Art 2 - 4 Cases

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F.
Cardenas. 1 As ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to
the solemnization of their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was declared in
default. Trial proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated
without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of
the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage,
license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the
name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to
Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the
couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter,
the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's
brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her
marital status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar,
regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that
there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro
Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO
who were allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged
(s)upportive marriage license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as
said license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
(Sgd)
CENON
A D.
QUINT
OS
Senior
Civil
Registry
Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to
apply for a license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the
marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish the
alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It
ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that
there was no marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that the
certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the
marriage between the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel
the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that the
certification issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record
adequately proved that no such license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court for
relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of private respondent Castro that she had no
part in the procurement of the subject marriage license. Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the
uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption
regarding the validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void, respondent
appellate court disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar,
regularly performed his duties when he attested in the marriage contract that marriage license no.
3196182 was duly presented to him before the solemnization of the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued
by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F.
Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations
was the New Civil Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage
license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage,
absence of a license would render the marriage voidab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a record
or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove
its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed by an officer having
custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry
of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a
register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter
alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant
data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative
value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his
office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not
a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly
due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil
ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as
a "secret marriage" — a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage
celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties.
The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of
the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against her.
Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the
petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly
declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate
in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion
between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the
contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a
spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been
presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage
license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by
respondent appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000]
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO
SY, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision[1] dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144,
whichaffirmed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the
petition[3] for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973
at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. [4]Both were then 22 years old. Their union was
blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14,
1978,respectively.[5]
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later at
San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga.[6]
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately,
and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his
father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15,1988, and from then on, lived with his father. [7]
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil Case No. 7900
before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action
was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the grounds that her husband abandoned
her without just cause; that they have been living separately for more than one year; and that they
voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated September 29, 1983, containing the rules
that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. [8] Judgment was rendered dissolving their
conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based on the
Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses.[9] The trial court also granted custody of the
children to Filipina.[10]
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in the
afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her
husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While
she was talking to her son,the boy ignored her and continued playing with the family computer. Filipina
got mad, took the computer away from her son, and started spanking him. At that instance, Fernando
pulled Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also
claimed that her husband started choking her when she fell on the floor, and released her only when he
thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on different parts of her body as
a result of the blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr.
James Ferraren. She said it was not the first time Fernando maltreated her. [11]
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision [12] dated April 26, 1990, convicted Fernando
only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Edpmis
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent, docketed as Civil Case
No. 8273,on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by
respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable cause for more
than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision [13] dated December
4,1991, granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued
a decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their
son Frederick to respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition[14] for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment rendered by
the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal separation, and
Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which ledto the conviction of her husband for slight
physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of her
husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her
without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her,
performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological
incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest
thereafter.[15]
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision [16] dated December 9, 1993, denied
the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It stated that
the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute psychological incapacity which
may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Lexjuris
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In the
decision[17]of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner concerning
respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify
a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals
held that petitioner failed to show that the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at
the time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial court that the
couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years from the date of the celebration of
their marriage. And prior to their separation in 1983, they were living together harmoniously. Thus, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court which it found to be in accordance with law and
the evidence on record.[18]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[19] which the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution dated
November 21, 1996.[20]
Hence, this appeal by certiorari[21] wherein petitioner now raises the following issues: Jurismis
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY

OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE
PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT
FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON
BY APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO
APPELLEE [herein respondent];

MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW
THAT THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED
OR WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN
1973;Jjjuris

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE
LOWER COURT THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE
COURT BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND
ALSO BELIEVES THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT A
REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND
5.WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V.COURT OF APPEALS (240 SCRA

20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO.[22]
In sum, two issues are to be resolved: justice
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for
lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage
celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license
at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of the actual celebration of their
marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and
incongruous. Jksm
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this
would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, [23] in a number of instances, we have relaxed
observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect
and promote substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain rules ought not to be applied with severity
and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their existence would be defeated. [24]Hence, when
substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities should
not be subject to cavil.[25] In our view, the case at bar requires that we address the issue of the validity of
the marriage between Fillipina and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of
a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict between
the parties. Note, however, that here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a
declaration of their effects according to existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of marriage
before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of the
marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning,
she points out that these critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted before the court.
The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in
their marriage contract which was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial. [26] The
date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973,
is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition
for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's answer
admitting it.[27]This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her
direct examination,[28] as follows: Es m
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married on November
15,1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's and
daughter's birth certificates, which are also attached as Annexes " B" and "C" in the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and
"C" in the course of the trial.[29] These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on
the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal
requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that
the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor
private respondent ever resided in Carmona.[30]
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner did not
expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the
actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the
documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after
the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was
indeed contracted without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these
dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code[31] is clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of
an exceptional character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be
classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79[32] of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under
Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning. Es msc
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are the birth
certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were
marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which shows that these have been examined and
admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been made as to their authenticity and due
execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court when she
affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of
the view, therefore, that having been admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely object
thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein. [33]
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain us. It is
mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized. Esmm is
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, dated December 9,1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the Court
of Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside. The
marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap and private respondent
Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of celebration. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19
May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas
and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and
Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D.
Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and
Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never
applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any
marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the
solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were married
civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 1969 5 at the Most Holy
Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of Manila
and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having
been married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant
[Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the city
hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain
Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's father accompanied them,
and who, together with another person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That although
marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated
in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any marriage license,
(Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the
Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael
D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever
issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed, this time in church
rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills,
Quezon City, where they executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same marriage
license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and expenses for the church wedding and
reception were jointly shared by his and defendant's parents. After the church wedding, he and
defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in
March 1970. As his parents continued to support him financially, he and defendant lived in Spain
for some time, for his medical studies. Eventually, their marital relationship turned bad because it
became difficult for him to be married he being a medical student at that time. They started living
apart in 1976, but they underwent family counseling before they eventually separated in 1978. It
was during this time when defendant's second son was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned.
Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against defendant in the United States in 1981 and later
secured a judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his service was
engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage, he
made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed marriage license
was obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious
wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7,
1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and
received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued Certifications dated
March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that
"no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy
Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and
defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it
noted that it was a "purely religious ceremony, having been civilly married on May 19, 1969 at the
City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19,
1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the
Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael
Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic relationship
after they met and were introduced to each other in October 1968. A model, she was compelled
by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose
her, asked her to run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on
her family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to Manila, she and
plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told
her not to worry. Her parents were hostile when they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla
convinced them that she will take care of everything, and promised to support plaintiff and
defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry him in civil rites,
without the knowledge of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969,
before a minister and where she was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had
lunch and later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the church wedding,
which the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged, since defendant's mother just came from
hospital. Her family did not participate in the wedding preparations. Defendant further stated that
there was no sexual consummation during their honeymoon and that it was after two months
when they finally had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their
wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98,
p. 15) for some traumatic problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has
unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he would take endless
pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in between the knees which she
called "intrafemural sex," while real sex between them was far and between like 8 months, hence,
abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant
attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad
temper who breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines,
benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then would take barbiturates
or downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away from drugs but failed
as it has become a habit to him. They had no fixed home since they often moved and partly lived
in Spain for about four and a half years, and during all those times, her mother-in-law would send
some financial support on and off, while defendant worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who
was supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff
physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in their marriage. Later, she learned
that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of his
daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they
returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since. His grandsons
practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he has supported his daughter's expenses
for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's
family that attended to all the preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her sister
with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed in civil rites some time prior to the
church wedding. She also stated that she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff inspite of
the marital differences between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable differences
with defendant and in order for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce each other;
that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the United States on June 14, 1983
(Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a certain
Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During his adverse testimony, plaintiff
identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Civil Registrar
of San Juan, that the marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the
marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious. 6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial court
made the following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence of
a license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the various certifications (Exhs.
"I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of San
Juan, and the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no.
2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on
the marriage contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was
fictitious. Such a certification enjoys probative value under the rules on evidence, particularly
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and
Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19,
1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B.
Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite
marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the
registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in
accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the
Office of the Solicitor General for its record and information. 7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court of
Appeals disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained
that: "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is
overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan
testified that they"failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is
registered," for the reason that "the employee handling is already retired." With said
testimony We cannot therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the parties'
marriage contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of
San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such
marriage license was issued but rather, because it "failed to locate the book wherein marriage
license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny,
there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an entry on marriage license no.
2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere perception
of plaintiff that his union with defendant is defective with respect to an essential requisite of a
marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not substantiated with facts on record. 8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a
Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties herein
prior to the celebration of the marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of
regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from the
contents of the marriage contracts in question which show on their face that a marriage license
was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a
marriage arising from the admitted "fact of marriage." 9
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage
contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of the parties
are Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of marriage.
The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null and
void on the ground of absence of a marriage license based on the certifications issued by the Local Civil
Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cariño v. Cariño13:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of
such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion,
as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value,
he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all date relative to the issuance of
a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has
been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is
valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default
before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a
marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner
conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her
case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of
the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar
should be read in line with the decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where it was
held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search,
a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified
tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are
public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are
required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the
date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document
does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search.
Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by an officer having the custody of
an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor
is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in
connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and deserved
to be accorded probative value.
The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11 March
1994. It reads:

