Language Learning 40:1, March 1990. pp.

79-105

Problems of Speech Act Theory From an

Applied Perspective*
John Flowerdew
Sultan Qaboos University, Oman
University of Southampton

Speech act theory has been very influential in a number

of fields, including applied linguistics. However, there
remain a number of fundamental problems within the
theory. These concern (1) how many speech acts there are;
(2) indirect speech acts and the concept of literal force;
(3)the size of speech act realization forms; (4) the contrast
between specific and diffuse acts; ( 5 ) discrete categories
versus scale of meaning; ( 6 ) the relation between locution,
illocution, and interaction; and (7)the relation between
the whole and the parts in a discourse. This paper dis-
cusses these problems and asks to what extent they under-
mine attempts to apply speech act theory in the field of
language pedagogy. In addition, consideration is given to
the question of whether future development in speech act
theory is likely to offer the possibility of further advances
in application.

* This is a revised version of a paper, Speech acts, communicative competence

and language teaching, presented at the joint BAAWAAAL seminar Commu-
nicative Competence Revisited, held at the University of Warwick, 8-10 July,
1988. Requests for reqrints may be sent to John Flowerdew, The Language
Centre, Sultan Qaboos University, Post Omce Box 32493, Al-Khod, Muscat,
Sultinate of Oman.

79
80 Language Learning Vol. 40, No. 1

INTRODUCTION
The original speech act theories of Austin (1962) and
Searle (1969,1975,1976)have been developed and applied in
a wide range of disciplines, including philosophy (e.g., Alston,
1963,1964,1974;Grice, 1968,1975; Strawson, 1971), linguis-
tics (e.g., Ross, 1970, Sadock, 1974, Cole & Morgan, 1975);
language-acquisition studies (e.g., Bruner, 1975, 1978; Dore,
1975, 1977; Halliday, 1975; Wells, Montgomery, & McClure,
1979);anthropology andethnography (e.g., Gumperz & Hymes,
1972, Hymes, 1974; Gumperz, 1982); and literary criticism
(e.g., Pratt, 1977; Schauber & Spolsky, 1986).
In the field of applied linguistics and language teaching,
speech act theory (Hymes, 1972; Canale & Swain, 1980)-as a
vital component of the notion of communicative competence
underlies much recent research. It underlies the work on
syllabus design of Wilkins (1976) and The Council of Europe
(van Ek & Alexander, 1975), the work on the analysis of class-
room interaction (Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975; Edmondson,
1981a); the work on cross-cultural understanding (Thomas,
1983, 1984), the work on sociolinguistic aspects of second-
language acquisition (Wolfson & Judd, 1983), and the work on
interlanguage pragmatics (Fraser, Rintell, & Walters, 1980;
Walters, 1981; Blum-Kulka, 1983; Kasper, 1984). Flowerdew
(1988) provides one of the most current review articles on
speech acts and language learning.
Despite the great wealth of insights that such work has
afforded, there still remain a number of crucial problems with
the basic theory. As Blum-Kulka, House, and Kasper (1987)
point out, “the diversity of theoretical approaches and meth-
odological frameworks employed in the study of speech acts
leaves many of the central issues unanswered” (p. 2).
It is because of t.he large number of problems within
speech act theory and the seeming intractability of some of
them, no doubt, that some have been led to question the whole
future of speech act theory as an area of inquiry (Levinson,
 Flowerdew 81

1981,1983;Leech, 1983;Thomas, 1985). Levinson (19831,for

example, has envisaged the replacement of speech act theory
by some new approach to the study of the functions of language:
"There are some compelling reasons to think that speech act
theory may slowly be superseded by much more complex
multifaceted pragmatic approaches to the functions that utter-
ances perform" (p. 278). In a recent paper, Candlin (1987),too,
has questioned the validity of speech act theory as a basis for
work in applied linguistics.
Blum-Kulka et al. (1987),however, take a different line on
this question. For them the conclusion to be drawn from the
problematic state in which speech act theory finds itself is not
that the whole basis of the theory needs to be thrown into
question, but that further work needs to be done in an attempt
to resolve some of the outstanding issues.
This paper will examine some of the outstanding unre-
solved issues in speech act theory with a view to considering to
what degree they might or might not undermine the validity of
application in the field of language pedagogy.

THE PROBLEMS
HOW M A N Y SPEECH ACTS?

