Portugal, 1715-1808 Joanine, Pombaline, and Rococo Portugal As - Nodrm

DAVID FRANCIS
PORTUGAL 1715-1808
JOANINE, POMBALINE AND ROCOCO PORTUGAL
AS SEEN BY BRITISH DIPLOMATS AND TRADERS
TAMESIS BOOKS LIMITED

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PORTUGAL 1715-1808
DAVID FRANCIS
PORTUGAL 1715-1808
JOANINE, POMBALINE AND ROCOCO PORTUGAL
AS SEEN BY BRITISH DIPLOMATS AND TRADERS

LONDON
Coleccion Tamesis
SERIE A - MONOGRAFIAS, CIX
© Copyright by Tamesis Books Limited

London, 1985
ISBN 0 7293 0190 7
Deposito legal: M. 38335-1984
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On the right, the second Baron Tyrawly, together with the second Duke of Montagu and, behind,
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CONTENTS
Page
Prefatory note. vii
1. Portugal after the treaties of Utrecht. 1
2. King John V, the Faithful, the Magnanimous. 7
3. The reign of John V, 1715-35. 31
4. The reign of John V, 1736-50 . 66
5. The age of Pombal. 103
6. The Lisbon earthquake and after. 122
7. The 1762 war with Spain . 146
8. Last years of Pombal. 162
9. Aftermath of Pombal and reign of Maria I . 181
10. The years of the French revolution. 215
11. The flight to Brazil. 245
Appendix. The Strangford-Sidney Smith controversy . 285
List of works cited. 287
VII
PREFATORY NOTE
This book had been completed in typescript form when the author was,
unfortunately, totally disabled by a paralytic stroke. Under these circum¬
stances, the undersigned, who had been familiar with the progress of the
work since its inception, undertook to try to find a publisher for it. Grateful
acknowledgement is due to Dr. Jose Blanco, of the Calouste Gulbenkian
Foundation, Lisbon, and to Professor John Varey, Principal of Westfield
College, for facilitating its publication by Tqmesis Books Ltd. Cordial thanks
are also due to Dr. Luis de Sousa Rebelo, Reader in Portuguese at King’s
College, University of London, and to S. George West O. B. E., the doyen
of the history of Anglo-Portuguese relations, for their support and en¬
couragement.
Readers of David Francis’ previous works on Anglo-Iberian relations in
the eighteenth century will need no reassurance that this book forms an
original and a substantial contribution to the diplomatic history of Europe
in general, as well as to Anglo-P ortuguese relations in particular.
C. R. BOXER
28 January 1984.
1
PORTUGAL AFTER THE TREATIES OF UTRECHT
Portugal did not do badly out of the treaties of Utrecht. Nevertheless

she emerged with a chip on her shoulder. Her treaty with France of the
11th April 1713 was one of several treaties signed by all the Allies except
the Emperor and presented relatively little* difficulty. Portugal had trouble
with France over her Brazilian frontiers, but in Europe had only been
halfheartedly at war, and, indeed, though committed to do so had never
positively declared war on France. At Utrecht she secured a settlement of
her frontier on the Maranhao and other difficulties were less important.
With Spain it was a different matter. Her treaty with Spain was only
achieved on 6th February 1715 after a prolonged negotiation and Portugal
only won partial satisfaction.1
Portugal’s war with Spain had been wholehearted enough. Spain was
dangerous for Portugal both at home and overseas and was felt to continue
to be so. In the treaties with her allies in 1703 Portugal had insisted that
the fortress of Badajoz and other frontier territories in Spain should be
ceded to her in the event of an allied victory and that the colony of Nova
Colonia or Sacramento, opposite Buenos Aires on the Rio de la Plata,
should be returned to her. Britain herself had had difficulty in obtaining
satisfaction from Spain; she had won the cession of Minorca and Gibraltar
and the coveted Asiento for the slave trade, but only in the face of obstinate
resistance and by bringing pressure to bear through France. Once she had
achieved peace with both France and Spain, she found her commitments
to Portugal awkward to sustain. But she did not back out from them at
once. In February 1713, before the conclusion of the treaties with France
and Spain, Bolingbroke manfully delivered an ultimatum to France to
secure satisfaction for Portugal on her Amazon frontier. As late as July
1713, after peace had been concluded, but before the commercial treaty
with Spain, he assured the Portuguese ambassador, Jose da Cunha Bro-
chado, that the queen would give him a formal guarantee of Portugal’s
1 For a description of the Utrecht treaties see A. D. Francis, The First Peninsu¬
lar War, 1975, cap. 18.
1
DAVID FRANCIS
claims, which would contain all that the king of Portugal could desire,
and more than he had any reason to expect from any other consideration
than the ‘queen’s unalterable steadiness, strict justice and transcendent
generosity’, for the queen maintained that she would never abandon Por¬
tugal.2 No doubt the good Queen Anne meant what she said, but her
minister had to look to British interests and to Tory party considerations;
he was in an equivocal situation and was much tempted to leave Portugal
in the lurch, as he did Catalonia. The commercial treaty with France of
1713 threatened the whole basis of Anglo-Portuguese relations consolidated
by the Methuen Commercial Treaty of 1703, which guaranteed that French
wines, when they were allowed again in England, would pay a third more
duty than Portuguese wines, in return for the free admittance without
restriction to Portugal of English cloth. The revolt of the British com¬
mercial interests affected brought about the rejection by parliament of the
clauses of the treaty allowing most favoured nation treatment to French
imports, so that the Portuguese ambassador was spared the necessity of
threatening counter-measures, but the event had shown that Portugal could
not always rely upon British treaty obligations to her. Like Spain she had
to look to the diplomatic field for those victories, which neither force of
arms nor the pledged word of her allies could secure for her.3
Portugal’s armies had not made a good showing during the war. Her
rank and file were good fighting stuff, but only if properly led, trained
and supplied. Many of the Portuguese nobility were degenerate, but they
still held a knightly tradition that it was their vocation to fight and the
better ones clung to this, right through the century; they could command
the old time loyalty of their men, but they had no notion of modern war,
and all efforts of foreign advisers to teach them foundered on their jealousy
and profound conservatism. Attempts to modernise the administration and
supply of the army met with equally little success. Individual commanders,
such as Pedro de Almeida, the future Count of Assumar, were sometimes
able to lead Portuguese troops to victory, but he was fighting in Spain,
where his troops were more amenable to allied guidance. At the end of the
war, when the Portuguese were defending their own territory and were
fighting against native Spanish troops without French stiffening, they did
well enough at Campo Maior, but taken as a whole their record had been
miserable.4
In the diplomatic field it was different. Rather unexpectedly in view
of the hidebound traditions of Lisbon, which belied her status as a capital
2 Add MSS 22206 Bolingbroke to Bishop of Bristol, 379, 402.

3 S. P. 94/81 Lexington to Bolingbroke, 20 Nov. 1713. A. D. Francis, The
Wine Trade, 1972, 1/39/42.
4 Stanhope MS. Stanhope to Assumar 25 Sept. 1709, Francis, 1st Peninsular
War, 280, 350.
2
and a great commercial centre, Portugal produced a distinguished band of

ambassadors. They were a handful of ‘estrangeirados’, cosmopolitan men
with a knowledge of foreign languages, who were well able to keep up
with the ambassadors of the great powers. The Portuguese liked to show
off; this weakness was a hindrance in a campaign, but often a sensible con¬
tribution to diplomatic success. For the 1705 campaign King Pedro had
spent money, which could have been far better used, on splendid saddle
cloths of velvet, so shining that one could not tell whether they were of
beaten gold or silver or of thread, and on tents with green velvet hangings
and great gold flowers on the insets, and silver on the fringes; they got
as far as Castel Branco, where they were captured by the enemy. On the
other hand analagous expenditure by the Count of Tarouca, as ambassador
at Utrecht, produced results. He had better pay than a Portuguese general,
receiving £500 a month, and was personally a wealthy man, who dived
deeply into his own pocket. He also had literary and artistic tastes, but
it was the splendour of his entertainments'which made such an impression
on the diplomatic corps and was long remembered. He made a wide circle
of friends and obtained full information through generous bribes and so
kept himself posted on the activities of his antagonists, who were to be
found not only among his official enemies, but also among his so-called
allies. Luis da Cunha, his colleague in Holland, afterwards ambassador in
Paris, was less remembered for personal magnificence; educated at Coimbra
he became a judge at Oporto and after some years as minister in London
filled the Portuguese embassies at the Hague and Paris until his death
in 1748. A master of the French language he became famous for his wit
and sagacity and for some years was the doyen of European ambassadors.
The Conde de Ribeira Grande, first ambassador to France after the war
of the Spanish Succession, was the son of a French princess and impressed
by the magnificence of his state entry. Even greater splendour attended the
entry into Vienna of the Conde de Vila Maior, brother of the Count of
Tarouca and son of the Marquis of Alegrete, to ask for the hand of Anna
Maria, Archduchess of Austria, for King John V of Portugal. The ambas¬
sador arrived in a painted gilt carved coach upholstered with crimson velvet
with borders of gold, drawn by six dappled grey horses brought specially
from Holland. Thirty lackeys preceded the coach, clad in scarlet with
trimmings of silver lace and strips of green velvet, hats with white and
gold plumes, and green silk stockings. Count Waldstein, imperial head of
protocol and lately ambassador in Lisbon, met them with a train of forty
coaches. On her way to the coast the queen kept well to the east to avoid
the danger of an enemy raid; she was escorted by a suite of seven hundred
using eight or nine hundred horses. After delays due to bad weather she
embarked in Holland on a British squadron which included four cargo ships
for her baggage and her bridal bed made in Holland at a cost of £9000.
There was some risk of the French intercepting her but she reached Ports-
3
DAVID FRANCIS
mouth safely, where the fleet was reinforced, and landed in Lisbon without
incident. Years before her mother in law had made the same voyage and
her brother Charles, the Habsburg candidate to the Spanish throne, also
travelled on the fleet to Lisbon, Barcelona and then to Italy. The Habsburgs
could not but be deeply impressed by the might and discipline of the
British fleet and formed a somewhat exaggerated idea of what it could do
for them. They were dazzled and did not appreciate that even the all
powerful fleet had its limitations; this attitude was often helpful to Britain
but sometimes led to too great expectations.5
It is hard to say how far diplomatic ostentation helped the cause of
Portugal, but it kept Portugal in the public eye and helped her to keep
up with the great powers, who set the pace. This would not have been
the case if her ambassadors had been stupid, but they were men of ability,
who brought Portugal through the peace negotiations relatively unscathed.
Spain obstinately refused to cede to Portugal Badajoz and the European
territory promised her by the Quadruple Treaty of 1703. This treaty,
which guaranteed Portugal all her possessions, was in theory the most
important treaty of all, though it fell into desuetude; at one period the
British Board of Trade denied its existence and when it came to light again,
it was found that the Dutch, who were joint signatories, had failed to
ratify it and in any case were disinclined to recognise its obligation. So
it was upon Cromwell’s much abused 1654 treaty more than on the 1703
treaties that British privileges in Portugal and also British guarantees to
preserve the integrity of Portugal and her possessions mainly rested. But
in 1714, irrespective of treaties, Britain was much interested in overseas
questions which touched on her trade. Her interest extended to the southern
frontiers of Brazil and the River Plate, where the Asiento agreement had
left the door to Spanish trade ajar. A free port on the River Plate would
have been welcome, but failing that the restoration to Portugal of Nova
Colonia, just across the river from Buenos Aires, opened up prospects of
an extensive contraband trade. Britain therefore backed Portugal in the
matter of Nova Colonia and the frontiers of Brazil against Spain and France,
and undertook to recompense Portugal for the loss of her Asiento. Never-;
theless at Utrecht the settlements were inconclusive and unsatisfactory to
Portugal who showed herself inclined to play off France against Britain.
The French competed as intermediaries between France and Spain, and
came near to emerging as sponsors of the eventual Hispano-Portuguese
Treaty. It was only at the last moment that Portugal acknowledged that
the treaty had been concluded under British auspices. The Pretender’s
landing in 1715 and understandable doubts about the permanence of the
Hanoverian regime encouraged Portugal to continue her dalliance with
5 Eduardo Brazao, Relagoes Externas de Portugal, reino de Joao V, 2 vols.,

