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This report reviews the naval planner's basic "menu" of operational antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) strategical choices. Basic ASW strategies, discussed from a historical
perspective, are: (1) destruction of the submarine (2) containment of the submarine,
and (3) limiting the submarine's efficiency. The report has been prepared for
inclusion in.the International Military and Defense Encyclopedia (IMADE), scheduled for
publication by Pergamon-Brassey's in 1991-91
Li^esslon F0I
NTIS GRA*i
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by Jan S. Breemer
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA
Introduction
Ami-Submaring Warfare
Historical Background
All things equal, the preferred ASW strategy is one that results
in the physical destruction of the submarine — the outcome is
permanent and, with the underwater opponent eliminated, resources
can be released for other wartime duties. Strategies of destruction
have also proven to be the most difficult and risky; depending on the
quality and quantity of the opposing submarine force, its complete
elimination may take more time and tie up more sources than can be
afforded. A different kind of risk may be associated with "strategic"
ASW against strategic missile submarines. The destruction (or even
the threat of destruction) of this particular type of submarine, claim
some commentators, undermines the stability of mutual strategic
deterrence, and could force a decision to "use-them-instead-of-lose-
them."
10
work and seek shelter. One of the hoped-for effects of the Allied city
bombings was the lowering of the morale and hence fighting
efficiency of U boat crews.
11
destroy the "Milch Cows"- the U-boats' fuel replenishment
submarines.
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3. Chairman 10
Department of National Security Affairs (Code 56)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5100