Consociational Democracy

also known by its non-identical twin –

‘Power-Sharing Democracy’
and its first cousin –
‘Consensus Democracy’

Paul Mitchell

Consociational Democracy
Part 1: Origins and Overview

Part 2: Avoiding Definitional Confusions

Part 3: Assorted Critiques

Part 4: What Works? - quantitative evidence.

Part 5: Complex Power-Sharing

Appendix: ‘the favorable conditions’ (we will probably not get to

these during the lecture – please read after class)
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 Part 1: Overview of Consociational Democracy

•  Most clearly associated with Arend Lijphart, and his books:

•  The Politics of Accommodation (1968) on the Netherlands, and

•  Democracy in Plural Societies (1977) – a generalization to all divided

societies.

•  It was initially an attempt to explain how political stability had been

achieved in the Netherlands despite that country’s division into
antagonistic segments or pillars, (namely the Catholic, Calvinist,
Socialist and Liberal).

Gabriel Almond
In 1956 Almond distinguished between 3 main types of party systems:
1. Anglo-American
2. Continental European (France, Italy and Germany)
3. Scandinavia and the Low Countries, the latter was ill defined but
somehow ‘in-between’ the other two.

Almond’s typology claimed a direct relationship between democratic

stability and political culture.

The Anglo-American democracies were assumed to have homogeneous

and secular political cultures, whereas the Continental European
countries had fragmented political cultures, divided by language and
religion,etc.

Homogeneity leads to democratic stability.

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2
 The Theory of Overlapping Memberships
•  ‘Stated briefly, this theory holds that when individuals belong to a
number of different organized or unorganized groups with diverse
interests and outlooks, their attitudes will tend to be moderate as a
result of these psychological cross pressures . . . [and] such
moderation is essential to political stability. Conversely, when a
society is riven with sharp cleavages and when memberships and
loyalties do not overlap but are concentrated exclusively within each
separate segment of society, the cross pressures that are vital to
political moderation and stability will be absent’. (Lijphart 1968: 12,
emphasis added).

•  Key Theme: cross pressures lead to greater mutual understanding and

tolerance.

•  By contrast many divided societies tend to exhibit segmental isolation

with cleavages that reinforce and deepen rather than cross-cut
divisions. 5

Centripetal Politics

•  The Anglo-American allegedly stable type is associated with party

systems with a small number of parties (classically the two-party
system).

•  The Continental European ‘unstable’ type is associated with multi-

party systems.

•  Two-Party Systems → aggregative politics → Centripetal politics

–  (i.e. following the median voter theorem).

•  Multi-Party Systems → transmit special interests → Centrifugal

politics

3
 What about the ‘in-between’ countries?

•  Almond’s claim that there is a direct causal relationship between a

societies political culture (level of fragmentation) and level of
democratic stability - fails to explain the Low counties (Netherlands,
Belgium, Switzerland), which had highly fragmented political cultures,
but also democratic stability.

•  Thus, the central question for Lijphart, was to explain how it is

possible to have a segmented political culture and yet maintain
democratic stability.

Elite Behaviour

•  Lijphart’s answer was to introduce a new independent variable: elite

behaviour.

•  Lijphart argued that a fragmented political culture (a deeply divided

society) could avoid the expected centrifugal fate if only the leaders
would abandon adversarial behaviour in favour of coalescence and
accommodation.

•  Thus the basic idea: ‘Overarching cooperation at the elite level can
be a substitute for cross-cutting affiliations at the mass level’.

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 Lijphart’s Prescriptive Claim

•  Clearly he is making a strong prescriptive claim – essentially that

under certain favourable conditions it is possible to turn a plural
(divided) society into a stable democracy by an act of will by
enlightened elites.

•  Lijphart (1977, 223) is quite explicit about this:

•  ‘This book’s message to the political leaders of plural societies is to

encourage them to engage in a form of political engineering: if they
wish to establish or strengthen democratic institutions in their
countries, they must become consociational engineers’.

Lijphart’s Typology of Democratic Systems

Structure of Society

Homogeneous Plural

Coalescent Depoliticized Consociational

Elite
Behaviour Adversarial Centripetal Centrifugal

•  Lijphart’s basic point is that deeply divided societies can avoid pulling
themselves apart (box, bottom right), only if each segments leaders abandon
adversarial behaviour in favour of accommodation and coalition.

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5
Institutional Features of Consociational Democracy

1. Grand Coalition

2. Mutual Veto Rights

3. Proportionality

4. Segmental Autonomy

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Grand Coalition

•  Leaders of all significant segments govern together in a grand coalition.

•  Grand coalitions are therefore different from a British or Adversarial type of

system, where we expect the cabinet to be majoritarian and minimum winning
(i.e any coalitions would not have unnecessary members – they are large
enough to win, but no larger).

•  But adversarial politics, if it has merits, is a form of zero-sum politics were the
winner takes all – this can only work well in homogeneous societies, where
politics is a game and the stakes are not too high.

•  Put another way, “when the people are ‘fundamentally at one’, as Lord
Balfour one said, they ‘can safely afford to bicker’. But in a political system
with clearly separate and potentially hostile population segments, virtually all
decisions are perceived as entailing high stakes, and strict majority rule
places a strain on the unity and peace of the system (Lijphart, 1977: 28).

