Mohamad Azzam (20)

XII MIPA 6

Lumpur Lapindo

Siduardjo hot mud flood, or what we often know is other mud, is an incident of hot mud gushing at the
Lapindo Brantas inc drilling location in Balongnongo hamlet in Renokenongo village, Porong sub-district,
Siduarjo district, East Java, since May 29, 2006.

The cause of the Lapindo mudflow was at least 3 aspects that caused the hot mudflow to occur. First, there is
a technical aspect. At the start of the tragedy, Lapindo hid behind the Yogyakarta tectonic earthquake that
occurred on the same day. This is supported by the opinion that the trigger for the mudflow (liquefaction) is a
sudden cyclic shock in Yogyakarta which causes sediment damage. However, it was denied by experts that
the earthquake in Yogyakarta which occurred due to the shift in the Opak Fault was not related to Surabaya.
The liquefaction argument is weak because it usually occurs in shallow layers, that is, in sandy-clay
sediments, not at a depth of 2,000-6,000 feet. Moreover, by referring to the earthquake in California (1989)
with a magnitude of 6.9 Mw, with the farthest radius of liquefaction occurring at a distance of 110 km from
the epicenter of the earthquake, because the Yogya earthquake was smaller at 6.3 Mw, the farthest
liquefaction radius should be less than 110 km. Finally, procedural errors emerged, such as allegations that
the dugout had not yet been clogged with liquid concrete as a cover. It is admitted that the Lapindo gas
eruption was caused by the rupture of the drilling well formation. As per its original design, Lapindo must
have installed a casing 30 inches at 150 feet deep, a 20 inch case at 1195 feet, a 16 inch casing at 2385 feet
and a 13-3 / 8 inch case at 3580 feet. When Lapindo drilled the earth's layer from a depth of 3580 feet to
9297 feet, they haven't installed a 9-5 / 8 inch case yet. Finally, the well penetrates a zone of high pressure
which causes a kick, namely the entry of the formation fluid into the well. In accordance with standard
procedures, drilling operations were stopped, the Blow Out Preventer (BOP) trap on the rig was immediately
closed and heavy density drilling mud was immediately pumped into the well with the aim of stopping the
kick. However, from information in the field, the BOP had broken up before the mudflow occurred. If this is
true, then there has been a technical error in the drilling, which means that there has also been an error in
standard operating procedures.

Second, the economic aspect. Lapindo Brantas Inc. is one of the Cooperation Contract Contractors (KKKS)
companies appointed by BP-MIGAS to carry out the oil and gas drilling process. Currently Lapindo has a 50%
participating interest in the Brantas Block area, East Java. In the case of the hot mudflow, Lapindo is
suspected of "deliberately saving" operational costs by not installing the casing. From an economic
perspective, the decision to install the casing has an impact on the costs incurred by Lapindo. Medco, as a
shareholder of the Brantas Block area, in letter number MGT-088 / JKT / 06, has warned Lapindo to install a
casing (drill casing) in accordance with the operational standards of oil and gas drilling. However, for some
reason Lapindo intentionally did not install the casing, so that when an underground blow out occurred, the
mud in the bowels of the earth burst out of control.