No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic) to
Marriage License Number 2880792,16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
March 11, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar
The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:
This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Office with
regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said
number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.
September 20, 1994

The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License Application was
filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this
Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our Local Civil Registry
Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for whatever legal intent
it may serve.
July 25, 2000

Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded work cannot
give you our full force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the said statement that
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence
of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both certifications failed to state with
absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the
fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said
person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the
logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that
all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among other things
the register of application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses received by the Office of the :Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with
you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your office
maintains as required by the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
xxxx
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the number
issued by their office while with respect to license no. 2770792 the office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask him how
about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by their office. Did you ask this 2887092,
but you could not find the record? But for the moment you cannot locate the books?
Which is which now, was this issued or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir. 19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to
locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of
regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is
effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed is among the disputable presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted and
acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one
which may be overcome by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that
an official act or duty has been regularly performed. x x x. 21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other
evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the
first and second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No.
2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found.
In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that
absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage,
the indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not
to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. 24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years
producing two offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the petition
for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991. 27 We are not ready
to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process
allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. 28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our
family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the
State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families.
The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern
of the family members alone.29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is
not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in
the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is
`that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage."30
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 31
By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest sentiments.
As we have said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like this one, where
neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female.
(Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from
inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked
the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two
human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas"
(Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes
made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person
successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of
a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his
first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition,
docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines
Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes
Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. 1 Feeling trapped in a man’s
body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated
on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery 2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was
thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the
Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have
his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to
"female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of
general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of the order were sent to the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the
petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American
fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or
for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his
present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with
the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always
felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s
misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken
against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-
awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their
dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition
despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to
interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil
Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender
from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate
by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that
the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in
the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals
granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP
Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under
Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. 10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As
found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or
for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible
with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the
civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. 11 A
change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. 13 In
this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA
9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first
name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name
is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and
procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first
name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner
and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to
make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. 18 RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion,
changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil
registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he
might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not
within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar
concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy
was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the
proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all
these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his
first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must
look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical
or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. 23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of
clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the
like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or
changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That
no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the
petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: 24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship;
(13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those
that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion
that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means
"to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations,
acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages,
naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage,
declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil
interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial
decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a
person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among
those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law,
expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters
as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations,
and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce,
and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal
to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child,
shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be
exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than
thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent
of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and
hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in
case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the
infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time
of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if
not attended by error,30is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the
absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil
Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this
connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male
from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or
bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." 35 Thus,
the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone
sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known
meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and
remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through
surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the
category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of
Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and
equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is
wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards
his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is
a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is
the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes
sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-
to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women
such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, 39 certain felonies under the Revised
Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment
by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to
engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend
it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or
change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof
must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a
person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with
his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment
of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as
having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter,
or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the
written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the]
realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social
convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Effect of absence, defect or irregularity (re: essential and formal requisites)
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994

JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A.
VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of
Court II, both of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.
Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.
Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.
PER CURIAM, J.:
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are
Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy
are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein
respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2)
falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4)
non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6)
requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities. 1
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their respective Comments. 2 A Reply to
Answers of Respondents was filed by complainants. 3 The case was thereafter referred to Executive
Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation report and
recommendation. The case was however transferred to First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N.
Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason that his wife is a cousin of respondent Judge
Palaypayon, Jr. 4
The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of this administrative matter, as
culled from the records thereof, are set out under each particular charge against respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage
license. Thus, the following couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the
marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano
and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay
and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As
a consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A, respectively) did not reflect any
marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not
indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license
to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the
marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares
the marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and its effect
on the marriages involved, but the latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees of the court
were already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he was filing a
protest against her appointment. She avers that it was only lately when she discovered that the court had
a marriage Register which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to furnish the parties
copies of the marriage contract and to register these with the local civil registrar; and that apparently
Sambo kept these marriage contracts in preparation for this administrative case. Complainant Sambo,
however, claims that all file copies of the marriage contracts were kept by respondent Baroy, but the latter
insists that she had instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by the contracting parties of their
marriage licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly
Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license requirement;
that he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract
and to file the same with the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in order to solve the problem,
the spouses subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their
marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil registrar; that the other five marriages alluded to
in the administrative complaint were not illegally solemnized because the marriage contracts were not
signed by him and they did not contain the date and place of marriage; that copies of these marriage
contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and
Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of
Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in
the absence of a marriage license; that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated
even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to
their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage contract which remains unsigned up to the
present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the number of marriages
solemnized and the number of documents notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of
July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that respondents
likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial
Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113) documents which were notarized during
that month; and that respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each document, although in
fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all marriages celebrated by
respondent judge are entered is under the exclusive control and custody of complainant Ramon Sambo,
hence he is the only one who should be held responsible for the entries made therein; that the reported
marriages are merely based on the payments made as solemnization fees which are in the custody of
respondent Baroy. She further avers that it is Sambo who is likewise the custodian of the Notarial
Register; that she cannot be held accountable for whatever alleged difference there is in the notarial fees
because she is liable only for those payments tendered to her by Sambo himself; that the notarial fees
she collects are duly covered by receipts; that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is remitted directly to the
Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Development Fund and P150 goes to the general fund of the
Supreme Court which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondent
theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly report were manipulated by complainant Sambo
considering that he is the one in charge of the preparation of the monthly report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of marriages celebrated was
intentionally placed by complainant Sambo; that the number of marriages solemnized should not be
based on solemnization fees paid for that month since not all the marriages paid for are solemnized in the
same month. He claims that there were actually only six (6) documents notarized in the month of July,
1992 which tallied with the official receipts issued by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo who should be
held accountable for any unreceipted payment for notarial fees because he is the one in charge of the
Notarial Register; and that this case filed by complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation for his failure to
be appointed as the clerk of court. Furthermore, respondent judge contends that he is not the one
supervising or preparing the monthly report, and that he merely has the ministerial duty to sign the same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent judge forwarded to
the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they
were surprised when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later
found out that respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning
unit to respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she purchased an air-conditioning unit but
when she was appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to Tinambac and, since she no longer needed
the air conditioner, she decided to sell the same to respondent judge. The installation and use thereof by
the latter in his office was with the consent of the Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the position of clerk of court to the
Supreme Court which has the sole authority over such appointments and that he had no hand in the
appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that the air-conditioning unit was bought from his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months after Baroy had been appointed
clerk of court. He claims that he would not be that naive to exhibit to the public as item which could not be
defended as a matter of honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman Januaria
Dacara was allowed by respondent judge to change her property bond to cash bond; that she paid the
amount of P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt therefor nor was it made to appear in the records
that the bond has been paid; that despite the lapse of two years, the money was never returned to the
bondswoman; and that it has not been shown that the money was turned over to the Municipal Treasurer
of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the former clerk of court, then turned
over to the acting clerk of court and, later, given to her under a corresponding receipt; that the cash bond
is deposited with the bank; and that should the bondswoman desire to withdraw the same, she should
follow the proper procedure therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved for failure of the bondsman to
deliver the body of the accused in court despite notice; and that he has nothing to do with the payment of
the cash bond as this is the duty of the clerk of court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention prisoners to work in his house, one of
whom was Alex Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act; that while Alano was in the custody of respondent judge, the former escaped and was never
recaptured; that in order to conceal this fact, the case was archived pursuant to an order issued by
respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never employed detention prisoners and that
he has adequate household help; and that he had to order the case archived because it had been
pending for more than six (6) months and the accused therein remained at large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees

Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that while the
corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to the Supreme Court
and, instead, she deposited the same in her personal account.
Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon Montenegro (because respondent
judge was on sick leave) who instructed her to demand payment of docket fees from said rural bank; that
the bank issued a check for P800.00; that she was not allowed by the Philippine National Bank to encash
the check and, instead, was instructed to deposit the same in any bank account for clearing; that
respondent deposited the same in her account; and that after the check was cleared, she remitted
P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other P400.00 was paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona prepared and
submitted to us his Report and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with the administrative
matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed the same and we are favorably impressed by the thorough and
exhaustive presentation and analysis of the facts and evidence in said report. We commend the
investigating judge for his industry and perspicacity reflected by his findings in said report which, being
amply substantiated by the evidence and supported by logical illations, we hereby approve and hereunder
reproduce at length the material portions thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of marriage. Judge
Palaypayon is charged with having solemnized without a marriage license the marriage
of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh.
B), Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor
(Exh. D), Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita
Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the marriage contracts to show
the number of the marriage was solemnized as required by Article 22 of the Family Code
were not filled up. While the contracting parties and their witnesses signed their marriage
contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix his signature in the marriage contracts, except
that of Abellano and Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate as
he claims that he solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. In said marriages the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their
marriage contract and the Local Civil Registrar was not sent either a copy of the marriage
certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been solemnized by Judge
Palaypayon without a marriage license. The testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo
Ariola, one of the witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, and the
photographs taken when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9)
sufficiently show that Judge Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya
declared that they were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days after
their marriage was solemnized and bring with them their marriage license. In the
meantime, they already started living together as husband and wife believing that the
formal requisites of marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte
because the parties allegedly did not have a marriage license. He declared that in fact he
did not sign the marriage certificate, there was no date stated on it and both the parties
and the Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy of the marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya
and Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains that they merely show as if he was
solemnizing the marriage. It was actually a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a
real one. This happened because of the pleading of the mother of one of the contracting
parties that he consent to be photographed to show that as if he was solemnizing the
marriage as he was told that the food for the wedding reception was already prepared,
visitors were already invited and the place of the parties where the reception would be
held was more than twenty (20) kilometers away from the poblacion of Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact alone that he did
not sign the marriage certificate or contract, the same did not bear a date and the parties
and the Local Civil Registrar were not furnished a copy of the marriage certificate, do not
by themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage. His uncorroborated
testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of Bocaya and Ariola who also declared,
among others, that Bocaya and his bride were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return
after ten (10) days with their marriage license and whose credibility had not been
impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the
marriage certificate in front of Judge Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-
b, K-3-c, K-4, K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly be just to show a
simulated solemnization of marriage. One or two pictures may convince a person of the
explanation of Judge Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon would allows
himself to be photographed as if he was solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a
person whom he did not even know for the alleged reasons given. It would be highly
improper and unbecoming of him to allow himself to be used as an instrument of deceit
by making it appear that Bocaya and Besmonte were married by him when in truth and in
fact he did not solemnize their marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon
admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of
the Family Code, so a marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here
executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for
almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it
was stated that Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and seven (7)
days old. If he and Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost six
(6) years already before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano
must ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13) years old when he started living with Edralin as
his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this
when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the
contracting parties who might ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an
instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge Palaypayon married
again Abellano and Edralin, this time with a marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation
given by Judge Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage of the same couple for the
second time is that he did not consider the first marriage he solemnized under Article 34
of the Family Code as (a) marriage at all because complainant Ramon Sambo did not
follow his instruction that the date should be placed in the marriage certificate to show
when he solemnized the marriage and that the contracting parties were not furnished a
copy of their marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the
second time with a marriage license already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first
time he solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was solemnized
under exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon
had already signed the marriage certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first
marriage under exceptional character where a marriage license was not required, why
did he already require the parties to have a marriage license when he solemnized their
marriage for the second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano and Edralin was
not a marriage at all as the marriage certificate did not state the date when the marriage
was solemnized and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their
marriage certificate, is not well taken as they are not any of those grounds under
Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code which declare a marriage void from the
beginning. Even if no one, however, received a copy of the marriage certificate, the
marriage is still valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just
absolve himself from responsibility by blaming his personnel. They are not the
guardian(s) of his official function and under Article 23 of the Family Code it is his duty to
furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of their marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), and
Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and
Nacarcio executed joint affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage
(Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the respondents that
actually Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage as they did not have a
marriage license. On cross-examination, however, both admitted that they did not know
who prepared their affidavits. They were just told, Carrido by a certain Charito
Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go to the Municipal
building and sign their joint affidavits there which were already prepared before the
Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their marriage
contract was signed by them and by their two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and
respondent Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the other aforementioned marriages, the
solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a receipt dated June 7, 1992 and signed by
respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of Gamay and Belga
allegedly because there was no marriage license. On her part, respondent Baroy at first
denied that the marriage was solemnized. When she was asked, however, why did she
sign the marriage contract as a witness she answered that she thought the marriage was
already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon. She signed the
marriage contract of Gamay and Belga as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet, she
wanted to give the impression that she did not even know that the marriage was
solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very difficult to believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the marriage of
Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting parties and their witnesses also signed the
marriage contract and paid the solemnization fee, but Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not
solemnize their marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge Palaypayon submitted
the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony
(Exh. 14). Medina, however, did not testify in this case and so his affidavit has no
probative value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been that before the
contracting parties and their witnesses enter his chamber in order to get married, he
already required complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task of preparing
the marriage contract, to already let the parties and their witnesses sign their marriage
contracts, as what happened to Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among
others. His purpose was to save his precious time as he has been solemnizing marriages
at the rate of three (3) to four (4) times everyday (TSN, p. 12;
2-1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and irregular, if not illegal,
because the contracting parties are supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing officer
and declare that they take each other as husband and wife before the solemnizing officer
in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses before they are supposed to sign their
marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his alleged practice

and procedure before solemnizing a marriage, is not true as shown by the picture taken
during the wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony of
respondent Baroy herself who declared that the practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been
to let the contracting parties and their witnesses sign the marriage contract only after
Judge Palaypayon has solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he was really
solemnizing three (3) to four (4) marriages everyday. On the contrary his monthly report
of cases for July, 1992 shows that his court had only twenty-seven (27) pending cases
and he solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the whole month (Exh. E). His monthly
report of cases for September, 1992 shows also that he solemnized only four (4)
marriages during the whole month (Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent Judge

