GOTTLOB FREGE

CONCEPTUAL
NOTATION
AND RELATED ARTICLES

Translated aud edited

with a Bíography and lutroducíion by
TERRELL WARD BYNUM

OXFORD

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

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® OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS i<;72 GOTTLOB FREGE

ij, ^

oxko.d

ONiversitY
 PREFACE

The present volumc is the culmination of a project begun in 1962

at the University of Delaware where 1 first became acquainted
with Frege's philosophy. After reading several of Frcge's works, I
attenipted to learn more about the man himself, only to discover that
very little was known about him and only a few of hís forty or more
publications had been translated into English. I was surprised to
discover that the book in which Frcge was said to have rcvolutionized
logic, the Be^riffsschrift, was(except for Geach's translation of most
of Chapter I) untranslated and unavailable at major universities even
in the original Germán. My curiosity had been aroused, however,
and I managed to acquire a microfilm of the Begriffsschrift, so I
began transiating parts of it. The more I learned about Frege, the
more interested 1 became in his Ufe and work.
During the year 1963-4 a Fulbright Fellowship in England pro-
vided the time and wherewithal to seek out information on Frege
and find some of his lesser-known works in European libraries.
The summer of 1965 proved to be the most fruitful and exciting
time for the project. A grant from the Danforth Foundation and one
from the Robert Wethcrill Trainer Memorial Fund of Chester,
Pennsylvania, made it possible to go to Europe. My wife and I visited
the Frege Archives in Münster, Germany, and received permission
from Professor Hans Hermes to read some of Frege's unpublished
works and letters. At Fribourg, Switzerland, we met Ignacio Ange-
lelli, who generously provided information and biographical data
which he had gathered over several years. In London I talked with
Rudolf Carnap about his experiences as a student in Frege s courses
at Jena University. At Bertrand Russelfs home in Wales I discussed
with him his discovery of Russell's Paradox and his subsequent cor-
respondence with Frege. Conversing with Russell over tea and read
ing Frege's original letters at Russell's desk are among the most
memorable events of the project for me.
By the end of the summer of 1965 I realized that a Frege renaj^s-
sance' was under way in América and Europe. Frege s phdosophy
was being studied avidly, and some of his works, mcludmg the
Begriffsschrifu were to appear in English. I was disappomted to learn
 PREFACE ix
V"' PREFACE
that my translation would not be the first into print; but my proiect ledgcmcnts are also diic to Gcorg Olms Verlagsbuchhandiung and
was well advanced, and I resolved to finish it. A Fregc biography Harvard University Press for permission to publish my translation
now would be even more timely, and a second translation could be of the Be^rijfsschrift.
beneficial in brmging out difTerences of interpretation. It is impossible to cxpress fully my gratitude lo my wife, Aliñe,
The first draft of the present volunte was written at Princeton whose encouragement, translatíng skills, and crilical and secretarial
Universtty dunng 1965 and 1966 on a grant from the Danforth eíTorts wcre indispensable to the success of this project.
ountoion. In completmg the translations, I benefited especially
from my wife, Aliñe, who aiso shared Albany, New York
20 March 1972
WbLgraphV^^'^'"^''"®' endiess,job of compiiing the
The volume was prepared with two major objectives in mind;(1)
to serve as an mtroduction to Frege's eariy philosophy, and (2) to
rsTnTntr H r' rosearch. The student using the book
™ssir nü n" 'he more teehnical
íirarks p ^"holar could forgo the more elementary
lopirallv ^ ^ themselves, rather íhan appearing chrono-
two latp' u" 'hat makes them easier to understand—
aim of tíip^fi'^ T respectively the justification and the
readerwilirfnTsf" Begriffsschrift itself. The
essav and fhe hetween the biographical
on Its
its own without
tu' reference
® fa'roduction, since each was written to stand
to the other

man^^^Znlp"!*'''' from the help of

wh^eenLousí ™ ""'«hted to my friend Ignacio Angelelli
2courser ' to profit from his wide knowledge and
hébedTn wa 7' A. Thomas who has
Sed topTf too subtie to describe. I am in-
ÍaSlwfv bef 777^"^ Radolf Carnap,and 1 regret that they
fuTtfpre^r S'^titude in print. I am grate-
thl manu crb:; "Ú E- Jordán for reading
I have benefitpH^i criticisms and suggestíons.
Fidaríans Church Dagfinn
Günther 'pat ' "'teiithal, Montgomery Furth, William Kneale,
tbtrod, ced R^omrb. who first
and wispc i°t °f'o" been a source of encouragement
that^ri H f ■ t° the late John R. Parsons and sorry
The cltnd" 7V P°'trait of Frege on the Frontispiece.
nrenarino provided valuable advice and assistance in
of «reat servid
OI great service in helpmg to prepare and SandyofSavage
the Index Shufelt
Ñames. was
Acknow-

V, . .'íM

tt
 CONTENTS

ON THE LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE

1
§1. Introduction
§2. Family Background 2
2
§3. Boyhood
3
§4. University Studies
4
§5. Habilitation
6
§6. Between Habilitation and Conceptual Notation*
10
§7. Conceptual Notation
15
§8. Reception of Conceptual Notation
§9. Between Conceptual Notation and Foundations ofArithmetic 20
24
§10. Foundations of Arithmetic
28
§11. Reception oí Foundations of Arithmetic
§12. Between Foundations of Arithmetic and Basic Laws of 30
Arithmetic I
34
§13. Basic Laws of Arithmetic I
37
§14. Reception ofBasic Laws ofArithmetic I. Frege and Peano
41
§15. Between Basic Laws of Arithmetic Iand Russell's Paradox
46
§16. Russell's Paradox: Frege and Russell
50
§17. After Russell's Paradox
55
editor's introduction

translations of frege's works

83
On the Scientific Justification of a Conceptual Notation
On the Aim of the "Conceptual Notation" 90

101
Conceptual Notation
204
Applications of the "Conceptual Notation
* 'Conceptual notation' is the English translation of Frege's term 'Begriffs-
schrift' In the present volume, when 'conceptual notation' appears in italics, it
refers tó Frege's book; when it is enclosed in double quotation marks,it denotes
Frege's symbolic language; when neither occurs, it means simply a language
like Frege's.
xii
CONTENTS
appendix i: reviews of the Conceptual Noiation by
fregeos CONTEMPORARIES 209
ON THE LIFE AND WORK OF
appendix II: evaluations of frege's Conceptual GOTTLOB FREGE
Notation by present-day scholars 236
§1. INTRODUCTION
A frece bibliography, 1873-19661 239
The works of Frege 240 During the past twenly ycars, Gottlob Frege has become one of
248
the most studied modcrn philosophers. Because of the present strotig
Secondary Sources emphasis ¡n philosophy upoti logic and litiguistic a.ialys,s the works
Additional Sources 270 of Frege are of primary interest, since he(1) revolutiomzed logtc and
289
senrantics,(2)¡nitiated the "linguistic turn" in philosophy.(3) riiadc
índex
a major contribution to the philosophy of mathemat.cs and (4)
t Items in the bibhography are rcferred to in the text by their serial rtuntl't''®' significantly influenccd leading scholars hke Peano, Husserl, Rtissell,
Wittgcnstein, Carnap, and Church.
Given thcse facts, it is astonishing that no major biography of
Frege was cver published; and it is tragic that the present biographical
sketch was made only after the Second World War,in which valuable
records and documents were destroyed (including a biography of
Frege by his adoptcd son Alfred).i Even before the war, the amount
of inaterial avaiiable would have been small. Now, relevant informa-
tion is scarce indeed; and the following account liad to be pieced
together from biographical fragments gathered from many places.
Very little is knowti about Frege's personality and prívate life, so
the prLent elTort must deal, for the most part, w.th hts works and
the main events in his career. A sketchy account, at least, can be
given of his person and eharaeter. A deseription from W.ttgenstem
Ld an extatit photograph3 y.yeal that"Frege was a
with a short beard,"who bounced around the room when he talked .
It is clearLm eisting records and Frege's wntmgs that he was a
^ Listed (1935) .m the .VI» íitems ¡n the Bibliography of the present
numbers)as among the documents in the
volume are rcferred to by (gj. Germany. However,Professor Hans
Frege Archives at the University biography is unknown to him and
Hcrmes at Münster has mformed me bmgrap y
must have been lost during the Second World War.
® Included in S22. . ^ frontispiece of the present volume is based
The portrait which appea provided from the Archives of
upon that photograph, which g indebted to Professor
Jena University by Protessor . • n^otograph's existence and enabling
Ignazio Angelelli for mformmg me of the pnotogr p
me to obtain it.
8243501

• • ''V*' '- :.
I
V'v
'i ':X
2 UFE ANDWORKOFGOTTLOB FRECE LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE 3

He was an effect¡vra''ndtonrc''^ remarkable energy and persistcnce. wliole pcriod in Wismar (a ílourishing commercial town, with a
explaining very complex materia"'He h'^^H í'"'' populalion of about 12,000, and one of ihe best harbours on the
Baltic). Frcge's family, like most familics in the región, was Lutheran.
could cut to the heart of a nmM logical insighl which
polemicist. When aroused he always a formidable His father died in 1866 whilc Fregc was still at the Gptj/iasi'um in
bis only major interests were hhZ v ^ ñongue/' Apparently, Wismar, whicii he attended for five years (1864-9) under the head-
. Throughout bis lífe Fr^r mastcrs Krain (father and son). He passed his graduation examina-
just a boy, bis fatber died I P'^Sued by tragedy. When he was tion (A/?in/r) in the spring of 1869 and immediately entcred Jena
ied young, and then bis wifí> marricd, bis children University.
formal system in which to derive^^f^h ^^^"ty-five years developing a This is all that is known at present about Frege's early life. There
that ene of bis assumptions can Je may have been many more details about this pcriod in tlic biography
of Frege that his adopted son Alfred gave to Professor Heinrich
w 1bise hemonumental achievementc
was alive; and ^
bis death' Jo-?^ '"oceived ín spite
little recognilion Scholz for the Fregc Archives in Münster in the 1930s.'
he seholarly world. It i onlvt ^nnotmed by
has arisen. and bis woJk^are h ^ ^ "general interest in his §4. UNIVERSITY STUDIES
s betng Widely rcad and discussed. Again, unfortunately, almost nothing is known about Fregc s life
as a university student, except the courses and professors he had. It is
olear, howcver, that he impressed his teachers as a bright, assiduous
on^Líuic Sf^■^CKground
Friedrich Ludwi'
MecMenburg Germany (in young man p but it is unknown, for example, where or how he lived,
or what induced him to move to Goltingen University after two years
F"mS"í,í" '■was«Sí;
Hamburo c a businec' Goiihb Emanuel
at Jena.-
Frege spent four semesters at Jena, from the spring of 1869 to the
winter of 1870. His professors were Geuther in chemistry; Fischer in
blotzky (9_i87of girls' school His m ,t founder philosophy; and Abbe, Schaeffer, and Snell in mathematics.^ During
Hter princ¡n!i Frege was B ^"£<^510 Biallo- his five semesters at Gottingen (Easter 1871-December 1873) he
Folish extra r ° school He was a teacher and studied philosophy of religión under Lotze; physics under Weber and
in the area S'°n- aiso ñame may indícate Riecke; and mathematics under Clebsch, Schering, and Voss.-^
* See S253 and footnote ! to §1 above.
Arnold Freee ^ ^^'®oburg región sinr^ ° peoples who
P-£e's brotheS " « W'" century A.a
io52, may have been
^ This was the descriptlon of Frege as a student included in an officíal memor
ándum from Professor Cari Snell to Professor Ernst Haeckel at Jena University.
^^"pcrLrpt Ernst Abbe. who had gone to both Jena and Gottingen himself, and
who donated millions of dollars (through the Cari Zeiss Síi/íiws) to Jena ín an
Almost nothing is ®°^HOO0 eíTort to make it as good as Gottingen, persuaded Frege to go to Gottingen in
order to get the best education possible, and then return to Jena to teach. Abbe
Was always impressed with Frege's great ability in logic and mathematics.
= From a Lebenslauf submittcd by Frege to Gottingen University on 12
■--«..a.,,,, ••"-PParentlyspentthis August 1873. r 11 •
* The courses which Frege took at Gottingen were the following:
Summcr 1871- Anaíytic Geometry with Professor CIcbsch, Images of Sur-
15 «n 2 August 1873. faces with Professor Clebsch, Functions of Complex Variables with
Professor Schering, Philosopliy of Religión with Professor Lotze.
"itrom the Frankfurt Goethe Winter 1871-2: Experimental Physics with Professor Weber.
[cont. onp.4
* work OF GOTTLOB FREGE LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE 5
and which she was then dirccting, was suíTicient lo support herself and

with Scherins in r.Ktti ' n-

he'sf^h"' of complex
Abbe in Jcna° and
her son.
Anothcr document which Fregc submitted was the article "Methods
a functional calculas coma' ' whlch dcvclops of Calculaíion Bascd upon an Amplification of the Concept of
te logic,' was apparentlv '"s great contribulions Magnitude", whicii was his Hahilitationsschrift? In March 1874
tion. composed at Gottingen bcfoce bis gradua- Professor Ernst Abbe submitted to the University officials a report
on this paper.'* The report shows that the Jena mathematics faculty
"'etrical disscrtation, On a Geo- were most impressed by Fregc's Schrift. Abbe found it to be erudite,
granted the decree of Dn^t lZ « Plane,^ and was clear, and to the point; bearing the mark of truc originality and
December of that year ° Philosophy in Góttingen on 12 extraordinary creatlve powcrsj and containing novel points of view,
sagacious explanations, and surprising relations among widely
separated regions of analysis. He speculated that it might contain the
§5. HABILITATION seeds of a comprehensive new point of view which, when fully
As soon as he received his Ph n t? developed, would atlain a durable significance for mathematical
Erast Abbe) applicd for a tP i- ' sponsored by analysis. Thus, Abbc's report was a truly impressive recommendation
several documenís he submitt^^ Position at Jena. Among the and, as it lurned out, a remarkable piece of foresight.
that she would support hím i ■ statement from his mother Since Frege's documenís were acceptable, he was admitted to an
salaried.2 At that time she'w P^^^ion he sought was un- oral examination on 18 April 1874.-'^ The questions asked were very
the income from the girls' school^ ''"t apparently general ones related to topics in Frege's Habilitatiomschrift. At the
end the committee was satisfied that Frege had mastered liis subject
Sum™ had founded matter and achieved defensible views; but they were less impressed
Wimer'l872-3'^rforr'
maticfli TI, '0<-ir-hour Dhvsirc uu Professor
. WWebcr.
b than they liad been by tlie Habilitationsschrifí itself, since Frege's
■^ieche, Mathe- answers were "neither quickwitted ñor ñuenf.®
Having sustained his oral examination, Frege was recommended
Schering. Selected
by the committee for acceptance into the University. They requested
speed in accepting him, because Professor Snell was not well, and
Frege was willing to take ovar part of Snell's duties. On 6 May he was
admitted as a lecturer {Privatdozent), provided that he would sustain
pús is Fz"?SS"' ^ prcsent section. a public disputation and present a satisfactory trial lecture. By 18
" "S virtually unstudied^F °f ¡nteresf aíd P''"''^"'"^S"ires griinden. May these requirements had been fulfilled;' and Frege had become
Pmfessor An8elel|¡wl:^°rt™Mely,
--.w^ovi rtngeie]irsrpnr:„f 7^ this circumctn^
^nis dro,' ™Pwtance; but, thus lai,
uui, mus far,
a member in good standing of Jena's mathematics faculty.®

Slxpber
psT'eemely"geometrillZn there"^eis =» See footnote 6 of §4, and also F2 of the Bibliography below.
• Apparently sent to Professor Ernst Haeckel on 30 March 1874.
® Given by Professors Abbe, Fortlage, Geuther, Haeckel, E. Schmid, M.
Bíbliography, pi t?- • ® ^^rstelhmg der •
and important material. Uis^I Schmidt, and Strasburger.
® From a report on Frege's examination to the University officials submitted
' From a re "ncluded in F'52 contain interesting by Professor Haeckel on the afternoon of 18 April 1874.
' The public disputation was held on Saturday, 16 May 1874 at 10 a.m.; and

SSlPiSS-ss!"-- the trial lecture was given at noon on the followíng Monday.
® Fregc worked most of his Ufe on problems in mathematics and philosophy;
and it is likely that he discussed his work with fellow faculty members in those
two disciplines. Mathematics and philosophy faculty members who were at Jena
« UFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FRECE LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FRECE 7
SS. BETWEEN HAB.L.TATION AND CONCEPTUAL spondcd with many Europcan scholars, incliiding such important
notation
people as Husserl, Peano, Russell, Hilbert, Lowenheim,and Wittgen-
Thus, in the summer semester nf tr stcin.= He met Lukasicwicz, Wittgcnstein, and Vailati(and, no doubt,
career. His Ufe durine fortv 'i'S teaching many others). He pubÜshed 40 works during his lifelime, including
and hermit-like as is commLi secludcd 4 books, 24 articles, S revicws and 4 commcnls and remarks.^ He
the Deutsche Akademie der N t ^o^ay. He was a member of aiso wroic a scorc of other works which did not appear bcfore his
matemático di PaJermo death, but have recenlly been published in one volumc/^
^chaftfür Medicin uitd Natu ■ ° ^^25), the Jenaische Gescll- The happicst period of Fregc's profcssional career appears to have
the Deutsche t° '917), and been the beginning, wliile he was a lecturer {Privaidozent). He was
read several
three papers at meetine.w
years—1899-1901_he '^97 to 1925). For
organizations.' He 2 The following is a list of thosc who are known to have had corrcspondence
with Frcec Whercvcr possible. the date of the corrcspondence and the number of
Johannes Thomae) of the L7™ Treasurer (along with extant pagcs (if any) are includcd. Many of thcsc Icltcrs contain intercsting and
"^g^n'^ation. He corre-
important technical disciissions which oiight to be published.
at JenaR "unng F^ege^s forty.four year, ,h. ■ , Avenarius
Ballue
1882
1895-7 6
6
I1 page
page

Couturat 1899-1906 12
12
Mathematics:
Darmstaedler 1913 and 1919 2
2
KarírT^'^''^^®) Dingler 1917 6
6
Falchenberg 1890 11
Hilbert 1895-1903 22
22
Hónigswaid 1925 5
Huntington ? 3
Husserl 1891-1906 10
10
Jourdain 1902-14 29
29
^oben Karl Hermán Í '^08) Klein 1881 1
1
Philosophy: Haussner (1905-31) Knoch
Koebner
1893
1891
2
2
2
Arnold'ioV^GÍr/p'^^:^^;
August Julius
74-85) Korselt
Lowenheim
1903
?
5
5
none
none

Mayor 1896-8 4
4
Hermann Guido (1871-6) Pasch 1894-1903 10
10
(1873-5) Peano 1894—1903 20
20
Russell 1902-12 51
51
Scheibc 1919 1
1
Schlomilch 1881 II
Ulrici 1881 11
Vailati 1904-6 3
3
Wittgcnstein 1910 or 1911 none
An unknown number of Frege letters were lost during the Secoiid World War.
These include the large corrcspondence with Lowenheim mentioned in S253.
Wittgcnstein mcntions his corrcspondence with Frege in the quotation included
in S22; but so far there is no trace of Ihem. Perhaps the Second World War
claimed them as wcll.

^S:S!ar^~ (Most of the extant letters, and perhaps all of them, are collected at the Frege
Archives in Münster, Germany.)
® See the Bibliography below.
* These are edited by H. Mermes, et al., and published (1969) by Félix Memer
in Hamburg, Germany. See F45.
 ját

8 life and work of gottlob frece LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FRECE
For Frcge it was especially important to get the fundamental
malhemalical sludents at points absolutely pcrfect—to make complelely olear the root
DtónfthTs b ° Ive" ""T"'
courses and published fcle
f"'"--
extra-heavy load of
concepls and basic assumptions upon which a discipline is built.
Indeed, this was the chief aim of all his major works and the root of
a little book {Conceptual Notar Seomelry, and most of his criticisni of other scholars.
later scholars would come to r/"" °" matlicmatics that This desire for clarily and correctness at the fundamental level,
From the hpainn; V as monumental, together with a seemingly insignificant revicw which Frege published
particularly in 1878 when n unusually large, during his first year of teaching,® may have bcen the origin of his idea
volunteered to taL over n. 7^?^ i"- ^regc for a project that shaped his career and consumed most of his vorking
carry fais own load besides so doT'' mathematics and life—namely, proving that ariíhmetic is a branch of logic. The book
gapmthemathematicalteacbina ' a" intolerable that Frege rcviewed was H. Secger's The Elemenís of Anthmetic,^°
could be acquired a yearTr J°'^^""^sThomac which was meant to explain to students the fundamentáis of arith-
him to sacrifice much of extra teaching ccrtainly forced metic. Frege's main criticisms are that the basic laws of arithmetic
making great strides in logic and jusí when lie was are left unproved and the fundamental concepts are poorly defined:
for the sake of the stu7etrm7k* designcd his lectures Aftcr somc parlially unfortunatc cxplanations of the calculating opera-
tions and thcir symbols,some propositions are prescnted in the second and
avoiding unnecessary comniexitv Tf ^ thoughtful and third chapters undcr the title of "the fundamental theorcms and the most
appreciated by the conseípnt;^ ^ his courses were much essential transformation formulas". Thcse propositions, which actually
seems to have been true from T ^^o attended them. This form the foundation of the wholc of arithmetic, are lumped together
end. Rudolph Carnap, who atte^deíF without proof; while, later, theorems of a much more limitcd importance
who is perhaps Frege's ereatP./ 7 ® courses in 1910-13, and are distinguished with particular ñames and proved in detail. ... The
amplification of concepts which is so highly important for arithmetic,
inspiration I received from im' ^ í"eports: "the most fruitful and is often the source of great confusión for the student, Icaves much to
those in the fields of philosonhT!'7^
fther from the lectures of Fr.
not come from
">^'11=0,31105 proper, but be desircd. ... The result of all these deficiencies will be that the student
will nierely memorize the laws of arithmetic and become accustomed to
fields".' °f F'ege on the borderlands between those being satisficd with words he does not understand.^^
Frege was not only an pff..,-
upon those who attended his lectur demanding Perhaps it was his disappointment with Seeger's book that gave
Umverstty offieials in Januarv mo W''work for the Frege the idea of wriling a olear, exact presentation of the funda
courses were little suited to niLe 1 reported that Frege's mental notions of arithmetic. The very things that he finds lacking in
I is just an exercise fo fu! "for whom Seeger's book—olear definitions of fundamental arithmetical
by yutue of the great clSld?" ' concepts and proofs of the basic laws of arithmetic—become the
major aims of his whole logistic programme. Conceptual Notation,^^
intr f ° "looghtfulness of °f his expression and by the first of four volumes devoted to the project, was completed four
'"toduce aspiring listeners to the d «1 is particularly fit to years after the appearance of the review in questíon enough time
leftu 7 repeatedlv^'"! ®"^'''''"'"'hcn""'<=al to conceive a plan and publish a little book about it.
Ivervy fundamental
J appeTredt
point."8 be "PP^^'-ndy to hear
absolutely perfect on We shall probably never learn whether or not this actually was the
path that led Frege to his logistic programme. From this point on.
® Frnm 5í ...1 • .
Profeso" Dr' «"-"ten by Abbc on 10 I
Unívepity ArchiSrr °/ '<="-. ProfesTor « am indebted to ® F3
" H SecRcr Die Elemente der Arithmeíik (Schwerin i. M.: A. Hildebrand,
" Also from 81^°' this docu^^ "^"eeldli. and the Jena
, '.wiu.;
1874). ' " From F3. "F7.
"om A34, p. 4.
 10 UFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE 11

endeavoured to fulfil this requirement to the strongest degree, I found an

own accomit^n°hT<5^h developed, since we have Frege's obstacle in the inadequacy of the language; despite all the unwieldiness
basic laws of arithmetic he ha"d7o d'' í!'® of the expressíons, the more complex the relations became, the less pre
proof. He tells us thaf" ^ ,1 decide what would constitute a cisión—which my purpose required—could be obtained. From this de-
into two kinds: the proof of the fir! ^ ficiency aróse the idea of the "conceptual notation
while that of the second mi.cf k proceed purely logically,
reasons which he lat a ^"PPorted by empirical facts"." For Thus confronted with the inadequacy of ordinary language, Frege
Arithmetic Freee IT T Foundations of was forced to use a more exacting one. Basing himself upon Leibniz's
programme for a universal language," and drawing upon his training
pendent
proofs ofofthe~al
exSn» Thhf:::®'
r'^"' ""^metic are inde-
his own principies, and interest in functional analysis, he developed a language custom-
give such proofs however proceed purely logically. To made for his purposes. In order to achieve the most accuracy and
mental concepts'and nn^' ^''eved he had to define the funda- avoid all error, he laid down very strict requirements.
and operations of logic. To achí "sing oniy concepts
(1) "reduce the conceot of n h devised the plan to (1) Ambiguity must be banned. Each symbol or combination of
logical ordering"-i5 c.a ^ ®""S-in-a-sequence to the notion of symbols must keep in the same conlext the meaning it is originally
given in that context.®
'number', 'magnitude' dcñnitions of
laws of arithmetic usiiig onirthev H"fi (2) All assumptions must be clearly stated. There must be no implicit
book. Conceptual Notnn^ • "^efin'tions and logic." His first presuppositions.^

liM otdaing-, Hr,
deals with the defimtion<= „r •
FinalIy,histwo-volumemfl»,?5
contains his proofs of the
the fimH
fundamental principies
In
•in the
ine Kbeginning
• Frí>
(Germán) in reducing the^nne"^^'r^''
oflogical ordering^Lt he
^ities and inaceuracy that
impossible;
was most import^rtrCp th?c1,r'
-^-faceot.,
in einer ReihTauf
work (see p. 173 beIow?íf ^
sequence" is toH.
te^inoTogl
ancestral. ' wished to give a purely lomeaiV^
" See tke Preface of F7.
■»"»'
bo„j """"»
. of Arithmetic,
'zero', *one', and so on.
Basic Lawsofofarithmetic.
Arithmetic
NOTATION
ordinary language
"'"«""g-m-a-sequence to that
lo'ckly discouraged by ambi-
"gorous, dependable arguraents
"onoticed here, it
sr
Preface of F7 k
«1®^ Anordnung
Frege caTI^ »?i-' 1^0"^ §26 of that
ordering-ín-a-
' today's
formulation of the proper-
" F23 and F30.
(3) The modes of inference must be as simple as possible and re-
stricted to as few as possible. They must be syntactically defined,
so that strict adherence to grammar will ensure correctness of
reasoning.®
(4) The two-dimensionality of the writing surface must be exploited
for the sake of perspicuity. The various logical interrelations
among the parts of a proposition or a proof must be clearly
illustrated in a two-dimensional display, thus making the nota
tion as easy to read as possible.®
Because of these rigorous requirements, Frege could not have
used ordinary language, or even the various systems of logical
notation that were then available. Ordinary language obviously
would not suffice; its words and phrases are often, indeed nearly
always, ambiguous, having many diíTerent meanings which are
^ From the Preface of F7. ^ »
»3 See, for example, Leibniz's "A Specimen of the Universal piculus .
3gg F11 ^ Preface of F7.
® See F7 and F11. . . , . 1 • 1 • c ♦
® See F11 and F12 Frege attached no logical or ontological significance to the
two-dimensionality of his notation. The two-dimensioiiality was purely prag-
tnatic: merely a means of aehieving maximuni perspicuity.
 lipe and work of gottlob frege LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE 13

He then had tools for expressing logical relations among assertible

ÍoSLT'I i" a one-dimcnsional contents {beurtheilbare Inhalte)\^- but he still had to express relations
s^lTé JZTl- the othcr); but Frcge within such contents. It is at this point that he made, perhaps, his
grcatest contribution to logic. Drawing upon a rich background in
Finallv in display, to achievc máximum pcrspicuity.
andmodeqof ^'í»course, assumptíons are frequently implicit, the mathematical iheory of complex functions, and the ground-
and carefuUy^Z'uld breaking rescarch which he' had done on functions as a student,"
apparently unaware at fhp f prolixity. Frcge was Frege ingeniously regarded sentences as functions of the ñames
notations such as fhm c Í"^? P''oject, of existíng symbolic occurring within them, treating property-expressions as functions of
would not have fulfillL°his°° Schroder; but those notations one argument, and relation-e.xpressions as functions of two or more
tained ambiguities and ^^'^"■remcnts anyway. They too con- arguments, and adding what would later be called "variable-binding
needed some logic difTerln^f quantifiers".
modernized and fnrtti a Aristotelian kind, evcn in the Frege was at last equipped to begin the first phase of his logistic
and others had presented Boo\c, Schroder, programme—reducing the concept of ordering-in-a-sequence to
that of logical ordering; and he published the results in his book
Conceptual Notation, a work which is now recognized as a landmark
developasymboHcW^^ own notation. He had not planned to
almost by accident a h ^ í^orced to do so, becoming a logician in the history of logic, making 1879 "the most important date in the
history of the subject"." It attained a standard of rigour and correct-
ma^or^advanceinlog¡c"incerrrotle''"' ' ncss that went unrivalled for more than forty years, and the list of
inventions and "firsts" that appear in its brief eighty-eight pages is
oíKrt/o«í(o/"j
and assenions udgemenfs"^^^^^^
of loain /c ' exprcss and analyse
callad Ihen) of mathematics truly impressive:^®
He believed rJ SfS'w''
the meaning co/ííen/?—'v
^hougUt").'
which concerned him related
(1) The invention of logical functions;
(2) The invention of quantification theory;
these®—of Buc~rtions°S",!l- (3) The first appearance of the functional calculus of first order;
conceptual contents of as^Prtío ' ,^°^8ht a symbolic language of (4) The first application of the logistic method;
"conceptual notation"« A ^ appropriately called a (5) The first formulation of the propositional calculus as a
contents of assertions woulH "^^dern ñame for conceptual logistic system;
terms, one would sav (6) The first definition of an ancestral of a relation ;
say th.t
that 1.1
FregeÍ^^^Positions'
sought « symbolic logia of proposF
more familiar
(7) The first logical analysis of proof by mathematical induction
or recursion;
0) assert them, (2) denyThem^ nf í propositions are
them, and (5) disjoin them vll i them, (4) conjoin " Beurtheileii means "to judge"; so 'beurtheilbare Inhalí\ taken literally mcans
"judicable content", and indeed this is how Jourdain gee F38) transíales i
these, and then used ncRatión a a ^ symbols for the first three of Russell fin S241') uses "propositional content , Geach (m F 47) employs possible
and disjunction.il Since hp d " '^?"'^^^'®"^^ityto define conjunction con^m óf jud e^ Bauer-Mengelberg (see F7) suggests "content that
that two formulas exp^s tuf ^he fact can becomc a judgcment". Baüer-Mengclberg's rcndenng seems to be. strictly
spcaking, closest to the mark, though unwieldy and inconvenient.
a sign for identity of content conceptual content, he added Because a judgement for Frege is an asscrtcd content. I render 6e»rr/,e//6nre
Inbair by "assertible content". A content for Frcge becomes a judgement by
: Z^Se wX'"s" e'^pf P'=face of F7 being asserted and only assertible contents can bccome judgements; so assert
ible content" seems to be the bcst convenicnt translation.
" See F2 and the discussion of it in the P'
" From S167, p. 511. " See S54, p. 268 and A70. p. 126.
'" '^"'"Mlbare Inhalf see " See S66, A40, AÍ24, and A125.
 UFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FRECE LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE 15

Waismann. It was more than two decades after the Conceptual Nota-
^'tionaTconn^V''^ and justify axioms
(9)The firT.
'"="1°''" '« define proposi- tion first appeared that these latter scholars began to do philosophy
with logical analysis.
With the publication of Frege's book, a logical renaissance occur-
(10)Thefirstc"lear°conLTen'fa^'
OI)The first dear
^ logistic systcm: red;2í but no one seemed to see it at the time. More than twenty
inference d.st.nction between axioms and rules of years passed before the greatness of Frege's achievement was sensed
by Bertrand Russell;-- and fifty more years elapsed before it could be
Besides all thpc#» « u* generally appreciated.^^
ushered in the so-calleH' ^""cepnial Noiaiion aiso Frege himselfseemed to be unaware that he had made monumental
Prefaee, Frege suggests that'sfmfir"" P^fosopliy.'» In the strides in logic. For him, his "conceptual notation" was not a logical
only illusions arisins fro P^iíosophical problems are really calculus, but a language to serve as a tool for his logistic programme;
assertsthatphilosopLrsconM^'^u^^^^ language; and early in 1879 he lectured to his colleagues in the Jenaische
and resolve such illusions Th i "ewly invented logic to and he
expose Gesellscliaft für Medicin und Naturwissenscliaft, demonstrating how
I is the first so-called ^É'cal language developed in Chapter his notation could be used to express propositions of geometry and
arithmetic.^" At that time he did not mention any new advances in
sophical problems.(Specifica 11
Propositions? Do their nrnnf
^®^'Sned to tacklc philo-
nature of mathematical logic.
purely logical?) The secnnrí ^mpirical evidence? Are they Though he apparently did not realize what a milestone he had
of an "ideal language" to a the first application established in logic, he was aware that he had improved it to some
are the laws of thought and Problem—namely,"What degree, for in the Prefaee of his book, he claimed to have done so,
them?" the interconnections that hold among and he correctly judged that one of his most important contributions
After the publication nf th would prove to be the introduction of logical functions.
tarn had been made* but "linguistic Some other advancements which he noted in the Prefaee were that
his notation would allow us to (1) fill in the logical gaps in existing
On Sense and Denotation" tl Í Founclations ofArithmetic, symbolic languages like those in arithmetic, geometry,and chemistry;
ínfluenced philosophers like R of Arithmeticf^ that (2) combine these sepárate languages into a single one; and (3)
construct other symbolic languages for fields such as kinematics and
17 „Strictly
. speakine F ' ^^rnap, Wittgenstein, and
mechanics. Thus, he believed that his Conceptual Notation was a step
towards Leibniz's dream of a universal language, rather than an
"Fregehimcoif.4-
"earSt aSoS mechanically used
are interpreted attempt to develop an abstract logic or calculus ratiocinator.^^
§8. RECEPTION OF CONCEPTUAL NOTATION
Because of the publication of the Conceptual Notation, 1879 was an
important year in Frege's life. It was important also because he was
"See Al27.
(c) Frege'f ^n«l ^rst u"sed •ogic, which "See S241 and Al39.
^ In the 1950s,interest in Frege began to grow; translations appeared and wider
linguistic Dhiln espoused views whiVh Philosophical problems. distribution of his works resulted.
oí- a generally associatcd with
This was the paper F8.
fogical structi.'"7 ary language freaii!¡^ h Í grammatical structurc "When he discusses these Leibnizian terms, Frege refers to Trendelenburg,
of dees not correspond to its
"Über Leibnizes Entwurf einer allgemeinen Charakteristik", Historische
(see Fll and th which can best be recn/ pseiido-probicms Beiírage zitr Philosophie, vol. 3, pp. 1-47. See S122.
F14, F20 and careful logical analysis
' ^23 respectively.
 m

16 LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FRECE LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE 17

prometed to the position of ausserordenílicher Professor} With th¡s For thcse reasons it was a very difiicult book to read; and because of
promotion he received a salary for the first time and could support all the symbois il was a bit frightening at first sight.
uimself and even a family. As a result, many readers misconstrued the aim of the book, and
it was misjudged and rejected by those who should have weleomed it.
hv granted on the strength of a recommcndation This was tragic, for Frege, an exceptionally lueid lecturer, was adept
sunnnrtpr af t' was Frege's best fricnd and strongest at introducing complicated mathematical notions to beginning
versitv fivp V ^ Frege had givcn the Uni- students;® and it is a mystery that he failed to exercise his rare talent
had taken n ° ^xcellent teaching, had carried an overload, and in his book.
sing the nnbrf Professor Snell. Then, in discus- At least six scholars, some of them very able logicians, reviewed
percentive rnm^ Notation, Abbe made somc Frege's book in the journals;« but none of them saw the great logical
that reveal unnT^T^ contains, he said, very original ideas advances. Lasswitz,' the most sympathetic of the reviewers, con-
"will be affectpH^^ i^iental powers. He speculated that mathematics sidered the Conceptual Notation "a valuable contribution to the
very little bv ih considerably, but immediately only theory of thinking", thus more of an epistemological or even psycho-
-"thor and the eontent of the logical study than an eífort to devise tools for rigorous demonstra-
appealingLo
of knowledge" and
^ome mathematieians "find little that is
'"^o the formal interrelationships
tions of mathematical propositions. He correctly judged, however,
that Frege's notion offunctions is interesting and perhaps important;
a positioron ^ble, off hand, to take although he made no further claims for it.
"it will probablv hp^^ eluster of ideas in this book"; thus, Hoppe® was also sympathetic, but he missed the point completely.
Abbe's Lt " appreeiated by only a few". Frege, in a few passages,® mentions certain features of classical logic
Frege presentedinTh^^^^^ remarkably prophetic. The ideas that that he exeludes from his own logic because they are not needed for
he adopted, heloed to ^otation, and the logistic position his purposes. Hoppe interpreted these remarks as criticisms of clas
diately, only three derJn^ mathematies—but not imnie- sical logic and the main thrust of the book. He expressed doubt that
Principia Maihematirrfl fv> indirectly, through the anything new had been gained from Frege's notation itself, but saw
"in all questions of InJ- f Whitehead, whose chief debt much of valué in the criticism of existing logic. He concluded that
the book was worth while.
Michaélis^® had a less favourable reaction. He considered the
understood and appreeiated b^^T
statement. For vears vírt n ° ^
probably be
proved to be an under- Conceptual Notation an eífort to advance logic, and concluded that it
was not an improvement, but, indeed, a step backwards! Frege
^onceptional
Part of theNotation and"L^
responlnh^ "o one but Frege
f T- understood
appreeiated it. the exeludes from his logic certain things from classical logic, such as
Frege's. He presented in w ^"fortúnate state of affairs was the subject-predicate distinction andthedistinctionbetweenapodictic
but they were abstract anH profound ideas, and assertoric statements. Michaélis saw this as removing part of the
already meagre eontent of logic; and he criticized Frege for not
reader tograsp;exolain
not thoroughly and Frege
tti dif t Prepare his readers well. He did adding more things:"One must not only criticize, he must contribute
did not make it clear that h' his symbolic language; he constructively." , ~ , r- n•
reasoning in proofs of matí.^ "otation was a device to ensure correct One of the most negative reviews was that of Paúl Tannery in
explain why the notation Propositions. Also, he did not France. Apparently, he merely skimmed the book and really did not
why existing notations fhp ^ unusual two-dimensional form,
as those of Boole and Sch?\? know about them)such ® See SI and the discussion oHt m tWs
® These reviews are SI35, SI7o, S205, S25 , , ^» See F7,§§3-4.
^ Annrn' ' ^*0^ his purpOSeS. 'See SI76. 8 See S135.
See S205. "See S283.

* See the Preface of S242. 8243501 C

 LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE 19
18 LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGH
There seem to be scvcral reasons why Vcnn and Schroder so
know what was in it. He asserted that it contains liltic more than an
exp anation of the symbolism, though ihis conslitulcs only ihe first completcly miscoiistrued the aim and natiire of Frege's logic. First,
when Lasswilz rcviewed the Conceptual Notation, he attackcd the
° mises, claimed
le, in reality, that thechaplcr
the sccond applications rcmain
provides proofsonly
of Boole-Schrodcr notalions as "onesided" and considercd Frege's
symbolic languagc prcferable in some respecls. Schroder had read
thought", and the third chaplcr contains deriva- ihis revicw before he wrote bis own," and he was ihus led lo consider
He rnnc"^ ^ proposltions from "a general theory of scqucnccs". Frege's "conceptual notation" as a threatening alternativc to his own
modilicd Boolcan notation.*^
and nredie^^ Frege's replaccmcnt of the notions of subject The misconstrual of Frege's aim might have been avoided, perhaps,
function and argument, though actually
it was a major advance in logic. if he had chosen a diíTerent tille for his book. He seems to have made
revicws werc ihose of Venn^- a singularly unfortunate choicc. The whole tille reads Conceptual
Notation, a Formula Language of Puré Thought Modelled upan the
logicians whn ^^'""^any. Both men were formidable Formula Language of Arithmetic. Now,formulas in Boolean notation
a great advanre ! welcomed the Conceptual Noiaiion as actually look like equations of arithmetic, so Boole's symbolic
clumsy and hardlv rejected Frege's notation as language is certainly "modelled upon arithmetic". Furthermore,
great achievement^
since the symbol for a concept {Begriff m' Germán) could be callad a
tual Notation to Rn ^^"stantly compared the Concef term, a concept-notation {Begriffsschrift in Germán) could easily be
aims of both bonlf Tiwught^'^ and considercd the taken to be a symbolic logic ofterms, which would be a good descrip-
eal assumption,one could tion of Boole s logic.
Frege's Since R í íog'^ 's better than In ihe Preface of the Conceptual Notation one finds still another
matfeLt¡ritloo'r
Fregean notation
familiar'symbols from
forbidding than Frege's inventions.
unfortunate choice of phrase that could lead the reader to think that
Frege's aims are the same as Boole's: in describing the project that
Boole's, and appearsTo^he led to his book, Frege says that it was "to test how far one could get
considerad Frege's nnt For these reasons Venn in arithmetic by means of logical deductions alone, supported only by
Schroder dubbed it "a ^ ^"-"ribrous and inconvenient", and the laws of thought".^® This sounds remarkably like a project that
in the Japanese custom could be described by the whole title of Boole's book, An Investiga-
tion of the Laws of Thought on which are Foundcd the Maíhematical
(perhaps correctl'y)"thlt"?""""! assumed Theories of Logic and ProbabiUties.
oludesftat
man workingfSS
out awork''if
schem^
scheme • .u '"^tances Bode.
mstances of He con-
an ingenious
For all these reasons, it is easy to see how Venn and Schroder
could have thought that the aim of Frege's book was the same as
entire ignorance that ^ ^"mbrous one^in Boole's and, being on the wrong Irack from the beginning, fail to see
before".i6 ything of the kind had ever been achieved Frege's achievements. If only they had studied Frege's book more
See S292.
carefully or, as Frege hiinself said later,-° had tried to transíate into
See S256. Boolean notation some of the formulas in Chapter III of the Concep
tual Notation, they would have seen at least some of the advances
Xf "" '"'"W'"refo.nded >l,e that Frege had made.

the K.oncep,ual Nolatum are trSalida Venn's personal copy of " He mentions Lasswitz's review in his own review.
'® See, for examplc, his book Der Operathnskreis des Logikkaikiiis (Leipzig,
ion
on ífI'h
to the' Cambridge
'=«)Univcrsitv
intrBod an no°t (• am indebled for Ibis infornia-
' 1877).
"See the Preface of F7. "In the article F12.
^91.°''''°°'''^™ logic.) See AÍ62. "' '
 m

21
LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE
20 LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FRECE
his critics. He did maintain an active interest in geometry and
Before the reception that greeted his Conceptual Notation, Frege physics, publishing a review^ of Hoppe s Textbook of Analytical
had every reason to be optimistic. He had established a good Geometry' and lecturing to ihc Jeiiaisclie Gesellschaft jw Medicin und
reputation at Jena, received a handsome promotion, and published Naturwissenschaft once on geometry^ and once on physics;* but most
\ the joy and success that seemed assured wcre not of his efiforts went into the defence of the Conceptual Notatlon.
^ ^eA a^turning
^PPy point
ycars in
hadhisended, for the reception of Frege's book To answer his critics, Frege wrote a long, brilliant paper, "Boole's
mar life. Henceforth frustration and tragedy Calculating Logic and the Conceptual Notatlon in which he care
were to haunt him. From 1879 to 1891 his works were ignored or fuily examined the aims and properties of his own notation and
misun erstoo . From 1891 to 1901 they were slowly acknowlcdged; compared them to Boolean logic. In this papcr Frege uses the great
clramatically and ironically capped by Russell's explanatory talent he failed to use in the Conceptual Notatlon. He
f ° ^ greatness and aimost simultaneous discovery clearly shows that he could not have used Boole s logic in his book,
and he carefuily explains the advantages of his own notation o ver
matic<; m Frege s carefuily laid foundations for mathe- Boole's. He submitted this paper to three journals, hoping that one of
him- for personal life sorrow and frustration plagued them would publish it and thus correct the misconceptions of his
Grevesmühlen to Margaret Lieseburg (1856-1905) of work. However, it was a very long paper, full of complex symbols,
die vounp 22 aV ^ ^ family only to see all the chiidren and all three journals rejected it.® He also wrote a much shorter
wüe d.ed m 1905 and left him to raise the boy alone. versión, *'Boole's Logical Formula Language and my Conceptual
Notatlon'\ which he submitted to a joumal that had published
severa! technical discussions of Boolean logic; but even this short
paper was rejected.'
ATIONS OF ARÍTHMETIC These further difficulties could only have added to Frege's frustra
tion and disappointment; however, he wrote another paper, "On the
plans. In the'^fare"of Ws^b Notatlon altered Fregeos Scientific Justification of a Conceptual Notation",® which was much
shorter and contained no special symbols. Unlike any of Frege s
proceed immediately from the G,
other works, it was very general and contained a liberal dose of
psychological and epistemological speculation. Perhaps this was
included to make the paper more attractive to the editor of the
ofthought wW?h M mfto'mv^" PO"' train Zeltschrift für Phllosophle und phllosophlsche Krltlk^ who accepted
to apply it to thSelfeí tSrr and published it in 1882.
provlde a deeper fcundation f,^ •? u ^ts concepts further and
presented in the third chanter «i ^ ^ Por the present, I have * F9.
Further pursuit of the «jima things which move in that direction. ^ R. Hoppe, Lehrbuch der analytischen Geometrie I (Leipzig, 1880).
of oumber/^¿¡ ^urse-the elucidatlon of the concepta ® Published as the article F13; delivered on 2 November 1883.
* Published as the article FIO; delivered on 15 July 1881.
investigations^S
mcn tUM ^""ject
Shan produce immediately after this of fnrther
book. ® This is one of the papers in the Frege Nachlass recently pubhshed in F45.
° Rejected by F Klein of the Mathematische Amalen; O. Schlonulch of the
Zeltschrift für Mathematik und Physik; and H. Ulrici of the Zeltschrift für
guage and spent most of the next three years answering Phllosophle und phllosophlsche Krltlk. Their letters of rejection can be found in
the Frege Archives in Münster, Germany. See F45, p. 9. , /•,. »
' Rejected by R. Avenarius of the Vlerteljahrsschrift fur wissenschaftliche
"^snot See S22.
1905 when Mrs. Frege died. It'Suld^not ^^red; but it musthave been before
Phllosophle. His letter of rejection can be found in the Frege Archives in Münster,
Germany. See F45, p. 53.
® Fll, included below, pp. 83-9.
See S22. was still a schoolbov
senoolboy ílh, ■'"S, however,
when Wittgenstein visited Freg¿ in 1911.

22 LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FRECE
Frege s major claim in this paper is that ¡n complcx scicntiíic
contexts, in order to avoid errors in rcasoning, onc nccds a much
more exact tool for reasoning than ordinary languagc, cithcr spoken
or written. Spoken language, he asserts, is fleciing: once a staiement
is spoken and unrecorded, it is gone and cannot be recaptured for
careful scrutiny. The written word has the advantage of permanence
and immutability; a written argument can be checked and rechecked
for correctness. But in ordinary written language, there are subtie
differences in the meanings of worcls; and modes of infcrence are
numerous,loose,and fluctuating. Thus,mistakes and presuppositions
can be easily overlooked. For exact scientific reasoning one needs an
unambiguous, rigorously constructed language, with oniy a few
care u y specified modes of inference. Frege's "conceptual notation
IS such a language.
Fr^e surely feit better once this paper was accepted for publica*
tion, for at least he was able to publish a very general justification of
his new symbolic language. He still had not answered the specific
objections of his critics, however, and no doubt welcomed the
opportunity to do so in a lecture at a meeting of the Jenaische
ese se aftfür Medicín und Naíunvissenschaft in January 1882. The
^ture was pubhshed later under the title "On the Aim of the
Conceptual Notaliorí'.^ In it Frege presents a brief account of Boole's
notation, criticizmg it on some fundamental points, and citing several
reasons why he could not have used Boolean logic in his own book-
Ihese reasons are, first, that Boole borrows symbols of arithmetic for
ogical purposes; but Frege needed these symbols for ordinary
ormulas ofarithmetic, and could not use them for logical operations.
Because he wished to avoid ambiguity, Frege could not use the saine
symbol(such as the sign which Boole used as a logical symbol)
part ot the time m a mathematical sense and part of the time in a
lo^cal sense. Second, Frege's aim was not merely to produce a
calculas ratwcmator hke Boole's, but to help develop a lingW
c aractenstica (mcluding propositional functions).'» As a result,
many of the statements from Chapter III of the Conceptual Notation
cannot be expressed at all in Boolean notation.
Frege aiso offered a defence against Schroder's claim that the two-
aimensional 'conceptual notation" is clumsy and a waste of space:
below, pp. 90-100.
difference between a calcidus ratiocinator and a
LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE 23
Frege's notation for "a or h" (using the exclusive sense of 'or') is
rTT
b= 1
while Schroder's is
and Boole's is even shorter,
a-^b = 1.
Schróder used this example to show that Frege's notation is "a
monstrous waste of space"; but Frege answered:
This criticism is based upen the view that my "conceptual notation" is
supposed to be a presentation of abstract logic. These formulas [of my
"conceptual notation"] are actually only empty schemata; and in their
application, one must think of whole formulas in the places of a and b—
perhaps extended equations, congruences, projections. Then the matter
appears completely diñerent. The disadvantage of the waste of space of
the "conceptual notation" is converted into the advantage of perspicuity;
the advantage of terseness for Boole is transformed into the disadvantage
of unintelligibility. The "conceptual notation" makes the most of the two-
dimensionality of the writing surface by allowing the assertible contents
to follow one below the other while each of these extends[separately]from
left to right. Thus, the sepárate contents are clearly separated from each
other, and yet their logical relations are easily visible at a glance."
Having published this second defensivo paper, Frege was ap-
parently satisfied that he had sufiiciently answered his critics and
"For example, let a be (a+b)ic+d)= (7+6)(4) and b be the equation
ac+bd-{-bc+ad = (7+6)(4+3). Then to form the exclusive disjunction of
and b, Frege could write the very perspicuous
— (fl +¿)(í'+4)=(7+6)(4)
T
— ac+ W+Af+fl</=(7+6)(4+3)
— (a+h)lc+d)=a+6)(4)
' Í/C+M+Ac+a</=(7+6)(4+3)
while Schroder's versión would be the unintelligible
((fl+éXc+rf)= (7+6)(4j)(ac+bd+be+ad = (7+6)(4+3))i+((út-l-Z»)(c-f í/)=
(J+6)(4))i(ac+bd+bc+ad = (7+6X4+3))= I
and Boole's result would be
((fl+6)(c+í/)= i7-{-6)(4))+iac+bd-\-bc+ad (7+6)(4+3))= 1.
The matter becomes worse and worse for Boole and Schróder as the assertible
contents that replace a and b get more and more complex.
I'."

LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE 25

^ UFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE
Fowulaiious ofArit/imeíic. Frege's original logistic programme became
to the next language. He was now rcady lo move on oniy a part of a more comprehensivo and anibitious project.
book The Fou„lZnsoS¡'J¡ür"'"''' A major part of that project was to be a critique of prevailing
schools of íhought in number thcory, and more than half of The
Foundations of Arithtnelic is devoted to this task. In that work, Frege
argües in particular against what he calis "psychologism", "formal-
The OF ARITIÍMETIC ism", and "pcbble and gingerbread arithmetic". Psychologism is the
hard lesso^n/i^^rlr"mg ihe Founclations
Conceptual Notation tauglU
of Arithmctic he wasFrege
mucha view that numbers are mental constructs, and that certain descriptions
more careful tn of psychoiogical processes are proofs of basic arithmetical proposi-
present and to reader for the ncw ideas that he wouM tions; but in his book Frege insists that descriptions of mental events
thetextwas written^ h ■ possiblc. This time, are not proofs and definitions of mathematics:
symbols to discoura ^^^man;thcre were no special It may, ofcourse, serve some purpose to investígate thcideasandchanges
purpose of the bonlí-w ^ ®^
text was devoted to
tenaciousandreader. The scope and
more than half of the
of ideas whích occur during the course of mathematical thinking; but
psychology should not imagine that it can contribute anything whatever
scholars, includina fam t:ritique of relevant views of other to the foundation of aritlimctic. To the mathematician as such these mental
Leibniz, and Kant- ontinental philosophers likc Descartes, picturcs, wilh thcir origins and thcir transformations, are immaterial. .. .
Hume, and Mill-i'anH philosophers such as Locke, Never Ict us take a descriptlon of the orígin of an idea for a definition, or
an account of the mental and physical conditions on whích we become
Jevons, Schroder mathematicians and logicíans like conscious of a proposition for a proof of it. A proposition may be thought,
preparing the ma ' ^rassmann. and again it may be true; let us never confuse these two tliings.*^
definitions of the basic^oA^"^'' developing his own
led to a careful studv of aríthmetic, Frege was naturally The second important school of thought which Frege attacks is
and he was dismaved w tí u of these other scholars; "formalism",'' according to which numbers are just the numeráis
ment were everywhere evp^'* ^ ^onnd. Ambiguity and disagree- (like T', '2', and so on) which one writes on paper or on the black-
anthxnetical concepts of ali- tí '^^nssions of one of the niost basíc board: they are just empty symbols, and the so-called "laws of
considered this a scandal í fní ^ natural number. Frege arithmetic" are mere rules (like the rules of a game) for the manipula-
undred years of rapid develon ^ undergone two tion of these symbols. The "formalist", Frege asserts, believes that
he can create new numbers just by creating new symbols; but, Frege
beenbasedupon
-negative, more and
fractional "^ost of the growth
concept had
of number insists,
f^^^^'^o^asolid, logicaifounj l.^"^^^^nary "umbers, and so on-^ the mathematician cannot create things at will, any more than the geo-
found a quagmire of disagreemf^ new edifice, Frege grapher can; he too can oniy discover what is there and give it a ñame.
^tthmetic was tottering ^confusión. He believed that This is the error that infects the formalist theory of fractions and of
^ound was forsaken and ^ i secute until this shaky negative and complex numbers. It is made a postúlate that the familiar
rules of calculation shall still hold, where possible, for the newly-introduced
rieh^f^^\^^^^°nght". He tonV^^ ^ foundation rooted iu numbers, and from this their general properties and relations are deduced.
of th situation by(n ref ^'mself the cnormous
of"'thmetic
aZ® "ahnost from
theLyscral t." di^'^reditingthewhole schools
foundations
* From Ihe Preface of F14, Austln's translation. See the Bibliography below
under F14.
® This movement should not be confused with the later project of David
Hilbert, which is also often called fonnalism. In this present essay the double
HÚm^''®''''®°w'=dgeof,h,. , ' '■ with the book r/;f
Zfi. °""^od^T,Thro
Cites Baurnann's fannir'"^' (Serlin, 1868)' u/Vi"
Berkeley, and
®3umann's Die Lehren von
quotation marks will always be used with the term 'formalism' in reference to
the earlier movement, to remind the reader that the term being used does not
refer to Hilbert's programme.
See the Preface of Fi4 cnever he cites these scholars, he
' See SI65, pp. 27-30.
26 UFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FRECE LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FRECE 27
Indced, it could have been ihc study of Cantor which led Frege lo his
cncounlcrcd. thc iniroduction of ihe ncw
famoLis deíinition of cardinal number. In The Foundaíions of Arith
diction still tn hp l' though it wcrc impossible for a contni- metic (í;ííS5-6) Frege discusscs Cantor s work, so it is clear that he
trom contradipf
from contradiction"amounted straighlncverilicle.'is.
somewheic away to cx¡stcncc.«
and as tliough frccdoin was familiar with it. He may have noticed that certain special sets
(which Cantor called "powers") have al! the mathematical properties
the extreme school ofasthought which Fregcwho
John Stuart
attacks is that of
claims that the
of cardinal numbers. Frege apparcntiy considered these sets to be the
cardinal numbers; and his logistic programme required that he should
índuction and ti^ ^"ipirical gencraüzations based upen define thcm pureiy logicaliy.
empirical concent^^ "ndamental aríthmetical concepls are mere Thc thrce essential concepts in Cantor's notion of "power" are
Physical obiect^F observation of aggrcgates of "class (or sel)"," ''ciass-membership", and "one-to-one corre-
to centuries of efFortfh^°"^'il^'^^'^ ^ major sctback spondence"(of the members of one class to thc members of another
of their science 'mathematicians to clarify the basic concepts class). Now, according lo Frege, logic had long concerned itself with
the notions of "concept", "falliiig under a concept (that is, bcing
continued over crnturip»; intellectual cíTort, which may have an entity to whicit the concept applies ), and the extensión of a
knowledge of a concent in "T at last succeeds in achieving concept"(that is, "the class of all and only those things to which the
accretlons which veil it fmm\i stripping oíT the irrelevant concept applies"). He considered these to be notions from puré logic;
say of those who, instead nf ^hat, thcn, are wc to and thus he could use them to define 'class-membership' and the
pleted, despise it, and betilrp ít. ^ork where it is not yet com- relevant classes: the classes that concerned hini he defined as
in the remotest conceivahip n^. ^ nursery, or bury themsclves extensions of certain given concepts; and membership in a class
bke John Stuart Mili somp u° cvolution, therc to discover, which is the extensión of, say, concept Fhe considered to be simply
oii'y to ascribe to the flavour'"?th Pebblc arithmetic! It remains "falling under the concept F".
concept of number A nrnpe.a° somc special meaning for the Having given pureiy logical definitions of'class' and'class-member-
-tional. and as unmaTh»."'! very reverse of ship', Frege had only the third concept—"one-to-one correspon-
Frege's critimiP r be.» dence"—to define pureiy logicaliy; and he cleverly saw how to do
vigorous, often perceptivTandT of thought is this by using the functional logic he had developed in the Conceptual
draws are that numbers are and the conclusions he Notation. He was thus abie to give in The Fouudations of Arithmetic
mere empty symbols ñor mental constructs, ñor a deñnition of cardinal number which he belicved to be pureiy
objects. logical; and using the notion of the ancestral of a relation which he
and has He
thusbelieves
clearedhethehaswL
nrnfot i ^Sg'omerations of physical
grounds for these criticisms, had presented in the Conceptual Notation, plus some aspects of his
account, of course, is the Inoí r account of the matter. This versión of set theory, he was able to provide, as well, a sketch of a
concepts of arithmetic fsuch I!' (I) fundamental proof that the series of natural numbers has no last meniber.
concepts of formal logic- and ^ defined using only Frege claimed that these promising achievements were strong
aws of arithmetic can be nrovla definitions, the basic evidence for his logistic thesis that arithmetic is a branch of logic.
I hope I may claim in the present work to have made it probable that the
^"now from formal logic laws of arithmetic are analytic judgments and consequently a priori.
for him,form'ariogL''!l!cfuded n .u "^^^'"al number^ that. Arithmetic thus becomes simply a development of logic, and every
® From p, 108 of Au<;f ' ^ much like Cantor's.^" proposition of arithmetic a law of logic, albeit a derivative one
'See J. s. mi A Zf' of Fl4 " At the time he wrote The Foundations of Arithmetic, Frege believed that
Cantor's notion of class was the same as his own. He later discoyered that Cantor
^ ^reface of Aust{J¡7Ja was unclear and perhaps even inconsistent about the notion of class, and he notes
(Leipzig, 1883)^^"^°'' m §"^2 of FI4.
S Jeinen Mannichfaltigkeitslehre
this in a review of Cantor's theory of transfinites. See F2I.
28 UFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE 29
Cantor's review was an unfortunate mistake, for his own effort to
Dositionq^ínn^^^lií^ "ladc thc analytic character of arithmclic pro- develop a theory of transfinite cardinals was strongly supported in
whether thev aL H^ Probable, because ¡t can still always be doubted The Foundations of Arithmetic. Cantor was apparently so much
other type of prentíss fe 1101?'°'^™^" harassed by criticism from others that he failed to recognize Frege s
our noticinff if Th- • ?V" . point in Ihcir proof without friendly encouragement.® He did realize that Frege's critique of
indicatíons T íiava ^ot be completely aliayed even by the prevaiiing schools of thought is an asset of the book; but he ap
Ó.Sy^~t
such that no sten ^ ° ^
of tho propositions; it can
deductions with no link missing, parently did not study Frege's own view very carefully, for he
smaU numbcr of principié of iñfer'' °""= "í." wrongly construcd Frege to be defining the cardinal numbers as sets
this day, scarcelv onA^- '"^®rence recognizcd as pureiy lógica!. To of physical objects, rather than sets ofconcepts. The criticism that he
lines....12 ^ proof has ever becn conducted on these offered in his review is thus misdirected. Frege pointed this out in
a brief reply published in 1885;" but this was also ignored or un-
noticed, even by Cantor himself. r. • u u
wanted to prov^hiTlom'^f-'
that arithmetic wonlH 11?
state of affairs. He
b®yond all doubt; and he believed
Another reviewer of The Foundations of Arithmetic was ein o
Hoppe, who. as editor of the ArcMv der Malhemalik undPhysik for
such a proof were aven rp®^^^"^^'^°"^®r^randcontradict¡onuntil many years (1873-1900), was influential and respectad. Hoppe was
from formal loeic alone A project was to provide, a stauneh advócate of psychologism in logic and mathemaücs; and
of arithmetic, '^^ "gapless" proofs of the basic laws he apparently took Frege's critique of psychologism very persona y.
His review was emotional, highly critical, and satirical. He referred
to Frege as "the doctrinaire logician" and used the ve^ same n
of psychologistic arguments that Frege's book had undermmed. H
As h POUNDATIONS OF ARITHMETIC Predicted that other scholars would consider Frege s theories fruitless
and unworthy of serious consideration. , ,, . «,«rA
project,FregewaitedfoM^^
He had written the bonV *
the next phase of his
to his Foundations ofArithmetic. Much to Frege's sorrow, Hoppe's prediction held í™® ^
of scholars; and he honeíT-f '"tended to attract a wide range than fifteen years: practically everyone, mcludmg researchers in t
technical aid comÍTrt '"e ground for the most ^ame field. ignored Lge's book-at least in print Tlus is surpris.^
weresoondashed,however K. programme. His hopes
for Frege was a respected scholar in an established university. He
given the Conceptual NntJ- t that was worse than that l'ved in a country and in a period in which basic "1^
—oven famous scholars—se'em and logicians was of serious concern to many others. In this ®®'=°°^
Apparently,it was reviewAH f i° ^^'*®Sard the book completely. Ployed none ofthe special symbols which ^gW^^^^
fromhisConcenma/AtoMOoniandheincluaeavigüi , e
and Cantor a The reviews were times—by HoppeLasswitz.^
yearsafteritappearedFreffe'«h.."i,^^°"'^^'''®.' tiearlyThe
twenty argumenta, dealing with a wide specttum ^ews^
person, besides the reviewerc u P'^^ctically ignored. only Today The Fomdalions of Arithmetic is one of Pf®8®
'
Edmund Husserl, who rrít*'^? discussed it seriously in print was works; and it is still read and valued as a hvely and ínteres g
Arithmetic.'^ 1891 in The Philosophy of contribution to the philosophy of mathematics. • j
Given these facts, it is remarkable that Frege's work
Rom pp.99 and 102 of Austin's transía,¡„„ of F,4. for so long. No single factor explains the silenre. The only e p
fírtn seems to Ibe that
1 i several1 factors,
fv.pfrtT'c which
"on wnic could not account
_ _x xi,_for the
4 Si "^Q "P í ® Si 7*7
matter when considered individually, worked together at the same
thne. FilS Freg^l a much more subtle and careful reasoner ftan
• £c Fl#
® An explanation suggested by Kneale m Si
si'Ksssr,?£í^'rsa"~
jMathematics appeared. See S241.
 life and work of gottlob frece LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE 31

presented vvere diílicult for inost of

which he answered with a major contribution to the philosophy of
language.*' He wrote, but never published, two polemical articles"' on
Benno Kerry's critique of logicism." About 1891 Frege s work began
at last to influence others when the Italian logician Peano read his
Third, psychologism ®""^'' works and cited them in print, and the Germán philosopher Husserl
formidable mnvAm \ , and extreme empiricism were all staried to correspond with Frege' and study his works intensively.
matics; and Freee^waV" Ph'iosophy of mathe- During this lime Frege's interest and attention were almost
Finally atleastfivA- a ^ strong tide in attacking them. entirely on his grand project of reform and logical reconstruction in
the foundations of mathematics. In his critique» of Cohen's The
reviews; and th'is coum' Principie of Infinitesimal Method and its History^ his emphasis is on
effort to master Frege's work^ encouraged others to make the the correct definition of mathematical concepts and the^^aning an
basis of mathematical propositions. Even in his article On the Law
The Fomdatiom disappointing silence that greeted of Inertia"(1891),^» in which he considers Ludwig Lange s account
stubbornly continuad tn ^®spite the bad reception, Frege of this law, Frege includes a discussion of logic and concepts:
someone somewhere
wnere wouIh""^ a°" and appreciate hoping
would understand tliat
his work.
The exprcssion ['concept'] should be dealt with in
dealt with it since oldcn times and necds such an expressio ^
its laws. Por this purpose, logic requires that a concept be exactly dete -
The ni
"'^baTiJlaws'^o'^'^^ '^fithmetic and
^i^ithmetic i
mined.... if a concept is not sharply defined, it cannot be a concePt of
logic A logical concept has no development, no history....
Poundations of Arithm^- between the publication of The agree with Lange that it is very necessary to talk of the
S®ic£awío/.4,/,/,^e,,.J';,g" of Volunte I of The a concept....Instead, it could be said that "there is a history of defimng
fruitful in Frege's carear H ur ^"^ong the busiest and most that and that concept", or "there is a history of J
an answer to Cantor's crit¡^ ^ r articles, two reviews, and that concept"- and that would be more pertinent. A concept is some
prepared a large nrelímír»'^"^ ^ Poundations of Arithmetic.^ He thing obSve wh"chwedo no.constructand which aiso hasno.dev^^^^^^^
Añthmetic, only to serán for The Basle Law'S of in us; but something which we try to understand,and in the end we do
understand, provlded we have not sought erroneously after something
bemodifiedandsupplementln 3u ^ ^'^^o^ered that his logic liad to
^^ ' ^ncountered semantical problems
where there is nothing.^'^

anddifficnltt° /^"^*
'FreSrriol'?f;
symbolism
,old me that he and ' ttTetly
yet deveinn a ^®ad. On the cont unjustly considered clurnsy Sau"onsXThS?e
displavs it r analysis Recan^^^' 7 5.!^®- .1 in the Frege Archives in Münster,
a gfanS' T?" complex statements are two-dimensional These letters are among thosc collect
Germany.
must in rno<!t^ ^ advantace nv grasp at
devices to resort to many parenthe^*^ one-dlmensional notations, which 'H.'cohen, Da. PrínAp dar fia!,a.¡,ml-Me,hade uad seiae Ceschichte
complex fi^o"PÍng in a c^rin? traces, dots, and other
Present volum^r^^ difficult indeed to rea? make very a'„ English translation was recently published by R. Rand. See the
The only ^ footnote 11 on p. 23 of the Bíbhography below. Eníwicklimg des Bewegitngsbegriffs imd ihr
rSu¿dth¡f'"\í^'
ced this problem. '^odem^methodr^f^
of photo-reproduction difficulty and
have greatly (Leipzig, 1886). lange published an answer to Frege
'F23.
See the Introduction of F23. ^^8, F19, F20,F21, F22. '"■''The"pmscnt translation of this passage owes mueh to Rand-s translation.
 LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE 33
32 UFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE
Frege's most important eñbrts during this period were additions
Jenaische^r\^u^ Frege deEvered to his colleagucs in the that he made to his logic, and the great strides he achieved in
concerninp liiid Naíurwissenschaft a lecture»^ semantics and philosophy of language. After he had recognized the
was the "form i' formal" theories of arithmetic. One tlieory inadequacy of the preliminary manuscript of The Basic Laws of
Foundations attacked so eíTcclively ¡n The Arithmetic^ he responded with a major creative eñbrt: he extended
further damapí and he continued the assault here with even further the expanded notion of "function" presented in the
logistic thesis theory was his own Conceptual Notation. This new extensión included (I) elaborating
that view is perharnth^^^f^ ^ oflogic; and his description of upon the distinction between function and object; (2) permitting
quoting at length)^ ^ clearest he ever published (and well worth any object to be the argument of a function; and (3) distinguishing
levels of functions," so that objects would be arguments offirsí-level
functions, while first-level functions would be arguments of second-
here only one^thch^ ^ level functions. Since a single function can have more than one
arithmetical theories O ^^Pon the comprchcnsive applicability of urgument, there could also be equaTlevel and unequal-level functions.
subject of thought: ide-Il!^"ideed count everything which can be a Finally, with respect to functions, he introduced courses-of-values
temporal entities as w<»li concepta as well as objects, and "value-ranges" offunctions, and defined a concept as a func
methods as well as theory ^ ^P^tial entities, events as well as bodics, tion of one argument whose valué is always a truth valué .
Strictly speakine thp count the numbers themselvcs. To give a clear, consistent account of the meaning of an identity
definition, a cert¡in f is a certain sharpness of statement, Frege replaced the oíd "identity of content sign with the
be inferred: the basic L a result, at least this much can customary identity sign from mathematics,and replaced the studiedly
cannot be based unon a upon which arithmetic is constructed yugue notion of"content" with the distinction between the sense(5mn)
theyexpress—as fforexa whose particular characteristics und the denotation {Bedeutung) of an expression. An identity state
characteristics]ofspace Th ® ofgeometry express[the peculiar ment, he decided, asserts that two expressions have the same denota-
everything thinkable aiid Propositions of arithmetic must cover don. Por the special and very important case of the sense and
Proposition within losic correct to include such a general denotation of sentencesy Frege held that they express a thought
nietic I draw several conclusions''^"^ ioglcal or formal nature of arith-
First, there is no sham Kr» Á which is their sense—and denote one or the other of the two logical
the scientific point of vípw between logic and arithmetic; from objects the True and the False. , ,^ •
formal theory is correct t'hp ° i ^ single science.... If this Besides these things, Frege added a notation for the defimte
considered supertciaUy unfruitful as it may article; gave rules for correct definition; provided a formal analysis
of descriptions; and distinguished use from mention,^^ ordinary from
inference which cannot"h^ Peculiarly arithmetical mode of oblique contexts. «
logic. to the general modes of inference in The result of all these additions and modifications to the con
[Finally], ¡t is clear that thA k j . ceptual notation" was a magnificent achievement—-a formal philo
nature of its fundamental rnn! of a science are fixed by the sophy of language with great power, scope, and subtlety—which is
from all particular proDert¡e« f*u- '^f ^J^ithmetic is to be divorced y'idely studied and imitated today, and which has exerted through
fundamental concepts ^thpv ♦ u same must hold for its the works of Russell, Wittgenstein, Camap,Church, and others(and
example,I have displaced fin^ ^°eical nature. Thus. for
class' VMenge'}, which is oftAn ofArithmetic]the expression "As early as FI4 Frege had distinguished levels of concepts(sw §53); but it
coiicept' VBegriff'} which íc ^ n^^thematicians, by the expression only after Uiat that he elaborated upon this distinction and carned it through
an indifferent change of nomAn^iT^"^ not merely ^ccoimt oj" "use-mention" distinction and his account of
of the true state of affairs. ^^ important for knowledge correct dSt^on^were°meant to avoid
took numeráis for numbers and believed they could define numbers mto existence.
la
8243501 I*
F16.
W UFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE 35
Frege had no great cxpcctations, however; for it is evident in the
themselvcs)-a profound Preface ihal he feared the worst. Here, obvioiisly pessimistic, he
seems to try hard to prod or persuade prospective readers to study
all these Tubtletnd forthcoming book for his book. He tells of disappointmcnt over the reception—or lack of
it—of bis earlier works; and lie informs tiie reader tiiat the appear-
them in a lecture "On f ^ books), Fregc explained many of ance of Volume 11 will depcnd upon a good reception of Volume í.
the Jenaische Glselbchañ''f°'^ collcagucs in He describes unfavourable altitudes and trends of tlie day, working
also published two anLI^ í'" "'"^ Nalmwissenschaft, and against the acceptance, or even the reading, of liis book, and he
a classic in semantics-) anrf ^^ Denotalion-' (now chalienges other scholars to do better or fi nd something esscntially
Kerry's objections to Freae\ an f'-inswering wrong wilh Jüs work. He criticizes "formalisin" and viciously
last, for the appearan^ ofT"» Tl'c stagc was set, attacks psychülogism, as if to provoke an answer. Finally, he asks
■Basic Laws oj Arithmetic. for support from other mathematicians against the corrupting
influence of the "psychologicaí logicians' .
Of a!I the ihreats to his work, and to the well-being of mathe-
After work-^*'' / matics itself, Frege considered psychologism to be the worst. He
"ig logic, and project, revolutioniz- believed that, by reducing everything to idea—to the subjective—the
language, Frege was read^Ti^ contribution to the philosophy of Proponcnls of psychologism blot out subtle distinctions which are
proofofhislogisticthet;!^ Publish the fi nal, step-by-step aecessary for truth in logic and mathematics; thus they destroy
"lany years, but vindicatinn'!^^ rejected or ignorad for objective truth itself and end up in a mire of contradiction and
This hope was soon shattered appcared to be in sight. oonfusion.'^ , , • r
pubhsher would risk printinfr p T írustraling problem: no As a concrete example of psychologism Frege selecte t le view o
and filled with two manuscript was very Benno Erdmann' and siibjected it to a reduclio ad absurdum.
notation.Thismadeprintiñarr'Tf displays of Fregc's arguments are lethal and crushing, but also merciless and satírica],
a book in ordinary lanLí, and more expensivespecial
than refiecting, perhaps, Frege's frustration and loss of patience after
rege's earlier works had oustomary logic. Furlhermore, years of arguing to deaf ears. The bitterness of the attack may also
^arantee that the new volume'V^ received, and there was no have been an intentional elTort to irritate the "P^yahojogical logicians
seemed a great financial risk t treatment- and provoke them into a reply; for Frege expresses m
no pubhshing house was willina^^^^"^ apparently belicf that "as soon as [the psychologicaí '°g'«a.is] so mu
The problem was fina Iv ? ° aondescend to occupy themselves seriously with my book, if only to
pubhsher Hermano Pohie in J la wh^T""' ' '=°'^Ptomise: the M^'y ol^rs brsILrt''lsychological logtcian«
On FunctionandConceDt"2^„
^ents, the publication of the . ' Pnnted
the bookFrege's
in two lecture
instal-
good reception of the first 3 c dependent upon a ■•epeiled by the content-even the appearance-of Frege s book, and
Tfege sadly admits that this is so:
«^late 1893, the first volume of The
An expression croppíng up here or there, as ene leafs 'hrou^i these
P^Ses, may easily appear strange and create prejudice. . . . Even
:.-S
' There is a note bv w ■ ■ " \ See F23, pp. xvii-xxv. ' In ^VdiTnie lLs ofArithmefic
rron, ^1' qnotations from , . - universityofofCalifornia).
California
his3 owFJ9."póS"lel^f A34.
to^pay Archives in Münster,
t'ay for the pubhcation of Volume II out of reprintcd by permission of The Regen
the Bibliograpliy under F23.
^ See the Preface of F23, p. v.
 1

36 UFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE 37
frighten peopie off; unfamüiar signs, pagcs of notliing but Anihmeiic had never been achieved bcfore (even in the Conceptual
Notalion), and would rcmain unrivalled for ncarly three dccades.»
^ as rcaders all thosc mathc- Although Frege was salisfied with this rigorous, scientific form of
'relation' 'iud^ logical exprcssions such as 'conccpt', Volume I, he was disappoinled by its meagre content He was forced
those philosonlT^"^ u suní, non leguntur, and likewise to publish, at first, only part of his work; and mudr of the m.lral
° °?nd^ ^ cry ,nat,enuUua sunU instalment had to be devoted to an explanat.on of his improved
the» óf mth not small. Pcrhaps "conceptual notation". Because of this. the only other things he
hurry until they have Jt '"'"cq^cnlly secm to be in a great managed to include were an account of cardinal numbers (finite and
Iscarcely darehonethaf undamental principies bchind thcm. And infinite), plus "ordering-in-a-sequence", relative producís, mapping
lengthiness wiil persuadeXn^of them^^^ by relations, and the like. This by Lf
logic, mathematics, and philosophy; but it sti ac e an
negative, fractional, irrational, and cornp ex
book. To ofrsetTo!l^P^"f^fi' hardly be optimistic for liis addition, multiplication, "fjj'^pVen so, he believed that
hints on how to read 1 k in the Preface was forced to reserve these for volume ii.
general understandinaofitc^^ achieve the quickest and easiest
began a rigorous proof ho' ^ TT' before he of his method and position, and he w
it, to make its course and ^ í*°^Sb introductory outline of honest reader would accede to all his argumen . ..
tion, Frege voiced the . significance easier to see. In addi- The only thing about which he expressed some reservation was h s
confidenceinthemattPrK someone would liave "enough Basle Law V Thl assuntption of his logical
a sufficient reward" for th T^k ^''pect in the intellectual profit that "the set of Fs is identical whlt the set^ ^
He expressed the belief thnt ^ study would require. are Gs and all Gs are Fs hrege conccu he
that he had overrated thp ^ reader would soon discover "which logicians perhaps have of puré logic". He
book actually facilitaípi n°i that the rigour of the nevertheless asserted, I bo>d ^a ^ ^e met; for the
notation is Overeóme once the novelty of the evidently believed that any objections to
final paragraph of the Preface rings with confidence.
TheTdetuf° Irt'''''
here attempted to realize ^and
Euclidean:
í" n^athematics, which I have It isthat
base prima
wasfacie improbable
uncertainor
I i
that s
defectiva
o círncture could be erected on a
Asa^refutation in^this I can only
I should like to describe as follow<i '^^deeá be named after Euciid, recognize someone's actually fundamental convictions, or else
be preved, because that is imno«iM demandad that everythinS durable edifica can he erected upo eonclusions. But no ene will he
lons used without proof be exnre«f'a^\ i"equire that ail proposi- that my principies lead to manifestly
Jstmctly what the whole structnm ^ such,so that wc can see sble to do that.^'^
diminish the number of these ^bat we must try to
eveiything that can be proved Fn th ^ possible, by proving DAt:!C LáWS OF ÁRITHMETIC I:
beyond Euclid-that aU methoL ^ demand-and in this I go §14. RECEPTION OF pFANO
frege and PEAMC»
advante;otherwisewecannotbecert
This .deal I believe I have noV ' employed berequirement.
specified in ^ ThP Basic
The reception hopasLaws of Arithmetic
and plans. There wereI only
was
another frustrating blow to Freg p
standard of rigtur'^Vnf ^ methodological ideal: the • See p. 268 of S54 and p. 126 of A'"_ jo generate RusseU's Paradox
correctness of The Basic Laws of ."This is the fateful assumption that can np
In Frege's logical system.
 LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE 39
LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE
ments in Frege's work, and failed to see that Frege s logic was much
neitherapprivarnor""^^^^"^^'''^'
As a result the nnhr^í^^^'°" scholarly worid—just silcnce. bettcr than his own.
Indecd. Pcano proudiy asscrted in his review that his own logic is
grand pr^J^* print Volume II; and Frege's niorc practical and more profound that Frege s. It is more practical,
thought—wasunfinisheH works in the history of he said, because the two-dimensionality of Frege s notation hides
was just delayed fHpu,./ / out, Frege did not givc up— associative and coniiTiutative properties from the eye, whiie his own
finally, ten years after tht his project through; so, notation does not. (Peano was naturally more at home in his own
publication of Voinm tt of Volume f, he paid for the symbolism, and tlius the logical properties expressed and reflected
The first review of V" were easier for him to see in his own notation than in Frege s.
that it hardly merits h Reinhold Hoppc.^ It is so brief Anyone accustomed to reading Frege's notation knows that Peano s
threesentencS^^^^ ^ "review". It consists of only
the book and accusing Pr^'"^ccurate summary of the contcnts of claim here is false.)
Apparently Hoppe had "^^ing secretive about his purposes. Peano's argument for the assertion that his log.c is more profound
dix, without reading the Proface and Appcn- was this: mathematical logic is an analysis of the ideas and proposi-
hisreview is insignificant- h, t'! ' ^ discussion of Fregc's work tions of logic and mathematics into primitive and derivative; ' and
this analysis is iinique". According to Peano, his log.c and Frege's
Thf ciiscouraged some would- are alternative attempts to porform the same analysis. He claimed to
use only three primitive notions and define all the others in terms of
unfavourable, but muXmn logician Peano.=» It aiso was these, while Frege used five primitives. Thtis, Peano concluded, his
^hangeoflettersbetweenPr
fiertrand Russell to read FrJl initiated
■" ^^00a orfruitful
1901 ex-
led logic gives a more profound analysis than Frege s.
Frege was most disturbad by Peano's clalm to have a more pro
^hicheventuallyiedtoagener.] the chain of events found logic. He believed this claim to be false, atid he wrote a letter
to prove it to Peano," asking him to publish the letter m the
had a ready done, was
^ review Peanomuch
andm As Frege
ofFrege's achievements-
di matemática. Peano iearned the hard way what an able polemtcis
Peano mathernati^r'^'^''^^'' developing a sym- he had ciralienged. Frege-s rcply was crushing; and it pomted out
of the h ' in his revieW weaknesses and mistakes in Peano's work. forc.ng Peano to prmt a
FrLv °f his own. HeliLt'f notations of Frege's recantation'
The maiorand thank
points Frege for
in Frege's making
reply improvements m his logic.
are these
notion of ! '"^'"ded a brief discussion of
exLr, "'®''°"'however ° "™ber, First, merely counting the number of pnm.t.ve stgns dees not g.ve
of his P«ge's'l0EÍc"r'" f° prosent a careful of sufficient grounds for judging which notation y^lds the deeper
analysis. Other things must be considerad, such as the stnctness
of the mies of definition" (which Frege found lackmg m Peano) and
differencpc k system- he V
(such as Pre!?^™"'®"^°notations"1Te°"'^
^ he never
simUarities and how rJh can be r ompllhed with the primitivas. Frege points out
pletely overlo„l"a'' Qreek that it is easy enough to reduce the number of primUive s.gns by
finctions an^í^ «"ch as th a" tuereiy fliW to take account of known dist.ncttons. He notes that
insures ^,3^ "^^^faUy workedJ f ^^^''ed analysis of logical Peano him elfrecognizes the difference between (1) the case m which
whole For tlT^^ tigour Peano
and welds Fr ^ ofinto
language that a thcught s merely expressed, but not asserted; and 2) the case m
these reasons a coherent which ft is also asserted Frege has a primitive symbol to capture this
', sf tootnote i of §13 greatest achieve-
distinction wiiile Peano does not. Gaining fewer primitiva symboIs m
the DreQPnt u- this warikes Peano'O sP28.
notation, if anythmg,
'
a te profound rather
Castellano Bu r '
' "ra'', Giudice, Vivantí n « ' Sce S2I2.
. Bettazzi, Fano, and others.
40 LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FRECE LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE 41
profound analysis, "since the actual dinerencc rcmains'* This contribution by Frege to Peano's logia is definitely known.
whether Peano is able to express it or not. In addition, Peano may also have adopted other things from Frege.
From its inception, Peano's logic was a gathcring of ideas and
for iudíTÍno-^fi^^i^^'^L of^primitive signs were good grounds techniques from many diíTcrent scholars, rathcr than his own indi
Ible^fcaus wff
disproved Frp« ^
P-"-" "e unten-
primitive symbols is easÜy
vidual creation. For example, he apparently acquired his famous
postúlales for arithmetic from Dedekind." Many logicians are men-
he claims to Peano never defines at al! one of the signs tioned in Peano's published works,^' and Frege is among them. Aiso,
of the identitv primitives. AIso, Peano's definition Frege and Peano corresponded between 1894 and 1906. For tiese
least four other
reasons, there may be otiier things that Peano^owes to Frege. A care-
t2 ShanTth his three primitives. ftil study of the matter has never been made.
show that Peano's loPÍr°^^ important reason which Frege cites to One of the things that Peano may have acquired from Frege is
tions are faultv Th.^ profound is that Peano's definí- quantification theory, which originated in 1879 in Frege s
that give the meaning'ofThe'Lmb r'"' P""'''' ^otatioju It first appeared in Peano's works in 189 ni o a
^Pecifiedcases.Thus Peano\r.. . 1""bon oniy for certam ^ogique mathémaíique;^^ but Peano had seen ^Prhirinii
But "logic can nnlv íire not completeíy determínate. Noiatioii at least three years before that, since he ci e i in
m.p¿x;
middle is iust anntlior • iaws". The law of excluded
di lógica malemaiica published in 1891d- Peano the san^^e
abbreviation technique as Frege; nantely, i c 'irthewhc^e
quantifyingnotationwhenthescopeofthequan .j ¡j,
logicthusviolates that of this requirement; and Peano's
definitions, Frege poinrour!?^' probiem with Peano's Proposition, Also.in Formulaire de maihémaUgues II. P exptahy
Peano's Formulairp
often gives more than onJ
i' specific definitions given in dredits Frege's Concepiual No,a,ion with po.nt.ng ^e need for
some notation to show which variables in a formu a „„antifica-
supply a proof that these definir fied.» All these things are evidence that Peano acqutred quanttfica
Peano was obviouslv ■ ^ontradict each other. don theory from Frege.
lishedrecantationhesaysíhaUt-wilí^
a number of controvertíai a a ^"K
^°"^''^^tite to the clarification of
and he gratefully acknowledges that"hir'"''í" '°®v "f §15. BETWEEN BASIC LAWS OF ARITHMETIC I
RUSSELVS paradox
an individual, but one of o/^ll u . ^ogic is not the work of
withgratituderemarks wTiiVK ^ °^^don; and he will always receive Sorrow and frustration continued to The cold
Because ofFreXeñw p'"" andperfection. Ptiblication of Volume I of The Basic Laws
JPdeptionthebookreceivedwasaiiother exaspwj Although
does use more than thrpo' forced to admit that his logio
his new book was a monumental contr nf marking a pre-
tfine.
him toAlso,
addFrege's
the signpolemir
*z= nf —indeed,
definitional uses atforced
procedures least ■Patios, no one realizad the fact. Howe-r -nstead ^
tives,andtochangesoinpfa, tature end to Frege's grand project, the p
there was an eSaHm!^^u definitions.definition") to his
Henee, because primi-
of Frege, '°SeeAl66. ...... . r^^mnpuf Dedekind, DeMorgan,
Peano's logicbetwe^nC'n^^^^^^^^^^^ Volume II of the Formulaire
mathematiques.^
P--- de Eir Frege,example, Boole,Günther, Halsted,
Grassmann, , j^'evons
Jevons, Liard,
ua MacFarlane, MacColI,
^^fy, Peirce, Poretzky, Schroder, Venn. j. ^ the matter. They
® Turin, 1895. " Perhaps the Frege-Peano letters ^11 sh
can be found in the Frege Archives m Munster,
^ som^i
* 1894
"id not publish it until ]* In the Rivisía di matemática, 1 361.
^ rfe mathématiques (1897). ® "«provements inte Volume II of Turin, 1897. See the discussion of proposition
 WORK OF GOTTLOB FRECE LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE 43
Student, Abbe was impressed with the originality and revolutionary
the project to a^succr'f"!^ '° ''""® charactcr of Fregc's work. !t was Abbe wlio recommcnded that Frege
wrote a torrent of n " Bctween 1894 anci 1902 Frege be admittcd to the Jena faculty in 1874, and Abbe again who sug-
details of hi<; nu/n published and unpubüshcd, working out gested that Frege be promoted to Professor Exlraordinarius in 1879.'*
end of this period and attacking opposing views. Ncat the Abbe had helped the Zciss famüy establish their Icns and camera
Basic Laws of Arith manuscript of Volumc II of The factory; and for this he reccived 45 per cent of all the profits. He
^omnll%tZT
and happy evento moa
it at his expense,
^as rewarded with some success,
used this moncy anonymously to establish and sustain the Cari Zeiss
hope. In 1896 he wac ^ '■'"onbles more bearable and rcnewed his Btifíung. Later he bought out Rhoderich Zeiss's share of the ííictory
and donated his profits to the Stiflwig as well.
Professor. About 1900 Honorary Ordinary Frege took full advantagc of his extra research time. In terms ot
a success in 1894 in hic n adopted a son. Also, he scored
Germán philosopher Hii« psychologism by converting the
Pages of manuscript, this period was the most productivo part o
in logic began to grow whp^h ° ; and his influence Frege's career. He corresponded witli Ballue, Couturat Hi bert,
logic of Peano.^ ^ niade additions and corrections to the Husserl, Knoch, Mayor, Pasch, and Peano. He P"blished ( ) a
Frege was probablv ofF a crushing review of Husserl's PhUosophy of ArithmeUc \ f (2) a aamag-
Professorship, but a full Honorary Ordinary ing critique of Schróder's Lectures on the Algebra f/Fog/c; ( ja
twenty-two years of exopn'"f^ Professorship. He liad given Jena lethal repiy to Peano's review of The Basic Laws of '
(4) a thouglitful comparison of his own logic and Peano (5) a com
pubhshedtwenty-six
was even granted theworifc
nrp^i ' ^^"^^'^ntious teaching
(Laier, inand
1907,had
he vincing rtfutation of Ballue's "formalist" defFFl'on o
number-;»and (6) a witty, satirical attack upon Schubert s philosop y
aworkwascertainly
full professorship -2appreciatcdr^
but—p c of ''Hofrar, so at Jena his
oíTered anthmetic r® • » •
íione before him^Freee rpf, ^nd friend, had He prepared, but did not publish, (D three large
"«conceptual no ation"-two (301 and 210 pages
hnieto teaching
"ve duties andprofessor^hin
of a full researrVi^u bg^ause he wished toadministra-
devote full theory of magnitude, and one (258 pages ont.rely n sy« ^
theposition of Hon
"rational numbers; (2) an essay ¡°S'" ,es of definition;
or was unsalaried and
a paper on the establishment of his strict p stand-
^t It gave Frege more free timp^f Ordinary Professor, 4nd (4) twoarticleswhich argüe flrf PP ,i,ers are
point" of Weierstrass, Kossak, and B-ermann that number
of Position because hp^ He was able to accept aggregates of objects Besides all this, Frege completed
that' gave hundreds
per year from thp r
of thousand-; generous
Stiftungf^ stipend
a foundation ^onpt of Volume II of The Basic Laws the most
Of the sixpaperswhich Frege pubhshed dun
fortín likely that Fre2e''í f ■ University every ®Portant and influential was his revie attack upon the
^ S^nerous grant to Freee Ernst Abbe was responsible PhUosophy of Anthmetic I. It delivers a devastatmg attacK p
' See§i4ofthepresenth- Ome that Frege was his
" ^3 ^ ^ of Frce. contri- I See SI and §6 of the present biograPlu"'
P HusserPs book is Philosophie der Anthmet,k, Erster b
j (Leipzig, 1891).
ege's review is F24. . der Logik (Leipzig. 1890,
M SdT„°a7y» «r
thetimehe wafSÍS°?í'P= ^2) Frege
f- 'e-her wlio
Professorship to the leo, ^broder's book ís Vorlesungen uber ate w/i
Bofrat ¡s strong eviH P^'omotion; (3) the fa t '^onip'eting his project at ^ ' 1895). Frege's article is F25. . p^o ® F27.
J-na Universitr and^ aíd be was granted the íltle of 8 Peano's review is S220; Frege's rep y >s ffl_ ^ entier considéré comme
^ co-director of'the J, ^onfirmed bv appreciatcd at fonri definition occurs in Ballue s arbcle
l'analysc mathématique", Revue de nwtaphysique
metapny eí de moiale, 3
^ See A146. ^tathematical Seminar at ¿a ^bat Frege was made lo ¿ Frege's article is F26. " See S253.
44
LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE 45
nQv l, 1 • WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE between the sense and the denotation of an expression, which ap-
argumeXmark¿°f^f Husserl's position. Frege's crushing parently led Husserl to his own distinction between the object and
Whilehewasasturi^^'f ® ""sserl's career."
out ofcuriositv the Iprf" ° "jathematics at Vienna, Husseri attended
the noema of an act of thought.
Frege replaced the classical distinction between an expression and
by Brentano's personart^^^ of Franz Brentano,and was so impressed its meaning with the trichotoniy of (1) the expression, (2) the sense of
his plan to become a ni Phdosophical lectures that he gave up the expression, and (3) the denotation (or reference) of the expression.
philosophy; and under ^ He devoted himself instead to Similarly, Husserl replaced Brentano's distinction between an act of
cate of psycholosicni m ^ influence became a staunch advo- thought and the object of that act with the trichotomy of (1) the act
1° 1891 hSi núbluS
Arithmetic, in which he
"-athematics.
volume of his Philosophy of
of thought, (2) the noema of the act, and (3) the object of the act.
Now, for Frege, the sense of an expression is that in virtue of which
logism. Heincludedan ^ view firmiy rooted in psycho- it has a denotation\ while, for Husserl, the noema of an act of thought
whichprodded Fregeinto! philosophy of arithmetic, ts that in virtue of which it has an object. Thus, Husserl s noema
^d subjected it to bis exrpnt^^ Frege reviewed the book
Husserl's major argumenté powers. Analysing each of corresponds to Frege's sense', and, indeed, Husserl considered his
con usion that iurked in th cxposed the contradiction and uotion of noema as sense generalized in some special way.^®
Here, then, is a strong link between Frege and the school of
tw ííid he
that there was underminp
littie left to ,tK ^^""^ations of underpinnings. So
HusserPs position, phenomenology. The notion of *^noema is crucial in phenomeno-
explains: stand upon. As Husserl's biographer íogy; and indeed this philosophical movement, initiated by Husserl,
could be reasonably described as an eñbrt to study noemata. ^
Frege had struck at th Unlike his review of Husserl's work, Frege's critique of Schroder's
Brentan^^v!^^"^ ^cgmatically aní vf ^Husserl's] views so that, unless he Lectures on the Algebra of Logic had no impact upon philosophy;
carrvon°f \u ^^^stomed
carrvonf ^^"stomed him it ® ^ ^®^tely
°^tely by the doctrines to which but from Frege's point of view it was important, because it disproved
Schroder's claim to have a better logic. When, back in 1880, Schroder
root nrinní 1 P^cdigious tajüV «F ^¡foffundamental questions— reviewed" Frege's Conceptual Notation, he proudly asserted tha is
ticaUy the whof particular and ^ ^^°^ough analysis of the own logic (and Boole's) was superior to Frege s in ewry respec , an
Positions witho! ^^tertowork
ut attempting builH waf • general,
over to and prac-
clarifying basic be produced a most critical and misguided review, rege a
Frege's review thus ma ^ ^ system on them." tered this attack in his lecture "On the Aim of the
^PPearance, Hu^rf h"?'!*® "" Husserl's career. «O""" (and in theNotation;'"')
'he Conceptual unpublishedbut
paperthe"Boole's Calculat.^ifhrSder's
Log'e and
£r.r¡,'» «"■¿Sí'r.
«SStíí"
J... , ■" Sil'"""
■- cirrpsSs...
' tic did not opponent of r»cx/oV.oio<rism.
matter appeared sixteen years later in Frege s
'°8'c. In that work Frege specifies many difficulües and mconsiste
^tes, tracing them to five major sources. Schro er a
- - -"

Frege's Weas from®p° í"® apparenüy did o Failed to distinguish between a elass as a "^^''^Íael
cluster, agglomLtion) of individuáis and a elass as an abstraet
thoroughlv 14 A ^°tnnients inH' by Frege himself) are (non-physical) object;
and 1906-anH *^o philosonhe^^^"^ studied them (2) Failed to distinguish between sign and thing signified,
(24 between 1891
12 o oontains a careful e*oio . s letters to Husserl " ^ thorough discussion of matter present biographi-
" The^^^^' Fhe review is S256. For a discussion ot its co
These letters can 1,0^''From*!')!
f ^213, n 51 "ation of Frege's distinction sketch, §8.
® found in the Freg¿ Archív " ^^0, S141, S142. " F12.
»» See S253.

