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Report No. 98-01
February, 1998
Recently an Operator reported a Thrust Reverser incident which caused damage to the Thrust
Reverser components. Although the Thrust Reverser investigation team is putting forward
fixes to prevent further occurrences, we are taking this opportunity to remind Operators’ of the
importance of NOT using the Emergency Stow on ground. The following is taken from Service
Letter RJ-SL-78-004 released March ‘97.
“It has been reported that some operators have used the Emergency Stow to clear
unlocked messages on the ground. This practice is in opposition to maintenance
practice which requires that an inspection and rigging check be made in order to clear
the snag.
On the Canadair Regional Jet, the Emergency Stow switches for the thrust reversers
(T/R) are intended to be used in the event of an uncommanded thrust reverser
deployment or thrust reverser unlock message in-flight.
The use of the Emergency Stow is intended as a means to either restore the T/R to the
stowed position or prevent it deploying once unlocked. Once Emergency Stow is used
in-flight, it should not be switched off until the aircraft is safely on the ground. The use
of the Emergency Stow to attempt to clear “T/R Unlocked” messages is not part of the
design intent and may contribute to further problems.
The use of Emergency Stow as a way of clearing an unlock message may put
unintended stress on the thrust reverser system and result in further messages or in
some cases system damage. Also it does not correct the problem which may have
been lubrication related or rigging, it merely postpones maintenance action until
something happens which cannot be cleared.
The proper procedure in the event of a T/R Unlock message on the ground is to:
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Report No. 98-01
February, 1998
This report is to clarify interpretation of a note which appears in the CRJ Illustrated Parts
Catalogue (IPC) sections 32-41-00 and 42-42-00 under nomenclature for the Main and Nose
tires. The note which appears next to the part numbers for both of the approved tire brands for
the main and nose, reads as follows:
This note makes reference to the intermix of different tire types/brands on the same axle,
instructing the operator not to install two different types on the same axle (ex. Michelin on L/H
INBD & Goodyear on L/H OUTBD or Michelin on L/H NOSE & Goodyear on R/H NOSE). The
restrictions are due to differences in tire design characteristics, such as static deflection, and
are intended to prevent a situation where one of the two tires on the same axle is forced to
consistently carry a majority of the load.
The subject note in no way implies that two tires of the same type/vendor must be changed as
pairs in the case where only one is worn or cut to limit. The note refers only to intermix of
different vendor/part number tires.
Bombardier is currently evaluating the possibility of lifting the intermix restriction for the main
gear tires. Please see CRJ Service Letter RJ-SL-32-021, released June ‘97 for details. There
is no plan to remove this restriction for the nose gear tires.
The subject note will be deleted from IPC section 32-41-00 for the main gear tires in revision
15 of the CRJ IPC (release target 2nd qtr ‘98). The note in section 32-42-00, nose tires will be
clarified or deleted in an upcoming revision.
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Report No. 98-01
February, 1998
There have been reports from Operators of damage to Main Landing Gear (MLG) Door and
actuating system rods due to improper orientation of the MLG door actuating bellcrank (p/n
601R31185-13, 14, 15 or 16) and push/pull rod (p/n 601R31212-9 or 10).
When properly installed, the lower attachment of the push/pull rod (to the bellcrank) should be
positioned outboard of the bellcrank pivot point (the point at which the bellcrank is attached to
the main gear fitting). The joint overcenter should be outboard (see illustration).
If the rod and bellcrank are installed with the overcenter inboard of the bellcrank pivot, damage
can occur to the MLG and/or MLG door during subsequent gear retraction.
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Report No. 98-01
February, 1998
98-01-3411 ICE & RAIN PROTECTION - PITOT PROBES CLEANING & COVERS
By: J. Micheal McKinnon, Avionics/Electrical, CRJ In-Service Support
In the third quarter of 1996, all the pitot covers were changed from plastic to a rubberized
material. This was done as the first part of a two part solution because it was reported that the
plastic covers were being melted and permeating to the pitot probes. Investigation revealed
that the covers were not being removed during maintenance and pre-flight activities when the
APU was operating. Under these conditions the pitot probes are powered-ON at 50%.
