Tomas P. Tan Jr. vs. Jose G.

Hosana
Facts: Jose and Milagros are husband and wife. During their marriage, they bought a
house and lot located in Naga City. While Jose was in Japan, Milagros sold the
property to petitioner Tomas, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale, by virtue of
a Special Power of Attorney executed by Jose in her favor. The Deed of Sale stated
that the purchase price for the lot was P200,000.00. A new title over the property
was issued in the name of Tomas. When Jose learned about the sale, he filed a
Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance and Damages
against Milagros, Tomas, and the Register of Deeds of Naga City. He averred that he
never authorized the sale and his signature in the SPA was forged. In his Answer,
Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good faith and for value. Before he paid
the full consideration of the sale, Tomas claimed he sought advice from his lawyer-
friend who told him that the title of the subject lot was authentic and in order. The
RTC ruled in favor or Jose and nullified the sale. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision
and directed Jose and Milagros to reimburse Tomas the purchase price of P200,000,
despite Tomas’ allegation that he paid P700,000 for the subject property. He
alleged that the lower purchase price reflected in the Deed of Sale was intended to
save on taxes. His subsequent MR was denied. In his present petition for review on
certiorari, Tomas argues, among others, that, his testimony establishing the actual
purchase price of P700,000.00 paid was uncontroverted.
Issue: Whether Tomas’ uncontroverted testimony as to the purchase price of
P700,00.00 can be considered as proof of payment.
Held: No. Tomas’ claim of paying P700,000.00 for the subject property was
unsubstantiated as he failed to tender any convincing evidence to establish his
claim.
In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party making allegations has the burden of
proving them by a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the
weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or
“greater weight of the credible evidence.” It means probability of the truth. It is
evidence that is more convincing to the court as it is worthier of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.
Tomas’ bare allegation that he paid Milagros the sum of P700,000.00 cannot be
considered as proof of payment, without any other convincing evidence to establish
this claim.
Tomas’ bare allegation, while uncontroverted, does not automatically entitle it to
be given weight and credence. It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads
payment has the burden of proving it; the burden rests on the defendant to prove
payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment.
A mere allegation is not evidence, and the person who alleges has the burden of
proving his or her allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence, which in civil
cases is preponderance of evidence.

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Tolentino, et. al. vs. Mendoza
Facts: This is an administrative case filed by petitioners Tolentino et.al. against
respondent Atty. Mendoza for Grossly immoral conduct and Gross Misconduct. The
complaint alleged that the Atty. Mendoza, a former MTC judge, abandoned his legal
wife, Felicitas, in favor of his paramour, Marilyn, who is also already married to
another man. Atty. Mendoza and Marilyn had two children, Mara and Myrra. They
declared in their children’s birth certificates that they were married in 1986. The
administrative case was referred to the IBP. The subject birth certificates and a copy
of news article in Naujanews, among other pieces of evidence, were formally
offered by complainants as documentary evidence. Nelson Melgar, one of the
complainants, testified that he was not the one who procured the certified true
copies of the subject birth certificates, as somebody just gave said documents to
him. Complainants’ witnesses also testified that Atty. Mendoza had been
introducing Marilyn as his wife as shown by a news article in Naujanews where he
was reported by said newspaper as husband to Marilyn. Respondent, on the other
hand, opted not to present any evidence and merely submitted a memorandum
expounding on his arguments that the testimonies of complainants’ witnesses are
mere hearsay, thus, said testimonies and their documentary evidence have no
probative weight.
The IBP found Atty. Mendoza guilty of the offense charged and suspended him from
the practice of law.
Issue: Whether the findings of the IBP are supported by evidence.
Held: Yes. The evidence presented by complainants reach that quantum of evidence
required in administrative proceedings which is only
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conviction.
Witness Melgar’s testimony that Atty. Mendoza had been publicly introducing
Marilyn as his wife is corroborated by the contents of an article in the Naujanews,
introducing respondent as one of Naujan’s public servants, and stating therein that
respondent has been blessed with two beautiful children with his wife, Marilyn. It
should be noted that said publication is under the control of respondent, he being
the Chairman of the Board thereof. Thus, it could be reasonably concluded that if he
contested the truth of the contents of subject article in the Naujanews, or if he did
not wish to publicly present Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife, he could have easily
ordered that the damning portions of said article to be edited out.
Moreover, the credibility of the witnesses’ testimonies cannot be discounted as
they are fully supported and corroborated by documentary evidence which speak
for themselves. The birth certificates of Mara and Myrra; and the Certification from
the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bulacan attesting to the existence in its records
of an entry of a marriage between Atty. Mendoza and Felicitas, are public
documents and are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.
People vs. Caranguian
Facts: In August 1971, Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO) members Ben Lumboy
and William Capili informed PO3 Edwin Birung that they sighted 2 former Civilian.
The group came under gunfire which resulted in Lumboy’s death. The following day,
a civilian informer named Palos informed PO3 Birung that the two former CAFGUs
the CVOs sighted were Bernardino Caranguian and Victoriano Garcia, herein
appellant and co-accused. After preliminary investigation, both Caranguian and
Garcia were charged with the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 2022, for the
killing of Lumboy. Garcia remained at large. Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU) agents at nearby Barangay Catarauan, in Amulung, Cagayan. Acting on the
information, PO3 Birung formed a team to track down the two former CAFGUs. On
direct examination, PO3 Birung testified that Lumboy and Capili informed him that
they sighted two former CAFGU in Cataruan. On cross-examination, PO3 Birung
testified, however, that Lumboy did not actually see the two former CAFGUs but
merely heard the news from his place. Further, Lumboy did not categorically tell
PO3 Birung that the two persons sighted were former CAFGUs,only that said
persons were armed. PO3 Birung testified that he merely heard from the people of
Barangay Catarauan that there were two dismissed CAFGUs in the vicinity. Further,
PO3 Birung testified that he was not even authorized by the army to catch the
dismissed CAFGUs, and that Catarauan was not part of his jurisdiction. PO3 Birung
testified that the day after the incident, a civilian informer named Palos told him the
names of appellant and accused. But Palos did not even witness the shooting
incident. He merely executed an affidavit during preliminary investigation but did
not testify in court. Despite this, the trial court found Caranguian guilty of the crime
charged. In his brief, the accused raises the sole issue that the lower court gravely
erred in convicting him of the crime of murder in
connection with the death of Lumboy. He claims that the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He assails the credibility of prosecution
witness Birung since the latter did not even know the names of appellant and co-
accused
at the time of the incident. Further, the testimony of Birung lacks corroboration.
Issue: Whether there is sufficiency of evidence to convict the accused.
Held: None. The quantum of evidence required in criminal cases is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Section 2 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required,
or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The
task of the prosecution is two-fold: first, to prove that a crime was committed, and
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second, that accused is the person responsible. Thus, the prosecution must be able
to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence beyond reasonable doubt
to justify the conviction of the accused. In the case at bar, the prosecution
presented proof that Lumboy was killed during the shooting incident. However, the
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was appellant who
perpetrated the killing. The information given by the witnesses at the identity of
appellant is hearsay. The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely
recites what
someone else has told him, whether orally or in writing. Section 36 of Rule 130
provides that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in the rules. In fact, the witness’ testimony is even double or
multiple hearsay since it is based upon “third hand” information related to the
witness by someone who heard it from others. Multiple hearsay is no more
competent than single hearsay.
In the Matter of the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in Favor of
Lilibeth O. Ladaga vs. Maj. Gen. Reynaldo Mapagu
Facts: Petitioners share the common circumstance of having their names included in
what is alleged to be a JCICC “AGILA” 3rd Quarter 2007 Order of Battle Validation
Result of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division (10th ID). They perceive that
by the inclusion of their names in the said Order of Battle (OB List), they become
easy targets of unexplained disappearances or extralegal killings – a real threat to
their life, liberty and security. ATTY. LILIBETH O. LADAGA (Atty. Ladaga), first came
to know of the existence of the OB List from an undisclosed source on May 21,
2009. In the OB List, it was reflected that the ULTIMATE GOAL is to TRY TO OUST
PGMA ON 30 NOV 2007. On the other hand, Atty. Angela Librado-Trinidad (Atty.
Librado-Trinidad), delivered a privileged speech before the members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to demand the removal of her name from said OB List. The
Commission on Human Rights, for its part, announced the conduct of its own
investigation into the matter.
According to Atty. Librado-Trinidad, in the course of the performance of her dutites
and functions, she has not committed any act against national security that would
justify the inclusion of her name in the said OB List. She said that sometime in May
2008, two suspicious-looking men tailed her vehicle. Also, on June 23, 2008 three
men tried to barge into their house. Meanwhile, Atty. Carlos Isagani T. Zarate was
informed that he was also included on the OB List. In his petition, he alleged that
the inclusion of his name in the said OB List was due to his advocacies as a public
interest or human rights lawyer. The Petitioners assert that the OB List is really a
military hit-list as allegedly shown by the fact that there have already been three
victims of extrajudicial killing whose violent deaths can be linked directly to the OB
List. On June 16, 2009 filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo. The RTC subsequently issued separate Writs of Amparo, directing the
respondents to file a verified written return. In the return of the respondents, they
denied authorship of the OB List, and alleged that petitioners failed to show that
they were responsible for the alleged threats. After submission of the parties’
respective Position Papers, the RTC issued Orders finding no substantial evidence to
show that the perceived threat to petitioners’ life, liberty and security was
attributable to the unlawful act or omission of the respondents. The privilege of the
Writ was therefore denied.
Issues: WON the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required under
the Writ of Amparo.
Held: No, the evidence does not satisfy degree of proof for the issuance of the Writ
of Amparo. The Writ of Amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-
making powers in response to the alarming rise in the number of cases of enforced
disappearances and extrajudicial killings. It is an extraordinary remedy intended to
address violations of, or threats to, the rights to life, liberty or security and that,
being a remedy of extraordinary character, is not one to issue on amorphous or
uncertain grounds but only upon reasonable certainty. Justifying allegations must
support the issuance of the writ, on the following matters:
1. The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
2. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for
the threat, act or omission;
3. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent and
how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;
4. The investigation conducted specifying the names, personal circumstances
and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals;
5. Actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for
the threat, act or omission;
6. The relief prayed for.
Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the parties shall establish their claims by
substantial evidence, and if the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial
evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be
proper and appropriate
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Petitioners sought to prove that
the inclusion of their names in the OB List presented a real threat to their security
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by attributing the violent deaths of the other known activists to the inclusion of
their names or the names of their militant organizations in the subject OB List.