Speech act theory attempts to explain how to do things

with words. One of the fundamental problems of speech act
theory, however, is how to specify the number of different acts
that are needed to achieve this goal of describing the things
that we do with language.
Based on the number of performative verbs in the lan-
guage, Austin (1962)estimated there to be somewhere between
1,000and 10,000 illocutionary forces and thus speech acts in
English. To impose some sort of order on these acts, both
Austin, and later Searle (1975,1976), proposed classifying
them into major groups.
82 Language Learning Vol. 40, No. 1

Austin (1962, p. 150) proposed a breakdown into five

groups : verdictives, exercitives, commissives,behabitives, and
expositives. Searle (1976) criticized this breakdown on a num-
ber of grounds, the most powerful of which is that there is no
consistent principle of classification.
To overcome this problem Searle attempted to develop a
more principled framework. His first attempt (1969) was to
systematically compare and contrast the conditions specified
for the performance of an act-“felicity conditions”-and group
acts into categories according to shared conditions. However,
as he discovered, the problem with this approach is that the
different types of conditions are so numerous that there is no
means of reducing the total number of acts to a limited number
of basic types.
As a result of this impasse he developed an alternative
approach (Searle, 1976), this time specifying 12 criteria that
would be required (at least) to produce his well-known
classification into representatives, directives, commissives,
expressives, and declarations.
Searle’s classification of speech acts is the most widely
accepted (Hancher, 1979). However, it has its problems.
Although Hancher describes the system as “more economical”
(p. 3) than Austin’s, the economy of a system employing “at
least” twelve criteria can be questioned. In addition, as Ed-
mondson (1981a) has pointed out, the criteria are not applied
systematically. Furthermore, one can legitimately ask how
great the value is of a system in which the categories are so
broadly defined. Indeed, when it comes to application it is
unable to handle naturally occurring connected discourse
(Coulthard, 1985).
One of the reasons that Searle’s system is unable to cope
with natural data is that it is based upon introspection. A
number of approaches to speech act classification have been
developed from a more applied empirical perspective. Labov
and Fanshell (1977)based their classification upon an analysis
of therapeutic interviews. Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) took
 Flowerdew 83

as the basis for the 22 acts they specify an analysis of classroom

interaction. Wells et al. (1979)worked with mother-childinter-
action.
Empirical accounts such as these are more satisfactory in
accounting for the data upon which they are based. However,
what they gain in terms of descriptive adequacy for the situ-
ation they are designed to account for, they lose in general-
izability to other situations.
This tension between descriptive adequacy and general-
izability is reflected in applications of speech act taxonomies as
the basis for language teaching course design.
The best known taxonomy of speech acts drawn up
specifically with language teaching in mind is that of Wilkins
(1976). This has been criticized for its ad hoc nature and its
basis in introspection (Stratton, 1977; Brumfit, 1981). A
system derived empirically out of observation of a narrowly
defined situation is that of Candlin et al. (1976) for doctor-
patient interaction. This has the advantage of fitting the
situation for which it was designed, but of course it is not
applicable to other situations.
Different approaches have thus been tried to cope with the
problem of deriving appropriate taxonomies of speech acts for
language teaching. Any approach, however, is likely to suffer
from the basic theoretical problem of the conflict between an
all-purpose system-which is likely to have defects in relation
to the specific situations in which it is applied-and a system
derived from one narrowly defined situation-which is liable to
lack applicability to other, more general situations.
One approach that seeks to bridge the gap between an all
purpose system and a situationally specific one is that of the
Threshold Level (van Ek and Alexander, 1975). In this model
the taxonomy is derived from empirical research into the
putative general needs and interests of the learners. An
advantage of this approach is that it is susceptible to continual
modification and refinement resulting from feedback from
those using the taxonomy.
84 Language Learning Vol. 40, No. 1

INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS AND THE

PROBLEM OF LITERAL FORCE

A second problem for speech act theory is posed by the

question of literal and implied force. An utterance such as It’s
cold in here can be interpreted as a statement of fact about the
temperature where the utterance was made, but it might also,
in appropriate circumstances, function as a request (to turn on
the heating) or a warning (to put on a coat) or any of an infinite
number of possible acts.
Searle (1975) accounted for this multiplicity of possible
meanings by the notion of indirect speech acts, which he
defined as “cases in which one illocutionary act is performed
indirectly by way of performing another” (p. 60). Thus an
utterance is to be taken as carrying its literal force of state-
ment, question, or command, unless the context dictates that
some other interpretation is to be put upon it.
This view of Searle’s has received a large body of support:
in theoretical linguistics (Lyons 1977, 1981; Bach & Harnish,
1979; Allan, 1986 )in contrastive linguistics (Sadock & Zwicky,
1985); and in psycholinguistics (Lakoff,1973; Schatz, 1974;
Clark & Clark. 1977).
An acceptance of Searle’s interpretation of indirect speech
acts and the underlying literal force hypothesis suggests the
following position for language teaching. Given that all forces,
both direct and indirect, are calculated on the basis of literal
force, the three literal forces and their associated sentence
types are fundamental. Direct speech acts would therefore
take priority over indirect speech acts. Such a position seems
to be adopted by Hatch (1983) when she suggests the grading
of speech act realization forms on the basis of directness:
The strength, directness, clarity, and nonambiguous na-
ture of the form of each of the speech acts may make them
more or less transparent for the learner. In terms of
markedness theory, the most common, most neutral forms
of each speech act should be the easiest for learners to
acquire. (p. xi>
 Flowerdew 85

However, such a view depends upon the assumption that the

most common realization forms for all speech acts are the most
direct, and it so happens that probably the strongest argument
against the underlying literal force view of indirect speech acts
is the fact that the majority of speech acts are most frequently
realized indirectly (Levinson, 1983, p. 264). For example,
commands and requests are rarely realized by imperatives in
conversational English (Ervin-Trip, 1976, cited in Levin-
son,1983, p. 275), as would be predicted by a literal force view.
Because of the predominance of indirect speech acts a
number of linguists have been led to argue for a replacement of
literal force theory by a more general pragmatic interpretation
of utterances. Thus Levinson argues that the three sentence
types be given a very general truth conditional characteriza-
tion that leaves the range of possible illocutionary forces quite
open. So interrogatives, for example, can be used with the
illocutionary force (depending on context) of “real” questions,
“exam” questions, rhetorical questions, requests, offers, sug-
gestions, threats, etc. without overriding some underlying
“literal” force, as would be the case with the literal force
hypothesis.
Similarly, Sperber and Wilson (1986) call for a more
broadly based pragmatic interpretation of utterance meaning,
this time based upon an extension of Grice’s maxim of relation
(or, as they call it, relevance). For Sperber and Wilson,
linguistic form serves merely to guide the interpretation proc-
ess in a rather general way. More crucial in the assignment of
pragmatic force to an utterance is its particular relevance to
the ongoing discourse:
illocutionary-force indicators such as declarative or im-
perative mood or interrogative word order merely have to
make manifest a rather abstract property of the speaker‘s
informative intention; the direction in which the relevance
of the utterance is to be sought. (p. 254)
In their strong form, the ramifications of these pragmatic
approaches for language teaching are severe. According to this
86 Language Learning Vol. 40, No. 1

strong view any speech act may be expressed by an infinite

range of forms, and each language form will have an unlimited
range of possible forces it can express; according to this view
there is no significant fondforce correlation. Rather than
being determined by conventional forms, the illocutionary
force of utterances is determined in large part by their place in
connected discourse. It is such a view that would seem to
motivate those applied linguists who have argued against the
validity of a language teaching syllabus as a list of prespecified
linguistic items to be taught (whether they be organized ac-
cording to form or meaning) and who have argued instead for
a curriculum that stresses the “negotiable”nature of meaning
and emphasizes methodology and the PROCESS of learning in
preference to a syllabus as the prespecified PRODUCT of
learning (Brumfit, 1984; Candlin, 1984). This view, in its
strongest form, it should be pointed out, denies a role for speech
act theory in language teaching.
Such approaches, however, taken to their extreme, de-
pend upon a strong pragmatic view and it is important to bear
in mind that even so-called pragmatic approaches to illocution-
a r y force still do not dispense with linguistic meaning entirely.’
Whereas it must be admitted that the phenomenon of indirect
speech acts is a serious challenge to the literal force view, no
theory, it is clear, can dispense with some recognition of
linguistic meaning. To do so after all would be to claim there
to be no linguistic basis for communication.
Whereas we might agree with Levinson (19831, therefore,
that “what people do with sentences seems quite unrestricted
by the surface form [i.e., sentence-type] of the sentences ut-
tered’’ (p. 265),it is certainly true that certain language forms
carry certain illocutionary force potential. Most people, for
example, would accept that an utterance such as Can you pass
the salt? has the potential force of a request or that Would you
like togo to the cinema? has the potential force of an invitation.
Whether this potential is realized in the performance of an
utterance depends upon pragmatic constraints. But the fact of
 Flowerdew 87