Lisbon, 1938. Francis, 1st Peninsular War, 1, 336/8, 332/3.
4
the French. Even on the question of Brazil, whose safety was the greatest
benefit to be hoped for from the Anglo-Dutch alliance, Portugal took
steps to reinsure herself with France. While obstinately refusing to sanction
any direct trade between Britain and Brazil, she gave occasional en¬
couragement to French traders and tried to whittle away the British treaty
privileges, which still left Britain a comer in Brazil. There was no real
intention of allowing the French in where the British were kept out, but
British protests helped the long term aim to exclude all foreign merchants
entirely from the ports of Brazil.6
On the face of it Portugal was in a very vulnerable position. Spain,
a much larger and more populous country, was her neighbour by land and
Spain still regarded her as a revolted province. Behind Spain lay the great
power of France. France did not accord Portugal any priority in her
political plans, but she resented the use of Portugal as a bastion for British
naval power, and was prone to use Portugal sometimes to win over Spain,
sometimes in plans against Spain. Portugal had a population of only
2j million which did not increase much until the latter half of the century;
but that of Brazil grew and at the end of the century numbered about
3 million and perhaps exceeded that of Portugal herself. Portugal could be
compared with Ireland, which also increased in population from 1750
onwards and in her trade and population was much larger in relation to
England and Scotland, than she became in the nineteenth century. The
war of the Spanish Succession had depleted much of the inherited wealth
of the Braganza family, but fortunately the increase of trade and the
development of the gold mines of Brazil brought a steady increment to the
royal revenues during the reign of King John V. This money was mainly
swallowed up by Lisbon in the expenses of a pretentious court, in the
building of churches and in ecclesiastical magnificence. Much was expended
on patronage, which maintained the court and the numerous courtiers, but
was not altogether denied to public and charitable works. The peasants
and the provinces continued to live in their traditional indigence, supported
by the old customs and ceremonies of the church, not altogether unhappily.
The royal revenues were perhaps squandered, but they had to find their
way into the pockets of someone. The money and incoming trade kept up
the British and foreign factories; many merchants went home, their fortunes
made, but they left descendants to carry on, and meanwhile their money
accounted for a fair proportion of Portuguese imports and created a good
deal of employment, particularly in Oporto, where the owners of vineyards,
the Douro boatmen, the coopers etc were all Portuguese. The British and
to a lesser degree other foreigners monopolised the trade of Portugal, even
that with Brazil indirectly, and Portugal was dependent on the British navy
for her protection. But in doing so the foreign traders offered hostages to
6 Francis, 1st Peninsular War, 351/2. S. P. 89/24 Worsley 22 Oct. 1/16, etc.
5
DAVID FRANCIS
fortune; privileged as they were they could not altogether flout Portuguese
law, and Portugal was able to take advantage of this to show a considerable
stiffness and independence.7
They constantly grumbled about British privileges, and contested the
provisions of the exacting treaty of 1654. But the old alliance, though it
remained in the background, held good, founded as it was on mutual in¬
terest. Portugal needed the support of the British Navy to maintain her
independence and the integrity of Brazil, and Britain leant heavily on
her trade with Portugal, of which a great part originated in Brazil.
7 Santarem, Quadro Elementar, 10 vols., Lisbon, 1860. 5-CLXXXVII. In 1713

Lisbon was in a state of penury.
6
2
KING JOHN V, THE FAITHFUL, THE MAGNANIMOUS
It is no longer fashionable to divide history into the reigns of kings,

but it must be admitted that the reign of John V makes a neat chapter
in Portuguese history. It tapered at both ends, for it took some time for
the king to grow up and in his last years h§ faded on the bed of sickness,
though until the end he asserted his will between strokes, and for close on
forty years his will was paramount. Furthermore developments at his
accession and at his death marked a dividing line. Within a few weeks of
his accession the defeat of Almanza was followed by the withdrawal of Por¬
tugal from active participation in the war and a lasting increase in the
influence of the party in Portugal which favoured neutrality. Portugal
still kept a few regiments fighting in Spain, and in 1712 after the second
climax of the war in Spain, and defeat of the allies, was moved by the
needs of self-defence to a gallant effort. But this was a minor affair and
Portugal had not been alone in relaxing her efforts in the peninsula, for
Britain and the United Provinces had done so too; they continued to pay
subsidies, but passed on as much of the fighting as they could to the
Emperor and the Archduke Charles. British, Dutch and. some Portuguese
troops remained in Spain, but German troops took over the leading role
and in Portugal British troops were much reduced. The French too left
the major part to the Spaniards except for the siege of Barcelona, the last
episode of the war, in which they played a leading part. But the Peninsular
War had become a war of its own rather than a part of the European
War. So the policy, which King John on the whole favoured, and his
successors still more, was one of neutrality, though a watchful eye still
had to be kept on Spain. This policy was moulded in the first years of
his reign.1
Upon his succession in 1707 King John was a diffident youth, who
had had little education to prepare him for reigning. For some five years
the Royal Council of State carried on of its own volition, but after that
1 For a general account see A. D. Francis, The First Peninsular War. 1975,
cap. 15.
7
PORTUGAL.-2
DAVID FRANCIS
k 1
he asserted himself and no important decision could be taken without him.
His parish was a wide one for in addition to little Portugal he ruled the
whole of Brazil from north of the Amazon to the River Plate, and from
the Atlantic to the Andes, the remaining fragments of the Portuguese empire
in the Far East, the Atlantic islands and the African forts, which provided
bases for the slave trade. His wealth depended on Brazil, and his safety
on keeping Spain at bay, while his consuming interest in the trappings of
religion and in the prestige of the church of Portugal kept his eyes cons¬
tantly fixed on Rome. He would have much liked to visit Rome, though
the fashions of his court and his manner of government were largely
modelled upon those of Versailles. His interests could not be said to be
narrow, but he had such passionate preoccupations that he often had little
time to spare for subjects outside them. He could not ignore Brazil or
Spain or Rome, but his main interests were turned inward; with the British
in particular he had little to do, in spite of the fact that he was so dependent
upon them.
In his younger days his sympathy for the Puritans, the old Portuguese
nobles, who only intermarried with each other and cared for what was
good enough for their fathers, was more than offset by his passion for
what was new, romantic or exotic. He tried to keep abreast of the times
in the arts and sciences, in the latest Paris fashions and in the ceremonies
of the church; although he followed the French fashion in employing car¬
dinals and respectable figureheads as his ministers, he also surrounded
himself with a number of foreign experts and cosmopolitan Portuguese,
‘estrangeirados’, and had no compunction about following their advice,
even when it differed from that of his ministers. The latter seldom dared
to expostulate. Nor was he afraid to break with Versailles or Rome for
quite small causes, if he felt his honour was concerned. He was intransigent,
when anything which touched his pride was concerned, and ready to
disregard his long term interests until some way round could be found.
In this respect he never mellowed, and an incident which occurred late
in his life, in 1745, well illustrates this characteristic. One of the chaplains
in the Portuguese legation in London, an Irishman by birth, had been
arrested, tried, and condemned at the Old Baillie and roughly handled in
prison. Azevedo, the Portuguese secretary of state, on receiving a complaint,
summoned Castres, the British Minister, and hauled him over the coals.
Castres pointed out that a suspect Irishman was subject to the law of the
land in England, just as a suspect Jew was in Portugal, and that at a
moment of crisis, when the Pretender’s army was threatening the whole
kingdom, the government could not afford to deal tenderly with a class
of men which was prone to treason. He also expressed a doubt, whether
King John, in whose name Azevedo spoke, was really familiar with the
case and would not find that the cogent arguments about national safety
8
KING JOHN V
justified the arrest. It was true that Azevedo, knowing his master’s sen¬
timents very well, had not troubled to consult the king. He did so now,
and the king reacted exactly as Azevedo had supposed. He was not so
much angered by the arrest of the chaplain, or by his treatment, as by
the fact that a Sardinian chaplain had recently been acquitted in a similar
case. He said that he would gladly treat the villain as he merited, if proof
of his treasonable activity could be shown and if he were shackled and
sent to Lisbon, but he could not tolerate the fact that the Sardinian chaplain
after being tried had been eventually released. Such a difference of treat¬
ment was an insult to Portugal and not to be borne. After repeated Por¬
tuguese protests, Francis Mountford, the Portuguese chaplain, was released
on bail, retried at the Old Baillie and eventually acquitted. But this did not
satisfy the king; he continued to grumble that the man should on no
account have been treated worse than the Sardinian, and that if there was
anything against him, he should have been sent to Portugal together with
the proper proofs of his guilt to face thesking of Portugal’s displeasure.
This attitude of the king was typical of his countrymen; such examples
of Portuguese pride are often cited in the contemporary essays of the
Cavaleiro de Oliveira.2
There were long periods in the first half of King John’s reign, when
his faithful secretary of state Diogo de Mendonca de Corte Real found
it very hard to bring any papers about foreign affairs to his master’s notice.
This was not due to any idleness on the king’s part; he was most conscien¬
tious in dealing with any papers put before him and upon occasion could
patiently sit out six hours of tedious discussion. But his time was entirely
taken up with church building, with his dealings with Rome on points of
ceremony, as also with the affairs of Brazil, where it was imperative that
the contributions from the royal fifths should be stepped up, if his inordinate
need for money was to be met. There was a Council for Overseas, which
dealt with Brazilian affairs, but in treating with both Roman and Brazilian
matters he worked through his personal confidants as much as through
the machinery of the hierarchy.
During the last years of the War of the Spanish Succession his govern¬
ment was in straitened circumstances; the cost of the war had eaten up
the royal revenues and much of the Braganza large family fortune; any
ready cash to be had was largely derived from the Anglo-Dutch subsidies;
it was lucky that Brazilian gold had begun to flow and continued to do
so in increasing quantities until the end of the reign, supplemented from
2 Almeida, Hist, de Portugal, Coimbra, 1920, vol. IV, 1926, vol. 5, 1927. Manuel
Bernades Branco, Portugal no Epoca de Joao V, 1885. Aquilino Ribeiro, O Galante
Seculo, Textos de Cavaleiro de Oliveira, Lisboa, 1966. Santarem, Quadro Elemen-
tar, VI-237, 247. S. P. 89/40, Tyrawly, 23 May 1739. S. P. 89/44, Castres to New¬
castle, 29 Jan., 23 Feb., 8 March, 28 April, 20 June 1746. S. P. 89/42, Kinnoull,
10 March 1760.
9
DAVID FRANCIS
w
1730 by diamonds. Trade, largely Anglo-Portuguese trade, amplified by the
growth of Brazil, prospered, and customs duties formed a major part of the
royal revenues. But Portugal was a small nation and could not have kept
her independence without protection by a major power. Luckily this was
forthcoming. It was to the interest of Britain to guard the integrity of
Portugal and to preserve the trade which went with it. King John could
count on this and display some insouciance in dealing with the nations
who had the power to be his masters. This required courage and application,
which he had, but these qualities would not have been enough in them¬
selves. He was able to exercise an autocratic power without even employing
an arm of the quality or size to support him at home or to defend him
abroad. In the first year of his reign at the behest of his allies a brave
attempt was made to modernise the army by giving it regular pay and
adequate equipment and converting it from a congeries of provincial levies
into a national army, no longer tied to their villages and their fields. But
the reforms did not get much further than the paper they were written on.
Once or twice when there was danger from Spain a hasty effort was
made to mobilize, but it did not last for long and in practice the most
notable service the army performed was to line the streets of Lisbon on
such occasions as the king’s wedding; it was not even used much in Por¬
tugal for police services before the next reign, though at the peak of the
building at Mafra some 7000 troops helped to keep order and to assist
with the actual construction.3
On the whole the reign of John V was a success story; it was no longer
the age of Camoens or of the comparatively heroic days of the war for
independence from Spain, but it was the age of gold and diamonds, and
it ended with Portugal little altered, unhurt by Spain or the great powers,
a little but not much more populous, and in Brazil retaining a growing
empire. At home the royal power had no serious rival, though there might
have been, if the king had not won his way with skill and determination.
The result of this relatively smooth passage through time has been a
paucity of records. Under an autocracy men are chary of expressing dissident
thoughts, so there were few memoirs, and there were no great wars to
promote correspondence. Politics were a hidden matter behind closed doors;
the administration plodded along its traditional course, jabbed from time
to time by royal orders or hints from royal confidants, but discussion was
muted and records other than of a routine nature scanty. All this makes
it hard for the historians; they wrote about the Portuguese Restoration
and about Pombal, but little about the peaceful reign of King John, though
he was undoubtedly the master spirit and himself a controversial character.
A generation of Portuguese historians treated him as a creature of tinsel
and gilded paste, but later they rallied and found in him qualities to admire.
3 Damiao Peres, Hist, de Portugal, VI-180/2, 571, etc.
10
KING JOHN V
The British minister Castres summed this up well. He said he had to base
his reports on the situation of Portugal on information got from well in¬
formed business men ‘No help being to be expected from books in a country,
where nothing, be it ever so trifling, that relates to a political matter or in
the least concerns the administration, can appear in print, but what has
passed in strict examination before one of the secretarys of state’. Un¬
fortunately the business men seldom committed their thoughts to paper, so
we have little record of them.4
King Pedro II had been an autocrat also, but in his early days he had
to face strong opposition and to the end he relied on the services of his
council of state, which consisted of leading noblemen and one or two
church dignitaries, while his confessor, a Jesuit, played a leading part
behind the scenes. In the reign of John V the council continued at first to
meet, usually in the presence of the king, who took note of their advice as
he did of the despatches of his ambassadors; but having pondered on the
matter he was quite capable of taking av line of his own. The leading
statesman the Marquis of Alegrete died in 1709, but the evergreen Duke
of Cadaval survived for some years. Diogo de Mendonca de Corte Real
held the secretariat of state until his death twenty-nine years later. Abroad
Luis da Cunha lived until 1748 and Alegrete’s sons, the Counts of Tarouca
and Vila Maior, and the Counts of Assumar and of Ribera Grande made
up a good ambassadorial team. They were able and industrious and upheld
Portuguese prestige in the grand manner.
The first public event to involve the young king intimately was his
marriage to the Archduchess Mariana, sister of the Emperor Charles VI,
lately the Habsburg Charles III of Spain. This prestigious match had long
been planned and there was no argument about its conclusion. After her
long journey from Vienna the new queen was received with equal pomp in
Lisbon. Seventeen triumphal arches were set up. They were contributed
by the various foreign communities and the trade guilds and the Senate
of Lisbon. The British arch was a much gilded affair commemorating the
old alliance and alluding to the recent union with Scotland.5 Although
Portuguese finances were in sore disarray and they were begging for more
allied subsidies, no expense was spared. Elsewhere the soldiers were
starving for want of pay and the officers were selling their shirts to buy
bread, while war still threatened on the frontiers. But about half the army
were brought to Lisbon to line the streets and no doubt were fed and
clothed for the occasion. Such dynastic occasions transcended wars and the
4 S. P. 89/48, Castres to Holderness, 3 July 1751. Santarem, Ed. Rebelo e