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6
 Exclusion, Alternation and Floating Voters

•  The government versus opposition norm of democratic theory is based on a

principle of exclusion: a large minority ‘lose’ the election and are kept out of
government.

•  But of course while each individual election creates winners and losers over a
longer time frame there is an expectation that losers can become winners,
and that governments and oppositions will alternate.

•  But this transformation depends upon the existence of a large floating vote –
and this is precisely what is lacking in a ethnically segmented and divided
society.

•  The operation of simple majority rule in divided societies, like Northern

Ireland, leads to what Lijphart has labelled ‘majority dictatorship’ by the
dominant segment and permanent opposition for the minority.

•  It is thus a purely procedural rather than substantive form of democracy.

13

Mutual Veto
•  “Decisions have to be made in grand coalitions, and when these are
reached by majority vote, though the minority’s presence in the coalition
does give it chance to present its case as forcefully as possible to its
coalition partners, it may nevertheless be outvoted by the majority. When
such decisions affect the vital interests of a minority segment, such a defeat
will be regarded as unacceptable and will endanger intersegmental elite
cooperation. A minority veto must therefore be added to the grand coalition
principle; only such a veto can give each segment a complete guarantee of
political protection” (Lijphart, 36-7).
•  A potential problem here is the danger that the minority veto could lead to
minority tyranny, whereby the minority votes everything down and
immobilism is the result.

•  Lijphart thinks this unlikely -partly because the minority will realise that too
frequent use of its veto can be turned against it by the other segments

•  and partly because the very fact that the veto is available as a potential
weapon gives a feeling of security which makes its actual use less likely.

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 Proportionality
•  Proportionality has two main functions.

1.  “It can be contrasted with the winner-take-all principle of unrestrained

majority rule. Because one of the motivations behind the formation of a
minimum winning coalition is that the ‘spoils’ of government can be divided
among as small a number of participants as possible, the proportional
allocation rule makes a minimum winning coalition less profitable and
therefore less probable” (Lijphart, 38-9, 1977)

2.  The proportionality rule refines the grand coalition concept in that it says that
not only should all the major segments be represented but that they should
be represented proportionally.

Thus the outcome of all elections for the legislature, executive etc should be
proportional to group size.

In addition there should be a proportional allocation of all resources: civil

service appointments and all kinds of grants and subsidies.

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Group Autonomy
•  Lijphart argues that the minority should rule over itself in areas which are of
exclusive concern to it. For example if there is a major religious cleavage,
then each segment should have control over its own educational system.

•  What should be emphasised here is that consociationalism is not a strategy

for depolarising a divided society (at least in the short term) but is rather an
elite crisis management technique. In fact by devolving powers to segmental
organisations (regional governments, churches, schools, trade unions etc.)
these organisations will be strengthened, such that the nature of the divisions
may become more institutionalised.

•  Lijphart is explicit about this: “Consociational democracy enhances the

democratic stability of a plural society not by making it less plural but by
making it more plural (Lijphart, 11, 1984).

•  Quite explicitly then, organisationally distinct segments are favourable for

consociationalism precisely because there is less contact, and therefore less
conflict between the communities.

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 Part 2: Avoiding Definitional Confusions!

•  Consociational Democracy or Consensus Democracy?

•  Majoritarian or non-majoritarian democracy?

•  Power-Sharing or Consociation?

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Consociational Democracy or Consensus Democracy

•  After 1969 ‘I found it [the term consociational democracy] to be an

obstacle in communicating with policy-makers who found it too esoteric,
polysyllabic and difficult to pronounce’ (Lijphart 2008, 6)
•  Hence Lijphart has often used the term ‘power-sharing democracy’ and
later ‘consensus democracy’, the latter ‘grew out of my effort to define
and measure consociational democracy more precisely’ (ibid).

•  In his 1984 and 1999 books consensus democracy was logically derived
as the opposite of the ‘Westminster (or Majoritarian) Model of
democracy.

•  These were demarcated in terms of 10 differences; the first five relate to

an ‘executives-parties dimension’ and the next five to a ‘federal-unitary
dimension’

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Majoritarian Consensus Consociational
democracy Democracy democracy
1.One party and bare majority Power-sharing in broad Grand coalitions
cabinets coalition cabinets
2. Executive dominates Exec-leg balance of power Mutual (minority) vetos
legislature
3. Two party system Multi party systems

4. Majoritarian and PR PR
disproportional electoral sys
5. Interest group pluralism: Corporatism: aimed at
adversarial coordination and compromise

1. Unitary, centralised govt. Federal and decentralised Segmental autonomy

2. Unicameral parliament: Bicameralism (division of

concentration of power powers btw 2 strong houses)
3. Flexible Constitutions: Rigid Constitutions: supra-
amended by majority majorities needed
4. Parliamentary sovereignty Judicial Review

5. Central banks dependent Independent central banks 19

on executive

CD or Consensus: How are they Related?

•  They overlap but neither is a sub-set of the other.

•  Most obviously CD is defined in terms of only 4 characteristics rather than 10.