8c Archives inMünster,Germany.
 47
WORK OF GOTTLOB FRECE LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE
At the height of this happiness and success the "impossible"
a concent between (i) an individuaPs falling under happcned! Someone—a young British logician named Bertrand
concepf'" concept's being subordinatcd lo another Russell—discovercd an antinomy in the "solid lógica! foundation
for mathematics which Frege had laid with such pain. In June 1902
^^ ^alirand"'" " Russell wrote to Frege to disclose his discovery.^ Frege was shocked.
The antinomy was the now famous Russell s Paradox concerning
ThuTTeT ''''''
what a formidahlí»^n^i Schroder aiso learncd thc hard way
the set of all sets which are not members of themselves; if it is not
a member of itself, then it is', and if it is a member of itself, then it
is /I0/.2
The ^hallenged. The trouble lay in the set theory which Frege employed in defining
criticism was H Schi h ^ ° target of Fregc's most caustic Ihe numbers and establishing their mathematical properties. The
foundations of mathptvf^!' chosen to write an article on thc Paradox aíTected not only Frege's work, but also the work of all
mathematischen W' edition of the Enzyklopadi^ scholars(such as Cantor and Dedekind) who had used set theory for
incompetent essay, and afte ^ singularly the foundations of mathematics.^' In Frege's system the difficulty
and others had in'vesteH * of careful work which he could be traced to his Basic Law V-the only fundamental principie
thought it was a scandal th ^ u of mathematics, Frege about which he had expressed some reservations.
article. He wrote a scath' ^ ^"^ykiopádie should print such an Frege believed that without a solution to the Paradox three
privately under the titlf» satire on Schubert's views, publishing 't decades of work would be in jeopardy, and mathematics would again
Paper, more than anv oth " of Mr. H. Schuberí.-'' This be tottering on weak foundations.» During the summer of 1902 he
have when aroused The h^' what a spicy tongue Frege could corresponded with Russell and attempted to work out a solution to
tains are the best examnIe.TfT' ^^ich it con-
ampies of Frege's efforts as a satirist. the Paradox; but the bad news had depressed be fdt i k
In late July he reported to Russell that he lacked the strength to
reply to Russell's letters as quickly as he wished
. ^^ginning RUSSELL Finally, as the end of the summer drew near, th pp
in 1896, Frege's luck Honorary Ordinary Professor sccond volume of the Basic La«'s °ff'''''"'''' ITfosZc
enjoying some success Th^ ° ^niprove; and by early 1902 he was Proaching, and Frege hoped to '«nlude ^ f Ls°c Law V
Arithmetic was in press- anH ^olume of his Basic Laws of Russell's discovery. He devised amen men paradox in his
oubtthatarithmeticisabran proved beyond all tvhich would prevent the generation • nn anoendix in
mathematics from a qual. believed he had rescued 'ogloal system;'and he ¡ncluded the amendmem
foundation rooted in "the^! ""^-^stablished it upon a solid ^hich he expressed confidence that h
Besides providin^th thought".
I See S240. , R,i«eli's Principies of Mathematics,
Frep had dealt a damagine decisive proof of his own view, 'For a discussion of this paradox see Russell
^ctrimentai
(Mili Weierstrass, Kossak ^ ° ^"'^^^"talternativetheories which
Extreme empiricism Chapter X. See S24I.
See the Appendix to F30. hincraDhieal sketch, p. 37.
u and "formalism" Psychologism (Erdmann I In
Seethe
thePreface
same; also §13 of the present
of F23. ,
biograpnic
. gg arlthmetic can be scientifi-
all beeneffectiveiyattacked
an Ale
shortcomings in the lom'mi Ballue, and contradictions
disciosed Thomae) had In the Appendix of F30,he says: 1
cally founded ... unless we are aHowed'at 'easr
conditionally—the transition
something
o w om had claimed that thpír " and Schroder, both from a concept to its extensión"(from Furth s transí
own logic was superior to Frege's. ake Frege's Basic Law V holds. . „„„f.his ietter can be found in the Frege
20 p29^
^'In a letter dated 28 Juiy 1902. A copy of tnis
Archives in Münster, Germany.
 48
WORK OF GOTTLOB FRECE
LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FRECE 49

Russell logistic foundations

ussell, in an appendixTn ti T lounclations of arithmetic.
ol anthniei.c. It is olear from information already presented in this biographical
Weknowtodav thf V
Weknowtodrv thalV ^"wav ont" of
Frege's «...cMathematics,^
..........er.. agreed.
Mathcmatics,^ sketch that these claims are overstatements. This fact was not clearly
adding very simnl#» • ^ unsucccssful, for by pointed out, however, until 1963, when Nidditch did so in his article
systemnewcontradictí!?"^^~^^'u y)—io his rcpaired "Peano and the Recognition of Frege" and many people are still
Frege ever becamí»
becarnt» n derived." We do not know whether unaware of the facts.
formanvvears!,«
fbrmanyyearshe ° shortcomings; biit it is clear
olear that
that Frege's work hardly "passed unnoticed" before Russell discovered
-
in '9.3-/4
courses at Jena Unlversity h'sbelogistic
Overeóme. As late
programme it; for it had been reviewed or criticized by many others, including
notable scholars like Venn, Schroder, Cantor, Husserl, and Peano.^®
Russell was certainly not the first person to read the Conceptual
iishednomoremabr^^
tions of arithmetic. HqT" Laws of Arithmetic II, Frege
or the pub-
founda-
l^otation. It had been reviewed six times^® and cited in Peano s
worksi7 and in Venn's Symbolic Logic,^^ both of which Russell
and philosophy of his ea '"^Pnct upon logic, mathematics, himself had read.
tbeworkofotherschoiarlrK-^?'®''®"'®"^^ had just begun. Finally, Frege did not remain "wholly without recognition until
bis influence increased anH ^ Wittgenstein, andThrough
Carnap) 1903; for, as we have seen,^® both Husserl and Peano had already
great Ímpetus to Frege's infl^^^^^^ Bertrand Russell gavc the first recognized Frege as an important scholar, and indeed had been
For decades inacciirnto • ^ssentially influenced by him.
relation to Frege and hi«; u/ circulated about Russell's Though Russell was not the first to "discover" Frege, he was the
that Frege's work was v¡rf,°^^ example, it has often been said hrst to see that Frege had made revolutionary advances in logic and
and drew attention to ¡f ; u- till Russell discovered it tbe philosophy of mathematics. The correct account seems to be,
himselffosteredsuchavÍP^" of Mathematics. Russell ^hen, that Husserl and Peano "discovered" Frege, while Russell
In so,T. .
spite of eDoch-mou- statements like these: <]iscovered Frege's greatness.
Starting with the Principies of Mathematics, Russe 1 taug i a
remamedwhollywithoutrécoJIif discoveries, he [Frege] had done before him—that applying the new °°
I^spiteofthe e ^^^^^^«^"tion tohimin 19^^^ Pbilosophical problems could yield impressive f^ubs. Throug^
hs Pubhcation.1^
m Person who eveí'^read it-more
\.Conceptual Notation], Russell, contemporary analytic philosophy, which had origmated
than twenty yearsI after
^as,
Frege, beT to Lw.Ironically, as Russell's fame mcreased,
Other scholars have eriir. a r. "''«ge was relefated to the bacltground; so he never hved to enjoy
years. Lewis andXangford sav f ® claims down through the recognitiorhe deserved. Russell and »
P, ,
Frege s work passed i example
'
'^"'hemaUca was acciaimed a Sh
La..s of Arithmetic was
ít by Mr. Bertrand RussdU3'^^^ ^hen attention was called to ™"<=h of what thePrittcipia had achieved (w.th 'he ""'Bbleexce^u^^^
'S241.
® solution to Russell's Paradox) ha himself called the
See A34 th "gorously» i„ Frege's book. Russell hved to see himself called
nap, dated 4 ADririS"®''« «"ateils in a I... ° ^'"2, S229, S234, S270.
"B. RusseU 4 l®'- " P"-®»"' writer from Caf '« S212 "See seo, S139, pO,S256, S292.
J946).p.858"^®«P'-J'P/»'a«er„ , Tn Ol nt /IQ902 cfrictlyspeaking,állthereviewers
,," From Russell's ■ Alien and Unwin, but ¿>.®^''®'^«'S205,S256,S283,andS292.
may have reviewed the bPf Schroder,
reviewing it. on the
17 b^nd, studied Frege's book in grea la jn S291.
P..d. '''"^'"^^'''NPwVos.:Cen.u..l932=0„ve..95..l959,. IB f example, in S220.
lo„.20 See§§14-15 aboye.
p. 268 of S54. For a discussion ofo some oí the imperfections in Russell s
'°8>c see A70.
®24850i E
50 LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FRECE LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE 51
greatest iogician since Aristotle,2i while Frege died wilh littie which he thanked Vailati for breakfasl indicalcs that Frege went to
recognition. Italy.i" Perhaps he met Peano ihcre, as wel! as Vailati. The last
of the Frcge-Russeil corrcspondence (dated Jcna, 9 June I9I2 )
§17. AFTER RUSSELL'S PARADOX
reveáis that Frege had accepted an invitation from Russell to come
During the decade following the publicatioii of Basic Lans of to England for a mathematics conference in the summer of 1912; but
Frcge led a rather unhappy Ufe. Thcrc is a widespread he was torced to cancel the trip at the last momeiit because his adopted
myth that Russell's Paradox had left him a disappointcd and broken son Alfred fell ill. . ^ ,
man, but actually, at least until 1914. he believed his logistic pro- Althoiigh Frege was active during this penod, he published only
a few things, including (1) several articles on the foundations of
fhTv u successfully. The probicm was rather geometry, which aróse from his corrcspondence with Hilbert betore
lervin„ n '505 death claimed his wife,' RusselPs Paradox;»"(2) three articles against "formalist" arhhmetic
from hk ™Kr adopted son alone, Aiso, it is clear in answer to the attack by his colleague Johannes Thomae.
har?h tltat Frege was irked and upset by tvvo Besidcs the published articles on "formalist" anthmetic he also
Thon^ae ;,fT t by his colleague Johannes wrote (1905-8) four unpublished essays on the same topic. Other
of hXÍ , A.Korselt on Frege's critique works in Frege's scientific Nachlass which were wntten m this period
metrv4 concerning axioms and definitions ¡n g^O' include (1) two incomplete manuscripts, "A ^
Logical Theories" and "Introduction to Logic which consider the
Riir °ld beyond his years".= same topics as the published "logical studies";(2)some essays agams
Frege reüfa n a" Jena University in 1918, however, Pasch, Hilbert, Korselt, Moore, and Schoenflies 011
newapplicatiLs^fn™"^"'' scholar, continuing to work on theory;and(3)thelargemanuscript(l51pages) n ogi ' ^
the views of nt^ ° 'Conceptual notation" and to study critically ntatics", which served as a basis for his ^mversity lectures of 19 .
universitv lect, foundations of mathematics.» He based hiS Frege's students had the advantage of te
tinued to be riem ^ current research and his courses con- lectures some of the topics from these unpubhshed
He was in tmiT student, impressive, and inspiring- those students was Rudolf Carnap, who m the^auturn of 191
Darmstaedter TV scholars, including Couturab attended Frege's course "Conceptual Notation ,
Vailati.8 Through"a T' Jourdain, Lowenheim, Russell, an introduction to Frege's "uew logic".- In 1913,
unforíunatelv Í i ? ^oí"í"espondence with Lowenheim, whicU comment that his new iogic could be used to cons ru
apparently conv\nclTf arithmetic, Carnap attended "Conceptual No a ion
formal arithmetic á /a HilbenT'^'^ of constructing an acceptab e I-
Frege , cntical
occasionally made •*•^.,1 rema
r^mqrks about,,,3,.
other attacked
conceptions,
the
sometimcs with irony and even sarcasni. n pí s„¡,-ibols [He]
travelled from^übnelo^f^'"^
irom time to time to visitscholars,
them. AnFrege apparently
extant postcardalso
on
^'íplamed vanous applications [ot nis
1967f p.'," "Russell Relcases Ufe Story", New York Times, 19 March ;; I am indebted to Professor lenazio Aogelelli fw^^^^
Bertrand Russell very kindly ™ to Korselfs attack
for providing from the Jena^Un^^ ^nd Professor Ignazio Ange'"^"' F31, F32, F34. The last Item cited here is frege s ic p
death. The Probable date date of Frau Frege s above. u ^qq s253, p. 29; also F45.
= F34. F35, F36 F37 ® in S128 is incorrect. 15 Kurze
'F36, F37. meiner logischcn
Übcrsicht . j phren" and "Einleitung in die Logik";
L
Frege's critique of Hilh^rt ¡c r .. 'S285, S286, S287. see S2.'53, p. 26. (Published in F45.) accoimt of the contents of
^ S^e ""esponse is in F34 Rorselt's attack is All these articles are mentioned S253. ^or
® Mostoftheseietterscanh r ° ^253. 7 See A34- the lectures see A34.(Articles published in F43.)
'See S253. 'n the Frege Archives ai Münster,Gerniany- " See A34.
 52 UFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE 53
some which we not contained in his publications, e.g., a definition of the In his study of the foundations of mathematics Wittgenstein read
n muity o a function, and of the limit of a function, the distinction Frege's works and was very strongly influenced by them. Later, in
convergence and uniform convergence. All these con- the Preface to his Tractatitsr'^ he reveáis this: "I owe a great part of
the stimulation of my thoughts to the great works of Frege and to
<sv<jtí»m «n the help of the quantifiers, which appear in his the writings of my friend Mr. Bertrand Russell.
mistflifi» m the ontological proof for the existence
mstake ^ demonstration
of God." ofthe logical So strongly did Frege influence Wittgenstein that it is difficult to
understand his works without first reading Frege. Anscombe says oí
Maíhim't' attended yet another Frege course, "Logic in the TractaíuSy for example:
tinno
üons andA conceptions
whichin Frcgc criticized some of the usual formula-
mathematics:
Wittgenstein's Tractatus has captured the rhouttt ^s
the "tathematicians did not even seem to aim at admiration of many, yet almost al! that has been publ.shed about it has
therefore show^H^ t unified, well-formed system of mathematics, and been wildiy irrelevant If this has had any one cause, that ^
" WnTi 't foundations. He pointed out a the neglect of Frege and of the new direction that he gave to Ph'losoPhy.
and proofs even * formulation of axioms, definitions, In the Traclatus Wittgenstein assumes, and does not try ° ^ ^j
SS •; ^he more prominent mathematicians.... He interest in the kind of questions that Frege wrote about, he aiso takes
for granted that his readers will have read Frege.^^
distinctions ee theí ® attention to certain fundament^
that betwe^n f'i ^ djs between the symbol and the symbolized, Frege's influence on Wittgenstein is
^iween a function and the valué of the function." work, including the later part where he rebels against
VlCWs
and influentin^ student years Carnap became a famous Sometime after 1914 as
had leamed murh f because he greatly admired Frege and retirement from Jena University ^ « fnr nríthmetic
and fuither Hev i semantics, he disseminated second thoughts about his"purely logical í Lnlora-
aSSsch^^ It is Carnap, more than Because of these doubts he became more ®*P®"I"®_. .j„
Who is chieflv re«; Wittgenstein runs a cióse second), tive. For example, his last published P/Pf"
the ^ renaissance" and "Negation" (1918), and "Compound Thoughts (
Durinff the f ♦!, ^tege s works are now receiving. some of his new explorations in logic.
Wittgensteín t "as a student at Jena, Frege ni«J Several papers from Frege's revea ^.Tpart of
methods. In'l910°WíttBp^^r-^^ developed Fregean ideas an ooinpletely given up his '®®'^® "way out" of Russell's
chester Universitv in F i engineering student at Man- lofíic Either he discovered that his own y _
foundations of math ^
malíes, where h^fonZ
There he became interested in th®
ofMathe'
pi.d.®S í:,':"..r i. -""?■? "'"i".;:
Frege puttinB fnnu account of Frege's views. He wrote to
ftoe. Al any rale, he W.S '^^^1924 woie "ihe fatadores
repairs of Russell and Zermelo, for 25
invitation of set theory . . . have destroyed set theory .
Frege andtobesida.!?
come to Jeií^VH''H^"°"^'
• *''® "atter. In•'«P'*®''
1911 hewith an
visited
studying the foundat'^*^"^^'r® objections, asked for advice about A173. The English translation here is that of Anscombe in
he sLuld go rcrh"'/""?"®^ reeommended that From S21, p. 12.
published (with wt.-» u ^ study with Russell, who had just ..pII ^be
F39,papers
F40. and
are, F41, respectively.
"(Tagebucheintragug ^^^^^^ggg^jflp¿grZahl)'',"Zahl".
j^athematischen Naturwissen-
L/ca W volume of Príacípía Malhe- Erkenntnisqueilen der Matheinati «TsJeuer Versuch der Grundiegung der
"From aHpS advice.- schaften". "Zahlen und Aritlimet.k'' and Neue^
"See S22 and Al75 Ruccoip • "From A34, p. Arithmetik". They were ali published ¿ecently
Wittgenstein had not^0^atTÍZ í,''' ™'- «>• PP' * From "Erkenntnisquellen", ibid. F 45, p.
time he carne to Cambridge is mistak®®'
54 LIFE AND WORK OF GOTTLOB FREGE
Thus Frege gave up the belief that numbcrs are abstract objects
oflogic (seis). However, he did not give up the belief that they are
abstract objects of some sort. In searching for a new foundation for EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
turned to an arca of lifelong interest: geomctry. He

The more I thought about it, the more convinced I bccamc that arithmctic The present volume includes Frcge's Concepiual Notation plus
n geometry grew from the same foundation, indced from the gcomclrical several works concerned with it—thrcc related articles by Frege, six
one; so that the whole of mathematics is actually geometry reviews (apparently the only enes) which appeared short y a er
Frege's book was published, and some remarks by four distinguís le
""""bers with points on a Gaussian planc, Frege contemporary scholars.' Taken together, these wor's cover
objects he thought he needed to give arithmetic important chapter in the rise of modern logic. . . .
Even though the Conceptual Notation ushered in a logical renais-
for he gave up a belief he had held sance, and, as such, lias bcen duly ceiebrated by n®'°'''fn® o .
schnm-'\ ^ (expressed as early as 1874 in his Hahilitations- many Importan! facts about the book have remained obscure o
rnntpH • I ú'? arithmetic is analytic a priori knowiedge generally unknown. Why did Frege vvrite h'® hook-precisdy w
in "opÓ"
in 8®on^s'ry is synthetic a priori knowiedge rooted
geometría intuition". «as its aim? What did he take as a basis for his ' j
make the great logical discoveries which 'he book conta ^ y
of^ríhm^t-^'i!'^' ''''' pursue his new foundations did he use an unusual two-dimensional no'ation? To date lypite
and aecb m rr
' 'he great influence of a growing interest in Frege, such issues have "ot b "
leffhTh^m 1 ' p «in- In 1918 he had in detail. The present Iiitroduction attempts'°.nns«® ^P ,
Kleinen n^r V to Haus 52 in Bad and ihereby provide a natural and appropriate preface to Fre„e
of 77 he died H of Wismar; on 26 July 1925, at the age ^ork.
world-atraBtftr í "'""''"y nnmarked by the scholarly
a revolution fnm log.e
I and !mitiated
" a great^ad singlehandedly
moyeLnt created
in philosophy. JL

The Conceptual Notation grew out of a

"F™™ "ZaWen und Aritlimetik", íbid. F45, p. 297. 2' F2.
"Frege's logistic project") that ^ntended to introduce
In that year he reviewed a mathemaUc
students to the fundamentáis of arithmetic '
complains that the book lacks laws of
concepts^ of arithmetic and (n) proofs . to develop
nnthmetic.® These shortcomings may have sp
.I The ■ is■ F7
XI Conceptual Notation F7- the
the related
reía anieles are F8, FU, F12; the
fpviews are S135, S176, S205, S256, S283, me
S54, SI67, A55, AI27. s The review is F3.
^ Seo Appendix II below, pp. 236-8. 'conccpt' (Begriff)
In this carly period of his career, . ® gntity, both subjective and
■"ather loosely, allowing it to stand for vari assigned 'concept'
'heTptm^ing "Whcse valué is always a truth-
™'"FÍe,e usen the term •ari.hmelic- very bread,y te Include, for example.
 EDITOR'S introduction EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
such definiuons and proofs himself; for, about thc same time, he
began an effort to do just tliat.
Before attempdng to prove tlie fundamental laws of arilhmetic, In the Proface lo thc Conccpnml Notalion Frege explains that the
rege a to decide what kind of proof wouid be appropriatc. Since initial phase of his projcct was an efibrt "to reduce the coneep of
srithmetic a science, the proofs had to be scientific. ordcring-in-a-sequence to that of logical ordenng. At
to dcvelop his arguments in Germán, but soon ou infer-
rtronfc^Ti? are two kinds of scientifically acceptable inadequate. Many words were ambiguous or vtigue, mo
whirh r.r^ depend upen empirical evidencc, and those ence were numerous, obscure, and difficult to -^''uracterize p ec sely,
however tW logically"(rein logisch). He rejectcd tlie vicW, implicit assumptions and intuitlons could creep °
he was left °^^"'^hmetical truíhs appeal to expericnce,' so noticed,lcav[ng"gaps"inthcchainsofreasomng. . i
S^ce h r^ thcm "purely logic'lly".» if they could be gfvmt at all, were loose and
concents (e of arithmetíc employ basic arilhmetical was wcll schooled in geomctry, was fccustome therefore
logically in orrfp"T had to be defined purely proofs, such as tliose in Euclidean geometry, a i,„'Hecldedto
concepts Frege h^ad logically. Apparently, the quite dissatisfied with this first efibrt. Consequentiy he dec.ded to
example the ""nd (besides that of "number") were, for develop a more precise ianguage in whieh to the
as "less'than" induction, and rclatlons such he was determined to construct the Ianguage in s ^ ^ thereby
Frege chose to'use r '°"' define these, Possibility of human error In reasoning wouid be mm.mtzed,thereby
appropriate choirp ■ ordering-in-a-sequence"®—a very making his proofs as reliabie as possibic.
sequentia! orderina "^^thematícal induction essentially involves Since he was familiar %vith of Leibniz's
"greater
0^ "after"than'Mn ?;r:f"of
i„ the sequence ' seeking a precise, scientific languag , scientific "universal
tirnbitious programme to develop a p »
Ianguage". As C. I. Lewis describes it,
devised th^fodow!^^^
sequence" (proper anLst" noiion of "ordering-in-a- This universal médium is to be an difier from
define the basic concentrn/^^-^u tíien, on this basis, character of which will represent a ® through using a combina-
deñnitions and the laws of i ^"d finally, given these existing ideographic languages, such as compound idea, instead of
a-rithmetic. °S'c, prove the fundamental laws oí bon of symbols, or some similar device, variety of things.
having a multiplicity of characters correspo lifetime, the universal
So that while Chinese can hardly be fundamental charac-
Introduction the term functional analysis. In the present cbaracterislic may be mastcred in a few ^¡H represent the
" See the Preface to F7 1
'In F14, where he ar' ^oJ'Jnie, pp. 103-4.
ters of the universal Ianguage will be few m i
taking this position. See also^pfe explains bis rcasons for ^^phabet of human thoiight'".^^
it vurnccl otit th* * nc "{> rertain sensible
dUnidUr"^ '°S:!\ogSeTwftií^^^ ofínferencc provided Leibniz characterized his proposed lun|"ag
® What F?ege '°sic. anthmetical concepts that are and palpable médium, which w.il guide the mtna
F7, this volume, p. 104. - . „
aormma76Ónller^®^
in his effon 'sTo^day^caíedThe^^^^^
^otation p 173 u T'"®?®'' Í'
^ relation "In
SeeFlFU, the present volume, PP* Euclid's proofs contam gaps .
and ,,,2^ f aruh^ic hom.ogi. st'T^f^'hfp^iLmTnrdücítoa 1, however, Frcgc points cu
hrege achieved thi<i firo^ 1
'• ^ríorexample, thc Preface o[ ,™e'uJtlUreitirf California Press;
Sred%?;Í''-=?2.SceaIsLtfc^
view below, pp. 218-32 " F7.present
8 of the transla.ed in the prcsenj
Introduction, and -Prin'il^Aí^ttí.Sa'^r^l^Rténts of the University of Caltfornta.)
 EDITOR'S introduction EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 59
drawa in geometry and the formulae for operations . . . in arith- Leibniz required that ihcre should be no *'gaps in chains of
metic".io Thus, reasoning:
if we could fiad characters or signs appropriatc for cxprcssing all our To derive onc truüi from anothcr, we must keep uninterruptcdly to a
oug ts, as efinitely and as exactly as arithmeíic cxprcsscs numbcrs and certain chain. For as wc may be sure that a chain will hold w len wc are su
geometnc analysis expresses lincs, wc could in all subjects in sofar as they that cach sepárate ring is of sound material, and that it clasps ... ^^on
hefore and the onc aftcr it. so likewise, we may be sure of the accur y
G^^omet^ accomplish what is done in Arithmctic and the reasoning whcn ... it contains nothing doubtful, an wien
For all inquines which depend on reasoning would be performcd by thc consists of a perpetual llnking with no gaps.^^
transposition of characters and by a kind of cálculos...
To prevent "gaps" in proofs, and guarantee that nothing could slip
^^"guage Leibniz proposed was ío be modelled upon arilb" in unnoticed. Frege required that every assumption-no malter 1 ow
íntpr S'^oj^etry disciplines in which Frege had considerable trivial—shonid be fully expressed; and every mference m ^ P™
hh í-ff training; and, even though Leibniz never succeeded in aonform to a simple, firinly estabüshed and syntac ica
^LtrZ . ^ "universal characteristic", Frege found the rule of infercnee, linking the derived sentence m question g
develonincf ^ he could fulfil a less ambitious project by ^ssumptions or previously derived sentences.
concernpH ^ ^he Leibnizian language—that par^
required ^ mathematics—Frege would have the tools
C'
h. T- P^<^vide. In applying these rigorons whtóh^
universal in lutself upon the Leibnizian programme for n
notation" began the development of his "conceptual Prev.onsly employed in '^conceptual notation".
oiher respccts served as a model for his ^05 the
One of the things he did adopt from' surface to
amphibolies" F Leibniz ruled out "equivocations and Practice of utilizing the two-dimension y . i^o.dimen-
notation" ren ' banned ambiguity from his "conceptual ^ulueve perspicnity.=« Geometric ügures are o^ t^o.dimensional
eacTrit¡ the same meaning in '°nal; bnt often proofs in arithmetic al proposiüonal
Accorlrtn
reasoning T Ír\"^'"®
mistakes^"Drol ' language will make no ^rrays.« For example, one freqnently writes down
barbarisms soIp * Í ^ avoid the errors of calculalion^ uxpression®» (equation, inequality, etc.) imni
tion".2» In the 'Ínn""' T , of grammar and construc- "Leibniz,"On Wisdom"(1693), Wicner, p. 78.
syutactically speoifie'd \nH of inference=i were to be o. Fll, the present voUime, p. 85. trrese achieved the first really
adherence to ^ramm' i S^^mmar so constituted that "nicr .< Indecd, bccause of these Le ourely syntactical. requiringno
gapless" proofs in any discipline. His proo rigour and formal correct-
thought processes" 22^^^ ^°tild guarantee the formal correctness of tuitivc steps or componcnts. They ^^bieve Lukasiewicz in 1920. See
unmatched for ovcr forty years until the works
aV See Fll,
^olume. p. 237.
this volume, p. 87 and F1 .
volume. p. 97.
5etoo/w, ed. P. p. wiener (1677), quoted in LeibniíZ See Fll, this volume, p.88. sentence', and so on, have been
thisbook^_m^^^^ Scribner's, 1951). p. 15. (Hcnccforth, uo H in dilferent ways
as 'proposition', 1.^40
by various ^uthors.(bee a p. 26.) To avoid confusión,
following way:
he present Introduction consistcntly ^age or notation; aproposiíional
<^xpression is a set of symbols in a giv g. ^ se/tíence is a propositiona
F7,this volume, p I17 Pr»» 1. is one which has the form (roughiy Frege s
f'i ÍT- «ferenee- see An? Ji^bnsuish f.^Pression whose meaning is a beL)is the meaning expressed
*^11, tms volume, p. 84 ' assertible contení" {beurleilbarer Inhalt), see 6 oeio
 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 61
from which it is derived; is an argument using Frege's connectives. In English it could be read
x-\-(¡ = 8 X is less than zero, and .v squared equals four; therefore, x equals
niinus two.
X = 8—6
The two-dimensional structure of arrays in Frege's notation m^es
x=2 them very easy lo read for one can tell at a glance how the gtven
thus achieving more perspicuity than could be attained by placing proposiiional expressions are related; and in proofs one can see
tüe expressions side by side: immediately whether a given derivation conforms to Frege s major
rule of inference-a rule of detachment {modus ponens). TIns títs
'^+6 = 8, X = 8-6, X = 2. very nicely with his desire to minimiza the possibility of mistakes.
pre^om°nn expression is derived from two (or more) 4
then a drawn, and the derived expressionthe other as
is placed before;
below it, Given Frege's rigorous proof standards and his two
fonnectives, one would indeed liavc the rudiments ^
x^==4
'iitedium, which will guide the mind as do the lines
X <0 geometry"; but onc would have to add, as well, some kind
construct the proposiiional expressions that the log.cal onn cüv
x= ~2. ^^'ate. To be sure, Frege could-and did-combme h
The hne can be read "therefore". expressions from arithmetic to form
major ainr, however, was to P^ovide
inherentTiiÍwn-H* "conceptual notation"the perspicuity ^""damenta! laws of arithmetic; and to acliieve thi
metic the practice"^^r*°"^^ arrays;®» and so he adopted from anth- (^ithout being circular) base his proofs upen propos.tional exprés
''°ns from arithmetic-he had to use purely °"7„„_sions
expressions, Frege needed logical
To develop a notation for purely logical One of
mge drew upon his mathematical traming an p . jj j^¡
so forth. Since nfono.^t , 'and', 'or', and major interests in mathematies tvas ^ft'hkr argu-
the other, he could ndd" were to occur one beloW ^°mmonly empicys letters for numerical ^ guch
notation and further i
Unes(as in geomelrv^t
^^cther two-dimensional aspect to his
Pcrspicujty by constructing figures from
ments (variables) for example, 'x', 'y , and / , njathe-
the array logical connectives. For example,
'«'«s enable one to express precisely
^Ucal properties, relations, and opera ' ' numbers we
I rp -V^=4 ^"Plmned, "by making use of letters instead of . • • numb
.Y<0 80 tt^afortunately,
r. • thatf Freee's
the erroneous view ® • noíation is difficult to read
jj^gPrefacecfhisPnncíp/eí
common. See, for example, Russell's remarks m the rr
I" x=~2 °^f^'/'emanb.(S241).
3a F8, the present volume, pp- 204- • - j-geidasastudent(seeabove,
p. ,f>ege had taken several university courses in this tiei
by a and
tíon sentence; an true
is either oíserz/bn
or false V ♦«•
CFrpTf' {Urteil}) is an asserted proposí- ju . Prege disapproved of using term , vanabl^, • u,p' because he thought (with
a sentence is asserted, the <?pntPnL°'f context, the proposition expressed by
either true or false. to be asserted ¡n that context and that it is often erroneously (see F38 or F7 [¿1. P- 1^
See F12, the present volume, pp. P'"eferred simply to use consistent account of the no
of a^ ®variable,apparently the íirst to g»ve a
See S54, this volume, p- 23/-;c ,
 EDITOR'S introduction EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

which there is some connection and order, whicli and so, in thc Conceptual Notaiion, he limits himself to propositional
a means of noticing theorcms and ccncral riilcs".^"^ expressions." Bccaiisc of this restriction, all functions in his "con
Rpraiic ofr thesp
13ecause ° theorcms
. and general
T ._t ceptual notation" are propositional^- and all non-function letters
exore^innch advantages, to construct thc propositional which are not in argumcnt
nrmimcnt places
nhiccs of functional
fuiictional expressions (or part
to emnlov lpn^°"r 'og't^al ones), Frege wishcd ®f Quantifiers) are propositional ieíters^^
involve con<;t V their argumenls. This would Frege's functional expressions are not only "modelled upon the
had previously
DrevTnn^^^^^notad, such a practica
i'"''' was notways;
non-numerical new: but, as Leibniz formula languagc of arilhmctic" as described above, they are also
analogous in the following way. In an arithmetic propositional
whosrme^iTno?irnvf samples of the art of characters expression, say =f{xy, if one were to replace all the letters by
designated points (rcommon""'''"''' niagnitudes. For if thesc Ictiers symbols for particular arguments, the resulting expression wou
could form a certain / P^'^^ticc aclually among Gcomctcrs), we a sentencc. ¿'omc resulting sentences, if asserted, would be /n/c-íor
different from Alpphr ^ operation which would be cntircly «ampie (replacing Y by %\ '-V by '2', and '/{ )' by the square
as the latter fe to enjoy the same advantages fnnction '( )2')
Aristotle, we ohtnin tu f" ^ letters desígnate terms or notions, as in 4 = (2F;
mocds.'^s ^ of logic which treats of thc figures and
while others would be false—for example' (replacing y by 9,
t)y '5', and /( )' by '( F'),
developed his ^otation Frege reveáis that he
arithmettc as a rde,
in detall if nnp "ot explain this comment
"t y = to; .

discipline concernen^ Frege's view of logic as that scientifie S'milarly in Frece's lo^ical propositional expressions. say V or
a strict analogy with arithm^e^'^"^'"® maintains H.)', i"!,!:'?; í».V.v.w='«r
..nlences .vhicl., 'P
by 'All man are mortal',,,.^7" ....in. V by
logical functions Frpop a derive an account of the ^^odüces sentences which, if assertea, woiuu u. - , .
isthescientificdiscinlinp A"thmelic, according to Frege, f,^^mple, replacing ; or r^Ucing x by
of arguments of its therefore the range fílate' and 'F' by 'is a Román' to get Plato is a
analogy with
soientific this view
disciplina ofaíiíhm\ "umbers. Maintaining aisstrict
crnlne^"' that
arguments of its functinnQ anyíhing at all, then the range of
functional notaLranaZf ^hus, using tow^ard'"t^o^ucing
arguments no longer restrlted tn anthmetic, but witli the developinglogical
the kindfunctions ^ to applyEven so, he
his logical
Purely
ones;3-logical
but, asexpressions—hnti, Frege couM construct
noted above ^P°"^'0"^landnon-propositional needed an importanl addition propositions
oted above, he was mainly interested in the former;^" '^.;>,^t:ons most effectively and express
""TheUnrl,^. Which he was concerned. Smce the
forpí-''''''
for proposiiions. Sec, for cxamole í> • 'fO). tostandWiener, p, 74. but also
for terms, ia E7, the present volume, P- 132. ¡jional function' ñor a Gorman
P 2(53''l2)or4(57'6)
Sec below, p. 104. Seeaísrsmr^^^ ,5 (34,5_24)
^167, pp. 92 and 96. prior equiv himself did not use the function in
defin h is uscd here in the sense of P P . j j.^ After
VaH"?dbyChurch(S66,p.257)as''a/w^^^^^ rangeF20,
of theFrege
dependused
»" AUw!;Z'sta¿"of i'-"!' "í'"™' "■ Va;¡rC^
prQr,^ e Je Church
^^riab ?.'s (S66,'r
composed oíp. propositions
257) ocVfW.
as/'a;-"-'
. ^(See 6 bciow.y
^hich 4. nf the depen-
wto problems of seLmfeand was not concerned den? ^'honal functions
39 c a distinction bctween 'vit ? below.) For example, he d¡d «'^^bableis composedi>i exíensioin
oftruth-valu«. for propos.t.ons
See F7, the presem volume n 127 ' ^"d "unsaturatcd" cntitics. ("as "Po^i'ional letters
' • " See above, p. 61. ^ "«^rtible contents") ratherin than
thc Coiic f
truth-values. gbee ^ below.

I
ir • r

64 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 65
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
functions was the entire universe,'*'' he could use them without sup- they do not, by themselves, indicate their intended scope.^® To over
plementation to indicate "generality" {AUgemeinheit), and thereby eóme this difficulty, Frege introduced a generality-delimiting symbol,
which is placed in the connective array in a manner similar to that
if ^v^rything in the universo—for example, of the negation sign. The symbol in question is a "concavity
P® y .^On the other
Property,
hand,*0(a')' would
one may wishmean "Everything
to express cither ( —•)which can occur within any horizontal line (just as the
negation sign can be attached to any horizontal line). In order to
^ ^ property 0), property 0 (j.e. something^ dees not have identify the letter, say a, whose scope is to be indicated, that letter
placed in the concavity (■ ") as well as in the arguraent
or
P'aces of the appropriate function expressions.
^ith this device (which logicians would later cali the universa
^ (i.e. nothingishas
suchproperty
that it 0).
is not the case that it has property ^ quantifier"),'»» Frege was able not only to delimit generality scopes;
aiso was able, by combining his "quantifier" with the negation
symboífor?n/'^° sentences differ in meaning. Merely adding a ^'gn, to express particular as well as universal propositions.
him to express the H functional expressions would not enable ^rege's universal quantifier was the first variable binding operato
(here índicateH h ^ The reason is that the generality ^sed in logic. Here is yet another similarity between the "conceptu^
•nof)govern diffLnT^artrfnhet''''' notation" and "the formula language of arithmetic"; for variable
'nding operators are used in arithmetic as well for examp e, in
Letussav «/¡tu r: expressions in question.
the generSft'vTnr P''" '^e expression covered by ^h® ®xpressions
(or the negationt If^" (Gebiet) of the generality sinx

indicated by '[ ]• añd"tLt negatíon is / x'^dx and lim

X"—>0 ^

(O Not.[everything
til M f {has propertygenerality
<S}] by '{ }•. the result is the variable V is bound by'j^(.)dx and ' Hm' respectively.®
M Everything is such that {it is not the case that[it has property d>]}-
®y combining his universal quantifier with bis letters p°p,. ,
tion,,wWle'^^iil'thp' generality
wmie in (ii) the reverse is theis case.
included within that of the nega- *ves and adding his rules for their application, Fr^e pro . „ g,
•nost powerful and most characterisüc instrument of modern ^ ,
must sometimes be'lfniif"ri'f^'^' generality or negatio" hough at that time he was not aware that he hf don® »o. He was
satisfied, however, that he had developed the Uibnizian gu g
""r Poeded, so he proceeded to the first phase of his logistic p J
M .7^ ' 1» «•> P^P"" *
expressed without' which Frege was concerned could not b® 6
symbol for neeation which clearly delimits scopes. His
tended scope of a eiví^n "automatically"—the iii' Phase of"conceptual notation"
Frege's logistic proved
project;" buttohebewould
®dcq"atelater discove ^
the position it occuDÍes"fn unambiguously indicated by
letters, however occur to ti, connective lines.'»' Frege s Sio"ñ Frcgc uses ¡talic letters, however,
scope of their generality.
they alwaysA40haven the
„ „ . „
entire expres-
288.
« AA y r . not within it; and term 'quantifier' stems from C. S. P®"" .' . rn this volume, p. 135.
See Frege' s versión of the square of oPP^"!,® j macérate! see MO, §6.'
Por a discussion of the use of these m logie and mathemancs,
See A40, p. 14. ,
P'^131. mples are similar to(i) and (iü) above. See F7, this volume» y* V. Quine, A127, p. vii. Quotcd below, p. 236.
*' See the section "Necatinn" i-n , ^ above, p. 10.
in F7, the present volume, pp. 120-4.
 67
EDITOR'S introduction EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
need for modifications and additions in order to complete the efTort. indeed, Frege sometimes refers to them that way. Again, however,
In particular, he would need a carefully developed theory of meaning. he seems to blur the distinction between subjective, mental entities
In Conceptual Notation Frege gives iittle attention to problems as traditional Scholastic logicians would have them®® and objec
o meaning. He does make linguistic or semantic distinctions where tive "thoughts", as he himself would later cali them.^
ey seem appropriate or helpful; but he does not systematize his In explaining the meaning of his identity sign( — (ínha tsgeic
is me lons, ñor even follow them consistently. For example, he which he uses to introduce abbreviations and express some
^inguis es sign from thing signified (or using from mentioning an of his "laws of puré thought", Frege makes (but never uses m the
p ession) y employing capital Greek letters while writing abouí ^^nceptual Notation) a semantical distinction which seems to oorre
s no ation, but not while writing in it.®® Similarly, he often places spond exactly to his later one between the sense (Sinn) an
inary anguage expressions within quotation marks when men- 'denotation"(Becleutung) of a sign.®® He treats identity as a relation
uoning rather than using them. On the other hand, at many places etween linguistic expressions, indicating that two expressions
rrege seems to confuse his symbols with what they stand for.®« ^ same conceptual content. Using an example from geome ,
meaning in the Conceptual
f>^es the ñame ^A\ which stands for a given point on ^
^he "ñame" which stands for the point of intersectio
this earlv^t u "content"(Tnhalt) of an expression. At ^^•"cle and a line rotating about A.
betwppn c ^ clearly distinguish (as he will later)
memonVc" ™®aning (private, mental images "arising fro"^
which vflrv°f impressions" and "saturated with feeling")»®'
Derson anH 7"^ person and even fluctuate for the same
of man'v meaning,"which may be the common property
He does int ^ mode ofthe individual mind".® ^ AS
exDress onlJ^ ^ related distinction, however—his notation is to
for lo^ • ;^0"ceptual content", which is that meaning necessary
sories^re f ^"^o^ive connotationsisand rhetorical acces-
a move toward the
"meaning, though there the rotating line is perpendicular to the diameter
T^mir the two. p''hen and 'B'stand for the very same point. In this
contents of nrn ° for Frege's notation are conceptual distinguishes
The expression ('^4' or '5');
therebv hemmA "• a contents can be asserted and ^ The content of the expression (the given point);
te™ for •Wr.
SL asserüble
K, contents" would be "propositions'(Lze);
"assertions").- and,
Another «' in «« is «-"t<:¡5:£in";~
or as "the point of intersection ... wlie
tual notation" he had talking about his "concepj
and "object languaee" ^ distinction between "metalanguage perpendicular ..
i^his tripartlte distinction apparently exactly corresponda to Frege s
" -S.«, P.485. 'ater one:»»
"LneSlV-JudiSwec^^^
one can make judgements ahmit ^ ^ ^
• SeJ^above, p. 62. The expression ('A' or 'B');
fljjerfóí/content, and oniy beiirtheilhnr ^ judgement is a"
04 «r p- 65 See F20.
'""'sm teloT ®''°" ■ 88 I ® § 8 of F7, the present volume, PP- 12^ • .{„» point.
Angelelii, in S5. was apparently the first to notice tnis p

9t!Sm ^■1
 69
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
(ü) The denotation of the expression (the given point); light upon several special features of Frege s notation. t exp ains,
(m) The of the expression; i.e. the way in which the denotation for example, why he uses so many diffcrent kinds of letters. or
is given (as the point on the circle, or as "the point of inter- sake of perspicuity, difierent letters are used when difíerent purposes
section ... when the rotating line is perpendicular ...")• are being served.«' When discussing the "conceptual notation ,
In the Conceptual Notation Frege does not use (3) as an aspect of rather than employing it, Frege uses capital Greek letters, such as
'A\'B\ T','0','ÍF' and'X\ In the "conceptual notation ilselt n
meaning, but he later employed the distinction of sense and denota- employs italic letters to express a generality when the ° ®
<4^ A the terms
added advantage in {das
'the True' his logistic
Wahre)project.
and 'theAtFalse'
that(das
timeFalsche)
he also generality (universal quantifier) is the whole of an ¿
o re t e valúes of propositional letters and the denotations of
and Germán letters when the scope is limited to p^ o
í'ormula. Lower-case Greek letters, such as a, ^, an y
sentences, respectively. In the Conceptual Notation argument places. . r ínHap-
truth-values, but uses, instead, the expressions Since Frege distinguishes mere asserüble
sentences^ denied' to distinguish between true and falso ments,™ he introduces some notation to olear y cap «troke"
fon. He places a long, horizontal line, oaUed^oontentj^^^^^^^
distinrtinnc^^K Notation Frege provides a set of semantic lo the left of a propositional expression, say >
them oarpf'11 ^ employ them consistently or develop Ihe assertible contení of :
ater semantics and indícate the direction inthey doheforeshadow
which will move:his
Distinctions in the
'Conceptual Notation'
This can be read "the propositíon that zl". ^
1 a. sign
Later distinctions tho given content, and thus expresses a
b. contení 1 a. sign jadgement stroke" to the left end of the conté
c. the way the contení is deter- b. denotation
mined
c. sense—thewaythedenotatioD
2 a. conceptual contení is given
b. other kinds of contení 2 a. objective meaning This can be read "A is a fact".®® u-^víntr oersoicuity and
3 a. the assertible contení b. subjective meaning The desire to preclude .^^. f^strategy'" of using in his
b. thejudgement 3 a. the thought
b. thejudgement
sunplicity also led Frege to adopt Leibniz s s po^thls reason Frege
4 a, *is aíBrmed'
4 a. 'the True' ttotation the fewest and simplest basic conc p * j^^Q^al connec-
5
b. 'is denied'
using Greek capitals and b. 'the False'
^^?>^8ht to find the smallest number of simpl^
5 use-mention distinction
tves and rules of inference that would
quotation marks to mention
expressions
68 See 6 aboye,
or footnote
p.66. 14 of F7 {b). , sien V from Frege, calling^
7 thp assertionRussell and8)Whitehead
using ^^^P.^^'l-proximately Frege's
thesense. From
's source, thesign" (p.
"assertion and
sign" it ° |n¡ng of propositiond
After Conceptual
asDcct of C!onceptual Notation is the only majof anri^'u"* ''rege modified his account of t "Assertion'. •_jjcate
with an eve tnw 7 rigorously and carefully developed ^changed
th^orne the meaning
logicians of'h'inaccordmgly- S
(e.g. Church syntactically
This usage .s mchwt
to entirely
chance of errnr ™aximizing perspicuity and minimizing a formula is a theorem m a given logi
amtains constant controlrespects,
maintains consta ? over developments;
the desire forandrigour
this fact
and throws
clarity from Frege's. , . Atni np. 6-7.
See Wiener, pp. xxvi and 10; and al »
 EDITOR'S introduction EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION ^
He managed to limit himself to oniy two connectives'^—negation which emerged only later from revisions in his and^'is
Thus, instcad of listing truth-values, Frege uses is a
pyH ^|onality
isjunction defining
in termsconjunction,
of thesc. Theinclusive disjunction,
condilional and
he employed, denied' • ••
Though Iic employs the material
conHíti "truth functional" or "material" nective, Frege notes that conjunction could ha • w more
thp ^pparently had not been used by logicians sínce and he choL the Ibrmer because it gives htm ^
advócate Greece, when PhÜo of Megara was its major K*.».,u,. or roforonoo- Tta. M.
previous'uJ V'"° "lowever, that Frege knew of its defines purely syntaclically.'^ In a,¡fies this claim,
*3^ that he hit upon the material only rule of inference; but at one poi
iunction \n w fr experimenting with negation and con- apparently acknowledging that he does use ■ gj^ospecific
appalVv nn suitable connectives. He derives a new judgement from a single premi . « j "substitu-
XStn
then A' Indeed
<=<""bination 'not(5 and not-^)' shares
ofdmary-language expression 'íf oames to ihese other rules, which today ^^grs to a conse-
'ion-, "generahzation", and for the
condilnaí (w,th B« as'
antecedent and A"'«^'''on for the material
as consequent). quení". Frege refers to all his rules o i . .gg their purely
^Pplication of our symbols",»" a phrase wh.ch mdioates
syniactical character. iipd "alphabetic change of
Except for a principie which could be ca stated; so
hound variables",®^ Frege's substitulion ru .¿^g^ His substitu
doefhesXTt
and he carefully wl'Xdr
nníntc ! stroke" can sometimes be 0"'^
read "if í to see what he permits, one v tables placed to the left
tions are simultaneous and are indícate^ y ^^^g pjj.
to the ordinary-Ianguage '.l"„'""y"tbol does not fully correspond of lile expressions derived therefrom. -phough he does not
continúes to reaH tKo j- • ' tifter this explanation, he Seneralization®® and one for ^onfinemen .
especiallywhilenroviHi^°" '*"ot {B and not-^)"» ^"iploy it in his deductions, he also states a principie ^
""^Whit ex^ r o"\'n ax?oi^^°" meta-Unguistic "proof")
employs what amoun^s^t^tTeT^.u ^ conditional stroke, Frege [Given a judgment with a gpnP''^''^y ^!f" ''"'í
tPent stroke] we can always derive arbitra y place of
his íogistic Project,
proiect how
however, hetruth-table
does notmethod.''^
yet employAt truth-values,
this stage of general contení by putting somethmg . contení stroke
he Germán letter; when we do this, the c
^ U is not known whether oisappears ^5
nnSÍ-r! connective, such as possibility of using just one . • ni iPtters in the Conceptual
n Ki'' to C S Peirrp "non-conjunction". The See 6 above. For this reason, Frege's P';®P°®^p°"ai contents"),
about
ífnr by H. M.
it isSclieffer
unlikclyintha^F
íoTi e ^"^0, pp. 134-5.first
Evenincntloned
if he kneWm triiS'"^" actually
«h-values. This isstand for propositions
one major respect (
'■^''l calcniusdifrers from most later ones -nema
formulation of th F23.
P
as72nilaf bis notation sinrp would have used such a connective
II
I conjunction, and the mat • 'i^ "®'tber so simple ñor so perspicuous
PP- 128-38. conditional. S=e F7, the present volume, PP- =>^19 "' 70 n6 and
H;. IWd-.p. 117. " Ib'd^t'derv^'¡onsofformulae70,nP.ar.
Stated¡n„l,p.l3.be.ow.Uscdmtheden
^ ^ aífirmed".
(pp.m'and his rule of detachment ia, f'P'^8e' s explanation of these ^^blcs
§11, P. 132 below. Used m the
pj- formulae 97theandder.
See ^^^'^L^^^^^hefirstuseofthp tí ^PP* ^"d 146 below). of
mechan'' n'^'
mechanically
Strictly speakinfr f "^clhod in the history of logic- 2 íot-mulac pp. 132-3109,below.
81, 96, A firsj-o
123. and 130. A sec ond-order versión
are mterpretedused regardiess nHnf ^ Frege The
metaln^'"^^^P-tation. did not useanaio^
nearest tabics that couldwork
be ¡rjhons of formulae 91, 93, and 95.
IP §11, p. 130 below.
 EDITOR'S introduction EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

In Part I of his little book Frege presents and explains his special
nguap; m Part he begins to apply it. There, he introduces a set
(he calis 11 a kernel") of "judgements of puré Ihought" which, he
compfe/e (vollstandig), in the sense that, together
thp "Ir ^ ^PPÍ'cation of the symbols"(rules of inferencc), f(d)
rn.n.
many oHher laws
i ' of thought from the^^egiven
otheís. Hisinplan
enes, is to
order toderive
show fíe)
containpd'^^^^tu'^^^"^ demónstrate "how some are implicitly (CSí/,

svstematt.r '/u-" P^^sent an axiomatic •"rege treats the italic propositional letters preLions
svstems arp^n" logic.®® He notes that other complete
used however^T merely one example, which may be ;^"ables, substituting more complicated '"'^7 eases
the others. [°r them, Tlie subslitulion instances, he says, ar p
corresnnnH; t fo"" his system is the following set of nine, nontained in" the expressions from which they" he dees
and(dCspeclei; Although Frege claims compleleness f""'
°t fully specify What this claim means, and he
° ^ pjfp',. ^ proof
fcompleleness. In 1934, however, Lukas.ew.cz p ov d^^
axioms of Frege's "kernel" form a complete se or the hrs^
''opositionai calculus,"" in the sense that oge /(acit) substitu-
T-o of Frege's rules of inference (modas Vs. the
every tautology of the PC0P°f tn of the proposi-
^°"ccpum! Notation contains the first formulat.o
^onal calculus as a logistic system. .independent,
i^kasiewicz also proved that the third axi Frege's rules of
i derived from the first two usmo derived from
Pp. 136-66 below. J^ference.®! None of the remaining five axioms can
See below, p. 136,
^According to Kiieale,"' Frege's nf nine axioms, together
^ .-oin-
cational logic. At^his earlv^stagp^b?a P'°"^®ring the development of quantifi-
second- and higher-order Inoir Th?, c clearly distinguísh first-order from
he uses a second-order confiiipmpnt in the derivation offormula 91 Plet
„ o Set for the°ffirst-order
generalization and ca
functional concu ■ .j-j^ús,
|, he also
gs agave the
logistic
one. In the derivations of formulae 77 anri ^ corresponding first-order
order logic, but cites corrcsDonriinc» fir ^ judgements from sccond
and 93 are obtained indícate th;ít t ^®t-order enes. The tables showing how 77
^ornmlation of the first-order functional calculus
Frege thought the second-ordpr
in accordance with his rulec nf¡nf
he wrote the Conceptual Notatio'h
follow from the cited first-order ones
p ^'arting with his "kernel" of "j"dgaments^of^P^re
this slip as evidence that a nJrln Heijenoort(see p. 3 of F7(6)) takes Wh'^u forty-nine more, thereby P . .jgquence to logical-
ceptual Noiation; but this Jpmc • generated in the system of the Con- om' 'c" base his "reduction of ordering proper ancestral),
introducing machinery which^rp2pT?^h smce the difficulty is easily solved by (i.e. his purely logical defin.t.on of the pr P
level" and "second-ievel" funrtif provides to distinguish betwccn "first-
confüses these two kinds nf f , le Conceptual Notntkm Frege never
terms for them.(See below fnntn 'f"®'though he dees not yet have sepárate '.I !<=<= §6 of F7, this volume, p. 118. J «. s"P ^¡9^"
2 ="<1 5. PP. 174 and 183. respectively.) ^neli rtranslatlon
«'Sh ^ ofoftheS284.
independcnce of axiom ^,3 S167, p- 4 ■
 75
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
To begin the reduction itself, he indicates the very broad notion of
function'that an expression such as '/(x, ;■)' ¡s to stand for: sincc 3.
/can be any binary rclation or procedure you likc (spatial, temporal,
logical, mathematicai, etc.), and .v and y can be anything in the ^h'

universe, | f{x,y) can be read eithcr

(i) No matter what x or y may be, and no mattcr what rclation/
may be, y bears the /-relation to ;c,
Kia «. l» ^ -1 ^ .
4.

or

(u) No rnatter what x or >- may be, and no mattcr what procedure/
may be, y is a result of an application of the procedure/ to x.
The notion of "relation" and "procedure" are so broad here that Given these very broad notions of function and
(ii) are to be taken as equivalent in meaning."^ Frege seems to P/'oceeds to define what he calis "an hereditary prop
pre er t e term procedure , apparently nearly always having in mind Property F, then every object to which -v bears ^ ,,95 (i.e.
. P^operty this meaL 4 is hereditary i" '
/•; tms means y is
US e °procedure of logicaliy defining
adding one to anmathematicai
intcgcr to get induction, and
its successor. ^''Tiodern
r^iodern parlance, "the property ^f is/-hered
is/bere "" ^ ¡ yeto define
ihe notion of "sequence" that Frege has in mind is aiso very broad, is definition of'hereditary proper
Demg simply the idea of a number of entities being interreiated by any the 't? Ptoper ancestral""''of'lieteditary P™P^Í;;y , Ff
and the ancestral ^ "relation.
tqHows x in the
be spatial, temporal, his definition of the proper ancestra , . ^^itary in the
relaf ^ quence" means: for any property FF, 1 ^he/-relation has
ation ^need not be linear, such as"rethatsequence
formed bydetermined
a string ofbybeads
tbe quence, and if every object to which ax |
^"^^nce, js a^ proper
or the natural numbers; if might be ring-like, or have branches like F, (i.e. in niodern parlance,
tree, some branches might merge, and so forth. 7^estor of . Fsequence
AS examples of such sequences, consider the following: Given ten
dtfierem entures labelled n, i, c, r/, ,■ .espectively; let beJ^
>"ingdefinition of the yancestral,
with X" means: ¡s identicaly ^-th x follows x in the
Jíueiicc (i,e. in moderii parlance, a is . ^pjcally;andtbey
anv ^bears the/-reIation to á (where d and Toan be the first to define these notions -.j^^gtic from logic.
"sequences"-^" " "ow the foIlowing important role in his later derivation of anthm
1.
9

2.
tiiF® ^'^bievements of the Conceptué prege did not realize
itt the history of logic- but even Frege
thent ' ""'.""I the introduction of log'ca
•""btcti'on"" P'''"r nnectionsamongthemeanings
■°n^.andthedemonstratmnofconnect.o
See fni-. 1 t/-7 Formula't)
' f/. 69 in §24 beiow, p. 167.
See §24 of F7, this volume, p. 169. Seí» in §29 below, p. 186.
^Ppendix 11 below, pp. 236-8.
76 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
of words such as *air,'some','not','and', and 'or'."" Though he was n of the Conceptual Notation deals "laws of
right in claiming that the introduction of functions (and thc quanti- Finally, thc most striking components o reg standing for the
fiers that go with them) is an advance, he was unaware of thc power first siglu, are thc two-dimensional formulas
and revolutionary nature of his achievements. kind of propositional relations that Boole s
Perhaps for this reason, he wrote the Conceptual Notation as if can express. ^ n,aior intended
it were just another work to be read and used by mathematicians of For these reasons, Venn and Schrbder propositional
his day: he introduced his symbols and assumptions, presented his contribution of Frege's book to focused their
derivations, and left the matter at that. There was no eíTort to exp'ain connectives such as 'and', 'or\ and no ,
carefully the logistic project which his notation was intended to ^ttention upon this aspect of the book, ra j establishment
faciiitate, no elaboration of the remark that the notation is modelled fributions such as logical functions, quanti e ,
upon that of arithmetic, no explanation or defence of the very •^f a purcly formal system. . -g the time, and
rigorous requirements he imposed upon his proofs, and no detaíled Schrbder was developing iiis own Boo challenger. He
discussion of the Leibnizian roots of his specia! language. apparently viewed Frege's notation as ^ book, arguing that
For these reasons Frege's book was not well received. No one published a long, captious review^®^ o » better than the
understood its aim or its contents, and many were daunted or "oole's logic (and therefore his own as ^ ^oubtlessly more
bewildered by the strange appearance of his two-dimensionaj conceptual notation", accomphshing jqg characterizes
formulas. Sbc different journals published reviews;^®® but nearly all ^^equate fashion" nearly all that ^gtrous waste of space
comments were unfavourable. and those that were favourable jcge's two-dimensional notation as a . ■ ^grlically"- He fin s
revealed a failure on the part of the reviewers to grasp the aim and „ ^'indulges in the Japanese custom o^ gjjction of ordering-m-
major thrust of the book. ^í^solutely nothing of valué" iit Fr^ge s -^ing the advan-
The most important reviewers were John Venn and Ernst Schrbder, ^-sequence to logical ordering". ,„bels them "pedantic .
who were both loglcians of some stature. One would expect them to uges of Frege's purely formal proo s, . though Frege s
welcome the logical achievements of the Conceptual Notation', but finds "an enonnous lack of He claims that
instead, they both criticized the book as a clumsy eífort to accom- °ok presents the first rigorous logi ^specially "1.1
phsh what Boolei®i had already achieved more elegantly. Tlns laws of puré thought "offer 5 they mdude the first
unfortunate misconstrual was apparently caused by several factors ^°ugh (as tukasiewicz would later s , calculus- ...
besides the lack of detailed exegesis and justification by Frege him- =°mplete set of axioms for the proP°^'"^ „views that Frege^
selt^ Venn and Schrbder were both accustomed to thinking of logic „otBoth Venn and Schroder suggest the Co„ceptual^
m ^ooíean terms.(Venn was completing his book Symbolic Logic^^ know any Boolean logic at the 1 apparently '0°
and Schroder had recently published a booklet on Boolean logic.^"®)
Because of this, they must have thought immediately of Boole's In íhis. they seem to all h.s con s s
a gebraic formulas when they read in Frege's book that the "concep- '°8io as a university student;"» and, in ma aour es
tual notation" is modelled upon arithmetic; and they must have aw""
^Sobra orSoometry
theory ofand functional L^ly ones in mathetnat
algebra-the
oug t o oole s The Laws of Thought when they noticed that Part ^ ich to encounter Boolean logm. u g^oiean ^ong
i" preface of F7, the present volume, p. 107. Jhentions no Boolean logic ^ of the ent in
uface he claims that his demonstra an advanc
of Frege's'boXi.^? Appendix I below, pp. 209-35. The receptio"
101 r o . above, pp. 15-20. uteanings of 'not', 'and', and or con
jS" Venn c Lam of Thought (London, 1854).
inü below, pp. 218-32. t„H¡es PP-
1877). -De/- Operationskreis des Logikkalküls (Leibzig: Teubner, See the discussion in 8 univers.ty stud.cs,
See the above discussion rega
 79
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
logic, and thus, he did not know that Boolean logicians had pre- here for the reader's convenience. Unless otherwise indieated, the
viously known and used those connections.^®' following renderings have been used:
After the appearance of Schroder's review Frege apparently
studied some Boolean logic, and then wrote a long, technical paper— "^"schauuncr Intuition .
Boole's Calculating Logic and the 'Conceptual Notation"""®—■ bedeuten mean, refer to. sign.fy, stand for
companng his own logic wíth that of Boole. This time he discussed ^^íieutitns mcaning, importance
te Leibnizian basis of his notation, explained its aim, and preved ^^^Snffüchcr Inhalt conceptual contcnt
that he could not have used Boolean logic for his purposes. Un- ^'^Snjrsschrift Conceptuad Notatm.
"conceptual notation ,
ortunate y, this paper (and even a shorter versión)^™ was rejected conceptual notation
y a the journals to which it was submitted,"" apparently because it OviW/)
^^^drd) bejaht is aftirmed
was very technical and full of unusual symbols. moda of dctermmaUon
^^thnmufigsweise
tn nnhr f appearance of his book Frege finally managed '"¡•"■'hcilbarer Inhalt
yrtbeilbarer asscrtible contení
^"ideutig many-one
Scient^fi?T^"fr' his "conceptual notation"-"On the ^uhalt content
bv maf of a Conceptual Notation""»—and he did so ^citz
Satz proposition
snernlar"^ general, and including the kind of psychological ^ctheil
^nheil iudgemcnt
ItTc tL .-T' í'" Phi'osophy, logic. and niathe- estcnsionoraconcept
^'>^fang eines Begriffes
Tdlnarv lancu ' and inadequacy of ^''[ueinung
'^''ueinung negation
tages of a scientific purposes and explains the advan- Wf/) venicint
wiVf/) is denicd
(18821 Frese ^wo-dimensional notation. In that same year l^'-^tellung
^'^'■stelluiig idea ,
comblnat.onof.dea
Melin u^dZT Gesellschaft für * ^^^dlungsverbindimg
tlk fte 00007™;"'°-^' his scientifie language. He * *••-•••• 'O

^oitie of Diese renderings merit _~g different ways. la

pare Ws ow^lo '? «^j^'^hons of Schroder and com-
Mcle^OnT a"' of the 'Conceptual Notation'" published as
article On the A.m ^Sriffsschnft —Frege uses this term J" appears in italics, it
® Present volume, when 'conceptual nota . ,g quotation marks,
to Frege's book; when it is enclosed tn do ^eans
XV
denotes Frege's symbolic language; when ne.the
a language like Frege's. , in the
in EnglisTTCsliüorTnstTadrf'®^'' ' ^1° v bedeuten -As indieated m 6 a
Frege does not yet have a careful'y
^ semántica
no
are arraneed in an nr-n ^ u- ^ occurring chronologically, they
and aim of the "concent
to the book itself.
articles on the justification
notation" to serve as an effective preface
^"Wrasted
on?'- with'hethepresent
later technieal
terms areterms 5,»« (se .né ausdrucken
respectively.'" ,■ „i,le eontent" (indee ,
gr^hs abovi^^W glossaryterminology is comments
and summary explained inaretheincluded
para- is. '■'"-"¡e.-ftare/- Inhalt —Literally
^°""'datn transíales this term),
^,,¡5 literal transíate
?^^ding, fo, ntake on^ thesecontent.
108 TV P- ^07.
> ^ judgement is an asserted conten ■ and pos.
111 Tir . ¿'^^"ssion above, p. 21
tion'?content",tendered "assertible eontent ^ R
Geaeh employs "posstWc
j^.^ement .
This Is í\l'> Tví PP- 90-100.
hich appears below, pp. 83-9. 114 see F23(fl).
.... ...
 EDITOR'S introdüction
^^-Mengelberg suggests "coníent that can become a judge-
ment ."5
Previous translations of the works below are listed in the Biblio-
^aphy of the present volume. The strategy adopted to take fuH
o t ese was to transíate Frege's works índependently, then TRANSLATIONS OF
^ Oíie to previous ones, accepting renderings that
fnnt f^ootnoting any majorwhile
diíTerences thattheremain. FREGE'S WORKS
ootnotes are marked with asterisks, those of presentFrege's
editor
employ arable numeráis.
See S241, F'47, and F7(¿), rcspcctivcly.