Silva, Quadro Elementar, 18 vols., 1860, VI-238.
5 Ameal y Cavalheiro, Errata a Elistoria de Portugal, Porto, 1939, 4/20. Eduardo
Brazao, Relagoes externas de Portugal, Reinado de Joad V. 2 vols., 1938, 1-328/98.
A. D. Francis, The 1st Peninsular War, 333. For description of Triumphal Arch see
British Hist. Soc. of Portugal, 1972, pp. 45/56.
11
DAVID FRANCIS
king of Spain opened the frontiers to allow horses to be brought for the
ceremonies. Most Portuguese took it for granted that such splendours were
fitting and necessary, and in this belief they were only following the
example of Vienna and Versailles. The young king took readily to this
custom of ostentation, but he did not initiate it; only a few contemporaries
paused to think; the diarist Soares da Silva for instance described the
ceremonies with relish, but at a tiipe when bread was dearer in Lisbon
than it had ever been in the memory of man, he was moved to comment,
‘They do not remember bread ever having been so dear, but what they
do not forget are the banquets in the palace with expenses of 1000 cruzados
a day for a state table, and private banquets too, especially among the
Germans and others, whom the king is keeping at his expense, and not
taking any notice of the miserable state of the realm with an active war
and hunger rife; we can fear a third punishment, plague, for repeated
illnesses already threaten it, and in this city disease is chronic and there are
no houses without mourning’.6
The young king played his part of fairy prince very well and no doubt
his role as the central figure in all this glory built up his confidence. He
had no reason to complain of his bride, a handsome blonde with agreeable
manners and a great air of majesty. But for some time the great marriage
bed did not produce the expected consequences; the king lost himself
there and preferred the company of the Grand Inquisitor’s nephew and
other bright young men, and after a while a series of beautiful and often
exotic girls. As the months passed and there was no sign of an heir, there
was gossip at court and soon rumours throughout the Chancelleries of
Europe. Already eighteen months after the wedding the emperor was
anxiously asking the advice of his ambassador in Barcelona, the duke of
Moles. There had been speculation whether history might not repeat itself
and whether King John might not be replaced in bed and on the throne
by his next brother the hearty and much more potent looking Infante
Francisco. He showed signs of courting the queen, while the king was
away at a country villa recovering from an illness. The queen seemed at
first rather flattered, but Dom Francisco, who had spent much of this
time roaming the streets in bad company, getting into all sorts of mischief
and committing several acts of violence, soon disgusted the queen by his
rough manners. The king was subject to fits of deep depression and some¬
times showed an inclination to throw in his hand; but when he next fell
ill and retired to the country, he made the queen regent; perhaps her
brief dalliance with Francisco had arisen from pique at the king’s failure
to make her regent on the previous occasion; in any case she had no
further truck with the prince, though he actually showed signs of reforming
6 Soares da Silva, Gazeta em forma de Carta, Memorias, Oeyras, 1931, 159,

174, 176, 182, 187.
12
KING JOHN V
some of his bad habits. He still indulged in violent brawls, and retained
his passion for hunting and bull-fighting, but he began to co-operate with
his brother and showed public spirit by fitting out at his own cost two
ships to take part in the crusade against the Turks. He was the only
member of the royal family to learn English and was indeed anglophile,
becoming an admirer of the British navy and a frequent visitor to captains
of British warships; one of his rare excursions into politics was a halfbaked
scheme to seek the hand of an English princess in marriage, but until his
death in 1742 he was mainly engrossed in his own pursuits, though he
kept up his interest in naval matters and became Grand Master of the
Order of Malta, an honorary rank which he took seriously.7
Dom Francisco never married, but while the king lacked an heir, the
Duke of Moles discussed the possibility of remedying this by finding him
a wife. It was suggested that he might marry one of the queen’s sisters,
but Moles said this would never do; the bestowal of one arch-duchess had
made the Portuguese conceited enough and* the acquisition of a second one
would inflate them beyond bounds. But he thought it would be a good
idea to marry Dom Francisco to someone, preferably not a French princess,
who would be too likely to develop political ambitions. However he thought
the case had already altered; this was so, for late in 1711 the Infanta
Barbara was born, and a year later an heir to the throne the Infante
Pedro; this child died an infant, but the Infante Joseph, who followed him,
survived to succeed his father, and other children were born after him. It
was as a sign of gratitude for the birth of an heir that King John decided
to devote himself to his great work at Mafra. Meanwhile the Pope sent
a special Nuncio to Lisbon bearing consecrated 'nappies’ for the Infante
Pedro; he was already dead, but they were duly installed on the Infante
Joseph by or in the presence of the Nuncio, and the whole court, with
tremendous ceremony.8
The king was much concerned for the future of his dynasty and became
a fond though strict parent. He became devoted to his Spanish daughter-
in-law Mariana, an attractive girl. He also learned to respect the queen.
She was an honest character and very religiously inclined, so the couple at
least had their piety in common, but the king’s affections were placed
elsewhere; he behaved to her correctly but without warmth and their paths
were parallel rather than united. The queen played her part in all state
appearances, but seldom interfered in politics; she continued however to
be a link with her brother the emperor and during the last years of the
king’s illness, when she sometimes had to act as Regent, this became
important, though she usually took the advice of the king’s favourite mi-
7 Hofarchiven, Vienna, Moles to Emperor, 16 April 1710. S. P. 89/29, Dormer

to Newcastle, 2 July 1729. S. P. 89/42, Castres, 2 May 1742.
8 Hofarchiven, Moles to Emperor, 7 Jan 1711. E. Brazao, foad V, 1-65/75.
13
DAVID FRANCIS
nister and did not often take an independent line. She did however use
her influence to secure that the heir to the throne, the Infante Joseph,
Prince of Brazil, was allowed to attend councils of state and to witness
the signature of documents, even though he still took no part in decisions.9
The exclusion of the royal princes from affairs of state except for occa¬
sional use in diplomatic intrigues or for making dynastic marriages, was
normal practice. The Infante Francisco was given the Casa del Infantado,
a kind of Duchy of Cornwall, and his brothers were given estates adequate
for a princely style of life, but they were denied any serious career even
in the armed services. They were worse off in this respect than their bastard
brothers or cousins. They sometimes tried to escape from their gilded cages,
but the only one to succeed was the Infante Manoel, who in 1715 contrived
to abscond on a British merchant vessel in the company of another boy,
the Count of Tarouca’s son, and of a tidy-sized bill of exchange. Paul
Methuen, who happened to be in Lisbon on his way home from his Madrid
embassy, volunteered to chase the pair in a British frigate, but they safely
reached the Hague, where the Count of Tarouca, ambassador there, tried
to persuade them to return home. They disregarded similar advice in Paris
and Vienna, where Manoel won the sympathy of Prince Eugene, who
allowed him to serve in the war against the Turks. Manoel remained in
Austria for some twenty years and the Tarouca boy spent the remainder
of his life in the Austrian service, in which he made a good career. With
the help of the emperor, Manoel was seconded for the thrones of Poland
and Sardinia and for other posts, but all these projects came to nothing,
for no money to help him was available from Portugal. Various plans
for marrying him were bruited. He was a candidate in 1742 for the hand
of one of two Russian arch-duchesses, but apparently he was not physically
prepossessing and they turned him down. He did not give up; there was
talk of his proposing to the ageing widowed queen of Charles II of Spain
exiled in France and as late as 1756 of his marrying the Princess of Brazil,
the heiress to the throne, but his brother Dom Pedro was chosen instead.
According to his sister-in-law the Infanta Mariana he was very keen to
get married. However although he returned to Portugal in 1735 and was
reconciled to King John he never settled down. However he had a certain
cultural influence, receiving at his small court at Bellas various Portuguese
and foreigners of distinction, including Martinho de Proenga and that rare
figure in Portugal, a woman authoress, Teresa Margarida de Silva e Ortiz.
His brother Carlos died at the age of 20 but the Infante Antonio also had
his extravagant small court, where he entertained the engineer Azevedo
Fortes and various scientists and cartographers. These oases of culture were
9 S. P. 89/42, Compton to Newcastle, 28 May 1742. Alexandre de Gusmao, e o

Tratado de Madrid, 5 parts in 9 volumes, Rio de Janeiro, 1956, Ed. Jaime Cortesao,
vol. l-ii-314.
14
KING JOHN V
small, but in a priest-ridden country like Portugal they had a certain

significance.10
King John followed the French fashion of having Cardinals for his
ministers; indeed he had three. The first was Nuno, Cardinal de Cunha,
cardinal from 1712 and later Chief Inquisitor. He did not always see eye
to eye with the king, for the splitting of Lisbon into two dioceses to
create an archbishopric for the Patriarch cut into his own jurisdiction, but
he was a conscientious and dedicated churchman with a particular hatred
for any suspicion of Judaism. He zealously organised the Autos da Fe,
great shows, which gave much pleasure to king and people, though the
days when a rich harvest of New Christians could be reaped were over;
only an occasional wealthy merchant was denounced or succeeded in fleeing
the country, though an appreciable tribute was still levied on persons who
found it prudent to escape the risk of denunciation by paying hush money
or making liberal donations. The Cardinal attended Autos as a pleasure as
well as a duty, but in private life was rathelt an open-hearted man. He was
friendly with the Ericeiras, whose liberalism the king tended to distrust and
in 1731 attended a birthday party they gave for him, at which there was
music and ladies were present. He was kind to the Infanta Mariana, when
she was fretting about court restraint and he shared with the cardinal
patriarch, as their family doctor, Francisco Xavier Leitao, who was
eulogised by Ericeira as a pupil of Melbranche and was sometimes regarded
as almost a Jansenist. He collaborated with the Patriarch in plans to do
away with abuses of the confessional, by which priests passed on the
names of malefactors. Where duty did not stand in the way a whiff of
eighteenth-century toleration percolated even the Portuguese cardinals and
in criticising a backward and priest-ridden country one must remember that
a very high proportion of those with any education at all belonged to some
sort of religious order and ministers of state had sometimes been canons;
so the ruling classes, whether enlightened or not, nearly all had a clerical
background. Many of the higher clergy were learned men. Cardinal da
Cunha was apparently not of their number; although he collected a library
of 11,000 volumes, the story went that he had never opened any of them
and they should properly be called the 11,000 virgins. Cardinal Mota, on
the other hand, was a good Latin scholar and was entrusted with the ca¬
taloguing of the Latin works in the royal library. He became a cardinal
in 1727 and after the death of Diogo de Mendoza in 1736 won the
king’s confidence and acted in effect as chief minister until his death in
10 Gusmao, l-i-99, 110/1, 321. S. P. 89/33, Worsley to Stanhope, 16 Nov. 1715.