•  As such the 4 are much broader concepts: for example federalism is only one
way of establishing group autonomy.

•  Consensus D. emphasises formal-institutional devices, whereas CD ‘relies to

a larger extent on informal practises’

•  As such the characteristics of Consensus D. are defined so that they can be

accurately measured ‘which is not possible for any of the consociational
characteristics’

•  Although both are suitable for divided societies CD is the ‘stronger medicine’
–  ‘while consensus democracy provides many incentives for broad power sharing,
consociationalism requires it and prescribes that all significant groups be included
in it. Similarly, consensus democracy facilitates but CD demands group autonomy.
Hence for the most deeply divided societies, I recommend a consociational instead
of a merely consensus systems’ (Lijphart 2008, 8).

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10
 So is CD anti-majoritarian?

•  This is a common confusion based on the traditional zero-sum

government versus opposition model.
•  CD points out that simple adversarial models don’t work in
segmented societies – oppositions can’t expect to become
governments since identities are ascribed and largely fixed – so
there is little of a floating vote – across communities.
•  But of course CD does not argue that because there are problems
with majority rule, therefore we should have minority rule!

•  Instead CD builds on majority rule and treats it as a minimum

requirement
–  ‘instead of being satisfied with narrow decision-making majorities, it
seeks to maximise the size of these majorities. The real contrast is not
so much between majoritarian and non-majoritarian as between bare-
majority and broad majority models of democracy’ (2008, 12).
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Power-Sharing or Consociation?

•  Note that although the two terms are often used inter-changeably
they are not synonyms.

•  This is because there are other, non-consociational ways to share

power.
–  For e.g. power can be shared through a separation of powers regime, by
means of federalism, temporary coalitions, etc.

•  The distinctive feature of consociational power sharing is that it

requires power-sharing between communities by means of
proportionality and autonomy.

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 Lijphart 1977

•  Begins by noting that social homogeneity and political consensus is

usually regarded as either a pre-requisite to stable democracy, or at
least highly conducive towards it.
–  When these are not present democratic breakdown is likely.

•  Lijphart’s premise is that ‘it may be difficult, but it is not at all

impossible to achieve and maintain stable democratic government in
a plural society’ (1977, 1).

•  ‘In a consociational democracy, the centrifugal tendencies inherent in

a plural society are counteracted by the cooperative attitudes and
behavior of the leaders of the different segments of the population.
Elite cooperation is the primary distinguishing feature of
consociational democracy . . .’ (1977, 1).

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‘CD is both an empirical and a normative model’

•  First, it is an empirical ‘explanation’ of the stability of a number of

smaller European democracies (Austria, Belgium, the NL and Swi).
–  ‘These countries are now retreating from their high point of
consociational development. They reached their apogee of sharp plural
divisions and close elite cooperation in the late 1950s and have been
declining since then – not, it is worth emphasizing, as a result of the
failure of CD, but because consociationalism by its very success has
begun to make itself superfluous’ (2)

•  Second CD is explicitly advocated as a normative model for the plural

societies of the third world.
–  ‘Pessimists can in good conscience reject or ignore the arguments and
recommendations of this book only if they are fully convinced that CD is
not merely improbable but completely impossible in the plural societies of
the Third World – a view that is untenable when all the evidence is
examined’ (3)

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 Definitions
•  One frequent criticism is that Lijphart does not provide clear
definitions.

•  In his book he says that ‘most of the terms . . .are quite well known,
widely used and to a large extent self-explanatory’ (3).

•  1. ‘Plural society’ is one divided by ‘segmental cleavages’

–  In Lijphart’s typology political culture is dichotomous (plural / non-plural).
–  But how do we draw a line between cases that should be included in the
consociational universe and those that should not?

–  E.g. Switzerland – there may be no serious conflict anyway.

–  Barry: ‘before the pattern of decision-making can be made the
explanation for a lack of hostility, it is necessary to rule out the alternative
hypothesis that there are no sources of serious conflict anyway’ (1975,
486).
–  ‘it is certainly hard to imagine that Switzerland is a country where the
groups are itching to oppress one another and kept from it only by the
manipulations of the political elite’ (Barry 1975, 488). 25

Degrees of Pluralism?

•  In a 1981 reply to Steiner Lijphart suggests that the ‘plural society’

variable should in fact be continuous, so that in principal we could
measure degrees of pluralism from 0 in a completely homogenous
state to 100 – extreme pluralism.
–  And he says that ‘in a completely plural society, there must be perfect
correspondence between segmental boundaries and the boundaries
between the political, social and economic organizations’ (1981)

•  But the problem remains – how could we devise quantitative indices

of pluralism for comparative study?

•  And even if we could - what degree of pluralism should be deep

enough to qualify a particular case for inclusion?

•  Lijphart has not been able to come up with clear ways of measuring
this concept.
26

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 Lijphart in 2008 on definitions and measurement

•  ‘I agree with Brendan O’Leary’s (2005) observation that the rival

evaluations of consociation may simply not be “amenable to decisive
confirmation or falsification by the evidence”.

•  ‘The main reason is that both the independent and dependent

variables are much more difficult to operationalize and to measure
precisely. The problems already begin with the definition and
measurement of deeply divided – or what I have called plural -
societies.’