However, the existence of the OB List could not be directly associated with the
menacing behaviour of suspicious men or the violent deaths of certain
personalities.
The Petitioners cannot assert that the inclusion of their names in the OB List is as
real a threat as that which brought ultimate harm to the other victims without
corroborative evidence from which it can be presumed that the suspicious deaths of
these three people were in fact, on account of their militant affiliations.
The Petitioners therefore were not able to prove by substantial evidence that there
was an actual threat to their rights to life, liberty and security. The mere inclusion of
their names in the OB List is not sufficient enough evidence for the issuance of the
Writ of Amparo.
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC) vs. HON. ORLANDO C.
CASIMIRO, in his capacity as Overall Deputy Ombudsman, FIDEL C. CU,
CARMELITA B. ZATE, and MARY LOU S. APELO.
G.R No. 206866. September 2, 2015
Facts:Petitioner PDIC, through its duly-authorized agents, filed a Joint-Affidavit
charging private respondents Cu (as the 85.99% owner of Bicol Development Bank,
Inc. (BDBI), Zate (as Chairman/President of BDBI), and Apelo (as a former employee
of the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) who acted as Bank Officer-In-Charge that
examined BDBI’s books and records, of the crimes of Direct Bribery and Corruption
of Public Officials, as well as violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It
averred that after the BSP Monetary Board ordered BDBI's closure, PDIC started to
perform its functions as statutory receiver, which includes, among others, the
control, management, and administration of BDBI as well as investigating the causes
of BDBI's closure. In the course of the receivership, Gomez — a former Cashier,
Service Officer, and Treasurer of BDBI — came forward and through her affidavit,
reported the purported scheme perpetrated by private respondents that
fraudulently concealed BDBI's true condition as a banking entity. Gomez's affidavit
outlines such scheme as follows: (a) Apelo would provide Cu an "advance warning"
of any impending surprise bank examinations on BDBI by BSP; (b) upon receipt of
the "advance warning," Cu would then make the necessary steps to misrepresent
BDBI's status, such as instructing BDBI employees on how to cover the possible
findings/exceptions of the BSP examiner on the books of BDBI, as well as infusing
cash into BDBI's vault in order to make it appear that the cash listed in the books
reflect the actual cash in vault, and thereafter returning such cash to the source; (c)
in exchange for such "advance warnings," Cu and/or Zate gave Apelo as
"professional fees" the aggregate amount of P140,000.00 by depositing the same to
the latter's bank account; and (d) to cover up such amounts given to Apelo, Cu
and/or Zate, instructed Gomez to initially cover the unofficial and unbooked cash
disbursements in favor of Apelo by placing such amounts in BDBI's books as "Other
Cash I tems," and thereafter, regularize and remove from BDBI 's books such
disbursements by including them in the other accounts of BDBI until they were
completely covered. To support such statements, Gomez provided copies of deposit
slips showing that such amount was indeed deposited to Apelo's bank account. She
likewise asserted that in the course of her employment at BDBI, she does not know
of any official or legitimate transactions that BDBI had with Apelo that would
warrant the disbursement of the aforesaid amount in the latter's favor. Cu denied
having ordered or instructed Gomez to make such deposits to Apelo's bank account.
He pointed to the lack of evidence to prove that Apelo was aware or made aware of
any alleged bank deposits made to her bank account, thus, negating the charge of
Direct Bribery against her and Corruption of Public Officials against him. For her
part, Zate likewise denied the allegations hurled against her, countering that
Gomez's statements should not be relied upon for being unfounded. Apelo did not
file any counter-affidavit despite the Ombudsman's orders.
The Ombudsman’s Ruling: The Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint for
lack of probable cause, finding that while it may be said that certain amounts were
indeed deposited to Apelo's bank account, there is no proof that Apelo
subsequently withdrew the same. PDIC moved for reconsideration, which was
denied. The Ombudsman found Gomez's affidavit showing Apelo as the source of
the "advance warnings" received by Cu in connection with the BSP examinations to
be inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding no
probable cause to indict private respondents of the crimes charged.
2. Whether the Ombudsman was correct in discrediting Gomez’s affidavit as
inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has
been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably
guilty thereof. It does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
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 Verily, preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of reiterate, the validity of the merits of a party's defense or accusations as
discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidences are better ventilated
has been committed and that the person charged should be held during the trial stage than in the preliminary stage.
responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a finding of
probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction. The presence or absence of the elements
of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be
BUENAFLOR CAR SERVICES, INC. v. CEZAR DURUMPILI DAVID, JR.
passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Hence, "the validity and
G.R No. 222730, November 07, 2016
merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of
testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at
FACTS: Respondent was employed as Service Manager by petitioner, doing business
the preliminary investigation level.”
under the trade name “Pronto! Auto Services”. In such capacity, he was in charge of
In view of the grave accusations against them, Cu and Zate resorted to
the overall day-to-day operations of petitioner, including the authority to sign
mere denials, while Apelo ignored the complaint by not filing a counter-
checks, check voucher, and purchase orders.
affidavit despite due notice, thus, miserably failing to debunk the charges
In the course of petitioner’s business, with respect to the purchase and delivery of
hurled against them. Indubitably, the foregoing establishes probable cause
automotive parts and products, it was company policy that all checks should be
to believe that private respondents may have indeed committed such acts
issued in the name of the specific supplier and not in “cash”, and that said checks
constituting the crimes charged against them. As such, they must defend
are to be picked up from the petitioner’s accounting assistant, Marilyn A. Del
themselves in a full-blown trial on the merits.
Rosario, at the company’s office in Muntinlupa City.
2. No. Owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the
On August 8, 2013, Chief Finance Officer Cristina S. David of petitoner’s affiliate
technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its
company, Diamond IGB, Inc., received a call from the branch manager of ChinaBank,
proceedings. In the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, the Court
SM City Bicutan Branch, informing her that the latter had cleared several checks
declared that hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable
issued by petitioner bearing the words “OR CASH” indicated after the payee’s name.
cause in preliminary investigations because such investigation is merely
An investigation was conducted thereafter.
preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of
On August 22, 2013, petitioner, through its president, Exequiel Lampa, along with
parties. Further, the determination of probable cause can rest partially,
Helen Lee, Human Resource Manager, confronted Del Rosario on the questioned
or even entirely, on hearsay evidence, as long as the person making the
checks. Del Rosario readily confessed that upon respondent’s instruction, she
hearsay statement is credible.
inserted the words “OR CASH” after the name of the payees when the same had
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long
been signed by all the authorized signatories. Along with respondent, Del Rosario
as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is
also implicated De Guzman, Purchasing Officer, and Caranto, petitioner’s
admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation
messenger/driver, who she alleged, were also under the respondent’s direct
because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally
supervision and co-conspirators. Del Rosario’s confession was put into writing in
adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.
two (2) separate letters both of even date. (Extrajudicial Confession)
In this case, assuming arguendo that Gomez's statements, as written in her
The ensuing investigation revealed that there were 27 checks with the words “OR
affidavit are indeed hearsay, there is nevertheless substantial basis to
CASH”, all signed by respondent in the total amount of P1,021,561.72. As a result,
credit the same, considering that she was a former Cashier, Service Officer,
respondent, together with Del Rosario, De Guzman, and Caranto, were placed
and Treasurer of BDBI — a high-ranking officer that may be privy to
under preventive suspension for a period of 30 days and directed to submit their
delicate transactions such as the purported "under-the-table" deal
respective written explanations.
involving private respondents. In this regard, it must be emphasized that in
Respondent, for his part, vehemently denied the charges against him. He claimed
determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at
that he has no control over the company’s finance and billing operations, nor the
a finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to support a prima facie
authority to instruct Del Rosario to make any check alterations, without the
case against the respondents are required, not absolute certainty. Probable
permission and authority of either Buenaflor, vice-president of operations, or
cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than
Vasay, Chief Finance Officer.
bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction. To
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On September 20, 2013, respondent and his co-workers were served with their
respective notices of termination after having been found guilty of violating the
company’s code of conduct and behavior, particularly serious misconduct and
willful breach of trust. Respondent, De Guzman, and Caranto filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of damages and
attorney’s fees against petitioners and Buenaflor.
In the meantime, Lee, on behalf of petitioner, filed a criminal complaint for 27
counts of Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Documents against
respondent, De Guzman, Caranto and Del Rosario, supported by Buenaflor and
Vasay’s affidavits attesting that the checks they signed did not bear the words “OR
CASH”, and that they did not authorize its insertion after the payee’s name.
Respondent, De Guzman, Caranto, and Del Rosario were indicted.
LABOR ARBITER RULING: In a decision dated September 29, 2014, The Labor Arbiter
ruled that respondent, De Guzman, and Caranto were illegally dismissed, and
consequently, awarded backwages, separation pay and attorney’s fees. The LA
observed that petitioner failed to establish existence of conspiracy among
respondent, De Guzman, Caranto and Del Rosario in altering the checks and that
the latter’s extrajudicial confession was informally made and not supported by
evidence. Petitioner appealed this decision to the NLRC.
NLRC RULING:In a decision dated November 28, 2014, the NLRC affirmed with
modification the LA’s decision, finding that De Guzman and Caranto have been
dismissed for cause, but sustained the illegality of respondent’s termination from
work. NLRC held that since De Guzman prepared the purchase orders, and Caranto
encashed the checks despite knowledge of the company policy, they could not be
discounted from the scheme. Having his motion for partial reconsideration denied,
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
COURT OF APPEALS RULING: CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the NLRC in holding that respondent was illegally dismissed. CA ruled that Del
Rosario’s extrajudicial confession only bound her as confessant but constitutes
hearsay with respect to respondent and the other co-accused. CA noted that at the
time the checks were signed by respondent, the words “OR CASH” were not yet
written on thereon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
upholding the NLRC’s ruling that respondent was illegally dismissed.
SUPREME COURT RULING: The petition is meritorious.
Article 297 of the Labor Code, as renumbered, enumerates the just causes for
termination of an employee, to wit:
ART. 297. Termination by Employer. An Employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or representative in conncetion with his work
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by
his employer or duly authorized representative
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person
of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly
authorized representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
In the case at bar, respondent’s termination was grounded on his violation of
petitoioner’s code of conduct and behavior, which was supposedly tantamount to
(a) Serious Misconduct and/or (b) willful breach of trust reposed in him by his
employer.
Petitioner’s claims was hinged on respondent’s alleged directive to petitioner’s
accounting assistant, Del Rosario, to insert the word “OR CASH” in the checks
payable to the suppliers.