Santarem, Quadro, V-cl., Elizabeth, empress of Russia by Tamara Talbot-Rice, 1970,
p. 36. Ericeira, Byblos. Marcus Cheke, Pombal, 1938, p. 99. A striking parallel to
Portuguese 18th century court life is provided by princely India quite recently. See
for instance J. R. Ackerley, Hindoo Holiday, 1932 (2nd edition 1952).
15
DAVID FRANCIS
1747. A cordial personal correspondence between him and the king has
survived, written in colloquial style and full of nicknames. These letters
are largely concerned with promotions and appointments. The king took
great pains with these and indeed his power of patronage formed the basis
of his rule. They show also that the affairs of Brazil, France and Spain
were a constant preoccupation, while those of England figured compara¬
tively little; Lord Tyrawly, for instance, who is credited with having
acquired a certain intimacy with him, is not often mentioned.11
While the Bourbon kings of Spain were beginning to be squeamish
about Autos da Fe King John attended them with the same enthusiasm as
characterised all his people. Members of the nobility gloried in becoming
Familiars of the Inquisition and performed in such offices many of the
functions of a secret police. To be a ‘Familiar’ was a valued privilege, for
it certified a man’s purity of blood from all taint of Jewish or Moorish
ancestry. This was the special pride of the Portuguese Puritans. They were
less austere than their British counterparts, though like all Portuguese they
were abstemious in matters of food and drink and restrained by the sump¬
tuary laws from ostentation in matters of dress. It was imprudent to make
a show of wealth which could be seized by the tax collector and dangerous
for merchants or anybody who might be suspected of Judaism. Displays of
wealth were limited to special occasions, but for these, for religious and
family celebrations and for state ceremonies, extravagance was the rule.
With advancing age King John became more discreet in his private life
but his court was always sumptuous and in his reign and those of his
successors no cost was stinted to promote opera and music. This was even
more the case in Spain during the reign of Ferdinand VI and Barbara,
when the king needed music to solace his melancholy and Farinelli, the
Italian director of the opera, became as powerful as a minister.
In 1717, the same year as that in which the building of Mafra was
begun, the inauguration of the patriarchal chapel as a new cathedral took
place with great ceremony. The patriarch left his coach half a mile away
and proceeded on a white mule attended by the regular and secular clergy,
and also by the guilds and trade fraternities of Lisbon. To the disgust of
the nobles the 18 canons were accorded the rank and precedence of count.
The king thus showed his will to cut down the nobles to size, though
in other ways he was careful to preserve their caste by insisting on dis¬
tinctions of rank and by withholding his licence from any who wished to
marry beneath them. He reduced their influence by leaving a number of
official posts vacant but by no means excluded them from his confidential
11 Almeida,Hist, de Portugal, IV-287. Cartas de Rainha Mariana Vitoria, Ed. Ga-

teano Beirao, 1936, 1-27 June 1938, Feb. 1742. Damiao Peres, Hist, de Portugal, VI-
191. Byblos, Ericeira’s diary, Feb. 1732, vol. 18, Dec. 1731, Feb. 1732. J. Ratton,
Recordagoes, 1813, 320. Eduardo Brazao, Cartas de Joao V ao Cardeal de Mota, 1943.
16
KING JOHN V
circle, and he still allowed them to monopolise all the principal offices of
state. Cardinal Joao de Mota came from an ordinary family but there
were not many like him. The future favourite Friar Gaspar de Encarnacao
was a son of the Marquis of Gouveia and the Patriarch was a brother-in-
law of Diogo de Mendonca, the secretary of state, and of good family.12
Although King John's health was never strong and he still suffered from
fits of depression the year 1717 or thereabouts saw a great flowering of
his personality. A burst of religious fervour in a young man of warm and
artistic temperament is not unusual and King John’s passion found ex¬
pression in the glorification of Mafra and the patriarchate. He strained to
win the rank of cardinal for the patriarch, which was eventually accorded
by the Pope in 1737. The king’s enthusiasm for the patriarchal church lasted
until his death and he publicly continued his devotions there after he had
become fit for little else. In his early years he had energy for much besides.
He won the acclaim of the pope and papal favours for his church by
responding to his appeal for help to the Venetians in the crusade against
the Turks. He enthusiastically promised to send a Portuguese squadron,
but it was not so easy to find the men, the ships, or the money. Not much
had been done in the previous years either for or by the Portuguese navy.
It had only played a small part in the war of the Spanish Succession and
though it was realised that there was a great need for ships, if the Brazil
fleets were to be convoyed and some independence achieved of British
protection, only a small beginning had been made. The king engaged William
Warden, a British subject, as dock-master and naval architect, and tried
to have ships built both in Portugal and Brazil, or to acquire them by
purchase or charter in England or Holland. The Marquis of Fronteira,
who was in charge of naval affairs, took a keen interest and Dom Francisco
furnished two ships at his own expense. But money was a great difficulty;
the 100,000 moedas received by the Brazil fleets for the royal fifth was
soon spent, but the grateful pope was persuaded to agree to some taxation
of the Portuguese clergy, and when the king was short of ships for the
Brazil convoys the British Factory contributed a loan of 40,000 cruzados,
and by a special bull of ‘cruzada’ 40 contos were raised in Brazil. But man
power was also short; the Portuguese nobility with a belated flare up of
crusading zeal and feudal loyalty responded well. There were volunteers
from many of the best families and to spare. Great efforts were made to
enlist foreign seamen by the offer of generous wages. But the British
minister and the consul had orders to prevent this; British sailors were
needed to man British ships and all possible means were used to prevent
them joining foreign service. However in spite of all these difficulties a
sizeable squadron of ten ships, including five major ships of 50 or more
guns, was got together and manned with close on 3000 men and with
12 Brazao, Joao V, ii-79 et seq. S. P. 89/23, Worsley to Methuen, 14 Feb. 1717.
17
DAVID FRANCIS
276 guns. It sailed in July 1716 but reached Corfu too late to take part in
the year’s campaign. But it went back next year and took a creditable
part in the battle at Matapan, which was claimed as a victory. The Vene¬
tians were to lose the Peloponnese, but Prince Eugene won Belgrade, and
a treaty of peace ensued, which gave parts of Servia and Wallachia to
the emperor and conserved the Venetian conquests in Bosnia, Albania, and
Herzegovina. Portugal could claim that she had played her part in combatting
the infidel in a very altruistic way, for by doing so she had gained prestige
but little material advantage. Her fleet, supposedly well provisioned, soon
ran short and had to take refuge in Sicily, but safely returned to Lisbon
without further accident. Possibly some impression had been made on the
Barbary corsairs, with whom there was chronic war, but these nominal
Turks had little to do with the Ottoman empire. The expedition was said
to have cost King John 300,000 moedas or about £400,000. It is hard to
assess what this really meant, but it represented the same value as the
total gold brought by the 1721 Brazil fleet. This was the only time in the
reign that the Portuguese fought in Europe save for skirmishes at sea with
corsairs or privateers.13
In 1715 the king conceived the idea of making a Grand Tour of
Europe to further Portuguese prestige and his own education. The Infante
Manoel had been designated to make the tour in the first instance; the
king then decided he would go with him but this plan too fell through
and in November Manoel lost patience and succeeded in making his escape
from Portugal. King John persisted for some time with his plans and made
great preparations. He was to travel incognito but still proposed to take
with him an imposing suite. The expense aroused almost universal oppos¬
ition and only a few like the minister Da Cunha Brochado in London,
who thought it would be to his personal advantage, and some cosmopolitans
like Ericeira, who believed the trip would be of benefit, gave their support.
The king at first was mainly interested in visiting Rome and in seeing the
ceremonial at the papal chapel there, but he enlarged his itinerary to
include even England, where he hoped to obtain payment of some old war
debts owing to Portugal and to obtain help for his crusade against the
Turks. His heart was set upon his tour and he was a hard man to gainsay;
he pursued his planning in secret without even consulting Mendonga, the
secretary of state, but all his privy councillors opposed him and the duke
of Cadaval went so far as to say that he could not leave the kingdom
without calling and consulting the Cortes. The British Minister Worsley
after some delay gave an assurance that King George would welcome the
visit but the queen of Portugal was against his going and in July 1716 he
13 S. P. 89/34, Worsley to Stanhope, 24 Feb., 14 March, 8, 19 Aug. Poyntz,

26 June 1716. S. P. 89/25, Worsley, 30 April 1717. S. P. 89/29, Burnet, 30 Aug.
1721. Almeida, Hist, de Portugal, IV-268/9288.
18
KING JOHN V
reluctantly gave up his plan. This caused him deep chagrin and he again
fell seriously ill, but he was now well in the saddle with three sons born
to him and surviving; he recovered and turned his attention to his crusade
and to the building of Mafra and the patriarchal chapel.14
King John needed more than religion to sublimate his desires; indeed
in his case the ceremonies of the church opened the door for love affairs.
He became a ‘freiratico’, a man who loved nuns. Courting nuns was an
old Portuguese custom which long persisted. A generation earlier the duke
of Grafton had taken to it with zest and King Pedro, though no mean
amorist himself, had made firm rules to restrict access to the grilles of
convents. These measures made little difference; the custom was in high
favour throughout King John’s reign and in 1752 Captain the Hon Augustus
Hervey, R. N., no mean connoisseur, found his way to many agreeable
assignations. Even in the 1830s British troops stationed in the Azores
continued to benefit. The Portuguese nobility bred more daughters than
could find husbands; it was not easy to provide them with dowries to
secure a gentleman with enough quarterings and unsullied purity of blood.
An easier solution and a cheaper one for a girl of good family was to
place her in a fashionable convent; these institutions were packed with
nubile girls, many of whom had little vocation but a hunger for life. At
home an unmarried girl had a dull time; she could never go out, except
heavily escorted to church, and her married sisters fared little better. Even
the Princess of Brazil, who had more facilities than most and came from
the court of Spain, where women also went little abroad, complained often
of the dullness of the Portuguese court. Any girl who fancied a little social
life had a far better time in a convent, where at least she could join in
parties, concerts, dances and sing-songs, organised often under the guise
of religious celebrations. Also she could be wooed through the grilles by
all the young men of the district. Convents were regular ports of call for
the bright sparks, who sought diversion and had tired of the only other
female company available, that of prostitutes. They strummed their guitars
and sang their love songs, and snatched an occasional kiss pressed on an
arm stretched through the bars. Often it went no further, but assignations
could ensue, and certainly did so in Hervey’s time. It must also be
remembered that not all the girls had taken their final vows; some were
in an intermediate stage; they were scarcely advanced in their novitiate
or were merely temporary visitors.
Among those who got beyond the grilles was undoubtedly King John.
The time was to come when he preserved his ardour by aphrodisiacs, and
14 S. P. 89/23, Worsley to Stanhope, 30 Nov. 1715. S. P. 89/24, 31 Jan., 14

