Daf Ditty Succah 15: Gezeirat Tikra

1
MISHNA: In the case of a roof made of boards that are four handbreadths wide upon which there
is no coat of plaster, Rabbi Yehuda says that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree with regard
to the manner in which to render it fit. Beit Shammai say: One moves each board, and then it is
considered as though he placed the board there for the sake of the mitzva of sukka, and one then
removes one board from among the boards and replaces it with fit roofing. Beit Hillel say: One
need not perform both actions; rather, one must either move the boards or remove one from
among them. Rabbi Meir says: One only removes one from among them and does not move
the others.

2
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Granted, according to Beit Hillel, their reason for initially
prohibiting this roof is due to the principle: Prepare it, and not from that which has already
been prepared. If one moves the boards, he performs an action. Likewise, if he removes one
of the boards from among them, he also performs an action. Therefore, in both cases, he prepared
the roofing and the sukka is fit. However, with regard to the opinion of Beit Shammai, what is
the rationale for their prohibition against using the original ceiling for a sukka? If the rationale
is also due to the principle: Prepare it, and not from that which has already been prepared,
one action should suffice. Or if the rationale is due to the decree of the roof, lest one come to
reside beneath a regular plastered ceiling inside a house, removing one board from among them
should suffice.

3
The Gemara answers: Actually, the rationale is due to the decree of the roof, and this is what
they are saying: Although one moves the boards, if he removes one board from among them,
yes, it is fit; if not, no, it is unfit. Moving the boards is inconsequential. Removing one board from
among them is all that is necessary.

4
The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: Rabbi Meir says: One removes one
from among them but does not move the others. This indicates that the opinion of Rabbi Meir
is identical to the opinion of Beit Shammai, as according to the above explanation, Beit Shammai
also hold that removing one of the boards and replacing it with fit roofing can render the sukka fit.
It is unreasonable to say that Rabbi Meir would hold in accordance with the opinion of Beit
Shammai, which is rejected.

The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi Meir is saying: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel do not
disagree on this matter. They agree that the boards are prohibited due to the decree of the roof
and that only by removing one of the boards is the sukka rendered fit. Rabbi Meir disagrees with
the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that there is a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel.

Summary

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Boards that are four handbreadths or less - how can we say that they are fit to cover a
sukka? Apparently, Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai had a dispute about this. Or perhaps they did
not have a dispute. Today's daf is about what makes an argument as much as it is about the
argument itself.1

Rabbi Yehuda tells us that Beit Shammai instructs us to move all of these boards and also to
remove on of the boards to render the sukka fit. Beit Hillel tells us that doing one of these actions
is enough. Finally, Rabbi Meir says that it is enough to just move one of the boards.

The Gemara shares attempts to understand these opinions - where they come from and how they
might intersect. For example, perhaps Beit Hillel was referring to the principal that states that we
should "prepare it, and not from which it has already been prepared". Thus, we must take a new
action to render an item fit for roofing a sukka. Or, the Gemara tells us, the decree of "moving the
boards is not enough; removing one board causes the sukka to be fit" is behind these assertions.

The rabbis then argue over whether or not Beit Hillel, Beit Shammai and Rabbi Meir were in
disagreement. They call on the notion of ritual impurity in general, the principle of the curved
wall, the size of the boards and other larger ideas to demonstrate that the dispute is extremely
limited in its scope.

A new Mishna is introduced. It tells us that a sukka is fit if there is space between metal skewers
or long bed boards. The spaces must be equal to the size of the boards, and they must be filled
with halachically fit roofing. It goes on to say that a hollowed-out bag of grain cannot be used to
make a sukka.

To the end of the daf, the rabbis discuss the first part of this Mishna. They consider the placement
of the skewers/boards and the placement of the halachically fit s’chach. They also look at how
skewers/boards might become ritually impure. If they could be construed as vessels, and there
was any metal in their construction, these skewers/boards could invalidate the sukka.

I wonder if our Sages became openly angry with each other when they disagreed; especially when
they disagreed with regard to a past rabbi's opinion. I can't imagine that they did not often take
these arguments personally. They were arguing today about how big another argument might have
been. It must have taken a specific type of personality to thrive in that kind of competitive, hostile,
intellectually driven setting.

Daf Shevui writes:2

1
https://dafyomibeginner.blogspot.com/2014/02/
2
https://www.sefaria.org/Sukkah.12b.1?lang=bi&p2=Daf_Shevui_to_Sukkah.12b&lang2=bi

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Today’s section begins with a new mishnah.

The Talmud will offer various explanations as to why these things cannot be used for s'chach.
Once any of them is untied, they are valid for s’chach because they all grow from the ground and
are not susceptible to impurity.

The final section teaches that everything that is invalid for the s’chach is valid for the walls. When
it comes to the walls all we are concerned about is that there are walls—we are not at all concerned
with the material of the walls.

R. Yaakov heard R. Yohanan his teacher explain two mishnayot but he’s not sure which
explanation goes with which mishnah. The first mishnah is the one above. The other mishnah is
one we will encounter later in this chapter. It teaches that if one hollows out an empty space in a
haystack one cannot use the empty space as a sukkah.

There are two reasons given for these mishnayot. The first is that one shouldn’t make his store
house into a sukkah. The second is that one must actively make his sukkah. The sukkah shouldn’t
be made on its own.

Now since this is a decree lest one use his storehouse [as a Sukkah] the other must have been
forbidden on the ground of ‘you shall make’ [which implies], but not from that which is made.
R. Yirmiyah now tries to sort out which explanation goes with which mishnah. R. Yirmiyah is
familiar with another tradition stated by R. Yohanan which explains that one cannot use these
bundles as s’chach lest one store his bundles up there and then later on decide to use it as his
sukkah. It looks as if this is actually the other reason, “you shall make, but not from that which is
made.”

Rashi explains that there are actually two levels of prohibitions here. From the Torah it would be
prohibited to put bundles on the sukkah and then change one’s mind and untie them to use them
as s’chach. This would indeed be a violation of the principle, “You shall make, but not from that
which is made.” Since this is a toraitic prohibition, the rabbis decreed that one can never use these
bundles as s’chach, even if one put them up there to use as s’chach from the outset. This is
understood as “lest one make one’s storehouse into a sukkah.”

Since this mishnah is explained by the principle of “lest one make one’s storehouse into a sukkah”
the other mishnah, about digging in a haystack, must be explained by the reason “you shall make,
but not from that which is made.” If one digs in a haystack and then uses the empty space as his
sukkah, he didn’t actually make a sukkah. Meaning he didn’t put s’chach on top of his sukkah.
Rather, he created negative space and it just turned out that he had s’chach above his head. This is
not considered making a sukkah.

The Talmud explains that R. Yaakov hadn’t heard this statement of R. Hiyya b. Abba. That’s why
he didn’t know which explanation went with which mishnah.

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The next section continues to deal with the explanation of the two mishnayot: 1) the prohibition
of using bundles of wood for the s’chach; 2) the prohibition of making a sukkah by hollowing out
a haystack.

R. Ashi disagrees with R. Yirmiyah’s analysis. He holds that both reasons apply to both mishnayot.
Using bundles of straw is prohibited because it looks like a storehouse and because one might first
put it up there and then change one’s mind and untie it, thereby violating the principle, “You shall
make, but not from that which is already made.” Hollowing out a haystack also looks like a
storehouse, and it also violates the “you shall make” principle.

The Talmud responds on behalf of R. Yohanan why he explained the two mishnayot he did. R.
Yohanan picked up on small cues from the language of the two mishnayot. When our mishnah
said, “one may not use them as s’chach” it meant from the outset (lehathilah) one shouldn’t use
them. But if one did, the sukkah is still valid. This type of halakhah is a “decree (gezerah)”—one
shouldn’t do something, but if he did, his act is still valid. The other mishnah uses the language “it
is not a sukkah.” This means that even according to toraitic law it is not a sukkah. This type of
halakhah is one that would come from a midrash on the Torah such as “You shall make, and not
from that which is already made.”