While the respondent denies these allegations, but, given his position of trust,
although his statements may be true, the court observes that it is highly unlikely
that respondent did not have any participation in the above-mentioned scheme to
defraud petitioner. No checks would have been issued if no purchase orders were
made, which the respondent must approve before the payment process can even
commence.
Case law states that “Labor suits require only substantial evidence to prove the
validity of the dismissal.” Based on such, the court is convinced that substantial
evidence exists to support petitioner’s allegations against respondent. The Doctrine
of Independently Relevant Statements was the basis of SC in considering the
extrajudicial confessions of Del Rosario as more than mere hearsay and is highly
relevant to the issue of the case.
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Petition Granted. Respondent is held to be validly dismissed, and thus, not entitled Yes. There exists in our jurisdiction a legitimate expectation of privacy governing
to backwages, separation pay, as well as attorney’s fees. bank accounts. The source of this right of expectation is statutory, and it is found in
R.A. No. 1405, otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy Act of 1955. Section 2 of the
law institutionalized this policy by characterizing as absolutely confidential in
general all deposits of whatever nature with banks and other financial institutions in
the country
BSB Group vs. Sally Go Facts:
The court noted that the inquiry into bank deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405
BSB Group, Inc., represented by its president, Ricardo, filed a case for Qualified
must be premised on the fact that the money deposited in the account is itself the
Theft against Sally, his wife. According to the complaint, Sally was employed by the
subject of the action. Given this perspective, the subject matter of the action in the
company as cashier. She was charged when several checks totaling P1,534,135.50
case at bar is to be determined from the indictment that charges respondent with
issued by the company’s customers were indorsed by her to her personal banking
the offense, and not from the evidence sought by the prosecution to be admitted
account with the Security Bank.
into the records. In the criminal Information filed with the trial court, respondent,
After a finding of probable cause, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed an
unqualifiedly and in plain language, is charged with qualified theft by abusing
Information charging Sally with Qualified Theft for theft of “cash” money belonging
petitioner’s trust and confidence and stealing cash in the amount of P1,534,135.50.
to BSB Group Inc. After arraignment, trial ensued on the merits. To prove that Sally
The said Information makes no factual allegation that in some material way involves
deposited the money to her personal account, the prosecution moved for issuance
the checks subject of the testimonial and documentary evidence sought to be
of subpoena duces mecum against the managers/representatives of Security Bank,
suppressed. Neither do the allegations in said Information make mention of the
as well as the Metrobank Jose Abad Santos branch. Sally moved to quash the
supposed bank account in which the funds represented by the checks have
subpoena to Metrobank, noting that no mention was made of Sally’s bank account
allegedly been kept.
with Metrobank. While arguing that the account with Metrobank was immaterial to
In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the indictment itself that the Security
the case, she waived her objection to the Security Bank subpoena. BSB opposed the
Bank account is the ostensible subject of the prosecution’s inquiry. Without
motion to quash, arguing that the complaint affidavit showed two checks were
needlessly expanding the scope of what is plainly alleged in the Information, the
deposited to the Metrobank account. Sally also filed a supplemental motion to
subject matter of the action in this case is the money amounting to P1,534,135.50
quash, alleging secrecy of bank deposits under R.A. 1405. The trial court denied the
alleged to have been stolen by respondent, and not the money equivalent of the
motions to quash. In the meantime, the representative of Security Bank testified
checks which are sought to be admitted in evidence. Thus, it is that, which the
and identified the checks deposited to Sally’s Security Bank account. Before her
prosecution is bound to prove with its evidence, and no other.
testimony could be completed, however, Sally moved to suppress her testimony,
It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and documentary evidence relative
invoking irrelevancy and secrecy of bank deposits under R.A. 1405. When the trial
to respondent’s Security Bank account serves no other purpose than to establish
court denied anew her motion to suppress, Sally filed a petition with the Court of
the existence of such account, its nature and the amount kept in it. It constitutes an
Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying
attempt by the prosecution at an impermissible inquiry into a bank deposit account
her motions to quash with respect to the Metrobank account, and the motion to
the privacy and confidentiality of which is protected by law.
suppress on the testimony of the bank representative from Security Bank.
In sum, the court held that the testimony of Marasigan on the particulars of
The Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari filed by Sally and reversed
respondent’s supposed bank account with Security Bank and the documentary
the assailed orders of the trial court as well as struck off the testimony of the bank
evidence represented by the checks adduced in support thereof, are not only
representative of Security Bank.
incompetent for being excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405. They are likewise
BSB Group, Inc and Ricardo then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as they do not appear to have any logical and
Court. They argued that the allegation in the Information of “cash” money taken by
reasonable connection to the prosecution of respondent for qualified theft. The
Sally encompass the checks deposited to the questioned bank accounts of Sally.
court found full merit in and affirm respondent’s objection to the evidence of the
Issue:
prosecution.
Whether the testimony of the bank representative and the accompanying bank
documents violate the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits and, hence,
excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405
Held:

7

De Jesus vs. Sanchez-Malit Facts:
Records showed Malit drafted and notarized a mortgage of a public market stall
that named the complainant, Mercedita De Jesus, as its absolute and registered
owner. As a result, the mortgagee charged De Jesus for perjury and for collection of
sum of money.
De Jesus claimed that Malit was a consultant of the local government unit of
Dinalupihan, Bataan and was aware that the public market stall was government-
owned. Malit made and notarized an agreement, but did not advise De Jesus that
the property was still covered by the period within which it could not be alienated.
An exchange of pleadings ensued after Malit was charged. Complainant offered in
evidence the copies of documents notarized by respondent
Respondent argues that the additional documents submitted in evidence by
complainant are inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of Section 4,
Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Issue:
Whether the documents notarized in violation of Rules on Notarial Practice are
admissible in evidence.
Held:
Yes.Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that “evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these
rules.”
The Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of evidence if it is
obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. On the other hand, the 2004
Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the inadmissibility of
documents obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly considered in
evidence the other notarized documents submitted by complainant as additional
evidence.
People vs. Samontanez
Facts: This is an automatic review of the decision in a criminal case convicting the
accused- appellant Roberto with the crime of rape with homicide sentencing him
with the penalty of death.
On Nov. 25, 1995, Corazon delas Alas saw her daughter, the 18-year-old Lolita, off
to school from their residence. In the evening of the same day Lolita’s lifeless and
naked body was found in the middle of a sugar cane plantation Lolita was
apparently raped before the attacker ended her life.
Nobody witnessed the actual commission of the grisly crime. However, police
investigation reveals that Roberto was seen at around 6:30 o clock in the evening on
November 25, 1995 while he was in the act of coming out of the sugar cane
plantation near the place where the dead body of Lolita was later found. Other
witnesses testified that they saw Roberto passed through the same path along the
cane field where Lolita was last seen.
On November 28, 1995, Roberto was fetched by the police authorities of Nasugbu,
Batangas from his workplace at Hermogenes Trading. During the investigation at
the Police Headquarters, Roberto admitted to the police that the other personal
belongings of Lolita delas Alas were inside his bag that was left at his workplace. A
follow-up investigation conducted by the Nasugbu police authorities led to the
recovery of the said personal belongings of the victim. The bag of Roberto was
recovered, containing an Omax wrist watch, a Joop cologne and a pawnshop receipt
for a gold ring that was subsequently redeemed by SPO2 Masikat for P500.00. The 3
articles were positively identified during the trial of the case by Corazon as
belonging to her daughter, Lolita. The police also found a balisong and a Barangay
Clearance inside the black bag of Roberto.
He confessed during custodial investigation that he committed the crime. Roberto
was formally charged in court with the crime of rape with homicide. Roberto
initially entered a plea of not guilty, but later on withdrew his earlier and pleaded
guilty.
In his Brief, appellant Roberto assails the validity of his plea of guilty to the charge in
the information in this case for having been improvidently made. The record shows
that the trial court relied on a) the appellant’s plea of guilty to the crime of rape
with homicide as charged in the information and b) the evidence adduced by the
prosecution during the trial of the instant case.
Issue: Whether the pieces of evidence (belongings of Lolita) are admissible.
Held: No. The trial court lamentably considered pieces of evidence that are
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. The facts
show that the appellant Roberto was actually arrested by police authorities at his
workplace. It does not appear from the record that the appellant was apprised of
his constitutional rights during the police custodial investigation which are
enshrined in the Constitution. It also does not appear that he was assisted by
counsel during the said custodial investigation. In the absence of a valid waiver, any
confession obtained from the appellant during the police custodial investigation
relative to the crime, including any other evidence secured by virtue of the said
confession is inadmissible in evidence even if the same was not objected to during
the trial by the counsel of the appellant. Thus, the personal belongings of the victim
namely: Omax wristwatch, gold ring and Joop cologne were recovered and found
inside the bag of the appellant when the police authorities returned to the
appellant’s place of work after they illegally obtained a confession from the
appellant, are inadmissible in evidence.
Under the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree, once the primary source ( the tree) is
shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the
fruit) derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence
8
is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the fruit of the poisonous
tree is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The fruit of the poisonous tree is at
least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible.
The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State
should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.

Navarro vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
In this case, the tape recording captured a heated conversation between a
policeman (Navarro) and a reporter (Lingan) which later led to the violent death of
the reporter, and which took place at the police station in the presence of several
people. The exchange of words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic
exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim who
provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man, testified.
Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had made
of the heated discussion at the police station between the accused police officer
Navarro and the deceased, Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the
two.
Issue:
Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200,
which prohibits wiretapping and recording of private communication..
Held:Yes, the tape is admissible.
RA 4200 prohibits the recording of private communication by any wiretapping or
recording device; and any information obtained in violation of this law shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
The Court held that the conversation was not a private communication, and
therefore was admissible in evidence in the homicide case filed against the
policeman for the reporter's death, even if the policeman did not authorize the
recording. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not
private, its tape recording is not covered by the prohibition under RA 4200.

9
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PAULINO SEVILLENO G.R. No. 129058. March 29,
1999

FACTS: Appellant Paulino Sevilleno was charged for rape with homicide, committed
against the 9 year old Virginia Baquia. He pleaded guilty during the arraignment as
assisted by PAO lawyers. Taking advantage of typhoon "Pepang" that struck the
island of Negros, the accused escaped from detention. The court then directed that
the accused be tried in absentia and counsel was relieved from his responsibility to
his client and the court. The prosecution presented the examining physician as well
as Maria Lariosa and Norma Baquia. Notably, these witnesses were not cross-
examined because, as already adverted to, Atty. Pabalinas earlier excused himself
from the case. Neither did the court appoint another counsel for the accused.