March, 9 May 1716. Da Cunha’s correspondence with Duke of Cadaval, Ed. Virginia
Rau, 1947, 14 Nov. 1718, p. 192. Gusmao, ll-i-369. Almeida, Hist, de Portugal,
VI-192.
19
DAVID FRANCIS
the last of his loves, a French actress named Petronilla, had to be sent
away for the sake of his health, to continue her successful career in Paris.
But in bis younger days success in love offset his melancholy and gave
him confidence and inspiration for his manifold activities. One of the
earlier and most famous of his loves was a seventeen-year-old of great
beauty, who became known as Mother Paula. She was an inmate of the
convent of Odivelas, one of the most fashionable and famous, where there
had been such toying with advanced ideas that in 1714 one of the nuns
had been found guilty of Judaism. The nuns there had luxurious apartments.
Mother Paula, whose real name was Teresa da Silva, was paid a handsome
allowance; her affair with the king lasted at least ten years from 1718
to 1728, and resulted in one or more children, one of whom was Dom
Jose, one of the Meninos de Palhava, who became Grand Inquisitor; the
other Menino, so called after the quinta where they were brought up, was
called Dom Antonio and was the son of a French girl. The first nun from
Odivelas to captivate the king was Dona Magdalena de Miranda, mother
of Dom Gaspar, who became archbishop of Braga. These three were
acknowledged sons and all lived to a great age. As state affairs began to
pre-occupy him more the king mixed love less with religion, but it con¬
tinued to be a pre-occupation, later to his detriment. Such a weakness was
usual among monarchs and was perhaps accentuated by too rich a diet.
King Louis XIV was sparing in his use of wine but he was a gigantic
trencherman. King John, like most Portuguese, indulged in little alcohol,
but was a glutton for sweetmeats; in Brazil lascivious tendencies could be
blamed on the climate and the allurement of so many nude slave girls,
but without any such spur the Portuguese at home were equally en¬
thusiastic; maybe it was a reaction against their almost Arab way of life.
Life in Lisbon was very boring, while the number of hangers-on with little
to do was very great. Perhaps this was the cause as much as any special
Portuguese sensuality.15
Dances in church had been part of many traditional ceremonies; the
cardinals restricted them and closed the churches at nightfall, so that they
could not be used for assignations. But music and dancing in convents was
very popular. The king was genuinely fond of music, as his grandfather
the Emperor Leopold had been, and promoted Italian operas and plays;
this affection naturally extended to opera singers and their like. His in¬
terests were serious but they were adorned with luxury and magnificence
and even gaiety. He patronised the university of Coimbra and the found¬
ation in 1720 of the Royal Academy of Portuguese History. Hidden behind
a curtain he regularly attended their sessions. The Academy naturally
15 Cartas de Rainha Mariana Vitoria, July 1737, 13 May 1738, 27 June 1738,
24 Jan 1741. Augustus Hervey’s Journals, Ed. David Erskine, 1954, p. 175. Damiao
Peres, Hist, de Portugal, VI-192.
20
KING JOHN V
followed tradition and gave priority to ecclesiastical history, to long lists

of bishops and of their good deeds. A major work was the genealogical
history of the House of Braganza in fourteen volumen, published in 1741
by Antonio Caetano de Sousa. It commemorated the Braganza pedigree
and served as a Debrett to raise the families happily included in it above
any suspicion of Jewish or Moorish blood. It successfully forgot many
charming and wealthy New Christian great-grandmothers, but showed
nevertheless real and careful scholarship, and the Academy won a good
reputation throughout Europe. Jean Dumont, a French historian and author
of the Corps Diplomatique Universal who had been made historiographer
to the emperor, wrote to the Count of Ericeira in 1721 that he had read
the rules of the new Academy with pleasure and Portugual was lucky to
have a young enthusiastic king, who was also a patron of learning. He
was delighted that the Academy proposed to publish MS from the Torre
do Tombo and was himself listing all the documents he could find about
Portugal. The Academy did in fact publish copies of manuscripts and
charters, which were printed in the news sheet Anno Historico e Noti-
cioso.16
The Academy also concerned itself with arts and sciences and specially
with any subject of interest for the development of Brazil. An Italian
Jesuit and mathematician named Father Carbone was brought to Lisbon
with the idea of sending him to Brazil to make a survey, but the king took
such a fancy to him that he kept him in Portugal, where he set up an
observatory, but was also employed on Roman questions as well as those
of Brazil and until his death in 1750 proved a man of integrity and
talent.
The Academy was even supposed to be free of the censorship or at
least to be privileged to censor its own publications. But the censorship
could still be very obstructive. A Carmelite wanted to publish a blameless
biography of the Constable Dom Nuno Alvarez Pereira, but the first censor
died, his successor was transferred and a third made a bishop; it was
many years later that the work first saw the light and then only in Spain
under another name. A book took at least three years to pass the censorship
and no less than nine censors were involved.17
Naturally the more flamboyant qualities of King John, his magnificence
and his mistresses, captured the public imagination. But as early as 1715
the French ambassador, the Abbe de Momay, discerned more solid qualities
in him. He commented The king was born with such qualities that he
16 Manoel Eduardo Portugal na Epoca de Joao V, 1885, 147, 175.

Branco,
C. Boxer, Anais de Academia Portuguesa de Histdria, ii-15-241, Dumont to Ericeira,
21 Dec. 1721, 20 Nov. 1722. Ano Historico e Noticioso, Luis Montes Mattoso, 1740,
ed. Costa Veiga, 1939.
17 S. P. 89/47, Castres to Bedford, 23 May 1749. Almeida, Hist, de Portugal,
V-418 et seq.
21
DAVID FRANCIS
would have been capable alone of the government of the kingdom, if

only the people in it had had more capacity or care to teach him those
things that he could not learn from the women who had looked after him
until the year of seventeen, an age when the time lost could with difficulty
be regained, for that prince was endowed with such vivacity and penetration,
and had such love for truth and justice, such a passion for letters and
sciences, and such a great desire to learn, that he afforded his minister
the chance to make of him a great monarch’.18 In spite of an artistic
temperament and weak health he showed a great determination to live
up to the Abbe’s description, but this took form in an obstinacy, which
was more than mulish in pursuing his obsession of the moment, whether
it was the building of Mafra and the patriarchal chapel, the Spanish
marriages, the crusade against Turkey or some quite small matter. The
British merchant Arthur Stert, back in Lisbon after an absence in England,
said he found the king much altered; he now thought he was much better
than anyone else and was pretty ungovernable. Santarem observed ‘after
listening to his councillors he decided what seemed to him best, and once
he had made his decision he obstinately stuck to it’. The British minister
Worsley remarked that the king was civil enough, when he saw him,
which was seldom, and then the conversation was purely formal. He
added that ‘the king was absolute and knew his own power, and did not
much mind his own ministers, when they advised against his own in¬
clination, as was daily seen in all his actions, as his establishing the Pa¬
triarchal See, and making all the nobility give way to the Patriarch as
he passed along the street, and the Counts to give way to the Canons, and
indeed the constitution of the kingdom is so set up that nobles must
submit in all to the king’s pleasure. Their titles are only for life, and their
estates are chiefly crown lands granted to them for life, and though both
are commonly regranted to their heirs, yet it depends on the king’s favour
and therefore binds them to good behaviour’. It is true that in Portugal the
royal authority had little to fear. In so conservative a country an immense
prestige buttressed the crown; the king was a distant and benevolent
figure and the nobles in spite of their prestige were well in hand; the
church naturally found the king’s glorification of it acceptable and the
pope was blandished by lavish donations; the king owed his independence
to his Brazilian revenues and to trade, but the very fact that foreign trade
was so largely in the hands of the British and other aliens made it easier
for him to control them as individuals; the only independent force was
that of the law, which presented an unassailable bureaucratic front, but
always leaned in the king’s favour in case of difficulty; he could always
18 Santarem, Quadro, V-8. Almeida, Hist, de Portugal, IV-280. Damiao Peres,

Hist, de Portugal, VI-571.
22
KING JOHN V
refer to it with the certainty that the ensuing delay would be little to his
detriment.19
The king of course had no autocratic powers abroad, but behaved
there with equal obstinacy. Spain offered the biggest threat to Portugal,
but Britain had such a stake in Anglo-Portuguese trade that the king could
always count on British support in the last resort. France on the whole
was content to leave Portugal in the background and to confine herself
to minor anti-British intrigues and to using Portugal as a counterpoise to
Britain or Spain, as circumstances required. The fact that the queen of
Portugal was the emperor’s sister helped relations there during the life of
Charles VI and the empire was usually a favourable factor for Portugal in
the balance of power. As all the powers, except Spain, had an interest in
keeping Portugal independent, the king could afford to be obstinate. He
showed it by interrupting diplomatic relations with France for fourteen
years on a point of protocol, his insistence that the French ambassador
should make the first call on the secretary of state rather than the other
way about. In 1728 after a long dispute about the grant of a cardinal’s
hat to the Nuncio in Portugal ‘ex officio’, he did not scruple to banish
the Nuncio and to break off relations with the papacy for two years in
spite of his excessive devotion and cordial relationship in matters where
pride or the independence of the Portuguese church were not concerned.
On the latter subject he was a true Henry VIII; for instance the pope put
forward names for the Brazilian bishoprics, but it was the king who
appointed them. In 1735 he broke off relations with Spain for two years;
in this case the background was more tense, but the actual occasion was
a minor incident involving a brawl in Madrid, which implicated servants
of the Portuguese ambassador. The king came near to war with Spain, as
he had already done in 1719, and went through the motions of mobilization,
but though he was prodigal with the money and labour of his subjects, he
preferred to spare their blood. He could not avoid Spanish fighting on
the River Plate, but elsewhere he was careful to hesitate on the brink.20
For several years the labour of his subjects was concentrated on the
great complex of buildings at Mafra. The work force exceeded an army
in numbers. The king went there every week and messengers brought him
news of progress every few hours. He attended to no other matter, how¬
ever urgent, for weeks at a time. Every carpenter and workman was
conscripted and the British Minister Lord Tyrawly had to send ten times
to the secretary of state to buy a few shillingsworth of whitewash. At
19 S. P. 89/33, Arthur Stert, 28 July 1726. S. P. 89/27, Worsley, 3 June 1719.