Rav Avrohom Adler writes:3

Rabbi Yehudah says: Beis Shammai maintains that a roof that consists of boards that have not yet
been covered with plaster and one wishes to convert the roof into s’chach, one must loosen the
boards and he then removes one board from between every two boards. Beis Hillel, however,
maintains that one can either loosen the boards or he can remove one board from between every
two boards.

Rabbi Meir says: he removes one board from between every two boards, but he does not (need to)
loosen them. The Gemora asks: It is well according to Beis Hillel; their reason is that ‘You shall
make (a Sukkah,’ which implies: but not from that which is already made (improperly); so that if
he loosens the boards, he performs an action (and it is regarded as he is making the Sukkah anew),
and if he removes one from between the two, he also performs an action; but what is the reason of
Beis Shammai (for requiring both)? If it is that ‘You shall make (a Sukkah,’ which implies: but
not from that which is already made (improperly), one action should be sufficient; and if it is
because of a decree against using anything that resembles a roof, it should suffice if he removes
one from between the two?

The Gemora answers: Indeed, it is because of a decree against using anything that resembles a
roof, but they mean as follows: Even though he loosens them, if he removes one from between the
two, it is valid, otherwise, it is not. The Gemora asks: If so, consider the concluding part of the
Mishna: Rabbi Meir says: he removes one board from between every two boards, but he does not
(need to) loosen them. Isn’t Rabbi Meir's view thus identical with that of Beis Shammai?
3
http://dafnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Sukkah_15.pdf

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The Gemora answers: Rabbi Meir means as follows: Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel did not argue
on this point. The Gemora asks: What then is the Mishnah teaching us? Is it that Rabbi Meir holds
that a decree (has been enacted) against using anything that resembles a roof, while Rabbi Yehudah
disregards the decree against using anything that resembles a roof?

But have they not already disputed on this point, seeing that we have learned in a Mishna: Boards
may be used for the s’chach; these are the words of Rabbi Yehudah; Rabbi Meir forbids them?
Rabbi Chiya bar Abba answered in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: The first Mishna deals with
smoothed boards, and they forbade them as a preventive measure against the possible use of
utensils (which are susceptible to tumah).

The Gemora asks: But according to Rav Yehudah in the name of Rav who said: If he covered the
Sukkah with arrow shafts, the halachah is as follows: If they are male ones (which lack a
receptacle), it is valid (for they are not susceptible to tumah); with female arrow shafts, it is invalid;
and he does not restrict male shafts on account of the possible use of female ones; here also, we
should not restrict smoothed boards on account of the possible use of utensils?

The Gemora therefore explains the dispute in the Mishna differently: The dispute in the first
Mishna is regarding the question whether a preventive measure against using anything that
resembles a roof has been enacted and that the dispute in the latter Mishnah is also on the same
question; but why should they dispute the same question twice?

The latter Mishna is what Rabbi Yehudah said to Rabbi Meir: Why do you forbid boards? Is it as
a preventive measure against using anything that resembles a roof? But it is Beis Shammai alone
who hold this opinion, while Beis Hillel do not enact any preventive measure? To this Rabbi Meir
answers that Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel do not dispute this point at all.

The Gemora asks: This is correct according to Rav who says that the dispute is where the boards
are four tefachim wide, since in such a case Rabbi Meir holds that a preventive measure has been
enacted against using anything that resembles a roof, while Rabbi Yehudah disregards the
preventive measure against using anything that resembles a roof; but according to Shmuel, who
says that the dispute is where the boards are not four tefachim wide, but that where they are four
tefachim wide all agree that it is invalid, on what principle do they argue about in the latter Mishna?

The Gemora answers: They dispute regarding the question of the nullification of a roof (thru the
loosening of the boards): One master (R’ Yehudah) holds the opinion that by this means it becomes
nullified, while the other master (R’ Meir) holds the opinion that by this means it does not become
nullified.

“MEFAKPEK" AND "TA'ASEH V'LO MIN HE'ASUY"

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:4

4
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/sukah/insites/su-dt-015.htm

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"
Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Meir in the Mishnah disagree with regard to the opinions of Beis Shamai
and Beis Hillel.

According to Rebbi Yehudah, Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel argue about a case of a Sukah that has
wooden boards as its roof. Beis Shamai (as the Gemara explains) maintains that it does not suffice
to pick up the boards and place them back down ("Mefakpek"). Rather, one must remove at least
every other board and replace it with valid Sechach ("Notel Achas mi'Beintayim"). According to
Beis Hillel, it suffices to pick up the boards and place them back down.

Rebbi Meir maintains that Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel do not argue. They both require that every
other board be replaced with new Sechach.

The Gemara quotes Rav who explains that Beis Hillel, according to Rebbi Yehudah's
understanding, maintains that there is no "Gezeiras Tikrah" at all -- even a board that is four
Tefachim wide is valid Sechach. The only reason why boards may not be used as Sechach for the
Sukah is because they were not placed there in order to create shade but in order to construct a
house. Consequently, the Sukah is "Min he'Asuy" and the Torah's condition that it be "Ta'aseh
v'Lo Min he'Asuy" has not been fulfilled. Therefore, Beis Hillel says that there are two ways in
which one may make the boards valid: he may pick up the boards and place them back down, or
he may remove every other board and place new, valid Sechach in its place.

Rav's explanation is difficult to understand. If the problem with the boards is that they were placed
on the Sechach for a purpose other than to create shade (and the Sechach is "Min he'Asuy"), then
why does it help to remove every other board? The boards that were not removed are still invalid
Sechach, and one who sits under those boards does not fulfill the Mitzvah of Sukah.

The answer, as RASHI implies (DH v'Hachi ka'Amri), is that the removal of even half of the
boards is considered a significant action (a "Ma'aseh Ma'alya"), so that the entire roof is considered
to have been properly made, even the boards that were not removed.

However, if the removal of half of the boards is considered a significant action to validate the
entire roof of the Sukah, then why does Beis Hillel, in his second option, say that one should be
"Mefakpek," pick up and place back down all of the boards on the roof? It should suffice to lift up
every other board and place it back down, because an action done with half of the boards suffices
to make all of the boards no longer considered "Min he'Asuy."5

Apparently, the act of lifting the board and placing it back down is not considered significant
enough to qualify as an effective fulfillment of the condition of "Ta'aseh" when one makes
Sechach. (The reason for this is because the primary act -- placing the boards upon the roof -- was
already done, and when it was done it was not done for the sake of shade.) Only when one is
5
When Beis Hillel in the Mishnah says that one may be "Mefakpek" the boards, he clearly does not mean that one may pick up
every other board, because had that been his intention, he would not have added that one may be "Notel Achas mi'Beintayim"
(replace every other board); even returning the same board that one picked up suffices. It is clear that Beis Hillel maintains that one
either must pick up every board and place it back down, or replace half the boards with new Sechach.

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"Mefakpek" all of the boards is that act considered significant enough to fulfill the requirement of
"Ta'aseh." In contrast, the complete removal of the boards and the placement of new, valid Sechach
in their place is a significant act and fulfills the requirement of "Ta'aseh" even when only half of
the boards are removed and replaced.

"BITUL TIKRAH"

The Gemara concludes that, according to Shmuel, both Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Meir agree that
there is a "Gezeiras Tikrah" and, therefore, a Tikrah (wooden board) that is four Tefachim wide is
invalid Sechach. The point of dispute between them is whether or not one may "cancel a wooden
board" ("Bitul Tikrah") by being "Mefakpek" the board. What does "Bitul Tikrah" mean? How
does one cancel or nullify a wooden board?