Thereafter, he was recaptured. The RTC convicted appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish that the crime happened
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

HELD: The court below also erred in disregarding the testimony of Norma Baquia
"for the reason that her testimony failed to establish that the incident happened
within the territorial jurisdiction of this court." The court did not consider her
testimony purportedly because she only testified that her sister Virginia went with
the accused to Guindali-an without specifying as to what municipality or city it was
part of. Again, this is error. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court requires courts
to take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
geographical divisions of our country. There is only one Sitio Guindali-an, Brgy.
Guadalupe, San Carlos City (Negros Occidental).

PELTAN DEVELOPMENT, INC. v. CA, ALEJANDRO Q. REY and JUAN B. ARAUJO G.R.
No. 117029. March 19, 1997
FACTS: Herein private respondents filed against eleven (11) herein petitioners a
complaint captioned for Cancellation of Titles and Damages. The complaint was
amended by including or impleading as the twelfth defendant the City Townhouse
Development Corporation. Respondents are applicants for a free patent over a
parcel of land comprising an area of 197,527 square meters, more or less, situated
in Barrio Tindig na Manga, Las Pias, Metro Manila. During the years that
respondents were occupying, cultivating, planting and staying on the aforestated
parcel of land, neither x x x one of the petitioners was in possession thereof.
The processing and eventual approval of respondents’ free patent application or
petition over the subject piece of land have, however, been obstructed and/or held
10
in abeyance, despite the absence of any opposition thereto, because of the alleged
existence of several supposed certificates of title thereon.
They then filed an Action for Cancellation of Title.
Peltan filed a Motion For Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defenses mainly on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of action against defendant Peltan. It is
alleged in the motion that plaintiffs are not the real parties in interest in the action
as they do not assert any present and subsisting title of ownership over the
property in question. Invoking the case of Gabila vs. Barriga, Peltan contends that
the action being one for cancellation of the certificates of title the Government,
through the Solicitor General not a private individual like plaintiff Gabila was the
real party in interest.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
order of the Regional Trial Court. It further held that the RTC should have treated
the case as an accion publiciana to determine who as between the parties plaintiffs
and defendants have a better right of possession.
ISSUE: Should the Court of Appeals invoke a Supreme Court decision promulgated
after such motion was filed by defendants and ruled upon by the trial court?
HELD: It is axiomatic nonetheless that a court has a mandate to apply relevant
statutes and jurisprudence in determining whether the allegations in a complaint
establish a cause of action. While it focuses on the complaint, a court clearly cannot
disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. In
resolving a motion to dismiss, every court must take cognizance of decisions this
Court has rendered because they are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice
as provided by Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
The said decisions, more importantly, form part of the legal system, and failure of
any court to apply them shall constitute an abdication of its duty to resolve a
dispute in accordance with law, and shall be a ground for administrative action
against an inferior court magistrate.
In resolving the present complaint, therefore, the Court is well aware that a
decision in Margolles vs. CA, rendered on 14 February 1994, upheld the validity of
OCT No. 4216 (and the certificates of title derived therefrom), the same OCT that
the present complaint seeks to nullify for being fictitious and spurious. Respondent
CA, in its assailed Decision dated 29 June 1994, failed to consider Margolles vs. CA.
This we cannot countenance.
In finding that the complaint stated a cause of action, Public Respondent CA
recognized that private respondent had a valid right over the property in question,
based on their actual possession thereof and their pending application for a free
patent thereon. The linchpin of this right, however, is the validity of OCT No. 4216.
In other words, private respondents right is premised on the allegation that the title
of herein petitioners originated merely from the fictitious and/or spurious OCT No.
4216.
Because it had failed to take cognizance of Margolles vs. CA, the CA was unable to
consider that the legality of OCT No. 4216. As adverted to earlier, Margolles vs. CA
upheld the validity of this title and the titles derived therefrom by, among others,
Petitioner Peltan Corporation. Clearly, private respondents possession of the land,
and their pending application for a free patent thereon, did not not vest in them a
right superior to the valid title of petitioner originating from OCT No. 4216. Indeed,
private respondents can invoke no right at all against the petitioners. Accordingly,
the first element of a cause of action, i.e., plaintiffs right, is not present in the
instant case.
In this light, the CAs treatment of the present suit as an accion publiciana to
determine which one among the parties had a better right over the property is but
an exercise in redundancy. As discussed above, the same issue has been foreclosed
by the Supreme Court in Margolles.
The Supreme Court promulgated Margolles ahead of the assailed CA decision. It
was incumbent upon Respondent CA to take judicial notice thereof and apply it in
resolving this case. That the CA did not is clearly a reversible error.
CANDELARIA VS PEOPLE
Facts:
Viron Transit Corporation (Viron) ordered 14,000 liters of diesel from United Oil
Petroleum (Unioil) owned by Lao. Petitioner Candelaria, employed as truck driver
by Lao, was dispatched together with his helper, Romano to deliver the diesel fuel
in Laon Laan. However, Lao was informed by Viron that it had not yet received its
order. Thereafter, Romano returned alone to Unioil's office and reported that
Candelaria poked a balisong at him. After few days, NBI agents found the
abandoned truck in Laguna, emptied of diesel. Lao filed complaint for Qualified
Theft against Candelaria.
The Mother of Lao, and Claro, dispatcher and driver of Unioil, corroborated Lao's
allegations on material points. Claro verified that it was Candelaria who was tasked
to deliver the diesel to Viron. Candelaria, in his defense, demurred to the
prosecution's evidence and argued that there was no direct evidence that linked
him to the commission of crime, as Lao has no personal knowledge as to what
actually happened to the diesel fuel.
Based on circumstantial evidence, RTC convicted Candelaria having found present
all the elements constituting the crime-- taking property belonging to another
without consent, with abuse of confidence. On appeal, CA affirmed the conviction
ruling that a finding of guilt need not always be based on direct evidence but may
also be based on circumstantial evidence or “evidence which proves a fact or series
of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference.” HOWEVER,
CA modified the amount which he was directed to indemnify Lao, fixing the same at
P14,000.00 in the absence of any supporting documents to prove that the diesel
11
fuel was indeed worth P497,000.00.
Issues:
1. Whether CA correctly found Petitioner guilty of crime on the basis of
circumstantial evidence.
2. Whether the value of diesel considered as matter of public knowledge which
falls within the purview of the rules on discretionary judicial notice.
Held:
1. Yes.All the elements are present. Thru testimony of prosecution witness, it was
established that the truck with plate number PTA-945 was loaded with
diesel, driven by the petitioner for delivery was taken by him without
consent of Lao and that petitioner abused the confidence reposed upon
him by Lao. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there
is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. It suffices to
convict an accused only if the circumstances proven constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing
to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person; the
circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and, at the same time,
inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilt. Corollary
thereto, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each
and every hypothesis consistent with innocence.
2. Yes.The imposable penalty for the crime of Qualified Theft depends upon the
value of thing stolen. Purposes of fixing the imposable penalty, the value of
property therefore must be proved through presentation of independent
and reliable corroborated estimate. More so, in the absence of such the
courts may either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the
value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the
case. Court ruled that, “the trial court can only take judicial notice of the
value of goods which are matters of public knowledge or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration.” In this case, Candelaria has been found
guilty of stealing diesel fuel the value of it may be readily gathered from
price lists published by the Department of Energy (DOE). In this regard,
the value of diesel fuel involved herein may then be considered as a
matter of public knowledge which falls within the purview of the rules on
discretionary judicial notice. Even though prosecution only presented the
uncorroborated testimony of Lao to prove the value of diesel-- taking
judicial notice of the fact that the pump price of diesel in August 2006 (the
time of commission of crime) is sufficient; as the value can be
independently ascertained from DOE's price publication. In this case,
RTC's valuation is correct amounting to P497,000.00
HABAGAT GRILL VS DMC-URBAN PROPERTY DEVELOPER Facts:
David m. Consunji, Inc. acquired residential lot in Davao. It transferred said lot to its
sister company, respondent DMC-Urban Property Developer. Complaint for Forcible
entry was filed in MTC with allegation that Biraogo forcibly entered lot thru strategy
and stealth, and thereby constructed Habagat grill. Biraogo denied the allegation
and averred that Habagat Grill was built in 1992 inside Municipal Reservation No.
1050 or Presidential Proclamation No.20 and not in the lot claimed by respondent.
A team was constituted with task to determine where Habagat was precisely
located. A report submitted states that Habagat Grill was occupring 934 square
meters of the lot in question. MTC rendered decision dismissing the case on ground
of lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal, CA ruled that MTC had jurisdiction over the Complaint for Forcible entry.
CA gave greater weight to the testimony of respondent's real property manager,
since he had personal knowledge.
Issue:Whether the MTC can take judicial notice under Section 2, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court.
Held:
No.
Trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the metes and bounds of the property
covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 20 Although the lower court may take
judicial notice of PD No. 20, it may not do so in regard to the metes and bounds.
"Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take
and act on without proof because they already know them." Its object is to save
time, labor and expense in securing and introducing evidence on matters that are
not ordinarily capable of dispute or actually bona fide disputed, and the tenor of
which can safely be assumed from the tribunal's general knowledge or from a slight
search on its part.
Municipal courts may take judicial notice of the municipal ordinances in force in the
municipality in which they sit. HOWEVER, such notice is limited to what the law is
and what it states.
In this case, the trial court took judicial notice of the existence of Presidential
Proclamation No. 20, which declared Times Beach a recreation center. The MTC also
took judicial notice of the location of the beach, made its own estimate of the
location of the metes and bounds of the property mentioned by the law.
The location of Habagat Grill cannot be resolved by merely taking judicial notice of
Presidential Proclamation No. 20; such location is precisely at the core of the
dispute in this case. Neither may the MTC take discretionary judicial notice under
Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, because the exact boundaries of the lot
covered by that law are not a matter of public knowledge capable of
unquestionable demonstration. Neither may these be known to judges because of
their judicial functions. Hence, the CA was correct in disregarding the findings of the
trial courts, because they had erred in taking judicial notice of the exact metes and
bounds of the property.