the matter is that there is a range of linguistic forms (including

the three sentence types) that, at least, have this illocutionary
force potential. That forms such as these can often (although
by no means always) be translated into other languages and
maintain their same illocutionary force potential (Searle, 1975,
p. 88; Sadock & Zwicky, 1985)adds weight to this argument.
Clearly these illocutionary force potentials cannot be
accounted for by means of the three sentence types alone. The
range must be extended to include performative verbs, items
such as please, would you, could you, let’s, etc. as well as,
importantly, intonation (see Sadock & Zwicky, 1985,for a more
comprehensive coverage).
According to this modified pragmatic model, in terms of
interpretation, illocutionary force would be accounted for by a
combination of illocutionary force potential and context. There
would be no need to relate the surface form to an underlying
literal force before its illocutionary force is determined, as is the
case with Searle’s account of indirect speech act assignment.
Expressions such as can you, I would like you to,would you
mind would carry the potential force of a request in their
surface form. Pragmatic factors will determine whether this
potential is realized.
In terms of language teaching the model that we are
proposing has the following ramifications. Instead of possible
exponents for speech acts being identified and graded for
teaching on the basis of an a priori assumption that mood
derivable and performative exponents were somehow primary,
as is the case with Searle’s theory of indirect speech acts, the
most likely (frequentlneutral) forms would be identified on the
basis of empirical research, accepting the possibility of a wider
range of illocutionary force indicators and of realizations that
do not carry any illocutionary force indicating device.
Ultimately, however, whichever model of indirect speech
acts is accepted, whether it be Searle’s or the more pragmatic
models favored here, pragmatic constraints will be a deciding
factor in the assignment of illocutionary force. To be sure that
88 Language Learning Vol. 40, No. 1

Can you pass the salt? is a request and not a “real” question we
need to know the context of the utterance. If the relation
between language and illocutionary force is to be conveyed
systematically to the language learner, then a level of opera-
tion higher than the single speech act, and providing some
pragmatic context for interpretation, is required.

HOW BIG IS THE FORMAL

REALIZATION OF A SPEECH ACT?

Although writers on speech acts acknowledge that the

formal manifestation of a speech act does not necessarily
correspond to the single sentence, there is nevertheless a
tendency to take the sentence as the standard speech act unit
(Schmidt & Richards, 1980, p. 13212 Of course, much work in
speech act theory has been carried out by philosophers, who are
concerned with underlying competence rather than with ac-
tual performance. As Searle (1969) says, he is interested in
“paradigm cases” and “simple and idealised cases,” (p. 54-55).
Those seeking to apply speech act theory are concerned, how-
ever, with performance, with how the analysis applies to actual
instances of speech (and writing).
If we move over to a performance view and look at actual
language use, we find that there are in fact no limits to the size
of the formal realization of a speech act. A single act can be
realized by less than a sentence (e.g., agreement can be ex-
pressed by a simple yes), or more than one sentence ( e.g., a
promise in the form of a formal oath might take many sen-
tences) (Schmidt & Richards, 1980, p. 132). On the other hand,
one sentence can express more than one act (Labov & Fanshell,
1977, p. 29; Brown 8z Yule, 1983, p. 233). Thus a student who
asks the teacher, “Would you speak more slowly please?” is
simultaneously requesting action, asserting that the teacher
speaks too quickly, and reporting difficulty(Richards 8z Schmidt,
1983, p. 126). To complicate things even further, an act is not
necessarily limited to one speaker turn (Schmidt & Richards,
 Flowerdew 89

1980,p. 132;Brown & Yule, 1983,p. 233). For example, a

request may be spread over a number of utterances in an
interaction, as the following data from Thomas (1985)shows:
Al: You know those browny glasses?
B1: Yeah.
A2: The ones we got from the garage.
B2: Mm.
A3: Do you use them much?
B3: Not really, no.
A4: Can I have them then? (p. 781)
Obviously as far as application of speech act theory is
concerned this question of size is a serious one. How is it
possible to recognize in a spoken or written text, or specify in
a syllabus inventory, the linguistic realization of a given speech
act, if the possible size of that realizational form cannot be
specified?
One means of mitigating this problem for language teach-
ing, is to use it as a criterion for grading. Single sentence
realizations, accordingly, can be taught first and longer ones
later; utterances conveying only one force can precede multiple
force utterances; acts restricted to one speaker turn can be
presented before acts spread over more than one turn. Obvi-
ously, this approach involves the acceptance of the principle of
idealization of the language being presented. Applied linguis-
tics, however, can often accept an idealized model of language,
where theoretical linguistics cannot.