Palaypayon has presented and marked in evidence several marriage contracts of other
persons, affidavits of persons and certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs.
12-B to 12-H). These persons who executed affidavits, however, did not testify in this
case. Besides, the marriage contracts and certification mentioned are immaterial as
Judge Palaypayon is not charged of having solemnized these marriages illegally also. He
is not charged that the marriages he solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of having falsified the monthly report
of cases submitted to the Supreme Court and not stating in the monthly report the actual
number of documents notarized and issuing the corresponding receipts of the notarial
fees, have been sufficiently proven by the complainants insofar as the monthly report of
cases for July and September, 1992 are concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for July, 1992 both
signed by the respondents, show that for said month there were six (6) documents
notarized by Judge Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-
1-b). The notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, however, shows that
there were actually one hundred thirteen (113) documents notarized by Judge
Palaypayon for the said month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the monthly report of cases for
July, 1992 because there were only six (6) notarized documents that were paid (for) as
shown by official receipts. He did not, however, present evidence of the alleged official
receipts showing that the notarial fee for the six (6) documetns were paid. Besides, the
monthly report of cases with respect to the number of documents notarized should not be
based on how many notarized documents were paid of the notarial fees, but the number
of documents placed or recorded in the notarial register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying and checking anymore
the correctness of the monthly reports because he relies on his co-respondent who is the
Clerk of Court and whom he has assumed to have checked and verified the records. He
merely signs the monthly report when it is already signed by respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is required to have
close supervision in the preparation of the monthly report of cases of which he certifies as
to their correctness. As a judge he is personally responsible for the proper discharge of
his functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In
Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581, it was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind
the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the falsification of the monthly
report of cases on complainant Sambo whom she allegedly assigned to prepare not only
the monthly report of cases, but the preparation and custody of marriage contracts,
notarized documents and the notarial register. By her own admission she has assigned to
complainant Sambo duties she was supposed to perform, yet according to her she never
bother(ed) to check the notarial register of the court to find out the number of documents
notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the monthly report of cases
to Sambo, which was denied by the latter as he claims that he only typed the monthly
report based on the data given to him by her, still it is her duty to verify and check
whether the report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in custody of marriage
contracts, notarized documents and notarial register, among other things, is not
acceptable not only because as clerk of court she was supposed to be in custody, control
and supervision of all court records including documents and other properties of the court
(p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she herself admitted that from January, 1992 she
was already in full control of all the records of the court including receipts (TSN, p. 11; 11-
23-93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge of falsification,
however, also shows that respondent Baroy did not account for what happened to the
notarial fees received for those documents notarized during the month of July and
September, 1992. The evidence adduced in this case also sufficiently show that she
received cash bond deposits and she did not deposit them to a bank or to the Municipal
Treasurer; and that she only issued temporary receipts for said cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have been notarized by
Judge Palaypayon although the documents notarized for said month were actually one
hundred thirteen (113) as recorded in the notarial register. For September, 1992, there
were only five (5) documents reported as notarized for that month, though the notarial
register show(s) that there were fifty-six (56) documents actually notarized. The fee for
each document notarized as appearing in the notarial register was P18.50. Respondent
Baroy and Sambo declared that what was actually being charged was P20.00.
Respondent Baroy declared that P18.50 went to the Supreme Court and P1.50 was
being turned over to the Municipal Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she really sent to the
Supreme Court the notarial fees of P18.50 for each document notarized and to the
Municipal Treasurer the additional notarial fee of P1.50. This should be fully accounted
for considering that Baroy herself declared that some notarial fees were allowed by her at
her own discretion to be paid later. Similarly, the solemnization fees have not been
accounted for by Baroy considering that she admitted that even (i)n those instances
where the marriages were not solemnized due to lack of marriage license the
solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless the contracting parties made a
demand for their return. Judge Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any instance
when solemnization fee was returned when the marriage was not solemnized due to lack
of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over to her some of the
notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It was not only because Sambo vehemently
denied it, but the minutes of the conference of the personnel of the MTC of Tinambac
dated January 20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy informed the personnel of the
court that she was taking over the functions she assigned to Sambo, particularly the
collection of legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial fees she claims that Sambo did not turn over
to her were for those documents notarized (i)n July and September, 1992 already.
Besides there never was any demand she made for Sambo to turn over some notarial
fees supposedly in his possession. Neither was there any memorandum she issued on
this matter, in spite of the fact that she has been holding meetings and issuing
memoranda to the personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A
(supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash bond deposit of a
certain Dacara in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to
her after she assumed office and for this cash bond she issued only a temporary receipt
(Exh. Y). She did not deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the Municipal Treasurer.
She just kept it in her own cash box on the alleged ground that the parties in that case
where the cash bond was deposited informed her that they would settle the case
amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the aforementioned cash bond of
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in
February, 1993, after this administrative case was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-
93). The Pass Book, however, shows that actually Baroy opened an account with the
LBP, Naga Branch, only on March 26, 1993 when she deposited an amount of Two
Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims that One Thousand
(P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial deposit was the cash bond of Dacara. If it were true, it
was only after keeping to herself the cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for
around one year and five months when she finally deposited it because of the filing of this
case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally deposited the One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of Dacara, she withdrew it from the bank without
any authority or order from the court. It was only on July 23, 1993, or after almost three
(3) months after she withdrew it, when she redeposited said cash bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-
94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28, 1993 respondent
Baroy received also a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain
Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash bond deposit, respondent Baroy
issued only an annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1). Again Baroy just kept
this Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to herself. She did not deposit it
either (in) a bank or (with) the Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that the parties
in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that they would settle the case amicably. It was on
April 26, 1993, or almost two months later when Judge Palaypayon issued an order for
the release of said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on October 21, 1991 she
used to issue temporary receipt only for cash bond deposits and other payments and
collections she received. She further admitted that some of these temporary receipts she
issued she failed to place the number of the receipts such as that receipt marked Exhibit
X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims that she did not know that she had to use the
official receipts of the Supreme Court. It was only from February, 1993, after this case
was already filed, when she only started issuing official receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be appointed Clerk of Court,
Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon an air conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with
respect to this charge, show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an air conditioner for
the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The
same was paid partly in cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner
was brought to court in order to be installed in the chamber of Judge Palaypayon, it was
still placed in the same box when it was bought and was not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for Twenty Thousand
(P20,00.00) Pesos on installment basis with a down payment of Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof thereof the respondents presented a typewritten receipt
dated May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was signed by both respondents and by the
Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur and another person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It was bought by Baroy
at a time when she was applying for the vacant position of Clerk of Court (to) which she
was eventually appointed in October, 1991. From the time she bought the air conditioner
on August 24, 1991 until it was installed in the office of Judge Palaypayon it was not used
yet. The sale to Judge Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt
dated May 29, 1992 when this case was already filed. The receipt could have been easily
prepared. The Municipal Mayor of Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a witness did
not testify in this case. The sale is between the Clerk of Court and the Judge of the same
court. All these circumstances give rise to suspicion of at least impropriety. Judges
should avoid such action as would subject (them) to suspicion and (their) conduct should
be free from the appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA 27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash bond deposit of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara
executed an affidavit regarding this charge that Judge Palaypayon did not give her a
receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit, however, has
no probative value as she did not show that this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way
into the hands of respondent Baroy who issued only a temporary receipt for it and this
has been discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of detention prisoners to work in
his house and one of them escaped while in his custody and was never found again. To
hide this fact, the case against said accused was ordered archived by Judge Palaypayon.
The evidence adduced with respect to this particular charge, show that in Crim. Case No.
5647 entitled People vs. Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe, accused Alex
Alano and Allan Adupe were arrested on April 12, 1991 and placed in the municipal jail of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence presented
that Alex Alano was taken by Judge Palaypayon from the municipal jail where said
accused was confined and that he escaped while in custody of Judge Palaypayon is
solely testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz, a former utility worker of the MTC of
Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The complainants should have
presented records from the police of Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took out
from the municipal jail Alex Alano where he was under detention and said accused
escaped while in the custody of Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim. Case No. 5047
archiving said case appears to be without basis. The order states: "this case was filed on
April 12, 1991 and the records show that the warrant of arrest (was) issued against the
accused, but up to this moment there is no return of service for the warrant of arrest
issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The records of said case, however, show that in
fact there was a return of the service of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991
showing that Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992 archiving Crim. Case No.
5047 referred only to one of the accused who remained at large. The explanation cannot
be accepted because the two other accused, Alano and Adupe, were arrested. Judge
Palaypayon should have issued an order for the arrest of Adupe who allegedly jumped
bail, but Alano was supposed to be confined in the municipal jail if his claim is true that he
did not take custody of Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case archived was
because he heard from the police that Alano escaped. This explanation is not acceptable
either. He should ha(ve) set the case and if the police failed to bring to court Alano, the
former should have been required to explain in writing why Alano was not brought to
court. If the explanation was that Alano escaped from jail, he should have issued an order
for his arrest. It is only later on when he could not be arrested when the case should have
been ordered archived. The order archiving this case for the reason that he only heard
that Alano escaped is another circumstance which gave rise to a suspicion that Alano
might have really escaped while in his custody only that the complainants could not
present records or other documentary evidence to prove the same.
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing fees on collection
cases filed by the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur which was supposed to be
exempted in paying filing fees under existing laws and that the filing fees received was
deposited by respondent Baroy in her personal account in the bank. The evidence
presented show that on February 4, 1992 the Rural Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil
cases for collection against farmers and it paid the total amount of Four Hundred
(P400.00) Pesos representing filing fees. The complainants cited Section 14 of Republic
Act 720, as amended, which exempts Rural Banks (from) the payment of filing fees on
collection of sums of money cases filed against farmers on loans they obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of the filing fees of the
Rural Bank of Tinambac as it was respondent Baroy who received them and besides, on
February 4, 1992, he was on sick leave. On her part Baroy claims that the bank paid
voluntarily the filing fees. The records, however, shows that respondent Baroy sent a
letter to the manager of the bank dated January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank
would not pay she would submit all Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6, comment
by respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of Tinambac was really
exempt from the payment of filing fees pursuant to Republic Act 720, as amended,
instead of threatening the bank to have its cases be submitted to the court in order to
have them dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees was made on February 4, 1992,
but the Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was only turned over to the Municipal Treasurer
on March 12, 1992. Here, there is an undue delay again in complying with her obligation
as accountable officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the complainants
sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized
marriages, particularly that of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage
license, and that it having been shown that he did not comply with his duty in closely
supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of the monthly report of cases being
submitted to the Supreme Court, particularly for the months of July and September, 1992
where it has been proven that the reports for said two (2) months were falsified with
respect to the number of documents notarized, it is respectfully recommended that he be
imposed a fine of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that the same
or similar offenses will be more severely dealt with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or certificates of
those marriages he solemnized without a marriage license, there were no dates placed in
the marriage contracts to show when they were solemnized, the contracting parties were
not furnished their marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was not being sent
any copy of the marriage contract, will not absolve him from liability. By solemnizing
alone a marriage without a marriage license he as the solemnizing officer is the one
responsible for the irregularity in not complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of marriage
and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally
and administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to comply with his duty of
closely supervising his clerk of court in the performance of the latter's duties and
functions, particularly the preparation of the monthly report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya,
58 SCRA 16). His explanation that he only signed the monthly report of cases only when
his clerk of court already signed the same, cannot be accepted. It is his duty to closely
supervise her, to check and verify the records if the monthly reports prepared by his clerk
of court do not contain false statements. It was held that "A judge cannot take refuge
behind the inefficiency or incompetence of court personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA
158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of
court of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been found to have
falsified the monthly report of cases for the months of July and September, 1992 with
respect to the number of documents notarized, for having failed to account (for) the
notarial fees she received for said two (2) months period; for having failed to account (for)
the solemnization fees of those marriages allegedly not solemnized, but the
solemnization fees were not returned; for unauthorized issuance of temporary receipts,
some of which were issued unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of Dacara on
October 29, 1991 in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she
issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and for depositing it with the Land Bank of the
Philippines only on March 26, 1993, or after one year and five months in her possession
and after this case was already filed; for withdrawing said cash bond of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any court order or authority and redepositing
it only on July 23, 1993; for receiving a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos
from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for
which she issued only an unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and for not
depositing it with a bank or with the Municipal Treasurer until it was ordered released;
and for requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on
February 4, 1992 for collection cases filed against farmers in the amount of Four Hundred
(P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said amount to the Municipal Treasurer only on March
12, 1992, it is respectfully recommended that said respondent clerk of court Nelia
Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the clerk of court who shall
issue official receipt to the provincial, city or municipal treasurer for the amount
withdrawn. Court deposits cannot be withdrawn except by order of the court, . . . ."
(Revised Manual of Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p. 127, Manual
for Clerks of Court). A circular also provides that the Clerks of Court shall immediately
issue an official receipt upon receipt of deposits from party litigants and thereafter deposit
intact the collection with the municipal, city or provincial treasurer and their deposits, can
only be withdrawn upon proper receipt and order of the Court (DOJ Circular No. 52, 26
April 1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme Court Memorandum Circular
No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides that "all collections of funds of fiduciary
character including rental deposits, shall be deposited immediately by the clerk of court
concerned upon receipt thereof with City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where his
court is located" and that "no withdrawal of any of such deposits shall be made except
upon lawful order of the court exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing circulars, or deliberately
disregarded, or even intentionally violated them. By her conduct, she demonstrated her
callous unconcern for the obligations and responsibility of her duties and functions as a
clerk of court and accountable officer. The gross neglect of her duties shown by her
constitute(s) a serious misconduct which warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case
of Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City;
A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was held that "The clerk of court is not authorized
to keep funds in his/her custody; monies received by him/her shall be deposited
immediately upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer.
Supreme Court Circular Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated December 3,
1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to remit the cash bail bonds and fine she collected
constitutes serious misconduct and her misappropriation of said funds constitutes
dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam was found guilty of dishonesty and serious
misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and (the Court) ordered her
immediate dismissal (from) the service.
xxx xxx xxx
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with
an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee
should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. 5 Integrity in a judicial office is more than a
virtue, it is a necessity. 6 It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least
of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a
Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites
of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable. 8
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and
what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice
to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any
religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage
ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." 9 This is of course,
within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on respondent judge
should, therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of marriages, it
does appear that he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's concern for the institution of
marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil status. This, and his undeniable participation in the other
offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such serious degree of misconduct and
of gross negligence in the performance of judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will
definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby DISMISSED from the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in any branch, agency
or instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the Office of the Ombudsman for
appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002]
MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs.JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO,respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a
sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge
solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license
and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed
away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast properties left by
Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired
Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court
Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain
Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having
been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage
in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo
informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan
which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent
judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the
requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another
date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions
for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that
if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a
stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the
parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured
respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they
failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same
reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid
despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by
the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the
Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her
marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because of her prodding and
reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this administrative
case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own
shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for
Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be
issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no
record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot
issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her
marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter
dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office
cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his
previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000,
found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and
for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on
respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court
judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as
defined by the Supreme Court.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,[1] respondent judge held office
and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte.
However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which
did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do
so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice
of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue,
as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability. [2] (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of
solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law.We further held that:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they
are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like
the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment,
for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of
law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons. [3]
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not
amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion
but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage
license. In People vs. Lara,[4] we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage
license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota
of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such
authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross
ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This
Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily
have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair
administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined. [5]Disciplinary
actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend
upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We
cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the Courts constitutional
power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of
a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority. [6]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court
of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004]
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision[1] dated October 21, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment [2] dated August 5, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein
petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison
term of seven (7) months ofprision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution [3] of the appellate court, dated
September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo,are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran
City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former
replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they
maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both
agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at theIglesia de Filipina Nacional at
Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against
appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago [4] at the Virgen sa
Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others,
the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony
actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information [5] filed by the City Prosecutor
of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. [6]
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial
nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was
granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in
the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to
the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from Seven (7) Months ofPrision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day
of Prision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first marriage to
Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[8] the trial court ruled that want
of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not
be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,[9] which held
that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses
may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial
status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere.
Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that
following People v. Bitdu,[10]everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know
that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate
court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and
Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this
decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent
declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The
reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 [12] of the Revised Penal Code is the act of
contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact
that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian
court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 [13] of the Civil Code and given
the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17 [14] of the Civil Code, a
declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign
jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending that the doctrine
in Mendiola v. People,[15] allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign
divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. [16] However, the
denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in CA-G.R. CR No.
20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The
dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void abinitio, then there was no first
marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since
herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable
doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN
CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN
INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE
CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE
VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT
EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE
TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.[17]
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so,
whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree
of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly,
which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of
criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like
other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of
criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the
intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that
his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant
case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v.
Bobis,[18] which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur,
stressing that under Article 40[19] of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a
party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as
everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioners contention that he was in good
faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case
No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first
determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[20] we
laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No.
20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the
marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and
further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.[21]
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and
Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by
the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is
void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 [22] and 4[23] of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and
that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and
purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the
celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married. [24] The
records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence,
the decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married.
But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the
two were never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect.
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at
the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be
acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.[25] In the latter
case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second
marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be
legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes
as void.[26]
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once,
but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months
later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired,
although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The
mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs
no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of
an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice
is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy.
Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack
of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated
September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground
that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, G.R. No. 167746
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. Promulgated:
COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents. August 28, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review onCertiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantaraassailing the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying
petitioners appeal and affirming the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofMakati City, Branch
143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.