•  ‘I have not been able to devise a more exact measurement than a

threefold classification into plural, semi-plural and non-plural societies
– and other scholars have not been able to improve on this’.

27

‘Favorable Conditions’
•  So much for the institutions of consociational democracy; the
question is, can it work?
•  Lijphart has outlined a whole series of what he calls favourable
conditions for consociational democracy
•  There has been much debate since the theory was first expounded
about whether or not any of the Favourable Conditions are really
essential for CD.
•  Lijphart was quite explicit about this. He said:

–  “It is also worth emphasizing that the favourable conditions that will be
discussed. . . are factors that are helpful but neither indispensable nor
sufficient in and of themselves to account for the success of
consociational democracy. Even when all the conditions are
unfavourable, consociationalism, though perhaps difficult, should not be
considered impossible. Conversely, a completely favourable
configuration of background conditions greatly facilitates but does not
guarantee consociational choices or success” (1977, 54).
28

14
 ‘Favorable Conditions’(2)

•  Critics have seen a problem here:

•  ‘Van Schendelen: “The main methodological problem here is that [the

favourable conditions] are ‘empty’. In Lijphart’s own words they are helpful
but neither indispensable nor sufficient nor unique for consociations . . . The
conditions may be present and absent, necessary and unnecessary, in short
conditions or no conditions at all”.

•  Lijphart’s response is that virtually all social science knowledge is

probabilistic. .

•  So, even if the favourable factors are absent – CD should still be tried . . .

29

Favorable Conditions for CD

The number of these vary in Lijphart’s different publications.

These are discussed further in an appendix to this lecture (below).

1. The Balance of Power

2. Size
3. External Threat
4. Leader-Follower Relationships
5. Overarching Loyalties
6. Segmental Isolation
7. Traditions of Elite Accommodation

30

15
 There are no Alternatives . . .

•  He does not argue, as some critics mistakenly allege ‘that consociationalism

is bound to be accepted or to work, but [rather] that it is the only solution that
has any prospect of being agreed upon and of working satisfactorily’ (1985,
93).

•  Or to recall his most famous formulation – there are no other democratic

choices for such plural societies – the realistic choice is between
‘consociaitonal democracy and no democracy at all’ (1977, 238).

•  Nevertheless some policy makers may question wheter Lijphart’s normative

attachment to the model clouds his empirical judgement.

•  Because it seems that Lijphart is saying: study the particular case and if the
pre-conditions for CD are present and favourable then GREAT → go ahead
and adopt CD since the prospects for success appear good.

•  But he also seems to be saying if the favourable conditions are absent – also
go ahead and adopt CD because there are no realistic alternatives.
31

Part 3:
Assorted Critiques of Consociationalism

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 Normative and Political Criticisms

1.  Consociations make no difference – or they only work were they

are not really needed because the divisions are not that sharp.

2.  Some argue that CD freezes and institutionalises antagonistic

Identities (at the expense of more ‘progressive’ identities like
class)

–  ‘consociation, in this perspective, does not resolve conflict: at best, it

organises and regulates a stalemate around the relevant collective
identities’ (O’Leary 2005, 5).

–  Paul Brass believes that advocates of CD operate with the ‘mistaken

assumption that cultural differences among ethnic groups are
“objective” factors’.

33

‘Consociationalists are not democrats’

•  It is said that it is undemocratic, it excludes oppositions – indeed in a full

consociation there is no opposition.

•  There is no opportunity to ‘throw the rascals out’ (Barry; Lustick ; Van Schendelen,
among other make this criticism.

•  With CD ‘nothing precludes intra bloc democratic competition, or the turnover

of political elites, or shifts of support between parties; and in a liberal
consociation, nothing necessarily blocks the dissolution of historic identities if
that is what people want.

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The ‘Bottom-up’, civil society and social transformation critique

•  Rupert Taylor writing about N. Ireland and South Africa:

–  ‘Contrary to the prevailing consensus, this chapter argues that in fact
consociationalism should not form the basis for present or future
policy . . . instead it is advanced that a social transformation approach,
which is concerned to transform the conflict by promoting participatory
democracy and challenging ethno-nationalism, holds the most promise
for peaceful change’. (Taylor 2001, 38).

–  ‘Consociationalism is a vehicle for the transition initially to elite-level

democracy and then to a more open form of democracy. For it is
maintained that over the course of time ethno-nationalist forces will
become less virulent and salient, so that the prospects for democracy
increase. In reality, how does this work? It is neither obvious nor logical
that ethno-nationalism can be cured by prescribing more if it through
constitutional engineering’ (ibid, 38, emphasis added).

35

Bottom-uppers

•  In relation to N. Ireland a range of explicitly non-partisan proposals

recognise the centrality of national identity in the on-going stalemate
and recommend that some progress may be made by taking actions to
depolarise the segmented communities (Wilford 1992)

•  or “deconstruct[ing] the root causes of conflict” (Todd 1995a: 171).

•  Wilford focuses on public policy initiatives such as fair employment,

integrated education and community relations schemes, which he
sees as possible means of advancing desegregation and pluralism
through inter-communal contact (Wilford 1992: 38).