SPECIFIC VERSUS DIFFUSE ACTS

De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981)point out that there is

a great difference between what they call “relatively well
defined” (p. 117)speech acts such as promising or threatening
and “extremely diffuse” (p. 117) speech acts such as stating,
asserting, or questioning.
Individual illocutionary acts have been defined in terms of
the conditions that must pertain for their performance (Austin,
90 Language Learning Vol. 40, No. 1

1962;Searle, 1965,1969;Labov & Fanshell, 1977;Blum-Kulka

et al., 1987). However, the conditions pertaining for the per-
formance of the more diffuse acts are not specifiablein the same
way as are those for the well-defined acts such as promising or
threatening. For this reason, no doubt, most of the work on
individual speech acts is limited to a relatively narrow range of
the more easily definable acts, such as requests, apologies,
compliments, thanking, etc. (Blum-Kulka et al., 1987).
What this means for the application of speech act theory
is that a large part of what people actually do with language in
performing the more diffuse acts is not susceptible to analysis
in terms of speech acts.
It is interesting to note in this respect that so-called func-
tional language teaching materials tend to focus on the “rela-
tively well-defined”acts-requesting, offering,thanking, apolo-
gizing, etc. It might legitimately be asked, however, in light of
the preceding discussion, if this state of affairs might not in
some way be pernicious. Are these acts selected and graded
solely according to need, frequency, etc. or are they there
because they happen to be the most easily characteri~ed.~
The problem posed by the more diffuse acts is particularly
apparent with the written word. Expository prose can be seen
to be mainly limited to the act of “describing“. In the teaching
of reading and writing, therefore, if we are primarily dealing
with only one act, a functional approach, it might be argued,
would seem to have limited value.
Interesting work has been carried out in this area by
Trimble and his associates (synthesized in Trimble, 1985).
Working with scientific and technical text, the overall descrip-
tive function characterizing this genre is subclassified into the
rhetorical functions of physical description, “function descrip-
tion,” “process description,” “definition,” and “classification”.
The practical value of the rhetorical function approach lies
in the specification provided of the linguistic forms most closely
associated with each rhetorical function and which provides a
possible basis for syllabus design.
 Flowerdew 91

What distinguishes the categories of rhetorical function,

one from the other, is not so much their force as speech acts, as
the conceptual areas to which they relate. The difference
between “function description” and “process description,” for
example, is parallel to the distinction, say, between “request-
ing goods” and “requesting services”. They are the same act,
but applied to a different conceptual area. A possible solution
to the problem of the lack of descriptive detail for the more
diffuse acts is thus provided not in speech act theory itself, but
by appeal to conceptual categories.
What work on rhetorical functions shows, therefore, is
how an “applied” approach can find an answer outside speech
act theory itself to a problem posed by an inadequacy in the
theory. The specificationof the categories of rhetorical function
and their associated realization forms provides a basis for or-
ganizing a teaching program organized around the more dif-
fuse acts for which speech act theory itself is unable to provide
much descriptive detail.

DISCRETE CATEGORIES VERSUS

SCALE OF MEANING

As was pointed out earlier, Austin (1962) based his esti-

mate of the number of speech acts on the number of performa-
tive verbs in English. He thus assumed that speech acts and
performative verbs are in a one-to-one relationship. This
assumption has been criticized by Leech (1981, 1983) and
others (Edmondson, 1981b, Wierzbicka, 1985) on the grounds
that there is no reason to believe that distinctions made in our
vocabulary necessarily exist in reality.
Leech (1981) argues that speech acts are indeterminate
and exist along a scale rather than belonging to distinct
categories. For example, it is difficult to say where the border
might lie between a request and an order. In language
teaching, therefore, is a sentence such as “Open the door
please” to be presented to the learner as a request or an order?
92 Language Learning Vol. 40, No. 1

