Rose Bunagan-Bansig vs. Atty. Rogelio Juan A.

Celera

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG vs. ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERAA.C. No. 5581. January 14, 2014.PER
CURIAMFacts:Bansig, sister of Bunagan narrated that, respondent and GraceMarie R. Bunagan,
entered into a contract of marriage. However, notwithstanding respondent’s marriage with
Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba, as
evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage.Bansig stressed that the
marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence when he
contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been annulled or
rendered void by any lawful authority.Bansigalleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with
Alba, while his marriage is still subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of
a member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.Despite repeated
summons and resolutions issued by the Court, Atty. Celera failed to properly answer the complaint.
The complaint dragged on for over a decade.

Issue:Whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of
justice.

Ruling:For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the
name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy,
which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the BarThe Codeof Professional Responsibility
provides:Rule 1.01-A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.Canon 7-A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.Rule 7.03-A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of
the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of
contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral
conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court.Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the
lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
and good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN
A. CELERA, guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him
unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from
the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately

Roque vs. AFP

RELEVANT FACTS

1.Petitioner Herminio Harry Roque filed a Petition to Cite for Indirect Contempt against
respondents Gen. Gregorio Pio Catapang, Brig. Gen. Arthur Ang, and Lt. Col. Harold Cabunoc, for
violating Rule139-B, Section18 of the Rules of Court1.
2.Roques is the lawyer of Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude, 26-year old Filipino, who was allegedly killed at a
motel in Olongapo City by 19-year old US Marine Private Joseph Scott Pemberton.

3.The question of custody over Pemberton was subject of public discussions. Pemberton was
eventually transferred from his ship to a facility in the headquarters of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.

4.On October 22, 2014, news broke out that Pemberton had been flown into Camp Aguinaldo,
where a detention facility had been constructed for him, in the premises of the Mutual Defense
Board-Security Engagement Board.71Section 18. Confidentiality. -Proceedings against attorneys shall be
private and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its
decisions in other cases.

5.Thus, Roque, together with his clients, the family of Laude, went to Camp General Emilio
Aguinaldo to demand to see Pemberton.

6.Respondents stated that Roque, with his clients, forced their way inside the premises of the
Mutual Defense Board-Security Engagement Board and gained entry despite having been instructed by
Military Police personnel not to enter the compound, and even though the gates were closed.

7.Roque allegedly fomented disorder by inciting his clients to scale the perimeter fence, to see
Pemberton.

8.In response to the events, respondents filed a disbarment complaint against Roque. Prior to this,
the Respondents released a press statements regarding the petition and conducted press conferences
on the matter.

9.In this regard, Roque alleged that this press statement was reported on, and generously quoted
from, by media, and thus are contumacious violations of the Rules of Court. Further, Roque
claimed that respondents' acts put to question his professional and personal reputation.

ISSUES1.Whether respondents' public pronouncements violate Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court and whether respondents may be punished for contempt.