The rubberized pitot covers were designed to not melt when heated, but to deteriorate, thereby
saving the pitot probes. It has now been reported to Bombardier that the inadvertent heating
of rubberized covers is causing granular pieces from the interior of the covers to scrape off.
This condition occurs when the covers are installed onto the probes. Granular debris is also
finding its way into the probes and blocking the water drain holes on all three probes, and the
static ports on the two main pitot probes. Under these conditions more water than expected
can find its way into the lines.
Bombardier recommends that all Operators inspect and replace probe covers that demonstrate
these conditions. Further, Bombardier recommends that all the drain and static holes in the
pitot probes be inspected and cleaned if necessary, as per the AMM tasks 34-11-00-140-801 &
34-11-00-140-802. This cleaning process can be part of the 72 elapsed hour service check,
item R (1).
Bombardier is looking into covers that will not burn or deteriorate in this way should they be
inadvertently be heated.
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Report No. 98-01
February, 1998
The second part of the corrective action taken by Bombardier was to create a mod that
disconnected the generator on-line signal from the APU going to the Air Data Heater
Controller. This removes the possibility of the probes being automatically heated to 50% while
the APU is running during maintenance and pre-flight activities. To heat the probes, under
these conditions, the probe switch on the overhead panel in the cockpit must be switched
“ON”.
SB 601R24-082 was released in October 1997 for in-service aircraft for this wiring change.
Bombardier highly recommends this SB be incorporated by the Operators at their earliest
opportunity.
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Report No. 98-01
February, 1998
In the past, Operators have expressed concern regarding the reliability of the fuel transfer
shutoff valves. The valves failed to function and/or fuel leaks were reported at the wing rear
spar in the wheel well area through the wire conduit. These valves allow fuel transfer to the
center tank and to each of their respective main tanks and are fully controlled by the fuel
system computer. When either of the main tanks is less than 93% full, the computer removes
a ground signal to the applicable transfer shutoff valve which causes the valve to open. An
open valve will allow fuel from the center tank to be transferred to the applicable main tank.
When the main tank reaches 97% full, the fuel computer will select the transfer valve to the
closed position. These valves feature a fail safe open mechanism so electric power is applied
to keep them closed.
Failure analysis reports show that the solenoid and the hall-effect sensors were burning out
due to overheat. Overheat was also the cause of internal seal damage which in turn lead to
the fuel migrating into the electrical conduit. Tests have shown that, any leakage into the
conduit which leads to an explosion, is such that the results of the explosion would have no
effect on safe operation. Tests have also shown that the temperature of the body of the valve
would not result in any unsafe condition.
Fuel computers p/n 736643-9, and previous configurations, keep the valve energized (closed),
when the center tank is empty. With the valve energized (closed), and center tank empty,
overheating of the valve may occur.
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Report No. 98-01
February, 1998
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February, 1998
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Report No. 98-01
February, 1998
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Report No. 98-01
February, 1998
Compiled By:
Miriam Rodgers Frank Baistrocchi
CRJ In-Service Support Manager, CRJ In-Service Support
BRAD BRAD
For additional information on any of these in-service items, please contact the local
Bombardier Regional Aircraft Field Service Representative or Bombardier Regional
Aircraft Division, CRJ In-Service Support Department, 400 Chemin Cote Vertu
Ouest, Dorval, Quebec, Canada, H4S 1Y9; Telephone (514) 855-5000.
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Bombardier Inc.
Bombardier Regional Aircraft Division
Garratt Boulevard
Downsview, Ontario
Canada M3K 1Y5
Telephone (416) 633-7310
IN-SERVICE ACTIVITIES
Customer
Services
Robert Labelle (DFW) Maurice Leblanc (MCN) Joe Basile (IAD) Raynald Godon
Gary Reid (SNA) 912-784-0318 ext. 212 Atlantic Coast Airlines Midway Airlines
Mesa Airlines Peter Baker (ATL) Washington, DC, USA. Durham, North Carolina
FortWorth, TX, USA. Atlantic Southeast Airlines (703) 925-6176 (919)-956-4800
Phone: 817-740-6615 404-765-1927
Martin Tremblay
Adria
416-375-3982
2 Report No. 98-01
February, 1998
Tom Schweiger
European Area Rep
Innsbruck, Austria
43-512-286-449