Santarem, Quadro, V-139.
20 Almeida, Hist, de Portugal, IV-268 et seq. Brazao, foad V, 1-423/6, 445/9.
Ameal, Joao, e Cavalheiro, Rodrigues, Erratas a Historia de Portugal, Porto, 1939,
21/30, 31/45. For 5th Count of Ericeira, see C. Boxer in Institut Frangais au Por¬
tugal, vols. 37/8 of 1977/8.
23
PORTUGAL.-3
DAVID FRANCIS
the height of the work of building there were 45,000 employed there and
oxen and horses and mules were conscripted from throughout the kingdom.
The work lasted from 1717 to 1744 and when the bells were installed,
the king spent hours on his knees praying for guidance. The inauguration
in 1730 lasted eight hours and unable to relieve himself the agonising
archbishop almost passed out. In May 1731 the bills owing for the work
amounted to 3,485,000 cruzados. In the same year the figure given for
the total revenue from the Minas Gerais was given as 159,688 milreis,
but by 1744 the year of the completion of Mafra it had risen to 382,645
milreis, near the maximum ever attained. The debts of million cruzados
equalled If million milreis or at 5/9 to the milreis something over half
a million pounds. Only a vague idea can be gathered from such figures
and the real truth is conjectural, but the debts in 1732 seem to have re¬
presented at least ten years royal revenue from Brazil.
Opinions differ whether Mafra was the ‘quintessence of eighteenth-
century classicism, noble, wide and serious’ or ‘a vast slave-built pile
crawling wearily over the soil and raising its tired head to give vent
to a groan of agony’. But at least the sweating hordes were better employed
than in long campaigns which cost them their blood as well as their labour.
The people no doubt took some pride in King John’s accomplishments, in
Mafra and in his other works, such as the patriarchal chapel and the great
aqueduct still serving Lisbon. But for the Lisbon earthquake more would
have survived and throughout Portugal many other churches, hospitals
and convents were built in the time of King John and his successor King
Joseph.21
Foreign ministers saw little of the king and of his application to business.
21 Almeida, Hist, de Portugal, 1-285 et seq. S., Trade and Power, 1970,
Sideri,
p. 68, gives a figure of £54 million as the cost of Mafra, or 40 billion cruzados. The
historian Luz Soriano estimated that the yield of gold from Brazil which entered
the Royal Treasury in the 23 years 1722/45 was 116 million cruzados. The largest
total brought by the Brazil fleet was said to be £3 million sterling in 1752. Fisher,
Portugal Trade, 32. Sideri speaks of subsidies to the Pope costing £17 million. The
cruzado was primarily a coin, and the old silver cruzado of the reign of Pedro II
was worth 400 reis. In the reign of John V according to C. Boxer in Golden Age
there was a new cruzado worth 580 reis. There were also double cruzados, so the
cruzado could present its problems, but seems to have been still 400 reis for
purposes of conversion even at the end of the century. The milreis, though only a
money of account, was a safer thing in so far as its exchange in London did not
vary greatly. At the beginning of the War of Succession it touched 6/1 but normally
it rated at about 5/6, though at the end of the century Balbi assessed it as low
as 4/9L In practice it varied according to the season, for the rate of exchange was
much affected by the arrival of the Brazil fleets. It is hard to assess values in
cruzados and milreis against each other, and Sideri quotes such experts as Balbi and
Macedo sometimes being led astray. For general purposes 2\ cruzados to the milreis
seems a sensible computation. Balbi, Essai Statistique, 2 vols., 1822, pp. 430/1, 442.
Boxer, Golden Age, 354/5. Luz Soriano, Hist, do Rei Jose, 1867, 2 vols., 1-156.
24
KING JOHN V
The British minister only came into the picture after the Spanish crisis
of 1735, when he began to see more of the king and also of Cardinal
Mota and some of the king’s confidants. The king always worked hard
and conscientiously on the papers submitted to him, but hitherto had felt
little need to concern himself much with foreign ministers and their affairs.
Instead he devoted himself to the subjects of primary interest to him, to
the careful scrutiny of all the candidates for office, to papal, dynastic and
Spanish affairs, and perhaps most important of all to Brazil. After 1736
there was a separate secretary of state for Brazil, and the Council for
Overseas Affairs played a more active part than the Council of State, which
had fallen into such desuetude that Castres thought it had ceased to exist,
though actually it was revived in 1739. For Brazil the king also had the
advice of the governors there and of a number of confidants, who fre¬
quently by-passed his ministers. From about 1730 the Brazilian-born
Alexander Gusma5 was a chief of these; he had served from about 1720
as secretary to Luis da Cunha in the embassy in Paris and had then been
employed by the king on his patriarchal church business in Rome, where
he retained the king’s confidence in spite of the jealousy of the other
members of the Portuguese mission. He also survived the cloud occasioned
by the precipitate flight of his brother Bartholomew from Lisbon to Spain
under suspicion of heresy and Judaism. Bartholomew had been a royal
favourite, known as the Voador’, the airman, owing to his claim to have
invented a flying machine, which could carry troops and messages to the
ends of the kingdom and even to Brazil. He had fascinated the king who
gave him all facilities to conduct his experiments undisturbed on one of
his country states. It appears that he did produce a sort of fire balloon,
which he demonstrated before king and court. His balloon went up in
flames once, and on a second occasion crashed to the ground, but on a
third occasion is said to have achieved a short flight from the castle of
St George in Lisbon to the Pago de Povo, the central square. If he did
so, he could claim to be the inventor of the first balloon to carry a
passenger. But he experimented no more, realising perhaps that further
progress was impracticable for the present, or that he lacked support, and
in any case was in danger of being accused by the inquisition of black
magic. However he worked on other inventions, including a wind-operated
pump, and made a great name by his eloquent sermons and his work for
the Academy of History. He also became the leading expert on cyphers
and on the breaking of them, and took charge of all the king’s secret
correspondence and of the interception and decyphering of that of foreign
ministers. But he became the prey of apocalyptic visions and of dreams
of Judaism, and suddenly fled to Spain, where he soon died, supposedly
repentant and reconciled with the church. His bizarre career and suspected
connections with Judaism and sorcery reflect the exotic and even suspect
25
DAVID FRANCIS
circles, which the king explored in his romantic and ‘hippy’ youth.
Gusmao’s brothers and sisters were in the priesthood or convents and
monastic orders, including a leading Carmelite named Mathew Aires. Ale*
xander Gusmao himself became a confidential adviser to the king on both
Roman and Brazilian affairs. He visited Brazil in about 1723 and was
awarded a profitable sinecure as clerk to the council of Vila Rica. Though
he made many enemies, including Cardinal Mota, he retained King John’s
confidence until his death. He did much for the mapping and exploration
of Brazil and introduced a capitation tax for the collection of the royal
fifth, which proved very unpopular, but lasted some fifteen years until
King John’s death, after which the tax was commuted in return for an
undertaking by the local authorities to pay a fixed annual sum of 100
arrobas of gold. Gusmao also took a leading part in the negotiations which
led to the Madrid treaty of 1750, which stabilised the Paraguay frontier
in favour of Portugal at the cost of the promise of the cession of Nova
Colonia. Spain had long been trying to suppress the flourishing clandestine
trade of Nova Colonia, and from 1723 onwards had built up the neigh¬
bouring post of Monte Video to impede its progress. However Britain
always supported the retention by Portugal of the place; the cession
envisaged in the 1750 treaty was not carried out and the treaty of Paris
of 1763 again confirmed the right of Portugal to its possession; it was
not until 1777 that Spain finally occupied the place and extinguished its
trade.22
Gusmao’s ideas did not always come to fruition but during the last
years of King John he played many parts. He was an active member of
the Academy of History and the author of operas performed with acclaim
in the presence of the king. He was liberal in his ideas; the eulogy for his
reception into the Academy in 1732 was pronounced by the liberal Count
of Ericeira. The king did not care much for either of the Ericeiras, father
or son, nor for their opinions. But Gusmao contrived to keep his place
near the centre of the royal circle in spite of many liberal ideas. He
scoffed at the Portuguese Puritans and their pretensions to purity of
blood, pointing out that every man and woman had more ancestors living
in the time of King Manoel than the whole population of Portugal, and
it was absurd to contend that Moors and Jews were not to be found among
them supplemented by those expelled from Spain and the 12,000 children
baptised by King Manoel to increase the population. He had a patriotic
feeling for Brazil and was inspired to encourage Brazilian institutions and
even to think of trying to protect the gold miners from being fleeced by
the planters, merchants, and drovers, who took all the profits of the mines
22 Hist, de Portugal, V-269/78. Experiences Aeronauticas de Bartolo¬

Almeida,
meu de Gusmao, Ed. Correa Neve, Lisboa, 1911. A. K. Manchester, British Pre¬
eminence in Brazil.
26
KING JOHN V
and paid no taxes. He went so far as to speak of the king not wishing to
enforce any measure without the knowledge and agreement of the people.
There was bitter argument whether his new system of capitation hurt or
favoured the three principal interests concerned, the Royal Treasury, the
people of the mines and the commerce of the kingdom in general. It
seemed to succeed at first but was discarded after the death of King John.23
At the peak of the building of Mafra Tyrawly said it was impossible
to know where one was with the king, or what he would do next or whom
he would employ to do it. In a moment of exasperation he even said the
king was mad, as mad as any in Bedlam. This contrasts with his later
opinion, when the king was anxious to have him made an ambassador
and took the unusual step of recommending him for army promotion.
He then said T have the utmost regard and esteem for the king’s person,
not only for the treatment I meet with from him, but for his great qualities,
for nobody ever had better parts, more wit, more quickness, and if one may
use so familiar a term for so great a marl, there never was one more
thoroughly agreeable than the king of Portugal’. The king, when he chose,
must have been a charmer, though Tyrawly continued to bear witness to
his habit of employing all sorts of odd people to do his business, conveying
for instance an instruction to Mendonca his secretary of state on a dirty
scrap of paper delivered by a scruffy looking priest, to be puzzled out,
as it happened, in Tyrawly’s presence. In 1741 Chavigny, the French
minister, saw no reason to depart from the opinion expressed in the
instruction to his predecessor twenty years earlier. ‘Nobody can [flatter
himself that he enjoys any influence with the king for any length of time’.
In 1737 after the agreement had been reached on mediation, Tyrawly,
when asked by Keene who in Portugal enjoyed the confidence of the
king, harboured no illusion about his own special position. He replied ‘I
can tell you in one word, as well as in a thousand, Nobody’. He was quite
unpredictable and would sometimes take no notice of what appeared to
be a most important matter, but the next moment would show an intense
interest in some trivial case connected with the British Factory. Even
Alexander Gusmao complained that he could not get access to the king,
because he was having an interminable discussion about the disposal of
the alms from a particular alms box. It was by employing numerous
advisers in addition to his officials, who were little known to the public
and often unknown to each other, and by carefully collating the informa¬
tion they gave him and then doing exactly what he wanted without refer-
23 S. P. 89/37, Tyrawly to Newcastle, 17 April 1734. C. Boxer in History Today,

November 1970, p. 794. S. P. 89/38, Tyrawly, private, to Newcastle, 17 March 1736.
Recueil des Instructions aux Ambassadeurs de France, Portugal, 3-269, 295. Gusmao,
ii-i-228, 237, 249. C. Boxer, Conde de Ericeira, in Institut Francais au Portugal,
Bulletin 37/8, 1977/8.
27
DAVID FRANCIS
ence to any particular one of them that the king maintained his do¬
minance.
In spite of his taste for night life and his excursions into Bohemia the
king was a stickler for protocol and for the maintenance of class dis¬
tinctions. He kept the nobles in their places and in 1726 exiled about
thirty of them, not exempting the most distinguished, when they tried
by force to reverse the sentence of one of his judges. Their prestige was
part of the royal heritage and so was upheld, and they were often allowed
to presume on their rank and to take liberties, but if they went too far
the king came down upon them like a ton of bricks. The nobles were free
with their swords and often beat their servants but all this went with a
traditional bonhomie and condescension and even some licence to answer
back. The old duke of Cadaval had a positively jokey manner and was
nicknamed the duke of Carnival. The king in his personal correspondence
with Cardinal Mota called everybody by their Christian names and was
colloquial to the point of slang. Something of the same spirit can still be
seen in the academic ceremonies at Coimbra where the Rector Magnificus
processes in a costume of Byzantine splendour, but the solemnity is diluted
by tootling instruments of music and a sort of jollity or bucolic good
humour. The Magnanimous Most Faithful King like an eastern caliph
still held regular public audiences, at which all could come and present
their petitions. In 1736, when all was in confusion owing to the death of
Mendonca, the secretary of state, and there was no-one to arrange an
audience. Lord Tyrawly and Admiral Norris solved the problem by turning
up at a public audience. Norris wrote ‘We saw people of the worst con¬
dition, both men and women, including a poor blind man and several
soldiers, who all delivered their petitions to His Majesty. We stayed until
it was over and then had a private audience with the king, and he took
our memorial and said we would have an answer, but not quite yet owing
to the death of his secretary’. It must be admitted that this visit had been
prepared, for Tyrawly had seen the king the day before and had told
him about the memorandum and been asked to bring a copy in Por¬
tuguese.24
These public audiences served a domestic purpose, as the Visconde
de Santarem recorded: ‘All the business of the kingdom came before him
and nothing was done save by his order. He was naturally jealous of his
authority, but he went everywhere without guards or attendants; he re¬
ceived his people once a week. All pleas and memorials were referred to
the appropriate department, and from the lists which were posted in the
24 S. P. 89/33, Dormer to Newcastle, 11, 13 July 1728. Add MSS 28139, Norris,
6, 19 May 1736, o. s. M. Bernades Branco, Portugal na Epoca de Joao V, Corres-
pondencia de Joao V e Cardeal de Mota, ed. Eduardo Brazao, 1945.
28
KING JOHN V
chamber of halbardiers, everyone could see what had happened to them.

These public audiences inspired great fear, for they signified that anyone
could complain to the king, who was thus able to keep a close eye on all
that happened in Lisbon or in the provinces of the realm, for people came
from every part to keep him informed of what passed. No prince had
more talent, more intelligence, more knowledge of affairs than him/ This
was a rosy view; it would be hard for a blind old woman or a down and
out soldier to find his way from Oporto or Braganza and even in Lisbon
he or she would need protection to compose an acceptable memorial in
writing. Further this applied to the king in his prime for in his last decade
he was not fit to receive and made no public appearances save in the
patriarchal chapel. But the audiences were a safety valve and were re¬
membered in the succeeding reign, when the growth of the police state
and the fear of assassination severely curtailed them. Class distinction,
though jealously guarded, was also eroded from below. A noble could be
recognised by his strutting retinue, but the sumptuary laws forbade luxury
in dress; in the street individuals looked alike and cobblers often presumed
to wear swords, while humble people of more cultural ambitions fitted
themselves out with learned looking spectacles. Though the nobles resented
it when the secretary of state was promoted to be an Excellency, in the
street it was safer to address any chance person encountered as ‘excellency',
rather than to risk giving offence, and the custom became general.25
At the height of the Mafra building Tyrawly thought there was much
discontent and the country was ripe for civil war. Certainly there were
many lampoons and complaints, particularly towards the end of the reign.
Early in the king’s illness even the Infanta Mariana remarked that many
people were not content with the king’s government and his sickness was
a miserable thing for all. She knew that Prince Joseph, her husband, was
dissatisfied, though he did not say much. The word went round that the
king’s fifths were peculated right and left. In the reaction after King
John’s death the British Minister Castres said that King Joseph had shown
more instances of justice and humanity in the short time he had sat
on the throne than the late king had in the whole of his long reign. But
King Joseph soon gave up his effort to work hard at reigning and devoted
himself to his music and his hunting, only occasionally putting in a good
humoured word to soften the increasing rigours of Sebastiao de Carvalho’s
regimen. During his last years King John could do little except pray and
his popularity waned; but in spite of his extravagance it had not been too
hard with an estimated revenue of £2,300,000 to play the part of the
magnanimous king. The money peculated did not disappear; somebody
25 Santarem, Quadro Elementar, 5-256. Add MSS 32794, Tyrawly to Keene,

4 April 1737.
29
DAVID FRANCIS
spent it and though there were many who earned no daily bread, circuses
for the people and ecclesiastical alms palliated the misery. So in the days
of Pombal the reign of John V came to be remembered as a golden age
and the king himself as a father figure of the utmost liberality and mag¬
nificence.26
26 S. P. 89/37, Tyrawly to Delafaye, 7 April and private to Newcastle, 28 Sept.