RATIO DECIDENDI1.Whether respondents' public pronouncements violate Section 18, Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court; NO. The confidentiality in disciplinary actions for lawyers is not absolute. It is not to be
applied under any circumstance, to all disclosures of any nature. As a general principle, speech on
matters of public interest should not be restricted. Matters of public interest should not be censured for
the sake of an unreasonably strict application of the confidentiality rule. As to violation of confidentiality
rule :The confidentiality rule requires only that "proceedings against attorneys" be kept private and
confidential. It is the proceedings against attorneys that must be kept private and confidential. This
would necessarily prohibit the distribution of actual disbarment complaints to the press. However,
the rule does not extend so far that it covers the mere existence or pendency of disciplinary
actions. Petitioner assails two acts as violating the confidentiality rule: first, respondents' supposed
public threats of filing a disbarment case against him, and second, respondents' public
statement that they had filed a disbarment complaint. Where there are yet no proceedings against a
lawyer, there is nothing to keep private
and confidential. Respondents' threats were made before November 4, 2014, and there was no
proceeding to keep private. Also, a close examination reveals that it does not divulge anything
that merits punishment for contempt. It only declared three things: first, respondent AFP filed a
disbarment complaint against petitioner; second, petitioner is a lawyer, and thus, must conduct
himself according to the standards of the legal profession; and third, petitioner's "unlawful
conduct" is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility. As to Power of contempt vs Right
to free expression: The power of contempt should be balanced with the right to freedom of
expression, especially when it may have the effect of stifling comment on public matters. The power to
punish for contempt is not exercised without careful consideration of the circumstances of
the allegedly contumacious act, and the purpose of punishing the act. Especially where freedom of
speech and press is involved, this Court has given a restrictive interpretation as to what constitutes
contempt. The Court, in deciding Danguilan-Vitug v. Court of Appeals, ruled that an article which
does not impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice is not contumacious. "Freedom of
speech and press should not be impaired through the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and
imminent threat to the administration of justice.” (Cabansag v. Fernandez quoting Craig v Hamey)“The
question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity
and degree.”(Cabansag, supra, quoting Schenck vs. U.S.).“The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the
other hand, has been adopted in cases where extreme difficulty is confronted in determining
where the freedom of expression ends and the right of courts to protect their independence begins.
There must be a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule lies in that the
freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right to petition for redress of grievance,
while guaranteed by the constitution, are not absolute. They are subject to restrictions and
limitations, one of them being the protection of the courts against contempt.”(Cabansag, supra, quoting
Gilbert vs. Minnesota)“This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a
dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is
not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that
the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring
about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.”(Cabansag, supra, quoting Gitlow
vs. New York)Given these circumstances, citing respondents in contempt would be an
unreasonable exercise of this Court's contempt power. DISPOSITIVE WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED.SO ORDERED. NO SEPARATE OPINIONS.

Josefina Royong vs. Atty. Ariston Oblena

FACTS:

• Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the bar and bench,
with rape. The Solicitor General immediately conducted an investigation and found out that there was
no rape, the carnal knowledge between complainant and respondent seems to be consensual sex.
• In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the
alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other misconduct. The Solicitor General made another
complaint charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to
the bar that he is a person of good moral character, of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the
same time maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year old Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him unfit to
practice law, praying that this Court render judgment ordering the permanent removal of the
respondent as lawyer and judge.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the adulterous
cohabitation of respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment.

HELD:

Ariston Oblena was disbarred.

RATIO:

The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted,
and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as ground
for disbarment.

Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession,
has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer.

Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case,
as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting
the prestige of the noble profession of the law.

As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show
good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known.

Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to
the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Brescia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed
to have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a person of good moral character. It is of no
moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member
of the bar.
Sta. Maria v. Tuazon

FACTS:

This is a petition for the disbarment of Atty. Eduardo M. Tuason, instituted by Emilio Sta. Maria.

Sometime in June 1955, Atty. Tuason represented the partnership of Sta. Maria, Guanzon and
Chincuanco in a collection case against Enriqueta de Hidalgo, involving a promissory note of P50,000.00.
Defendant Hidalgo in this case was declared in default and was ordered to pay. By virtue of a writ of
execution, the provincial sheriff of Pampanga was able to obtain the amount of P22,930.64.

Respondent Tuason got the whole amount from the sheriff and applied it in the following manner :
P10,000 attorney’s fees, P1,648 supposed expenses of litigation which he claimed to have advanced
during the prosecution and the balance of P11,282.64 to Fausto Chincuanco, his uncle.

Despite demands from Sta. Maria to turn over the money to him or to the sheriff, respondent failed to
comply and contempt proceedings were instituted against Tuason. The matter was referred to the Office
of the Solicitor General who made the findings and recommendation that: respondent Tuason was not
in connivance with his uncle Chincuanco in depriving petitioner of his lawful share in the liquidation of
partnership assets, however, the collection of P10,000 as attorney’s fees after the case was terminated
after one brief hearing is unreasonable. There was also no evidence presented to show that Tuason
actually spent P1,648 for the expenses.

The Sol. Gen. recommended that instead of a more severe penalty which he would otherwise deserve,
respondent be reprimanded for professional indiscretion, with a warning that a more severe penalty be
imposed for the repetition of the same of similar acts.

ISSUE : Whether respondent committed acts that would merit his disbarment.

RULING:

The fact that the respondent placed his private and personal interest over and above that of his clients
constitutes a breach of the lawyer’s oath, to say the least. Call it professional indiscretion or any other
name, but the cold fact remains that the act is not conducive to the health growth of the legal
profession. Respondent is hereby admonished that a repetition of similar acts will merit more drastic
action.