Another example of indeterminacy provided by Leech is

the fact that some illocutions are deliberately ambivalent,
sharing the characteristics of more than one force. Tag ques-
tions are a good example here. Applying this to language
teaching again, a sentence such as ‘You will come, won’t you?”,
for example, cannot really be presented to a learner as either
an order or an invitation; it should rather be described as a
“pressing invitation”.
A third type of indeterminacy for Leech exists where both
a direct and an indirect form are possible realizations of an act.
In these cases it is misleading to say that they are both ways of
saying the same thing. This is a common problem for language
teaching, where syllabuses and course books present lists of
possible exponents for speech acts as if they all carried exactly
the same force. To take just one example, the Threshold Level
(van Ek & Alexander, 1975) presents I want, I’d like, and may
I have as possible exponents of “expressing want, desire”
(p. 49). Obviously, an indication of the relative force of these
three forms is required if the learner is not going to use them
inappropriately.
In sum, what the scalar, as opposed to the categorical,
nature of speech act categories means for application to lan-
guage teaching, is that exact specification or assignment of
speech act realization forms will be problematic.
As with the problems of literdindirect force and the size
of speech act realization forms, the problem presented by the
scalar nature of speech act categories can be tackled through
grading. Those realization patterns falling most clearly into
particular categories can take priority over less clear-cut ones.
In addition, those features that contribute to the “fuzzi-
ness’’ of speech act categories can be given particular emphasis,
perhaps later on in a course. Learners can be introduced to the
various means by which the force of an utterance can be
mitigated, to the ambivalent nature of certain types of utter-
ance, and to the distinctions to be drawn between direct and
indirect speech acts.
 Flowerdew 93

LOCUTION, ILLOCUTION, AND INTERACTION

The speech act theories of Austin (1962) and Searle (1975,

1976) make the distinction between two types of act created in
the making of an utterance. The locutionary act conveys the
literal meaning of the words and grammatical structures of the
utterance. The illocutionary act conveys the force-ar func-
tion-of the utterance, "how it. . .is to be taken" (Austin, 1962,
p. 9814 More recently, however, a third type of act also present
in the making of an utterance has been specified. This is the
interactive, or interactional, act (Widdowson, 1979; Edmond-
son, 1981a) that conveys how one utterance relates to the other
utterances in the discourse. The 22 acts in the model of dis-
course proposed by Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) are of this

There are two important consequences of the introduction

of this third type of act. First, it means that the analysis of any
instance of spoken text will be further complicated, in so far as
three types of meaning will have to be considered. Second, it
emphasizes the dynamic nature of speech and the fact that acts
combine together in a structured way. Conversation is not seen
merely as a piling up of locutions and illocutions, but as the
creation of interactions structured by patterns of interactive
acts.
The introduction of the interactive function into speech
act theory implies for language teaching that consideration
must be given not only to the paradigmatic dimension of the
various types of illocutionary act, but also to the syntagmatic
dimension of the sequential relevance of the various types of
interactive act, as they combine in the creation of coherent
discourse. The most widely known syllabus proposals based on
speech act taxonomies (van Ek & Alexander, 1975; Wilkins,
1976; Munby, 1978) however, are remarkable for their failure
to take this feature of speech acts into account.
This early neglect of the interactive function and the
syntagmatic dimension on the part of those concerned with
94 Language Learning Vol. 40, No. 1

functional approaches to language teaching has now been

generally accepted (Wilkins, 1981; Munby, 1983; Trim, 19841,
and various attempts have been made to present speech act se-
quences in courses (e.g., Rossner, Shaw, Shepherd, Taylor, &
Davies, 1979;Candlin & Edelhof, 1982;Cook,1982;The British
Council, 1984). This is one area, therefore, in which insight
gained in speech act theory has clearly been carried over into
pedagogical practice.
A further benefit accruing from this insight concerning the
importance of the interactive function has resulted in greater
attention being given to the interactive roles of teachers and
learners in classroom activities (Kramsch, 1981; Riley, 1985).
Riley (1985) has drawn attention to the fact, for example, that
the learner’s contributionin the language classroom has tended
to focus on the matching of particular linguistic forms to
selected illucutionary acts, the use of the range of interactive
acts, paradoxically, being very much restricted to the teacher.
An awareness of this problem opens the door to a reform of
methodology to give greater emphasis to the interactive roles
of the learner.