®24a50i
 ON THE SCIENTIFIC JUSTIEICATION
OE A CONCEPTUAL NOTATION'
Time and again, in the more abstrae! regions of science, tlie lack of
a means of avoiding misunderstandings on
also errors in one's own thought, makes itself felt. "«th [sho t-
comings] have their origin in the imperfection oflanguage,
'lave to use sensible symbols to think. vivacitv of
Our attention is directed by natura to the ou si .
sense-impressions surpasses that of ,determine
to such an extent that, at 'ifa„imals.
a'most by themselves the course of our ideas, as is jj. ,
And we would scarcely ever be able to escape t us depe. dency
°nter worid were not to some extent dependen!"P""^
. Even most animals, through their ability
^fluence on their sense-impressions: t my ca^^^
íid they can even eíTect changes m thi g .
a much greater degree; but neverthe , freedom from
^ser Vorstellungsverlauf} would ^hich our hand
can fíashion, our voiceit intone,
would still be limi g .^^^^don of. symbols
without ^j^sent,
cali to mind
^sible, perhaps even beyond the censes {íw of a thing
do not deny that even without symbo s of niemory-images
/p^®^'^heraboutitself{Mmííc/iíí2'"'«^^") . further: a new
^" /"^f^erunisbilder}; but we could not allow others
•■ception would let these images sink mto a ^ percep-
° ^^erge. But if we produce the symbol of an idea wn
called to minl we create in this way a firm, neW
b J Bartlett wliich
"PPeaí^'i'" 'ranslation73 was madepp.'ndependently
(1964), oHhebetter,
155-60i fimed one ¡t was
"""j'TJ'J'Sd
adoptad »d
duly ^ ^ Bartielt's intcrpretation or wordmg s . ^ .^5,31100 remained,
S aT""'noted,
^herever
to give important
the reader differences
the b^t oof ¿"terp
bom „,ore the s^nse
Of i Bartlett renders this "unseeable", but hf^'' ble, but not
rf^nscendental". Moving air, for exafflple, >s nn^
^rtlett renders this "catalyse"-]
^ ON THE SCIENTIFIC JUSTIFICATION
to
world of our ideas anH
sensibles itself [das SimhT
straint. Symbols have tF ^
ing how to use the w¡
Thus, let no ene desn" °
choosingthemproperlv^AnH^u^-^^''
fact that, after lene nrarf
valué is not diminished
symbols, we need no Innrr^^^'
thinlc in words neverth^f^
niatical
Also,orwithout
other symbols
svmbnk
^Ptual thinking. Thus in
similar things, we actuallv
iit ratfaer what [the similard
;»"cept is fi„t ¿ineH "luT
®Parcept,ble, ¡t requires ,"
ap^ar to US. ^ perceptible representative in order to
Penétrate step by step into the inner
w'"» "sing the realm of
free ourselves from its con-
™portance for thought that discover-
^S^'^st the wind had for navigation.
dependsbyupon
the
longer produce [external]
^Ofds, then in mathe-
scarcely lift ourselves to con-
symbol to diíTerent but
^y^^bolize the individual thing,
concept. This
OF A CONCEPTUAL NOTATION 85
thought processes {Gedankenbewegwig}. The '" j¡_
ence is expressed aro so ^nricd, so loose and
tions can easily slip in unnoticed ana Tn this wav
necessary conditions for the conclusión are Alhemeinheit}^
the conclusión obtains a greater generahty {gro
than it justifiably deserves.
Even such a conscientious and ngo cnprifips neither in
malees tacit use of Pr^^^PP^^'P.®"® J "^emis^ses of the particular
bis axioms and postulates ñor in Pf the nineteenth theorem
theorem [being proved]. Thus, in the pro . . the largest angle
of the first book of T/i. (in every
lies opposite the largest side), he tacitly use
(1) If a iine segment is not largar than a second one, the formar .s
eqiial to or smaller than the latter. r^,.„pr ic not
(2) If an angle is the same size as a second one. the formar
larger than the latter. . ,
(3) If an angle is smaller than a second one, the or
than
tnan the latter. . ,

Oniy by paying particular f ^Ly^s^m

not ii
demónstrate their indispensaSmv^ symbols; but it may suffice to
even m protect' prevés to be deficient, aware of the omission of these se . j. , j,t that they are
respecT' ~ from error. It itdees not so cióse to being as fundamental as the iaws oí
in this «sed just iike those iaws is simply not present
slightly'dw"^ Which dangerous cases [of . Astrictlydefinedgroupofmode linguistíc form we
the manv! '■ and t, ^ word are only ^0 [ordinary] —..c—c
language,. so that on«'oanleSS auvauvw
advance {lückenloser
recurrine [of this kind of °°í y"'™Portant variations. Of ^annot
annot distinguish
distinguish b^ween
between aa g ^^ission
P . .
(,•
of connecting
connecting links
links.
serve tols be tnent °"'y °nc frequently [in the argument] and an [ordinary]
can even say that the former lanauage because it would
Md individual "Th T «l'stinction "nder that .^oguage, that it runs against the fee o language, logical
denote the sneé' ''orse" can dennt» between concept mvolve an ínsuíferable prolixity. guessing, not
animal." Finaurí,^^ sentence- "Th'",®'® "®®'rire; it can also ^olations are almost always only hmtea a
"This is a horse " "^^note a co herbivorous actüally expressed. . has over the spoken
Tanguage is not sentence: The only advantage that the wri review a train of
ord is permanence; [with the wri 'chango; and thus we can
p Frege^ld wonld^gUManV''*^ ® ^ay that mere Jboughtmany times without feartha . of testing], since
woídTo?1"'^ «= of'tSf""'™ marks to!,' correctness of ®st its validity more thorough y. word-language itself, the
í' ¿"ge'if ^wVa™««ion d,s'¡in"^
ngo¡ ^ frotn^bisntentlon. ^sufficient security lies in the natu piumb-line. But even so,
horse', which rt herejía ®"closed reason, His
the of logic are appHed externally hke a p
'» and 'a horse' S ^'^hnguish between
'^'^hich denotes a concept.] [. Barden renders this "greater validity".]
 ON THE SCIENTIFIC JUSTIFICATION OF A CONCEPTUAL NOTATION «7
arise froni examiner, especially those which the physical and mental conditions of reason has just the disadva g
nevertheless find meanings of a word. That we of keeping reason more depcndent upon these. • shanes.
science we owe to^tíi^ ^bout reasonably well in life as well as in It is completely dillerent with visible This
disposal. Experienc ^ checking that we have at our They are generally sharply defined ^^ sl^nified
errors. Logical rules perception protect us from many dehnite„essofwrittensymbo.wiUt^
aetiniteness of written symbols wiii lenu
as is shown by exam applied,] furnish littie protection, siso more sharply deíined; and just such an can
checking begin to fail^Tf disciplines in which the means of ^orsiellungeii]" must be
'^c achieved, however, only if the sy
°directly {wtmillelbar}
philosophers from mist fallad to defend aven great
lilgher mathematics frp helped just as littie in keeping denotes the
denotes the thing
thina [symbolized].
rsvmbolized]. . . . areater permanence
r»Armnnence

remained external tn ^ \ error, because they have always A further advantage of the wntten f' , concept-as it
The sho t
{gewissen Weichheitl
^eatent,
[iiere] are rooted in a certain softness ^"oulimmutability.
dof be-and In this way, it is also
thus, of course.
our actual thought PrP.«''"
the . ¡j j-q the restless
^^XZ>,be.eg.ng}.
¡ng many things in mind
nevertheless
jnent. In thisisnecessar^V"'^^''^^'^^
respect \nr7' ^^^^^^dity[ordinary] language,
and potential which
for develop- fruten symbols offer the possibihty O P can only concen-
hand, which despite its ad.'T can be compared to the at the same time; and oven if, at "J°^in a general impression
«''dequate.' We diversa tasks is stiH trate upon a small part of these, we stil disnosal whenever
Plomar purpo3, °yurselves artificial hands, tools for What remains, and this is immed.ately at our disposa
«n próvida. And how ifth '""re accuracy than the hand it. , a two-dimensional
iffness and inflexibility of na Possible? Through the very The spatial relations of wntten sy diverse ways to express
« dextrous. Word-languaaeT ^^ich makes the hand Writing surface can be -Pl?^^''/",f!:tZ:«?o,lowingand
ystem of symbols {c' in a similar way. We need mner relationships {innere Beziehunge } fadlitates the appre-
ambiguity is banned. whfc' from which every Preceding in one-dimensional tiine, attention. In fact,
a cannot escape. ^ 'ogical form from which th® hension of that to which we wish to to the diversity
n'i&y now ask u• ^'rnple sequential ordering in no way c j^terconnected.
üon is'^t'„^7'"';l'ave, 'rstlraiuf'''
fi "'f" logical relations through which thoug symbol further
Thus, the very properties which se
rarrch can hV° of extéín f ''dvantage that their produC" ^Part [than the spoken word] . certain shortcomings
inner pror Particular T '^'■"^""^stances. Furthermote, ^J'stellungsverlauf} are most suite ^ cuestión of representmg
C
^nth are equtn the t
kinship ofappearance
sounds to our make-up. Therefore, when it is n ^ • ^cal action with
"atural thought as it actually took shap suppiementation of the
- ^he same word-language, but concerns ^ ^ olose connection with
^nloursdo-a a ^ sounds have a more intímate onesidedness of thinking which resu preferable. Such
do justice to ''ornan voice than shapes n" sense of hearing, then the ^ . all word-languages in
of feelings But "rost delió ''""ndless flexibility is od ^ a notation must be completely di e written symbols. It need
r''- Porpos:s"r"'-''owvat^"=
deductions Pert, no imn ^
Pombiadvantages
nations andmay
variation
b® f®,
°rder to exploit the peculiar advantage p,ay
- this intintate ad f°r the rigour of logiP''' ■'ardly be mentioned that these advantag
"f al! in the written word. The reía i to a larga extent
[• bSI:;;'! or «f audible symbds to respect to each other on the writing s without importance.
'" tríSiá'j^^'the e>cperie„'tiaf®rf_^'t;s Iranslation.) ^Pon thelength of the Unes [of prmt]
[H Bartlettrendersthis .magery .1
 OF A CONCEPTUAL NOTATION 89
It would be easy to worry unnecessarily about the feasibility of the
Of formulas is a concp advantages. The arithmetic language matler.i^ It is impossible, someonc might say, to advance science with
facts without the inte ^ • "otation since it directly expresses the a conceptual notation, for the invention of the latter a rea y p -
which allows it to As such, it attains a brevity supposes the completion of the former. Exactly the
in one line. Such conte"^t^^ i content of a simple judgement difiiculty arises for [ordinary] language. This is suppose °
follow from ene or inequalities—as they «ade reason possible, but how could man have mvented language
followsfromtwootherc ^ ^aparate
a horizontal stroke whính^ ^""enthe
under
thirdone
fromanother.
tiie firstIftwo
a third
with
without reason? Research into the laws of nature employs phys.cal
'ostruments; but these can be produced only by means of an advanced
two-dimensionalitv'of tViP "therefore". In this way, the foohnology, Which again is basad upon hnowledge of 1^ laws of
Perspicuity. Here the 's utilized for the sake of noture. The [apparently vicious] circle ts resolved /och oase^
oeing almost always ba<ipa
numbers yielding identical ^tereotyped {sehr einformigY"
''^^ntical transformations ofidentical
way: an advance in physics results m an o^o ^ te^hno^ gy,
®od this makes possible the construetion o íof this
only method ofinference in T^!u' "o means the ^cans of which physics is again advanced. The app
tir it is generallv
the anthmetic language 0?^^ n progres-
it in words. Thus, ^^ample] to our case is obvious. . lansuase of
Now I have attempted* to supplement the
notof^*'°"®'^"^'therefore
ion in the full sense 'itd^"^^ merit expressions
the ñame of for logical
conceptual anthmetic with symhois for the logical ''f ^^ j
at first just for arithmetic—a conceptual no a i
Exactly the opn Ptesented as desirahle. This does not rule out PE ^ and
wiánating «¡th Leibniz ^y^^olism for logical relations ^\ymbols to other fields. The logical relations sen thaí th^ ñt
Se U™''• E ScSr^'' -odern timefby Boole. R-
£Lr^' ;otentSv;- have the framework of the conceptual notation.
P^rspicuous representation of the forms o o
of contente Tf
resulting:' ^
«PlaceT^ "S'o'otters with expressions
onalytic enuat;
lacking. I" 'gnificance extending beyond mathematics.
Eow üttie demónstrate with the S»ve some attention to the matter!
ftue concent. I "^"d of sy^,^ ^oomEiguity—ofthe formulas I Bartlett's turn of phrase.] r p..^g Thought modeUed upon
I wSr fhe construetion of a ; Conceptual Notation, a Formtda Language ofPnre
I'^Eicb.
otnstliiaiterf
hJ 'ho®odes
fol,o„i„^
of
f, f™o conceptual notation:
orinula Language of Arithmetic, Halle a. ■»

^"-0 can?"" '°®oal relation;

a contení. Also ^"¡table forJfflbttrittg
^''fyofthewriü?'^^'ovity,au3j ^ oasily most
and surely mastered.
intimately with
oo'ty. The symbofs?^'^® he ^ ."f^^hat the two-dimension-
he easily created henoting contp , ^'he sake of persp'"
avatlable. If an?'?"''®'', once th essential. They can
««e Bestcmdth^a of a concent ^ ^^ootal [logical] forms afc
^0 conteníS »ot su??™'" ""™ote components
"•k5-.Sr"■«t '
^ «¿«rac//j. Erdm. p. 94.

ON THE AIM OF THE
CONCEPTUAL NOTATION"'
ceptual notation" Wh
observation that iu
I gather from several
[í gave my last paper
from these reviews
the achievements of BonÍ°^ f^ding, among other things, to consider
E. Schroder in the reviV^'
Physik, XXV, In comn.!^
•sEoolean formula
Preferable lanmiao/^N
in everv r!?!' .
P case me, I am still thankful t
echmcal reasons for hk nK
tumty to refute the objectionf!!?."''
With respect to the renrnn T
xx,:, me obiprtírx«^
oof alall th,t the
that thí. Boolean fo2,t
reproach just meníí.^«^^ t wish to say
a sma^v Passed since ks
woulH^ ^^ccess that leavinp
onlv a ^ cf course
problem
si-s '^cvelopment
fabricred^^^^^^ ESr apDear
paper^ here about my "con-
me to return to it again is the
frequently been misunderstood. This
book^ which have appeared since
judgemenls must have resultad
^hosQ who make this reproach is
Zeitschrift für Mathematik und
"conceptual notation"
conclusión withlatter
that the the
judgement can hardly
^ctailed review and the
give me the oppor-
,
^ brighter light-
6'*^ iin-
f'' "^^«ioned. I
.o,, first
first
more than twenty
has in no way had such
foundation it established
nppear foolish, and that
u ^=.r
» Sis. £^^cf
.«
THE AIM OF "CONCEPTUAL NOTATION 91
more precise and perspicuous way than is ^
fact, I wishcd to produce, not a mere
^'figua characíerisiica in the Leibnizian sense. n ' ^ptual
í recognize that deductive calculus is a necessary par
"otation. If this was misunderstood, perhaps it is because I let
abstract lógica! aspect stand too nuich in the Boole's
Now, in arder to demónstrate in detail ^ c 1 nresentation of
fcrmula language and mine, 1 shall give first ^ ^ort ^ «
the fonner. We cannot consider all the vanants wh ch are found^^_
oolc's predccessors and successors, since, Boole's
siderable diíTerence between my "conceptual notatio
calculus], these others are not ""P^'tant
nnportant. .econdary
.^^.ondary proposi
proposi-
^oole distinguishes primary proposition gp^g {vergleichen
f'-. The formar compare the among
^Si-iffe ihrem Umfange nach], the a división is m-
^^^ertible contents {beurtheUbare Inhalte} ^
sufficient since existential judgements ai ° letters denote
Let US consider first such are not signified;
c extensions of concepts. Particular ® formula language,
this is an important deficiency m th ^ difference
cr even if a concept covers only a si^ letters are combinad
«!" remains between it and this th.ng. Now the^letters^ ^
^'"1 each other by logical 'r^nd B means the extensión
"1^ extensión of the concept "triangle and
°f Ihe concept "equilateral", then the log.cal produc
A R
feoi fies the extensión of the concept "equilateral triangle". The
cgical sum
ogical sum A+B • 1 «r
to be ur

^'2 and was dar

indepe„de„"íy «n 27 JaSua'""'?'' GeseUschaft fi»
o important differen«íí <''^8).PP.¿ÜS S9-S '^'*2. ?
The^PP™'=''
present translation
" tbc Austral"- ,4(5.C) = U-S)-<^
A+B=^B+á
present on 24
present volume, pp. aoZ t/ '"terpretation wL'/?
I879. AnTn the two were compare^'
aub+c) =
clear F7> theV ■ ^"ghsh translation appeared in di^
^'ear,however, whí^tí. ^'^^viewssns
^Shsh in the PreseS'íolS^ of ^'^6, S283, S292. It ¡s "Ot A(,B+C) - .4 and B exdude each other,
PP. 101-235.] All these ítems appear lO tvhi ?°°'e presupposes by this dees
that not.
the con
among others, Schroder

■i
92 THE AIM OF "CONCEPTUAL NOTATION"
THE AIM OF "CONCEPTUAL NOTATION
But these points of agreeraent {Übereinstimmungen} with algébrale Writers differ from each other here. For
Th addítionsound:
The followmg are logically stand opposed to large discrepancies. ^ttaches to the Ictters the index I. Others have ¡' fj^gp^tion
the negation of identity. I do not consider this mult p
^ = A.Á = A.A.A sj^bols an advantage of Boolean example, hypothetical
A = A-\-A = A-\-A-'rA Boole reduces seconciary proposiíions nn^itions in a very
^"d disjunctive judgements—to printary pjop ^ ^ ^^2 _ 4"
and mathematiLÍ^"T^l^^ algebra. The diñerences in logical Artificial way.' He ¡nterprets the judgement 1 - ^ 2 is subordínate
that solving logicaUaTar°" important consequences this way: the class of moments of time in w uc^ ^ Xhus, here again
himself, has scarcely anXñr o the class of moments of time m ^hic^ ¿f concepts;
equations. ything m common with solving algebraic ^ matter amounts to the comparison „-ppiceiv as classes of
°tily here these concepts are fixed niore p conception has
[in Boole's notatíonTtfe expressed l^t^ments of time in which a sentence is gj^ould remain
® disadvantage that time becomes invo ve expressions for
Por ^ = A.B. ^°mpletely out of the matter^MacCo 1 exp^^
propositions independently o P ^ result, every
and B si^ifles^the extensión of the concept "mammal" ^ 'ritermingling of time is certainly avoi e , j according to
the equafon saS^t exír "air-breathing", then Merconnection is severed between ^ ^r in primary proposi-
'air-breathing mammal" concepts "mammal" and ocle, compose logic. We proceed, t .j Boole; or else,
breathing:-The falline nf ■ ^s, all mammals are air- and use the formulas in the sense ® interpretations of
totally different from the under a concept, which is ® proceed in secondary proposiíions an judgement to the
has no particular exnreccíí!^ ination of one concept to another, C0II.S Any [logical]transitionfrom f blocked;
none at all.v ^ oole[ s notation]; strictly speaking» er—which,to be sure, often occurs m ac ^ meaning in the
Everything thus far is airean, f ^ may not use the same symbols with a doubi
fnT^ Leibniz, whose works L superficial diver- context. ,, as a whole, we dis-
area I daré say were unknown hen we view the Boolean formu a a dress of algebraic
OsignifiesforBoolethe
íalls, 1 means the extensión ^of"a'r ^ concept under which nothing uiutiiiiife . r a conien'-j "

bemg considered (t^mverj everything that symbols. It is not suited for the ° ^ntion.I wish to blend
0 not its purpose. But this is exact ^^ symbols already
etic. Instead of these Leih^
these cspecially of 1, deviates froiH gether the few symbols which I introdu languagelAn it,
In mathematics to form a jjd to the word-stems
"^zhas"nonert5"and'W. existing symbols [of mathematics] c com-
says that the two co ^^-^ = 0 paÍ'^.^f^"Ary] language; while „^ords {Fonnwdrter}Hm
loo*gically interrelate
suffixestheand [deductive]
contents embe stems. for d_ .
symbolísm;
. .The equation can hoi»
not7
1 ^easible to have,^for example, the + sign ¡Q,,,s!ions,
occurring in the same
28 (1877). PP-
W^stillneedasyntbolf
for exampieT' °=gation other ,1,
' Concept tn order to con 20^3 die works of Hugh MacCdl ^¡l^ll'^)hUosophical
[it ^'®8®8parenthes«„
p , . the concept "not man'•
^oesesanditaUcs.] P n'"!' 5th ser. 11 (1881), PP; 40;3.]
Adman renders this "particles .J
 94 THE AIM OF "CONCEPTUAL NOTATION"
THE AIM OF "CONCEPTUAL NOTATION" 95
the'ari^hm^pr logical sense and part of the time in The falsehood of this equation, however, is jy¿„e-
TJoT^XIT"\ between the lógica! and arith- A new assertible content has been formed which becomes^^h^^^^
bring about rn "f which is of valué to Bode, can only ^cnt"4+2 does not equal 7" only by adding the judgement stroke.
symboliclaneuaff both are combined together. Boole's I—j—4+2=7.
arithmetic. Therefore^r^^^^^^^^ complete separation from
relations. // ' mvent cther symbols for the logical If we wish to relate two assertible contents,.1 and B,to each other,
^c must consider the following cases.
in comiaon with^lSf conceptual notation" has almost nothing
calculus of (1) A and B
diíferences between mv ^ important
and the Boolean irinH»^ j ^ iderpretation {/lM#fl55Wrtgín'c/5c} (2) A and not B
-that'l do noíZteTf the Ari^totelian mode
this is certainly not tn concepts, but from judgements. But (3) not A and B
relation of subordinati ^ ^ould not be able to express the
Infrontofan e^f ^^"cepts. (4) not A and not B.
I Put a horizontal stroTe^ th^ content,such as 2+3 — 5,
minus sign by Its greater Ien¿h"'^^"^ stroke, distinguishable from the bíow I understand by |^
Isotake the negation of the third case. This ^third case in
thatthis stroke
other to m '
symbok "^+3=5
content which follows it is unified,
oís can be related to it [as a whole]. ^cial at first. It is not clear at first why S j Xhe reason,
P^nicular and express its negation by a
however, will be immediately evident from
inus, we can also write:

withoutbeingBuiitvnf, r~~~"'+^='' U— A • -

IfI wish to assert a conté'?® +ÍM the case that is not equal to ^ 4. This
«"•oke en the left end of the I Put thejudgement
content stroke: qual to 4. We can transíate it: if a+ einbedded in our
^^slation reveáis the importance o i all laws
How thoroughly one ' ^ 2+3=5 symbol. Indeed, the hypothetical judgemen a
modeofnotationlmeañu??™"'""""' Through this nature and of all causal connectioas m ^ ünguist.c
Rabil i" ®"'® '"td the formatir? ^ t^istinction between the '^Pdering by means of"if" is twt''PP+i^ent-Iike .v here-confers
®Se, but only if an indeterminate con 2, then one wou
tit order to expresq th„
S roke to the content strok????
® ^ two!
I attach the negatio» +«ality on the whole. Were we to replacc by
^Ppropriately transíate
'or example,
• """ I — 4-j- 2—7
die ""fdem G h' A 2+2=4
I—2H
• ^«^iangen, isso. Logik bei deu Deutschen
^y"If2+2 = 4,then 2^ = 4".

..iiiBsáámmimmBKtamm
 Now co ^ 'CONCEPTUAL NOTATION" the ATM of "CONCEPTUAL NOTATION" 97
tion stroke iñthVfollowTng"ubí^^^ I pause here lo answer some objections of Schroder. He compares
'"y tepresentation of the exclusive -A or B" with his mode of wnting
abi+Oi b = I
Thecase'not A The casc'not/í
A and 5'¡s finds here, as elsewhere in my "conceptual notation", a monstrous
^ denied.
S
and fi'is afCirmed:
B and not A.
^"Ste of space. In fact, I cannot deny that my expression takes up
""ore room than Schroder's, which for its part is again more spread
Boole's original
~A Thccase*>4 aA-b = 1-
and 5'is A Thc case Vi and
this criticism is based «pon the view that my ¡'c°nceP^
■"« deniedMand
■5 exelude
T: 5
5'is affirmed:
A and B. is supposed lo be a presentation of abstraer
each other. [of my "conceptual notation"]
in 'he places of ^ and B-perhaps
application, ene must think o w
extended Thé
^ flecase'not
Thecase'not
A and not fi' ""H P °Jections. Then the matter appears completely differpn^
' ^ is denied:
Aor 'T—^ affirmed: neither
^^^^dvantage of the waste of space of the of
A or B.
A ñor B.
'"'o the advantage of perspicmty, , ofunintel-
(4) lin
^f'h'lity.'forTheBode is transformed
"conceptual into "'the
notation" ' hes he mostg of the tw^
~T~A The case 'A
^nd not 5' ~l I \~A The case 'A and Í:f-h'y
[sen
of the'writing surfaee hy al«
foilow one below the other w
'he ^
^ontents are clearly
is denied. not B'is affinned :
sena^^^^^^yJ ^tom left to right. Thus, the separa ^ ^ g^s¡jy
líweattachthe V B .4 and nol B. visihi^^^'^ ^tom each other, and yet their ogi gj^cessively long,
Thrd°Ve' d °° strokes of°nthe expres- wS result.
^ Surely it would
Boole,bea unjust
single to charge Boole, w
second '«ft ¡s Tlw P t ^A\ d S ths cQU^tion
A be (a+b)(c+d) == Lclusive disjunctlon of A
cancel. Theti,- Verbal replacing A by the andft+'"^+'"í= (7+6)(4+3). Then to form the exclus.v
the second bv'th arises the two denials of A ' ^rege couid write the very perspicuous
the third ca/ ^ °°itversion of /? ■ the fourth from
""•¿S :.?• »"»£'r''ií-»' '■ ■•"•■£ ®* the exclusive "or can be

(fc+Mr ""'o ^ í74.6)(4+3))i+((''+*"'''h'" "

= ÜAexmac+bdA-bc+ad - (
or also
arid ■^^'^''-^bd+bc+ad = (7+6)(4+3)) - -
"ole's result would be ^ - í7+6)(4+3)) = 1-
The (7+6)(4)) + C«^+^^+'"'^f^ . Schroder as the assertible
^^htení's^t? Escomes worse and worse complex.]
^243501 ^
98 THE AIM OF "CONCEPTUAL NOTATION"
THE AIM OF "CONCEPTUAL NOTATION" 99
thought of such an application of his formulas, with the easily dis- runs in words: if x= = 9. then = 81- Now vve
coverable disadvantages that arise in this way. But it would be
whose square is 9"a square root of 9", and one g
tíL consider as a defect of the "conceptual notalion" 's 81 "a fourth root of 81", and then transíate: all q -
in ° case of the mere indication of content [as "e fourth roots of 81. Here, the concept the
contents]^^^ where A and B merely indícate extensive complex ordinated to the concept "fourth root o
letter A-is to make the whole judgement gener ^ ^ correct
luy fornnila°i°^"^^"^
my lormula languageofindulces
Schroderinis related
th. to what I have
' just
r said— ^ontent should hold whatever one may put '
judgement even resuUs if, for example, we put
letters with whoirformS^^^^
that nothiníT nm i •
imagines replacing the single
arithmetical equations, he discovers
derivation onTd "
other, but puts them
^very arithmetical
sepárate equations next to each
for the case
^mce F cÍQgg
where F = y
equal 9.
9 and ed'o« not equal 81 is to be denied
«omiitv to a part of the
Thus, in bis evaluatbn Scr'd' '''''' of perspicuity. . is sometimes nccessary to confme the ge j,. j- jetters, as in
assumption oflan im«, a-' proceeds throughout from [the JBdgement.^Then í make use of Germán mstead oí itaiic
of the "conceptual nnt which is non-existent—
language. He means tn Leibnizian-Boolean formula
of opinions with the remTwn eñectively to the correctiou
aot essentiallv diffprpnt u modes of symbolization are
the other. But this nrnvp could transíate from one iuto ; Z u- then a: — 0. Here the
ledge is symboüzed bv m department of knoW- B Words: if each square root of x is * pLérality expressed by a
ncavity with the a signifies that the g
necessarily
would be thatatranslnT^'''
possible. Conv ^ °l^mnscription from
systems,
onethen
intoitthefollows
other ®old be confined to the content of
possibility
The systemthan the existenr
of symbols iiothing department
more follows from this
of knowledge- I— a-=x-
ean ask whether this transUf ^ essentially diíTerent. We
Perhaps my formal language !!!? throughout, or whether \ ^°os¡der this mode of notation one of the j^as, as
P^Bents of my "conceptual notation", ^advantage over
. ^^h^oder says that my "Ln ^ región.» mere presentation of logical forms, a con artificial
mcoi^on withthat
oould appear the Booleanrr^í"^^
the "cnn notation"
ooncepts.has
Fromalmost nothing
this account, mode of notation. In tlus I Qthe/f'ímaryandthe
olean elaboration, an organic reíation j-ecognizes the advan-
on^nfíií
the opposite. The judgeme^t examplenot
willbeconviuoo
able to propositioíis is established. c ¡j- jn the Boolean
f m this, when he makes the effor o that he has not
ramilla language. However, in so ¿gamitation ofthescope
^"=81 to lieart of the matter; j-ding to Schroder s pro-
for Fre 9
° ^hich the generality should extendKAccor
¡ficulus and\uStS:'í a°sma^Ik to Boolean log'O. the difference between
hat Boolean Frege 03^'^ B^cause of his functiona x=0
great advance he l'ad
haH achieved inFerhaofp^^ statements
did not yetand lógica!
(1882) rel^tJO
realize what —a=x and I ^
'00 THE AIM OF "CONCEPTUAL NOTATION"
the difference is so great that
his Dronosai ^ former is true. A further disadvantage of
It woTilrf Ip^h yet another symbol for negation. CONCEPTUAL NOTATION
particular crift' ^ ^"swer all of Schroder's
aim of the "00?!^^^/ suffice to have his false conception of the A FORMULA LANGUAGE OF PURE THOUGHT
the lack of coííp ^ ootation" corrected and to show in this way modelled upon the
remarks Had he a^t of at least some of his critica! FORMULA LANGUAGE OF ARITHMETIC
third chapter of mv transíate some of the formulas of the
(1879)
presentine to vnii en those which I had the honour of
calis better then hJ^x mode of notation which he
undertaking the errnn^°^ discovered by the difficulty of the
Neverthel^ ^is view.
' thankful to him for the review of my book.
 PREFACE^

The apprehension of a scientifio tom mUnade-

several stages of certainty. pfoposition becomes
quate number of particular cases obtainin« through chains
little by little more firmly truths—whether conclusions
Of reasoning. a connection w.th otor t™
wh,ch find confirmation m =0»® ^ as Iconclusiónwefrom
oonversely, whetherit come tobe seen
already
can ask by
established propositions Thus o ^ ^ established; or, on the
w wt path a proposition been. establishable.
other hand, in what way it' differently for differ-
Perhaps the former question mus ¿egnite, and its answer is
ent people. The latter ^eTropo^tion under considera-
connected with the inner nature ot tne p p
"tta
Purely iogical one, which, Dwg^h'^ 's based solely
of things {die besondere Beschaff Accordingly, we divide
upon the laws on which all knowledg
aUtruths which require aproof mto ^
• ^^ f second
^ kind
kind can proceed purely
^ust be supported by empincal lac .
for a proposition to be of the inind without acíivity
never come to the consciousness ^ the psychological
of the senses* {Siniiesíhdtigkeií}. thod of proof {Beweisfüh-
"tode of origin, but the most perfect
underlies the classification.
1 tp. hefore the appearance of the English
, This English translation was F7 ¡n the bibliography below) and
Kanslation by Stefan Bauer-Mengelbej(sce b ^ g,ve
¡Jdependent
the reader theofbenefit
the translation
of severa!of °..¡ons
notedthein three translations
the footnotes werepresent
of ^he com
pared; and any important gr-Mengelberg's interpretations or
^ork. At a few places Geach s or translator, and so they were
Phrase seemed better than those o 1
adopted and credited in the footnotes.] characteristics of objects d
[" Bauer-Mengelberg renders thi jeveloprnent is possible for
Since without sense perceptio" ¡udgements.
•^own to US, the latter point holds for aii ju b
 PREFACE PREFACE
Now, while considering the question to which of these two kinds ♦t.he relatiou of the n^'croscope to tKp
th pve The latter, because of
101 truths]dojudgements of arithmetic belong, I had first to test how the rauge of its applicability nnd bwau superiority
ar one could get in arithmetic by means of lógica! deductions alone, adapt itself to the most yaned c.rcnms ^c"
uppor e on y y the lawsofthought,which transcend all particulars. over the microscope. course ue unnoticed only
Inri'nr'f"V" '^is: I sought first to reduce the reveáis many ™Perfect.ons which as soon as
ine in nrH to the notion of logical order- hecause of its intímate connection v/i ' ^ sharpness of
So'thatsomett,'° ^ coricept of number. seientific purposes place strong r^l" j^e
in unnoticeri ™,'"''ive {etwas Anschauliches] could not squeeze wsolution, the eye proves '' purposes; but, for this
reasoning free oTgaps"as nticroscope is perfectly suited for ju
^ery reason, it is useless for all «^hers. ¿gyjged for particular
most rigorcusly I Li '"''f to fulfil this requirement
language- desnite inadequacy of the Similarly, this "conceptual notati it because it
nomplex the relations becamrtht'íeT expressions. the more scientific purposes; and therefore one m purposes in some
required conlH Ka u* • ' precisión—which my purpose 's useless for other purposes. Even i j
oAhe'weptll notf^ -o- ''e idea "^easure, one may still fail to find n improvement in
should be to test in thp P^^sented here. Thus, its chief purpose uevertheless take comfort in the convic
of reasoning and expose'^^ach Vres^^ ^ yhethod also advances science. Bacon, a ' discovered
in unnoticed so that ;tc P'^osupposition which tends to creep nnportaut to invent a means by fact, all great
I have omitted the iovestigated. For this reason, easily than to discover some partícula . '¡rorigininanimprove-
tance for the chain of ° overything which is without impor- scientific advances in recent times have
*hent of method. ,^rpctimated—the advantages
natedbyeoneepCco^e:
importance for me. Hencp J, ^"halt}I"
that§3.which
I haveis ofdesig-
solé Leibniz also recognized—perhaps o
wishes to grasp correctlv tL always be kept in mind if one f an adequate method of notation { , or ratiocinator,*
the ñame "Conceptual Notatio^^^^ ° formula language. Also, ^ Universal characteristic, a calculus p beyond the mere
myself, for the present to th fí'om this. Since I limited ^as too ambitíous for the eífort to nvercomes its [would be]
independentof the particular sL?Tu °" I was also able to use P^eparatory steps. The enthusiasm ^hi . in the mental
the expression "formula hncn.l ^ ^^ings, ^feator when he considers what an imm notation which
opon the formula language of Stu thought". The modelling Power of mankind would result from a underestimate the
the title refers more to the fnnu f have alluded in ^i^ings themselves {die Sachen se . g^t even if this high
structure. jfficulty which such an undertakmg co
an artificialThefarthestthinaf"
similarity throueh ^^
th ideas thaneífort
to the detailed
to establish cannot be attained in one try, we ® ^ complete gener-
sum of its characteristic marks of a concept as the ^ slow, stepwise approximation- a p provisionally; then,
pomt of contacta between mv r ^ The most immediate ily appears unsolvable, we ha.ve , advance. We can view
Jí^^haps, it will be mastered with a gr as realizations
I bX"eÍLr
^Tw 1 cdii nisicfi tVi used™
' 7 symbols of arithmetic, geometry, «^.ouceptual notation"
the Leibnizian idea in particular area • ^
"(• WUhlr®"'®' "conceptual uotation" to Wered here adds a new domain to ttiesy, po,nt,
berguse.n,e;eTí^.°f
Frege's reraark here si' T"' on chlra^ —"b "■^50.
^ Bauer-Mengel" •' «dl. .. .b. «b». Tbbb
áemonstrandi in abstrJ^^^ to be an allusion ♦ see FI4, §53.
í ®®"®r-Mengelberg's íuií.°^
arn of phrase.]
logic^F^'''"'^ inelegans specimen
apparently knew well.]
Vo' i Vb 3tbb.[(1867)
^olume poin"Über
SM Trerdpbnbbr.
Leibnizes Entwurl allpemeiMn Charabtwidik .
i^P. 1-47.]
 PREFACE
PREFACE
With the greatest ev . • . t. driven hy a necessity inherent in the subject matter ¡tselT These
gapsintheexistinof^^^ success, we can begin to fill in the deviations from the traditional find the.r just.fication „ the
domains to the pr
to— "Vius
fields which
^^nguages,connect their hitherto sepárate
^ single formula language and extend ít I* .P ,P ... p„ X XS— p'nS
wnich Un tn t,^ t - o— iaiiiiua5^ and grammar. In particular, I beli ^¡„
I am sure that m ^ 'acked such a language. concepts of suhjeci and f ¿ ,,0^ regarding a content
appliedwherevpr.
appliedwhereveras
proofs, as in lavinJ^^^'^r
~ ■ conceptual notation"
^»ci a Sn^rial ,,.^1.._ notation" can
. can be
be successfuUy
successful y
be placed upen the validity o
_ - f Al n\ prove itself in the long run. It is easy concepts.
as a funclion "f an argumen to ^„„„,ction between the
calculus. ^ ® loundation of the differential and integral Furthermore, the df^dnstration
It appears to me tr. u nteanings of the words: if, and, not, >
°f this formula laneu applicatio" forth, may deserve notice.
r„„,i . ■ • _
^Antinn bere-
^fewsymbolsforfh^®® geometry. We should oniy have to add Only the following further """®®^"¡ng,e mode of inference is
should acquire a telations that occur there. In this way. . The restriction, declared m of such a conceptual
The transition to ' ""alysis siius. , justified by the fact that in laymg t' d ^^oscn as simple as
Physicsmight folios?®® '^'"ematics and further to mechanics and notation the primitive componen created. This does not
«sought {die üenkn T "elds, where besides necessity Possible if perspicuity and ofder ° several judge-
^^''^endigkeitY
«mn rvith'thassertsd ^ ^""herphysical necessity {die Na""'
development of the mode of Preclude the possibility that, laíer,
Rients to a new one, which are P° ¡n^o direct ways for
W® ^ecomeimpojjjy
-id reason L l^"owledge is easiest to forese^ inference in only an índirect way, e advisable in a later
such transformations appoaf Ibe sake of abbreviation. Indeed, t i jgg of inference would
^PpHcation. In this way, then, fur le
Íal'!"®'" «inÍ uSr.''^ the power of the word ovef ^^ise.
^i'ise. ,-111 and
_^A í'41)
/A]\ can
. I noticed only later that formulas (31) and t l
ron be combined
coufrT°f''="^taosrunT'"® ^hích through the use o >nto the single formula
Unguistíc' "^dught fró doncerning the relatious^^^
notatin of exnrpQ ■ ^ ^ which only the nature of I
tooTt to it, then my "conceptu^¡
pure for^ SdPhers Cert ■ 'i'' Purposes, can hecome a use ^bich makes even more simplifi'^^I'®"^
fhich simplifiaations PP" starting point of the
«•ougS a„d?w T'^'" does n;t reproduce ideas Arilhm.tip.
Arithmetic, as IT said
«»id at the beginning, was tn notation". I intend.
oeptual
'""gsmittejp''""' "diside of inevitable for a lí'ain of thought which led me to my c ^o analyse its con-
Una ■ *■ co the
^0 the unt,
becausp
the nnr.
nn,^ uu
and hn-
áussern
áussern
can limit these discrepan
- therefore, to apply it to this scienc® ^
tb'®'^''"í'^^^^dation for its theorems. For
' «lause the?"''''''^ d"d harml^"'^' ^spts further and provide a deeper ohaptef some things which
'"'d do the other hand, Pief^ ^be present, I have presented in tie n suggested course
dsainstaon^'^ -'" '■"rdlnarvi / «fdft they
kind from thosea [disctoP ¡n that direction. Further magnitude, and so forth—
Theme:e":r^<"nflue:el^:;8dage, provide proteftid" Ibeelucidationof the concepts j ^ ^hich I shall produce
advanceH cfthis 'v expression- to be the subject of further invest.gation
Ibemselvestoi, I hope notation", it seems to ^tnmediately after this book.® jg December 1878
assent to i^^^^timpression of unfanii'i
ía ^auer-M ^ '^novations to which I have ,^Ppearance
[• These was
"further iuvestigation^; are those^
delayed several years
P fiauer.íí^^S^'berE r^nri
P ®auer-Mp"®®'herg rendr^ *^1!'^ "rational necessity"-!
his "empirical necessity"-!
s this "by concrete means"-]
CONTENTS OF THE CONCEPTUAL NOTATÍO
I. DEFINITION OF THE SYMBQLS
111
Letters and other symbols

The Jucigenient
§2. Assertibility of a contcnt. Contení stroke,judgement s
§3- Subject and predícate. Conceptual contení ■„r,rtive-
H Universal, particular; negativa, categor»^ ' IF
apodictic. assertorlc, problematic judgemenis
CondUionality 11'
If. Conditional stroke U
Inference. The Aristotelian modes of inference
Negation J2C
§7. Negation stroke. Or, either-or, and, but, ne
Identily of Contem . „ of such
§8- The need for a symbol for ¡dentity of contení, ra r ,2.
[a symbol]
neFmction p„„etions of
Dcflnition of the words "fnnction"
several argumenta. Argument places. ^
Use of letters as function symbols. ' ^tp^pHcation of the procedure
í'-relation to A". "5 is a rfuU oUn^ ^^gon,ent
^ to the object A." The function sym
Generality s„bstitutiv¡ty of
Germán letters. The «ncavlty in the^^
Uerman letters. Their scope. Italia ^
There are some things which do not gome do not. Som 13
some . Every. Causal opposit'on
Possible that . Square of logical
I

CONTENTS

derivation of some
OGEMENTS of PURE THOUGHT I. DEFINITION OF THE SYMBOLS
first ^ ^eductive mode of presentation §1. The symbols customarily used in *e general theo^^^
[Some on their ^onditionality tudes fau inte two kinds. The «rst cons.sjs^of
T^ethirdbasicr''^"'"'''. which represents either a number it nossible lo use
first basic law and consequenccs left undelermined, This '"5'^'®™'"^™ Hdity ^
second basic 1 ° consequenccs letters for the expression of the genera
third basic law and consequenccs {a+b)c = ac+bc.
first basic law of' consequenccs
® second basic la content and a consequence The other kind consists of such symbols as +. < «• T 2. each of
® basic law of o,» ^'^cntity of content and consequenccs which has its own specific two kinds of symbols,
^^"'^^ality and consequenccs ladopt this fundamental'dea of tlirough in the theory of
which unfortunately is not stnct V ¡nciñshe domain of puré
SOMp Magnitudes,* in order to use ,, ^ symbols I employ into
from a general
^houghí in general. I therefore and those which liave
sequences ,,, fhose which one can take to sigiufy ¡etters, and these are to
^ completely fixed sense. The rs ^ , n^ust insist that
^°"»quences -¡"«isement stroke. Lower-case Greek te»ers serve mainly for the expression o ^ should retain throughout the
a letter, for all its indeterminate , context].
17Í same context the meaning whicl
the judgement
^^"■^bercn " with X." Definition and con jg6 roA with the aid of the symbol
§2- A judgemenF will always be expresse
"ature of
^ Procedure. Definition and consequen
or combination of symbols
Which stands to the left of ..gment. If we omit the small
giving tne
to^viug the contení
content {irmui^)
{ínhait} of
— ¡contal one,
horizontal one, then
uicn the judge-
vertical stroke at the left end ot the i ¡deas {biosse
ment is to be transformed '"1°''/"^Hter
mW ¿oes not statewhether or
dees ot
^orsteiiungsverbindung] ^í'^Jerample, let
"Ot he acknowledges its truth. for
J

\r

•PConsider I, log, sin, Hm-

'Judgement' herecorrespo
,he mo« modern term -assertion'. Frege's
"assertion sign -J
symbol'U ' is today called the

.V * , ■ p' V ''N
■ fp ■ ' . .',v ' t">^ '
 ie, ,,,

I. DEFINITION OF THE SYMBOLS lt3

Then niagnetic poles attract each other.
still prcdominates. Now I cali the part of the content wliich is
ííiwí, i„ boiii tiie conceptual content {begriffiicher Inhalt}. Since
""'y this is meaninaful {yon Bcdeutung ist] for [our] =0""?'"^'
'he idea o'fThVrecST"'''"".^hould simply evoke in tlie reader notation", we nced not distinguish between Pt°P°®"""!®'j'''"'''
^^^naps,
p®*" aps, say,
Say, in orderTn
order ^ of
oí" opposite magnetic poles,
poles. same conceptual content. If one says, "The subject is the concept
test the correctne.. rT ^<^nclusions from it and with 7.h whicl, the judgement is concorned.", this apphes "1^° the
¿^eans
Py means of the words "?I ^^ought. We paraphrase in '"'l.í;-::
this case °bj"0t. Therefore, w^e can say only: "The subject ts the '
^ that'' or 'V//c propositio^ 'ch the judgement is cliieíly conccrncd.' In [of "iBlJ^orH-order
í^ot every cont c subject-place has the significance {Bedeutuiig} ¡tí ,¡ j (p
W ^ J^dgement by placing f— ' °f n spcdal place wltere one puts what he w.shes 1 stenj
cannot. We there- i ""'""'ttt'y heed. (See
'cate a relationof this also §9.) This
judgement can serve, a °
toothers,thus fpp'dje
P3pPPts
r/ie contents** {heurtheilbare un understanding of the whole context. Now all^a^pccts
Pf'°f the symbol
| ties ■ "faction of speaker
of [ordinary] language which resu
and listener—for examp e, w
V ^
^^ntalone I "fénica] assertion, ^^"'S'it«'dtrack
ers the liLner's expectations and tries to
even before speaking a [complete] ®®"tenc
<^ontent strol ^hole T f ^ íé
strolce servp Vertical oné tf horizontal stroke ti
^ytübols that f reíate stroke. The conten onl^tv"'''"® ■"mat which influences its
n/H'üyj stroke.
Stroke. líí" formed by t /"tMÍA/ "® f jft'gP™®"' '' foracorrectinferenceis
^ ^sertiblp
^sertibip foUows the contení
content sífO fullv e ""'""«"dnccí. Everything Hy ¡s not indicated;
§3. ^
.^^•Adisünct,„„. .
cowíení. ñor;!- but what is not example of the
for '"^ " '° Sítessing. In this I stnctly o distinguish
'anguage of mathematics, in which, a so, j^anuage]. We
^t'ntenk'of'C""® '''jt'dgtmenrT^
'•t® <=356 that ra||-',''''s^®ents can ri'ff "t'®' ^
""' he
¡íle caj""''
peri ¡fng'tiepredícate onlyinbywhich
a language doing tne
violence
propI ° ' "Archimedes
in the
, jfdgenient c '^""sequenj ^V"'^° "t®'' '''"''^the fon owingtfrway:
the "The
conquest of death
Syracuse. , wo
®° frota the » hined with „ ^ t^hich can be derived froW . violent of Archtntedes at he conquest
couq ^of
T^^'y- tht
p^^^sians the
jttCmen?"'""
Gre 7 "ot be ,n.
theth
°«t«s
°«^«® can
<=fn always be der.v^
"^""ibined with the same otb^^^|
oth®^®'
is a fact." Even here, if one w.shes, e can^^^
were def propositions, atid'fh
a In
PP^t'tffte; but the subject p^^'^s a judgement.
predícate serves only to present
Such
judgemenís;
"M°»»«»S;«'' £¿,;5?';í "-n'» ^ would have only a single predica f
Mcp ^ slight difr ' íhe first way- ^ c llT'' « /-'"• We see that here^ we cannot speak^^^^ _
^ttt> lette,, „ , " '"'Sr'"rind!? theT symbol 1
h/ri itTLnmon predícale for all
ho'u' othbe ' """d,'"' ■,1"', "te". an'app®^ «Pital alpha] as abbreviado"' /y
PPt^P"'"" sense if I do not specA"" T X f..misledbytheexample
Of r" of a formula language, combining subject
"Si'the e"/"'" there are houses (or.<W^^„Íy a ^nd°n
0^^ predícate.íanguage intoformmgju
I soon became convmced, el sthat this was an
fo?S
"Pula= 81."f a„" "'"«a"^'
nnther ten. "Pria-J.^ne
ki„^ 'hat §12.)was
s house b„, made of wood.
"house", «<1%
"¿¿id
aP
"""«ertibiel"®? °'««=» „.d., g». «d"-..j-SL?,
content,'" see
P'"""[the passage
""p"®" f^lowidSl
fo 8243^^^ Bauer-Mengelberg renders this P
 . DEF.N.TIONOF THE SYMBOLS
54 T ^ ^EFINíTION of the symbols 0) A is affirmed and B is den.cd
for ourVurlnT"^ remarles are intended to explain the significance, (1) yl is denied and B is affirmed
iadgeraents «^istinctions which people make with regar (4) y| is denied and B is demed.
reallynotadist1ncÍn"T^"'^^
shouldsav "n ■ j
por/ícw/ar judgements: this
judgements, but between con
Now, hi I B

a paniculnr wnfi ^ u)dye,-^Qi co}Uenf\ I fUh-d of íhese possibilities does not

stands for the judgement that the denial of
even when it is nut'fn'Ti" " properties belong to the j] occur, huí ene of the other three does.
proposition.(See 52§2)*^^^^'
Proposition.
The CQry,„ I ,.
\ a judgement, but as an [unassert
[tniasse
-f
_T- ^ A

l— B
®^say,''®4polf.,í°''
the content-tf
"'8^''on-segments
For example, in an indirect pt°^,
AB and CD were not eq that therefore A is denied
signifies that the third possibility occu .
^ontains a negation f ^egments .Í5 and CD are not eq and
10 B
-o is
is aflirmed.
amrmed.
is not present contení, althougil it could be From among the cases in which t..