Alfelor vs Halasan GR No. 165987 March 31, 2006
12
Facts:
Children and heirs of the late spouses Alfelor filed a complaint for partition before
the RTC. Teresita Sorongon and her 2 children Joshua and Katrina, who claimed to
be the surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor (one of the children of deceased spouses
Alfelor), were among the plaintiffs of the case. Josefina Halasan filed a Motion for
Intervention alleging, among others, that she is the surviving spouse and primary
compulsory heir of Jose Alfelor. Attached to the Motion is their marriage contract.
Because of the petitioners’ opposition, the judge set the motion for hearing.
Josefina presented the marriage contract and Reply-in-Intervention filed by the
heirs of spouses Alfelor, where Teresita declared that she knew of the previous
marriage of the late Jose Alfelor. Teresita also testified before the RTC wherein she
stated that while she did not know Josefina personally, she knew that her husband
had been previously married to Josefina and that the two did not live together as
husband and wife. Teresita also revealed that Jose told her that he did not have his
marriage to Josefina annulled because he believed in good faith that he had the
right to remarry.
Judge Fuentes issued an Order denying the motion and dismissed the complaint.
The trial court also declared that Teresita and her children were the legal and
legitimate heirs of the late Jose Alfelor.
Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration insisting that under Section 4 Rule 129
of the Revised Rules of Court, an admission need not be proved. The said Motion
was denied.
Josefina fied a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. CA reversed the ruling of the
trial court. It held that Teresita already admitted that Josefina had been married to
the deceased and under Section 4 Rule 129, a judicial admission no longer requires
proof.
Issue:
Held:
Yes. The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs, petitioners
herein, admitted the existence of the first marriage in their Reply- in-Intervention
filed in the RTC, to wit:
1.1. Plaintiff Teresita S. Alfelor admits knowledge of the previous marriage of the
late Jose K. Alfelor, with that of the herein intervenor were married on February 1,
1956;
People of the Philippines vs Castillo GR No. 131592-93February 15, 2000
Facts: Julian Castillo was charged with Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearms in
2 separate informations. The police, accompanied by Akoy (brother-in-law of the
victim and construction worker), proceeded to Port San Pedro where they saw
Castillo on board a vessel bound for Cebu. Castillo denied killing Abawag. The police
found in his possession a .38 caliber handmade revolver, 3 empty shells and 3 live
ammunitions. It was also revealed upon further inquiry that Castillo owned the
gun but had no license to possess it. Castillo was convicted of Homicide and Illegal
Possession of Firearm, aggravated by homicide.
Issue: Whether or not Castillo’s conviction was unwarranted as no proof was
adduced by the prosecution that he was not licensed to possess the subject firearm
Held: Yes. Two (2) requisites are necessary to establish illegal possession of
firearms: first, the existence of the subject firearm, and second, the fact that the
accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or
permit to carry it outside his residence. The onus probandi of establishing these
elements as alleged in the Information lies with the prosecution. The first element --
the existence of the firearm -- was indubitably established by the prosecution.
Prosecution eyewitness Acaso saw appellant shoot the victim thrice with a .38
caliber revolver. Appellant himself admitted that he did not turn over the gun to the
security guards in the building after the shooting. The same gun was recovered from
the appellant and offered in evidence by the prosecution. However, no proof was
adduced by the prosecution to establish the second element of the crime, i.e., that
the appellant was not licensed to possess the firearm. This negative fact constitutes
an essential element of the crime as mere possession, by itself, is not an offense.
The lack of a license or permit should have been proved either by the testimony or
certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the
accused was not a licensee of the subject firearm or that the type of firearm
involved can be lawfully possessed only by certain military personnel.
Although the appellant himself admitted that he had no license for the gun
recovered from his possession, his admission will not relieve the prosecution of its
duty to establish beyond reasonable doubt the appellant's lack of license or
permit to possess the gun.
Moreover, said admission is extrajudicial in nature. As such, it does not fall under
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court. Not being a judicial admission,
said statement by accused-appellant does not prove beyond reasonable doubt the
second element of illegal possession of firearm.
Constantino vs Heirs of Constantino
GR No. 181508 October 2, 2013
Facts:
Asuncion and Josefina filed a complaint against petitioners for the nullification of a
document denominated as “Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukom”, Tax Declaration and
13
reinstatement of Tax Declaration No. 20814 in the name of Pedro Sr.
Respondents alleged that petitioners asserted their claim of ownership to the
exclusion of respondents. The petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that the
document was perfectly valid and legal, as it was a product of mutual and voluntary
agreement between and among the descendants of the deceased Pedro Sr. Pre-trial
Conference was conducted wherein the parties entered into stipulations and
admissions as well as identification of the issues to be litigated. RTC rendered a
Decision in favor of the respondents finding that as a result of execution of
“Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver”, both the plaintiffs and defendants acted
equally at fault. The Complaint for Nullification was dismissed. CA ruled in favor of
the respondent heirs of Pedro Jr. declaring that the subject lot actually belongs to
Pedro Jr., hence, not part of the estate of Pedro Sr.
Issue: Whether or not CA erred in disregarding the stipulations and admissions
during the pre-trial conference on which the application of the doctrine of in pari
delicto was based
Held: Weak as the reasoning is, the CA actually contradicted the admissions made
no less by the respondents during the pre-trial conference where they stipulated
that the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534 consisting of 192 sq. m belongs
to Pedro Sr.
A portion of the admission and stipulations made by both parties during the pre-
trial is hereunder quoted, thus:
Respondents’ admissions:
"1. That the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534 previously owned by Pedro
Constantino, Sr. was transferred to Maria Constantino under Tax Declaration No.
9535;
1. The existence of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver per Doc. No.319, Page No.
44, Book No. 11, Series of 1968 by Notary Public Romerico Flores, Jr."
Clearly, the above stipulation is an admission against respondents’ interest of the
fact of ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq m lot covered by Tax Declaration No.
9534.
In addition, Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, provides that:
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in
the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.
As contemplated in the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court, the general
rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it and the
dispensation of proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the
admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no
such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an
admission by denying that he made such an admission.
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial
admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly
provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that
the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action,
thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried.
People of the Philippines vs Rullepa GR No. 131516March 5, 2003Facts:
Ronnie Rullepa was charged with rape of a 3 year old before the RTC. Upon
arraignment, Rullepa pleaded not guilty. According to the prosecution, Cyra Mae
(rape victim) who was then 3.5 years old told her Mama about Ronnie’s doing to
her, which includes insertion of penis on her anus and mouth. Col. Buenafe and
Gloria, parents of Cyra Mae, confronted Rullepa and the latter readily admitted
doing those things to Cyra Mae. The spouses brought Rullepa to Camp Karingal
where he admitted the imputations against him. The defense’s sole witness was
Rullepa who denied having anything to do with the abrasions found in Cyra Mae’s
genitalia (abrasion which was reported by Dr. Preyra, medico-legal officer). RTC
found Rullepa guilty beyond reasonable doubt and is sentenced to death.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death
upon Rullepa
Held:
No. The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that the accused had carnal
knowledge of a woman, and (2) that the woman is below twelve years of age. The
first element, carnal knowledge, had been established beyond reasonable doubt.
The same is true with respect to the second element.
The victim’s age is relevant in rape cases since it may constitute an element of the
offense. Furthermore, the victim’s age may constitute a qualifying circumstance,
warranting the imposition of the death sentence.
Because of the seemingly conflicting decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence
of the victims’ age in rape cases, this Court, in the recently decided case of People v.
Pruna, established a set of guidelines in appreciating age as an element of the crime
or as a qualifying circumstance, to wit:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of
birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved
14
is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony
of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party.
The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall
not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the
victim.
In the present case, the prosecution did not offer the victims certificate of live birth
or similar authentic documents in evidence. The victim and her mother, however,
testified that she was only three years old at the time of the rape.
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age
sought to be proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no
difficulty ascertaining the victims age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt,
therefore, exists that the second element of statutory rape, i.e., that the victim was
below twelve years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, is present.
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp (Solidbank) vs Del Monte Motor Works GR No.
143338July 29, 2005
Facts:
Solidbank filed before the RTC a complaint for recovery of sum of money against
respondents and spouses Morales. Solidbank alleged that it extended in favor of the
respondents a loan in amount of P1 million as evidenced by a promissory note.
Respondents defaulted on their monthly installments and so the full amount of the
loan became due and demandable. Solidbank also alleged that it made oral and
written demands upon respondents to settle their obligation. Solidbank attached to
its complaint a photocopy of the promissory note, a copy of the demand letter and
statement of account. Solidbank filed an Ex- Parte Motion to Declare the
Defendants in Default which was opposed by the defendants. Respondent
corporation and spouses Morales filed their respective manifestations and answers.
Motion to Declare Respondents in Default was denied. During the trial, Solidbank
presented Lavarino (manager of Collection Department) and testified regarding the
transaction. Solidbank made its formal offer of evidence. However, as the original
copy of the promissory note (Exhibit A) could no longer be found, Solidbank
instead sought the admission of the duplicate original of the promissory note
(Exhibit E). RTC initially admitted the duplicate original of the promissory note and
granted respondent’s motion to amend their Answers. Respondent corporation
filed a manifestation and motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s order admitting
into evidence Exhibit E claiming that it was immaterial, irrelevant, was not properly
identified and hearsay evidence. Same issues were raised by the spouses Morales.
RTC granted respondents’ motions for reconsideration. Respondents filed their
motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner no longer possessed any proof of
respondent’s alleged indebtedness. RTC dismissed the case which was subsequently
affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not CA gravely erred when it upheld the exclusion of Exhibit E (second
original of the PN) despite the fact that the original of Exhibit A was actually in the
possession of private respondents
Held:
The best evidence rule is encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure which provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself, except in the following cases:
15
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
Bearing in mind that the risk of mistransmission of the contents of a writing is the
justification for the best evidence rule, we declare that this rule finds no application
to this case. It should be noted that respondents never disputed the terms and
conditions of the promissory note thus leaving us to conclude that as far as the
parties herein are concerned, the wording or content of said note is clear enough
and leaves no room for disagreement. In their responsive pleadings, respondents
principal defense rests on the alleged lack of consideration of the promissory note.
In addition, respondent Morales also claims that he did not sign the note in his
personal capacity. These contentions clearly do not question the precise wording of
the promissory note which should have paved the way for the application of the
best evidence rule. It was, therefore, an error for the Court of Appeals to sustain the
decision of the trial court on this point.
Besides, the best evidence rule as stated in our Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is
not absolute. As quoted earlier, the rule accepts of exceptions one of which is when
the original of the subject document is in the possession of the adverse party. As
pointed out by petitioner in its motion to inhibit, had it been given the opportunity
by the court a quo, it would have sufficiently established that the original of Exhibit
A was in the possession of respondents which would have called into application
one of the exceptions to the best evidence rule.