THE WHOLE DOES NOT EQUAL

THE SUM OF THE PARTS

Just as attempts to classify speech acts into discrete

categories along the paradigmatic dimension have a number of
problems, so does any attempt to characterize the syntagmatic
dimension in terms of discrete nonoverlapping segments.
Reference has already been made to the fact that illocu-
tionary forces may be spread over a number of utterances and
that one utterance may share more than one force.
Another problem relates to what has been referred to as
the hermeneutic spiral, that is, the problem of the interdepend-
ence in the interpretation of meaning between the parts and
the whole. Hirsch (cited in Sullivan, 1984) states this relation
as follows:
 Flowerdew 95

The meaning of a text (or anything else) is a complex of sub-

meanings or parts which hang together. (Whenever the
parts do not cohere, we confront meaninglessness or chaos,
not meaning). Thus the complex of parts is not a merely
mechanical collocation, but a relational unity in which the
relations of the parts to one another and to the whole,
constitute an essential aspect of their character a s parts.
That is, the meaning of a part is determined by its relation-
ship to the whole . . . . From the standpoint of knowledge,
therefore, we cannot perceive the meaning of a part until
after we have grasped the meaning ofthe whole, since only
then can we understand the function of the part within the
whole. (p. 117)
In applying speech act theory to the analysis of a text
therefore, the individual speech acts (the parts) can be deter-
mined only in relation to the overall text (the whole). As every
text is different, this means that the component parts (the
speech act categories) making up that text are also likely to be
different. Thus the whole idea of developing a universal set of
speech act categories applicable to any text is thrown into
question. A system of analysis that works for one text is likely
not to work for another.
In terms of application to language teaching, this theoreti-
cal insight undermines the validity of the whole enterprise of
breaking language events down into discrete categories of acts
and then using these acts as the components of a syllabus. This
view is reflected in the advocacy on the part of some so-called
“task-based” syllabuses in which text is not treated as being
composed of a set of acts or functions, but instead is approached
as belonging to communicative knowledge in general, commu-
nicative knowledge being conceived of as “a unified system (of)
text, interpersonal behaviour, and ideation” (Breen, 1987, p.
161). This approach it should be pointed out, tends to deny a
role for speech act theory in language teaching.
For those not wishing to adopt such a “strong“ view, there
are alternative approaches to tackling this problem in applica-
tion. One response is to ignore the problem, a t least in the early
96 Language Learning Vol. 40, No. 1

stages of a course, and present an idealized model of discourse,

susceptible to a description in terms of a taxonomy of acts that
can be applied to any situation. This approach is perfectly
respectable, so long as it is borne in mind that the standards
required for adequacyin linguistic description are not the same
as those required for adequacy in conforming to sound peda-
gogical principle (Widdowson, 1979, pp. 234-246).
An alternative response is to treat every situation on its
merits and present various models according to each linguistic
register. A course might thus be organized as a sequence of
materials falling within various registers. This approach
would be most economical for specific purpose courses, in which
the focus was on one or a limited number of registers.

ON THE RELATION BETWEEN

THEORY AND PRACTICE
Having reviewed the major problems of speech act theory
as they relate to language pedagogy, let us return to the
question posed in the introduction of this paper, namely,
whether or not the problems are serious enough to undermine
speech act theory as a basis for application.
Levinson (1981, 19831, it will be recalled, suggested the
possibility of an alternative theory replacing that of speech
acts. But Levinson is concerned with theory per se. It may well
be that a new, more sophisticated theory will supersede speech
act theory. This will be for the future. In this paper, however,
the concern is with application, with the effectiveness of the
theory we have now in handling practical problems. Thus,
although the theory has its problems, these problems will not
necessarily undermine its validty for application.
As Halliday, McIntosh, and Strevens (1964) put it in an
early consideration of the relation between linguistics and
language teaching, “the value of a theory depends on what use
is to be made of it, and . . . a model is tested by its effectiveness
 Flowerdew 97

for specific purposes” (p. 301). As was made clear in the intro-
duction to this paper, applications of speech act theory have
already been extremely fruitful. This in itself suggests that in
spite of its problems the theory has some validity. In addition,
an awareness of the problems outlined here tends to lead to a
greater sensitivity in application, as some of the pedagogic
responses to the various problems discussed have demon-
strated. The problems of speech act theory, rather than
presenting insurmountable obstacles to the application of the
theory to language teaching, can be seen as offering challenges
that in many cases can be met by pedagogical innovation.
Given the great diversity of its applications, it might be
argued as a further defense of speech act theory that one all-
embracing theory would in any case be too much to expect and
that we should settle for a degree of theoretical pluralism
instead. Indeed, this is only to be expected from a functional
view of language. As Halliday (1978) has stated, “language,
unlike mathematics, is not clearcut or precise. It is a natural
human creation, and, like many other natural human crea-
tions, it is inherently messy” (p. 203). And Widdowson (1979):
“there is no model of language which has the monopoly on the
truth, that captures reality. All descriptions, no matter how
apparently objective they might appear, are really only projec-
tions of personal or social attitudes” (p. 239).

POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT

If it is accepted that speech act theory, in spite of its
problems, nevertheless offers a basis for application, the fol-
lowing question remains. What scope is there for resolution of
some of these problems and therefore for further advances in
application?
It would be too much to expect a clear-cut answer here.
Obviously some areas offer a greater prospect of advancement
than do others. Regarding the question of the number of
98 Language Learning Vol. 40, No. 1

possible speech acts and their classificationinto groups, Searle’s

classification is, as Coulthard (1985 ) states, “a first step”
(p. 25). More recent work in this area is offered by Leech (19831,
Allan (19861, and Wierzbicka (1987). Progress, thus, seems to
be being made here. It may be, however, as Crombie (198513, p.
17) has stated, that any classification will, to a certain extent,
represent the preoccupation of the taxonomist, and that there
will thus not be any one “correct”grouping.
Regarding the question of literal force, more work of a
psychological nature is needed here to test this hypothesis.
However, if the more empirical approach toward the selection
and grading of speech acts for teaching is adopted, the work
collected and reviewed in Blum-Kulka et al. (1987) demon-
strates possible ways forward in the collection and classification
of speech act realization patterns as a basis for teaching. In
addition, this work presents exciting research contrasting
speech acts and their realization patterns across languages
and cultures.
Concerning the question of the size of speech act realiza-
tions, interesting work is being done in the field of conversa-
tional analysis with the concept of “preference” (Pomerantz,
1978; Atkinson & Drew, 1979; Levinson, 1983; Atkinson &
Heritage, 1984);that is, the idea that speech acts, as they occur
in the syntagmatic chain, are either “preferred” or “disprefer-
red,” “preferred” responses being structurally simpler (and
therefore shorter) than “dispreferred” responses, which tend to
be marked by various forms of structural complexity (and
therefore longer). This work is only in its infancy, however, and
no attempt has so far been made to apply it to pedagogy.
Concerning the relation between the various types of
force, the work of Crombie (1985a, 1985b),in the applied field,
covers fresh ground in investigating how categories of locution-
ary, illocutionary, and interactional force might interrelate in
the creation of a language syllabus.
 Flowerdew 99

CONCLUSION
A feature of many of the problems discussed here is the
fact that speech act theory, whether on the paradigmatic or the
syntagmatic dimension, can only deal in approximations, not
discrete categories, and that even these approximations are
likely to vary from one situation to another. Any application
must accept therefore a degree of “fuzziness”. As Lyons (1981)
has warned, “discreteness is a property of form, not meaning“
(p. 148).
Nevertheless, and bearing in mind this warning, it can be
said with some certainty that there is considerable mileage left
in the investigation of the various facets of speech act theory
and that the findings of this investigation are likely to offer
further insights for application.

NOTES
Sadock (1988) refers to them as “avowedlypragmatic accounts ...[which] fall
back on formal quasi-semantic markers of basic sentence type or mood” (p.
195).
Searle (1969) i s typically ambiguous on this point, on the one hand
reconciling the study of speech acts with that of sentences: “a study of the
meaning of sentences is not in principle distinct from a study of speech acts.
Properly construed, they are the same study” (p.18); “the characteristic form
of the illocutionary act is the complete sentence” (p, 25); and yet at the same
time acknowledging that a speech act can be expressed in more than one
sentence: “every possible speech act can in principle be given an exact formu-
lation in a sentence or SENTENCES [emphasis added]” (p. 18).
See Kennedy (1979) for a discussion of the place of what he refers to as
expressive and affective functions in language teaching.
‘ Austin also distinguished a third type of act, the perlocutionary act,
concerning the effect, or result, of an act.
The names of the acts from this model-elicitation, informative, nomination,
reply, accept, evaluate-are themselves suggestive of the interactive func-
tion.
100 Language Learning Vol. 40, No. 1

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