^ content wheít ^ ■í'^dgement. Negation attaches ^ ^ fore

•n
er/cma/} of
Th
an o.
Oí an í?íc.,,;.; "
to regard negation as a chara
rogara negation ai, a
■ distincíio
ákt\r> confPMt ^fíve affirmed, we stress the following. ^ entirely im-
j•i"udgements3pp°^"^of
gements ann." categóri ca!, hypothetical,
categórica], hvnothetical, and
and ^'p^""nce' (1) H must be affirmed Then ^ ,, ,„d ,et^
thea^'''""'"'^''ojudap° '° ^ grammatical material. For example, ís shining. Here only tie
stand for the circumstance that t e „eed not
the .
the suggests"^®"'
sug„e<,I '^'stinguished from
;■ ■" o'stinguished from tne
the a«-
assof ° ^),ic
^n'- first two of the four cases meiitio J contents.
inL ''°'"ion
^^'^ion S l"'"'''^tenceof
i general judgements fro^
fro-" • .n exist a causal connecllon ^ent of A is immaterial. For
abo
^bouSl"- If II cal
eoflcj Stounds
cali"; ^
aV;/r.l'' whife the assertoric lack^ .¡pt
necessary, I thereby g I (2) B is to be denied. Then the onten
feí/o/^'^atenío. .^"^g^ment. But since this does "" ^gen"' example, let B stand for the circi universe is mfinite.
possible, and A the circumstance tha^^^ p^^g.ble. There
only the second and fourth o ^ g.
need be no causal connect.on between
'''■S'w judgem''^'^®"d possiblethat
' "' "' indicating
as possible, , thehespeak
speak^"'
knoW '®o l»el (3) Wecan make the judgement
'>'^iss!!"^''^=negatrT
m. , ^y'ngtl„.5®''on ofth. ¡ndicating
J- ..., .,„.„id foUo^V^tse-el
that he knoW
tile latter"^ ^^^t the univ Proposition] would fo fat^^'
^ n are to be affirmed or demed.
' "'■de With®'' §U.) .!! '';''susuallycalledapfl''"f'''^j„ sot^® el without knowing 1" circumstance that ^
''"''"Acoí/"°"^arhe„ Possible that the "le flf aS^' For example, let B stand ° ^ circumstance tha
§5^ ,jj,
sj
' ' e suít
resuit i:i"'y
T'y ''"dy." isis an
an exampl
examplee of
oí
" eath." is an [example of] ''he
he
th^¿„d
o quadralLire [with the sun], un
US a semicircle. In this case,
transíate

i'igfoutl'"ifistandf ''°''°'tional.ty 1 A

•^"''■bilities;
•"ues; '''''^"tible contents (9ii^
-wic contents (§2), there are
'TU.. (I) .. - .

i'lS'"?''
a brought out® by the whole o f Ibis

. ■ ' ■ ■;-v ,v' ;

;; :V •■' . '' • • ' ■ • ■• "
* < '-Ü f
'-r
116 , I. DEFINITION of the symbols 117
With "EFINITION of the symbols means that A is denied and B is aflirmed. From this is obtamed what
"íf the moon is in quadrature is given above. If a causal connection is present, we can also s^,
iinpHcitin ih. ^ semicircle." The causal connecuo ^'A is the necessary consequence of B anáF. , or, e cir
although a iurT^^ '' is not expressed by our symbo » stances B and F occur, then A occurs also."
ofsuch a made only on the ^ We can see just as easily that
this point connection ¡s something general,
(See §12.) ^ yet have an expression for genera i
oalled the conditinl^^í^^^ which connects the two horizontal ones b denies the case in which 5is affirmed, but A and T are
^"tiated to the left of the upper horizontal stro assume a causal connection between ^4 an ,w
tile meaning, ® ^o"ditional stroke is the contení stroke
P ained, of the symbol combination formula]: "If^ is the necessary consequence of5,
■t occurs."

§6. A result of the definition [of the conditional stroke] given in §5 is

that from the two judgements
stroke between T Theintended
part oftothef^i^te to ^
hor.zon^ I—— A and 1 ^
I B
stroke horizom^f conditional stroke is the the new judgement 1
^ it is ea^v to
tr^ see that follows. Of the four cases enumerated above, the third is exoluded by
hz:
denies ^6 Qq • ■ 11
^ut the second and fourth [cases are excluded] y
a<í ^--uica ai
<=°"structed from that only the first [case] remains.
We could write this inference perhaps this way.
aud p
ip the
"ti:
:.1 0(

IZt (■ TT^reisan h=r=

BW the denial of chroder in hís review of the present
°ther five revíewers caught the slip.]
118 ,^ I DEFINITION OF THE SYMBOLS
^EFINITION OF THE SYMBOLS by means of XX, must be formed, by a method other than the ene
A "aborious iflong expressions slood in the above, from the two judgements v^are
therefore would have to be written Further, if, say, thejudgement
| j*
I would abbreviate the two ¡nferences
occurs in the r abbreviation: Each judgernent ^
placed to the ^ labelled with a number
sappose for \ judgement at ¡ts first occurrence.
ll^at thejudgement
(XXX)::
-.0„
Then I write
.
^ ^Pecial case—has been labelled hz-:
^"einference this way: (XX):;

®ven more like this:

^ere it ¡s left
s reader to construct the judgement
I—I— A (XX,XXX):;
l^rom[—^ '— B . gd I A.
judgement X. and to see if it tallies with the c
then ^^ample th" Urtheile X stimrnt.Y
In logic people enumérate, foUowmg^ns^^^^^^^
"^ ^vrhe | ^ was labelled by > modes of inference. I use just th single judgement.®
ame mference this way: a new judgement is derivad pUcit in another mode of
We can, of course, express ^1-^ and iV holds,
1—I— A mference in ene judgement of the
then A holds as well; in symbols;
iXX),,^ ^
^^^ethedonKi A.
ü t 1 N and i — m, i
broin this judgement plus
|
to see whethcr it is
F Here reading Schiüsse for preface of the present work)that
"siT'- ®y thk
yi'hy Frejjp ''«If,
/»„ '"'^ee but th ^ judgement
means judaement
which X „ b"
¡s ^ P Frege frequently says (for though he actually also
'lie the nh oi- an / constructed sentencia .reiy he uses only one mode of mference .¡ consequent. and several «Jthers
^ses substitution, confinement of g , j^g seems to be aware that e
f"'í&S' «SiSKsas-,''"> (see 8 of the Editor's Introduction ^hovef
tises some other mode of inference to derive
judgement from a single
SdV^cu C„^,al given one.]
120 j I. DEFINITION of the symbols 121
follows of the symbols of affirming both zl and B does not exist." Therefore, only the follow-
inference ca^K inferencc using any mode of ing threc cases remain:
to manase with / Accordingíy, since it is possible A is affirmed and B is denied
^6 do so Otli of biferencc, perspicuity demands t la
^^'otelianTorr/.''"^ be no reason to stop with t A is denied and B is affirmed
ones indefinitelv X ^ instead, we could go on adding ae A is denied and B is denied.
of judgemenw ^ ^Pocial moda of inferencc of eacft
""•«ngle mode ""formulas in §§13 to 22.This reslrid'" In view of the preceding, ¡t is easy to f '^e si^^
"mchologlcal „„„™' "in ?io way íntended to g each of the three parts of the horizontal stroke to the left of A.
!""« expedient fomTr"' ^^lle the question of
judgements that r.nl "''""oeptual mtation"]. Some of tn
sewed in §22 Anstotelian modes of inference wiH bs P I

t'ormulas 59, 62, 65).

means: "The case m. whtch
I.- 1 vivi «'f.j^Td
Hpnied5and the negation
cannot of B is
both be denied."
affirmed does not obtain. , or, A
f^nly the following possibilities remain.
^^•Ifasmallv ■ ^®°ation A is afarmed and B is aflfinned
this is to'í the underside ofthe conten|
Ttas. for*the oiroumstance that the contení dees fo' A is affirmed and B is denied
^is denied and^Bis affirmed.
tteans: "4 ¿ ^andand"either—or"
5 together are
exhanst all the possibilities. Now the words "or"
used in two ways.
ñSdr"^°^°''Cpa°r;-u ^ "^is sman vertical stroke ^ 'A or 5'
theneaap'''°h«isthecontf
as in otli'°°
t horizontal stroke to the nght o ,
is th» r" ^'"'oke of A; while the part to the means, first, just the same as
ment strott ® the «""'ont stroke
no judge^;°"=«Pt«al of the negation
notation", withoutofthe J«dg, g, J—- 2-» ,
^ is made.
^hüs, that nothing is conceivable o er than A and B. For
j-essure example:
increases. In
''^hstponusn, ~~r—A If7' «a 4uantity
quantity olof gas
gas isis ncais.",
heated, its volume or P
ils second use, the expression
ifí> __ .

or 5"
'"■<'"4an?"''^tsoÍ:''^true.
i

^nites the meanings of

"®8ation a„ 'n which the symbols fo'
®te combinad.

^0 that. ficst, there is no third possibility outside of ^ and and

pBauer-Mengelberg'sturnofphrase,]
""" ¿*¿11";' f=In ■Hrmi d .nd tto "«•'¿"¿lí
otlier words, "The
122
I. DEFINITION of the symbols I. DEFINITION OF THE SYMBOLS
can be rendered by:'M and 5and T". IT we wish to
PoTsibllLf
Poss.b,hties, then,^only themutually exclusive.
following Of the [original] fo"''
two remain: or B"in symbols with the secondary meanmg of mutu
^ is affirmed and B is denied we must express TT- ^ and 'f- ^Ins S'ves
_ I ■ — /?

^ is denied and B is affirmed.

coexistencrofTand T'
^eshalluse íheword"n '' "w
'he first, in which the
the more important; an
to malee this distinof '' ^^^smeaning. Perhaps it is appropna
'belattershalUaTe'r
can then transíate '"'T""""
^ccondary meaning of"either-or" that o^y
mutual exclusión.
j— D

, Instead of expressing "and" by means of the

tionality and negation, as is done here, ^
by"4 or5». Similarly, ^^Present conditionality by means of a symbol for
^ynibol for negation. We could introduce, say,

the meaning of
-the symbol for the combinad content ofr and and then render
means I—• B.

is denied"; or'«th > y. ij.

Conversei;, t¿e threTpoí"S' ^ ^ ttre both affirmed occurs"- ^chosetheotherway becausedeductionseem »and" and "but" is
^ '"bthties left open by
simply that way. The distinction notation". The
kind that is not expressed m this follows
^^--•'ded.Accordingty, can transíate

by: "Both A and B 1 j.]-,at A is denied

are facts." Al
•SO, we can easily see that ^cans:"Of the four Possibilities^h^ by]:
^ ^ affirmed, occurs." Thus,
"5and(but)not^occurs."
^24 I. DEFINITION OF THE SYMBOLS I. DEFINITION OF THE SYMBOLS
We can transíate thesymbolcombination Position of the straight line at any
that it follows the rule that contmuous changes in the
h[ r B straight line inust always correspond to conün
in the same way. A Position of B.

A
*

thus transíate [this ^ occurs." We can [As Ihe line turns

in ihc direction
of the arrow. B
'Neither^noriisafact." moves towards A,
Obviously, the words "or" j.. .. til! ihey coincide.^»]
sidered only in so far as tt, ' ' °®itlter—ñor" are here con-
'they combine assertible contents.

§8. Identity of conte"^^^'^'^^ COntent Therefore, the ñame B denotes yet specified.
relatingtonames^nMtotmr f°"" =°°ditionaIity and negation by uorresponding position of the ®truig position of the
representatives of their are usually 00^^ can now ask: What point corresponds tji ^e^P ^
usually] expresses that each combination [" straight Une when it is perpendicular game
hby^tif'
the symbol for identitfl/'"'""'' between
^PPear m pronr: ^ ^ their
as they arecontents-'
combined 7"' be: The point ,4. Thus, in this ^f=^'„\\,veusedoniyonenauie
^ontent as the ñame A; and yet we could n
■ ^ tile«f two
tntrodneU„, h-coatent, for this signifies
ñamesfo^H
a sym^ the circum-
Thus, with the f'ottt the beginning sinoe tbe just» ^ ,,,,,
Py our answer. The same point is deter
Sol y into a'^ ^ontent, a bifurcation (1) Directiy through perception. straight Une's
Pertaim^^ ^Pression at fi at times for themselves- O) As the point B corresponding to tbe [rotating]
"Thav 'he el'lf"'''hat what we are dealing whb being perpendicular to the díame
and ttL „'t , ^ sepárate ñame corresponds to eac of a symbol for
show the f 1 svmF i symbols of the same ' ^ etermination {Bestiwmungsweisen}. ' same contení
ftom ííome^^f'his ipeínn lie i"^entity of content rests upon the fo
^^«hefullydeterminedindiírerent way , thesajtie coníent,
{different} modes of
'hecircumfer^' ^ ^'^aight lint' fodowinS
[of the cirrui
circipi ,i ^'^circle
^ ^íircle \A/i
Wi about aa fixed
aoGut point '-A
hxeo poim. ^ ^ particular case, is actually ^ pefore this [judgement]
Point BjcorJ'
corres p
the cnTr^^r*^ straight
^^taight line forms a ^^^^mination is the content of ^ aames, corresponding to
US go
&n on tn to thifi
a_ P^'ichne fn H.!- '. the íliameter] opposite AA
diameterl onoosite be made, we must supply for the thing thus deter-
be two [different] modes of determ g^pression a symbol for
the strailnr''°" w"f 'he íwo Unes"■[tbatKi
"Id"«M.
tlie
.s, 1 -ned.Buttheiudgenientre.u^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
""=] the point B correspondiug to F" Here I follow Geach m mclud
t Bauer-Mengelberg's turn of
126
I- DEFINITION of the symbols I. definition of the symbols
are the same function with different arguments ¡f
ihat dfeent "Ín gen" and "oxygen" as arguments. On ^he «ther 1 and
indiíTerent miít contení are nol alvvays mcrely ^ different functions of the same argument if we
different modes^of^H ''^^her, if they are associatcd dioxide" as the argument. ^¡.cumstance that the centre
thematter.ii Tn th- they concern the vcry Consider now as our example. th internal
iíiKant'ssense svn^tiíT' as toreason
identityforofthe mtr of mass of the solar system has no
tíon of a symbo^ f ^ superficial forces act on the solar system". Here, so ar sy argument
?--tentrÍl^ of content is thal it is places. We can thus consider this as ^ »solar
^smustthen "solar system" in various ways, first or the second
the Original form^ '^^"tityabbreviation
of content for a lengthy
between the abbrev tíofl
system" as replaceable by other argun g^nig thing
or at both places—but in the last ca , ,, .-f^erent. The proposition
Now, let ■ hoth times. These threc functions are ^ jj- think of
®ean: the e > * (A=B) .,¡¿¡1 that Cato killed Cato shows the same t'" g-
that^^^ ca/í always replace
^y^bolABbyhave thevice
sameversa.
eof'^^ 'Cato" as replaceable at the first occurren ' ^ second
B and the function.'lf we think of "Cato as -placeab^f
oecurrence, then "being killed by Ca „,curreaces. then "killing
Let üs sim function . ijffhtei' We think of "Cato" as replaceable at botn o
oneself" is the function.
Sr the circumstance that hydroge" We now express the matter genera y. ¿¡ssertible), a simple
oxv^
for nZ »^y^^ogen, we formula
can insertlanguaS^*
the sy^^. 1 fo^ f/, in an expression
a complex symbo! occurs m one
places and we imagine it
all
Sy this means, the sense is ^s replaceable by another [symhol\ ( w expi'ession that
this ^^ood bef ^ o^trogen" enters into the relatioos .|g jii 0^ same of ¡bese places, then we ca ^ function ánd the
the tof r ^^^'des intn^rn^^^ expression as shows itself invariant [under such ¡ep
"■opwZ relat- ^ ^onstant component which .^¿ a ''^Placeable part its argument. .^,„pthins can occur as an
these rpi ^y ^'^hers symbol which is Since, according to this ' (¡on where it is not regarded
CCt--
oontenf L ^distinoftt oomponent a function, th ^gpt^
argument and also at places m th <,r(Tiiment-places and other
as replaceable, we distinguish between a g
°f''bCfr««n'j::fi:;,^^vayofviewfng
S>°nlyw r'°" "°thing toit.doAUhough,
with th'',.n^„, Ptaces in the function. . ^hich the use of [ordinary]
Let me warn here against an i .. propositions:
hendthe "^^^ancarh ^""^ííIsO '^---'--"-'^^^Xtre-o"outs,.tates."
^^^omesZ^°"^^Ptua°c
function T ^
function, we can ^
'"sucha way that "car . gen "The number 20 can be represen

'^^P^^ceabi ^ase wp
"lonia-'^^^ ^y otheMr °"íy heavier than
of "carbón
ZposttWeintegetcanbetepresentedasthesuntoffour
''The p- "hydrogen chloride gas squares." resentable as the sum of
and that c i.
^í'Don dioxide is heavier than
ydrog^ tt appears possible to consider "the number 20" one
four squares" as a function whose arg oan discern
and "every positive integer
oarbon dioxide is heavier than ^
■1 pa Geaclfs tar" ^
128 ,. def.nition of the symbols
of the symbols ic f to . at will,
-11 *i,'
>s free permit, this nr that component of theissentence
/j^lsfreedom to
limited by
and "everv^n'^*^- observation that "the number 20 ^Ppear as the principal argument, howev ,
isleichen "«t concepts of the same ran the scarcity of words.
^sserted in the? asserted of the number 20 canno
^liough, ofcourse?n?"^^ ^°"cept] "every "'?!lry §10./„ order ,o e.rpress an
Positive inteper tu ^'^^'^t^stances it may be asserted o - ^^put A in parenthesesfollowing a leííer, f
unlike [the exnr ^ ^'^pression "every positive integcr" by >
"the number 20", yields no independen^t 0(A).
sentence. acquires a sense only in the context
í^o ^imihrly
be considere^?^"'^ which the same conceptual ''^presents a function {not more .rnlicitlv
exp determined)
^ of the two
parentheses
"Qportance so Ion» ^ of this or that argument ¡y <^'-Suments A and B. Here, the places oj a regardless
. ®terminate. But function and argument are comP ''^Present the positions that A and B occupy function].
®®°'®ht:"wu . ^ argument becomes indeterminate, as' °f whether ^ or5each occupies one place or mor i
being representa? ^t^itrary positive integer we take as "^hus, in general, and
P^7°^ition fs fov.r squares', the[re^
«/■e difTerent.
can acQuir/"^'' ^he distinction between fu
tbp f ^^PPe" that ^ {inhaltlich} significa^ rthan two] argumenls are
índeterminate functions of more
of ^^g^^^ent is determínate, c^pressed in a corresponding way.
and the opp
ing. the wholp v or the more and j-d- can read I——" <p(A)
^
at it ^ ^ contení function and arguine/d ^
íf M^e • according to our way of l^o "A has the property <&■''
'^aí ¡n „ f, . {ar I ^(A,B)
places M,h ''^P^oceahií*^^^'^^ ^ symbol, which has so J .^¡¡e
"^""«ionZIl we 'th""T "thls "'"•í'' <=an be translated by "B stands in the ® ^• toobject
Af^^ or "5 is a
A."
funri- ""'her art, by considering U >" tW® '^csult of an application of the proce u expression
badbefore^^^^^c. Sínce the symbol ^ occurs at a pía
consiHp that hvH ^''Saments arise. Thus, fot* ^ ,g" ca^ 0(A) ,
"^^rbon ® ^^^nction lighter tlian carbón dioxi
ther symbols [such as]
a ínf" 1 since we can think of it as of the afg^tnentj-^®
'^''dinaryi is usually 'h® ^''ó'bjéc'- ' which then express . j.gument This s lo
»'»-pp- » Zc'^" consider as a function of j^alysis, which
motive
pa p , "Passive
® [grammatical] i ^^neral that the concept
followed, of functm^
is far more restr.cted tha
ti usage would read ¡t Frege had aiso ad p
thif ' and indeed by the time (lo^-'-l
reading.]
previously regardcd ®24:S5j)j K
^'^onstant, ''^P'^'^able at those positions «W
 T T\
• OEFINITION of the symbols I. DEFINITION OF THE SYMBOLS t31
^t is obvious that, unlike
§n In th generality I — 0{a)
combination of ^ J^í^gement we can always regará the "tese judgements cannot be used to derive less generaljudgements by
of theand
Setter symbols
introdur^^^!!^ rightreplace
of(—— as a function
this argument by o of on «placing Q by something definite. By means of \-r^ 7 ^ÍV'
same Germán Iptto 'Contení stroke a concavity coníaininS "is denied that Xfo) is always a fact whatever we may put m place
as in "f a. This in no way denies that we can specify a meaning A such
t at X{A) would be a fact.
thenth' ^
''^m'>yiake^^{°^'''yj'"'sement that thefunction is afact
symbol, li]{g 0 ¡1,1 ^'®'ter which ¡s used as a func
I function, it can he r "®®'f considered as the argume" "'uans that the case in which —>a-- XM ¡sf
The meanin?''?^" ^ Gorman letter in the manner
Alie rnean;»^ -f "'acunan leiier in tac ü'—-
funied dees not occur. But this in no «^y "emes he occurrence
case in which A-(d) is affirmed and A
s ""Usrestrictionsthñm^ letter is subject only t°
to fj. jnst Seen. X(,A) can be affirmed and yet ^ -.Uout
the o°l''°"°^ing
tteGe Jíl!!''^^^urtibility(§2) of ^a combinat.o if
'^°"°*'ng the con here also we cannot arbitrarily subst.tute for a wdho^^
mu Setter ann stroke must remain intact, Jcopardizing the truth of the judgement, This explam J ¡
upL ^ ^"notion symbol, this circuís / ■^uvity with the Germán letter written in it s neoessa y
^Cope [Gebiet] of the generality signified by t le e ■ Q^j„an
anarh-f"^"'* "^hus fm ° letter are to be , ^ive «'cr cetains its significa,tce only mtlm Us scope^ the
sometfa/^'^l^""iberof,w ^ j^'^Sement, we can ttío^ ^"cr can occur fn^rious scopes in one
caning that we may ascribe to it in one ®copc c ¡nclude that of
We do tÜ^ ^'^erent each less general contení by P
The i^''JZontal
'• ^oncavt the Germán letter,^ "^c other scopes. The scope of one Germán letter can mclude
stroke oontent stroke disappears ag another, as is shown by the example
"uated left of the concavity in
1^0— A{a)
the content ^ — ^(a) B(a, t)
"ShtoX*® ®ay pnt^j"f [the asser(¡yg contení] that ^(a) [u this case, different letters must be uhoscn; ^ rnayjoj^r^^^^^
"únk Of a °°ncavity is P'^ne of a. The horizontal stroke Naturaliy, it is permitted to replace on
its scope by anmher P-tic" This
■ "^^ter yfjJ '"^placed bv stroke of cP(a), and here erent letters standing where diífe . ^j-e permitted only if
definite. ,f th^
it ¡g ^ above about the significa"^® iheT
° see what an expression ^^ncavity followsuontent.
immediately af judgement
.gg the stroke
scope soof that
the
oontent of the whole j^^gement con titules ^
^eans, Th* '"vS^ y/ i ®rman letter. Since, accordmgly, thi . abbreviation
°unur as
as parf , case, I shall i"'™""" the fjlowmg
°t >t: An itaiic letter is always to have as ,ts scope
f a judgement like
h-,— ^ [is Geach's translation.]
X(a).
 DEFINITION of the symbols I. definition of the symbols
whole judgement, and this need not be signiíied by a concavity xu,,
ihus, we cannot. deny
j i»
^ íB/al and affinn A; that is.
e content stroke. If an italic letter occurs in an expression which is I— ^(<í)
not preceded by a judgement strokei® then this expression has no
sense {ist smnhs}. An italic letter may always be replaced by a Germán
occur in thejudgement; when this is done,the Similarly, from
Fnr example,
i-or pv^ ^ instead
he placed
of immediately after the judgement stroke.
can deduce
we may put

""
argument places of XCa).
obvious thatfrom
ifn „a does
, not occur in• .<4. or xíB and 0(a) contains a onlysincein mstead
ana t )
argumentof
places. This case can be reduced to the precedmg ene,
• ..fC /Vi I
H ^(a)
' A
H'e can derive

—— ^

argument pkJe^ofVíl^u''''"
be able to specifv a mpi„- "7^"^ denied, then we mu
""'^úst
■—^2/— í'íal
be able to specifv a
f "^ affirraed,
that then
0{a) we
is denied. Thus, if
should have to
0^
-r-T- A
and (5(a) denied. But becaus ^ would be affirme
Can be converted again into
0^ 0faj
A
tve cannot do this • for th • ^ ^

the case in which Wa1 whatever a may he»

®(«) would be denied and A affirmed is excluded. U o there are stiU more conditional
u' In order to introd ^ similar treatment holds wbe
^trokes.
íie^SnT' F'-'^ee does not have to insist that
aSaS 'ba containing an italic letter. §12. We now consider some combinations of symbols.
emplovs a pr, involves Frío f precede such an expression. Th
ihe coiñent the content strít ^ notation for quantification v^'hi
bere. Thus \htlt ^""^sement stroke therefore re^mVeí die presence f
Hke: "><» /.J. íntrodiipmA¿ hovvever, is not essentially involve . such that «d) would be
^ntire svtnhnj'^
tion could reaT-'i'f " ^bvays ta hav^ • ^^breviation could run somethinS
that assertible content of fh that we can find som®"'.'"®'.!^re'are some things which do
bv thp p. f ti an italíclettpr '^ner appears." Finallv the restric cnied. We can thus transíate i
" "" 'ben this espresXn
^pression 7,™
has no sense."] ™bich is not preceded bQt have the property X"
134 I. DEFINITION OF THE SYMBOLS
I. DEFINITION OF THE SYMBOLS 135
The sense of
denies -^S^n— and can thus be rendered as: "Some A's
a may be. ^-(0) raust always be I— A(a)
are not P's." P (a)
Y", nr something having the property
ínó X" ' that has the property X a X: "There I—M(a)
^(<i} is denied by
denies that no M is a /> and thns nteans: "Sonte* are í's.". or
"It is possibie for a iW to be a P. •
Thtis, we can transíate it: "There are /l's."» Thus we obtain the square of lógica oppo
.0,-^ p/-„) CONTRARY ^S^-pT

s -H í'- «•'
"i""" :;r£""
for ofef" -d ^(a) affirnted.
A I
for and X(„) denied. D
A I
PWwonldhave tobe denied andX(a) denied. R C
We can thus transíate'"Tf «r»m tU'
has the property p" «r "Px ^ property X, then it also
r/.. ca../ -nection^^^^^ ^"A" -/"s."

means: "A meaning cannot h. • Pía) [SUBI CONTRARY —

could both be affirnted" Thi,« ° "lat P(a) and V(a) L— X(a) „
property f does not have the .; transíate: "What has the A utTc to include the case one •
the property X". or "No-P is a X" * The word "some" must always be unde^ onc."
a more lengthy manncr, we could say.

* This 1".^
«ampie, "There exists one A." For
•*■ is a hoiise, then
means; "Therp u ' ' A ^a)
footnote. or is at Icast on. u
house." See §2, [Frege's] second
 H. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT 137
The following derivation would Ürc the reader if he were to trace
it in all its details. Its purpose is only to keep m readiness the answe
n. representation and derivation of to any question about the derivation of a law.
SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT

of introduced in the first chapter several principies

corr^ LZ'7u the laws to which they says:"The case in which ais denied, b is
excluded," This is obvious since a cannot be deni
because íhev form° t u "conceptual notation" the same time. We can also express thejudgement >^ds th s way.
puré thought which^ h' chapter, some judgements of "If a proposition a holds, it holds also m case
™ »r"'j
complex of these inZ
tanatural
.ta -~„p,..i .«.lo."
to deduce the more fon b holds." For example, let a stand for t e p P ^
sum of the angles of the tnangle ABC is two ng ^
bring out the relations of unnecessary, but to for the proposition that the angle ÁB triangle ABC
knowing the laws is nL° ^ J^^gements to one another. Merely obtain the judgement:"If the sum «"he thrch th
how some are imnliriti ^ understanding 'S two right angles, this holds also for the case m wm
ais the number for this formula.
the n,les)rÍel"L'" T'"' "te laws contained in The(l)to the right of r~r^
of them. And it is an aH " ®fbryonic form, the content of all
that it teaches us ín r« of the deductive mode of presentation
Because we cannot [undeveloped] kernel [of content].
that can be established boundless number of laws
for those which, potentíZZ^^ completeness only by a search
must be admitted that the *^thers. Now, of course, it
this particular one. Thus ^^t'on is possible in other ways besides
elucidate all the interronn mode of presentation will n^t
there is yet another serie. T-® thought. Periiaps
addition ofEven
be derived. thosesocontainer-
surh íi ^u^ rules) all the lawswhich (with can
of thought the
by the mode of reduction mterconnections is displayed ^eans;'The case in which
be much facüitated. every other derivation wiH
—

"Wína «V——„ ..

Three of these—formulé o kernel in the following presentation-

(except for the letters) onlv'tn ^^i"equire for their expression
formulas28,3I,and4LconL
Jwo—formulas 52 and 54-^
conditionality. Three-
addition the symbol for negation-
ntj and in one—formula 58 Tk^'" identity of con- denied and
used. 58-the concavity in the content stroke is
TE:
138 II. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT
11, SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT
Therefore, the case in which
is affirmed does not occur." But

means the circumstance that the case in which a is denied, b is is denied and
affirmed, and c is affirmed is excluded. The denial of

's affirmed cannot occur; and the judgement

y hat I ^ ^ is denied and —j— bb isis affirmed. But ths

affirmed. But the

I " ^ means that a is denied and c is affirmed-

— c

Thus, the denial of

¡..i»."I —■" I"""'' "

also express it this way:
means that a is denied. c is affirmed. and
b is affirmed.
"If a proposition {a) is the necessary consequence of tw p P
ib and c), that is if
ftom the affirmation of —,— h .
-|^ * and c.the affirmation of h foHo^s-
Tliat is why the denial of ^

and if tlie first of them

■ ihe necessary consequence
(b) ¡s agam(«)istn
of
consequence
the other(c),then the proposition
the last proposition (c) alone.
implies the denial of example, let ¡c
case is excluded bv the ^^^^.^S^i'mation of b and c. Exactly tbis . 2 each succeedmg term
^ me atiirmation of
^ mean that in a sequence of num
^ greater than the preceding term L.
^ mean that a term M greater han
^ mean that the term N is grea
140 II. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT II. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT 141
Then we obtain the following judgement: expressed in an abbreviated fashion as in §6. In full it would be
written this way:
If from the proposition that ín the number sequence X each
^cceeding term is greater than the preceding one and that a term
is greater than a term L, it can be inferred that the term ¡s
grea er t an L, and if from the proposition that in the number
í ^ succeeding term is greater than the preceding
^eater than L^cangreater than h\
be inferred thenthe
from theproposition
propositionthat
thateach
7^ i®
Tirp/-
preceding one." number sequence Z is greater than the

The 2 on the left

inferencewhichbringTaL?f!/°"°"'''(2) stands to its right. Tb®
fansition from (2) and (1) to (3) foreot to include this tabte l
the original Germán text, Freg®
 II. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT
Now the little table under the 1 serves to make proposition (I) H. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT
niore easily recognizable in the more complex form in whicb it table under (2) means that in
appears here. It says that in [the judgement]

we may put

put in the places of a, b, c the expressions stand.ng to the.r

® From this, we obtain

in place of a and
in place of 6.

L- h.

easily see how (4)follows from this and()

 I. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT
n. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT

example "et explained in §6. As an ~T"'

' A

b be the
wire D ^ current flows through the
^bethecircumstancethatthekeyrisdepressed.
Wethenobtainthejudgement:
a g®'vaniJ'íurr»í magnetized as soon as
tbrough D as soon^aTr™^''"'''^
awon as T is depressed; ® galvanic current floWS

«>»^becomesuragne,izedifris depressed.-
If w
~r
.5) this way: ^usal connections are present, we can express
"If b'
dition for ¿ then c is if c is a sufficient con-
"^isasufficientconditionfor^."

differs from (5) only in that it has two c

As P^^ce of the one condition c.

hiovpH r ^'"^cumstance that the pisto , position,

^ 1./ its leftmost position to its nghtmost P
^ 'he cireumstance that the stopcock ■" P" ^
^359; <=iaruy, since Frece also used H lor ui
146 11. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT II. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT 14^
b mean the circumstance that the density D of the air in the is affirmed is excluded. This can also be expressed thus:"Ifa ptoposi-
cylinder of the air pump is halved; lion is the consequence of two conditions, their order is immat
a mean the circumstance that the height H of a barometer con-
hei^ght of the air pump falls to half of its former
Then we obtain the judgement:
tn a asPJ'oposition
soon as theholds thatDtheofheight
density the airH isofhalved;
the barometer falls
P'°P°sition holds that the density D is halved if the
Dositinn
position and if the stopcock S lefímost position
is in position I; to its rightmost
then it follows that

moved froi^ít'^Vf^ barometer sinks to half if the pistón K js This proposition diífers only immaterially from (5)
the stoncnrF S<3^*is ^m position
me stopcock position
1." to its rightmost position while

and í/are affirSlTdoerLío^^^^^ ^

means the same* anH /"os

()says that the case in which

is denied and
148 II. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT II. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT
We can transíate this formula thus:"If íhe proposition that b occurs
ciiffi occur is a sufíicient condition for a, then b alone is ^
sufficient condition for a."

c d

'i-enttir when several cond-

154 II. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT II. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGH
Then we have the judgement:
Tf from the círcumstance *1,
thatf M
M i<í alive his breathing can his
j. bj-gathe be
inferred, then from the circumstance that he
death can be inferred."
(8):
<l I fl

. í-Qj. then from the

! (27) ^ and c [together] are sufficient con ^ conditions (c), the
We cannot(at the same time) affirm and deny a. of a and the affirmation of
^hial of the other condition can c i

wnicti - Q- ab is■ j
means: "The case in which • j anda —r—
denied — ^^
afíinned does nol occur"TUe» a - i + -r- ^
• The denial of ~~ j-|— b means that

transtttor, from l,t

156 II. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT H. SOME tunOEMENTS OF
occurrence of Ihe obstada b can be inferre
of a togethcr with the occurrence of c.
\-r-n

'1 ^ ineans the denial of the denial, henee the affirmation of

Therefore,a cannot be denied and(at Ihe same time) TT ^ affinne
Dúplex negado affirmat. The denial of denial is afíirmation.

31
aI b
(7):

' flimtcd docs

case in which b is denied, T ^ gccurs, then one of fl or &
Ifaoréoccurs, then ¿ or a occurs. occur. We can express this thus:
^ccürs." L

" —p- b
" ■—I— a
V h
.the occurrence
rp olí'
of b or
^ ís the necessary consequence pot examp p
' ^he necessary consequence of c factor of a pr^
' mean the circumstance that th
a consequenoe the occurrence of a, tbe" Recomes 0;
158 II. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT i-\ir piirE THOUGHT
n. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF P por example,
c mean the circumstance that the second factor of P becomes 0; Jf the cholee is only between a and a, then fl o r^Qoether] exhaust
a mean the circumstance that the product P becomes 0. ístippose] we have to dislinguish two cases \ that
Then we have the judgement: ah the posslbilities. ín pursuing the first, we [case]. Then
« ^curs; the same [is the result] if we pursue the seco
^he proposition a holds.
L comes
^be product P becomes
,then the vanishingO of
in case the firstcan
the product or the second factor
be inferred from
the vanishmg of the second factor."

The affirmation of a denles

the denial of n.
holds not only if.occurs, but also
(41):
O ° Another way of expressing i gquence, then a
a I of c has a as a necessary conseq ^ ^
 n. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT
II. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT
[^""dition for n. The derivation of formula (101) offers an ext
^ ^Pphcation [of this judgcmcnt].

'I' I ^2
Lp í- (47)

I^a proposition this way; "If not only c, but aiso b

tion a holds if6 or c occurs, then the proposi-
distineuished in ■'"^Sement is used where two cases are to be
reduce them tn ^bere more cases occur, we can always
the totalitv o tw.!' the cases as the first and
latter inte two cases as the second. We can divide the
divisions are still pSl'e manner as long as

I ci V
If d'
only ¿ but ako c ¡ra^Sem °'='=""once of b or e, and if ""I
®nt condition for a. then is a sufficient
i_T-r- fid)
162 II. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT 11. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT 163
The case in which the content of c is identical with the content of d places of/because this function occurs also outside the scope of a
an in which/(c) is affirmed and f(d) denied does not occur. This in the judgement.
proposition says that we may replace c everywhere by d, if c
ny(c) c may aiso occur in places other iban the argument places.
Thus,f{d) may slill contain c.

f(d)
f(c)
(c=d}
(8):
f f(d)
^ f(c) f(d)
d (c^d) (c^d)
f(c)
example, let

I bL mean an ostrich;
• , that
1 . is,
-c í,n individual animal belonging to
an ina
The content of c is identical with the con this species;
S(A) mean is a bird.";
content of c.
f{A) mean ^*A can fly."
(c^v)
(53): Then we have the judgement:
f('^) I (A^c) flv then it follows that some
(d =c) "If this ostrich is a bird and cann ^
(9): (c^d) (55) (see §12,[Frege's] 2nd footnote) birds ca •
^ (d^c) see how this judgement since no subject
^ (c^d) ¡ic)
a f(d)
{c^d)
f(c) ^ r/h)

fdtcj (56) fíA)

g(A)
f(c) h(A)

(C=d) (5')

a. Therefore, if — occurs whatever we may understand by

what our senlence cannot be denied. This >s
■ Here, n can occur oniy in the
 I. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT
II. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT
fie)
(9):
^ I f(c)
c I .V
(8):
« f{x)
b g(x) C I A-
(i
^ere a occurs in two scopes. but this aiso
conneclion between them. In ^ the mode ofinference
Which thfminor of iiiference Barbara in the case m ^rite c instead of a. This judgement replaces
(^{a:)) has a particular content. Barbara for the case in which the minor pre
I— h(a)
fhe way in which denvations
Th. are mad "í . ^hich correspond
«'1 be in a position to derive also tbejudgem^j"' here;
'o the other modes of inference. These may suffice as
 n. SOME JUDGEMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT

f(c) ín. SOME TOPICS FROM A GENERAL THEORY

~|— /<(■')
b '
[(-^^f(a))=b]
h
OF SEQUENCES
[(-vS--ría;) = /'J
fia) §23. The following derivations are
how to handle this "conceptual notatio ' ^ ^^uld only
Perhaps, to entirely reveal the advan^g ^ Besides, we
stand out clearíy with more Denken} (regardless of
f(c) see m this example how puré thoug i { ^ ^i^rongh
any content given through die senses content which
an intuition) is able, all by itself, to glance seem to
ansas from its own nature judgements . ^.an compare
possible only on the grounds of some changing air, which
this to condensation by which we succe visible drop-
appears to be nothing to the '=>»e:::ncesTev:.oped in what
forming fluid. The propositions about s q ^hich can
follows far surpass in generahty all simi jf oae wishes
be derivad from any intuition of sequen ■ ¡ntuitive idea of
to consider it more appropriate to ta e a so obtained,
sequences, then he must not forget ^ as the ones given here,
^hich might have somewhat the same w t^gy would have
^ould not state nearly so much as ® , intuition upon which
^alidity only in the domain of the par
they were founded.