•  While not suggesting that these policies are panaceas for Northern
Ireland’s ills he interpreted these “bottom-up” approaches as a
necessary corrective to the top-down character of classic
consociational prescriptions.
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 Emancipation

•  Judging that none of the available constitutional settlements can

currently attract sufficient consent Todd (1995a; 1995b) and Ruane
and Todd (1996) recommended an “emancipatory process” whose

–  “primary aim is to deconstruct the root causes of conflict so that

participants are freed to reconstruct alternative relationships among
themselves” (Todd 1995a: 171).

•  While the approach represents a genuine attempt to avoid the

pitfalls of imposed settlements through a participatory process it is
ultimately rather too thin on specifics.

•  Apart from encouraging general social processes that may already

be underway it specifies few concrete mechanisms of change.

37

Emancipation: What’s the mechanism?

•  The problem is that while such social change would be intrinsically

helpful in all divided societies it may not do much about ethnic conflict:
such identities are not easily “reconstructed” along more amenable
lines.
•  The approach as a whole probably underestimates the extent to which
political divisions in protracted ethno-national conflict are relatively
independent of changes in the social structure.
–  This is not to argue that there is no connection - that ethnic conflicts are
impervious to social change - but rather to recognise the resilience of ethnic
antagonisms in the face of changes in economic, social and cultural
conditions.

•  The ascriptive nature of ethnic identities means that ethnic conflicts

tend to be intense, enduring and stubbornly resistant to purely material
or social change.
•  Political change is usually required.
38

19
 Contact → Conflict?
•  Bottom-up approaches are premised on a liberal article of faith: namely
that contact promotes toleration and understanding.
–  Wilford argues: “Experimentation has shown that prolonged and intense
contact, especially where it entails co-operation in problem-solving, can
assist markedly in overcoming mutual distrust, incomprehension and
suspicion, thereby significantly reducing stereotypical behaviour among all
the parties” (1992: 38).

•  But at best the evidence on this is mixed and indecisive.

•  While it is a plausible tenet in liberal democracies (though even here it

can be challenged) it is less convincing in ethno-national conflicts where
grievances are intensely held and violence a real possibility.

•  A number of specialists on ethnic conflict have noted that contact is as

necessary for violence as it is for friendship (Connor 1994; Horowitz
1985).
39

Prudence?
•  This debate highlights a philosophical difference of opinion as to the
most prudential path for public policy in protracted ethnic conflicts.

•  One school believes that ethnic differences in polarised conflicts are

likely to be enduring realities and therefore the best course of action
in the short-term is to treat them as realities that should not be wished
away but rather accommodated and respected. In consociational
language the ethnic communities become building blocks in a
balanced settlement.

•  The bottom-up or civil society school believes the consociational

approach “conveys a rather bleak view of humanity” (Wilford 1992:
31).

•  In contrast, advocates of civil society approaches tend to treat ethnic

identities as more fluid and recommend strategies of pluralisation,
deconstruction and the transcending of traditional identities (Todd
1995; Ruane and Todd 1996).
40

20
 *Warning: an opinion follows . . .time to get off the fence. . .

•  Any reconciling effects due to increased voluntary contact between

communities, deconstruction or emancipation, would be helpful in the
conditions of the debilitating polarisation of many divided societies.

•  But there are at least two reasons to doubt the political significance
of desegmentation strategies in such intractable conflicts.

•  First, often there is little empirical evidence that much reconciling is

taking place beyond certain cosmopolitan enclaves.
–  Most ethnic partisans do not want to be emancipated any more than they
want to be integrated. The limited progress that is sometimes made in
terms of inter-ethnic understanding is frequently eclipsed by the latest
polarising event which quickly reasserts intra-ethnic solidarities.

•  Second, even if bottom-up (or civil society) approaches could make

progress that had political implications for the conflict, the likelihood is
that this would be a case of too little, too late and too slow.
41

Part 4: What Works?

42

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 Quantitative Evidence: Which institutional variables are
associated with higher levels of democracy?

•  Pippa Norris uses a data set that observes the same variables for 30
years from 1974-2004 for 191 countries.

•  It is a Cross Sectional Time Series research design that collects data

across space (many countries) and across time (different time points).

•  The response (or dependent variable) is a measure of the underlying

level of democracy in each country each year.

•  There are many rival indices that attempt to measure ‘democracy’

43

Measuring Democracy

44

22
 The rival indexes correlate quite highly

•  Despite vigorous debate about which index is best (and their respective
weaknesses) – it is striking how highly they correlate.

•  For example the two most widely used – Freedom House and Polity –
correlate at .904
45

The growth of democracies, worldwide 1972-2004

46

23
 Electoral Systems and Democracy:
Quick recap and caricature

•  The pro-power sharing camp argue:

1.  PR defuses conflict by including minorities

2.  While PR is best, ‘positive action strategies’ can also facilitate
inclusion (communal rolls for Maoris in NZ; reserved seats in India,
etc)
3.  Legislative inclusion by winning seats incentivises bargaining and
cooperation.
4.  All of this strengthens democracy, etc.