(a) RASHI explains that even though the "Gezeiras Tikrah" normally invalidates a wooden board
that is four Tefachim wide, it does not apply when a person picks up the board and places it back
down. Through his action, he demonstrates that he is aware that there is a Pesul of "Ta'aseh v'Lo
Min he'Asuy," and thus the Gezeirah is not necessary. (See Rashi 12b, DH Amar Lach, where he
writes similarly that when a person performs an action that shows that he knows that there is a
Pesul of "Min he'Asuy," the Gezeirah of Tikrah does not apply.) This is what the Gemara means
when it says that the act of "Mefakpek" can "nullify" the Tikrah -- the act of "Mefakpek" exempts
the board from the "Gezeiras Tikrah."

How, though, does the act of "Notel Achas mi'Beintayim" (one removes every other board and
replaces it with valid Sechach) validate the Sukah? Everyone, even Rebbi Meir, agrees that such
an act validates the Sukah. According to Rebbi Meir, who maintains that a mere display of one's
knowledge of the principle of "Ta'aseh v'Lo Min he'Asuy" does not remove the "Gezeiras Tikrah,"
the act of "Notel Achas mi'Beintayim" also should not work, because four Tefachim of invalid
Sechach remain between each row of valid Sechach!

Indeed, Rashi (on the Mishnah) explains that according to Rebbi Meir "Notel Achas mi'Beintayim"
does not remove the "Gezeiras Tikrah"; replacing every other board with valid Sechach should not
validate the remaining boards. Rather, "Notel Achas mi'Beintayim" together with the principle of
"Dofen Akumah" makes the Sechach in the middle of the Sukah valid (because two rows of valid
Sechach now lie side by side and together total more than seven Tefachim).

(b) The RA'AVAD and RAMBAN (in his first explanation) point out that the RIF does not learn
like Rashi. Even though the Rif rules like Shmuel (who says that both Rebbi Meir and Rebbi
Yehudah agree that the "Gezeiras Tikrah" applies to a board four Tefachim wide), he writes that
the argument between Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Meir in the Mishnah is whether "Mefakpek"
removes the problem of "Ta'aseh v'Lo Min he'Asuy." Why does the Rif not explain that the
argument is whether "Mefakpek" removes the problem of the "Gezeiras Tikrah"?

The Ra'avad and Ramban explain that the Rif understands that both Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi
Meir agree that one may cancel the "Gezeiras Tikrah" by lifting up the board and placing it back
down, for this act shows that he knows about the Pesul of "Ta'aseh v'Lo Min he'Asuy" (as Rashi

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explains). When the Gemara says that they argue about "Bitul Tikrah," it means that they argue
whether or not one may cancel the Pesul of "Min he'Asuy" that invalidates the Tikrah. The reason
why Rebbi Meir says that one cannot validate the Sukah with an act of "Mefakpek," lifting and
returning the boards, is because "Mefakpek" is not a significant enough action to cancel the Pesul
of "v'Lo Min he'Asuy," but it does cancel the "Gezeiras Tikrah." Rebbi Yehudah maintains that it
is able to remove the Pesul of "v'Lo Min he'Asuy" as well.6

(c) The RAMBAN concludes, however, that the RIF means something entirely different. The Rif
means to say that according to Shmuel, the Tikrah mentioned in the Mishnah is not a board that is
four Tefachim wide, or even three Tefachim wide. The Mishnah refers to a board that is even one
Tefach wide. The reason why the "Gezeiras Tikrah" applies to such boards is because they were
part of an actual Tikrah (ceiling board) until now. The Tana who maintains that the "Gezeiras
Tikrah" applies to a board of four Tefachim also rules that the "Gezeiras Tikrah" applies to
anything that was part of an actual Tikrah until now.
However, this "Gezeiras Tikrah" -- unlike the "Gezeiras Tikrah" that applies to a four-Tefach-wide
board -- can be corrected by "Bitul," by removing the boards and taking away their status of
roofboards. (That is, "Bitul" removes the association of these boards with the "Tikrah" which they
originally formed.) What exactly constitutes "Bitul" is the subject of the dispute between Rebbi
Yehudah and Rebbi Meir.

Rebbi Yehudah rules that even an action like "Mefakpek" dissociates the boards from the Tikrah
they once comprised. According to Rebbi Meir, only a significant action, and one which is clearly
noticeable to all who enter, such as "Notel Achas mi'Beintayim" (replacing every other board with
valid Sechach) is able to remove the status of Tikrah from the boards. Merely lifting up the boards
and placing them back down does not work, either because a "Ma'aseh Rabah" (a significant
action) is required (RAMBAN and RAN), or because people who see the Sukah afterwards will
not know that some action ("Mefakpek") was done to the boards and thus the "Gezeiras Tikrah"
still applies to them (RITVA).

This seems to be the opinion of the RAMBAM (Hilchos Sukah 5:8) as well, as the KORBAN
NESANEL (29:3) notes.

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:7

The first Mishnah on our daf discusses the case of a house with a plain wooden roof that has no
tar or other kind of covering. All of the tanna’im agree that some type of preparation must be made
in order for the house to be used as a sukkah. They disagree on what needs to be done:

• According to Bet Shamai, two things need to be done to the wooden roof – mifakpek ve-
notel ahat mi-benatayim (one must shake up the wood and remove one of the boards).

6
Even though the Gemara earlier (11a) says that shaking the Sechach ("Na'anu'a") fulfills the requirement of "Ta'aseh," perhaps
the act of "Mefakpek" is a less-significant action. "Mefakpek" might refer merely to the removal of the nails from the boards
(without lifting them), as the ROSH and TUR imply (see Korban Nesanel 29:1)
7
https://www.ou.org/life/torah/masechet_sukkah1319/

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 • Bet Hillel requires one or the other – one must either shake up the boards
or remove one of them.
• Rabbi Meir requires one of the boards to be removed but does not
require them to be shaken up.

The concept of mefakpek – shaking the boards on the roof – is to remove the Rabbinic prohibition
called gezeirat tikra, a concern that someone will sit under a real roof. By moving the boards
around, the person indicates his awareness of the fact that he cannot fulfill the commandment
of sukkah by sitting in a house under a real roof. In so doing, he succeeds in removing the gezeirat
tikra. (See further discussion of this issue in the Ramban, Rif, Ritva and Me’iri.)

The word mefakpek means to move something from its place by shaking it. In modern Hebrew the
term has been “borrowed” to refer to conceptual issues, as well, where it means to question an
accepted idea. According to the Rambam, what is accomplished by shaking the boards is the
removal of the nails that are holding them in place in the roof. Other rishonim (like Rabbi Natan
Av ha-Yeshiva and the Perush Kadmon on Sukkah) say that shaking the boards shifts them around,
leaving room for additional sechach to be added.

A house covered with boards which are four tefachim wide is ‫ פסול‬as a sukkah. It was constructed
as a house, and not as a sukkah.8 Beis Hillel rules that this house can be corrected and become a
kosher sukkah by lifting each board and then placing it back down, having in mind that it is being
done for the sake of the mitzvah of sukkah (‫)מפקפק‬. An alternative solution would be to remove
every other board ‫מבינתם אחד נוטל‬. Either of these methods would solve the problem of ( ‫תעשה ולא‬
‫)מן העשוי חדש בית‬

O.C. 637 asks how this second suggestion of removing every other one of the boards can help the
entire layer of ‫ סכך‬be considered ‫—תעשה‬after all, only those boards were removed, and the others
all remain as they were before. If they still, should they, ‫ תעשה ולא מן העשוי‬to due ‫פסול מדאורייתא‬
were be unacceptable.

We also know that ‫ סכך‬which is ‫ פסול‬which covers four tefachim invalidates the entire sukkah!
Bach answers that the middle boards are removed, which is a new act of ‫תעשה‬. The remaining
boards were not intrinsically ‫פסולים‬, but they were invalid due to a situational condition— their
having been placed as part of a house. This condition has now been changed, so the problem of
‫ העשוי מם ולא תעשה‬is now solved.