The antecedent facts are:

A petition for annulment of marriage [3] was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita
A. Alcantaraalleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage
license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage
for them.They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain
Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. [4]They got married on the same
day, 8 December 1982.Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San
Jose de ManuguitChurch in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated
without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured
in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident
of Carmona, and they never went toCarmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said
place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose AnnAlcantara. In 1988, they parted
ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their
marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract [5] and its
entry on file.[6]

Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their marriage
and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of
the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite.Contrary to petitioners representation, respondent gave birth to their
first child named Rose AnnAlcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel
Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.[7] Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children.
[8]
Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution forconcubinage.
[9]
Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before
theMetropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.[10] Respondent prays that the petition for
annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.

On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows:

The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;

2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) per month as support for their two (2) children on the first five (5) days of
each month; and

3. To pay the costs.[11]

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioners appeal. His Motion
for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.[12]

The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and
petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties marriage
contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[13]

In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:

a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the
Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on
record that there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the
solemnization of the marriage.

b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to
the Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact that the same was not
identified and offered as evidence during the trial, and was not the Marriage
license number appearing on the face of the marriage contract.

c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply
the ruling laid down by this Honorable Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of
Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).

d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the
observance of procedural rules to protect and promote the substantial rights of
the party litigants.[14]

We deny the petition.

Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there
was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a
fixer who arranged everything for them. [15] The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Halland not
in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. AquilinoNavarro who solemnized the marriage belongs. [16]He and
respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license
from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the place.
The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the
certification states that Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of
Mr. RestitutoAlcantara and Miss Rosita Almario[17] but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033
for their marriage license number.

The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to theeffectivity of
the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect
at the time of its celebration.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) [18] in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.
[19]

Article 53 of the Civil Code [20] which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties
states:

Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. [21]

Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The
cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the
marriage void are clear-cut.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due
search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued
to the parties. The Court held that the certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry as
to the purported marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being
the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that would
render the marriage voidab initio.

In Cario v. Cario,[23] the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner
and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court held that the
certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage
license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being
one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and
the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.

In Sy v. Court of Appeals,[24] the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year
after the ceremony took place on 15 November 1973.The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is
that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.

In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage void.

Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no
such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner
and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the
local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.[25] The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically
identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and
RositaAlmario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.

The certification of Municipal Civil RegistrarMacrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:

This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage
License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr.Restituto Alcantara and Miss
Rosita Almario onDecember 8, 1982.

This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for
whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.[26]

This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance
of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. [27] The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every
reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officers
act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. [28] Significantly, apart from
these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.[29]

Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he
nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis
to annul petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not
the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence
of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. [30] An irregularity in any of the formal requisites
of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.[31]

Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No. 7054133,
while the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is number
7054033.Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a
mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the
numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore
does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the
parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, [32] petitioner cannot pretend
that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without
the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place because he initiated it.
[33]
Petitioner is an educated person. He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and
voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage
ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond
at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle.We
cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays
his bad faith.[34]

Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year
utilizing the same marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony
in church under duress or with a gun to his head.Everything was executed without nary a whimper on the
part of the petitioner.