S FfocJ
Ffa)
f(t,a)
F(^¡
i ^/rs.xi
'fi ed oreviously since
^his sentence is different from J^fj^ed before; it itself gives
symbols occur in it which have no e equation has the
thedefinition.Itdoesnotsay, "Ther g^ the same
same content as the left side. , " * . a iudgement; and conse-
^ontent.» This sentence is therefore not a j
168 III. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES
.n, GENERAL THEORV OE SEQUENCE
quentiy,to use the Kantian expression, also not a syniheíic judgemef^^' ^ny time from the abbreviaíedform
I make this remark because Kant holds that all judgements of
mathematics are synthetic. Now if(69) were a synthetic judgement, 8/f(a)
the propositions derived from it would be synthetic also. But we can
do without the symbols introduced by this sentence, and thus the i\/(S, «)•
sentence itself as their definition; nothing follows from it whicli could
not also be inferred without it. The only aim of such definitions is to example. cc/m
bnng about an extrinsic simplification by the establishment of ari ./(8,«)
a reviation. Besides, ihey serve to cali special atíention to a par
ticular combination of symbols from the abundance of the possible ^tands for the expression
ones and thereby obtain a firmer grasp [of it] for the imagination
/•Ya)
{die Vorstellmg}} Now, even if the simplification mentioned is
ar y noticeable in the small number ofjudgements presented here,
'F(^)
ave nevertheless adopted this formula to provide an example-
^hilc
convlr^/ (69) is not a judgement, still it is readily ap(a)
snPf-lfi A 'I meaning of the new symbols is
holdR nk' then on; and therefore formula (69)
eet niif ^ ^tit as an analytic one, since we can on Y . H xpression.
dual rnf [in the first place]. This no sense. We sea that the alwa| of
"fY^'oice
doublini formula, is indicated by the ^7^^ompUcated the funotions F ^nd/ ..bitraty ohoi
tions whirh f
The lowp
stroke. Thus, with respect to the deriva
treated as an ordinary judgement.
'¿'Bblished again with certainty apart from
^'■inan letters. [The formula]
the Gera^ here for the first time, are hh^
With them onl 'fT representing no indcpendent conten • -/í'r,^) /tor."
a and S dfovíHpH tu ^ov/er-case Greek letters in the places
same letters are which were previously occupied by t ^ p,
rendered, "J is a resu" ^Jh^reUtd.
's the object of an apphomio ,bears the yjvalent m
letters are not renl ^gam by the same letters and difieren .; bears the/-relation to P. , jaken as eq
of Greek letters L '''' 4'^'Btion to.1." These expressions arete
/-e...
'"""g- a iñ")
S/F(a)
«W'") ^ishereditary
purpose IS to enable us to unambiguously reconstrucí the compl^^^ > translated: "the circumstance the follo« 6
— Fía)
exa can make vererbt] in on accep
this expressi ceptablo^ ^L®'
_______/fb, o)
1' Bau„.Me„,e,berg .ende,this "onr tepresentation-.l fK N) mean the circumstance being-
mean the circumstance that
 III. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES [. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCE
F(y)
Fía;
f íA'..v;
h
Zta] /í.v.a; F^v;
Aitfa) F(xj
S iFía)
a MC8,ct;
ZKt)

is the circumstance that each child of a human being is aiso a human * ./(S.aJ
a /í'S.a;
F(y}
property being a human being is hereditary. FfyJ
lAlthough this example was easy to put into words,] we can see, F (0)
however, that it can become difficult and even impossible to give /í'.v.a;
a rendering m words if very complicated functions occur in the (58)::
places of Fand/ Sentence (69) could be expressed in words this F(y)
F(r) /(A-.y;
fix.D F (A-;
"Jffrom the proposition that b has the property F, whatever b may S tF(a)
tJe, lí can always be inferred that each result ofan appVication ofthe
procedure/m b has the property F,
then Isay:
The property F is hereditary in thef-sequence\" . if X has the
V the property F is hereditary in ^
P^-operty F, and y is a result ofan appl'(^^
^ on y fjas iiie property F.
F(y)
f(^.y)
Fía) 8 Ffu) F(X)
fr^.a) =|( S íF(^)

F(y)
F(y) f(s.y)
a , b /(A-,y; 8 iF(oi)
F(a) F(x)
Ffa)
f(r,a. f(x,
FfF) FíxJ F (A-;
S ,F(<x) S . F(ccJ /í'S.a) 5 iF(<^)

a
a Yfá.oí)
 173
172 III. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES III. GENERAL
THEORY OF SEQUENCES
72 §26.
T— '-'(y)
L— f(x.y)
F(X)
8
o,/ FM
ría/ ^(y)
i( ,
IX J(8.a) f(x,a) S if(xr-yf)
(8):
K
8
(76)
1 F(y)
-|— F(y) (
(X f(8tCt)
f(x.y) f(x,y)
F(x)
8 V F(a) 8 ,F{a)
is the definition of the symbol combina
Z f{Xyy
« ^ f(8,a)
í^^^ich stands on the right. ^With A tnt the
j.gfefdoubling of the
F(x) 0^^
[the reader] to
j'^dgement stroke and to the Greek e
fesult ofan'^apZ in thef-sequence, tfien every
of the procedurefto x has the properíy F,
It would not do to write simply

hF(a)
y . functionofxandy
69
1—
F(a)
n':/■rb,Q) H( of the above expression becau^e in a^^^ „„,side the
fítten out in detail these letters i¿ ^ot be discernible
F(^) «/r8.«; [Sument places, in which case it then i^tter mus
(52): P aces were to be considered argumen P jndicM Y
be marked as such. This is . gf (he fact that o
® niust choose different Índices in vi Qjeek lettefs so
8 F(a) ^®nts might be the same. For this, w® ^ which
b® sure to have a choice, so that for tn
8 FU) [ ^f(8,^}
d T— F{a) P , . expressi®"' w® ^
I— /íb,
i aj ■"eludes within itself a simüarly ncluded The
« f(8,a) (75)
m F(^) f f to mark the argument places ^;^„,,uding oniy
yy from the way we mark thos® of^ signific"''
and difference ofthe Greek letters
Iffrom the proposition that h /» " "t the expression y
it can be inferred that everv r f P^operty F, whatever b ntay
to b has the property F th appUcation of the procedurcj ^ '' . a s exprassiunl
sequence. ^ t e property F is hereditary in the f" [¡■es®•cating
sameanyletters can occur ""'■j'[®J°tters'withín th® ®*Pt®®''°"
relation whatever to [
174 III. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES ni. GENERAL consid.red
We transíate jf(x,,y0) in accordance with §10, means:
Werent functions of the argument F.{l ) ' Fishereditary
.difthe property
by 7 follows ,Tc in the/-sequence", a way of speaking which, to be íf y follows X in thef'Sequence. a J ¡ication ofthepro-
sure, is possible only so long as the function/is determined. Accord- tn the f-sequence; and y f¡as the property F.
ingly, in words (76) can be expressed something like this: ceduref to x has the property t: tnen y
Iffrom the two propositions, thaí every result of an appHc^^'^" ,
of the proceduref to x has the property F, and that the proparty F
is hereditary in the fsequence, it can be inferred, whatever F tnay
be, that y has the property F; S j'F(a)
then I say: i 1/(5.«7
yfollows X in thef-sequence^ or'x precedes y in thef-sequence ■ _____________ ^f(>^ryV

"^(y) later notation of F23

^^'tch from to '=') it would look like tms
5fa)
a; f(Xy-y^} 68' . h\
5

® fih.'x)
■encc) would then be as follows:
(68): 2 7"be substitutions (listed horizontally for conve
Q &
T) F(y)
h jL
riy) f ^ 7
Fía) — r/v)
71 Z/f.VyO>)
a J '
rro; r(y)
f(x,a) •rt«i
/ú-,a) Yf.v.ü)
í) F(a)
■g rí«)
ír oL^f(S,'x} " ,.,irueequivalence
f the definitionally
;:^X'esubstitutions in 68', corredness.
and detachment o no wayhis con^ry
I fíxyyfi)
C ¡: r Ids 77 with flawless '°n) To state th
to treating Fíy) as a functi {wh¡^ he M n
t)re? P ® thought (see ^23, P- j rnach nery avaj »
'S suchI reniind [theon
readerl of ordering-in-a-sequenceg' de\,*'^ ' however, required the n j.jevel foaed^ "cjjtot's Introd ,^},g
a sequence as beads a strin •!P°ssibil¡ties, Among these are not on.X te? distingúish first- f^vín ¿eijenoort (in the f syste^^
F7 S be easily «solved. Van 88 in 8
* ucaas on a . .. rtinuin; aiw •- .
"lerging of severa! branches nT ®^ibit, but a!so
"^.ergmg also branching like a family tr '
;
^urucklaufen}.[Bauer-CngeL^.w
[Bauer-Cnge ¿e^.W^ranslation
'"^''"elikeofself-linking Coi supposing tha (Sce footno
[ To prove 77, Precre
anal /g 1^f"^'^^on of this
this last term.1 tC T""' 'totano,,
"l°"gh he does not yetFrege
havenwer con
sepárate Iheni.
nalogous second-order Ss
princinlV last^8term.] ,
itself. He needs
P^noiple (calí it 68') ¡nvolving quantiíication ove-" the Editoras Introduction above.)j
 I. general theory of sequences
UI. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES
'(<i) Since in (74) y occurs only in
'(X,ÜJ ^Ffy)
Fía) — jQ sil thc
f(X,a; ^^Placing the y by the Germán letter n transíate
8 ¡F(ctj can immedíately precede this express.on. We
i \,/75.a^ yX has a property F which is
(y)
Fíy)
yfoUows X in thef-sequence, then y has ¡e
For example, let F be the property bemg a that
P^°«dure/be the decreasing of a heap of beans by
5 jFfa)
,t.. heap a except for
i f(8,x) the case that b contains all beans ft»» « .,io„ „e would
F(a)
and nothing else but this. Then from gt all would be
tain the result that a single bean or eve j. ^^3^5] were
f r.Y,aj
5 lF(a}
^ heap of beans. if the property of h^g ^7/„>ersally the case
^'feditary in the/-sequence. However,th.s is n ¡^determinató-
i i/YS,^; ° there are certoin a's for which.f;;^¿°;,ible [or den.able]
^(y) content "
If ¡^(^)

^ra;
S iff"}

<% \ f(hyO.)
81 l__-r—t— FfW
P

S F(")
,

f(x,^) ^(x) i
F(a) ______ F(X)
f(x,a)
S ¡F(<x) F(y) ,
« yí(8,oc) tf(xy,yp>
i \ f{8,%) /gO) '^f(Xy,y^) p

F(x)
8 F(<^)
F(y)
i W"'
F(x)
S iFfcíJ

i ^8l)
induction is based upon tbisTJ®^ Ipyed it start"
.r Irst to use mathematical induction. He
 III. general theory of sequences I. GENERAL THEORY QF SEQUENCES
F(y)
Fia)
fi{y} /(x,a)
fny) 6 F('x)
« h(x}

^ffXy.y'íjW
« f(^,a)
g(x)
/í{xj
Fiy)
« I F(y¡ S Ff<x)
(36);: /i('x)
/•Ya;
^ S(x) f(xA) a /fS,aJ
a h(x) gfyJ Fíal
^'fyJ f(x,a)
^ ^fíS.a)

« /(S.aJ
F(z)
fiyr-^
FJy) F(y) h F(a)
^ .1' h 'Fcx)
|(fíh.yy} F(a)
í
a /"("Siaj ka. F(a)
f(x,a)
tf(xryp)
Fix) p
fiXA)
f/ y .• Fi'z)
p(y) f'í Xy,y
F(y) f(yF^)
|/^AV-V F(=) h F(«)
f(yr-)
h F(3í)
'^I(vrá,a; Ff'x) Fiy)
d F(XÍ a y^á.aJ 5 FM
1
"Demonstratio rationum
Opera, \o\. 1, Geneva, e/c"
1744n' ^'"uditorum, pp. 360-1 (reprinted in bis (73)::
 ni. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES ni. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES 181
F(z)
)—r- _ Fiz) /O'.z)
'I—T-T—I
I 5 Fff^)
y
/(.r.r)
ñ FC^)
S F(ac)
i ^775.2)
L^Sr-]— f(q)
i Fía)
I—/f-v.aJ
Fía) f(x,a)
, Ifi7) fíy--) (88)
/L>'V'-v^;
/9
vation of this proposition in words will read something If'®'
WLet>,foIIow^inthe/-sequence;
the pro^rty aPP'ication of the procedure/to X have >S(y)
W)Let the properiy f be hereditary in lhe/-sequence. ^ía)
rom these assumptíons it follows according to (85) that f(x,a)
5 pU) = -T fi^yy^)
p

(S) y has the property F.

(O Let í be a result of an application of the procedure/to y- i /rs.a:)
follows from (y),(S)^ according to (73)^ that Z fí^Y^y^)
^ has the property F. ^(yJ diy)
íííoJ ^(a)
Therefore:
■f(x,a) ffXA)
S Fia.) 8 ÍS(a)
y, which fo¡lows°xTn the proceduref to an obje^J^^
opplication of the nm ri ^ and if every result oj i
^ has property F. I ifr-^y,y0)
/-rz; (5)- 'f(Xy.y^)
L- f(y.z}
S F(ol)
d(y) ^(y)
[^/(8.!x) ^(a)
fix.a)
'5 (a)
f(x.a)
F(<^)
' fíx,a) S '5H S &(«/'

(15): i ^/(S.") i
error. The minor premisl aSaUy uIedT(73^^^^ ^ typograp^^"^^*
 ni. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES III. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES
63
sr.v)
60®
/ ^
50-/ 5(a)
a Í5
X y
Si'oí U^-Af
/í-v.a) fCrj rfv) s S(A)
f(x,r) s rhj
S d(oc)
I í^'"'
i yYS.aJ
.(r, 1( 1 ^/-fS,aJ
^frJ
« /rs.a;
(90): /rv.v; rraj S íjCaY
I /C-v.y)
I I
1 •
^y 7r/v V )
I y'.I/i/ b 5
/(x.aj
i ^/íS,<x)
díQj
I—f(x.y) (9'^ /!x-,aj
ihe propoTuonT^ denvation of proposition (91) in words. From
application of the procedure/to x has the
5(v) 50'J
5 ÍÍM S
'/has thf ^ be, that
dure/to ^ ^ result of an application of the proce- 1 i ^/YS.o:)
5faJ SfaJ fQ
that proposition(a)and the proposition ííx.aj f{x,aj
be,that in the/-sequence, whatever í5
^nre/to 5 if y is a result of an appiication of the proce-
of the clause, "every result of an ¡n words unintenigi|'^^^ changes
Every proposition which follows Iiolds: Property g"; but this makes the ^nvatjC) .^
follows íhis X in íhTfsequenc^^^ "Procedme f to an object X assumption that the original was a yp , / n ¡t 60')
nre here Included in the text.l rpouires a principie (cali
. r Similar lo the derivation of 77, '"".f p'^Vofple ta^duesti
'nvolving quantification ovar fimction . f (^)
on would .
h-^|/r.vvvivJ 60' h-] rTZff¡f(P)
(53): ^ /r.v,v) i - Qt¡ /
f f
Np f m
d "

—— ^f(zyy^} pp f (^)

(i X f{y,y) ía rnn as follows:

c z .92) The substitutions in this case would % r(P)
' (x=')
* With respect to the m — f MpPi^ 7— ^
'y;;, l— ftxA)

¡ZZ ■" " procedure is ¿ Í° " ''""sequent. Note that the prese"' ndordereonflnement principé
fté dS,"; ,™ 's it. erro Hcijenoort (in the Editor «eeabove, §27. footnote 2.) Frege also uses asee
Mn ptL' Sr.he't" here.]
° of this Clause, Frege had two occurrences
ni. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES III. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES
, HtT"
fíy.-)
'' ^f(-^yy^)
ja^r-yf) O
'' f(y.=)
5f--;
5 .Sí'a'

a ^J(S.c)
w, w«-»/'*''"triír *"""""
follows X in thef-sequence,foUows a'
f(x.a) jfíxr"^)
fM
y í>
Zf(xy.ip)
P

~ ^(z¡ S I Z/fXy.a^)
"(y) If(Xy.rf)
I
-l

r
" /cs.tr;
f(x,a)
P

f(y.-)

The properíy offollowifiS ^ m ihef-sequence

i 1 fM
is hereditary in the

i f~sequence.
^(a) í,
f(x,a)
lf(x,,y^)
p

f(y'-)
(84): ^ lf(Xy,^)
FÍD IffXyXn) P

tf(yy^^)

Zf(Xy.^> Zf(XY^y^)

Zf(Xy.>f) ¡f.follo^^syinthef-^'l"'""'
P
and if
f(y.z) If yfollows X in thef'sequence,
then zfollows x in thef-seqnence.
 ni. general theory of sequences III. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES
i> (Z^X)
f(=.y)
■f r-Vv-'/sj
f f-'^y,:^) |/r-s-V

f(z.y)

and the introduction of new symbols. formu

^/r-vr^/í^
y y. í(~.y)
(z^x)
be trfin 1 '*'
belenes /-sequence beginning^^^'^,^gj
this way ■^"^^'^"ence ending with z." In words, the , (96, 92)..

ÍJ,"''""™' ^ in the f-sequcnce, the" ¡ "'^■ y

z
z X
..
V
_
z X f(Z,v)
^naing jv/V/i 2," .Wr/i -v"; y V

(102)

US give here the derivation of (102) m words.

f92) every resuit 01
\f(^yi^f¡) If 2 is identical with a-, íhen .v in the/-sequence.
application of the procedure/ o to (96), eve^
Ifresult
^ follows X in the /-=7"^;„«dure / to z follows x m the
of an application of the p
/-sequence. ...
p rom these two propositions it-.f.ilnws ' accordmgto(lOl)-
¡yn every result
P' (1' Ifz belongs to thef-sequence the f-sequence.
of an appHcation of the procedure
r . Whhresard.0 this las.
 III. general theory of sequences III. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES -
Whatever follows x in ¡he f-sequence belongs to thef-sequence egm
I—r—, f -- "ing wiíh X.

IÜ6 I ^ /S
|./r.vv.-7^ I - • L í/r-rXii)
|y(W
>' .- - I

(^^x)
(S=z)
í f(=y>y8)
■~T—
~/fXy=l!)
X f(yy)
jf(Xy.:il) ''^f{Zy,V^)
i f(-y'y^)
(x^z) f(y''')
f'-xí jf(=y^y^)
Xf(ZyyV^)
P

r.vs--^
íf(^y^y^)
lfíS,,-fí)
l f(Xy=fl> (102)::
r
h(zyy^)
p

f(y,v)
^í/(sr-
r
P J
«f n08) íii
Let US give here the derivation according
(^^X) ZffxyP ■„ Mong. .0 */-«-" S;"r"S p'"-"Cú
lo (102), evíij mil "¿"J, .cootdins " '™L"Sl.o«
fi'
follows z in the /-sequence.
ofanapplicationoftheprocedure/ belongs to the/
beginning with z.
Therefore; . .„ z, then every result
1 fiXy'P
(^^X) P' , pf an appUcation oj the p
X beginning with z.
o T/'v

' '' 1 . '. '

 III. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES 191
III. general theory of sequences Tile following is Ihc derivation ol'(in) in words.
ir^i belongs to the/-sequence beginning with
to (108), every result of an applicat.on rf the procedurey y
-

y
X

b f(b.al
belongs to the/-sequence beginning wit
Therefore, every result of an z in the
belongs to the y^sequence beginning >
/-sequence.
5 /l/rAV'V Thus:
•ti, T thpn every result
If y belongs to the f-sequence ío the f-sequence
Thc ofan appUcation of the proceduref to y^
iti to the f-sequence beginning beginning wUh z, or precedes z i" 'b^f'

,I f/r-r-,' 105 H
L—
í^/ÍS.ccJ
-r-

P
^ y
y m lf(yy"^)
p (:^x)
h ,
^f(Xy.oi3> i~mx)

f(y^^) jfí-'^'y^jí)

p lf(=y^X,f
/(y,") ífíZy,X^)
lf(íy4> {:=x)
rf(ttyA'^}
^(yy)
^ ¡
j/íh'-^K' =cyr-->-ví)

f(yy) (104)::
h(K.
 III. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES
ni. general theory of sequences IfU can be iafccrcdfi^ ''l be, /bal c/c/y
ZT'afríX/^J^.p/.i/ba./,. <■ « - ■•
then I say:
Lp l
"/ is a many-one procedure.
y , (1'''
(r P 1 S
Til f I f(t.a¡^ i/íM
S is the derivation of this formula ¡n words: I— __ .ííM.
elong to the/-sequence beginning with z. ^ (68): b.—r-vi (a = x)
/(P) U fasD f(h.a)
^ in ^
f(b,a) fiK'')
J'M ?

/■sequenc» begb' n^'' ^with ;c. according to (112), ^ belongs t

o®gmning S
I/í'8,€j

•^"Sequence bepíiír^
g nning with ;r, or itfoHows
followsz inthat z belongs
the/-sequence.
^^erefore: f(y.a)
f(b.G) /fy.-vj
^^f-sÍZl^^^f-se,uence
bemning M,h x, be^i
X belonof
o, xnfo/Ls
.7 „
nin, .Ukz in the,ken ^ "et^. t ^jntisS
f(b, s) 8
ifa.€)
€
^f(S.€)
fa^xj
(a=x) /Cy.«^
/íy.xj
fl y-^)
(a ^x)
ííM
ÍM

■f(b,Q) = Jf{8,€)
(58):: {a=x)
Q b fCy.aJ
f(r) ^
^ transíate g ("as.v)
jir.a) 8

W'*thpn- ^/(S, e) .f(r. .-<)

(Í15) a th ^
' '=an be re¿ P^cedure/is many-one {eh"
;^SZ4.
nere i f«„
^'"hisway: 8248691
* »011o«, t.. .
^^Furth
I ®^"er-MengeIberg uses "sins'^
 III. general theory of sequences III. general theory of sequences 195

til ^--x)
fly,a) /V.v.,.a^; I f'{Xy,W^)
P
f(y\x) fl\\x} A
8
8 /('r-aj
|/Ov.V
l/rs,ej
c f(y\x)
e
s 8
(d^x) ^ ^ f(^,€ ) \f(8x)
ft y

f a — x) jf(Xy,m0) ^f(Xy,m^)
fiy^a) p

(r^x) I a 55 x)
f(y^r)
f(\\x) P

\f(8.€} f(y^
(20): (. (110);:
^ (a^x) p
íf(^r"y ^f[yw"ii)
¡i p

5 /(}■■") f(y>^J
f()■,-■<)
S ,
e

(U2):: ^ , L... giv. h,. «..«.r—<■» "ZZ

P
ffy.")
, "m., , I.
»<«), — »' ■" •"""
,, „
" .f
f(y\^)
^ \ Therefore, according to r^enuence beginning with x.
if(M the procedure f to y belongs to 6
Íí(yr'^'
y ,
/O'."
Ifxisa result ofan app¡ifa"°" ^' roceZefto y belongs to
then every result of an «/'/'{'f'"^pormula 122.)
the f-sequence beginníPg ^yttn x-1
I
 .ÚD

III. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES 197

ni. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES
Let m follow y in the/-sequence.
Then from (110) it follows that if every result of an
lf(my,xp)
, ^ PJ"ocedure/to y belongs to the/-sequcnce bcginning
a m e ongs to the/-sequence beginning with x. p
jf(xy,mp}
This togetherwith (122) shows that
^f(yy>nj^)
'v ^'PPlicationbeginning
e ongs to the/-sequence of the many-one
with .v. procedure/'" ffy'X)
S
Thus:
l/M

y ^PpUcation of the many-one f

beg.nn^ng „uh X.(Formula 12^)
The following is the derivaüon of this formula in words:
L.,, b..„.n of."PP»»"»"
/to y.

Let m follow y in the/-sequence.

o
1/(8,íj
.
Then,accordingto(I24).mhelongstothe/.se.uencehesinning
With X.

Consequently, accordmg to tni4)í ^ belongs to thc/-sequence

Asequence.
^ I beginning with m; or m foUows x m the; q
r
We can also express this:
f(y,x} Zffyy,'"f> ^ belongs to the/-sequeacebeginnmgw.thm,
fy. or precedes m m
f(y,x) the/-sequence.
S ,
I/ÍS,()
€ Therefore:
yjifthe procedurefis many-one,
Ifmfollows y in procedurefto ^
y
^ í then every result ofan apphc pj-^cedes m in the f- í"
r , the f-sequence beginning ^tt
(114):;
 ni. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES III. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES

lf(my,x^)
lf(yy.n^fi)
P

/(}■,■■<)
8
&f(niy.yp)

P
1/(5.; (1
y^,
' ñ j
p
fíXy^m^)

f(y,x}
8
m,.) |/Ov."V^ In words, (129) reads this way:
,/í ifv belongs to thef-seguence
If the proceduref is many-one, ar . ^nce; then every resulí
beginning with m, or precedes mm J thef-seguence
oí an application of the
.. .. ...) beginning with m, or precedes mm
 III. general theory of sequences
ni. general theory of sequences

y_ f(S,a)

0 3
y i/rs.e;
0^
|/í'my.i^;
5 p
y
I/Y<S.€Í
^/ov'^y
y
0 /fS.a; -^/l'-Vy
P

m.) ^/Í'-V'V
s
\ /r5.«; y (5,€; 3
I/íS,e;
e

P■
Z/fmyjjsJ
Ifíay.mn) p

/ÍS.aJ 0 |/í;v-»V ^/O'y'V

fíb.a) p

f/r-VyJp^ IfíXy.y^l
^ffniyPfi) p

Zf(by.f>}^)

\f(8,oc)
^" fímy.r^
|/r-
y /rs,a; zf(niy.y^)
5

^ords,(131-. |/rr,.,v \f(Xy,y§)

:f{Xy,nt^)
Procedur. .
í/ie/í the property ^
in orpreceding m in theí'''"^
202 ni. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES 111. GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES
In words, this proposition reads this way:
3 62 . 21 47 48 . 75
49 70 71
íf the proceduref is many-one, and if m aml y follow x in the 5 66 . 71
86 48 101 71 72
j-sequence; íhen y belongs to the f-sequence beginning with m, or 11
24
74
84
.
. 103 49 50 72 73
precedes m in the f-sequence. 26 96 . 119 50 51 . 74
27 9 10 123 51 128 73 87
36 11 20 121 52 53 74 81
125 . 57 75 97
3 19 .
44 . 75 . 109
in ^ shows where use is made of ene foru^ola 4
39
21
37
21
47 . 89 . 131
105 76 77
whip^ of another. It can be used to look up t!ie ways 73 56 22 23
55 . 89
employed.
requently a formula has been used. We can also learn froni.it b® ^ 79 . 61 23 48
25
53
. 92 77 78
4 117 24
130 . 63 54 55 . 85
5
56 78 79
was derivé" number stands to the right of the [thin] 6 . 132 25 111 55
104 . 110
left [of the tMn formula whose number stands to 7
9
10
11
30
112
26
27
27
42 56 57 79 80
29 57 68 80 81
12 12 13 28
33 . 100 81 82
niore tha^oni"i)ofq are used herc
repeated the numeráis when a formula was used
to make the tablc easier to rcad.]
14
16 .
15
16 29 30 58 59 .
60 82
84
83
18 24 30 59 .
32 ■ 61 83 133
22 35 31
33 . 62 84 98
25 49 32 67 85 86
29 60 33 34 .
46 .
72 86 87
34 . 85 . 118 87 88
45 127 34 35 •
36 ■ 120 88 95
80 13 14 . _ 89 90
15 35 40 59
90 14 93 90 91
7 15 88 36 37 60
38 61 65 •
32 16 17 .
83 62 63 91 92
67 18 - 64 92 102
106 ■
94 . 22 37
39 63
91 93 94
107 17 50 38
113 78 39 40 64 65
66 95
II
96
19 40 43 65
9 18 — 96 97
10 20 41 42 66 ¿o , 102
23 42 43 67
12
44 68 70 97 98
17 51 43 77 98 --
64 44 45 •
26 .
38
53 19
82 45
20 46
46
47 69
.
%
 APPLICATIONS of the "CONCEPTUAL NOTATION 205
begriff} that I took as a basis [for my "conceptual notation"], we
can regard
M+1 = V

..^APPLICATIONS of the as a function of u and v and can therefore view it as a particular case
CONCEPTUAL NOTATION'" of/(«, v). Accordingly

[essay] several examples are to be given of bo^ |(0,+ l = Oí)

my "con'r ^ notation".
conceptual gcometric relations can be expressed with the he p means that a belongs to the sequence which
wr begins with O and anses
been invented that the symbols employed "jj from a constant increase by 1, namely
neral mpa
general mean.ngs
' tbat they^or
suffice
eachforparticular
rendering very
case,diverse relaüoDS-
but have 0,1,2, 3,4...
^ AB^CD
Henee, a is a positiva whole number.
Theu wt of points AB and CD-
straight Une circumstance that the point D hes i y (0^+1= a,)
"^^'cdetennmedby points 5 and Cthisway:
—\ (D = %) ís therefore the expression
'— (BD-BH) whole number. Similarly,
-ru
tile
I h#» affirmation
nc:_ r»r+!, (C¿)=C'«U; v. • ffOitt
_ _«vi

die congnience nf ti! ^°"tent of this formula would tb® ^(0,+rf=bp)

<=ongmeGceofthr.
can be deduced P°'"ts 5/) andwhateverand
^ i^iay
■^is the same point as D; means that a belongs to the sequence
can find ab«! i ífs O, á, 2dy 3í/-
points with B and f° than D whích form^
respectively, would be congruent with ^ ^nd thus is a múltiple of d.
deternuned by*"! and only when D lies in the straig^
P'ane determinrd bv^,! [the fact] that a point bes ib;ntb« ^ ^í'2y+l=V
' türee points. A'
y _ {t)^a)

^ signify tbat V u_| ^^ fdí"^ says that « is divisible by nene oi

of the numbcrs
niore general^conp /-sequence beginning with x-
xr This is FR ^ . ^Pi^ion of function [alígemeinerer 2. 3,4,
Jenaische Gesellschafi
206 APPLICATIONS OF THE "CONCEPTUAL NOTATION'
APPLICATIONS OF THE "CONCEPTUAL NOTATION
except by itself. If we add further that a is a posUive whole number»
We must still say that such whole numbers ff ^e omit
negation stroke in front of the whole, then we o a
then we obtain in

pj_ (3U = a'- + l>-+''+8"'

n~ ^(Oy+t>=a^j
L|(0,,+ l=V
■^ (2y+ l
|(Oy+l = V
1 (h = aj
— |(Ov+' = V'
P

:^(0-,+ l=9^)

T* „ circumstance that a is a prime nuinber- ,

renders^thp^tl^^"lonstrated how the "conceptual jg 'he denial of the circumstance that a, sD, , ' a^ are whole at
numbers whichot
least ene
number e representad theory that each positive
as the sum of four squares. whol^ have 30 as the sum of their squares; aguares is
c, g is not a whole number, or uilgemeinbeits^^^<^
Theequation 30 = aHbHe^+9» >2-Ln2 not 30, Now, if we place S^neraliziug s whole:
dees not say [universal quantifiers] for a, b, 9

+ +
(2) that thpm^' ^ whole numbers, I—T—1—
"ttherearesuchnumbers.
¿(0>.+ I=^^^
?
________
{30 = a^ + b'- 4-e2 +g')
'j(Oy+^
^(0,+ l-a^)
|(0^+l = b^)
(Oy+ 1 =',3) in this way, the sense "f 1 "• ® '^^jjcíooot be
®Jguifies the circumstance that, ^jieir sq j numbers
hey are positive whole numbers, ^^, p^sitrve who of
0; in other words, that this is exaotly the
^""■this denotes ■ ^ne sum of whose squares is
"• 8, and that 30 is the sum of the sq^
' 9 are positive whole numbers.
208 APPLICATIONS OF THE "CONCEPTUAL NOTATION
what we wish to express. Therefore, if we place thc iiegation stroke
e ore the whole, we then achieve our goal. Thus appendix i

—I—j—j—p- (30 - a» + b'+c'+9"'

I— ^(Oy 4-1 = a,í)
I ¿(Ov + I -b^í)
ñ
I ¿(Q..+ l =erf)
í(Or -i l =%ti)
ft
«rcumstance that the number 30 is "rf
®n<iing "able^^i"^ T'^p Possibility. whioh
REVIEWS OF THE CONCEPTUAL NOTATION
BY FREGE'S CONTEMPORARIES
A. Review of Frege's Cowce/ímfl/AoW"»" ^y Bericht
Mathematik und Physik, Ist ser. 63 (187^3, l
CCLII, pp. 44-5. ^^
The author wishes to rescue uiathcmatical log gyjjjbols.
,» íordinary]laiiguagebyrepIac¡ngconcepts an language the
Thc deficiency is especially evident in Vj^¡tj^diosewhichserveoniy
rfo«f ^.ipmpntsareintermingie Hktinctions re-
--w.ucuiyuiipuiuuKci^u.www^.
essentinlN/

[corred] sentence construction log

. unimportani ui^—
pcseníial ones.
W two denial T- "representable", is thus ^^use quired by grammar conceal and disguise snedankeninhalte) are sym
one does not ^0^^ denia^ [[n the present work], thought con c thought ^
generalized- anH tt, ^"^"^^diately after the other. The fir bolized by a letter apiece. The mo ® . j (he conditional, the e
that is imnncc-K-r obtain the generahty .^^¿s related [to others]-the affirmation of the thought).^
possibility. ' '^^^^eupon, the denial of impossibi i V tive assertion (as opposed to the mere p _ jj^p-ietters -¡on
on^is symbolized by means of «trokes- substituí om^
^hole numher oxpress the proposition that th®^ substitutivity and to desígnate ,he peculiar ^ Xhe
must be renla^^^ ^ t*epresented as the sum of fo^^ If we wish to evalúate this und than the ongm P,
^lustbe added thT ^ symbol, say a; and the execmion_gives
execution gives aa nmre
more favourab
f^^^iurabiee^ ^dmits^
^ o is a positive whole number: de mentions a "puré thought ,a ¡s based solely up author
disregarding the particular state at fi^t that
^hich all knowledge rests . Frorn g^gots ^ahd fot ^g^gs to
—I—p- (íj=a +b-+« considers the symbol arrangements j j^ganzenLebetis)
;deas Of all of Hfe {... Ocdanken^^^
hse the mathematical modes of
for thes^
j-gmains comp
,,g
proceed
I— ~ (0^4-1 = 0;?^
^istake, inherited from formal log . author do ^^sgr-
— z(-0,+1=y [author's] work and has no influenc ^ \,ntent but even
^ith preconceived ideas, but sets Xtareempty of ^at the
^ I f0v+I=«4 ^«ion; he does not begin with of mathemafcs,
''^stricts his actual goal to spoo^ho t ^ ínvented form^^
= (-0.^ + 1 = 9d^ objectlve therefore always temams m by the the
Now we doubt that anything ha j^athematit^l leamed
¿ fO,. + I = "l¡> '^hguage itself. To us, the n^uchmorevaluu
^hthor directed his work seems to he
ttom this [effort] and in tum taugm l
before the whole presents this the"^ 8243501
208 APPLICATIONS OF THE "CONCEPTUAL NOTATION"
befnrí^il^'^u
before the whole, we thenTherefore,
achieve ourifgoal
we place
Thusthc negation stroke
—r-^Q^b^e„o
^ \—I—I—n~ (30 - Q« + bH-c»+g«)
'— í(Oy-h\ = ai)
^ £(Ov + l =b^í)
¿(O,. + I = e^)
|(üv
Wawe//¿ar}
ending "able"a^thT^^
Í6arí"n7tt number
squares. 30 is which
Possibility, "representable
lies m
by two denials whLu ^ "representable", is thus expíes
one dees not foiim ■ ° cancel each other out becau
generalized- and .. after the other. The first denia
is. impoLibil °biain the generality of den¿
possibility. ^iiweupon, the denial of impossibility y®'
^bole number can\rr proposition that each
30 must be replaced t the sum of four squares,^
be added that ^^^bol, say and the conditi^
a positive whole number:
rí7=Q^+b- + e"+ 9-''
^ (Oy + 1 - a^)
|roy+]=v
= (0^+ 1 = e^)
|(0y + I = 9^;
í (0^+1 = a^)
assertion""®"" before the whole presents this theo
appendix i
REVIEWS of the conceptual NOTATION
BY frege's contemporaries
A- Review of Frege's Co/irept«a/AíoWW" by sericht
^othematik undPhysik, Ist ser. 63(18 }>
CCLII, pp. 44-5. ^
^be author vvishes to rescue niathcniatical logic
crdinary]language by replacing concepts an e language the
c deficíency is especially evídcnt ^ serve oniy
^sentially important elements are interming e í . ^ disíinctions re-
sentence construction-logically
^ü'red by grammar conceal and disguise t e . ^^^^¡^^j,i„}ia¡íe] are sym-
the present work], thought contents(
by a letter apiece. Thc mode in í;;^',„ditional, the defini-
ated [to others]—the affirmation and ■ pf the thought), an
jc assertion (as opposcd to the mere '¡ ^-letters serve t»/"^
sutTÍ' '^"^bolized
bstitutivity and tobydesígnate
means ofargument
strokes. Func^
pl substituí
fact is th om^
If We wish to evalúate this undertakmg, original
^
mentions a "puré thought',and the Proface upon t
!"^®^t-ding the particular state of thmgs, ^ at first , aín of
all knowledge rests". From this ^\,hd for the dom^n
fbe symbol arrangements he P Lebetis}^
üsp bfe {das Gcdankenbereic i jj^ese. the
mist í "^^Ihematical modes of thoug complete X
[antí ' inherited from formal logic, ^ obser-
WitK ^"*1 bas no influence o jj,ost gven
Vatio That are empty so that the
he does not begin with forms that ^athemat.es,
objeT? soal toremains mth
^ctíve therefore always 'Xmatical.^^y the m ted fon"^^
the
we doubt that anything has hc^thematical Hehasleam®^
fro,^ ^'t-ected his work seems to b
^Ihis [effort]and in turn taught[oth
P^tinghis
®24350i P
 APPENDIX I REVIEWS OF THE CONCEPTUAL NOTATION 211
clear to him that in a judgement of mathematics thc distinction of subject soon dispeis this. When the author calis his "conceptual notation" "a
an attribute is useless; for, as he himself cxplains, when he first started formula language modeiled upon that of arithmetic", this refers more to
wor ing he held the opposite vicw. Even though this obscrsation seems thc fundamenta! ideas of thc book, and not to that artificial similarity
o vious, it appears to have been unnoticed by all logicians up to now. with algebra which is attalncd through the ínadmissible apprehension of a
whose merits in mathematical logic are praised by concept as thc sum of its characteristic marks {Merkmale}} Ncvertheless,
un er m his article T. LVI p. 26, nevcrthcless commits thc error of it would have been dcsirablc for the author to have gene into more detail
inguis ing subject and predícate. Thc author characterizes this mistake nbout his position rcgarding thcse (above mcntíoned) efforts. Furthermore,
more generally by pointing out that logic up to now has adhered too cailing the "conceptual notation" "a formula language of puré thought
e y o [ordinary]language and grammar,a criticism which is supportcd could obviousiy fríghlcn off those, like the revlewer, who cannot believe in
tile cxistence of a piirc thought which would be possible wlthout a definite
^ characterizes thc biased dcpcndencc upon content. ít must be said, llierefore, that [the apparent difficulty] here is only
thmking of most logicians. Thc author reveáis by his
1.nolds
ij sway°over the word. that he is one of the few for whom thought
a matter of a partially unfortunate cholee of expression. The author
delineates his tttsk so cicarly that no doubt can persíst about thejustiti-
appears not only in thc fundamental cation of his project. There are obviousiy certain groups of concepts whose
contents have such a general naturc that they can be treated 'n a way simii^
¡r/e but is also evidcnt in the to that of general concepts of mathematics. Now the project of [deyelopmg
suGeestiv* and pioneerlng,
as suggestive ® the partlculars.
is worth while On thc wholc, the book, a formula language arising from an investigation only
H. of scquence (thercfore from a mathematical inqmry) sliou . .¡on"
"pon such concepts. The author intends that his
B. Review of the Conceptual Notation by K. Lasswitz, Jenaer 1"= -iPPiied at first only in arithmetic; then ''"S the
•''nd finally in general wherever a special valué must be p
Literaturzeitung, 6(1879), pp. 248-9. ^ahdity of the method of P™°f "conceptual notation"
b® author very aptiy explains the relation o ..__..one and the eye;
Jo [ordinaryj language with a comparison fbe mi
[means°of]^ex°^essi°oTo^^^ [ordinary]language is a most¡nadequate latter,which
becausc
evident in LeihnÍ7'
theselain^Ír,
and thus the wish (which already
^ Pasigraphy) that thinking be freed from oasc with it 'canofadapt
the range
to the ofmostits yari
•'•PP'f'l^"tces
ed has a great
Penonty over the microscope. Of course, unnoticed only
need for "Lfnurn^"' "^ain and again. But obviousiy. we pPt it reveáis many imperfections, which usi scientific
instruments of reasoLr.r^^^
parales} which far sur
'V.!
^'Senthiunliche Functioninmg des Dettkap ^oause of its intímate connection with menta i ■ olution, the eye
Now EnJush 1 logic of cid. ^"■■Poaes place strong requiremcnts upon is perfecdy
have derived from th^^' building upon him, Pi-oves to be inadequate. On the other *¡™u,eless for all others.
holding for concepts algebra the purely logical ' "ted for such purposes; but, for 'Ws yary P rticular scientific
{^egriffsrechmmp\ nr. ? based a conceptual calcu
and E. Schroder Germany, the works of R. Grassmann
namely the apprehenc"" r ' ^bese investigations ^vas
the quantification {oll^nrfí ^■'"bgement as an equation with the help °
deduction as a [sor S ' f the apprehension of
great doubt is present hpr ^ l^"bon. Certainly, a onesidedness which causo
° 'Pduce those who are discouraged by ^ b® [dting] the u^al
in their relation to dpH "^ture and formation of concep "^ttlityPfofthought (and wish to excuse
such efforts) Phe booM;
not to shun the !f¿tfptual notahon .tsd
from the com™,Urfi (which may not be separated Who plan at first to make "^%°"':,„Xignifican.renta^
It is thus '"^"ffla^tly considered.
attack this problem'in Present work an attempt to he- '"i and
^ epistemologicalof^P^y
concepts. rforexample]. tha aPP
gives cause for scepticism at^fi"! ^F14,§53.J
first, but a closer examination of the boo
V For Frege's account of characteristic mar
212 REVIEWS OF THE CONCEPTUAL NOTATION
appendtx i
After a repeated study of Frege's
«h°l'= which is Indcpcndcnt of the linguis"^ beginning that the diligencc the
hehaselaboratedhissystcmdeserves
Wehope that the author's
' circulation among the intel-
thp (T,'?" °i ^"'1 predícate is a conclusión which confirnis an
™ obtaincd in somc olhcr way. efforts may havc thorough study a application
aUty neEatinn'rit'"® ""'^«''«adons [in this book]concerning c""'''" ¿ lectuals; and wc also do not doub contribiite to the
aspeciallv n í- to concepta like "or","and", and so o") within the limits which he himself i He does not claim to have
SlsT theconccpt of function. We canno S» improvement or assurance ofscient.fic method H^ d.^s
itseTf'
Chapter m "g' t"
-1 construction of thc ••00000?^
attcntion to the applications o
spoken new truths or advanccd quantita iv
According to remarks in the Pre
^ book,
^-(^tation" pr "formula language
This bonk ™,yoP'"from a General Thcory of Scquences . Fregc happened to invent his j to judgements of arithmetíc
result of long, t^L' thought through. It is ¡i^ose of puré thought" through in the domain of arithmetíc,
interested as a'val u?"^ liighiy recommendcd to and the authority of the laws of puré *ougM" ..,,,„ence" to
— ® to the theory of thinking- and cspeclally through the elfort to re [ordinary] language stoo
K, LassWIT^
that of "logical ordering". The ° U" chaln of deduction.
in the way of the strong demand f®' ,. ¡^^te this difficulty. It is to
The "conceptual
render notation" Is suppose
the tLughtpurely;orif this demand tsjunattainable ideal for and
ZeítKhrm ^""ceptual Notaüon by C. Th. external means of cxpression [that ''' . ¡ng and Hmit the discrepancia
(1880).pp.¿2_^''''=''''''^TP'to%íe und Sprachwissenschajh tnevertheless] yleld the best ™,¿guaranteethevalidityofacham
In Germany thp , • Th® to the unavoidable and harmless. It shou g „g eye^
LeibnÍ2ian-\Vo]g Philosophy nnd mathcmatics is of deduction and reveal the structure of tto '"eS¿
The "conceptual notation" has only a tat dtsp nsaW
^^Plestheinfluence^f shows in its method and scope dees not make the eye d'^P"""tual notation" does not make
sophy and mathemaf Kant compared the methods o of the two in ordiniuy lifc, '2 deseription superfl"""
and ideas fro^.;" ^¡s earliest works and then bor ^ [ordinary] language and usua purposes- "Ifitfuld s .j.fj,ough
Philosophicai concp r Principal work. He owes the bes P devised merely for particular ^^hat it was mean o
the unión S'"' contempiation of mathemat.cS^I^V^ some degree", then "hasacco P .^„y,/««-wl"ch i
fn Psycholn sciences is most proniinent m .th® it, thc Leibnizian idea «ff 22notation-
US a"n "tnthenSiV^^ Philosophical speculations a ^^^ughj IS a gigantic [task], but cheniical mo . This
Diir tiT' creation ""dimensional space. Last ye through the arithmetic, geo that of logi®^ .physical
L? modelled ,' """PpP'Pal notation",a"formula lanS ^^¡ch should be fuifilled in a new .j^^hon in mathema i rnodlfi-
and'^'" ^d in n formula language of arithmetic' ^gs "conceptual notation" is to n ^^¿yancement of ¡ts creator,
impres i" 'lP"We origin. and which malees « '¿nttt' inquines and also Thus, its scope, acco
B^tn,'^''''''^P°ncavi
svmk'1 .'"^tsconcavíf: ■ vertical and ho^^^¡„p
'^"8 and short, vertical au- - cation of certain logical theo " . -g¡ve boundaries. . ^scientific
is confined to definite, not to su®®®
Effn !'
t' 'Merman snaky lines;
Unes; its double colon an tion, special symbols must be added few sym
beene^
beenen í°
l? phiio<¡
phi!ocr.^i,'
,^^nequaUys„,„„ Pbilosophy with ^"d italic large and small letters- ^0
if, at ^^'^ssful Fin tk^ mathematics and^ ,.,w
vice versa h^^^ uie domain under consideration-
to exhibit, derive and solve p p
,^gjcal ded" . g the basic
discusses the . „^t he expresses
catión^' '^víewer w ^^d it would[thus]beunderst In the first part of lus '.¡pn"; then in the ^t; and [finallyJ.
Thé hit '""PonanowTd '' "PProach with a ¿ertain mistas symbols of the "conceptual n of ^ ueral theory of
mathemaf^^^^dphiS^J^^
nottoT Philosophv^^ "^^^^^"^^^dinacomplctelyong»"^
such misgivings. The union bbet^'^^y by meaos of the notation som J propositions o second
that whenf in the third part, he develop t is mtr ^ jism withm
^^at one of made f i but experience cer
ordering-in-a^equence. Only^ invented sym
part demonstrates the emp
toitsnrn task,
^ ^vi^nZ^'"
sciencp ° the fronr
two there is the imp®"and-
the relationship .
a false direction.
 214
. appendix i REVIEWS OF THE CONCEPTUAL NOTATION 215
wgic; and the thi rf
A díscussíon of the i rcaJm of mathematícs. drawn downward. It can vary in length accordíng to need; and a new
berichte der Jenaisch ^ ^ Frcgc's postscript^ in the Sitziing^' content stroke with its own particular letters can be attached to the ríght
January I879) is HpcT für Medicin imd Natuncissenschaft of its lower end. If severa! conditional strokes belong to one judgement
can go ¡nto it her ^ revicw in a mathematical journal. stroke, then all of the content strokes attached to these are just long
^Pplicability {LeistuMo ^ shcds light upon the range o enough so that they all end [on the right-hand side] at the same imaginary
vertical line.
Prege uses two Icin/ ^ of the new "conceptual notation". (4) The fourth basic symbol is that of negation, which consists of a smdl
to expresa a general ° ^y^ibols for bis "conceptual notation":
[by a determínate determínate concept which is rcplacea vertical stroke attached to the underside of the content stroke. (In fact, in
the printing of the book, an inverted [numeral] one was used; but flus does
equivoca!, determina ñame] in each particular case; and un not appear to be the author's intention. In any case, the mv^ed numer
"^atics also makes thi«! symbols for lógica! operations. ' is not displeasing to the eye.) When the negation syinbol is attached to the
^eat advantage, above least to some degree; and it has content stroke, this means that the attached content
^uctureofa verycomnl
'tten, exhibits the "^^'«'ng immediately
formula. clear toexpression,
The mathematical the eye t The last three symbols are (5) that of «?''ff
^selves and their comh* ^'ements and their unión, the p^rt^ symbols, and (7) that oí generality. The symbol for equality of content.
one used also in mathematies, eonsists of three
Fregean notatín u structure. that Unes placed between two letters which are suppose
ggp °®^y one sense unequivocal, determinate symbols US conceptual content. 'n'® "
h accomplishes ^ relatively small number. ^ usual one of matheinatiK. dependent expression of
first two svmK f : maticalonesiniteitsigmfi«.no^^ of ae
bínd!"'
bind!^^ ^0"2ontal
^°"2ontal str'^t^^^ vertical judgemení
judgement ^
íhe middle nf.i,_ which ran k. of idei iyorstelluf;'
also attached SSS: aS. « "rSi» .¿.w .«.»«•
form • and -""•"A
lymbXr" geñf r X' ' c ^^^^^^^
toto requirem •'"^^ement strokehowever,
'^'te judgement, can be of ch^^f^
must content stroke. It opens upward ,
from an argument of the
^ ^ concavity
/^nd the generality thus covers
thecont^? predícate isdron^^^í symbols. The usual distmctJ follows directly after x by omitting the concavity [and
fW f ís C0LI Greek letter situated to the ri^t the content of the whole judgement},
to this ea ofthe iud^o whole, unified conceptúa c the accompanying Germán lette J, rgnlaced by an italíc letter.
Perished Jr to comnlet rnust mentally add' gdeS symbols followingand
Thejudgement thecontent
contentsteokewAaft^^^^^^
stro e f.jnction 0(A), which contains
The sentence,
Also, Freop a t>f Archimpw^^"^^'" ^ould be rendered in t' j" only the one argument A, function 5) contains two argu-
^ohooMogig \T^- "°t have the el oonquest of Syracuse is py property <?." On the other hand, i . jbe í'relation to A" or
Ostión)as m« "P'fOfsal, parH- . ^ttioMion of judgemcnts as ^ .^¡í' ments, A and B, then its mean'ng is - ^poa A." A judgement
"°'°f ad»r''^"^"álysró singular], interpreting this i "B is the result of an appUcaUon or m p _ function is the case,
mole or V''^"tseiv«fí=<f"<=0Ptual oontent ofjudgemo^sto' eontaining the symbol fot general^ means.
• ^0most im '"^otence r,„pÍ "'^o limits himself to one singl® whatever we take its argument ® * . ^^-^be simple symbols. Some o
There is a large number of com content stroke accompani^
gttached to the ""^t^ter,¡s "t® one which gives the whole ,¡^0 these have already been is seldom lacking, and [it is
'' ■'Ti s is P» "^Pt stroke \ ^'"""'iiional stroke, a thin ver other symbols; the judgement
"V^-S J • is included ° ® judgement str missing] only where a mere comp .^ ^.^{¡00. if two judgements an
Confinéis® eíainis to m ^asüsh translation in the presea and not a judgement, is under ^ ,s tod,
are eonneeted by the condihona^ smote- "f "t®
though he aho uses then A cannot be denied. T u®; ^ j ^ j, denied, while is
binationsofAand5:theposs.bihtythat
»J them, or faiis to rcalize that they ar
216
^ APPENDIX i REVIEWS OF THE CONCEPTUAL
This brief description of Frege's symbols P potation.
^nied,^f¿ hmh"f possibilitics; (1) ^ and 5 are both to glvc at Icast an idea of his intcntions . expressed [above] is
The possible comh- 's afiirmcd, B is dcnicd. It ¡s obvious that the content of the prop content can be
symbolarethese'fhf»i"ff'^"^ conditional strokc and thc negalion ^ery mcagre and that a somewhat richer ^'". ^jnore particular onw;
or in both places - and^ " ohl-aÍr,«.^ only
'juuiinea 1.. 1by rcpiacing
i.,«í«rT th/> peneral SymDOi:» transition nr
ut can do
—
both. Throucii th^' on thc uppcr or lower content stroke or but the Fregean notation is not able to pro various possible
relations and conrpnf^ y^fious possibilities, a wholc series of judgcmen so only to a llmítcd cxtent. To be abe ... ¡gaboutallFregec^do]
enumérate them herp "p can be exprcsscd, biit wc shaH no relations between conditional j„Mfonvard logic woul gain
nogical] connection«5 ó up combinatlons of strokcs, chains o 's certainly not worthless; but '^'Lxpandinthisdirectionm^
combination of i" many dificrent ways. considerably if it wcre to improve its too many thi ^
relations of suhnl? ""idi'ionality, negation, and generaliV iustly be doubted. For his purposes. meagre] content.
Judgenients can be renH ™ "^""'rary, subcontrary, and contradicW »n formal logic and detract even more ^ of judgements
in the selna 1 Who does not agree that the usual ítsdf, but
notation", by using on^' 'he help of his artificial ene, which categorizes, J .¿mtelianclassificaüonofrn
evelops 68 Proposition, ^'u '^ristotelian modo of infercnce,' F"" content;and who does not know that j.(.markable that ®
how that they are ¡nde' herivation from each other is ofinfcrence is pretty superfluous. An ^vell-known auth
these thoughts without at least men 10 catisfactory
ogi^yfron,therelat¡on?"r «"P^rience and discoverablc "^ade those objections long ago. exccption of tbe un
2 'hought. These [68 logical propos'''"";] I do not doubt, however, that. -'th h f ¡s complete. One m
Pron"'^^ "''rdJ"'-
P™P°smons(or8,if pan 2'^"'=ral
himselftheory of sequcnccs
designates 9 of tlic wlne
68 los'^, classification [ofjudgements], ^ constructively. ^ jn
not only criticizc, one must contr character of the
he ntost inrportam.
^y^S'ble tin w S propositionsmcntioned
as examplesin theof Pre^^'"
statemP""' band,] De Morgan discovered Üie pointed
transitivity and commutativity, ' ^ ^ an idea classifio^bon
analyse the properties
«naiyse the properties of
ot the
me copula an^ ^
A ^ correct
correct