Accordingly, the entire sukkah is kosher. Furthermore, the remaining boards are not a material
which is ‫פסול‬, so the halacha does not disqualify the entire sukkah due to ‫ פסול סכך‬of four tefachim

8
https://dafdigest.org/masechtos/Sukkah%20015.pdf

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in a sukkah. According to this answer, the area under the boards is still not kosher, but the rest of
the sukkah, where the boards were removed is kosher.

Rav David Brofsky writes:9

Introduction – The Centrality of the Sekhakh

Two parts come together to form a sukka: the walls and the sekhakh. A careful study of
the gemara and its commentaries points to the centrality of the sekhakh. As we shall see,

9
https://www.etzion.org.il/en/halakha/orach-chaim/holidays/sekhakh-1-sekhakh-pasul-and-gaps-sekhakh

14
the gemara and Rishonim at times debate the extent to which the walls are also considered to be
part of the sukka - but the centrality of the sekhakh remains clear.

For example, as we discussed previously, the gemara (2a) offers different explanations for
the mishna’s assertion that “a sukka which is more than twenty amot high is not valid.”

From where do we know this? Rabba answered: Scripture says, “That your generations
may know that I made the children of Israel to dwell in sukkot” - [with a sukka] up to
twenty amot [high], a man “knows” that he is dwelling in a sukka, but with one higher
than twenty amot, he does not “know” that he is dwelling in a sukka, since his eye does
not see it. R. Zeira replied: From the following verse, “And there shall be a booth for a
shadow in the daytime from the heat” - [with a sukka] up to twenty amot [high] a man
sits in the shade of the sukka; but with one higher than twenty amot he sits not in the
shade of the sukka, but in the shade of its walls… Rava replied: [It is derived] from the
following verse, “You shall dwell in booths seven days” – the Torah declared: For the
whole seven days, leave your permanent abode and dwell in a temporary abode. [With
a sukka] up to twenty amot [high], a man makes his abode a temporary one; [in one]
higher than twenty amot, a man does not make his abode temporary, but permanent.

According to both R. Zeira and Rabba, a sukka higher than twenty amot is invalid because one
cannot properly appreciate or benefit from its sekhakh. Indeed, Rashi explains that according to
Rabba, “He doesn’t see the sekhakh, and the sukka is the sekhakh, after its name.” Even according
to Rava, defining a sukka as a temporary or permanent abode depends upon the quality and
location of the sekhakh and not the walls.

Similarly, the gemara (9a) teaches that one may not derive benefit from the “wood of
the sukka” for the duration of the festival.

From where do we know that the wood of the sukka is forbidden all the seven [days of
the Festival]? From Scripture, which states, “The festival of Sukkot, seven days to the
Lord;” and it was taught, R. Yehuda b. Beteira says: Just as the Name of Heaven rests
upon the Festival offering, so does it rest upon the sukka, since it is said, “The festival
of Sukkot, seven days to the Lord:” just as the festival [offering] is “to the Lord,” so is
the sukka also “to the Lord.”

While all agree that this prohibition refers to the sekhakh, the Rishonim disagree as to whether this
prohibition applies only to the sekhakh (Rosh 1:13) or to the walls as well
(Rambam, Hilkhot Sukka 6:15). R. Soloveitchik suggests that the Rosh and Rambam disagree
regarding this point: the Rosh believes that the walls are not inherently part of the sukka, but merely
support the sekhakh, while the Rambam views both the walls and the sekhakh as part of
the sukka (R. Zvi Reichman, Reshimot Shiurim [New York: 4749], p. 5). R. Soloveitchik’s
grandfather, R. Chaim Soloveitchik, reportedly understood that even the Rambam agrees that the
walls are not to be considered part of the sukka at all, and we can attribute the prohibition of
deriving benefit from the walls of the sukka to the mitzva of yeshiva ba-sukka, which one fulfills
inside the entire sukka.

15
 Some relate this question to another intriguing debate. The first mishna of
the masekhet teaches that a sukka “which has more sun than shade (chamata meruba mi-tzilata),
is not valid.” The gemara (7b) records a debate regarding how we measure the ratio of sun to
shade.

Our Rabbis taught: [This applies only where] the sunshine is due to the scanty covering,
but not where it is due to [gaps in] the walls, while R. Yoshiya says, Even where it is due
to [gaps in] the walls. R. Yemar b. Shelemiah said in the name of Abayye: What is the
reason of R. Yoshiya? Because it is written: “And you shall cover the ark with the
veil” (Shemot 40:3). Now, since the “veil” was a partition and the Divine Law
nevertheless called it a “covering,” it is evident that a wall must be akin to a covering.

While the first opinion clearly limits the halakha of chamata meruba mi-tzilata to the sekhakh, R.
Yoshiya applies it to the walls of the sukka as well!

Similarly, as we learned last week, the Or Zaru’a (Hilkhot Sukka 289:2; see also Hagahot
Asheri 1:24) cites a Yerushalmi that derives from the same verse that one may not construct
a sukka from materials that are mekabel tum’a (objects that potentially may become tamei), that
is, materials which may not be used for sekhakh. Again, this source implies a similarity between
the sekhakh and the walls. (Our text of the Yerushalmi [1:6], however, teaches the opposite.)

Once again, we see a dispute regarding the definition of the sukka and the roles of
the sekhakh and the walls.

Finally, the halakhot of lishma for sukka, or at least the requirement that the sukka not be
“old,” refers to the sekhakh (9a). Likewise, the requisite of “ta’aseh – ve-lo min ha-asuy”- derived
from the verse, “The holiday of Sukkot you shall make (ta'aseh)” (Devarim 16:13) - teaches that
the sekhakh should be actively placed on the sukka and one should not construct the sukka in a
manner in which the sekhakh, already placed upon the sukka, only later becomes valid. For
example, one may not hollow out space within a large haystack, hoping to use the hay on top of
the space as sekhakh, as the hay became sekhakh only after the walls were created by hollowing
out the inside of the sukka.

The Rema (635:1), based upon this principle, rules that one should only place
the sekhakh upon the walls once they are erect. This may be especially relevant to canvas sukkot,
where one may erect the frame before suspending the walls. The Arukh Ha-Shulchan (5) argues
that be-diavad, the sukka is valid. In any case, these halakhot and others further highlight the
primacy of the sekhakh in the building of the sukka: When the Torah says, “you shall make,” it
refers to the sekhakh.

Regardless of whether one focuses upon the transient nature of the sukka from a physical
or spiritual perspective, as we have discussed previously, one’s experience within the sukka relates
primarily to its sekhakh, and therefore, as Rashi (2a) writes, “the sukka was named for
the sekhakh.”

16
Rabbi Jeremy Rosen writes:10

Building a sukkah from scratch is a great deal of work. What if you could use something you
already have — like your house? It turns out that although the sukkah must be a temporary
structure, and it must be intentionally prepared in the days leading up to the holiday, you canuse
your house as part of that structure. In one model, you can lean your sukkah against your house so
that one wall of your home serves as a wall of your sukkah. But perhaps more surprisingly, the
rabbis today envision a scenario in which you use all four walls of your house as the walls of your
sukkah.

How is this even possible? Although the sukkah is meant to be impermanent,

the Gemara seemingly has no problem with the idea that you would essentially convert your home
into a sukkah. The real challenge here is not the walls but the roof. After all, the sukkah roof —
that spread of loose, unthatched plant materials (s’chach) that allow us to look through and see the
stars — is the essence of the sukkah.

It is clear from the Gemara that the rabbis imagine most home roofs to be made of wooden slats
covered with plaster. To make this roof kosher as a sukkah roof, one would need to start by
removing the plaster. (In fact, according to the Gemara, sometimes a roof may be intentionally
unfinished in such a way as to enable an easy conversion into a kosher sukkah.)