The power-sharing critics argue:

1.  Identities are much more fluid than consociationalism suggests.

Power-sharing institutionalises and reinforces divisions, etc.
2.  It’s not prudent to give ethnic conflict group leaders extra institutional
weaponry.
3.  Its not fair to majorities, etc. 47

Level of Democracy by Electoral System (bi-variate)

•  Norris: ‘The comparison, without any prior controls, confirms that among homogeneous
societies, nations-states using PR electoral systems were consistently more democratic
than countries with majoritarian elections, and the difference in levels of democracy
between PR and majoritarian electoral systems was greatest in heterogeneous societies,
as Lijphart theorizes’.
48
•  But clearly – this is only preliminary support – a multivariate test is needed.

24
 Multivariate test

49

Multivariate test (plural societies only)

•  Note that when we look only at ‘plural societies’ the substantive results are much
stronger.

•  For example, using PR results on average in a 5-10 point increase in democracy on the
50
100 point scale.

25
•  Finally – in addition to electoral systems –

•  Does federalism help?

•  Is it better to have a Presidential or Parliamentary System?

51

Final results (Norris 2008)

52

26
 The quantitative evidence is that power
sharing works!

•  ‘the evidence presented here indicates that reforms which

promote and implement power-sharing constitutional arrangements
should be more widely recognized as one of the most promising
avenues to contribute toward lasting peace-settlements and
sustainable democracy’

–  Pippa Norris (2008) Driving Democracy: Do Power Sharing Institutions Work? Oxford U.P.

53

•  Part 5: Complex Power-Sharing

54

27
 The ‘Grand Coalition’ Concept revisited

•  Lijphart’s suggestion that consociation may require a Grand Coalition of

all the significant ethnic segments – has sometimes caused problems,
especially if empirically a ‘grand coalition’ is hard to find!

•  The fundamental point is that a “grand coalition offers the only

possibility of avoiding the permanent exclusion of the minority from the
government” (Lijphart, 1977, 30).

•  Many critics have analysed particular cases and claimed that no grand
coalition actually existed (i.e they did in Austria, but not in Belgium or
the Netherlands).
•  The concept tends to imply the need for an all-party cabinet coalition –
when one is not easily found – critics say CD can’t exist if even its main
institutional characteristic cannot be located.
55

The ‘Grand Coalition’ Concept (2)

•  Critics, such as Sue Halpern, accuse Lijphart of conceptual stretching.
–  ‘grand coalition becomes a catch-all concept, describing any joint governmental or
quasi-governmental activity pursued by segmental elites whether they undertake that
activity as bloc representatives or not, or engage at all in “summit
diplomacy”’ (Halpern 1986, 190).

•  Lijphart has indeed ‘found’ power sharing devices in a variety of ways,

from full blown all-party coalitions, to all party commissions to even
catch-all parties such as India’s Congress.

•  But Lijphart actually said that:

–  ‘The grand coalition cabinet is the prototypical device, but a variety of other forms
can serve the same function. The essential characteristic of the grand coalition is not
so much any particular institutional arrangement as the participation by the leaders of
all significant segments in governing a plural society’ (1977, 31); i.e. some type of
power-sharing is essential.

–  Also as Andeweg has argued this ‘does not do much theoretical damage;
consociationalism is characterised by intersegmental elite cooperation, and whatever
institution, mechanism, or venue can be shown to have facilitated such cooperation
56
fits the theory’ (2000, 520).

28
 O’Leary elaborates the grand coalition concept
•  He distinguishes three types of consociational executives: complete, Concurrent
and Weak.

•  Complete – suggested by the title ‘grand coalition’ – all inclusive, all segments
and all parties:
–  ‘Imagine, for example, that there are two ethnic groups, Na and Nb, and that all
voters in both groups split their votes between two political parties respectively, giving
rise to a four party political system: A1, A2, supported by segment Na, and B1, B2,
supported by segment Nb. In a complete consociation, these four parties would all
be represented in the executive’ (O’Leary 2005, 12).

•  But clearly we want to be able to count other executives as

consociational – even if they are not as all inclusive as this.

•  It is really the word ‘grand’ – implying total inclusion – that is causing

the trouble here.

•  ‘What matters is meaningful, cross-community, joint decision making

within the executive’ (O’Leary, 12).
57

Complete, Concurrent and Weak

•  Concurrent – each significant ethnic segment has representation in

the executive - and that executive has at least majority support in
each segment.
–  So each significant segment has over half its voters supporting parties in
the government.
–  For example – A1 and B1 are in the executive and each has a majority in
its segment, but there can still be other parties (A2, B2) that don’t join the
executive

•  Weak – each significant segment has competitively elected leaders in

the executive, but, in at least one segment, the relevant leadership
has only plurality (rather than majority) support among voters.

58

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 Complete, Concurrent and Weak (2)

•  Thus a democratic consociation ‘does not require a complete, total or

all-encompassing grand coalition in the executive. What it must have
is meaningful cross-community executive power sharing in which
each significant segment is represented in the government with at
least plurality levels of support within its segment’.

•  Note also, that the distinction between complete, concurrent and

weak (plurality) consociational executives – need not only be applied
to executives.

•  It applies equally to legislatives procedures (votes in the chamber and

committees), and to procedures for amending the constitution.