(2) If°f'°"'^'''°Ws.° "holds aiso in case an arbitrar/ P^' oot by Kant. but incorrectly worked be an advance-
of judgements, which at ^b^ ^ ^¡^ference,^ul j^gic
olassification
olasslficatínn of
nf concepts and m rcjected. Tb® ^ decreased,
rcíected. fb® Hpcreased,
fodow^ P™Positions 6 and c; n^ent of logic which should not be^ not be
(3)'' « a proposition
n? 'hisf,.,,lX?c
^ ^ alone. ,.,h ^vhich has becn much too meagm vhich Fregc makes
but increased. ^ ^¡th the comments v ^^matics have
Also:rcannot
Also, I cannot completely mental concepts °«fj;—eauence
^„.m-a-sequence
about the relations which the fu ^^ncept of or concept of
to each
to other. I7 .o^not
cannot aeree
agree th
that tn let ,tnai
mg-in-a-sequence.
^ ^nuence.
be reduced to that of '^^'í^g^tigations mto ¡g a secondary one,
number can be advanced by 1 jgfing-ín-a-seque number is
den"r K3) and "Th^ On the contrary, the concept of^ ^^f^hile the con^P^neral concept of
(7) w «he sanie ir" combíned by the expressio"' dependent upon thc oon^ept o however,
íi ^epbee c ""'"® «"h^ation". Pnmary mathematical one-J"^,_¡nc {logische
t^^miary mathematicai {logis^"^
' FolgT,^of causaiuy "T;
tb»"rthP
all. The concept of logical order oon^pt
confpt itd [th
nte to be more closely correlato These though
ooncept of ordering-in-a-seque in c . ^ ^
<"=¿hio:7«®ymbol '"e ninth P^°Position
p . ore th^ conceptoflog¡calordering]baso^y^^^^^ share the part /
ra p is really nothinS
]i T^^ootnote?.. , [® The two corresponding Oc^jog".]
eftme¿'-e ,hj, review.] fo' Fnglish words share the part

the san¡e as the identity

"Jnderstand that >s"]
sign of mathematics-J
 218
appendix i
REVIEWS OF THE CONCEPTUAL Aror.4r/OJV 219
which are impossible to know, or to make compromises
a detailed poTem^c isT considercd and so little worked out, tliat to mention the fact that new aims, which emerge as des^abk along the
way, may perhaps turn out to be achlevable in unexpec e r ^„i2tmg
existing^torks^ oní
Jevons, Schrñripr
"o "oticc at all of the prcviously
subjcct. I mean the investigations of B^o e,
I bciievc I do not depart from the histoncal
the probiem in the following way mUand,s ™
exactly the same'
logical calculus—
and othcrs who—partiy sccking to
Frege, and partiy wishing to cstablish
ficlds Of knowledge). t. «4 i—
Simple, complefely determínate an (categoríes) icith
offormulasanHc, occupicd thcmscivcs with the establishmen fewest possible fundamental concepts {
cerned, what f opcrations. So far as MacColl is co - clearly delimited extensions. . to refer to an analogue which
and his (mentioner^n ^th kinship of Frcge's In considering an ideal, it is no ^ comparison already employed
Language") ¡s that í ^ducational Times undcr the titic "Symtj has already been used. Thus, I say, how composite numbers
casily solving somn hclp of his symbols, [MacColl] succeeds by Leibniz (if I remember also, if you wiU,
Perhaps the utiiiJl? integral and probability calcuius. arise from prime numbers through constructed {ziisammen-
adaptable, and partlv Previous works,valué
whichto are simP ' how in a similar way the natural nu numbers through the
His work [however] not be without the auth ^ gesetzi} in general from the ^ f^rm the decimal system. Inci-
^■nly does not lack obviously so much more original and
■ack importance relations of multiplication and ^ works have been published which
Berlín
dentally, in recent times severa! b/"® . g^tal concepts {Kategorien}.
concern themselves with listing ic granted only a minor v^ue so
C. Th. Micha^i-'^ Nevertheless, such schematizations » omitted that, in fact,
long as the proof (which I find concepts which those works
Review of Frege's r ^ r ZeU' through the combination of the follow—thus also so long as
'">"■1/1 fiir Math Notation by E. Schrbder, ^ lay down, all the remaining conc p come into
investigation lacks [an accoun ^ ^re governed.
very unos ' ^5 (1880). pp. 81-94.' question and by which laws the l^test one now un
thinkerw¡thaptre¡'°3';~°.b''i™sly the original work of an Even if, in spiíe of all earher not yet been reahzed m a
"«uíallvT M °f mind-pursues ahimself coursebas'o 'bvh discussion, the idea of a universa hone
^ nearly satisfactory sense; it is s contrary, there is a '
Leib Th ^ ^ympathctic, since he undertaking has not come to ig • ¡ scientific techmca
rea'hw' '"="1 of a „ work promiscs to advance ¡„ though remote, that by by developing
Philosn'h" the .'anguage, which is still very faf . ^¡iiiafl' { wlssenscl,aftnd,e -^'^rTrm foundation by of phUosophical
facrt 'mportance laid upon it by tliat brd ^ language. we may gam a
someday bccome poss ble í ^
the confusa
^^hose confli
SS"®'"otat!on7S^^^ language, charactcristic, controversies, termmologie , generally aJmost
by ir '^^«8 to &»,-,/,} does not exist eve" is to be mainly attnbuted ( rphe blame mus forced to
CLr°^''^^ottosav ir 'he beginning
7"'dbe,rr;;;;^«arisk whata compi
to state [what is to bected nj definiteness of the basic
such idea entirely upon the imperfection indícate in
^'Snificant?' find n ^ Wstory teaches, in the further P ^ argüe from the outset. , notation'] whicn ¡ ¡Notation,
^bward Fn modify the ^.tapb^ { Given the sense [of 'cono P Frege's titlj correspond at
Point unim'^
""'"^Pbrtant ^crhaps
or ov?h ? succeeded in advancing su pprt^b
considering the niost the above remarks, it must ® ^1 ^hat the íitle b®
promises too much—ino^re P j^^stead of leaning
^ universal
himself)
[' Thistrans, ■ ® all to the content [of the l^bo^^ unknown to the
characteristic, the present wo
of the one by V. H- ,pud»an's.urnofpl-»-'
rema- and H PP- c'eeiu'"^
they were ^ WhTr^" ^ 'nterpretation or wordmg j
® ^'so noted to give theimportant
reader thedifferences
benefit ofofbotb ie>vs
220
REVIEWS of the CONCEPrt/^X NOT^riON 221
appendix i Howevcr, the comment (which I shall "concep-
Sfnn In thc la«er most eíTectively to the correction o °P'"* Booie's formula lan-
tual noíation" dees not d>lfer ^ e granted.
very credit:,hi^^^v advance which I should consider guage as the Jena reviewer (pe P "function" and
acconiDlishpH h' ^ attcmpts had not alrcady With the exception of what is heginnmg on page 55 [Part IH of
more adequate ^ "doubtlcssly "generality" and up to the supp establishment of a formula
Frege's book], the book is deyotcd presenting
comments refrcshingly written and also rich in perceptiva language, which essential y coi and which certamly m no
nearly all thp c pertinent; and I rcad with genuine juclgements and Booie's caicu
example the ^'^ciissions which accompany Frege's tlicory. way achieves more. . "conceptual notation" could be
such unoualU^^^^ On the other hand, I can pa^s no With rcgard to its major con e , Boolean formula language.
itself. Neverthele^ "P°" ^he major contcnt—the formula '-n considered actually a íranscrtp i different beyond recog-
derive muchstimulat^onh"'^^v/orking
mterestcdtlirough
in thethc
methodoJogy of With regard to its form, though, ^ it ^as without
that it merits a rppf^ book;and I stateexp nition—and not to its " „^ently-ali too independently.
-nd in partsel' °"r ^t^dy. in spitc of the numero^ doubt developed completely 'udependen 3^^,,an one
First of all I conciV^'^-"^ which now I shall also objectively put fofW If the author's notation does ^ ¿¡gadvantage. I think that to anyo
isolated a manner aní"^ ^ shortcoming that the book is presented m which eludcd me, it certainly s , j^ptation] must above j
ments that have bppn
of Boole), but evpn
serious conncction with ac >
^ essentially similar dírcctions (namely
who is familiar with both, f® = »'';°„Vin,e„tionally.
impression of hiding
but
oí and genuine analogies whic
author makes which ^hem entirely. The only comment ^ ficially"—themany beautiful, rea , 1 AHth
is the statement on n concerned with [Booie's achievem formula language naturally MoácWed Upon
^^oidedthoseefforts to^';\°^ reads. "X have stn I„ the subtitle. the boob —
metical and logical fnr ^ an artificial similarity (between thc metió", I bnd
advertised program, b
which a muob5 ofmoretheoo^
n^
„t
appears to
^nceptasthesumofitTh^
®ven by itself Icnds a íanguages)^marks
through the interpretation
{Merkmale}r This -^g
ooi^rmation in other wav^'" P'^obability to the supposition—whic previous works. If, -^g ¡etters m both ca ,
° those efforts" simnlv h"" author has an erroneous loW oP consist of nothing more ^ use - criticaUy
It may be mentioned h lacks knowledgc of them. j^e me this does not sufficie y . ^ asscrtions an ¡j^g known
^s^Kurt Lasswitz 2 ^ has been revicwed by sor^ Now in order to prove j cannot help this
(1879), No. 18, PP- ts, examine the formula calcifius. appendbí is to
the basic concepts of elsewhere, an ex referring to
slan^ allowinp kindiy written review on many ¡jig discipline, which I have desa^^ other side, I want
be found at the end [of the P expressed by understanding what
Qj. orroneous conception even further my book (6).« in v.ew of .gsential
to explain here the few thmg introduce the calculus
within a'spec 'i'^"'^^ "onesided", just as follows.
As a propaedeutic_ forr the logical
,„atiifo^^ ¡dentitat
.u metical von Gebieten
discipline whose
develoñr tha, field naturally is. It fa'."' of identity of domains of ^ mat e ^ ^d correct-
emer Mannigfam^c^ g^^ited
■>«therupon\"°' spec¡fica¡ív'f°
upon "H u ° «admis.^ ^ furnished, Boolean theory
doubtfu,. apprehension of the concepf"or ^ aH ís,r.'íí«—
t® Schroder assu my argument below). [S Dudman-s tum of
[•Numeráis in parentheses t
üte book list at «he end of th
'•»'2iíí e," "«. -í ISÍ"'
' ;sj
 222
REVIEWS OF THE CONCEPTUAL NOTATION 223
leads APPENDIX I Of speeial note is the first of fbesc aaording to whteh
entirely to the Present logical one, which corresponds whieh are "eontained" {en.MeU) (included
Let there be a mo [calculating] tcchniquc is concerned. (as ab is included in a) may thinking about regions of
Points of an a?bS K example the [elements]of the Once one has convinced oneseii s y j'
enrJ "nboundcd plañe. Lct.ers, such planes—of the validity of the formulas
manifold, thus—for « ^'"'^'trary domains which belong entirely to thi a,l=a, a+0 = a. a-0 =». "+1 = '
plañe. These domainc"^ ^'^ample—to speak generally, any parts of t . . í. ij ¡n arithmetic).* and then the theorems
identieal. considercd cqual only when they (only the first three of which hold
concerned with negation, , , ,n „ u
so used to assoSu!t°i"« disregarded.(The malliematician'' a.a. = 0, a+a.-l.t ^(n\=^a" (a.b)x¿by
= a,+b,,
Bode and(«+6)i = ). and
Jevons(l
duantity that for a beain """" of 'be number representing
«o fr« húmelffrom th1 g °k:!" '=^''="1"^ a conscious eñbrt is necess^ (the latter two of which were ^ r rassmann), one has acquired every-
. i^borlously instilled in 'bough it is not given to him by o®"! „ first completely expressed ® follows and indeed many beautiful
"self. but notíhe noX" "«"oe, o stands for the planar reg.o» thing necessary to understand what
its size.) , applications of the logical calcu u . .. |g converted into the proper
negation" of a by mea ® ® 7" manifold is symbolized by I; «bilo Now. the preeeding Ptopaedcut|C the eafcate
oomplementofain,h^^"'.f,0. logical ealculus—more preciM y»' , i <jf the concept is kept in ™n )
2^oId if it tnamfoid. Osymbolizes
stands for athesupposed
domaindomain
which of
«s 'b^ of concepts (where the extensión . „ {Classen} of those indivi u
if one takes a, 6, ... as r^feiTing ^ence which consUtjite
a^ment,„ eommon[tv|t|,tul^"'®.''"PPosed domain] has absolutc^^jt which fall under the concepts to manifold of
Now'^f"* of the latter "oonifold] and henee actualiy does no their extensión. Then, m ^ the sphere of any of e co
objects of thought which investigation (if necessary oo e
Mch otí''®'""" oommon^ thi.""r''r^'°°'' ^"terf^' related to the domain
••«mverse
Logical niultiph«hon^^^^^^^^^
are adri
of "loti
f by a+Á rt domain] in which [a and W jb]
íhen it!"""^^'ood]that domain in which correspondsoftoCiscourse"
the so-calleor of one[ofcon«pt
coUective unión set ]. by<,í,rdme
andher.t
the
assoéSr" "«"bPliSól'ovtdent that the operations. thus ezpla'"^a [logieal] addition «-rresponds to ^ ~mpletely dtsm^^
foUowing fíbulas®'bhmetica]"o o'c the
justsame
as commutah
ñame,^ ^
Now, there ^^f r^^pt. Ais». « sh^'^be
expresa• P®f^tions with ''contenr [i.e. ,, calculas has to .. ¿oes allow the
Q{bc) f t
that the above [descrié ^ ^^at. N®^®^beto ^ ^^^g^rfaUy
with its eventual future appear m a
of this th " c+(h+c)= s greatest part of formal logic
olear light. is motivated m '. yt,tedly definite
'bot^roo°^^^®''®'sSro°^^^
iost in 00^?''°"® stand in ''P omitted
íerms. in producís
Moreover, it ¡s of^( iba'
n®' That onesidedness,
immediate aim—by the ac . ¡ j^any concepts
to whichwith
Wundt(^ '®P^jj, this^ould
way
®*Presscdint'^°P"on (as in,.^'"b"t've relation to each other, ¡t is ♦Theehoieeofthesymbol;jj»¿«„en;ion^fc™^^^^
^"«formulas: " «™bmetic). but reciprocally. Thus, as deprlve us also of the —^la would the" . gil finite ® j above
®-(A+e) =,, the fourth, less familiar, formum unsuitabte ^ ^
this symbol would of probab.hues
dentl^' "balte the I ®'"f o+(é.c)= (a+b).(''+'^' ^p- symbol 1, to which he o J discip
^Píorict'Í^C.trbon. which I had aiso madc in"^" this, the applications
undoubtedly of onot^
urges retent ^ laim-—aappoint which I m
a Product canV*"" p®" OQual ñ fo'- ')• .efltia'f.M t Wundt (9) has recently these
®orems 1 only if t^ben each one of its term lit sider on another occasio • .,^^o|d deprive us o
®*Pressed in ,u ^'so equals I. Similar'^' [' Dudman incorrectly has
o+oA. '""»® formulas. formulas".]
"•"Oh hay, "■ o(o+é)
■' "P anaiogt,. aa — a, a^ o ,hv-p'ipS'
'b arithmetic, hold as immediat®'''
 225

224
REVIEWS OF THE CONCEPTUAL NOTATION
appendix i introduced purely non^«"tion^y m OTder W^ep^ ^
content [intensión] at aU. So it is for most truth or falsehood of a P™P^b° ^j^^coU. among others, does it this
l negation; for cxample, as H. Lotzeí does, the intervening time segments,
way.)
to ah^trnot +1,^' human mlnd it remains an ever unfulfiHable tas With the first of the schemata.
man—thnc fr^ characteristics from everything which is not a
them into th<» melancholy, and sulphuric acid—to combm
mto the concept "non-man".
T"
' b
comZn notation" actually has almost nothing "J ^ L c ^
is, with the Bool^ ^he logical calculus just characterizcd, .*• «. When fu>ann} b holds, then a also holds
tCh ~r oíconcepts; but it ceítainly does have some- Frege
(if not represents the propositben
actually necessarily, lo • ^^ j^two equations,
¿he notation
the first of
of
ments.§ The follow^* second part, the Boolean calculus of ju the logical calculus, a,b^^ ^f/holi but at the same time a does not
of the
also applicable to th Á
consideration brings us to this [second part
of domains {Calcul mit Gebiet^ which asserts that the case in ¿ ^gs in which a hol^
hold does not occur; the secón ® ^so, one equation would
appIicabletoperiod<ínft°"^^^"
but simply taken a«i ifof intervals
again on not
these are a straight
thoughtline;
ofasit i®-'"® j or b does not hold are the on y P ^ ^ (more precisely, duality { ppo-
tained in them or (dasses) of the (individual) momcnts derivable from the other through neJtion
Every investigauln ^ . ..e í/í/ow}), since (í7i¿>)x - . g author represents the ° '
constantly taken as fnim??^ certain presuppositions whi .
gation. Now, m ordpr ^^°ughout the entire course of the m
^ possible, let i stand r° etemity out of the question here ^
srtions of an investimti ^Sment during which the pr®'
® considered judsem^^ conducted are satisfied. Then let
{ 'houptungen] Enelish^ i^rlheile) (propositions {Aiissascn), which do not correspond wi ^ f^rther applicatious m is
<« soon «l^ivalent "s,áteme,Us") (8). and at the is correct, is in accordance w g^gertion represente ^ {wenn} and
meanuigtaklngpw^ "¡"'"f"formulas or calcúlales (a small In additíon, the wording ° ^ of "always. when"
'0Ȓ ore true. Thereun,> "egments during which these giren P g misleading because of th ^ "in case g^ye, here yield
the laws«of-Positíon
the logiJ?o°"'" frP-"formulas
^Pte^t-through what hasor been said that
equations ob^. "when" {wann} ("^ soo
{immer dann, wenn), oto)
often mt
jy, reason, it P
instructive to
(j,g asser-
r Phe-directionaí'- • ^"nultaneous holding and ""ft®® ^¡ir an essentiaUypointforamom®n'.
dwellonthe diflérent KsehemaissupP^dto^
W ^^ggt f-p b
whlrh follow
r^"^edingen))of 'fP''cat¡on (conditional)
most diverse {dasThe
propositions. einee'''
apP¿j ^gps
tP tion I—— ag (that is.
is, tnar® ^
^n^rP®"PfWb!í'' «ntiy; and we can now prot^^ptc ... - 0). which is
tf .r. r«nresented , uoids. More
end I t^'nvation ntu culminates with the section jj,¡s
schém^"^'
P ®®ta. fet wtroduce a h""® ^"dgements of Puré
<*>'« and explain some ofthe Thought
simplest ofth®•®"',i,or'«
abov!®® by I . to t"® the
onlypossibility of bi c (th^ ^hich
thepossibilitiesrem ^¿gcan+íc+bi®i-
be su ' 'y hold. Conse-
(It is u . '—r— b th-it L notation hy a = I 'I" whi®hs.inr®n.®fn.
° fious that the latt ^°ld;® that is, that bt == ^¡o b® Now, for all these possi i» gquation
quently, this is expressed y =
t £oe> tvays of writing it C""'
i?>a'titfe.'874.
•■^Placed by'«Tf^^OTect in tu-
^
b ave
Q
8243501
should
^^dnian is 5^®^tal Notatilf actually
"«eation stroke here.]
226 REVIEWS OF THE CONCEPTUAL NOTATION 227
appendix i
in other words ^ \ unintended interpretation of thc^'^^®°'^ h^fy"Sr^to later
ai{b+c{)= O, an imputation of"generality;-about which, by the way, tn
oralso
c = 1.
(p. 19) makcs some veiy P";""'"'^e'ihe disjuncüve"or"- namely,
Now,in order to represent, for examp , author has to use the
negation"of '^'stake of the author is only that, basically, he omits the to state that o holds or b holds, bol ool both-ib. author
schema
ft^Z '
' cquation. Thus, «, b,c O ¡s assigned as the
•"S. the schema, sincc according to the [assigned] n
dMied".)? 'he case In which e is affirmed, but b and n are
proposition- ea the meaning of the [third] schema
_ ^ dependent upen c, then a holds.", Which deflniteiy appears ciumsy
writing:
com^ «o the Booiean mode of
abi-\-Oib — ^
(which, proDerlv'i'^^'j'^ Pdtresponds to the author's second
to conmion sen^ thí?v °'''^ ''h<=""^ould seem incon<» °of Some Judgments of Puré
to'otakentogether; sentence is fuily synonymous with the foH From the section ''^^P^^^-Justration:
Thought" I cite an example as an
Nr. 2
"If6 holds, a holds." and
"If c does not hold, a holds."
^hd, yetj this is the
^^e,since in fact the equation
=O
^be divided
'"to the two equations
~ O and Qi ci 0. handc andéis dependent
"e difficuity arises
oiti the use of the or the wording of the senten*^ ,»
,oW
This shouid be read: if nIs ^ ^tr="
upon c, and e holds, «hen n ho„o, then it ¡s abo the case tn
the de!i¿^^f«1 Particle "ifMnstead of it expressed;ifo.Ac = 0and6.e
intpi^^^^
a„j^'®'®tton;consequen 'h® telation
either b k |~'h® teader aswilla conditional
tend to make(as'
t e rpUof c,
Here is the proof: t ¿. = ""
th®
ProDn -"^"tely holds- dependent (as it were, causal y »ut
Whe^r'®" «toPty^h,^/®^''hts is not always the case, and^j ide' Of course, we can aiso write ^^
onth' "h°Ws or does n —^Sifcs us no information ® .^(en' like; o-fei+o»'^
tta^ tr™^- ™slatter is not atdoes
all what
thaf;Z''h^rna is J'® ®°P<«tional of b and c does not
not
ts >« wnai""
o e(/'+Ci)('''h^''h rnuitiplieation)»
"holds. n.e coiah^tort-something for these tuone , verifyaaanideoti'y(h>;'=;;^'^;gationsofeach
The latterform is °coming togetho' •f.om the latter form,
utte'"Pploy diffefj tvording,t therefore, misleads slnce
other, mutuaUycaneel and ytc product 0. Also,
in this way factois keep
spicuity an^^t t''' ®hange'¡nTif' ®'°®® 't seems to me that the autlfrom"elC''
lUthor's
^ of'etters only detracts
^vf-
,lfhef"
y» f shan have to adopt this wording mys®'
then (the produ(
be truc).
ige of the Frcge
n of its judgeme
xcept for negatic
Is two kinds( 1-
e lattcr [that is, í
"cur ways. Writi
iple, runs as foll(

.6c)i = 0;

jla with oniy adc

írtion, nothing pr
□r, etc.; thus wri

6c = 0) = O,

s inferencc link
uce formulas a
illícit wav- not

lays down stípulations . i^vjshly

cisely. I shall not follow ^ ^ ¡ustificatio^
one may not perchance
 231

230
reviews of the conceptual notation by one
APPENDIX I
the "inheritance" of a properly in the same iJ^.j^y_j,„g.ness of a(not
ea«iiiv^°°^^u• analogous modification or extensión element from the previous "seauence" is characterized only
essentian^ Boolean notation as well. The author achieyes t i further characterized) procedure . g^t fwhich is otherwise left
establishin ^ Gothic letters as symbols for generality by the fact that a certain kind o a v say, perhaps,
a strnkp K ^ negating this generality —for which I shal u general) from one element to ano
.hataparticularprocedureofdeduct.ojUea^from^^ element to another.
branch
all q's hfl^v in question]. The eqiiation /(n) = ^ Of course, the deductive P®^bs here generality
^ert f- Then {/(a)}, or more bnefiy/,(a)= off, and run together again; and the ^ ^seemsto me,howeyer.
Ontheothpr h !f r "ot-/; that is, all n's lack the that is given in this way to ^beconcep ^ ^ generalization; on the
some q's do n ^ ~^ assert: not all a's have the P'"°P^^^"^grts that there is absolutely noftmg of^ ^rfering» of elements tog a
®nt with Frege): no M is a P. Then, the equation contrary, in my opinión, if f or inadmissible, then ins ««
straight line is immaterial. "■^°"^;^;5¡¿aüon"set"»}/'®y®'«'»
•Vquence-.oneshouldusesunpytoedK^
P(á)M(a)= O
denv that ttií» . • rt nflC {S'yLm}, or "manifold" (W®"l"'Sentireworkwithth^
could assign to «•
Ithe first eauationi
equation would be true for every
,' ®*P^®ssing that there is at least one a for
j^jch According to the author, he «nderto^» ^
of obtaining complete «¡«"'f y ¡o test "how far one i
etc. ^ be false. or [in other words] that some M s^ metical judgements, and a ° . (¡gnsalone'MfH'^y'P™ ^ ínlarge
arithmeticbymeansoflopo® then this point woul y'jj^asof
^bing; for ^^°P^ various methods to accompÜsh the sa ^ stood what the author wis «® ¿rough the perceptiva m
for "not equal" in f of Cayley), through a sign suc measure, already settled-namely, ^
shorter.oi^ Oí'wm ij ~ together with va 7^" 'jcied HennannGrassmannJo--^^^^
ftementíonti^^y thatsome o's are aiso ¿'s. Peirce(4, V oo^ ture related to this eífort,« j ^dy existrag
f^e exnlanatí ^oocy in another way.^® «¡cal) the author had taken "«"^^-aH ««■«"=' of «ncooraging the
gives for the concept of ^^ comments, however, have yj^^juraging i^' ,yose intetested in
Previoüs explanatinn?^ entirely original. It is much broad®*] jj^n- further his research, rat thanks j „♦ the same time
With regard to this h be not without ' ref®^ In conclusión, I believe ®h"ant of logio (and at the^^_^ ^
[thereader]tothebnokT^7®^' because mention
of limitedthatspace, I the . the more recent '"'«1^''®® tj ¡liat were ""'"'"^-rks of which I am
of the publisher I ^ ^ ^^"^'"erely through fuim an obligation to *« „f ,he «1^^ X^^phy of (6).
der
, . —.c« Gespn. L
t have . .. ..... cu-rtinssO^^\ue' my book) (6), if I g'V« ® found in the Bibhogr
^essionof ^ ^ftfur Medizin und Naíiirivissenschafi(... ^fíy^
^ offpriht
now aware, though they c ofQualUy Apart
j.?P^P^oal notation''" ^bich the author presents two appboatio . Pare Logic- or the í»f g,,a,¡on of
(1) William o« %Mk, 18«- PP'
numh" fbree pc^^?- ^®®^ding the expression of a ^¿ing ^ from Quantity, f'th ^ ,-„don and New
the theorem ^ straight line), the ofber r ^ Logic and Mathematics. L pr¡m:¡ple ofReasomng,
Driat ^ ^bich he intA a ^bich are indeed appropriate apP^^' , cimilars, the Tn>e R""'' ,869. 86 pp.
Ce
ne"appendix" rrh
vCe "notation"-though le® **$0^^ (2)—-.neSubstitntionJ%^,o,¡f,Dict'>o<-^^ '
Derivedfrom a ModificoUO ^
the^srh^'^^^ ^ General Conceptual Notaíiofi concern ^ . Piesjofwork,
saeteé'whose
o London, 1879,
Cv Crare omatJͮr hleV (3) ; The
S"'"®''
whichT ^ 0° have jol . ^™''°i®l Hete it would be de®"^des.rab-ela""„ Method—a very s'S"'"
786pp.,isnowbefore • y„ee volames".!
feven at «.^*'"^^ih'6 in the^ 'n'roduced for certain cotnpl'®®'®
(«Ven <=°r¡,ou'id Pe chP^f.
Threew '"Psnse,temnr. ^^®'®ni. simpler ones sho" .cks/''^ h p.pu<hnan.s.m.;¿PrSÍn-et^^
nfter'"o'her
anmu "^^'^''Pns
i„, occur.which concern«omplete expression
[1]the {Aus
following " elef®,]
oío^^ ,. [íJ [la {dessett 3. Aup-s
[10 j
®«quence". which is left very indeterPPP"
*^^0 left out the reference to Peirce.]
 232
appendix i
REVIEWS OF THE CONCEPTUAL NOTATION 233
(4) Charles S. Peirce:(Three papers on logic, rcad bcfore the American contains little more than an explanation them. They

onl?" ' "O"a"Improvemcnt in Boole's Calculus df.:"!!'!"';' timoalgorithmshaveno^

DD 2fi]^R7^TTT^Í^^' Natural Classification of Argurnents ,
líth!\ ^ List of Categorics", pp. 287-98. Frocce^'gs
0867). Articlc 1 anticipates
(5) "^ present rcviewer arrived in (6). warity or a great simpimcauon ui the notations are cavw
from an of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives ResiilUt'g to the contrary, the expíanations are insu i j.gjiiaiii only
extractad Co/íce/7í/o«í of Boole's CalcuUts ' sively complcx; and as far as apphcat'*^"^
iv+62 D ^
1870. iv+62pp ofthe American Academy, vol. IX. Cambri " Promises. , ,... oreeting which the presen
Dr. Frege has very few illusions a ou ^^j^pju-es ordin^ language
Teubner, 1877^^^^^^* ^P^i'ationskreis des Logikkalkids. Leipzi® Work will probably receive. To defend i' . » jq the microscop ,
to the human eye and his "conceptual no ation ^
99 pp. ^ogique algorithmíque. Liége and Bruxellcs, 18 valuable instrument, but ene too di c ^pp,y his mve
studies for which it was meant. The au ¡j¡ ^linatc t^e co"C P
at first to arithmetic. With it. he P^jo . ^ his
®^ation Calculus of Equivalent Statcmcnts and Int^ number, magnitudc, and so on. We . that is, to
(1877-78), pn ofthe London Malhematical Society, goal, to project a given image with i system
oí" the logical calcTilne interesting app' argurnents into ordinary language. . ^he salient pom r
determine the new r •? mcchanical) solution of proble ■ It will suffice for the moment to the con^^
|iniits the sequenj^ ní^ !' rcpeated integrations betwecn var as far as logic ís concerned. The [au he cal
Is spoiied by the modified as desired. The pols and predícate and replaces them y carbon-dioxide , jgf than
^=^d-)toexprL ,^^^ author introduces symmetrical symb yiiment. Thus, The circumstance carbon-dioxide ^ ¡^n with
subordination, as a rL ^y™etrical relations of subordination and hydrogen' and 'the circumstai^ as the with the
(9) Wilhelm w he certainly gets himself confuse ■ oxygen' can be considered or as different fu ^onception
fkeminiss und Untevsudnmg de. Principia'' j. dih-erent argurnents (hydrogen. deny that this
Same argument (carbon-dioxide). of
2'''"''tnisskhre. Stntt„ f , " '""^ensclmftlicher Forschung, " '(o ^oes not seem to be very fruitful. this is how
^kome the factufS«'
that '«80- 585 pp.-The work devotes 52vve
he criticized, If we wish an exainple of the" rendered.
j with the tnaíhp Philosophers are beginning f^gfve® Pfopositions usually considered m ^
•^ws'deratiop. ,,rtainly deser
Karlsrubf.
Ernst Schr¿ (e) No A' is Z'- • ^
^fege's c
^^'^osopkique^ g ^otation^ by P. Tannery, ^ (i) SomeA'isf^
^'^"tboratte ^ PP- 108-9.
'3Tes of7dge'°enf''"^^^»ofsymboIicttotat¡ot,apP^^^^^^ (o) Somc A.■IS not
r.:P.
^
. P 1hepres5n(j. ■ ' ° ^'1 modes of reasoning. His stn ivqed this way: aigrmed-
«Wep?"*,,]j^slation ?f''tte^y "^ginally¡n Prench. Tannery gWf'h^ dlj The first symbol-combination
. ..on be analyseo
.j^^tes that a
. gjjjeot ^
[olg^bre. ii, a ^ formules / P^^ge's book: ReprésentationJ ¡„i d The vertical stroke on the 6
'ew ,?r/'
'"=^hy uninteiiiPg pensé/p„re
that ^ h'eral tr^slation (intod'ff
FrencbJ'/of"'
 B8BSBE

appendix i
reviews
REVIbwo of
u the conceptual NOTATION 235
haveforcedthemselvesupon
,holds for
^ the
^ argument
would be
and so on; all these being po.nts wh'ch m d.velopment of Logic.I have
a."a singular proposition; namely, *'the function P the attcntion of those who have s u Fregc's system to attempt
not made myself sufficicntly fami lar wi ^onfess that it seems to me
-v .. TT without
thetically ~ by itself,
judging its denotes the proposition—poscd
truth-that the function P holdsonly hyp®
whatever to work out problcms by help of it. but I must
the argument(o) might be. cumbrous and inconvenient. [J. V.]

on the vertical strokc in the middle with the horizontal stroke

ATqI anH^Pr' a conditional relation bctween the functions
former and
lomer anH deny
h the ^^'ation
latter. is that we cannot simultaneously affirm th

individual symbol-combination] this way:

"AU A'is P" K it also has property P"; or,¡n other wor
In the other formulas,the httle vertical strokcs are the signs for negation-
PAUL TaNNERY

O Notation by John Venn, ^

dealing mucrmVrrhl'H° ^ ^°"^ewhat novel kind of Symbolic to^
Acertainarrangementnfi!^^^"^^^^*^ geometric forms than
or symbols exDrestíPc n, °"^®otalandverticalIinesconnectedw¡th
letters or symbols- the propositions involvmg
bmations of terms' ^ themselves standing for terms or
with them;
^ those who have bppn
difficult to judge by those ttn^ot
"^^^sarily appear cumbrous and mcon
ut, making all dug ^'^^tistomed to make use of some different sy
o me that Dr. Frece's considerations, it does .pf
oole. I should suppose ^ moment compare with
sr, that he has not spp' making no reference whateve
^ are familiar here Cer^ ■ modifications of it wd j^¡s
wn method are comm which he claims as novel
^ntplams that logicST, u symbolic method. For " bols
r terms and for operatin^^^ employed distlnct sets of sy ^
haH met with such
in which thpr"^'
exprese* ^ makes
seem use of letters
no novelty surely and
to anyof i¿jg¡£¿*
°*s.Similarl/S^^^^ = :ry+Azas significant
so impon^
betweensuhi"^ ^nd predicate
P theticalanddisjunctiv and loses
on theall predicatioo
its signiS^^
^ Propositiong become equivalent to oa
 PRESENT-DAY SCHOLARS ON ''''''"''JJl
logic about attributes or ofteíentosed the traditional
that seemed to cover both, but ^ «f rflatíons. Working on some
conception of logic to include t^ shortiy after
suggestions of DeMorgan, ^P produced independently a
APPENDIX II the publication of the Begriffssc tnf , for expressing all the
doctrine of functions with a notauon -dequate
FREGE'S conceptual principies formulated by Frege, u . . jjj^g timóse given in the las
ATíOí^ BY PRESENT-DAY SCHOLARS system or set out a number of bf aU the essentials of
scction. Frcge's work. on the hand co
™,„„ ...i.,...
P''®face to J. T. Clark, Convenüonallo^ successors to say that lo/.^ i
subject.
Press'1952\ pp. v-vii.l
(Woodstock. Maryland: Woodstock CoU S
XrfOg*
Physics centuries^aff!?'^?'"^ ^ rcnaissance such as was C. [From I. M. Bochenski, f^%/veSr°f Notre Dame
ficd with the Dublimf the logical rcnaissance might be i . I. Thomas (Notre Dante, Indtana.
Press, 1962), p. 268.] ^ unique place. His
Galileo. toX thtr^ ^opcmicus's
InsufficÍPnd Be,rmsckrift in 1879-am book
De revoliitionibus the ^
hJ Among all these
|endtooverlook
he oíd logic andthe
the n command a propcr
exaggcrate the disparities Begriffsschrift can only . of Anstotle. Th Pj.gge
But if *f • ncw, history of logic, the Tno founde
new log¡(;_ ¡j ^ j, ®'<aggerate the cleavage betwcen the oíd^ gjty put on a level, for Arist js a ^ca contains a
could as a result only deve f , yj. lilce the Pno ^ time
importance of ^^P'^^ble to undercstimate the nov^ two gifted works. The p,ege fortnd^^ „„oepts of
^™8Íngquant¡fioa io^"™- '^erewith
'''d ¡""eed usher in a renatss^°^^t
the most powerful
long series of quite ^variables and cons^ he has a
the sharp distinction be function, of theory of an
trp ^Quinas anH íogic. Logical and semantical p .^qí logical function. of a of the ¡ntrO"
fiSr^í "sht of q^rm-r notably more accurate ""f jearly betwcen law ^^^^^_j^guage,
ofrip? ^ ^^^"todernln! the aid of axiomatic system, ^•®'*"j':'7ction between of the theoi7 °
to a egree hitherto
|n general anH fk^^^^®^^®"^hletoi]luminatetherriec duces an equally sharp he is 7fLnotionofa valué, he i
undreamed mathematics in though without using ^1"° ¿iscovered,indeed,th
description; without hayin gygtematic^iy- " nearly aU ^jy
[From Win V t of the first to have elabora y^ístotle, h P ^gj^atic way-
At the same time,and cle^ "^fZltico-lo&oeX theo^s
(London^ot The Developr^l^
Press;i962), pP- ideas and intuitions m jong senes ofm , g¿¡ckenlos), ^
in the Begnfsschrifi we hav a1^^^, í^^^Sematical
®Pena'^p;^°«P í^^'inter^''"' Pomprehensive systetd^ff/s <>[ derivad from a few Various othe m theon^'7
says, for the first at once so many. o
*^ntradirf ^°^hions. He h-h ■ 'n certain common v ^q(i' the same time, or even -resenting n! twenty
^nndament'^í^^han ^'^duded
the need his formúlate
^hich beíong the
to\principia®
part of nene of them had the g.» J ..... m wa.t ,
cnginal, ^nnovations ^¡5 logici
ín pa«,^7^"^ of p^in^a^y logic. Such an ac^>v^ It is a remarkable ^ poticed, a ^ggjgwi
years before he was j^esumed by
^dation beh! ^bout but neither he ñor ^jy th^ strictness of procedure
a parai^f Pdrnary succeeded in showing ^ fso^ i
betwU"ftimary andlogic. Leibniz and
certain propositioos
 238
appendix n
betwcen 1879 and 1921 fcll bclow thc standard of
ín pan determ- ^"ained even today. Thc fatc of Frcgc's work
It is not truc that it is particularly A FRECE BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1873 1966
below but ít ic'^ ^ '"eader can assurc himsclf from thc cxainples
íhankind, to be'accept'^bl°° contrary to thc age-oid habits Co,„p:l.d by Terrell Ward Bynum ««d Alina W. Bynun,
The compilers have attempted to próvida in Fraga to
use and of valué to cveryone-from gffort has been made
scholars engaged in detailed matter in what language it happens
pp.203-9] F-hees, Journal of Symboíic LogiCt 24( to include every secondary translations, so that the rea e
Feys regards Boole a<; f¡, ■ ■ .tn the to be publishcd, and to Hst all rep ' editions that he can o
may conduct his Frege ínvest.gations ^hh th ¡„ ^hich he read
reviewer, onthecnn^». ^ origmator of modern logic: it seems .
short with Schroder^'fh' development of logic had =s;;:
contemporary loo¡c ^t have been no clear scnse in
f'cs. Feys starts with r, s^iperior to that of, for example. the
^ Boole, which seem betwcen the lógica! work of Leí ^ This Bibliography is divided m bis doctoral
to overstrcss thc logically) all the pubhshed liachlass. It is not list,
Published and Leibniz dM^^^''PPortant difí-ercnce was surely tha of 1873 to his recentiy of Frege's jn Münster,
all translations and repu letters which are c Ji„pg,,forschung-
C^H llí' however, the ""P^blished 'f'^econdary sources pri-
míst senst^that deserves great credit for ¿jd Germany,atthe//wnVH//w^ hptically) published s .^compl®^®
siffn'fi ^ory diffi /" histórica! circumstances The second part lists It is ">^"",567 ^d 1968
and ^owever, we ask after the a marily or extensively concern ^ntries appreciate
fathe?"í. must Present interest in Boole's list of such works from 18 compiléis would
S Boole cannot correctiy be have also been included), .joos. which, although
any suggested ^d'^bions or co ^dditional sou ^ material of
operato"'^^^'^^ cour<! ^ which sepárate modern ^ ||y, oí The third part lists (-'Pb^betic^^^ Frege. ^y ^
not primarily or ^bis sec^on ^ork.
th^w^f both due can be nested) and a concePj^^ valué for Frege research. E jiandled m ^b® . though,agam,
forabstr Booie^
aneither present even ^
great histórica! '"^^^'^^garliei'' alphabetical list of the meant to be
This section of the b'bhography ¡ sugges'ed ad f^rence. W
^bich of theorv nf ^ad Leibniz two centuries the compilers would gratef^'^^^f/serial
gainM "°Ptainefth
^''íension F '"Aportan f ^^^'ídional theory of the syH^^
nneisht- "íb'' Each entry has been all begin with ^¡,j(,nal-source n
numbers of the works of Frege^.^^ ,he adc.
'^''^fiand! theorv ,1, '^^ber from the secondary-source numbers
P'easantsur"^^"® unacquai ^be magnitude of t ü bers begin with -A'.
and how'"'^^ ^ben he di^ ^ ^bb Boole's works will ^ 3ct^^
^Ppfused hi« p how ill-constructed his the A Analysis ^ ,,,cmalik
^Planations of it.
DLZ Deuísche Liter
E Erkenutnis
 A frege BIBLIOGRAPHV. .873-1956
A FRECE BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1 873-1966 Translations: p r,eachofpartofChapter 1 mF'47.
Jahresberichie chr Deutschcn Moihemalikcr-Vereimgung (p) Englishtranslat.onbyP. Ge^4Ch^_P^_^^^,j,^^g of .he enüre
JZN ^''^'■oíurzeitung
Jenaische Zeitschrift für Naiurwissenscba/t
(i) English translation by • . logic, ed. J. vm
^ Journal ofPhilosophy book in Sonrce Book "'^retts: Harvard Un veraPy
Heijenoort (Cambr.dge,
Press, 1967);aIsomFr«e
CdM ed. University
J. van He.jenoort
Press,
^<>"rna¡ofSymbal¡cLogic
* mind
The Monist
(Cambridge, Massaehusetts. Ha
1970). . h„ T W. Bynum in F'53.
(c) English translabon oy • ,,u„¡chte der Jenai-
PAS Review
PAS,SV '^'"'^^otclian Society .
RM fí of the Arisíoíeliats Society, Supplemcntary ' schen
(1879),Geselischaft fnr
pp. 29-33. Repr.nted.nF F7, S89.Í
S_ f"':'^f^etaphysics
Synthese Translation: vv Bynum io _
ZPPK English translation by • • ceometrie /, DLZ
""'fi für Philosophie und philosnphische Kritik F9. Review ofR.Hoppe,i*W^.^'^^^
1 (1880), PP. ^ und Huy|-mit P^ J
The works of frege FIO. "über <í^-.^;Íf'',f7Liscken
Siízungsbenchte ner
® »rintedinF'^'-
Ebene (Jena-'"A'"x E)arstellung der imaginaren Ncer.vissenscl.aft, JZN i ( oiner
Gottingen
sen. r'
Repnntcd^^ucnhann,
in F'52. 1873). Doctoral D'ss FII. "Über die wissenschafüic e ¡^ted in F48 an
ZPPK 81 (1882), PP-
sich auf eine Erweítcrung des F7, S89, S217.] ^73(15®'*''''^''
Translations: by3-Bar"®'"" ; f'53.
Review ofH
"nierricht benyk Elemente der Arithmeíik, /¿2.
W EnShR'nslationByT-^JJ^^^^
Review ofof
Review ^ "• analytisd'e ('^°"'Mn,
E. Winter, Die aiwlytisd'ef
leU'^
^°!"abe<''
F12. "über den Zweck
Jenaischen Gesdlsdcft ¡o F'49. [Saa
dLZ 4 (187-^ ^eraden und ihre Anwendung oi'f ,6Translations.
(1882-3), PP.l-'"-'^® «CndH-an-iP^-'
lationby"^-^ cq.-97.
^"'"'"
Reviewofj.' ' id) English transía ^ pp. 8^ ^ ^,53.
^^^dung der ¿"aww/í#;^ von Formeln,
nal ofPhilosoP^^y XV. Byn^ ^.hericMe der
'^^'■den, Ji2 4 Rosenhain'schen Funktionen g ib) English translatio ^'%senschaff'
"^ber eine W P.3. "Geometrie der Natnn
^^fzufasse^), «?' Gestait eines Dreiecks ais Jenaischen GeselUchafU ^ ¡o F 5-. y
erf/cí^ «nrf TVar der Jenaíschen nrinte^ ' 17 (1884),
17 (1884), pp.
pp. 98-102. ReP ,o,/reM«''«;;%„er,
Koebner' 18 -
F'52. ^'''"'•^issenschaft, in /Z/^ 12 (1878). F14. D/e o,*"
Grundlagen *^ír ¡ffder »»í/rBr«sIan.
^ Ariíbt^^^ <Sli <■"■Fl -> """■ ''
3306),
r.u.r den Begrw
^^^''^ffsschrift .
nachgebildete j:4 [See: S139, S161, S217
S177.] B
^,7= "" P 2 L. Nebert, 1879). Reprmte^
ReSs'snf
s- S135, •SI76, S205, S256, S283, 'sS-'
8243&01

^
 A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1873-1966 A FRECE BIBLIOGRAPHY. 1873-1966 ^3
Reprints: F, - Be,riffaen.: H. f
(«) Reprintedin 1934 by M.and H. Marcus,in Breslau.[Review: and F52. [See S141. S217. Reviews: S136. S23:).J
S250.] Translation: . . c'47
(¿) §§6,62-5, 68 reprinted in O.Becker, Grundlagen der Mathe- English translation by P. Geach m
nmik iu geschichtlicher Enlwickiung (Frelburg i. B. and " 7PPK 100 (1892), PP. 25-50.
Munich: K. Alber, 1954). "Über Sinn und Bedeutung , _ gjgQ §217, S230,
(c) Entire book reprinted in 1961 by G. Olms in Hildesheim- Reprinted in F'48 and F'52 [See: S25. SI56,
Translations:
S236, 8237, S238, S263, S284, S303.J
(a) Entire book translated into Italian by L. Gcymonat in F'46. Translations: , _ in F'46. ^

íh\ l?•' S72,into

S223,English
S260, S27I.]
(а) Italian translation by U G ^ pp. 207-30.
Entire book translated by J. Austin, The (б) English translation by M-
Reprinted in F'47. p.adings in Philosoph^
iQ?nU, ,1953). 0/ Arithmeíic
Reprinted in (Oxford: Blackwell
1960 by Harper andand Mott,
Brothei^» (c) English "i w. Sellars (New York:
[Reviews: S19, S20, S30, S52, S76, S106, Sl27r
f.^sf'f^'S20l.S209.S228,S275.] in Me^ning and World, 1965), PP-
translated into Spanish by A. Moreno (New York: Harcourt. Braee
Critica de Frege a una demostración de Leibniz y defimcióo
'oni Transfiniten, 2í-»
16 número con medios-Iógico-puro", ' (1892). pp. 269-72. Repnntedin [See: PFd j,,
Review of G. Cantor, p'52. .issen-
LVc PP- M(M4.
translated into English by M. Mahoney »» j" Vierteljohrsscnrj p,^g
c ^^thematics: Selected Readings, ed. ; "über Begriff und Gegens^d r pnnted ^
Prentir^^u (Englewood Cliffs, New Jers^y- schaftliche Philosoplue, 'g2i7. Reviews. S9,
andF52. [See: F14. Sl60, S161.
inciurn" Austin's translation (í¿) Translations; _ , Geymonat m F ^ giack, ÍP
Physics- R^ r' ^"d M. Lazerowitz, ed^ (a) Italian translation by revised by M
■Jersev P ^eappraisals (Englewood Cliífs, ib) M60(1951).PP-
English translationí68i>^
y Reprinted m F -
1966), pp. 67-74.
Keview of H j „nd
^eineCeschichte zTp^^n •!r
Cnmdgesene jd ^^^'^' ^p^rinted, '^rSÜl, -fU Volume H'
S210, S219,
"Übe
(Jena: H. Pohle, [See: F28, >
Arithmetik", SitzimgsbericMe 1962 by G. Olms, H''<i^iews: SI37, S220.]^ ^ ^..ehelroth «f
(1885-6) nn oí Medicin und Naturxvissenschaf^i S248,S257,S284,S297.Rev
tnetiky\ Rezension der Grundlagen der -4^'^ ' (lEngS transiation
S60, S306.] P- 1030. Reprinted in F52. [See:
*'Übe d
SÍ<S3Sí'ití5f¿25;i.,„,-..
Ptimed irF^52ySe^^^^ PP'
Translations:
(^) Italian tranei *•
(e)EnglishtransIa.;onb Mg59.Rev.eWS.
W EngUsh transUtío" and §§1-52 inF 50-1
'ttslation l''by Rose Rand in of
S13 (1961).^ PP-
 A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1873-1966
A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHY.
I
. U D n^-ich oí §§56-67, 139-44, 146-7
F24. Review of E. Husserl. Philosophie der Ariihmetik, ZPPK 103 (/)) English translaüon by ^ Reprinted in Classics in
(1894), pp. 313-32. Reprinted in F'52. [See: S139, AI36.] ["Frege on Definitions J ofKnowledge and
Logic, Readiugsin Library,
T
Translation:
_
Dialectics, ed. Ruñes (New torK
English translation fay P. Geach of some parts in F'47. 1962), pp. 329-42. - . Appendix in F'47.
(c) English translation by • e Appendix in F'50.
F25. "Kritische Beleuchtung einiger Punkte in E.Schroders Vorlesungen {d) English translation by M.
über die Algebra der Logik", Archiv fiir sysíematische Philosophie, [See:S99.] /2)MF12(1903),PP-319-
1 (1895), pp. 433-56. Reprinted in F'51 and F'52.
F31. "Ober die Grundiagen der Geometrie ,
Translation: 24. Reprinted in F'52. [See: F d
English translation by P. Geach in F'47. Translation; xí Szabo in FR 69 (1960), PP-3" ■
English translation by M. pp_
entier", Revue de méíaphysique el de inórale, 3(1895)» F32. '-Ober die Grundiagen der Geomem^^^
PP- /o-s. Reprinted in F'52.
368-75. Reprinted in F 52. •
Translation: Translation: Szabo in FR 69 (1960), PP- -
Germán translation by M. Held and K. Held in F'52. English translation by M. BolnnnaM

'I" He™ Peano nnd meine eipn^ ■

schaft rf ^<¡i-handlmgen der KonigUch Sáchsischen Ge
Kla e ™ Leipzig: Ma,hemalisch-Pl0^ S217.]
FU'F23 F28. S2I9.
PP- S220.] Reprild in F'52.[See: F7, F8,FH. Translation:
English translation by _ • ^goch in F''^7.
tn
j _ rieonieh"ie> 1, —/r-j
Peano dated "t all'editore [A letter from Frege F34. "Ober die Grundiagen der u Repriníe'linF;-'p3, j^above,
pp. 293-309, 377-403, 423-30. R „.th F3i.
\(.Revue de nmt^
Reprints:
^eptember 1896"]", Rivista di Male'"
"'""''"'"'mee), 6 (1896-9), pp. 53-9.[See: S219.]
(1) Reprinted in G.Peano, Opere scelte(Rome: 1958). PP- m ™ -di.FfíSrS.
Reprinted in F'52.
F29, ji - íco9)'
F36. "Die Unmoglichked
. a r Thomaeschen for"^Aprinted in
17 (1908), PP-
Reprinted inF^t and5"''"
F'52 (-^ena: H. ^ohle, neue nachgewiesen , g^Sd, S287.1 f'52.
F'52. [See: F35, F37, p_ 56, Repr
H- Pohle, 19Q^\ ^egnjffsschriftlich abgeleiíeí
Olms, ^°g^lher with Volume I, ^ c23^>
S240, S267,S270] ^171» S210, S229, F38. "Remarks on P.
Translations:
l'st^] b^M of§§ 86-137["Frege Against ^D- Matherualles, 43 (1^. Reprin^"
into English by F
PP- ^'-93,2oS"■ r PP- C50)
Reprinted in F'47. [See: Fi6, ^5
 A FRECE BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1 873-1966 A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHY, 18
Der Gedanke: Eine logische Untersuchung", Beitrüge zut Philo- F45. Nachgelafiene Schrifteu, ed.. u • Mermes,
_ ^ F. 1970).
Kambartel, and
[See: S175,
sophie des deuíschen Idealismus, 1 (1918), pp. 58-77. Reprintcd in F. Kaulbach (Hamburg: Félix Metner Verlag,
51 and F'52. [See: F40, F41, F45, S218.] S253.]
Translation:
En^ish translation by A. Quinten and M. Quinten in M 65 Calleations of Frege"s Works (Turin: Giulio
F'46. Aritmética e lógica, trans. and ed. L. V S271.]
0^/ PP- 289-311;
hilosophical also included
Logic (Oxford: Oxford inUniversity
P. F. Strawson, ed.,
Press, 1967), Einaudi, 1948). [See: S107. ¡f f18, F20. F22, part
PP- 17-38.[Reviews: S34, S83, S96.] Contalns Italian translations of. P . P
of the Preface of F23. . Cottlob Frege,
Eine logische Untersuchung", Beitrage zur F'47. Transía,¡o„s from the (oXd: Blackvvell. 1952,
'(>918).
F 51 and F'52. [See: F39, F41. pp. 143-57. Re-
F45. S218.] trans. and ed. P. Geach and M. Blao^tJ S3 S31
1960). [See S50, S73, S102, „fsl89 S252,S290.]Contmns
translation: S57, S75, S84, SI 11, SUS, S 26, S182,
English translations of. par
M89, ^
¿.¡(.(ion, and§§l-7of >
'f^nslation by P. Geach in F'47.
part of the Preface,
ofF24;F25; the ent.re
§§56-67, 86-137,In 139-44,
rod^"°^ the APP^nd^
Teil: Gedankengefüge'-
36-51 Rpn • ,n F'51 des
" 51 Repnn^d anddeuíschen
F'52, [See:Idealismus,
F39, F40,3F45.
(1923), PP"
S218.] of F30; F33; F40. stndien, ed. G. Pa™
Translation: F'48. Fnnktinn, BegnJ, 1962). [Se=^ '
®nsl'shtranslationbyR. StoothoíTin M72(1963),PP- Containsrcprintsof:Fn.Fl9.F20
(Góttingen: Vandenhoeck a p22,F33. (Hildeshei^
vina rt""'!' Gottlob Frege über Hilberts ers^ F'49. Begri ffsschrl1964).
G.Olms, ft nnd[Seeandere ^^^'^¿^8197.] Containsrepr
SI4I.S246.
laB ven kh Grundiagen der Geometrie [Aus dem of: F7, F8, FIO, FU, F12.
^•'^mgsberichte d herausgegeben ven Max ' F'50. The Basle Laws of University of C ' o contains
'^"IhematiJ, ""Albergar Akademie der Wissenschaft
^Iberg, I940rp Klmse, Jahrgang 1940(H and ed. M. Furth (Los ^8=^-^ 3,33, S2 6 S2^.1
S274.Rertew: S38T'"''''" ^ 1964). [See: S99, S102- i„troduet.on,
Translation: English translattons o _ Vandenho^L
42). pVT4"¿9'°" Eeumer in Siínon Stevin 25(>9^^ Logiscfie untersii^"^'""- _
and Ruprecht, 1966). [
S 218.] TOd^'""-

F29, F39, F40, F41.