In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose
deManuguit Church the marriage contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before
theManila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioners testimony as follows

WITNESS

As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the
wedding.

COURT

What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San
Jose de Manuguit church.

WITNESS

I dont remember your honor.

COURT

Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?

WITNESS

I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I
dont know if it is good enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.

COURT

In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with
you already a Marriage Contract?

WITNESS

Yes your honor.

COURT

That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the
Marriage Contract issued which Marriage License is Number 7054033.

WITNESS

Yes your honor.[35]

The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place at that
time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever
irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding.[36]

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a fixer who arranged everything for
them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of
the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to
have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary.
[37]
Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license
has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is
that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of
the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled
the requirements of law.[38]

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage.
[39]
Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look
upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is
of great weight.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143
of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., G.R. No. 191425
Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
- versus - PERALTA,*
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA,** JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondent. September 7, 2011
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 30 September 2009 as
well as the Resolution3 promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 31538. The appellate court affirmed the 19 November 2007 Decision 4 of Branch 215 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial court) in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031.
The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. Co-accused
Rowena Geraldino(Geraldino) was acquitted for the prosecutions failure to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Facts
The appellate court recited the facts as follows:
On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an

Informationagainst Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) and Rowena P. Geraldino (Geraldino) for the crime of
Bigamy. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married to one JESUSA
PINAT NOLLORA, and as said marriage has not been legally dissolved and still
subsisting, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent
or second marriage with her [sic] co-accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly
consented and agreed to be married to her co-accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR.
knowing him to be a married man, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party
JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA.
Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accusedNollora assisted by counsel, refused to enter his plea.
Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the Court for him. Accused Geraldino, on the other hand,
entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June 14, 2005. On even date, pre-trial conference was
held and both the prosecution and defense entered the following stipulation of facts:
1. the validity of the first marriage betweenAtilano O. Nollora, Jr.

and Jesusa PinatNollora solemnized on April 6, 1999 atSapang Palay, San Jose del
Monte;
2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with Rowena

P.Geraldino on December 8, 2001 in Quezon City;
3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of AtilanoO. Nollora, Jr., he admitted that he contracted the

second marriage to Rowena P. Geraldino;
4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the Certificate of Marriage

with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated December 8, 2001;
5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P.Geraldino with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. as admitted in

her Counter-Affidavit.
The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTCs resolution is whether or not the second
marriage is bigamous. Afterwards, pre-trial conference was terminated and the case was set for initial
hearing. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution

As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective testimonies of prosecution witnesses were as
follows:
xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and accused Atilano O.Nollora,

Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while she was working there as a Staff Midwife in
King Abdulah Naval Base Hospital.Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her and on April 6,
1999, they got married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit A). While working in said hospital, she heard rumors that her
husband has another wife and because of anxiety and emotional stress, she left Saudi
Arabia and returned to the Philippines (TSN, October 4, 2005, page 10). Upon arrival in
the Philippines, the private complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
contracted a second marriage with co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8,
2001 (Exhibit B) when she secured a certification as to the civil status
of AtilanoO. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit C) from the National Statistics Office (NSO) sometime in
November 2003.
Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena

P.Geraldino at the latters workplace in CBW, FTI, Taguig and asked her if she knew of
the first marriage between complainant andAtilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which Rowena
P.Geraldino allegedly affirmed and despite this knowledge, she allegedly still
marriedAtilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him so much and because they were
neighbors and childhood friends. Private complainant also knew that Rowena
P.Geraldino knew of her marriage withAtilano O. Nollora, Jr., because when she (private
complainant) was brought byAtilano O. Nollora, Jr. at the latters residence in Taguig,
Metro Manila and introduced her to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.sparents, Rowena
P. Geraldino was there in the house together with a friend and she heard everything that
they were talking about.
Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return to Saudi Arabia to work
as a Staff Midwife thereby losing income opportunity in the amount ofP34,000.00 a
month, more or less. When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared
that what happened to her was a tragedy and she had entertained [thoughts] of
committing suicide. She added that because of what happened to her, her mother died
and she almost got raped when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left her alone in their residence in
Saudi Arabia. However, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her
sufferings. Instead, she just asked for the return of her money in the amount
of P50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005, pages 4-14).
Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the marriage between the
private complainant and Atilano O.Nollora, Jr., because she was one of the sponsors in
said wedding. Sometime in November 2003, she was asked by the private complainant to
accompany the latter to the workplace of Rowena P.Geraldino in
FTI, Taguig, Metro Manila. She declared that the private complainant and Rowena
P. Geraldino had a confrontation and she heard that Rowena P. Geraldino admitted that
she (Rowena) knew of the first marriage of Atilano O.Nollora, Jr. and the private
complainant but she still went on to marry Atilano O.Nollora, Jr. because she loves him
very much (TSN, October 24, 2005, pages 3-5).
Evidence for the Defense
The defenses version of facts, as summarized in the herein assailed Decision, is as follows:
Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first
with private complainant Jesusa Pinatand the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He,
however, claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even
before he contracted the first marriage with the private complainant. As a
[M]uslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives as allowed under the
Muslim or Islam belief.
To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to the private
complainant, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. presented a Certificate of Conversion dated August 2,
2004 issued by one Hadji AbdulKajar Madueo and approved by one KhadIbrahim
A. Alyamin wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly converted as a Muslim
since January 19, 1992 (Exhibit 2, 3 and 4). Aside from said certificate, he also presented
a Pledge of Conversion dated January 10, 1992 issued by the
same Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueoand approved by one Khad Ibrahim A.Alyamin (Exhibit
7).
He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert prior to their
marriage because she [sic] told this fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and
the reason why said private complainant filed the instant case was due to hatred having
learned of his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino. She [sic] further testified that
Rowena P.Geraldino was not aware of his first marriage with the private complainant and
he did not tell her this fact because Rowena P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he does not
want to lose her if she learns of his first marriage.
He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that he was a

Catholic Pentecostal but that he was not aware why it was placed as such on said
contract. In his Marriage Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion Catholic was
also indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the society
does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that he was single despite his
first marriage to keep said first marriage a secret (TSN, January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).

Defense witness Hadji Abdul QasarMadueo testified that he is the founder and president
of Balik Islam TableeghFoundation of the Philippines and as suchpresident, he has the
power and authority to convert any applicant to the Muslim religion. He alleged that
sometime in 1992, he met accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. inMabini (Manila) who was then
going abroad. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. applied to become a Muslim (Exhibit 14) and after
receiving the application, said accused was indoctrinated regarding his obligations as a
Muslim. On January 10, 1992, Atilano O.Nollora, Jr. embraced the Muslim faith. He was
then directed to report every Sunday to monitor his development.
In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for a certification because
of the filing of the instant case. On October 2, 2004, he issued a Certificate of Conversion
wherein it is stated thatAtilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a Muslim convert since January 10, 1992.
Apart from the above-mentioned document, their Imam also issued a Pledge of
Conversion (Exhibit 7). He declared that a Muslim convert could marry more than one
according to the Holy Koran. However, before marrying his second, third and fourth
wives, it is required that the consent of the first Muslim wife be secured. Thus, if the first
wife is not a Muslim, there is no necessity to secure her consent (TSN, October 9, 2006,
pages 2-12).
During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim convert gets married not in
accordance with the Muslim faith, the same is contrary to the teachings of the Muslim
faith. A Muslim also can marry up to four times but he should be able to treat them
equally. He claimed that he was not aware of the first marriage but was aware of the
second. Since his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino was not in accordance
with the Muslim faith, he advised Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to re-marry Rowena
P. Geraldino in accordance with Muslim marriage celebration, otherwise, he will not be
considered as a true Muslim (TSN, June 25, 2007, pages 3-7).
Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this incident of
bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does not know the private
complainantJesusa Pinat Nollora and only came to know her when this case was filed.
She insists that she is the one lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been
married to the latter since December 8, 2001. Upon learning that Atilano O.Nollora, Jr.
contracted a first marriage with the private complainant, she confronted the former who
admitted the said marriage. Prior to their marriage, she asked AtilanoO. Nollora, Jr. if he
was single and the latter responded that he was single. She also knew that her husband
was a Catholic prior to their marriage but after she learned of the first marriage of her
husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert. She also claimed that after learning
that her husband was a Muslim convert, she andAtilano O. Nollora, Jr., also got married
in accordance with the Muslim rites. She also belied the allegations of the private
complainant that she was sought by the private complainant and that they had a
confrontation where she admitted that she knew that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. was married
to the private complainant and despite this knowledge, she went on to marry him
because she loved him very much. She insisted that she only came to know the private
complainant when she (private complainant) filed this case (TSN, August 14, 2007,
pages 2-8).5
The Trial Courts Ruling
In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted Geraldino.
The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to prosecution for bigamy: Article 41 7 of the
Family Code, or Executive Order No. 209, and Article 180 8 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The trial court also cited Article 27 of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides the qualifications for allowing Muslim men to have more
than one wife: [N]o Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with them in equal
companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional cases.
In convicting Nollora, the trial courts Decision further stated thus:
The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is allowed only to meet urgent
needs. Only with the permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have a second wife subject to
certain requirements. This is because having plurality of wives is merely tolerated, not encouraged, under
certain circumstances (Muslim Law on Personal Status in the Philippines by Amer M. Bara-
acal andAbdulmajid J. Astir, 1998 First Edition, Pages 64-65). Arbitration is necessary. Any Muslim
husband desiring to contract subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall notify the ShariaCircuit Court
of the place where his family resides. The clerk of court shall serve a copy thereof to the wife or wives.
Should any of them objects [sic]; an Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If said council fails to
secure the wifes consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall, subject to Article 27, decide whether
on [sic] not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines).
Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, didnot

