COVERAGE OF ASSIGNED READINGS: MEETING NO. 3 (Lec. No.

26)

d. Residency
i. Change of Domicile

To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with
conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a
declared and probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode.

1. Sabili v. COMELEC, 670 SCRA 664 (2012)

Petitioner’s actual physical presence in Lipa City is established not only by the presence of a place (Pinagtong-ulan house and lot) he can actually live
in, but also the affidavits of various persons in Pinagtong-ulan, and the Certification of its barangay captain. Petitioner’s substantial and real interest in
establishing his domicile of choice in Lipa City is also sufficiently shown not only by the acquisition of additional property in the area and the transfer of
his voter registration, but also his participation in the community’s socio-civic and religious life, as well as his declaration in his ITR that he is a resident
thereof.

ii. The Law Treats Citizenship Independently of Domicile; However:

RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and
consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born
Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish
residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a
citizen.24 However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an elective public
office, residency in the Philippines becomes material. Section 5(2) of FLA No. 9225
provides:cralawlawlibrary

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
x x x x

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

1. Caballero v. Comelec, G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015

In  Coquilla v. COMELEC28  we ruled that naturalization in a foreign country may result in
an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's case as
permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian
citizenship.29 Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and
transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his
vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment.

e. Age
i. Garvida v. Sales, G.R. No. 124893, April 18, 1997
The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his
election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When the law
speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days each. One born on the first day of the year is
consequently deemed to be one year old on the 365th day after his birth — the last day of the year. In
computing years, the first year is reached after completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first
day of the second 365-day cycle begins. The phrase “not more than 21 years of age” means not over 21
years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or
a fraction of a year because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. “Not more than 21 years old” is not
equivalent to “less than 22 years old,” contrary to petitioner’s claims. The law does not state that the
candidate be less than 22 years on election day. The requirement that a candidate possess the age
qualification is founded on public policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared
ineligible.

Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the
statutes for holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for
succession of the SK Chairman.
 f. Other Eligibilities of Candidates
i. Non-suffering from Any Term Limitation
In order for the ineligibility under the "three-term limit rule" to apply, two conditions must concur: first, that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and second,
that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one
term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.

the COMELEC Second Division found that it is an ineligibility which is a proper ground for a petition to deny due
course to or to cancel a Certificate of Candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC, hence considered the petition as
such.

1. Albania v. Comelec, G.R. No. 226792, June 7, 2017

As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local
elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term.1âwphi1 Verily, while he was
declared the winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundo's full term
has been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his dpponent (Torres). Hence,
there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have
served the full 2004-2007 term.

Applying the foregoing in the instant case, since Respondent did not serve the full 2007-2010 term, it
cannot be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold. Consequently,
Respondent cannot be said to have continuously served as Governor for three consecutive terms prior
to the 2016 elections.

2. Summary of prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of

terms and involuntary interruption

"voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the continuity
of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected."

Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from any of these events or causes: succession or assumption
of office by operation of law, preventive suspension, declaration of the defeated candidate as the winner in
an election contest, declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an election contest,
proclamation of a non-candidate as the winner in a recall election, removal of the official by operation of
law, and other analogous causes.

It must be stressed that involuntary interruption of service which jurisprudence deems an exception to the three-term
limit rule, implies that the service of the term has begun before it was interrupted. 

Abundo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 201716, 8 January 2013

Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundo’s opponent actually served as Mayor is and
ought to be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term,
cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term
threshold.

As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the
right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty
seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundo’s full term has been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by
his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be
considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term.

ii. Non-Suffering from Any Accessory Penalty of Disqualification

Notably, Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously convicted of a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the said accessory penalty shall have
 been expressly remitted in the pardon. In this case, the same accessory penalty had not been expressly remitted in the
Order of Commutation or by any subsequent pardon and as such, petitioner’s disqualification to run for elective office is
deemed to subsist.
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office and for the right to vote,
such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence.

The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment of conviction
becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on
whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be
permitted to hold any public office during the period of his [perpetual special] disqualification." Once the judgment of
conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his
conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public
office perpetually. 