59

Cleavages and Nationalism

•  The type of cleavages, the number of cleavages and the relationship

between cleavages (for example do they reinforce or cross-cut) are
clearly important matters.

•  ‘Lijphart writes as if all possible cleavages that give rise to enduring

segmental antagonisms are equally amenable to consociational
treatment. That does not seem to be so.’

•  ‘Consociation alone may not be enough to overcome some types of

division’.

•  ‘There are good grounds for supposing that, where communities are
already mobilized as nations or parts of nations, they will not be content
with consociational settlements that simply leave the existing definition
of state sovereignty intact.’ (O’Leary 2005, 26).
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 Cleavages and Nationalism (2)

•  Hence if one or more of the groups has mobilized on the basis of

national appeals ‘they may be willing to accept consociational
arrangements only if other arrangements dilute the sovereignty or
unitary nature of the existing state.’

•  They might require institutional political recognition of their national

identity by means of co-sovereignty, confederalism, or at least territorial
self-government in regions they regard as (part of) their national
homelands.

–  As Brendan O’Leary puts it: ‘Consociational arrangements alone are not

enough to pacify a nationalist community with authentic and feasible
irredentist or secessionist ambitions, as in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka or
Cyprus, but they may nonetheless, constitute a fundamental part of a stable
settlement.’ (p.26)

61

International Intervention

•  There are international prescriptions against the promotion of

genocide, expulsion, forced population transfers and coercive
assimilation.

•  And despite some return to favour, there remain biases against

secession and partition.

•  These rules and norms mean that when international organizations or

the great powers intervene (leaving aside simple peace-keeping) -
the institutional options available boil down to one of three main
responses:

1.  Territorial autonomy and/or federalism

2.  Integration
3.  Consociation
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 ‘Complex’ Consociations

•  There are a small number of current experiments in what can be called

complex consociations – Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Macedonia – and some would add Iraq.

•  These consociations are ‘complex’ in four senses (O’Leary 2005).

1.  They are about national self-determination: ‘They are political

settlements that specifically attempt to address national self-
determination disputes between communities – i.e., where there is an
opposition between at least secessionists and some unionists or
federalists – by institutionally recognizing more than one people, nation
or society and providing constitutional architecture within which more
than people can co-exist , durably if not necessarily permanently’. (p.
34).
–  The state might be defined as multinational, more than one nation may be
recognized in the constitution (for example the Kurdish nation). 63

‘Complex’ Consociations

2.  Complex Consociations are political settlements that are also peace
processes.
–  So they involve a wide range of other mechanisms – confidence building
measures, policy transformations to help prevent future conflict,
demilitarisation, reform of the security system, transitional justice, human
rights protection, etc.

3.  Institutional combinations: “‘complex’ consociations involve at least

one additional strategy other than consociation” (O’Leary, p.34).
–  This is clearest in cases like NI and Bosnia that combine consociationalism
and territorial autonomy.
–  In practice ‘complex’ consociations involve the combinations of
consociational strategies with at least one other strategy such as territorial
autonomy, arbitration, integration.

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 ‘Complex’ Consociations

4.  The fourth element of complexity is the involvement of international

actors in the making, ratification and maintenance of the consociational
and/or autonomy arrangements.

•  ‘In summary, “complex” consociation is distinguished by the existence

of policies, institutions, and constitutional arrangements that address
an antagonistic self-determination dispute, incorporate peace
processes, involve elements of at least one other major domestic
conflict-regulating strategy, and, lastly, enlist external or international
powers in the making, implementation, and maintenance of the
settlement’ (p.35).

•  While up until now these complex consociations have been relatively

rare, O’leary suggests that ‘these relatively novel emergent
configurations are likely to proliferate in future crisis zones.

•  Hybrid forms of conflict regulation are on the increase.

65

Appendix
•  We will be unlikely to get to this section during the lecture

•  Please read after class.

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 1. Multiple Balance of Power

•  Lijphart’s position is that “a multiple balance of power among the

segments of a plural society is more conducive to consociational
democracy than a dual balance of power or a hegemony by one of
the segments, because if one segment has a clear majority its
leaders may attempt to dominate rather than cooperate with the rival
minority. And in a society with two segments of approximately equal
size, the leaders of both may hope to win a majority and to achieve
their aims by domination instead of cooperation” (1977, 55).

•  Lijphart believes that the ideal situation is where there are three or
four segments and none of them individually has a numerical
majority, in other words a very similar situation to the Netherlands in
the first half of the century.

67

1. Multiple Balance of Power (cont/d)

•  Lijphart’s position here has been quite convincingly challenged on both
empirical and theoretical grounds.
•  In particular, Austria the so-called ‘jewel in the consociational crown’,
indicates that an all-minority situation is not such a determining factor, since
when the grand coalition was formed in 1945 there were only two segments,
and the Austrian Peoples’ Party (the catholic party) had an absolute majority.
•  Therefore the fact that one segment has a segment has a majority does not
completely rule out consociationalism, though clearly it is unlikely to help.