comply with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that he was a
Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal intent. In his converting to the Muslim faith, said
accused entertained the mistaken belief that he can just marry anybody again after marrying the private
complainant. What is clear, therefore, is [that] a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just marry
anybody the second, third or fourth time. There are requirements that the Sharia law imposes, that is, he
should have notified the Sharia Court where his family resides so that copy of said notice should be
furnished to the first wife. The argument that notice to the first wife is not required since she is not a
Muslim is of no moment. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon accused AtilanoNollora, Jr. It is
not for him to interpret the Sharialaw. It is the Sharia Court that has this authority.
In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused recelebrated their marriage in accordance

with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has already been violated.
The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., only. There is no
sufficient evidence that would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down. The evidence presented by the
prosecution against her is the allegation that she knew of the first marriage between private complainant
and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,] being open to several interpretations. Private complainant alleged
that when she was brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to the latters house in Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena
P. Geraldino was there standing near the door and heard their conversation. From this incident, private
complainant concluded that said Rowena P. Geraldino was aware that she andAtilano Nollora, Jr., were
married. This conclusion is obviously misplaced since it could not be reasonably presumed that Rowena
P.Geraldino understands what was going on between her and Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic
that (E)very circumstance favoringaccuseds innocence must be taken into account, proof against him
must survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment
(People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This Court, therefore, has to acquit Rowena P. Geraldino for failure
of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. This court hereby renders judgment imposing
upon him a prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day ofprision correccional, as
minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
plus accessory penalties provided by law.
b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of Bigamy for failure of the prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.9
Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of his temporary liberty under the same bail
bond pending appeal. The trial court granted Nollorasmotion.

Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one error of the trial court:
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged despite the
prosecutions failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 10
The Appellate Courts Ruling
On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissedNolloras appeal and affirmed the trial courts
decision.11
The appellate court rejected Nolloras defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was in lawful
exercise of his Islamic religion and was allowed by the Quran. The appellate court
denied Nolloras invocation of his religious beliefs and practices to the prejudice of the non-Muslim women
who married him pursuant to Philippine civil laws. Nolloras two marriages were not conducted in
accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence the Family Code of the Philippines should
apply. Nolloras claim of religious freedom will not immobilize the State and render it impotent in protecting
the general welfare.
In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court denied Nolloras motion for reconsideration.

The allegations in the motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash of Nolloras earlier arguments, and
there was no reason for the appellate court to modify its 30 September 2009 Decision.
Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6 April 2010.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.

The Courts Ruling
Nolloras petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the appellate court and of the trial court.
Elements of Bigamy
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 349. Bigamy. ‒ The penalty of prision mayorshall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolvedor, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequentmarriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.13
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to
Pinat;14 (2) Nollora and Pinats marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second
marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his second marriage to Geraldino; 15 and
(4) Nollora andGeraldinos marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack of
capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage.16

The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinatsmarriage states that Nollora and Pinat were married
atSapang Palay IEMELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on 6 April 1999. Rev.
Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the IEMELIF Churchofficiated the ceremony. The marriage
certificate18 ofNollora and Geraldinos marriage states that Nollora andGeraldino were married at Maxs
Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro Manila on 8 December 2001. Rev. Honorato D.
Santos officiated the ceremony.
A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil Registrar General reads:
We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have been born on February 22, 1968 from
ATILANO M. NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT, appears in our National Indices of Marriage for
Groom for the years 1973 to 2002 with the following information:
Date of Marriage Place of Marriage

a) April 06, 1999 b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN
a) December 08, 2001 b) QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA
(2nd District)19
Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense. He alleged
that his religion allows him to marry more than once. Grantingarguendo that Nollora is indeed of Muslim
faith at the time of celebration of both marriages, 20 Nollora cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies
were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No.
1083. The applicable Articles in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws read:
Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature, consequences and
incidents are governed by this Code and the Sharia and not subject to stipulation, except that the
marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the property relations of the spouses.
Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following essential
requisites are complied with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons after the proper
guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons.
Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age and any Muslim
female of the age of puberty or upwards and not suffering from any impediment under the provisions of
this Code may contract marriage. A female is presumed to have attained puberty upon reaching the age
of fifteen.
x x x.
Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but the ijab and
the qabul in marriage shall be declared publicly in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage
and the two competent witnesses. The declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed
or marked by the contracting parties and said witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the
marriage. One copy shall be given to the contracting parties and another sent to the Circuit Registrar by
the solemnizing officer who shall keep the third.
Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. -Marriage maybe solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;
(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under Muslim law to solemnize
marriage; or
(c) By the judge of the Sharia District Court orSharia Circuit Court or any person designated by the judge,
should the proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize the solemnization.
Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of
the Sharia judge, office of the Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other suitable
place agreed upon by the parties.
Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the contracting parties
(mahr-musamma) before, during or after the celebration of marriage. If the amount or the value thereof
has not been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl) shall, upon petition of the wife, be determined by the
court according to the social standing of the parties.
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that [i]n case of a marriage between a
Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the[Family
Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines]shall
apply. Nolloras religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the claim that Nolloras marriages were
solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim
exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.21

Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate withGeraldino that his civil status is single. Moreover, both
of Nolloras marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the
declaration of ones religion in the marriage certificate is not an essential requirement for marriage, such
omissions are sufficient proofs of Nolloras liability for bigamy. Nolloras false declaration about his civil
status is thus further compounded by these omissions.
[ATTY. CALDINO:]
Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, withJesusa Pinat, you indicated here as your religion, Catholic
Pentecostal, and you were saying that since January 10, 1992, you are already a [M]uslim convert. . . you
said, Mr. Witness, that you are already a [M]uslim convert since January 10, 1992. However, in your
marriage contract withJesusa Pinat, there is no indication here that you have indicated your religion. Will
you please go over your marriage contract?
[NOLLORA:]
A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I didnt know why they did not place any
Catholic there.
x x x
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with respect to your marriage contract with
your co-accused in this case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please tell us, Mr. Witness,
considering that you said that you are already a [M]uslim convert on January 10, 1992, why in the
marriage contract with Rowena Geraldino, you indicated there your religion as Catholic, Mr.
Witness?
A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then keeping, I was keeping it as a secret my
being my Balik-Islam, thats why I placed there Catholic since I know that the society doesnt
approve a Catholic to marry another, thats why I placed there Catholic as my religion, sir.
Q: How about under the column, civil status, why did you indicate there that youre single, Mr.
Witness?
A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier married. 22 (Emphasis supplied)
x x x

[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]
Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr.Nollora?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that your faith be indicated as Catholic when
in fact you were already as you alleged [M]uslim to be put in your marriage contract?
x x x
[A:] I dont think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so we can get married under the Catholic
rights [sic] because after that we even got married under the [M]uslim rights [sic], your Honor.
x x x
Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you required under your faith to secure the
permission of your first wife to get married?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa Nollora?
A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she was very mad at me, at the start, she was
always very mad, maam.23

In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity of his marriage
to Geraldino. Nollora may not impugn his marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself from criminal
liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors to allowing the solemnization of multiple flawed
marriage ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:24
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void abinitio, may
still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for
bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus
escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women
with the promise of futurity and commitment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538
promulgated on 30 September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on 23 February 2010
are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy in Criminal
Case No. Q-04-129031 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment with a term of two years,
four months and one day of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day
of prision mayor as maximum of his indeterminate sentence, as well as the accessory penalties provided
by law.
Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29,
2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25,
2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee
Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo
of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of
Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with
Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband
and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with
any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore,
null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a
motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007,
the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a determination for failure of
both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing
despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty
Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right
over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to the
testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after
the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never
again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never
processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for
want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give
their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the
nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further
explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live as
husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is,
for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE

CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST,
HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to
be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly
entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to
the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of
marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The
parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the
purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage
was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply 10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on
certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole
purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of
lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the
purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of
marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages
where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been
referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into
solely for the legitimization of a child.12Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration
purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their
marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status. 14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 15 established the principal
test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a
sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married. "This
standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA),
which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the
purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining
the intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws. 16 It must
be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not
purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited
purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages
in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country,
the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The
Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent
permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every
contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they
do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception
to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without
subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of
representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an end to it as
soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all. They
must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as
merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, 19 which declared as valid a
marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid
marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited
purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham
marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first
necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited
purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such
marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC
went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their
consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for
the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential
requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a
marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American
citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under
Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code
provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately
enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation,
and undue influence.24 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable
of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their
act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. 26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage.
Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear
intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a
joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that
the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to
enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to
create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void
ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There
is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for
any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to
acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their
objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There
was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for
a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a
conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with
law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes
other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore,
so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid. 28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on
the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm
of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. 29 The right to marital privacy
allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live
apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. 30 Thus, marriages entered
into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and
title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, 31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not
precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes,
It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham
or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and
subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the
Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud,
namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the
wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4)
concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall
constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole
purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore,
under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the
present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham
marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare
such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed
of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to
use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to
enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an
inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State. 32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and
caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be
entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which
reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case
No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as
provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family
Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at
Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that
is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in
1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. 4 He arrived in the
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his
mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived
with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the
ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a
marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a
marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of
their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. 5 The Municipal Civil
Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage
license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the
number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. 6 Said
certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No.
9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January
19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA
F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may
serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002,
and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or
not there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel. 8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued
to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993. 9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are
issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by
Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License
No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their
office had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other
person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain,
and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines. 12 He testified that he solemnized
the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993. 13 He
stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola. 14 He
testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with the
requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day
before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his secretary. 16 After the
solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz
submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office. 17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria
Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure
the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on
January 8, 1993.19He further testified that he did not know where the marriage license was obtained. 20 He
attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and
witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the other
witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that
she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house. 22 She testified that she
sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week
before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with the application for marriage
license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house, showed her the marriage license
before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. 24 She further
testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the
marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by
Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated
January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 26
As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the
sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the
wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony
corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing
their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage
license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he
will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an application for marriage
license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they
gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that
she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence. 28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993. 29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon
Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did
not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their
marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese. 31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No.
9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed. 32 It also took
into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code. 33 As the marriage was not
one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an
absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent
declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria
Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the respondent
even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage
of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office,
are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by
petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same,
prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER
AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE
DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID

MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY
TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE
SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH
OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO
WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES
ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW. 35
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of
Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative
value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and
Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. 37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also
considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted
his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy. 38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and
Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is
DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09
January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 40 but the same was denied by the CA in
a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING

REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT
AND CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING

ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.

As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the
Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this
particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before
the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal
requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the
marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of
the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had
been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held
that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the
marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To
prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification that
no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 43 such certification was allowed,
as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an
official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to
exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as
evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-
issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be
found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the
duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and
such other relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as
his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was
allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was
issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado
and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which
was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the
document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply with
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and
since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent
search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is worth noting that in
that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was
lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the
alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the
Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a
categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has
been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in
performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof
does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed
located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of
Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the
records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to
explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither
party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the
validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the
existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her
mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to not
reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo
approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from.
The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how
the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as
the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage
license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could
have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed
to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the
Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-
issuance of said license. The case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the
parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove
that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured. 49 Gloria has failed
to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license
was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not
affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license
was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were
validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and appellee
have been validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties
are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of
Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the
signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were presented showing
appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members of appellant’s
family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after
the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage
Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima
Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on
01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We
take serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after an Information for
Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent
marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by
declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from
his own deceit and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage
contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the
Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also
provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt
from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code. 51 Again, this
marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a
marriage license, is void ab initio.1âwphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are
less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for
the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence
presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria
who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite,
is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City
dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with
respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent
marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43
(trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September
1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn,
Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer
in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In December 1981, Azucena left for
the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife.
Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought
Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally,
knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their
cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin, married to
Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the
name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a single
individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and
Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against
Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for
declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the
ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid
marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in
accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties
during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A
total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the
seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied.
Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction
which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present any evidence before the trial court
citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several
opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11
September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings
from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the
case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight
to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during
trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February
1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally. 5 The trial
court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court
ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because of
other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case.
The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because they were
not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sally’s claim for spousal support because she was not
married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley who were both of
legal age and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in her
answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally
married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamin’s
parents who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The 37
titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely
descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and
190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed
to prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in their purchase. The trial court found that
Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well
as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot
under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin
alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos.
8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to
Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to
Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s share in the properties
covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share
reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at
Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared
NONEXISTENT.
Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos.
17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950,
188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629,
194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209,
206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The registered owners, namely:
Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are
the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and
Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties acquired
from petitioner’s money without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties of the petitioner
and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties.
Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of income from these five (5) properties
within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further
directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and surrender control and possession of
these properties including the documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-ownership of
the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of
Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal
ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2) properties shall
be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.
Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the parties’ children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and
the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated
27 August 2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s decision before the
Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that
there were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence,
and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or the case would be deemed
submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her evidence. She
insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed despite the presence of
her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamin’s action was based on his prior marriage to
Azucena and there was no evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin
contracted the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court committed no
error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148
of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being claimed
by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him
exclusively because he was able to establish that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and
8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual contribution in their
purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared equally. However, the share of
Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena while Sally’s
share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that would
show bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision
and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos.
61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the properties under TCT
Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the
respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and common and to be
shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his
first marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution,
the Court of Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s ruling
that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s
decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-
existent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification the
trial court’s decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that she waived her right to
present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and Benjamin
were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is
addressed to the discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sally’s presentation of evidence was scheduled
on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11
September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at Sally’s
instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that in case
she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the date of the
scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting
Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court could not
dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial court’s prior warning due to the
numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to
present her evidence because all the postponements were at her instance and she was warned by the
trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she still fail to present her evidence on 28
November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to
have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s continued failure to
present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to
proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case because she was waiting for
the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial court’s denial of her demurrer to
evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary restraining order as Sally
prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable institution
because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and
refusal to proceed by one of the parties.10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin
because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further
alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence, she would have proven her marriage to
Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring real
properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin was the
informant in their children’s birth certificates where he stated that he was their father; and that Benjamin
introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real
property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not
the informant in the birth certificates of his children with Azucena.
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial court,
evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into
a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and
subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of
the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to
Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were
issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series issued for
the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage
License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification
enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a
marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license. 12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified
by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records Management and Archives
Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts; 14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil
Registration Department of the National Statistics Office. 15 The documentary and testimonial evidence
proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest" 16 and "a simulated marriage, at the
instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends
and the society especially from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives." 17 In short, it was a fictitious
marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s
birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982 18 while Sally was the
informant in Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March
1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did not match the dates
reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and,
at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a
license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the
beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It
was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568
did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month
of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 20 which made their marriage void ab
initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on
void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated
or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning." 21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in
sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio
and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the
trial court’s decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands." 22 While the Court of Appeals did
notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring
that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial court’s discussion that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null
and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being
no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage
contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but
for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara
[CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting marriage against the provisions
of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the
parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand
of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming
that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or
criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena. 23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity
except for the existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage.
Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed
marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary,
their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption
shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his
children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even admitted that
"Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective
spouses which included Sally x x x."25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in
accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the
names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in
the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos.
8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally 28 with the descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while
the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single
individual. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. 29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without
proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148
of the Family Code.30
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the
case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further
alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his partiality
against her and in favor of Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound
discretion on the part of the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to
establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred
from the decision or order itself.32In this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did not
err in submitting the case for decision because of Sally’s continued refusal to present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used uncomplimentary
words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he
acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
SO ORDERED.

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SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

The controlling facts are undisputed:

February 20, 1987

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.

We affirm the impugned Decision.

[G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000]

FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

5.WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V.COURT OF APPEALS (240 SCRA

In sum, two issues are to be resolved: justice

FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.

G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006

The trial court made the following findings:

This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.

He raises the following issues for Resolution.

We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

San Juan, Metro Manila

March 11, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

San Juan, Metro Manila

September 20, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

San Juan, Metro Manila

July 25, 2000

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

As testified to by Perlita Mercader:

A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.

A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .

Q Did you bring that with you?

A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.

In one case, it was held:

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

xxx xxx xxx

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

Effect of absence, defect or irregularity (re: essential and formal requisites)

A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994

Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.

Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.

1. Illegal solemnization of marriage

4. Cash bond issued without a receipt