1730. Cartas de Rainha Mariana Vitoria, 1742. S. P. 89/48, Castres, 3 July 1751. The
royal income is conjectural but A. Balbi, Essai Statistique, 1822, 1-5, assessed it in
1805, a good year, as 28 m cruzados, about £3^ million. This was more than the
estimated £2,300,000 in King John V’s reign; the highest value brought by the Brazil
fleet was 3£ million in 1752. Fisher, Portugal Trade, 32.
30
3
THE REIGN OF JOHN V, 1715-35
The British minister from 1714 to 1721 was Henry Worsley, a com¬
petent and unpretentious man who had served as envoy in Barcelona
in 1708. He was confronted by a kaleidoscopic European situation. The
Jacobites suffered a setback in 1715, but they were still active in France
and even more so in Spain, and elsewhere as far as Sweden. Spain after
the arrival of the new queen Isabel Farnese in December 1714, with
her compelling Italian ambitions, took on a new lease of life during the
ministry of Alberoni. He built a fleet which invaded Sardinia and Sicily;
it was destroyed at Passaro in 1718 and Britain drifted into a war with
Spain. Alberoni fell and was succeeded by Ripperda but this did not
change Spanish policy much. She continued to vacillate, but built another
fleet for use against England, or in the Mediterranean, or in America;
nobody knew where, but eventually it was employed in an unsuccessful
attack on the Moors in Africa.
In Spain aspirations in Italy fought for priority with the ardent desire
to recover Gibraltar and to annul the trade concessions which Britain had
won at the treaty of Utrecht. An offer to cede Gibraltar was actually
rejected in 1717 and afterwards the British government more than once
indulged in secret negotiations to do a deal about The rock of contention’,
but was always thwarted by public opinion, which was as obstinate in
Britain as in Spain. Early in 1718 Spain made great preparations for
another naval expedition advertised by a galloping visit of the minister
Patino to Cadiz with the aid of 27 relays of horses borrowed from the
royal stables. Britain, America and Portugal’s Brazil fleet were named as
possible targets but in the end the fleet went to Sardinia and Sicily.1 All
the same arms and munitions had been stored in northern Spain to help
the Pretender, and Lord Cobham made a rich haul of them, when he
landed at Vigo in the autumn of 1719. The landing was effected without
1 S. Harcourt Smith, Alberoni, 1943. Cartas de Luis da Cunha para o Duque

de Cadaval, ed. Virginia Rau, 1946. S. P. 89/26, Worsley, 3 Jan., 21 May, 5, 16 July,
18 Sept. 1718. S. P. 89/27, Worsley, 22 April, 2 May 1719. George Hills, Rock of
Contention, 1974, 246, etc.
31
DAVID FRANCIS
meeting much resistance. Help from a rising by the Basques was quashed
by the presence of King Philip, and H. M. S. Success, which had been
sent to Santander to co-operate, was also delayed by bad weather and
failed to reach Vigo to provide pilotage services. But the Duke of Berwick,
who was now not only an ally but Cobham’s commander-in-chief, sent a
French pilot. Though the Galician peasants were hostile they offered little
opposition to the landing; this was lucky, as the British troops were for
three days out of action owing to their potations of the wines which they
found waiting for shipment. Fortunately during this pause the navy were
able to land some guns and bring them up to the walls of Vigo, where the
garrison formed an exaggerated impression of their enemy’s strength and
surrendered at once. Cobham then marched inland to Pontevedra where
he found a munitions factory and more booty. But he could not risk re¬
maining in a hostile country with winter coming on, particularly as it
was clear that no help would be forthcoming from the adjacent Portuguese.
Lord Hinchinbrooke had been sent to Lisbon and had been civilly received,
but had been given no positive answer, and Cobham sailed before he
could rejoin him. Nevertheless the landing had been of some value as a
diversion and the spoils, though far less publicised than those of the more
famous landing at Vigo of 1702, were appreciable. They enabled Lord
Cobham to embark on an ambitious building programme on his estate
at Stowe.2
Portugal was scared of possible Spanish aggression against Portugal or
Brazil. The French attitude was also uncertain. She had joined the quadruple
alliance as an ally of Britain and had shown an inclination to include
Portugal. She had also invaded Catalonia in a rather half-hearted way
and had helped Britain in Galicia. She also occupied in 1720 Maldonade,
a Spanish island at the entry to the River Plate, and was rumoured to be
attacking Spanish Florida. In Lisbon her ministers spoke of Britain as an
ally, but by no means relinquished edging in on the trade of Brazil at
British expense, and France was still half inclined to abet any further
attempt against the United Kingdom by the Pretender.3
Meanwhile in spite of many alarms Portugal remained at peace and
trade flourished; 18% of British exports went to Portugal and the growth
of the wine trade accounted for 90% of imports. The principal British
exports were textiles, of which a large proportion went to Brazil. This
created an unfavourable balance of trade, which British observers tried to
argue away, but seems to have amounted to an average of £350,000 in
the years 1716/20 and to £850,000 in 1736/40. This balance was mostly
2 S. P. 94/89, R. Johnston, 9 Aug., Cobham, 7 Sept., 18 Oct, Wade, 11 Oct.

1719. S. P. 89/27, Worsley, 28 Aug., 29 Oct., 6, 14 Nov. 1719. Dorothy Stroude,
Capability Browne, 1973.
3 S. P. 89/27, Worsley, 27, 29 Aug. 1719. S. P. 89/20, 15 Oct. 1720.
32
paid in gold bullion, though at first the bullion included a good deal of
silver, which was often smuggled from the Argentine by way of Nova
Colonia; the silver mostly found its way to the East Indies and British
purchases of silver increasingly entered through Jamaica. The export of
gold from Portugal was prohibited by a mediaeval law, which the Por¬
tuguese tenaciously upheld, though it had been made in very different
circumstances and they well knew that they could not pay for their imports
except with the help of bullion. Most of the gold was exported on
H. M. Ships or in the Packet Boats and in practice winked at, as long as
discretion was observed. During the war an unusual number of H. M. Ships
called and took the major proportion. The amounts were often indiscreetly
exaggerated by rumour. H. M. S. Gibraltar was credited with having
taken £200,000, whereas the real amount was nearer a tenth of that figure.
Consul General Poyntz in 1718 complained that London newspapers
persistently vaunted the amount of gold reaching London and thus provoked
Portuguese resentment. Consequently there was much talk of measures to
restrict the export of gold and the privileges of the packet boats. Customs
officers sometimes boarded them and arrested ships’ officers. Worsley
protested that they had no right to interfere on board, though he conceded
that arrests might be made for offences committed on shore. It was the
aim of the customs’ officers to examine the bills of lading of incoming
ships and their freight, in order to ensure that duty was paid; the Por¬
tuguese as well as foreigners were to blame, and particularly the nobles
who had houses on the water front, where they could conceal smuggled
goods. Throughout the century the struggle between the British who strove
to conserve their privileges and the Portuguese, who tried to reduce them,
continued. From time to time there was a flare up, when some special
incident occurred, but for most of the time it was a matter of pin-pricks
and occasional arrests. In time of peace, when there were fewer visits by
war ships, the Packet Boats carried most of the trade. The captains of
the packets served for a number of years and came to know the ropes
very well. They made direct arrangements with old established firms, who
had good relations with Portuguese officialdom. This aroused the jealousy
of young firms, who tried to undercut their rivals and got into trouble.
H. M. Ships also caused incidents. Their captains were tempted by the
profits to accept casual offers, and as they were here today and gone
tomorrow, they did not feel the same need for caution and for covering
their tracks as regular visitors.4
4 S. P. 89/24, Poyntz, 10 March 1716. Worsley, 24 Feb. 1716. S. P. 89/28,

Worsley, 15 Jan., 4 March, 22 April 1720. S. P. 89/26, Poyntz, 21 May, Worsley,
9 Sept. 1718. S. P. 89/30, Burnet, 18 March 1723 reported that Brazil fleet brought
£1000,000 in gold and 250,000 pieces of 8 in silver. C. Boxer, Some literary sources
for the history of Brazil in the eighteenth century. Taylorian Lecture, Oxford, 1967,
Appendix 2. Sideri, Trade and Power, 1970, Table, p. 234. Luz Soriano, Hist, do
33
DAVID FRANCIS
The Packet Boats were usually five in number. They tended to be

reduced or to become obsolete from time to time, and then to be reinstated
by vigorous protests from the Factory. They maintained a fortnightly
service, but in time of war they were sometimes captured, and adverse
weather could increase the interval between them to two months. In the
summer prevailing north winds hampered the homeward service, while
south-west gales in winter could cause reverse conditions. Sometimes as
many as eight or nine mails could pile up. They also suffered from the
rivalry between the Southern Department and the Post Office, and the
Minister and the Lisbon Factory and Consul. In 1725 the Post Office
complained that the Packet Hanover had not maintained a regular service
and wanted to take over the control of the times of sailing from H. M. Min¬
ister. The Legation argued that there was no reason for a change, that
the wishes of the Factory were always consulted as far as possible, and
the diplomatic status of the Packets could only be upheld by the Minister.
Dormer explained that he did not wish to interfere with the Post Office
administration, but needed to retain the power to grant passports to
passengers and to control the time of sailing. Paul Methuen, a former
minister, now Controller of the Household, could give full details. Both
sides stuck to their point. Walpole and Carteret laid down that the
Minister had authority to hold up sailings in case of need, but pointed out
that the Post Office held authority by virtue of an act of parliament.
Dormer insisted that he must retain control, while the Factory, anxious
for the traffic in gold which they could not publicly avow, vigorously
protested against any interruptions in service by the Portuguese or by
anybody else, and the Post Office claimed that their agent always considered
carefully H. M. Minister’s representations. This was a chronic dispute, in
which the navy, which also sought control, sometimes intervened, but on
the whole a modus vivendi was found with the minister having the last
word. The Portuguese also pecked away at the Packet Boats’ immunities,
but they were not seriously curtailed before the end of the century, when
the running of gold had become less important, and the British government,
who had a serious smuggling problem in their own hands, was more in¬
clined to sympathise with Portugal’s efforts to curb contraband.5
After a culminating incident in 1721 the gold running situation became
more or less stabilised. Before this cases had begun to multiply. In May
1718 a customs officer had impounded a British ship and confiscated
£5000 in gold; the captain had only escaped arrest by taking refuge in the
Rei Jose, 1-156 quotes a figure of 3248 arrobas of silver paid to the king as his
quinto. H. E. S. Fisher, Portugal Trade, 5.
5 For Packet Boats see History of Falmouth, H. D. Blyth, 1863, and list of
commanders published by J. H. Lake, 1896. S. P. 89/24, 24 Feb., Lisbon Factory 18
Feb. 1716. S. P. 89/30, Lumley, 5 Sept. 1722. S. P. 89/32, Dormer to Newcastle,
30 June, 14 July 1725. Post Office, 9, 23 July 1725.
34
Legation. In September the Belem fort fired on a Packet Boat, but this
was admitted to be a mistake. In March 1720 the king decreed that all
gold or gold dust found would be confiscated, unless the owners could
prove that it had been properly registered. This applied more particularly
to incoming gold and meant that gold in one’s pocket could be suspect,
though it was not otherwise contraband, unless it could be shown that
the owner intended to carry it out of the country.6
The French ambassador, though suppossed to be an ally of Britain,
had orders to do what he could to restrict the British Packets and in 1716
the Portuguese threatened to abolish their privileges. The famous 1721
incident concerned the case of Wingfield and Roberts and involved not
only the confiscation of gold in transit but of all the books, correspondence
and cash of the firm’s office. Wingfield and Roberts themselves and several
of their employees were arrested. This was done, not on the order of the
Judge Conservator, but of another judge, the Corregidor de Crimes de
Corte, who was deemed by the British to have no authority in the matter.
The Secretary of State Mendonga professed ignorance of the case, but
after making enquiry told Worsley that the firm had shipped gold and
money in specie in contravention of the old law forbidding it on pain of
death and confiscation. Worsley saw the king, who expressed polite regret
that his friends the British were involved and promised to order a careful
investigation. Wingfield and Roberts were released after admitting that
they had indeed exported gold, and they were allowed to confer with
John Bristow Junior, a partner of the firm and representative of the South
Sea Company, who was still detained. Worsley argued that under the
terms of the 1654 treaty British subjects were entitled to export all articles,
merchandise and goods of whatever nature. The Portuguese themselves
were doubtful whether it was prudent to enforce the ancient law, and all
the merchants were disturbed, as hitherto the worst penalty had been
confiscation. King John was believed to have been personally responsible
for the arrests and not to have consulted the Council of State. The sum
involved was large, for according to the firm’s books the value of their
exports in the last twenty months had been £210,179; but they claimed
that the value of the quinto paid in Brazil should be set against the total
and that they had paid £221,000 in Portuguese duties. Bristow was soon
released without further interrogation and so was the book-keeper Curry,
who had committed no offence. The king again said that he would examine
the legal rights and wrongs of the case, but showed no sign of yielding.
Worsley told the master of the next incoming packet to abstract any mail
addressed to Messrs Wingfield, as this might provide more evidence against
them. He also managed to dig out an old treaty between Portugal and
6 S P. 89/26, Poyntz, 21 May, Worsley, 9 Sept. 1718. S. P. 89/28, Worsley,