•  Pappalardo has argued that the real condition is not the size of the segments
or how many of them there are, but rather the electoral stability of the
segments.
•  By electoral stability what we essentially mean is that one segment does not
compete for the others’ vote.
•  This is important because “there can be no pact of coexistence if even only
one of the actors involved successfully practises an expansionist politics,
while others limit themselves to defending their position. The basis of this
pact is the ‘recognition of diversity’, and the readiness of the blocs to accept
one another as basic realities which cannot and should not be
changed” (Pappalardo, 369, 1981).
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 2. Size
•  Lipjhart points out that all of the European consociational democracies
are fairly small countries.

•  He believes that the size of the country has both direct and indirect
effects.

•  The direct effects of small size are that the elites are more likely to
know each other and to meet often. He believes that this is likely to
engender goodwill and increase the probability of cooperative
behaviour.

•  However, there seems to be very little evidence that this is the case.

•  In particular it cannot really explain, even taking Lijphart’s original

cases of Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium, why during some
periods the leaders were highly conflictual and competitive, whilst
during others they were cooperative, since the size of the countries did
not vary.
. 69

3. External Threat
•  Lijphart’s indirect effects of small size are a little more plausible.

•  The size factor here is that “small countries are more likely to be
and feel threatened by other powers than larger countries. Such
feelings of vulnerability and insecurity provide strong incentives to
maintain internal solidarity” (66).
•  Lijphart makes the point that in all of the European consociational
democracies the crucial steps toward this type of regime were taken
during times of grave external threats to the countries’ existence.

•  Of course, for the external threat to be of any use in impressing

upon quarrelling leaders the necessity to cooperate, the threat must
be perceived as a common danger by all of the segments.

•  It is no use, for example, if one segment wants to secede from the

country.

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 4. Leader-Follower Relationships

•  What is absolutely essential is that the elites “must have a basic

willingness to engage in cooperative efforts with the leaders of other
segments in a spirit of moderation and compromise” (1977, 53).

•  The difficulty of course is that even if the leaders have this a priori
willingness to compromise they must at the same time maintain the
support and loyalty of their party members.

•  ‘I do think that someone who does not read the small print may go
away with the impression that in order to turn a conflict-ridden
democracy into a harmonious one all that is required is an effort of
will by political leaders. Insufficient attention may be paid to the fact
that , if the country is a democracy, the leaders can continue to be
leaders only so long as they have followers’ (Barry 1975b, 395-6)

71

5. Overarching Loyalties

•  Overarching loyalties are important if they provide some cohesion for

the society as a whole and hence moderate the intensity of
cleavages.

•  One possibility would be nationalism.

•  Of course nationalist sentiment only helps if it unites the society. If

there are competing nationalisms, then it becomes another source of
division, by promoting loyalty to a ‘nation’ which is not coterminous
with the state.

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 6. Segmental Isolation
•  Lijphart argues that “clear boundaries between the segments of a plural
society have the advantage of limiting mutual contacts and
consequently of limiting the chances of ever-present potential
antagonisms to erupt into actual hostility” (1977, 88).
•  Clearly this argument runs contrary to the normal liberal democratic
argument that frequent contact between groups fosters mutual
understanding and tolerance.
•  But we must note that the institutions and structures of plural societies
by definition tend to be organised along segmental lines.
•  Lijphart is explicit about this: “Consociational democracy enhances
the democratic stability of a plural society not by making it less plural
but by making it more plural (Lijphart, 11, 1984).

•  ‘It is in the nature of CD,at least initially, to make plural societies more
thoroughly plural. Its approach is not to abolish or weaken segmental
cleavages but to recognise them explicitly and to turn the segments into
constructive elements of stable democracy’ (1977, 42).
73

7. Traditions of Elite Accommodation

•  Hans Daalder has argued that there were strong traditions of elite
compromise long before the Netherlands became a democracy –
•  so that the adoption of consociational practises should not be
regarded as a “response to the perils of subcultural splits, but as the
prior reason why subcultural divisions never did become
perilous” (Daalder, 367-8, 1971).
•  While Lijphart accepts that a prior tradition of elite accommodation
may be helpful he does not accept it as a pre-condition of CD.

•  This is because he wishes to avoid historical determinism and defend

the possibility of the self-negating prophecy coming into play (self-
negating: leaders predict disaster and therefore take steps to avoid
it).

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 7. Traditions of Elite Accommodation (cont/d)

•  This is important to Lijphart because he wishes to stress “the

voluntary, rational, purposive and contractual elements of CD
because the discussion of the consociational model as a normative
model . . .presupposes that consociationalism is an example that can
be freely and deliberately followed” (103).

•  His general plea is that “one should not rule out the possibility that
leaders in plural societies are capable of a creative and constructive
act of free will” (ibid).

•  Whether or not leaders in deeply divided societies have such room for
manoeuvre will determine whether a strategy of conflict regulation is
at all likely and feasible.

75

Types of Consociation (O’Leary)

•  Complete – suggested by the title ‘grand coalition’ – all inclusive, all

segments and all parties

•  Concurrent – each significant ethnic segment has representation in

the executive - and that executive has at least majority support in
each segment

•  Weak – each significant segment has competitively elected leaders in

the executive, but, in at least one segment, the relevant leadership
has only plurality (rather than majority) support among voters.

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