So, once you remove the plaster, how do you turn your home with a roof of slats into a sukkah?
Depends on who you ask! The mishnah says that according to Beit Shammai all you need is to
move each board or slat, and this shows you are acting with intention to make a structure for the
festival; then finish your sukkah by removing a few slats and replacing them with some
suitable s’chach. Beit Hillel, who is more lenient, says all you have to do is remove alternate slats.
Rabbi Meir, even more lenient, says you only need to remove one slat.

It is logical to wonder about the nature of this plaster that is removed for the festival and then,
presumably, reapplied afterward. The word for plaster in Hebrew is ma’azivah. Our earliest
reference is in the Book of Nehemia where the word is used to describe the reinforcements or
strengthening of the city of Jerusalem and its walls (Nehemiah 3:8). In Bava Metzia 117a there’s
a fascinating case in which two people live on separate floors of a structure. If the plaster of the
upper floor cracks so that when the resident of the upper floor washed it with water, it leaked, and
the water ran down and damaged the lower floor, who was responsible for the repairs? Naturally,
the rabbis disagree. But from this, we learn that ma’azivah was a material used for both floors and
ceilings — so it must have been pretty strong.

But what exactly was it? Sometimes ma’azivah is called gravel and sometimes cement.
The Jerusalem Talmud says there is a difference between thick ma’azivah and thin ma’azivah but
we do not know what the difference was and which would have been for the roofing and which for
the floor. A few centuries after the Talmud was closed, Rabbi Hai Gaon (939-1038), who lived in
Pumbedita in Iraq, said that ma’azivah was purely decorative and not functional. Another opinion,
quoted by Marcus Jastrow in a modern dictionary of ancient Aramaic, has it that ma’azivah comes

10
Myjewishlearning.com

17
from the Aramaic for goat’s hair, ma’aziyah, which was often used to strengthen the mixture of
earthen ingredients that went into making the plaster. But who knows for certain? Whatever it was,
if you wanted to turn your home into a sukkah, you had to remove it from the roof.

Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:11

The Mishna (Sukkah 1:7) in our daf (Sukkah 15a) presents a variety of opinions about what must
be done to transform a yet-to-be-finished roof of a house where the beams are in place, to a valid
sukkah roof.

For example, according to Beit Shammai, the beams must be loosened and symbolically moved
(to demonstrate that this roof is now being deliberately constructed as a sukkah roof) and a beam
must also be removed from between every two beams where s’chach should then be placed.
According to Beit Hillel, either one of these actions suffices, while according to Rabbi Meir, only
the latter action of removing the alternate beams is required.

Reflecting on our Mishna, though disagreement exists about how this transformation must be done,
all seem to agree that some dual act of deconstruction and reconstruction is necessary to transform
and to ‘convert’ the roof of a house to the roof of a sukkah. But why?

Though there are a number of technical reasons why this is so including a rabbinic decree against
using a house roof as a sukkah, the overall reason for this is rooted in the Talmudic principle of
‫‘ – תעשה ולא מן העשוי‬you shall make [the sukkah] rather than simply use something ready-made’.

In terms of Jewish thought, what I believe this principle means is that even in a situation where all
the elements of a house are in place, a house does not become a home – even a temporary home -
merely because of what it looks like. Instead, it becomes a home when time and energy is invested
towards the act of ‘making’ (‫)תעשה‬, which in almost every instance requires some form – even a
symbolic form - of deconstruction and reconstruction.

Ultimately, it is possible to find a house that is ready to move into. But for a house to become a
home, one has to ‘make’ that house into a home.

The Definition of Valid and

Invalid Sekhakh (Sekhakh Kasher and Sekhakh Pasul)

The Talmud teaches that only materials that fulfill three conditions may be used
for sekhakh: they must grow from the ground (gidulo min ha-aretz), they must not be able to
contract tum’a (eino mekabel tum’a), and they must not be connected to the ground (eino
mechubar le-karka). Yesterday’s Daf cites this principle:

11
www.rabbijohnnysolomon.com

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 This is the general rule: Whatever is susceptible to tum’a and does not grow from the
soil may not be used for sukka-covering, but whatever is not susceptible to tum’a and
grows from the soil may be used for sukka-covering.

The gemara our daf (12a) continues:

When Rabin came, he said in the name of R. Yochanan: Scripture says, “[You shall keep
the Feast of Tabernacles seven days] after you have gathered in from your threshing-
floor and from your winepress” (Devarim 16:13). The verse thus speaks of the leavings
of the threshing-floor and the winepress.

The gemara interprets the verse as referring to making sukkot, “from that which you have gathered
in from your threshing floor and from your winepress.”

Regarding gidulo min ha-aretz, some Rishonim point out that animals, which receive their
sustenance from the land, are sometimes considered gidulei karka. The Me’iri (11a) discusses
whether leather hides may be used for sekhakh. Most Rishonim, as well as the Shulchan Arukh
(629:1), rule that one may only use that which grows from the ground, such as branches,
for sekhakh.

Items that are mekabel tum’a include vessels made from metal, or even from materials that
would ordinarily be valid for sekhakh, such as wood, but were shaped into a beit kibul (a
receptacle) and were made into vessels; these may not be used as sekhakh. Therefore, one may not
use cartons or boxes for sekhakh.

What about boxes that were broken and are no longer considered vessels?
The gemara (15b) teaches that “If he covered the sukka with discarded vessels, it is invalid.” In
other words, even though the broken vessel is no longer mekabel tum’a, one may not use it
for sekhakh. The Rishonim dispute the reason for this prohibition. Rashi (s.v. bivlai) explains that
since these broken vessels were once vessels, the Rabbis prohibited using them for sekhakh. The
Rambam (Hilkhot Sukka 5:37) explains that the Rabbis prohibited using broken vessels
as sekhakh lest one come to use a vessel which is still mekabel tum’a.

The Arukh Ha-Shulchan (629:5) writes that according to the Rambam, if one intentionally
breaks a vessel, with the intention of “purifying” it, one may use the pieces for sekhakh. The Shevet
Ha-Levi (3:95) writes that the halakha is not in accordance with the Arukh Ha-Shulchan.

19
 R. Eliezer Yehuda Waldenberg 1915-2006

What if one cannot discern whether the broken pieces were once a vessel? R. Eliezer
Yehuda Waldenberg (Responsa Tzitz Eliezer 13:66) relates the following story:

It once happened that a rabbi from chutz la-aretz moved to Israel right before Sukkot.
He took apart the wooden crate within which his belongings were packed and made them
into thin wooden strips… and used them as sekhakh for his sukka. His neighbors
mocked him, claiming that his sukka is invalid since he used sekhakh which came from
a vessel, as the crates were considered a davar ha-mekabel tum’a. He came to me
during chol ha-mo’ed to ask if indeed they were correct. I answered him that they were…
I saw he was greatly distressed at the embarrassing prospect of having to disassemble
his sukka and erect a new one on chol ha-mo’ed.

Rav Waldenberg describes how he showed the man the opinion of the Arukh Ha-Shulchan cited
above in an attempt to comfort him. That evening, between Mincha and Ma’ariv, he discussed the
issue with another person, who related that although R. Chaim Berlin also prohibited using these
wooden strips for sekhakh, R. Shmuel Salant (1816-1909), the former chief rabbi of Jerusalem,
permitted using these strips if they no longer appeared as if they came from the original wooden
vessel.

20
 In addition, some suggest that a “lift” - a wooden moving container which is broken open
after use - is not mekabel tum’a (Keilim 16:5), and therefore one may use its pieces
for sekhakh (Sukka Ke-Hilkhata p. 59; Sefer Ha-Sukka Ha-Shalem, p. 270).