1. Jalosjos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013

In the present case, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal which,
pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried with it the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn, pursuant to
Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him to run for elective office. As discussed, Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases
wherein a penal provision – such as Article 41 in this case – directly and specifically prohibits the convict from running for elective
office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from petitioner’s service of his commuted prison term, he remains bound
to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor
for Zamboanga City.

Notably, Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or
reclusion temporal continues to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the said accessory penalty shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. 33 In this case, the same
accessory penalty had not been expressly remitted in the Order of Commutation or by any subsequent pardon and as such,
petitioner’s disqualification to run for elective office is deemed to subsist.

Further, it is well to note that the use of the word "perpetual" in the aforementioned accessory penalty connotes a lifetime restriction
and in this respect, does not depend on the length of the prison term which is imposed as its principal penalty. Instructive on this
point is the Court’s ruling in Lacuna v. Abes, 34 where the court explained the meaning of the term "perpetual" as applied to the
penalty of disqualification to run for public office:

The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office and for the right to vote, such
disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the
case of Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961.

But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the
right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually,
as distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

2. Disqualification of Candidates
a. Grounds for Disqualification
i. To All Candidates – Omnibus Election Code, Secs. 68 and 12

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has
been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be
a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent
authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his
service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed
acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by
this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified
from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent
 resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code,
unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with
the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

ii. To Local Candidates – LGC, Sec. 40

SECTION 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad; (f) Permanent residents in a
foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same
right after the effectivity of this Code; and (
g) The insane or feeble-minded.

iii. To SK Candidates – RA 10742, Sec. 27

SEC. 27. Mandatory and Continuing Training Programs. – For the purpose of emphasizing the role
of the youth in nation-building and molding them to become better citizens with the values of patriotism,
nationalism and honor as a Filipino, any Sangguniang Kabataan official, whether elected or appointed,
or any member of the LYDC must undergo the mandatory training programs before he or she can
assume office. During their incumbency, they must attend the continuing training programs to be
undertaken by the Commission in coordination with the DILG. Deliberate failure to attend the said
training programs shall constitute sufficient ground to disqualify said Sangguniang Kabataan official or
LYDC member or subject them to disciplinary actions. (LOCAL YOUTH DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL)

iv. To Candidates of a Special Election – RA 9285

v. Candidate Subject to Disqualification is Eligible but Committed Infraction

or Placed in a Disqualifying Situation - Tagolino v. HRET, G.R. No.
202202, March 19, 2013
It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have been a candidate,
albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do not, however, deny his or her
statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidate’s compliance with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law,
such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as
a form of penal sanction brought by the commission of the above-mentioned election offenses.

vi. Prior court judgment required? Francisco v. Comelec, G.R. No.

230249, April 24, 2018
The Court declares that in a Petition for Disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code, a prior judgment by a competent court that the candidate is guilty of an election
offense is not required before the said petition can be entertained or given due course by the
Commission on Elections.
vii. Restoration of Pardonee’s Right to Run for Public Office - Risos-Vidal
v. Comelec, G. R. No. 206666, 21 January 2015
viii. Effect of Penal Provision to the LGC Provision Which Allows Prior Convict
to Run After Two (2) Years - Jalosjos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205033,
June 18, 2013
ix. Administratively ‘Removed from Office’ Defined - Albania v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 226792, June 7, 2017
x. Doctrine of Condonation - Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
The condonation would not apply where the offense was committed while the public
official was still an appointive official and he had been elected for the first time. The
condonation of an administrative offense takes place only when the public official is
reelected despite the pendency of an administrative case against him (Ombudsman v
Torres, 2008).
A challenge to a preventive suspension order becomes moot and academic upon
expiration of the term of office of petitioner and petitioner’s reelection to the same post
(Dumlao v Diaz, 1969). Of course, this condonation of misconduct committed during the
expired term of the public officer by virtue of his reelection to office for a new term
applies only to his administrative and not to his criminal guilt. The condonation would
still apply even if the anomalies were discovered, and the administrative complaints were
filed only after his reelection. The remedy then would be to file the appropriate civil and
criminal actions.