Lorenzana vs. LelinaG.R. No. 187850, August 17, 2016
Facts: Lelina executed a Deed of Absolute Sale6 over one-half of an undivided parcel
of land covered by Tax Declaration in favor of her son, the respondent. The Deed of
Absolute Sale, however, specified only an area of 810 sq. m. as the one-half of
the property covered by the tax declaration. Around August 1996, respondents
were informed that the property is already owned by petitioner by virtue of a Deed
of Final Conveyance both in the name of petitioner. Alerted by the turn of events,
respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title and cancellation of documents,
claiming that there appears to be a cloud over his ownership and possession of the
property. Petitioner alleged that she acquired a land with an area of 16,047 sq. m.
through a foreclosure sale. Petitioner claims that she became the judgment creditor
in a case for collection of sum of money she filed against Aquilino, and the decision
in her favor became final with an Entry of Judgment. No redemption having been
made despite the lapse of the one year period for redemption, a Deed of Final
Conveyance was issued in her favor. During trial, it was undisputed that the
property is found within the levied property. The RTC upheld respondent's
ownership over the half of the levied property. 27 It ruled that the levied property is
exclusively owned by Ambrosia, and could not be held to answer for the obligations
of her husband in the collection case. As a result, it declared the Deed of Final
Conveyance invalid and without force. The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC and
upheld respondent's ownership over the property. It ruled that the power of the
court in the execution of its judgment extends only to properties unquestionably
belonging to the judgment debtor. Petitioner argues that respondent's sole basis for
his claim of ownership over the property is the Deed of Absolute Sale, the original
of which was not presented in court. Since only the photocopy of the Deed of
Absolute Sale was presented, its contents are inadmissible for violating the best
evidence rule. Thus, respondent's claim of ownership should be denied.
ISSUE: Whether respondent is the owner of one-half (1/2) of the levied property
comprising of 16,047 sq. m.
HELD: The Court affirm the finding that respondent is the owner of the property
equivalent to half of the levied property. The best evidence rule requires that when
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other
than the original document itself except in the instances mentioned in ROC. Mere
photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence rule.42
Nevertheless, evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly
considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. Objection to evidence must be
16
made at the time it is formally offered. In case of documentary evidence, offer is
made after all the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying
the purpose for which the evidence is being offered.47 It is only at this time, and
not at any other, that objection to the documentary evidence may be made. And
when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they
were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. This is true
even if by its nature the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been
rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time. 49 Moreover, grounds for
objection must be specified in any case. Grounds for objections not raised at the
proper time shall be considered waived, even if the evidence was objected to on
some other ground.51 Thus, even on appeal, the appellate court may not consider
any other ground of objection, except those that were raised at the proper time. In
this case, the objection to the Deed of Absolute Sale was belatedly raised. Having
failed to object on the ground of inadmissibility under the best evidence rule,
petitioner is now deemed to have waived her objection on this ground and cannot
raise it for the first time on appeal. We stress that petitioner does not question the
validity of the sale, but merely the admissibility of the deed. Having been admitted
in evidence as to its contents, the Deed of Absolute Sale sufficiently proves
respondent's ownership over the property. The deed, coupled with respondent's
possession over the property since its sale in 1975 until 1995, proves his ownership.
Heirs of Prodon vs. Heirs of Alvarez G.R. No. 170604, September 2, 2013
In their complaint for quieting of title and damages against Prodon, the respondents
averred as the plaintiffs that their parents, the late spouses Alvarez, Sr. and Clave,
were the registered owners of that parcel of land covered by TCT No. 84797; that
upon their parents’ deaths, they had continued the possession of the property as
heirs, paying the real property taxes due thereon; that they could not locate the
owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797, but the original copy of TCT No. 84797 on
file with the Register of Deeds of Manila was intact; that the original copy contained
an entry stating that the property had been sold to defendant Prodon subject to the
right of repurchase; and that the entry had been maliciously done by Prodon
because the deed of sale with right to repurchase covering the property did not
exist. Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had executed on September
9, 1975 the deed of sale with right to repurchase; that the deed had been registered
with the Register of Deeds and duly annotated on the title; that the late Alvarez, Sr.
had been granted six months within which to repurchase the property; and that she
had then become the absolute owner of the property due to its non-repurchase
within the given 6-month period. During trial, the custodian of the records of the
property attested that the copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase could
not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds of Manila. RTC opined that
although the deed itself could not be presented as evidence in court, its contents
could nevertheless be proved by secondary evidence in accordance with the Rules
of Court, upon proof of its execution or existence and of the cause of its
unavailability being without bad faith. It found that the defendant had established
the execution and existence of the deed. The RTC concluded that the original copy
of the deed of sale with right to repurchase had been lost, and that earnest efforts
had been exerted to produce it before the court. CA promulgated its assailed
decision, reversing the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the pre-requisites for the admission of secondary evidence
had been complied with.
HELD: Best Evidence Rule was not applicable herein. The court conclude that the CA
and the RTC both misapplied the Best Evidence Rule to this case, and their
misapplication diverted the attention from the decisive issue in this action for
quieting of title. The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a
17
written document the original of the document must be produced in court. Verily, if
a party is in the possession of the best evidence and withholds it, and seeks to
substitute inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises that the
better evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes that its production would
expose and defeat. Lastly, the rule protects against misleading inferences resulting
from the intentional or unintentional introduction of selected portions of a larger
set of writing. Hence, the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a
writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external
facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference
to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such a case, secondary
evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the original. The action for
quieting of title may be based on the fact that a deed is invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the writing may or may not be material to
an action for quieting of title, depending on the ground alleged by the plaintiff. It is
not denied that this action does not involve the terms or contents of the deed of
sale with right to repurchase. In an action for quieting of title based on the
inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud
on the title of a property, therefore, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and the
defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence other than the original
document
NPC v HON. RAMON CODILLA, JR. GR 170491 | 4 April 2007
FACTS: M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private
respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged petitioners
Power Barge 209 which was then moored at the Cebu International Port. Thus, on
26 April 1996, Petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against
private respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged damages caused on
petitioners power barges when M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned
and operated by private respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and
damaged petitioners Power Barge 209. Petitioner, after adducing evidence during
the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence consisting of Exhibits A to V
together with the sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently, private respondents
Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed their respective objections to
petitioners formal offer of evidence. Public respondent judge issued the assailed
order denying the admission and excluding from the records petitioners Exhibits A,
C, D, E, H and its sub- markings, I, J and its sub-markings, K, L, M and its sub-
markings, N and its sub-markings, O, P and its sub-markings, Q and its sub-markings,
R and S and its sub-markings holding that Xerox copies do not constitute the
electronic evidence defined in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition wherein the
petitioner insists that, contrary to the rulings of both the trial court and the
appellate court, the photocopies it presented as documentary evidence actually
constitute electronic evidence based on its own premise that an electronic
document as defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence
is not limited to information that is received, recorded, retrieved or produced
electronically. Rather, petitioner maintains that an electronic document can also
refer to other modes of written expression that is produced electronically, such as
photocopies, as included in the sections catch-all proviso: any print-out or output,
readable by sight or other means.
ISSUE: Are the photocopies considered electronic evidence?
HELD: NO, they are not. What differentiates an electronic document from a paper-
based document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the
information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. A perusal of the
information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that
not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who
purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By
no stretch of the imagination can a person’s signature affixed manually be
considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since
these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these
photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic
Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law.
Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic
documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the
functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law. Furthermore, no error
can be ascribed to the court a quo in denying admission and excluding from the
records petitioners Exhibits A, C, D, E, H and its sub-markings, I, J and its sub-
markings, K, L, M and its sub-markings, N and its sub-markings, O, P and its sub-
markings, Q and its sub-markings, and R. The trial court was correct in rejecting
these photocopies as they violate the best evidence rule and are therefore of no
probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence. Before the onset of liberal
rules of discovery, and modern technique of electronic copying, the best evidence
rule was designed to guard against incomplete or fraudulent proof and the
introduction of altered copies and the withholding of the originals. But the modern
justification for the rule has expanded from the prevention of fraud to a recognition
that writings occupy a central position in the law. The importance of the precise
terms of writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory
as reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete
duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best evidence rule. Moreover, as
mandated under Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. There can be no
evidence of a writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the
18
original writing itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been
lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court; (b) When the original is in the
possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice; (c) When the original is a record or other
document in the custody of a public officer; (d) When the original has been
recorded in an existing record a certified copy of which is made evidence by law; (e)
When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole." When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror,
upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents
in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a)
the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine
practices of destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair
preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or
destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona
fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place
or places. However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the
photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was
made in accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the abovequoted
rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the court a quo denying
admissibility of the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.
Petition is denied.
ELLA M. BARTOLOME v ROSALIE B. MARANAN, COURT STENOGRAPHER III,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 20, IMUS, CAVITE, Respondent.A.M. No. P-11-
2979 | 18 November 2014 [formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3352-P]Per Curiam
FACTS: The complainant filed against respondent this administrative matter
charging her with extortion, graft and corruption, gross misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of a court employee.
The complainant alleged that the respondent asked P200,000 from her which was
later reduced to P160,000.00, to facilitate the filing of her case for annulment of
marriage. She further alleged that the respondent undertook to have the case
decided in her favor without the need of court appearances during the proceedings
of the case. During the entrapment operation conducted by police officers of Imus
Police Station, the respondent was apprehended inside the premises of the RTC,
Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, in the act of receiving the money from the complainant.
In support of her allegations, the complainant attached to her affidavit-complaint
the transcribed electronic communications (text messages) between her and the
respondent; a copy of an Electronic Psychiatric History form given to her by the
respondent for her to accomplish in filing the petition for annulment of marriage; a
copy of the Imus Police Station Blotter showing that the respondent was
apprehended during the entrapment operation conducted by police officers of Imus
Police Station on November 11, 2009 at 2:40 p.m. and a versatile compact disc
(VCD) containing the video taken during the entrapment operation conducted
against the respondent.
Respondent denied the accusations against her. She alleged her belief that
Bartolome is a fictitious name as the affidavit- complaint does not indicate the
complainant’s exact address. She insisted that the present complaint against her is
plain and simple harassment and a vexatious suit by the complainant who either
has a grudge against her or must have been used by another person with a grudge
against her. All she did was to secure the services of a lawyer at the complainant’s
request; this act, she claimed, does not constitute graft and corruption, gross
misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a court employee and extortion.