Finally, the Rishonim search for the source of the requirement that sekhakh be detached
from the ground (talush min ha-karka). Rashi (11a) explains that the verse says, “That you have
gathered,” implying that it is after being cut from the ground. The Ritva (11) suggests that this
requirement comes from the principle of ta’aseh ve-lo min ha-asuy (discussed above); sekhakh is
intended to be placed on the sukka.

In addition to the above, the Rabbis also prohibited certain types of sekhakh that would
ordinarily have been valid. For example, one may not use sekhakh that emits a foul smell,
or sekhakh from which pieces fall into the sukka, as this may cause one to leave the sukka (12b).

The Talmud also records Rabbinic enactments that disqualify certain types of sekhakh,
even if they fulfill the requirements delineated above. We will discuss one of them, which may
have particular relevance.

Gezeirat Tikra

The mishna (14a) cites a debate concerning the use of wooden planks as sekhakh.

Planks may be used for the sekhakh; these are the words of R. Yehuda. R. Meir forbids
them.

The gemara cites a difference of opinion regarding this mishna.

Rav said the dispute concerns planks which are four [tefachim wide], in which case R.
Meir holds the preventive measure against [the possible use of] an ordinary roofing
(gezeirat tikra), while R. Yehuda disregards this preventive measure against [the use of]
an ordinary roofing; but in the case of planks which are less than four tefachim wide all
agree that the sukka is valid. Shmuel however says… If they are four [tefachim wide],
the sukka is invalid according to all; if they are less than three, it is valid according to
all. What is the reason? Since they are mere sticks. What do they dispute? Regarding
[planks that are] from three to four [tefachim wide].

In other words, according to Rav, all agree that one may use thin planks, and R. Yehuda and R.
Meir disagree regarding planks wider than four tefachim. Shmuel maintains that they argue even
regarding narrow planks, between three to four tefachim wide, while all agree that one may not
use planks wider than four tefachim.

While the Rishonim disagree as to whether we rule in accordance with Shmuel according
to R. Yehuda or Rav according to R. Meir, the conclusion is the same: The Shulchan Arukh
(629:18) rules that one may not use planks for sekhakh that are wider than four tefachim, even if
they are placed on their narrow side.

21
 What is the reason behind this enactment, described by the gemara as “a preventive
measure against [the possible use of] an ordinary roofing,” or gezeirat tikra?

Rashi explains that since most roofs are constructed from planks four tefachim wide or
wider, one may come to justify sitting in one’s house during Sukkot: “What is the difference
between using these [planks] for sekhakh and sitting under the roof of my house?” (Rashi s.v. R.
Meir). In other words, Rashi believes that if one is permitted to used planks for sekhakh that are
similar to the ones used for a roof, one might mistakenly conclude that one could construct
a sukka under his own roof!

The Ritva (s.v. amar) and Ran (7b) question Rashi’s assumptions. First, they note that
the gemara (Bava Metzia 117a) relates that most roofs are constructed from beams narrower than
four tefachim. Second, the gezeira was intended for the observer, not the builder of
the sukka. They conclude that that since beams which are four tefachim wide or wider are
generally only used for houses (dirot keva), one who observes another sitting in a sukka covered
by such beams may come to understand that constructing a sukka in one’s house and sitting under
one’s roof may be acceptable as well.

Interestingly, the Ran clarifies Rashi’s assertion that the majority of roofs are constructed
from beams of four tefachim wide or wider. He explains that Rashi refers to planks that are
comprised of thin boards joined together to form wider boards. Rashi believes that although the
planks are composed of narrow boards, one may still not use the larger, composite planks
for sekhakh. The Ritva, apparently, focuses upon the actual wooden strips, and therefore only
prohibits solid planks that are four tefachim wide.

Similarly, the Teshuvot Ha-Rashba (1:213) discusses whether one may use a lattice
board, consisting of thin wooden beams held together by metal nails, as sekhakh. He relates that
“according to one of our teachers,” this would be prohibited due to the gezeirat tikra. He
concludes that this issue is subject to debate, and one should not criticize someone who uses
these boards: “Leave [it] to Israel - if they are not prophets they are the sons of prophets.”

While it is difficult to discern Rashba’s true opinion, the Magen Avraham (632:1) rules

that narrow wooden strips joined together to form a plank more than four tefachim wide are

invalid. The Chayyei Adam (146:31) also questions whether a lattice plank should be prohibited,

even if one placed the sekhakh on top. He concludes that one should not criticize those who are

lenient, since he places sekhakh on top of it.

22
 Although the Shulchan Arukh never relates to this specific case, it appears that one should

not use lattice planks more than four tefachim wide for sekhakh. We will return to this issue shortly

when we discuss the use of sekhakh mats.

Using Reed Mats for Sekhakh

The mishna (19b) cites a debate regarding whether one may use a reed mat for sekhakh.

A large reed mat, if made for reclining upon, is susceptible to tum’a and is invalid
as sekhakh. If made for a covering, it may be used for sekhakh and is not susceptible
to tum’a. R. Eliezer ruled that whether small or large, if it was made for reclining upon,
it is susceptible to tum’a and is invalid as sekhakh; if made for a covering, it is valid
as sekhakh and is not susceptible to tum’a.

The gemara explains their dispute:

Rather said R. Pappa: With regard to a small [mat], all agree that ordinarily it is intended
for reclining upon. In what do they dispute? In the case of a large one. The first Tanna is
of the opinion that ordinarily a large one is intended for a covering, while R. Eliezer is
of the opinion that ordinarily a large one is intended for reclining upon as well.

In other words, although they both agree that a small mat is ordinarily intended for reclining upon,
and therefore is mekabel tum’a, they disagree whether one should make the same assumption
regarding a large mat (R. Eliezer), or whether one may assume that a large mat is ordinarily made
for covering (Tanna Kama) and is not mekabel tum’a. The halakha is in accordance with the Tanna
Kama.
Who determines whether a mat is intended for reclining or covering? The
Rosh (Sukka 1:37) cites R. Yishaya di Trani (c.1180–c.1250), an Italian Talmudist and author of
the Tosafot Rid:

R. Yishaya di Trani wrote: These mats that the merchants sell, which are generally made
for reclining upon them… and they are also used for partitions - therefore we do not
follow how they were made, because the artisan simply makes them to be sold to whoever
need them, every person according to his need. Rather, one should follow [the intention
at] the time of purchase - and if it was purchase to recline upon, it is mekabel tum’a…
Therefore, a person may purchase a new mat in order to cover one’s sukka, even though
it can also be used for reclining.

The Rosh disagrees. He argues:

This does not seem correct to me. Rather one should follow the custom of the local
people… Therefore, in a place where [people] are accustomed to reclining on [these
mats], even if he asked the artisan to prepare a mat for covering the sukka, one may not
use it for sekhakh.

23
While the Shulchan Arukh (629:6) implies that we follow the intention of the artisan, the Rama
cites the view of the Rosh that we follow the custom of the majority of people in that place. The
questions of whether one may use mats purchased from public markets for sekhakh has
occupied Poskim for generations. The Bi’ur Halakha (629:6) cites a few examples; in the Mishna
Berura (18), he concludes that in his region, the majority of mats were made for reclining, and
therefore they may not be used for sekhakh.

Nowadays, while one may certainly not use mats intended for reclining, or even venetian
blinds, as they are mekabel tum’a, even after they are not longer used for that purpose (Iggerot
Moshe Orach Chaim 1:177), mats which are produced from reeds or narrow wooden sticks and
sold for the purpose of using them for sekhakh may be used for sekhakh.

