely
damaged and removed for the collapsed choke. Choke vendor to specify correct Cv of failed valve.
Reaction forces in piping as a result of choke failure are high. Loads to be treated the same way as for blast
loads, i.e. piping supports may be damaged, but piping should not rupture. This is based on the fact that
operations need to perform a complete verification of a flow line subject to choke collapse- and replace/or
-repair the damaged supports and piping.
Normally the primary barrier shall be sufficiently fast to prevent the secondary protection to open (normally
PSV); this to achieve the goal of having two independent levels of protection. In many cases of choke collapse
this is a challenge as the pressure build up is very rapid, depending on the initial pressure upstream the choke
prior to failure. If the primary barrier operates too fast, it may result in damage to this barrier during normal
operation of the plant. In such cases other methods need to be applied to approve the barrier towards
overpressure. Such solutions could be:
• Increase design pressure of downstream system

• Allow the downstream system to be pressurized to the hydrostatic test pressure
• Use a risk-based approach to determine if the primary and secondary barriers together meet the
acceptance criteria for avoiding rupture of the downstream system
• Have a procedure to start up wells known to have a high shut-in pressure to the production system
instead of the test system
If collapse free chokes cannot be applied the following design procedure shall be used:
For a collapsed choke the cage will be damaged, but severe damage to the plug is not likely. The pressure
drop is taken across the cage, while the plug is exposed to flow only at the nose. If a choke collapses, the
plug may restrict the flow, depending on its position. It is possible to take advantage of this effect by
implementing a suitable start-up procedure for the wells. If the shut-in pressure/flowing wellhead pressure is
high, the choke shall be opened slowly. This secures a low Cv in the event of choke collapse since the plug is
in almost closed position. When the flowing wellhead pressure depletes the choke may gradually be opened.
The entire opening sequence shall be evaluated since the collapse may occur for any plug position. By
applying this procedure it is likely that mal-operation of the Wing valve with a fully open choke will be the
dimensioning case. Introduction of opening procedures shall be agreed with ConocoPhillips.
Based on experience from previous projects the following items are important for the collapse calculations:
• Liquid hold-up downstream the choke valve.

30 36
• Pipe geometry and production prior to shut-in influence the liquid hold-up, which influences the
available buffer volume.
• Choke collapse causes a rapid pressure build-up down-stream the choke valve. In a simulation the
pressure increase pushes the gas from the well into the liquid phase and hence reduces the pressure
build-up. In reality the transient behaviour of choke collapse does not allow for thermodynamic
equilibrium between gas and liquid.
• Choke collapse cases
• Choke collapse shall be checked for both start-up of the first well and start-up of the last well.
• It is possible to calculate the shut-in pressure without a multiphase simulator if no liquid mirror is expected
for shut-in conditions, typically if the fluid is in the dense phase region.

31 36
Appendix A - Sketches
Legend:

32 36
Figure A.1 Single block and bleed arrangement for process systems
Figure A.2 Double block and bleed arrangement for process systems.
Figure A.3 Isolation of control valve with bypass, pressure class 300 and below for “hydrocarbon systems” or
for all “non-hydrocarbon systems”.
Figure A.4 Isolation of control valve with bypass, pressure class 600 and above for “hydrocarbon systems”.

33 36
Figure A.5 Isolation of single PSV.
Figure A.6 Isolation of multiple PSVs, pressure class 300 and below for “hydrocarbon systems” or all “non-
hydrocarbon systems”.
Note: Double block and bleed arrangement required upstream PSVs if pressure class 600 and above for
“hydrocarbon systems”.
Figure A.7: Connection to closed drain.

34 36
Figure A.8 Connection to atmospheric vent from a pressurised system.
Figure A.9 Emergency blow down arrangement.
Figure A.10 Manual depressurisation arrangement.

35 36
Figure A.11 Level transmitter / level gauge connection to closed drain.
Figure A.12 Rupture disc arrangement
Figure A.13 Tie-in isolation, pressure class 300 and below for “hydrocarbon systems” and all “non-
hydrocarbon systems”. Bleed valve on valve body required for large valves only.

36 36
Figure A.14 Tie-in isolation, pressure class 600 and above for “hydrocarbon systems”. Bleed valve on valve
body required.

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Document no: 4911E

NORSOK Standard Reference:

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4911E / 10 3 Manager-Facilities-Engineering 04.10.2018

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Additional requirements to NORSOK Standard ............................................................................................... 5

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4.4.1 Radiation constraints .................................................................................................................... 19

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Additional requirements to NORSOK Standard

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1.3 Target group and responsibility

1.3.1 Target group

1.4 Deviation Management

1.5 Definitions / Abbreviations

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4911E / 10 3 Manager-Facilities-Engineering 04.10.2018

DIB Double Isolation and Bleed

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1.6.1 Normative References

1.6.2 Informative References

1.7 Handling of critical business information

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4911E / 10 3 Manager-Facilities-Engineering 04.10.2018

2 Additional requirements to NORSOK P-002 Process System

2.2 NORSOK P-002 7.4 - Sizing of gas/liquid Two- or Multi-Phase lines

2.3 NORSOK P-002 7.5.3 - Pressure safety valve lines

• Acoustic fatigue calculations

2.4 NORSOK P-002 10 - Insulation and Heat Tracing

2.5 NORSOK P-002 7.4 Atmospheric tanks

2.6 NORSOK P-002 15.3 Regeneration unit and storage

2.7 NORSOK P-002 21 Flare and vent (system 43)

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4911E / 10 3 Manager-Facilities-Engineering 04.10.2018

2.8 NORSOK P-002 6.4.2 - Relief devices

2.9 NORSOK P-002 22.1 Oily Water Treatment – General

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4911E / 10 3 Manager-Facilities-Engineering 04.10.2018

• Maintenance can be done safely.

3.1 General Isolation Requirements

• System 0xx - Wellheads and flow lines

• System 530 - Chemical injection (including pressure equalization)

3.1.1 Design requirements for positive isolation

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1. Remove a spool piece and insert a blind flange

3.1.2 Design requirements for proved isolation

3.1.3 Single vs. double isolation

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Process System Pressure Isolation

• Parallel process trains (pumps, compressors, separators, heat exchangers etc.)

3.2 Typical isolation guidelines

3.2.2 Control valves

3.2.3 Flare connections

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4911E / 10 3 Manager-Facilities-Engineering 04.10.2018