The OCA, (Deputy Court Administrator Nimfa C. Vilches and OCA Chief of Legal
Office Wilhelmina D. Geronga) found enough evidence to prove the respondent’s
involvement in anomalous activities.
ISSUES:
3. Are the text messages between complainant and respondent admissible as
evidence?
4. Are the VCDs of the entrapment operation admissible as evidence?
HELD:
1. YES. Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence, subject
to certain conditions. "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone
conversations, text messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video,
and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded
or retained. It may be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the
communications or has personal knowledge thereof. In the present case, we have
no doubt regarding the probative value of the text messages as evidence in
considering the present case. The complainant, who was the recipient of the text
messages and who therefore has personal knowledge of these text messages,
identified the respondent as the sender through cellphone number 09175775982.
The respondent herself admitted that her conversations with the complainant had
been thru SMS messaging and that the cellphone number reflected in the
complainant’s cellphone from which the text messages originated was hers. She
confirmed that it was her cellphone number during the entrapment operation the
Imus Cavite Police conducted.
2. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 11 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, audio, photographic and
video evidence of events, acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall
be shown, presented or displayed to the court and shall be identified, explained or
authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some other person
competent to testify on the accuracy thereof. The court viewed the VCD and the
video showed the actual entrapment operation.
The Court found the respondent is guilty of grave misconduct and conduct
19
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. As a public servant, nothing less than
the highest sense of honesty and integrity is expected of the respondent at all
times. She should be the personification of the principle that public office is a public
trust. The respondent unfortunately fell extremely short of the standards that
should have governed her life as a public servant. By soliciting money from the
complainant, she committed a crime and an act of serious impropriety that
tarnished the honor and dignity of the judiciary and deeply affected the people’s
confidence in it. She committed an ultimate betrayal of the duty to uphold the
dignity and authority of the judiciary by peddling influence to litigants, thereby
creating the impression that decision can be bought and sold.
MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HOMER T.
SAQUILAYAN
FACTS: In the 2010 Local Elections for Mayor of Imus, Cavite, COMELEC declared
Homer Saquilayan as the winner, but Emmanuel Maliksi filed an election protest.
The RTC thereafter granted the protest and order Saquilayan to cease and desist
from performing the functions as Mayor. COMELEC First Division then decided to
conduct a recount of votes using the printout of ballot images from the CF cards.
After the recount, the COMELEC nullified the RTC ruling and reinstated Saquilayan
as the winner. Maliksi filed his MR, contending that he was denied due process as
he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings; and that the resort to the
printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been
unwarranted because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had
not been preserved. COMELEC En Banc decided to deny the MR.
In a petition for certiorari with the SC, the Court likewise denied the same,
pronouncing that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use the
ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot
images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the
same evidentiary value as the official ballots under the
Rule on Electronic Evidence.
ISSUE: Did the Supreme Court err in upholding the COMELEC First Division’s ruling
to dispense with the physical ballots and resort to their digital images, in an alleged
contravention to the best evidence rule?
RULING: YES, it did. Indeed,are thus given equal probative weight. In short, when
either is presented as evidence, one is not considered as weightier than
the other. However, this does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the
Electoral Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture
images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without notice to the
parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the official ballots and the
printouts of their picture images, the rules for the revision of ballots adopted for
their respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the primary or
best evidence of the voters’ will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots are
to be used only when it is first shown that the official ballots are lost or their
integrity has been compromised.
MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION v SSANGYONG CORPORATION
FACTS: Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office at
Binondo, Manila, is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless
steel products. One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong), an
international trading company with head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional
headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations conducted business
through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Ssangyong would
send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to
MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the
faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax. The petitioner and the
respondent agreed on the sale and purchase of 220MT of stainless steel at
US$1,860.00 per MT. This initial contract was perfected. Later, as petitioner asked
for several extensions to pay, adjustments in the delivery dates, and discounts in
the price as originally agreed, the parties slightly varied the terms of their contract,
without necessarily novating it, to the effect that the original order was reduced to
200MT, split into two deliveries, and the price discounted to US$1,700 per MT.
Petitioner, however, paid only half of its obligation and failed to open an L/C for the
other 100MT. Thus, respondent filed a civil action for damages due to breach of
contract against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before the RTC
Makati. After Ssangyong rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence
alleging that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent
Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are
inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because
the law merely admits as the best evidence the original fax transmittal. The court
denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary evidence presented had already
been admitted in the December 16, 2002 Order and their admissibility finds support
20
in RA 8792. Considering that both testimonial and documentary evidence tended to
substantiate the material allegations in the complaint, Ssangyong's evidence
sufficed for purposes of a prima facie case. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that the
copies of the said pro-forma invoices submitted by the appellee are admissible in
evidence, although they are mere electronic facsimile printouts of appellant's
orders. Such facsimile printouts are considered Electronic Documents under the
New Rules on Electronic Evidence, which came into effect on August 1, 2001. (Rule
2, Section 1 [h], A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC).
ISSUE: Is an original printout of a facsimile transmission an electronic data message
or electronic document, and ultimately, are the print-out and/or photocopies of
facsimile transmissions electronic evidence and admissible as such?
HELD: NO, it is not. The terms "electronic data message" and "electronic
document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include
a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered
as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the
Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence. Since a facsimile
transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document," and
cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a
photocopy of such fax transmission not electronic evidence. In the present case,
therefore, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2- POSTS0401-2
(Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals,
are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the
appellate courts.."
Nevertheless, despite the pro forma invoices not being electronic evidence, the
court found that the respondent has proven by
preponderance of evidence the existence of a perfected contract of sale.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS as successor-in-interest of FAR EAST BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY,Petitioner vs. SMP, INC., Respondent.
FACTS: SMP, Inc. undertook the acceptance and servicing of a purchase order of
CLOTHESPAK MANUFACTURING PHILS. (Clothespak) for 4,000 bags or sacks of
General purpose (GPS) polystyrene products. The ordered products were delivered,
for which delivery receipts were issued. As payment, Clothespak issued postdated
checks in favor of SMP and delivered the same
to Maria Teresa Michaela Ong. When the same were deposited by SMP Inc. on their
maturity dates, the drawee bank dishonored and returned said checks for the
reason "Account Closed."
In the meantime, Far East Bank and Trust Company won the case against
Clothespak for a recovery of sum of money where real and personal properties of
the defendants were levied and attached which includes the bags of General
Purpose (GPS) polystyrene products taken at Clothespak factory.
SMP, Inc. filed a case to recover from the attaching bank the value of the goods it
claims ownership and for damages. SMP, Inc. alleges that there was wrongful
attachment of the goods for ownership of the same was never transferred to
Clothespak. The former anchors its claim of ownership over the goods by virtue of
the Provisional Receipt No. 4476 issued by Sales Executive Maria Teresa Michaela
Ong to Clothespak with the words, "Materials belong to SMP Inc. until your checks
clear."
Defendant bank, however, claims that the said provisional receipt was falsified to
negate the terms of the Sales Invoices. It assails the admissibility of the receipt for it
is a mere triplicate copy; the original and duplicate copies were not presented in
court, in violation of the Best Evidence Rule. Neither was there secondary evidence
presented to conform to the rule.
ISSUE: Is the receipt presented by SMP and original document?
HELD: Yes. The best evidence rule is the rule which requires the highest grade of
evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact. Although there are certain recognized
exceptions when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself
The receipt presented by SMP is deemed as an original, considering that the
triplicate copy of the provisional receipt was executed at the same time as the other
copies of the same receipt involving the same transaction. Section 4, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Original of document. —(a) The original of the document is one the contents
of which are the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time,
with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied
from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise
equally regarded as originals.
CAPITALSHOESFACTORY,LTD., Petitioner,
vs. TRAVELER KIDS, INC., Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS: Capital Shoes Factory Ltd., (CSFL),a foreign corporation and respondent
Traveller Kids, Inc. (TKI),a domestic corporation entered into an agreement, wherein
they agreed that TKI would import the shoes and sandals made by CSFL from its
China factory. For the first three years, TKI was able to pay its purchase orders and
the shipments made by CSFL. In 2004, however, TKI started to default in its
payments.
CSFL filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and damages against TKI.
During the trial, CSFL, through its witness, identified several sales invoices and order
slips it issued as evidence of its transactions with TKI. The latter objected to the
identification pointing out that the documents being presented were mere
photocopies. The RTC issued the Order 7 admitting all the exhibits offered by CFSL.
TKI filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the exhibits formally offered by
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CSFL were inadmissible in evidence for being mere photocopies. The RTC issued the
order denying TKI’s motion for reconsideration. The CA partially granted TKI’s
petition. CSFL basically argues that the excluded documents are admissible in
evidence because it was duly established during the trial that the said documents
were duplicate originals, and not mere photocopies, considering that they were
prepared at the same time as the originals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documents presented are duplicate originals.
HELD: It is undisputed that the documents presented were duplicate originals and
are therefore admissible as evidence.
In People vs. Tan, (105 Phil. 1242 [1959]),we said: When carbon sheets are inserted
between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon
the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby,
produces a facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature being thus
reproduced by the same stroke of pen which made the surface or exposed
impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and
either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the
nonproduction of the others.
Records reveal that Chiu, CSFL’s principal witness, was able to satisfactorily explain
that Exhibits "D" to "GG-1" and "HH" to "KK-1" were duplicate originals of invoices
and order slips, and not mere photocopies. The transcripts of stenographic notes
(TSNs) clearly show that Chiu convincingly explained that CSFL usually prepared two
(2) copies of invoices for a particular transaction, giving one copy to a client and
retaining the other copy. The Court combed through her testimony and found
nothing that would indicate that the documents offered were mere photocopies.
She remained firm and consistent with her statement that the subject invoices were
duplicate originals as they were prepared at the same time. The Court sees no
reason why Section 4(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court should not apply.
COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION vs ANTONIO LAGMAN
FACTS: Nelson Santos (Santos) applied for a license with the National Food
Authority (NFA) to engage in the business of storing not more than 30,000 sacks of
palay in his warehouse. Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (Country Bankers)
issued Warehouse Bond No. 0330 & 02355 (1989 Bonds) through its agent, Antonio
Lagman (Lagman). Santos was the bond principal, Lagman was the surety and the
Republic of the Philippines, through the NFA was the obligee.