The Poskim, however, raise two issues concerning the use of mats for sekhakh:

1- Mats comprised of bamboo reeds or wood strips held together must not be woven together
with a material which is mekabel tum’a or materials that are not gidulo min ha-aretz, as
these materials may not be used as sekhakh. One should preferably tie the reeds together
with wooden fibers, flask, or other natural materials that were not processed. Some (R.
Ovadya Yosef, Yechavveh Da’at 1:64; see Piskei Teshuvot 629:6).even permit using
processed fibers produced from gidulei karka, as they are only invalid for sekhakh mi-
derabbanan (Rambam, Hilkhot Sukka 5:6). See R. Yehuda Paris, “Keshirat Sekhakh La-
Netzach al yedei Chutei Barzel,” Techumin 15, who argues for the permissibility of tying
down sekhakh with copper wire.
2- R. Binyanim Zilber (1917-2008), in his Responsa Az Nidberu (2:66) cites the view of R.
Yosef Shalom Elyashiv (b.1910), who prohibits using these mats. He believes that since
the mats of reeds or strips are so closely and strongly fastened together, using these mats
violates the Rabbinic prohibition of using boards over four tefachim wide, known
as gezeirat tikra, as described above. He finds precedent for this in the view of the Rashba
cited above (and by the Beit Yosef 629), who reports that some prohibit using narrow
boards which are nailed together and are wider than four tefachim. R. Eliezer Yehuda
Waldenberg (1916-2006) concurs in his Tzitz Eliezer (10:29).

Most Poskim (R. Binyamin Zilber (ibid.); R. Ovadya Yosef, Chazon Ovadya p. 28); R. Shmuel
Wosner (b.1913), Shevet Ha-Levi 6:74; R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, Halikhot Shlomo p. 128)
disagree, and permit using mats produced and sold specifically to be used as sekhakh. Some argue
that these mats are thin and flexible, and therefore do not resemble the planks mentioned by the
Rashba. Others note that these mats are generally made from bamboo reeds and not wooden planks,
and therefore should not be included in the enactment of gezeirat tikra.

The Impact of Gaps and Sekhakh Pasul on the Sukka

Previously, we encountered halakhot pertaining to both sekhakh pasul and gaps in

the sekhakh. The Talmud discusses the extent to which sekhakh pasul or air affects the sukka, and
whether or not one may eat and sleep under them.

24
 We have already learned that if sekhakh pasul at the side of one’s sukka is less than
four amot wide, we invoke the principle of dofen akuma, and the sukka is valid. However, when
the sekhakh pasul is more than four amot from the side, the sukka is disqualified. What
about sekhakh in the middle of the sukka? The Talmud (17a) cites a dispute between Rav and
Shmuel.

In Sura they taught this decision in the above words; in Nehardea, they taught [as
follows]: R. Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Invalid sekhakh in the middle [of
the sukka] invalidates if it is four [tefachim wide]; at the side, only if it is four amot wide;
while Rav says: Whether in the middle or at the sides, [it invalidates] only if it is
four amot wide.

Most Rishonim, including the Rif (8b), Rambam (Hilkhot Sukka 5:14), Rosh (1:32), and Ran (8b),
rule is accordance with Shmuel and disqualify a sukka even if the portion of sekhakh pasul is
four tefachim wide.

Only sekhakh pasul that runs the entire length of the sukka disqualifies the sukka.
Furthermore, this would only apply to a sukka constructed of three walls, when
the sekhakh pasul begins from the middle wall and extends across the sukka to the side without a
wall, because in that case neither remaining side has enough walls for a valid sukka. However, if
a strip of sekhakh pasul runs across a sukka constructed from four walls, it may simply divide
the sukka into two separate sukkot, if each has three complete walls of at least seven tefachim by
seven tefachim.

The gemara (19a) teaches that although one may not sleep under a gap in the sekhakh, even
one which is under three tefachim wide, one may sleep under sekhakh pasul less than
four tefachim wide. Most Rishonim, including the Ba’al Ha-Ma’or (7a), permit one to sleep under
a section of sekhakh pasul less than four tefachim wide. The Ra’avad (hasagot on the Rif 7a) and
Ritva (19a), however, insist that while one may sleep under a portion of sekhakh pasul less than
three tefachim wide, one may not sleep under a portion of sekhakh pasul over three tefachim wide.
Although the Shulchan Arukh (632) does not cite this distinction, the Mishna Berura (3) cites
some Acharonim who rule that preferably one should be stringent.

Regarding air, the mishna (17a) teaches: “If one distances the sekhakh three tefachim from
the walls, it is invalid.” The gemara (18a) discusses whether this principle, which overlooks a gap
of less than three tefachim, applies in all cases.

This applies only to the side, but as regards the middle, R. Acha and Ravina differ. One
says that the rule of lavud applies in the middle, while the other says that the rule
of lavud does not apply in the middle.

The Rambam (Hilkhot Sukka 5:20), the Rosh (1:33), and the Shulchan Arukh (631) rule
that lavud applies to a gap both from the side of and in the middle of the sekhakh.

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 A gap in the sekhakh (avir) differs from sekhakh pasul in that sekhakh pasul only poses a
problem if it is wider than four tefachim. Furthermore, the gemara (19a) teaches that one may not
sleep under a gap in the sekhakh, even one which is under three tefachim wide.

Since the gemara clearly did not intend that the sekhakh of one’s sukka should be similar
to the roof of a house, without any holes, as discussed above, the Rishonim differ as to when one
may sleep under the gaps in the sekhakh. Some Rishonim (Ritva 18a, s.v. amar Abbaye; Ran 9a)
explain that one may not sleep under a gap of less than three tefachim, within which one may fit
one’s head or the majority of one’s body. Others (Rosh 1:36; Rabbeinu Yerucham, Toldot Adam
Ve-Chava 8:1) however, disagree, and rules that one may not sleep under a gap which runs the
entire length of the sukka. The Rama (632:2) cites both opinions; therefore, one should not sleep
under a gap that either runs the length of the sukka or within which one may fit one’s head or the
majority of one’s body.

Interestingly, R. Shlomo b. Yehoshua Adeni (early 17th century), in his commentary on the
Mishna, Melekhet Shlomo (Sukka 2:1), suggests that although one may not sleep under a gap of
less than three tefachim, one may eat there. The Bi’ur Halakha (632:2), however, rules that one
should not distinguish between sleeping and eating.

Although the gemara concludes that in a large sukka, over seven tefachim by
seven tefachim, sekhakh pasul does not combine with air in order to disqualify the sukka,
the Rishonim (Tosafot 17a s.v. ilu; Rosh 1:33; Shulchan Arukh 632:4) ask whether a total of
four tefachim of sekhakh pasul, divided by less than three tefachim of air, disqualifies the sukka.
Although air cannot combine with sekhakh pasul in order disqualify the sukka, does it function, in
this case, like sekhakh kasher, interrupting between the two segments of sekhakh pasul? The
question remains unresolved (Bikkurei Yaakov 9; Mishna Berura 19).

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 The Beauty of S’chach: Peering Through the Surface

Shmuel Reichman writes:12

The journey from Rosh Chodesh Elul through Yom Kippur is a 40-day experience of self-
awareness, teshuva, and spiritual growth, whereby we come closer than ever to Hashem and our
true selves. This process of closeness culminates in the holiday of Sukkot, which represents the
ultimate connection between Hashem and the Jewish people. The center of this connection is the
sukkah, which represents the marriage canopy as klal Yisrael marries Hashem. As we approach
this time of closeness, let us delve into the meaning of the sukkah and the lessons it holds for us.

Chazal cryptically compare the s’chach of the sukkah to the ideal form of beauty. What does this
mean?

The spiritual concept of beauty, and its relevance to marriage, is central to the connection we aim
to develop through the process of Sukkot. In order to understand this connection, let us delve into
the spiritual concept of beauty. To do so, we must understand the unique beauty of Sarah Imeinu.