... WissenschaR'if|j®
"■ieh Liebmann h ^
Grundiagen
E^ege [Aus dem NachlaB v
ie>H'L(?,^r2Í8:]Cont^"-f^^^
Max Anmerkungen v^r Buchgeselischaft, ^9 f13. F1^ \,^ns\^úon 01
^íssenschaf der Heideíberger
of:F21,Fi,F22,F2,F24,
E3 FAF25,1-2
^Sudes a G-ma ^ ^3, f39, F40,
t ^34^ p35, ha .
'^^^^gang 1041 ^^^^^^atisch-naturwíssenschaftllC"^ , j:42»
S132,S274 ] «^'delberg, ,941). Reprintcd in F'52. [Se-
Letter to
22 June 1902"!"^?^^"^^^» Russeli's Paradox
a
^d.
ra :z.,
Bynum (Oxford: Clare ^g^pji^FIA
íoolc ¿ f'^'^ded '1'° Englisli by B. (Caid; English translations ot '
p,"*®'- MassaclÜ J- van Hcijen°°' ^s^c. S283;andareprmt of
• ®102. S22Q ' 9,?®' Harvard University Press.
S234, S240, S241 S270.1
 A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1873-1966 A FREGE BIBLIOGRAFH .
_^.Frege. Gottlob",
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 W|..-

252 A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1873-1966 A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHV, 1873-1966 ^ 253

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Science, 32(1965)^n^f Incomplete Entities", Philosop
of '""■""",RC.-ír"
Review of R| [See:A3«-' " A.F»-
5234. l-PP-329-41. t..,
"«""lyse,
S229, S270.] ' pp. 139^4. [See: F30, F'47. Heidelberg: Spnnge ,
 ^ PREGE BTBLIOGRAPHY, 1873-1966
Scholz, H., Die Anmcrkungen von H. Scholz zur Begrijf^schrifi f
imd andere Aufsdtze, cd. I. Ange
(H.ldesheim: G. Oims, 1964). pp. 115-16. [Sce: F'49.]
Frege", in Maíhesis Universalis, ed. H. L. Gcymonat, ScientiOy 8 (1910),
oA (Base! and Stuttgart: B. Schwabe, 1961). PP- 268-^'
IReview: A97.]
pp. 387-9. r.gical Doctrines
Kl^i ^ Anmerkungen zu Grundgesetze V\ The Scope of University of
Expounded, icith Same
BuZgeseilschaft, 1967), pp. 420-2.(Darmstadt: WissenschaftHch
[Scc; F23, F'52.] Press, 1911). 16-37. [See:
aí65(1956).PP-' 1
Shwaydcr, D. S., • Denotation .
ÜTnZ? hat Frege für eine Simpson, T. M.. "A NolP sen
wtsr79?5,''f"
Jy-i5), 7 sem., pp. 16-47. in Se,„es,cr.Ber'c'"
(1967), pp. 207-9. [See: F20.] , ^
-^dition (1934) of Frege's . .nndR0S''""® '??iDuinra««"^
56 (1935), pp. ,63-70. [Sce: F14.]
Sloman, A., "Funet.ons -and M.D
Reci¡rs¡vcFmc¡¡ons,ca.- _ ,,ans. and
dam: North Holland, ■ of Arí<''""l%¡,H Journol
S252.
13 ^
o .
?! "Gottlob Frege ais Philosoph .
P- 154. [See: S1801
.. c of
-KevlewofFrege-sry.^^-^^c/F^^^^^^
cd. M. Furth, also of ^ 17 (1966), PP
Gottlob iW ^''^"^lotions from the Plulosophical for ¡he Philosophy "J S
S253 Schl hlaB
von G. Frene" ®^pl^"iann, "Der wissenschaftliche^^^^y,,'^ CU. in¿9> pp- ^ni
^^^'ontifioue rp' congrés iníernational de Munich: K. Mber. 196-).
196-)- 489-505.
S175.] -IPdJ] 8 (1936). pp. 24-30. [See: F45. S242.] . ,, pp 54
Smart, H.
Tj "Frego ®
R-»
' .^. j967)'
metfoil'
„ metfOH'
.®P''™P'tzer, Die sogenannten Definitf»""'''" [Review: S67.] rr-UpnrV
^ Refeto^^®
. —WMÍV. .
S255 o . ^einer. 1935). ...
Schotten H p • T/^ítscb^ Smith, ^ A "Frege's
G. A., fheoi^^ University*ccellieoo® P «2(F
^ \Vayne
ff^tr ^athematZZít °ií F^^ktion iind ^ Doctoral Dissertatio , Tantinon^'® j(1949),PP'
Abteilung p on Physik, 38 (1893), Historisch-l>t
Sobocinski, B., «ctiondeF^®® '
Schroder, E. pp • . rhriP niewski:
8. IV. LaS229,
[See: S102, oorrecfon^ ¿s ^¡¡'"'^'"¡¿¡,1. aí
Frege's Begrijfsschrift. '^^''c'53,
S149.] 25(1880), pp. 81-94. [See: V% F
5^ C'y Somenzi, V., R^vie^ fo948),PP' j f^^'^Hodli
SchrÓter, K a • -tp ed. L. Geymonat, S¡g , ^sterdaP"'
Hirzel,'1943^^ derfregeschen AussagettkaH^'^' Sommers, F., . ,,y </
S258• ^p , j.
Searle, fSee: F7. F23.] . Problems m the m
Reference";^ 18 Frege's Theory of Holland, 1967).
pp. 137-43. [See: S146,
 1966
A FREGE ''''''''
A FRECE BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1873-1966
^ammler, G. [§§58-65 of] Begriff, Urteil, Schlufi (Halle a.d. S.: S286. "Gedankcnloser l^enker, ei S287.]
M. Njcmeyer. 1928). pp. 171-89. (1906), pp. 434-8. [See: E35, F3 , P35_
S2B7. _.-Er«".77>MF.5(«,PP-5'»--
Frtí' with]"Ein
ge uber Hilberts erste unbckanntcr
Vorlesung über dieBrief von Gottlob
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r ^'^^^^"Ssberichte der Heidelbcrger .Jjn
0940), nr. 6. [See:
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^^^^^^'^^^dsch-natnnvissenschafíHche Klasse / „at¡onalTru.hV--^:S:
S2S9. Valpola.V.,"OntheConceptof^^^^^^^^
fAn«^''o" P"''=8<='s FoimdaUons of Anihmetic, trans- M. B-"'
Mathematica, 17 (1951), pp. 260-2. [See: Fl S290. Veatch,
Veatch, H..
H.. Revicw o
Kcvicw w. g¿, ^*p'47l
eci. r. -
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them no"s University Prcss,77/eor;'
1966). (Carbondaie, liünois: Sou T PP-
n e nonos,, 17 (1954), PP- ''''' .. J...'sSchemí'.'P
Frege^^.']
5291. Venn, vv p,illan, ifiRl)
1»»'" p.*" 41^* ^ .07, [See:
J., "Chapter 7^. j^acrpiHí^'
«•eL0./e(Fondon.Ma
■^'"'''"■6(1955), pp. 58_64.°f 'he Term 'True' P'"'"' SynAolic Logic (London. Mac ^^ p, 297.
'c fíeei'iJf^
5292. Rcview of Frcge h-actioJ^
Frege's Promnt-''''^^ '^hbc's Cutachieii (1879) F7. F'53, S59.] . ^es définih""'
5293. Vuillemin.
Vuillemin, J., "L'f 156 (196«. PP'
^^den und'^ri -r
and 28. [Seefsfr an der Universitat Jena. 25
r,,, """""'I ^
i;íí..«^
Stoothoff, R. H 77 (1963). 5294. "Sur le jugemen'
jugement ^ chichis *' .
pp. 406-8. [See* S2l ] ^ Doctrine of Frege", A/ chez Frege". Archis f„r
pp. 310-25. '
jRevreW.
Review of R \f n- 5295. walker, J., A Stndy of^reP fhdo-
trans. anded t a ®^^Jukov, Two Soviet Síudies on
S47.] I. Angelelli, PQ ig (iggg), p. 396. [See: S45, "
5296. _ Review of B. '. .¡c: §6
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Svk. R.
^ykes, p n p P- 395. [See: F50.] TiifC^
^^dosophers, AuT^ Anscombe and P. and Frege and ,n ^4 B
PP. 378-83. [See: 822^]"^'^ /o«rw/ of Philosophy, 40 ( of Ackermann an
(Peking: ^P23, ^51.] ^
tíisto^y^'
79-81, 423-31. [Se®- ronc®?^ li<5.1 ^ ,cc",
^ 0879), Reviiephilosopf"^ S298. Warner.D.H.F/'FP^rsVí®'''-
Thiel,c. F'53. S59.] Philosophy, i 0^65), P , ogik och ¡p„et1966)-
¡k: '
F20, F23 j g 1965). Doctora! Dissertation, ^ ptid s.».
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, nntolosy '
j .J "^"^''^^^°^drecht.Holland:D.Reidel, l^ S300. Wells, R.,
•'^^I5(l'906)''"''3ungen zum Aufsatze des Herrn S36, SI 16. Review:»
'■ P- 56. [See: F35. F36, F37. S285, S287.]
 im-

A frece BÍBLIOGRAPIIY, 1873-1966

A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1873-1966 2"
j A A crnnlfel Fowiáations of Seí Tlieory
5301. Wells, R.,"is Frege's Concept of Function Valid?", JP 60(1963).
PP. 719-30. [See: S28.]
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5302. Wh'te, M., "On the Church-Frege Solution of thc Paradox of
Barker, S., of number,
nn 3Ü5-8.
PP. o' [See: S71, A42.]Phenomenohgical Research, 9(1948-9).

rD'48fg/,c°-
PP. 483-94.[See: F20, S202.S,nn
S238.and BedeuUu,,",
Review: S230.] M 59 (-950).
Ari.hmctic" and "IX. The
Imroductin Mathcmatics an Extensión of Logie •'
York Svfi" Poimdaíions of Mathematics (London, tion" of functions.
S305 Í965), pp. 208. 219-45.
g3(,g PhUoZCl RriT(°96°i A"^'=o™he
^'4 ('963), pp. 270-1. [See: and
S22.]P. Gcach, Three levels of functíons, psychologism.
--CW of

f P "Logidsni, Some Considerations" (Prmceton.

srs—
Arms « ^^^^^IONAL SOURCES _
Frege.„h«
topic: »-.»
definition C»B NO. B.-. ™ »(l»a .►
of number.
pp. 146-52 ofLogicto Mathematics". MO29(i9l^
'O ^^thematicSógic^''^'''arguments against psycholog'sn
Benacerraf, P-, A H Piitnam
'^"'"7édIntroduction
P Benacerraftoand
Philosophy
H. Putnamof
Rachelard ^ a
Presses Univérsita^g'^^ Logique de Husserl ^ g'g Mathemada,SeIec,ed Rea^^^^ pp. ,-27
(Englewood existence of mathemadcal
^^'t^queofHusserl's
que of Frege's Gnj>, nply^"?^'
^ ^rege topics:
der Anthmeíik, Husserl Frege topies. ^tical induction.
entit¡es,logicism,mathematica. Uoosala: Alm-
A3. ^ar-Hillei
Bar H„ , Y «t,"""'"P"'
, Arithmcik. .
T 16 (1950),"pp Definition of Analytic Pi^°P°f,'¡0O), Berg J.. Bolzüoo's 1963).
avSanWiksells. Logic (S'^^khota, of number,comparison
empty P™-of
pp. 32-55. Frege ton' * appears in Meíhodos, of
analytic propp^.^.^^ pies: Bolzano's vcrsiis Frege's definido
A4. Rey"
Semant¡rAnaty,^;,^h^h, "The Need for Abstract Ent¡t¡f^
eategore^ltie f;^
antics. (1952), pp. ,37-9.
d syncategorematic [See: S69.]
expressions, The Philosophy of " 469-502. Frege ^
~ Review of w s''
7^"pCo®m9ntsonthI\?U"ne, "Semantics and Abstract extensi ón, P^feUcter of geometnc prmetples.
theory.synthettcuprmttcfi
valúes. 9^.ttg, ontoiogy, sense and denotation.
 273
A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHY. 1873-1966
.PKHOBBIBUOGRAPHV. IJ--^^^^^^^
Beth, E. W., "Hundred Years of Symbolic Logic", Dialéctica, 1 28. Bohncrt, H., "Carnap on Definan^ g^|j¡|pp (La Salle,
947), pp. 331-46. Frcgc topic; iogicism. PhUosophy n/P"''a'/«,o Vr^gc topic: psychoIog.sn>.
Opea Court, 1963), PP- " 5 7 (1948-9),
sémanlique ct sa portee philosophiqiic", Setaaatl^^ 29. Brltzclmayr, W„
(Arcluvio di filosofía, 1955), pp. 41-62. Frcgc topics: Freges pp. 50-7. Frcge topics: beurt
con n utions to logic and scmantics (general commcnis).
truth valúe. MhimatiVte(f^^^^'
~ Wiskunde, lógica en natiuirphilosophlc op iict Congres^ 30. Bmnschvicg, L.. Les ^ ^^Hables.
Nederlands tijdschrift voor wijsbegeerte F. Alean. 1922). Frege top.cs. fun
C on ^1^37-8). pp. I3(M2. Fregc topic: Frege's contri
but.onstothefoundat¡onsofmathemat¡cs. 31. Burlaamp. W..
^14 ngL°^ "Formal Logic and Matheniaws ^
::s';::^;i6S^nc.ions. ,3S).
and math atics, Fregc's infiucncc Frcge's
topics:on contributions
Hilbcrt. to
[See: SI3L] 32. Wirklichkeit ut
Frege topic: criticism ""^Kesan P:»"!'
(Stuttgart: Fronini^^"^®;
33.
logism. deflnition of number, psf [Countcss ven ZePP^l' ' ^ ppblished by ,959). «
1937,1949. 1951,1954- Paterna"' ,934). ,i,es.
1956, and Littlefiel ® p[s. couiscs-"
ofFormal in • n J^^P'^out of Logia and I. Bochenski, A . . g, edltlon: /.0g«e/ieS.,vi «^íprac/ie
¿ions.(^'conceP funcPOP^ ^.
ánd '6(1963), pp.491-502. Frcgc toP¡cs¿®„, analyticity. classes. Pp,ions, '^etheory.
truth functionc
"ons. [See:
re S54, S167.]functions, sense and deno definition of number, descr
sions, Iogicism, negatm ' jjjgtion. philosop^'y
Black, ivl, "pr» A ji<;trac^
Objects'"' O" Quine's 'Scmantics and A
■^c/e/iceí, 80 flQ-^n o/ the American Acadeniy of ' gg of
general terms. [See- ^5 topics: extensions, na Rudolf Carnap, ed. P- carnaP .5 .nflu
New YorkTHárcoTt^°'' ^' '°' " (^ondon: Kegan Pa"!'
í. ^' ^935). Frege topic: Iogicism.
.35. "Dle loSl^l^f'ppip'^ ivers® "[
Concepts", Dialogae, 2 O^gd pp. 91-105. Frege
middie. definition of 'concept', law of
.36. Meaning and 2ve p^^ge toP j ¡erchanB ^^potai
y.ob Review of A r-u ^'itroduction to Matheinaticalt íoS'^'
^ Press, ,947. 1966. l.icaime
descriptions,generáis ^^.^posi ^s, .^nse .« Cii«'
"
^ochenski, I. ^ p , . " HOÍ'
(Padé?' I9T91 Logic >37. Carruccio. E..
lop- ^ F. Sciin " cdition: Griindrif i¡-is temporary Thought (Ch ■
Frege topic; Frege', ^^54). French sketch ofFrege-slog'^"=%
Holland: F. G.cdition:
Kroonder, ^^49). 8248591
®'^^ntributionsto logic.
 A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1873-1966 2M
274 A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1873-1966
A49. Davidson, D., "nie Medtod of
A38. Cassirer, Eva, Review of G. E. M. Anscombe, An Introduction to The Philosophy of "Z i\l-Í9 Fiege topics: antimony
WittgensteirCs Tractatus, British Journal for the Philosophy of Illinois: Open Court, "")• PP^ contexts, paradox of
Science, 14(1963-4), pp. 359-66. Frege topic: assumption versus of the ñame relation, idenbty, oDiique
assertion. analysis, sense and denotation.
A39. ^urch.A., Connotation",¡n Encyclopaedia Britannica(Chicago» A50.
__ ..Theories of Meaning and
London, Toronto: Benton, 1960), vol. 6, p. 275. Frege topic:
sense and denotation. [See SI94.]
94. Frege topic. sense an ..7,0
A40.
•— Introduction to Mathematical Logic, vol. I(Princeton: Fritice-
"56, 1958, 1962). Frege topics: assertion Dedekind, R-, (A Lettcr from ■ pp 159-1. FrW
to equallty ofsenses, Frege's contribution
A51.
Axiomati^tion B,^,ffsscmt and Crund-
tion señla^" h'íí' oontexts,proper ñames,rule of " '0PÍc:Dedeto<'i,f^97,A52.]
lagen. [See. F7, .
' denotation,truth functlons,truth valúes, variables.
A41. ^PrefacetotheSecondE^-^^^^^
^femTrf'""^ Sd'dences", in I. Bocheñski et A52.
Zohlen?(fieena^-%lZ,
Dame I>r«s' )» pp. 3-11. Frege 'topic:
■"•■ana:propositions.
University of No w. W. Beman, m R. W'" , p,cge topic: the reiai
A42.
A Reply»^jcr^i 'Paradox of Analysis' work to Frege s Grunm g

A43.
of analysis
ys's. sen? P*
sense and denotation. Frege topics: identity,
[See: S302.] A53. Dummett, »x "Truth", (Englewood
PAS 59 a ^ ^ew Jersey: Prenüce-
of pw-
JSL 9 (1944\ Foundations of Phenomenolo0*^ posirions, relations, sense an
Frege's influence on ~ topics: Frege's concept of n"*"
A44.
^ critique of Husserl, psycholog'Strt*
Review of c T v.. . «a PiO' A54.
JSL 6 (Í94n Charles Sanders Peirce as a fíSilS'»» .í "í
Propositional function 161-2. Frege topic: invention
A45.
A55.
__Review Of & pp, 203-9. Fnig
8 (1943), pu "Note on Existence and R. Rhees, „ ^as-
oblique contexts ñrr. " '• ^^®8e topics: meanings, ordinary Boole, is the fath
. ' P^sitions, sense and denotation.
aw, R-
A46. ^Opi, ,4-j f A56.
sepnadi jilosofi' ...fopnien/o/ío^;«^.s logie.
"64), vol. 17, pp ¿'l°'«'-aal, México City, Sydney: Oto Enriques, HoU. "^P)- p.undotío'^
A57.
A47.
<^atello, H T "M ' os7) thal (New York. « Iniroducdon^^^-. Holt,
Zat he should study
t^Di^p" '-°»e:
«hh, o®*'® Introduction",toJPWittg®
tecommendation 5^ (¿n A58.
„Eves, H and C. V.Concepfs^ iUh'Qiopics.deO^
Aa'f""j^tíon of numbar.
A48.
A., Review pp
61
A66.] "P- '22-T5. Prege
pL'*' tppi^. Peference and Generaliiy<
pames> [S^
8243591
276 A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1873-1966
A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHY, I873-I966 2"
A70.
Oade.,K««
A59. Farber, M., The Foundation of PItenomenolofíy: Edmimd Husserl Bertrand Russelh^^- • • nepnnted(Ñew York: Harper &
the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Phihsophy (CanibridS®»
Mass^husette: Harvard University Press, 1943). Frcgc topics:
rege s criticism of Husserl, Frege's conccpt of numbcr.
A^.
n Kattsoff, A Phihsophy ofMaíhemaíics, A71.
::od:teln,R.."OnlPeHa.a.^
«ívmK r topics: definition of number, Fregc Lógica, Studia Dedícala P. ¿ as"The Nature
relatin ranges of valúes.
property, many-onc rclations, onc-to-on
Éditions du Griffon, I959¿PP¿^¿_ ¡„ the PMo^P^^
relations, of Mathematics m R- Lcicester
A61. hfalhemalics^i^'^^^ definition of number, P
der Philosophie imd der Mathematik
granune Frege topic: Frege's logistic P logism, sense, and denotati ^ Reprinted
A62. A72.
i„R p^, 1965), pp.
metiy in^tltó'lSh Trends in the Foundations oí Geo
ofScience ed F ^ethodology and Phdosop topi<íforroalization, 9"'°^*''°°"' . ^ ne BBe ofSciendfie
1962) pn'fíñ ? Stanford University
• Frege topic: Frege's criticism of Hilbei*t* Grünbaum, iA., Re
ReviewofH.Re'ehff®?¿{
j^^„,^„attca, 19 (1953). P 48.54. Frege
A63. A73.
F«to9*^n¿"ofmathematícalenüües.
S: SKñames,
identity, proper 32 (1958), pp. 157-72- Fr«««
propositions.
top.e:ex.steneeol
A64.

tteoiy on^ntiiy^^ PP- A74.

A65.

toPics:^MTcew''anfoh°"^"'
Perties of a concept '^"nctions,(1954-5),
marks ofpp.a 251-^-7^^
concep » A75. Hilbert, D.,..o UreFonndatíonS ofLo®;«''„f„,ole
53, Frege «oP"®.;J numW.
paradoxes,logic®»-
A66. 15 (1905), PP- "e"duction,
inferencebyeomp „«« wlogteal par3^ frzegl^
Stanach
•962). FtegeZní^ ^enerality athaca: Cornell Vaiversifí^gí
A67.
•^P"'".[rUw:14^]"'®'"'' expressions, tvvo K"""
«&a<í4t7« h'^ PP-
pp. 62-83 pl ■ -^PP^CDubuque,lowarW.C-
Anteriean
d,y.Ll«('9«'
swiptions, identiiv '®®®.'°P''s: concept and object, defin'^ jj. A77.
A68, •"j'»naming
®"cAícAre der n ■ ' 21""
l''!''"'"''erijdi,r¡g"'¡!'''f"^* Jena, 1548I58-I9SS: FestS"^ ^g),
h^lr' P- ''28; vol,_ n.
•j^bilitation^F n"'"^"}'>l>ilaum
PP- US and 584.(Jena: G.topicf-
Frege Fischer. 's A78.
1900-1). Frege top. rflndiw^dWes .op.
ates m Freg^.j car¿r"^'°"'^'®®®'® Predecessors,some «nP . - «The Comparís^ 2(1952-3); PP
A69. A79.
®eymonat, L «i thedefimtionoí
identity, platonism. •^®' «""4
® e delle ten®"'®
(1952), pp. 280-8. Fteg® liCS'

sense and denotation.

278 A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1873-1966 .
A frege
FREOt BIBLIOGRAPHY. 1873-1966
u«fTnPÍc" "9
ia Encyclopaedia
ASO. Isimoto, A.,"Kindai ronrigaku no tenbó"["A Survey of Modern A93. Kemeny. J-, ™ronto: Bentok 19«». ™'-
Lo^c ]Sisó, 347(1953), pp. 97-106. Frege topic: Frcge's contri BrUamica (Chicago. ' ^ denotation.
butions to modem logic. pp. „3c-1130. Frege topto. sen.
ASI. Johansen, H., "D¡e Russellschc Thcorie der definiten Desknp- A94. Kneale. W.. "The f^^do;.. G. AUen and Un^ni
tionen vom Standpunkt der Sprachwissenschaft aus betrachtet , Philosophy, ed. H. D. 237-61- Frege topi •
18(1952), pp. 32-58. Fregó subjects: definite descriptions, sense New York; MacmiUan. 19361. w
and denotation, thoughts. influence on logic. « ondon: Hutchinson
<! 7»e
Komer. S.. The Pliilosopliy
■r^' of^topics-dasse^
crege -ijcses definition. defim-
^(iflcation.
A82. Jorgensen, J.,"Einige Hauptpunkte der Entwicklung der fórmale" A95.
University Librad, l»^" ^ciple of abstracuon. fiuantdica
o^k seit Boole", E 5(1935-6), pp. 131-42. Frege topic: Frege üonofnumber.log.c.sni,pr>n9P
contnbutions to formal logic. sense and denotation- ...Qn die Prohlem
A83.
Pp"4^7 frege
^ topic:
® '/'Logic andlogicPsychology", 7 "Zagadni
Kraszewski.Z-,.., enie intensjnnjttoofc l sense^andp de-ge
f d,-n3ítozolfcr"«'
Frege's and its purposes. 27 (191'^)' A96.

A84. "'■-■"ir?»—"'»"-"'
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A85.
A97. Kreisel. G-. Review ^ ^86- Ftege top
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logic.* ' contributions to the advancement in Frege's system- P • «"^^.feontri-
A86.
A98. Küng. G..
Springer. 1963)-
nntipsyehoto®^¿^i
jelations wi
n. fun^»^
(ification. seos
20 Numbers and the Principies of Mathematie^
butions to logic. Fre^^ p„position.
A87.
20(1911), ^y^'cism in Modern
logism. ' topics: definition of numbers,P A99.
A88.
Revievv of P vr * iktett
a-^aki^^ ",he Historycálculos,
positional of q [Sce=Comparac^ mdianjopic-
and
^issenschaften, i¿20^ng^'tf'^ iogischen Grundlagen
numbers.[Seo: All2] ' LReviewofP^-21(1956). PP-^^'
A89. AlOO.
western PW'°^°P¿r \soc: A79-] ^es:
» ^61(1952), pp. 57-71. Frege '"P'"' definition of num fOy^boUc Log" chapí«' ^^p¡cs:
A90. Kamhflrt 1 p «.p. ,.
^ambartel, Russell on definite descriptio" •
«^izaa"» AlOl. Lewis. C-1-. '^^^7Í9Í8)- P'Pp"'¿Utable.
^^undlegung dlr
1^63), pp. viUta
Herausgebers", in
F- Kambartel(Hamburg: F.f' d
,^ein®^' of(NewCn«f°' "'® ^-^r; and I-odd^'
York-D and ^.s'ílation to Peano an ¡¡^ pUlo-
fege's logic^ ' topic: comparison of Bolzan Frege's log'® proposi^"®^'„ jeiseyt
A91.
K^aplan, t>. «p^, ^ ^ ^eles' Frege's symbohsm Necf Cliffa. Ne^jQ, «f
^ «'Entailí"®"^ „j ck (FnS
J964). Doctoral ^^ssertation, Lewy, C., ^ gd. M. ,83^97. Freg topic- n
^^ssertation,ofUCLA.
Intensíonal
FregeLogic"
topic: Frege,s se
A102.
tics. 19kj¡(ions-
19f
A92. Prentice-wai.
Kattsoff L r •I self-identity P
N«1off.'l95QXeTnpics:
'!" functionsofand
Reality (The neS
variables,
 A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1873-1966 A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHY. 1873-1966 281
Lmke, P., "Die Implikation ais cchte Wcnn-so-Bczichung", Al 12. Natorp, P., Die losischert Griindlagen der exakten Wissenschaften
Wissenschafüiche Zeitschrift cler Friedrich-Schiller-Üniversitát (Leipzig and Berlín: Teubner, 1910). Fregc topic: logicism. [See:
Jena, 3(1953-4), pp. 107-8. Fregc topic: thc mcaning of 'if-thcn' SI52, SI98. Revicw: A88.]
statements.
Al 13. Ogdcn, C. K. and 1. A. Richards. The Meaning of Meaning(New
cbchaub
u (Chicago and Epistcmology", in Philosophy Toda}\ ed. E. York: Harcourt, Bracc, 1923, 1926, 1930, 1936, 1946, 1960; Lon
London: Opcn Court, 1928), pp. 359-92. don: Routicdgc and Kegan Paúl, 1949). Fregc topic: sense and
is is a rcpnnt of"Thc Prcsent Status of Logic and Epislemology denotation.
in Germany", MO 36 (1926), pp. 222-55. Fregc topics: anti-
psychoíogism, concepis and functions, formal logic, Fregc's in- A114. Pací, E.,"Fondazionc econstruzionc lógica del mondo in Carnap .
nsseri, lógica! iaws, logicism, meanings of thc tcrm in Lógica e analisi(Archivio di Filosofia, 1966), pp. 95-107. Frege
topics: Fregc's infiuence on Camap, Husscrls critique of Frege,
scnse and denotation.
Philosophischc Wissenschaft?", Wissenschafdiche
PP Al 15. Pap, A., Semanfics and Necessary Trnth (New Haven: Yale
pp. 25 38 Fregc topics: assertion,judgcmcnts.Jena, 2 (1952-3),
25-38. University Press, 1958), pp. 44-6, 214-1. Frege topics. analyticity,
definition, paradox of analysis.
6(1951 7^ « fUr philosophische ForschwiS^
de ín Wissanschamche Zeitschrift A1I6. Peano, G., "Studii di lógica matemática", Atíi delta Reale Áccade-
3 (1953^), PP. oda delíe Scienze di Torino, 32 (1896-7), pp. 565-83. Reprmted
laws of thought anTllws'of^gif^ judgcmcnts m logic, in G. Peano, Opere scelte (Rome: Edizioni Cremonese, 1958),
vol. II, pp. 201-17. Germán translation by G. Bohlmann and
A. Schiepp, in G. Peano, Angelo Genocchi Differentialrechmng
Mathenmtik", in FIATRevie'o of ttnd Gnmdzilge der Integralrechnung (Leipzig. 1899), pp. •
Dieterich'sche Vprl u " ^athematics,Part 1(Wiesbade Frege topics: Frege's logic, Frege's versas Peano's use of material
the connection het ^^'^S),pp. 11-22. Fregetopic- implication.
to Schroter and "ot'on of a mathematical theory due
and ideas of Fregc. AU7. Peters, F., "Russell on Class Theory", S 15 (1963), pp. 327-35.
lation Gmyter, 1958). Engüsh tranS' Frege topic: relation-concepts.

topics: D. Reidel, 1965 ■ AllS. Popovich, M.V.,"Philosophic Aspects of the Problem of Me£mmg
propositions, truth valuL'^^' '^'^scriptions, extensions, intensión »
— .M-IUV-S. and Sense", Soviet Stiidies in Philosophy, 1 (í963), PP. 23 -
Marshall, W. R^v; Frege topics: extensional logic, identity, ñames, objects, sense
Modern Logic" /^aTr^iü' "Two Ways of OntologV denotation, truth valúes.
ness of functions ln»;r>on ^1~2. Fregc topics: incomP ® ® A1I9. Prior, A. N., Formal Logic(Oxford: Clarendon Press,
x._. ^
Martín, o.
' S Uy complex objects. [See: S208.]
G. "Met. .• . Frege topics: axioms of propositional calculas, class '
Síudium Genérale, ^^obleme der Metaphysik der Zahl' conjunction, levels of concepts, postúlate sets for lógica »
Abhandlungen (Coloenp G. Martin, Gesatvmed proof of Frege's third axiom, proper ñames, propositiona un -
125-36. Frcge topic: logicism^ Gniversitats Verlag, 1961). PP* tions, truth functions.
l^ates, B., stoir t A120. Quine, W. V., "Carnap and Lógica! Truth", m The P n P
Pfess, 1953, 1961) FrP .^"geles: University of CaliforP'^ of Rudolf Carnap, ed. P. A. Schilpp (La Salle,
and denotation. * ^^ms: conditionals, predicates, sen Court, 1963), pp. 385-406.Italian translation in Rmsta difi F »
48 (1957), pp. 3-29. Frege topic: logicism.

■ ■■
 ^ tv..

A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1 873-1966 A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1873-1966 283

Quine, W. V., From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard Univcrsity Press, 1953, 1961). Frcge
topics: ancestral of a relation, definitíon of number, idcnlity con-
texts, individua! concepts, logicism, nanilng, oblique contcxts,
ontolo^ propositions, reference to truth valúes, thcory of classes.
Lbee: SISO.]
Identity, Ostensión and Hypostasis",7^47(1950), pp- 621-
"age topic: identity. [See: S36, S81.]
A131. "Whitciicad and the Riso of Modern Logic", in The Philo-
sophy of Al/red North Whitehead, cd. P. A. Schilpp (New York:
Tudor. 1944). pp. 125-63. Frcge topic: Frcgc's versus Whitchead's
logic.
A132. Revicw of A. Church, "A Formulation of the Simple Theory
of Typcs", JSL 5 (1940). pp. 114-15. Frcge topics: class ab
straction. Frcgcan approach to a thcory of typcs, functional
abstraction, relational abstraction, relations, truth valúes.

Ffiií- in Encyclopedia Americana, Intemational A133. Quinten, A., "The A Priori and the Analytic", PAS 64 (1963-4),
ta r,to symbolic logic.
butions 17. pp- 690-6, Frege topic: Frcge's contri- pp. 31-54. Frege topic: analyticlty.
AI 34. Rabus, L., Die neuesíen Besírebungen auf dem Gebiete der Logik
UniverJtí^p^''^' 21o^/c (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard bei den Deiiíschcn und die logische Froga (Erlangen: 1880). Frege
^rsanH T' T"- ''''■ 15®')- topics: abstraction, topics: asscrtiblc contcnls, asscrting. judging.
inclusión-ihh" liefinitíon of number, descriptions, A135. Rcscher. N. and J. Thomson, Rcview of V. Valpola. "Über
mathematical™'a 'ogicism, material implication, Ñamen", JSL 16 (1951), pp. 212-13. Frege topics: logical truth,
Ct'Sl ancestral, proper ancestral, proper ñames, sense and denotation.
useandmentioatsTe%''l03.r A136. R-ovighi, S. V., "Capitolo sccondo", of La filosofia di Edmmid
)7ork: Holt, Rinchart and Winston, Husserl (Milán: Societá Editrice, 1939). Frege topic: Frege s
critique of Husscrl's Pbilosophie der Aritbmetik. [See. F-4.]
material implication ' "ic^nings, quantification,
of number, logicism,
truth functions. A137. Russcll, B., Introduction to Af£í//ie/uíi//Cíi/ Philosophy (London:
61 (19^^00^'^ Reduction and the World of Numbers", JP G. Alien, 1919). Frege topic: logicism.
logy. ' topics: definitíon of number, onto AI38. "Logic as the Essence of Philosophy", in Oiir Knoicledge of
the Externa! World{Lonáon: G. Alien, 1914). Reprinted m
i'i Logic from Aristotle to Russell, ed. R. Jager (Englewood CliHs,
(Woodstock Loglc and Modera Logic New Jersey: Prcntice-Hall, 1963), pp. 120-39. Frege topic: pro-
vii. Frege topie-- Fr«et' College Press, 1952), PP- v-
"^^80 s contnbutlon to logic. positions.

American Objects", Proceedings of

■ ~ "My Mental Development", in The Philosophy of P^tírand
Pusseli, ed. P. A. Schilpp (London: Tudor, 1944, 1951), pP- 3-20.
Frege^topics rnamingg, {ni? ^^iences,
ontology, sense 80 (1951),truth
and denotation, PP-val9^'
úes. Reprinted (New York: Harper and Row, 1963). Frege topic.
RusselPs relation to Frege.
vard University prefs^^fí? (Cambridge,ancestral
axiom of infinitv c]J. .u
Massachusetts: Har-
of a relation. -—"On Denoting", M 14 (1905), pp. 479-93. Repr'nted in
Readings in Philosophical Anolysis, ed. H. Feigl and . c
abstraction, law of concretT^^^'°"' definition of number, function (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), pp. 103-15, and
also in Meaning and Knoicledge, Systematic Readings in
tenw/ogy, ed. E. Nagcl and R. Brandt (New York: Harcou ,
pp. 267-79. Frege
^ singular terms '^
Thcory", JSL 21 (1956).
functional abstraction, sentences Brace and World. 1965), pp. 78-87. Frege topics: definite aescnp-
tions, denoting expressions, sense and denotation. [ ee. ,
SH6, S147, S258.]
 ^Mi

284 A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1873-1966 A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1873-1966 285

A141. Schnelle, H., Zeichensysteme zur wissenschaftlichen Darstellung A152. Stanosz, B.,"Znaczcnie i oznaczanie a paradoks mtensjonalnoáci
(Stuttgart and Bad Connstatt: F. Frommann, 1962). Frege topic: ["Meaning and Dcsignation and the Paradox of Intension^ity J,
Frege's symbolism. Síudia filozoficznc, 2 (1965), pp. 19-48. Frege topics: Frege s
A142. Scholz, H., Geschichte der Logik (Berlín: Junker and Dünnhaupt, logic and semantics, intensionality, sense and denotation.
1931). Frege topic: Frege's contributions to logic. A153. Stegmüller, W., Das Wahrheitsproblem und die Idee der Semantik
(Vicnna: Springer, 1957). Frege topic: sense and denotation.
A143. - Die klassische deutsche Philosophie und díe neue Logik »
in Actes du congrés international de philosophie scientifigue {Paris. A154. Stcrnfeld, R., "Philosophical Principies and Techniwl Problems
^i5), vol. 8, pp. 1-8. Frege topic: Frege's contributions to logic. in Mathcmatical Logic", Meíhodos, 8 (1956), pp. 2 - . rege
[Review: SI74.] topic: Frege versus Russell and Godel on classes.
A144. "Die Wissenschaftslehre Bolzanos", Mathesis Universalis A155. Strawson, P. F., Individuáis (London: Metliuen, 1959, reprinte^
^asel Stuttgart: Benno Schwabe, 1961), pp. 219-67. Frege topic: New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1963. Frege topics: concepts and
Frege's cntique of Hilbert. objects, proper ñames, subject-predicate, saturated an unsa u
rated entities. [See: 8298.]
A145. —- Zur Erhellung des Verstehens", in Geistige Gesíalten und
A156. Tarski, A„ Introduction to Logic and to the
n Geburtstag, ed. H. Wenke Oeductive Scienccs, trans. O. Helmer (Oxford. Ox or ^ niv
mathema ics, propositions,
Meyer,symbolic logic,291-310.
1942), pp. Frege topics:
truth valúes. Press, 1941). Frege topic: Frege's contributions to logic.
A146. &homerus. F., IVetdm und IVesen der Carl-Zeiss-Stiflung (StuK- Al57. Thomson,J. F., Review of R.Rudner,"On Sinn as a Combination
of Physical Properties", JSL 18 (1953), p. 89. Frege topic. se
the Carl¿TssS¡ftun¿ and denotation. [See: S238.]
AI47.
A158. Review of D. S. Shwayder, JSL 21
Frege topics: proper ñames, sense and denotation.[ ee.
clac<í u- J i^Oo). Frege topics: cardinal numbers,
of symbolic logic. impü-
AI59. Thomson, J. and N. Rescher, Review of .2,^^
Ñamen", JSL 16 (1951), pp. 212-13. Frege topics: lógica
crUiqiie of Frege"" universal propositions, Venns proper ñames, sense and denotation. [See: A161.]
A148. Al60. Thompson, M. H. Jr., "The Logical Paradoxes and ®
O""®' Matters", /"i"'''-''' Semiotic", JP 46 (1949), p. 520. Frege topic: Frege versus
on Wittgenstein fu 'opics: definition, Frege's influence on functions.
notation. ' ñames, propositions, sense and de- AI6I. Valpola, V.,"ÜberÑamen:Eine logischeUntersuchung ,
A149. ^cademiae Scientiarum Fennicoe, ser. B, 68 (1950). reg®
0^3^46 Functions",
PP «-46. Frege top.c: propositional PAS, SV 34 (1960),
functions. logical truth, proper ñames,sense and denotation.[Review.
A150.
A162. tVenn, J.], Books on Logic Presented to the Library
ír«d/ej(MÓy«ooi)"6'^®««'®" iukasiewicz", PhUosopMcal (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1889).
topic: Frege works owned by Venn.
relation to
A163.
A151. ^aismann, F.,"How I See Philosophy", in Contemporary Brit^
Quartevly, 4 (196^"^^^ 57 Bhilosophy,ed. H.D.Lewis(London: G. Alien and Unwm, '
pp. 447-90. Reprinted in Logical Positivism, ed. A. . ,•
and ímperatives. ' question Vork: Free Press, 1959). Frege topic: Frege and philosophie
method.
 I.

A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1 873-1966 A FREGE BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1 873-1966 287

Waisimnn, F., Introduction to Mathematical Tliinking, trans. A173. - Tractaíus Logko-Phiiosophicus (Annalcn dcr Naturphilo-
i' í".., Harpcr, 1959). English translation of sophic. 1921). English trans. byC. K. Ogden(London, 1922,1933).
'^^athematisdw Dcnken (Vicnna: F. Ungar, English translation by D. Pcars and B. McGuinncss (London.
y.36). Italian translation of this work: huroduzione al peiisiero Romlcdgc and Kcgan Paúl. 1961, 1963). Prcgc topics: definitions
matemático (Turin. 1939). Prcgc topics: critique of formalism, and thc introduction of signs. Frege's logic, functions, generality.
definitmn of numbcr, iogicism. [Revicw: S85.] judgcmcnt strokc, rules of infcrence, logiatl constants, logical
— ofLinguisíic Phihsophy(London; Macmillan; objccls. ñames, propositions. scnsc and denotation, truth valúes.
j r¡ . s, 1965). Prcgc topics: conccpt and objcct, ^^174. von Wright, G. H., Den logiska í'/np/r/ivíií'/i: En /ifíVHí/ríAím/í^ /
^ number, dclimitation of conccpts, formalism, funda- niodern /ihsofi [Logivcd Empiricism: A Lcading Movernent in
sophy ^ogic, meaning, ñames, thc task of philo- Modeni Phihsophy](Helsinki, 1943). Prcgc topic: logicism.
^*75. —— "Ludwig Wittgenstein, a Biographical Sketch", PR 64(1955),
^^145 '7^^ ^'''omatization of Arithmetic", JSL 22 (1957), pp. 527-45. Prcgc topic: Frege's advice to Wittgenstein.
das 1 '-^nalytic-synthctic,ancestral ofa rclation, ^^76. Zilli, "L(; attitudini proposizlonali", Rassegno di filosofía,
to DedekinH
lo '■
uedekind,:logicism, definition of numbcr, Prcgc's rclation
rclation. 6(1957), pp. 338-54. Prcgc topics: definite descriptions, sense and
denotation.
dedicata^^^ Fundamental Studies", in Lógica, studia
pp. 262-93 Switzerland: GrilTon, 1959),
Frese's Copies: dasses, conccpts, definition of numbcr,
reIations,typetye°oryo?p?e^^^^^^^^^^ '''''''''''
Sense^nd D^noTat^oí' Formulation of the Logic of
g tne Pregean'approach. [Scc: S67.]
developingtheFrcpp. PP"

chusetts: F/n7ojoj!?/iy (Cambridge, Massa-

ticity, Freee's ar» Press, 1956). Prego topics: analy-
and synonymy loeid!"*^ existence of meanings, identity
m, sense and denotation, truth valúes.

A 12(1951) !
S202.] '' '"®Se topic: sense and denotation. [Ses-

pp. 329-47. Freee^tn"^ Naming Relation", Inquiry, 7(1964),

positions. Frege's influence on Wittgenstein,
Wittgensteln L ;
ed. G. E m' Anc ^ Foundations of Mathematics,
York: Macmillan 1956?'/' E- M. Anscombe (New
truth, laws of thñ kf i topics: immediate realization o
number, straight linel ¡siefsHS

Y '*'» '•
V , r-,y^ ■
 INDEX

Abbe, E., 3, 4 f., f, n., 8. 16. 42 f. Dclbocuf, J., 41 n., 232

Angclelli, I., 1 n., 2 n.. 4 n., 8 n., 50 n.. DcMorgan, A., 41 n., 217, 237
n-, 67 n. Desearles, R.. 24
Anscombe. G. E. M 53 Dinglcr. H.. 6 n., 7 n., 50
Aquinas, T., 236 Dudman, V. H., 90 n., 93 n., 218 n..
Arisioilc, 12, 50. 62. 109. 119 f., 236 f. 219 n., 221 n., 223 n., 224 n., 228 n.,
Austm. J. L.. 25 n.. 26 n., 28 n. 230 n., 231 n.
Avenanus, R., 7 n., 21 n. Dummcit, M., 238
^3con, F., 105 Ellis, 41 n.
7 n., 43. 46 Erdniann, B., 35, 46
' n., 86 n., 87 n.. Erhardt, F., 6 n.
89n. Euckcn, R., 6 n.
*3n.. Eudid. 36, 57 n., 85
18 n., 121
1IR n., 124'
n.,106
126n.,
n., 113
128 n., Falckenberg, R.,6 n., 7 n.
Baif®"' í74n.. l92n.
"aurnann, J. j., 24 n
Fano, 38 n.
Fischer, 3
Berkeley, o 177
BcrnouiiU., 24n.n. Fortlage, C,5 n., 6 n.
^etiazzí. 38 n Frcge, Alfred, 1, 3, 20, 51
Frcge, Arnold, 2
Frege, A. B., 2
^'ei^ann. O.. 43 46 Fregó, C. G. E., 2
Booíe"G ■ '-M-.'237-8 Frege, K. A., 2
Frcge, M. L., 20 n., 50 n.
41 n i' 1®!"- 21 íf., 24 n., Furth, M., 35 n., 47 n., 104 n., 192 n.
218 270 r 5' 210,
238* ' 228 ff., 234, 236,
Galileo, G., 236
^rentano, F. 44 r Galois, E., 58 n. .
"ynum, A., 209 Geach, P., 13 n., 79, 103 n., 124 n..
125 n., 126 n., 131 n.
Geuther, 3, 5 n.
Gíudice, 38 n.
Grassmann, H., 231 .
Grassmann, R.,24.41 n., 88, 210.223.
chívl-;^' "•• 228
Günther, S., 41 n., 210
Gutzmer, A., 6 n.

Haeckel, E., 3 n., 4 n., 5 n.

Halsted, 41 n.
Hankel, H., 46
Hauber, 210
Haussner, R.» 6 n.
Kermes. H-, 1 n.. 4 n.7 n.. 50 n.
Hilbert, D.,7,25n..43,50f.
Hobbes, T., 24 n.
290 ^
NDEX INDEX 291
Honigswaid, R., 7 n. Venn. J., 18 f., 30,41 n., 49,76 f.. 234-5
Hoppe R j7 21 oc íT -jj Peircc, C. S.. 41 n.. 65 n., 70 n., 222. Whilchead. A. N., 16, 49, 52, 69 n.
230. 232. 237 Vivanti. 38 n. Wicncr, P. P.. 58 n., 59 n., 62 n., 69 n,
209-10 ' 38,
Hume, D., 24 Pililo of .Vlcgara, 70 ^oss, 3, 4 n. Witlgcnstein. L., 1, 7, 14, 33, 48, 52 f.
Huntington, E. V., 7 n Pilt/, A., 6 n. Wundl. W., 223 n., 229, 232
Pohlc, H., 34 Waismann. F. 15
H"^^"I,E..I,7,28,3Í.42fr.,49f. Porctzky. 41 n. J., 6 n Z ciss, C., 3 n., 42 f.
^ebcr. 3, 4 n. Zciss, R., 43
Quine, W. V., 65 n,, 236 Weicrstrass, K. T. W.. 43, 46 Zcrmelo, E., 53
Jourda¡„.P.,7n,_,3„
Rabus, L., 94
Rand, R., 31 n.
Kant.rB.,24.
Kfry, 31,126,168,217
34 '" Rau, R., 6 n.
|fe™,F.,7n., 21 n.
Kneale, M., 236-7
Rcin, W., 6 n.
Rhces, R., 238
Kneale,W.,29n., 73 236 7 Ricckc, 3, 4 n. „
^och,7n.,43 Russcll, B., 1,7. 13 n.. 14 0-. 20,28
30n.,33,37n.,38,46-50,
Koebner, 7 n
^orselt, A.,7n., 50 f. 69 n., 79
Kossak, 43, 46
Krain, 3 SchaeíTcr, H., 3, 6 n.
ScheíTcr, H. M., 70 n.
í^ge. L., 31 Schcibc, 7 n.
Tánger, p., s n Scheler, M.. 6 n.
Langford, C. H., 48 Schering, 3 f.
Schlomilcli, O., 7 n., 21 n.
28. 210-12, 220 Schmid, E., 5 n.
®.26,88,9rf "ff., 62, Schmidt, M., 5 n.
213, 218 ff., 236 105, 210, Schcennics, A., 51
c. I., 48 5;^^^ Scholz, H., 3, 34 n.
Liard, 41 n.
Schottcn, H., 34 n.
f-iebmann, o., 6 n Schrader, E., 6 n. ^
Lieseburg, M.,20' Schróder, E., 12, 16, 18 f-. 221"
}'^"ke,P.,6n; 41 n., 43, 45 f., 49, 56 n.,^ '
focke. J., 24 90, 91 n., 93 f., 97 ff., n7n.,
H., 3, 224 218-32, 238
Lowenheim, L., 7 50 Schubcrt, H., 43, 46
Schultze, F., 6 n.
^acColl H Al Seeger, H., 9
Snell, C, 3, 4n., 5, 6n., 8, 16
Stoh, H., 6 n.
Stoh, V., 6 n.
S^'ítl^6'iP'2-i8
Moore, E. H.'sj' "■
Strasburger, 5 n.
Tannery, P., 17, 30, 232-4
41 n. Thomae, J., 6, 8, 46, 50 f.
Nidditch, p 40 Thomas, I., 237-8 p.
^"IH. H., 6 ñ!*® Trendelenburg, F. A., 15 n-,
^asch, 7 Ulrici, H., 7n., 21 n.
Peano, g., i 7 1 Uschmann, G., 1 n., 8 n., 50 n-
46.49.5r''2®"-'3l,37-41. 42f.. Vailati.G., 7, 38n., 50f. 182:
Van Heijenoort, J., 72n., 1 ''