In consideration of these issuances, corresponding Indemnity Agreements were
executed by Santos, as bond principal, together with (Ban Lee Lim), (Reguine) and
Lagman, as co-signors. The latter bound themselves jointly and severally liable to
Country Bankers and to reimburse Country Bankers of whatever amount it may pay
or cause to be paid or become liable to pay thereunder
Santos then secured a loan using his warehouse receipts as collateral. When the
loan matured, Santos defaulted in his payment. The sacks of palay covered by the
warehouse receipts were no longer found in the bonded warehouse. By virtue of
the surety bonds, Country Bankers was compelled to pay P1,166,750.37.
Consequently, Country Bankers filed a complaint for a sum of money before the
(RTC) of Manila. In his Answer, Lagman alleged that the 1989 Bonds were valid only
for 1 year from the date of their issuance, as evidenced by receipts; that the bonds
were never renewed and revived by payment of premiums; that on 5 November
1990, Country Bankers issued Warehouse Bond No. 03515 (1990 Bond) which was
also valid for one year and that no Indemnity Agreement was executed for the
purpose; and that the 1990 Bond supersedes, cancels, and renders no force and
effect the 1989 Bonds. The trial court rendered judgment declaring Reguine and
Lagman jointly and severally liable to pay Country Bankers. The trial court
rationalized that the bonds remain in force unless cancelled by the Administrator of
the NFA and cannot be unilaterally cancelled by Lagman.
Lagman anchors his defense on two (2) arguments: 1) the 1989 Bonds have expired
and 2) the 1990 Bond novates the 1989 Bonds.
Country Bankers questions the existence of a third bond, the 1990 Bond, which
allegedly cancelled the 1989 Bonds on the following grounds: First, Lagman failed to
produce the original of the 1990 Bond and no basis has been laid for the
presentation of secondary evidence; Second, the issuance of the 1990 Bond was not
approved and processed by Country Bankers; Third, the NFA as bond obligee was
not in possession of the 1990 Bond.
ISSUE: Whether a photocopy of a document is admissible as secondary evidence.
HELD: Under the best evidence rule, the original document must be produced
whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry. [25] The rule is encapsulated in
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as follow:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a documents, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown
that the original is unavailable Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC.5 When original document is unavailable. When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of
its execution or existence and the cause of its
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unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by
a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of
the original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due
execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason
for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of
bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct
order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.
In the case at bar, Lagman mentioned during the direct examination that there are
actually four (4) duplicate originals of the 1990 Bond: the first is kept by the NFA,
the second is with the Loan Officer of the NFA in Tarlac, the third is with Country
Bankers and the fourth was in his possession. A party must first present to the court
proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for the non- production of the
original instrument. When more than one original copy exists, it must appear that
all of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before
secondary evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without
accounting for the other originals.
Despite knowledge of the existence and whereabouts of these duplicate originals,
Lagman merely presented a photocopy. He admitted that he kept a copy of the
1990 Bond but he could no longer produce it because he had already severed his
ties with Country Bankers. However, he did not explain why severance of ties is by
itself reason enough for the non-availability of his copy of the bond considering
that, as it appears from the 1989 Bonds, Lagman himself is a bondsman. Neither did
Lagman explain why he failed to secure the original from any of the three other
custodians he mentioned in his testimony. While he apparently was able to find the
original with the NFA Loan Officer, he was merely contented with producing its
photocopy. Clearly, Lagman failed to exert diligent efforts to produce the original.
Josef vs. PeopleG.R. No. 146242, November 18, 2005
Petitioner, a Marikina-based manufacturer and seller of shoes, purchased leather
materials from Alarilla for which the former issued a total of 26 post dated checks.
When presented for payment, all checks were returned on closed account. After
negotiation, Josef issued a new set of replacement checks. Alarilla returned the first
batch but retained photocopies thereof. Again, the replacement checks bounced.
Hence, a charge for the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed against him. The trial court
convicted the petitioner on all counts. On appeal, the conviction was affirmed.
Hence, this petition where Josef claims, among others, that the trial court erred in
accepting as evidence photocopies of the original checks.
ISSUE: Did the trial court err?
HELD: No. It bears stressing that the raison d’etre of the proscription against the
admission of secondary evidence in lieu or in substitution of the original thereof is
to prevent the commission of fraud on the part of the offeror who is in possession
of the best evidence but, in lieu thereof, adduced secondary evidence.
When he testified in the Court a quo, the [Petitioner] brought out the originals of
the checks and even marked the same in evidence as Exhibits "1" to "21", except
five (5) of the subject checks, which he claimed as missing and the Prosecution even
adopted the original checks as its evidence. The [Petitioner] admitted, before the
Court a quo, that the originals of the subject checks were in his possession. The
[Petitioner] never alleged that the photostatic copies of the checks marked and
offered in evidence by the Prosecution were not faithful copies of the originals of
the checks. Having admitted, albeit impliedly, that the photostatic copies of the
checks admitted in evidence by the Court a quo were the faithful reproduction of
the original copies in his possession, the Petitioner was thus estopped from invoking
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence. By admitting that the originals
were in his possession and even producing them in open court, petitioner cured
whatever flaw might have existed in the prosecution’s evidence
ENGR. BAYANI MAGDAYAO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
An Information was filed by Ricky Olvis charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg.
22. Olvis testified that when informed that his check was dishonored, the petitioner
pleaded for time to pay the amount thereof, but reneged on his promise. Olvis then
filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The
petitioner again offered to repay Olvis the amount of the obligation by retrieving
the dishonored check and replacing the same with two other checks: one for
P400,000.00 and another for P200,000.00 payable to Olvis. Taking pity on the
petitioner, he agreed. He then returned the original copy of the check to the
petitioner, but the latter again failed to make good on his promise and failed to pay
the P600,000.00. The prosecution offered in evidence the photocopy of PNB Check
No. 399967, which the court admitted. The trial court rendered judgment convicting
the petitioner of the crime charged. CA affirmed the trial court. Petitioner contends
among others that (a) the photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967, adduced in
evidence by the prosecution, is inadmissible in evidence under Rule 129, Section 1
of the Revised Rules of Evidence; hence, has no probative weight;
ISSUE: Whether the photocopy of the check is admissible as evidence.
HELD: Under Section 3(b), Rule 130 of the said Rules, secondary evidence of a
writing may be admitted when the original is in the custody or under the control of
the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice. To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when
the original of a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of
Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must be given reasonable notice, that he
fails or refuses to produce the same in court and that the offeror offers satisfactory
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proof of its existence:
When original document is in adverse party’s custody or control.— If the document
is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable
notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence,
he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the
case of its loss.
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party
against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence.
The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best
evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the document. The notice
may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open
court in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided
that the party in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same.
When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to
produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted. The
records show that despite the numerous opportunities given to him by the trial
court, the petitioner refused to adduce any evidence in his behalf. Petition is
DENIED.
SAAD AGRO-INDUSTRIES, INC. vs REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: A Free Patent was granted to (Orcullo) for Lot No. 1434, while the Registry
of Deeds for the Province of Cebu issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-
6667 over the said lot. Subsequently, the subject lot was sold to SAAD Agro-
Industries, Inc. (petitioner) by one of Orcullos heirs. Sometime in 1995, the Republic
of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a complaint for annulment of
title and reversion of the lot covered by Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-
6667 and reversion of Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D to the mass of the public domain,
on the ground that the issuance of the said free patent and title for Lot No. 1434
was irregular and erroneous, following the discovery that the lot is allegedly part of
the timberland and forest reserve of Sibonga, Cebu. The discovery was made after
Pedro Urgello filed a letter-complaint before the DENR. Urgello filed a complaint-in-
intervention against the heirs of Orcullo, adopting the allegations of respondent.
However, the heirs failed to file their answer to the complaint and were thus
declared in default. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed the
trial court.
Petitioner questions the Court of Appeals reliance on the land classification map
(L.C. Map) presented by respondent. The trial court had previously declared L.C.
Map No. 2961 as inadmissible, finding that the plaintiff has not duly proved the
authenticity and contents. According to petitioner, the L.C. Map presented in court
is neither a certified true copy nor one attested to be a true copy by any DENR
official having legal custody of the original thereof, and thus should not have been
made the basis of the cancellation of the free patent and title. In this case,
respondent claims that the presentation of the original L.C. Map is unnecessary
since it is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in the public office.
ISSUE: Is the presentation of the original LC Map necessary?
HELD: Yes. Evidence, indeed, is admissible when the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. However, to prove its
contents, there is a need to present a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof. In addition, while the L.C. Map may be considered a public
document and prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, the map, to be
admissible for any purpose, must be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record.
The rules of admissibility must be applied uniformly. The same rule holds true when
the Government is one of the parties. The Government, when it comes to court to
litigate with one of its citizens, must submit to the rules of procedure and its rights
and privileges at every stage of the proceedings are substantially in every respect
the same as those of its citizens; it cannot have a superior advantage. This is so
because when a sovereignty submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court and
participates therein, its claims and rights are justiciable by every other principle and
rule applicable to the claims and rights of the private parties under
similar circumstances. Failure to abide by the rules on admissibility renders the L.C.
Map submitted by respondent inadmissible as proof to show that the subject lot is
part of the forest reserve.
Even assuming that the L.C. Map submitted by respondent is admissible in evidence,
still the land in question can hardly be considered part of the timberland or forest
reserve. L.C. Map No. 2961, which purports to be the correct map of the areas
demarcated as permanent forest pursuant of the provisions of P.D. No. 705 as
amended was made only in 1980. Thus, the delineation of the areas was made nine
(9) years after Orcullo was awarded the free patent over the subject lot.
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant, vs, ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA,
Respondent
PER CURIAM:
FACTS: A Petition for Disbarment was filed by complainant (Bansig) against
respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross Immoral Conduct. In
her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R.
Bunagan (Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified
xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila.
Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent
contracted another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres
Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage
issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila. Respondent failed to
24
submit his comment on the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether the certified Xerox copy of the Marriage Certificate is admissible as
evidence.
HELD: In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent
contracted a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first
marriage, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage
issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao,
states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997
with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila;
the second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the
Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San
Juan, Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on
January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church,
Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that
respondent entered into a second marriage while the latter’s first marriage was still
subsisting. We note that the second marriage apparently took place barely a year
from his first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage
was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second marriage with
Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in
custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided
for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being
admissible in evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second
marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of
the marriage certificates would already have been sufficient to establish the
existence of two marriages entered into by
respondent. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding,
these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent are competent and
convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to
continue as a member of the Bar.

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