12
https://jewishlink.news/divrei-torah/33821-the-beauty-of-s-chach-peering-through-the-surface

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Sarah Imeinu
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Sarah Imeinu was the most beautiful woman in the world. This beauty was not only spiritual
beauty, a description of her immense holiness and spiritual stature. Sarah’s beauty was physical as
well, as proclaimed by Chazal in the Gemara and midrash (Bava Batra 58a, Bereishit Rabbah 45:4)
and testified to by the Egyptian people and Pharaoh himself. When Avraham and Sarah descended
to Mitzrayim to escape the famine in the land of Eretz Yisrael, the Egyptian people, and even
Pharaoh himself, desired Sarah. The Egyptians, worshippers of immorality, were interested only
in the kind of beauty that ran skin deep. Their fixation on Sarah was not spiritually motivated,
rather based in physical desire alone. However, this physical beauty was not Sarah Imeinu’s
defining trait. Sarah, foremother of the entire Jewish people, gained her status and prominence
through her immense spiritual prowess. Her unmatched physical beauty was accompanied by the
ultimate in spiritual beauty. This is the definition of true beauty, and this incredible balance is
reflected in a second name the Torah calls Sarah. At the end of Parshat Noach, Rashi (Bereishit
11:29) clarifies that “Yiscah” is another name for Sarah Imeinu. A name always reflects essence,
which means that the meaning of Yiscah perfectly captures Sarah Imeinu’s nature. Yiscah means
transparent, and Sarah’s complete beauty lay in her transparency. Her inner beauty permeated her
physical body. True beauty is when the physical body reflects a spiritual inner core, a depth that is
infinitely greater than any external beauty. True beauty is oneness, where the physical and spiritual
come together perfectly and melt into a oneness. Sara Imeinu modeled this beauty, and this is why
she was ultimately beautiful both physically and spiritually. This is the beauty that we look to
emulate—a beauty in which the physical does not hide the inner self, but reveals it.

The connection between Sarah Imeinu’s middah of transparency and our connection to Hashem
through Sukkot is striking. Yiscah, another name for Sarah Imeinu, shares the same root as s’chach,
the roof of the sukkah. Within halachic thought, the ikar (central component) of the sukkah is the
s’chach. What, though, does transparency have to do with s’chach and the sukkah? The answer
lies in the very deep theme of Sukkot itself.

Sukkot is about seeing past the illusion of self-security and recognizing that Hashem is our only
true source of protection. This is why we leave our physical dwellings, our sturdy homes, and
reside instead within a dirat arai, a temporary dwelling place. The sukkah is a spiritual hut of
connection between us and Hashem, where we show how completely we rely on him. While on
the surface, our security and safety seem to come only from our own efforts and hishtadlut, when
we look past the surface we recognize that everything comes from Hashem. This is why the s’chach
is the main component of the sukkah: s’chach trains us to see past the surface. In order to be valid,
s’chach must be transparent, allowing us to see past our physical sukkahs into the endless night
sky. (You must be able to see the stars at night. It must also allow the sunlight to pour in from
outside and must be loose enough to allow rain into the sukkah as well.) When we look up, we
must see Hashem behind His physical mask, we must recognize the spirituality inherent behind
this physical world. Only with a transparent surface can we truly tap into that internal truth.

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Two Levels of Reality

This is the most powerful message of life. There are always two levels of reality: the surface level
and the deeper, spiritual level. The surface is meant to reflect the spiritual, reveal it, emanate its
truth and beauty. But often we struggle, we forget, we get caught up in the deception that the
surface is all that there is. But even when we fail, even when we fall, there is always hope, there
is always a path back to our true selves. This is the message of Sukkot; this is the message of life.
To strive to see more, feel more, learn more, become more. May we all be inspired to not only see
past the surface, but to then reveal that truth through the surface, to live holistic lives of truth,
spiritual beauty, and true oneness.

Honest S’chach
Rabbi Yehoshua Berman writes:13

On Monday, September 25, the Israel Nature and National Parks Protection Authority issued a call
to the public: “Do not destroy trees and shrubs for the sake of the Four Species and s’chach.” Chief
Rabbi David Lau joined the call, including in his public announcement the halachic prohibition

13
https://hamodia.com/2017/10/01/honest-schach/

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against using stolen branches for s’chach, and that one who uses stolen items for the dalet
minim cannot make a brachah.

Such announcements should really be superfluous, shouldn’t they? But the fact is that the topic of
stolen dalet minim and s’chach is elaborated upon — at length — by the Gemara and the Poskim.
Clearly, then, it is not a gratuitous discussion. One cannot help but wonder, though, what it is that
could be going through the mind of someone who procures his mitzvah wares in a less-than-
scrupulous manner. Unlike someone who steals out of a desire for monetary gain, the
dishonest mitzvah consumer is — ostensibly, at least — trying to carry out Hashem’s
commandment. So, doesn’t that seem a bit odd, to do one mitzvah by violating another?
Most probably, it’s the insidious “moreh heter syndrome” at work, otherwise known as
rationalizing. When it comes to the prohibition against speaking lashon hara, the Chofetz Chaim
says that rationalizing is one of the greatest barriers to proper observance of the laws. People
rationalize to themselves, says the Chofetz Chaim, that about such a situation or person the
prohibition doesn’t apply.

Likely, that is also the case when it comes to theft. “After all,” a public park plucker may think,
“these trees belong to everyone. So, I am only taking my fair share!” Or how about this one: “Ahhh
… look how many trees there are in this forest. Do you really think that the owner would care if I
cut down a few measly branches for my sukkah? And don’t Chazal say that a person is happy to
have a mitzvah done with his property?”

A close friend of mine disclosed how he was once looking into a potential business deal and
realized that he was not 100-percent certain of the rectitude of several aspects of it. “Don’t get me
wrong,” he emphasized. “There was definitely nothing illegal about it. It was just that certain facets
of the deal didn’t feel quite right.” So, what happened? Well, he happened to mention the matter
to the elderly secretary who was a holdover from his grandfather’s days in the business. That
grandfather had long since passed on, but the memory of his character hadn’t. “Your grandfather,”
the secretary — who, by the way, was not Jewish — told my friend, “would have never touched a
deal like this with a 10-foot pole.” And that was that.
Honesty is not always such a straightforward, cut-and-dried undertaking. There can be an awful
lot of gray shades out there. And it’s quite possible that particularly when we are operating under
the pressure of wanting to do a mitzvah in the best way possible (with all the peer pressure that
comes along with it), it becomes that much more acutely necessary to beware of the “moreh
heter syndrome.” And, ironic as it may sound, Sukkos is an incredibly opportune time to process
this point. Zman simchaseinu, the pesukim make abundantly clear, has everything to do with the
fact that the produce which was drying the whole summer can finally be gathered in and one feels
a surge of joy over the material abundance.

Many of the special mizmorim that were sung in the Beis Hamikdash during Sukkos
contain pesukim that exhort us to not forget about our responsibilities vis-a-vis that material
abundance, such as tithing and giving tzedakah. Equally clear is the need to direct that joy
toward avodas Hashem; to give recognition where recognition is due and feel the appropriate
gratitude to the One who showers all this bounty upon us. It’s a time to recall the heartfelt tefillos of
merely a few days prior, when we tearfully beseeched our Creator to give us a sweet year, full of
blessing and plenty.

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And it’s a time to exit our beautiful homes and temporarily take up residence in a little hut that
reminds us of a time, long ago, when we traversed a dangerous, forbidding desert protected by the
Clouds of Glory that Hashem lovingly provided for us. The recognition that we are completely
dependent on Hashem, and that everything we have is His gift to us, stands at the center of what
Sukkos is all about.
When we rejoice in the blessings that we have, what we really are celebrating is the relationship
we have with our loving Father in Heaven who cares for us endlessly and provides for our every
need. Embracing that awareness — which is the joyous gift of the Yom Tov of Sukkos — makes
the desire to rationalize dishonest efforts simply melt away.

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