31 March 1720.
35
DAVID FRANCIS
Sweden, which revoked the prohibition of the export of gold. Mendonga

at first said he could not find any copy and denied all knowledge of the
treaty. He also complained of the Packet Boat Captain tampering with
the mail. Nevertheless Worsley was inclined to think that the Portuguese
would see reason and eventually agree to revoke the prohibition in return
for the imposition of an export duty. Meanwhile the king ordered three
judges to review the case; one of them was the Judge Conservator Bel-
chior Rego de Andrade, acting however not as Conservator but as a judge
of the mint. Later Mendonga turned up a copy of the Swedish treaty and
Andrade was made the sole judge. In November the secretary of the
Portuguese legation in London arrived; finding no Packet Boat available he
had made a hurried journey overland by way of Paris. He reported that
the attitude of the British government was very stiff. After considering his
report the Council of State decided that the matter must be settled, as
anything was preferable to a breach with England. Yet the Portuguese
continued to hedge, even when a further dispatch from the British Govern¬
ment arrived confirming their dissatisfaction. Worsley then had orders to
seek an immediate audience with the king. Lord Carteret had written that
King George felt the imprisonment of Wingfield and Roberts deeply and
had not the least doubt that the king of Portugal’s wisdom and justice,
which were so well known to him, would decide him to redress this
grievance by giving orders that the treaties must be observed. He desired
to cultivate the friendship of King John, and hoped that he would reci¬
procate by exculpating those who had been arrested, by restoring all their
effects, and by reimbursing them for the damage they had suffered. The
king only replied that he would consult some learned men, and for the
sake of His Majesty’s friendship he was always ready not only to do justice
to His Majesty’s Subjects, but to do them favour. Worsley refrained from
saying any more and from asking that the officials, who had so taken King
George’s name in vain, should be punished. In London the Portuguese
Minister Galvad had hinted that King John was personally responsible
and that it was generally believed that neither Mendonga nor any of the
ministers had had anything to do with it. Mendonga eventually came to see
Worsley to inform him of the judgment of the Chancellor and of the
learned men consulted, but it was so lengthy and complicated that Worsley
could form no opinion until he had studied it at length. Finally the king
said that the firm had been justly accused, but from the particular esteem
he held for King George’s Subjects he would show his royal clemency.
Worsley replied that this was not good enough, and that if a full and
speedy satisfaction were not offered, the affair could not end amicably
and he would have to send the king’s messenger back to England with this
news. He reported, that although there were none so blind as those who
would not see, he still hoped that orders would be sent to Galvao to
find some way out. Trade could not carry on without gold being exported;
36
perhaps the introduction of a small export duty would meet the case. As
there was no Packet Boat available he had held up H. M. S. Dolphin to
take the reply. Meanwhile the Judge Conservator had told Consul General
Burnet that if he petitioned the king for clemency, his petition would be
granted. Worsley advised him not to agree. He said he must send the
final reply; he could not delay the Dolphin any longer but in any case a
Packet had now come in. Some Portuguese holidays intervened, which
were the excuse for a further delay, but he supposed that after these the
judges’ sentence would be published and the king would probably free the
prisoners as an act of grace. On December 25th Burnet reported that
Worsley was still insisting that royal clemency was not enough, and that
although the king had ordered the procedure to be abridged, the sentence
was not yet known and might well be held up until further news came
from London.7 A gap of four months now occurred in the legation records
owing to the departure of Worsley home for consultation, before leaving
Portugal to take up his appointment as governor of Barbados. Thomas
Lumley was to succeed him. Worsley only returned to Lisbon in order
to embark for Barbados. He had orders to leave as soon as the Wingfield
case was settled but there is no further record of it in the files, save an
indirect one in an April despatch of Lumley implying that it had been
satisfactorily concluded. According to the Viscount of Santarem Wingfield
and Roberts were actually condemned to death, but pardoned and released
when news came that a fleet under the command of Admiral Wager was
on the point of sailing, and had orders to enter Portuguese ports if necessary.
It appears that any climbing down which had to be done was discreetly
effected in London, while King John’s pride was saved by keeping a stiff
upper lip in Lisbon. Actually in June 1722 the Portuguese minister in
London was authorised to negotiate a treaty on the subject of the import
of bullion but this came to nothing.8
Eight years later Lord Tyrawly looked back nostalgically to this famous
case, when the Portuguese had been taught a lesson. But in fact the Por¬
tuguese ministers had been united in their wish to extricate their monarch
without loss of face, and both sides at the highest level had observed tact
and restraint. A 'modus vivendi’ resulted; many further incidents occurred,
but the British Government were determined not to push matters, except
when a matter of principle became involved; they managed to adhere to
this policy, though the Portuguese, in spite of the fact that they were well
7 Recueil des instructions aux Ambassadeurs de France, vol. 3, Portugal, Abbe

de Momay, 254. S. P. 89/29, Worsley, 17, 20, 21 Sept., 23 Oct., 7, 30 Nov., 24 Dec.,
Burnet 29 Sept., 4 Oct., 29 Nov., 25 Dec. 1721.
8 Add MSS 15956, Carteret, 20 Nov. 1721, 13, 15, 23 Feb. 1722. S. P. 89/30,
Burnet 27 April 1722. Santarem, Quadro Elementar, vol. 18, 16, 21 Sept. 1721 and
16 Jan. 1722, pp. 292/3 re proposed bullion treaty.
37
DAVID FRANCIS
aware that in the last resort they must yield to force, were tenacious in
standing up for themselves.9
Worsley suffered no ill will. He was given a handsome present and a
cordial sendoff to Barbados, and before he left Mendonca called on both
him and Lumley. The latter, also know as Sir Thomas Saunderson, later
Earl of Scarborough, was a man of good connections, who became an
equerry to the king. He only remained two years in Lisbon, interrupted
by an interval of home leave, but he also had several disputes to settle.
One concerned the carriage of arms by British Subjects. He succeeded in
finding a copy of an old decree in the files at the consulate, which allowed
British Subjects, and even their servants, provided they were not Spaniards,
to carry arms. The exception was appropriate, for another war scare with
Spain had occurred occasioned by troop movements near the frontier and
the putting out to grass there of 5000 potential cavalry horses. Lumley
thought it better to hold the decree in reserve for the time being and to
confine his protest to the better authenticated claim on behalf of parties
from H. M. Ships. These were often escorting shipments of gold and
Lumley exhorted captains to use the utmost discretion and to conduct
themselves in a quiet and private manner. Lumley was sure that the Por¬
tuguese knew very well that the export of gold was essential and would
be content to leave well alone, but he thought it prudent to tread gently;
so he dropped the claim for restitution of £2000 in gold confiscated from
the Cooper galley; he could perhaps have got the money back as a favour,
but this would have meant conceding the principle and re-opening the
whole question.10
The Portuguese were anxious to tighten their control at the Brazilian
as well as at the Portuguese end. The old Brazil Company, founded in
1649, which had formerly held the monopoly for exports to Brazil, and had
enjoyed immunity from inroads by the Inquisition on capital held by Jews
or New Christians, finally petered out in 1720 and only survived in the
form of a Junta, which functioned as a committee to provide convoys for
the Brazil fleets. There were many attempts to found a new company but
their success was determined by the need to find foreign capital. The
Portuguese ministers in London and Paris drew up reports for the govern¬
ment’s guidance on the South Sea and Mississippi Companies. A French
project was turned down, but the king was inclined to favour a British
plan drawn up by Sir John Lambert and forwarded by the Portuguese
minister Jacinto Borges. But Cardinal da Cunha, as Inquisitor General,
and all the clergy firmly opposed any scheme limiting their powers to seize
the property of Jews and heretics, and so the plan foundered. Only foreign¬
ers would have subscribed, for the only rich merchants in Portugal were
9 S. P. 89/35, Tyrawly, 3 June 1729.

10 S. P. 89/30, Burnet, 27 April, 10 May 1722.
38
suspect of Judaism, and would never risk their money in such a company,
preferring to lodge their effects secretly in Portugal or abroad out of reach
of the Inquisition.11
Another effort to found a Brazil Company was made in 1723 with the
support of the Count of Abrantes, a leading councillor and a friend of the
king, the Count of Ribeira, and a Frenchman named Dainsaint; but the
latter was reputed to be an adventurer and received no official French
backing. However a number of Portuguese were interested, also some
foreigners including an Englishman named Sherman. The plan was to
place an island off the west coast of Africa at the disposition of the
company to serve as an entrepot for the trade in slaves with Brazil. Lumley
persuaded Sherman to withdraw, as he thought there was too much French
backing for the scheme, which would enable the French to compete with
the English merchants in the contraband trade. Nevertheless a company
called the Corisco Company was set on foot and traded for a time with
Angola in spite of the vehement opposition',of the Dutch and the prefer¬
ence of the Bahia merchants for slaves from the Guinea coast, where the
Portuguese since their expulsion a century earlier had played little part,
but from about 1727 were setting up again their post at Ajuda or Whydah.12
The Inquisition were very hot against Jews and in 1714 about a hundred
were expelled from Brazil; many of them were substantial sugar planters
and their elimination appreciably damaged the sugar trade. There were
constant complaints in Lisbon of British ships offering asylum to Jews
alleged to have run foul of the law or to owe money to the king. Some
of the fugitives were quite big fish who took their money with them to
follow eminent careers abroad. There was Gaspar Lopez, who fled to
Gibraltar and thence to Vienna, where he became a friend of the Empress
Maria Teresa, and as Count of Aguiar helped her to build Schonbrunn.
There was Da Costa Villareal, who escaped to England. The Inquisition
did not lose sight of them even there, and claimed a debt owing to one
Miguel Viana, who replied that it was a case of mistaken identity and that
he had lived in England for thirty years. Jews were careful to cover up
their tracks and often changed their names. The British government some¬
times expressed a mild humanitarian spirit. Newcastle observed ‘that acts
of humanity and compassion excused themselves and with no man alive
more than with the king our master, who among other great qualities
possesses in a sovereign a degree of good nature, yet the consequences
should be weighed, lest our pity to one should prove an injury to many
others’. The monarch allegedly so good natured was George I and New¬
castle was soon assuring the Portuguese minister Galva5 in his name
that ships’ captains were being ordered not to receive such people. It was
11 S. P. 89/28, Burnet, 3 March, 14 Oct. 1720.

12 S. P. 89/30, Lumley, 31 May 1723.
39
PORTUGAL.-4
DAVID FRANCIS
agreed that the official line was to support the Portuguese government
and not to receive on board anybody without a Portuguese passport. But
there were fat profits to be made out of refugees, and it was a pleasure to
defraud the Inquisition, so British officialdom continued to wink a good
deal at the practice.13
Many New Christians continued to enjoy protection until some mis¬
fortune or enmity exposed them. The unfortunates accused of Judaism at
Autos da Fe were now mostly poor wretches from the Tras os Montes and
frontier districts, where relicts of families evicted long ago preserved traces
of an old tradition. The Autos da Fe were still very popular spectacles and
at one held in June 1720 in the presence of the court at the Dominican
convent 24 men and 14 women were accused and a man and a woman
were burnt. Worsley was personally disposed to take a strong line; in
1717 he was reproved by the secretary of state in London for sending
a poor woman prosecuted by the Inquisition on board the Packet Boat,
and in 1720 he told Mendonga that a British warship was as good as
British soil and he would not return a Jew, who had taken refuge on one,
though he would send his effects on shore, if he owed money to the king.
He added that if Borges, the Portuguese minister in London, complained,
he should be told that the Portuguese were always giving asylum to British
sailors and deserters, and kidnapping British children.14 This was true, and
the Portuguese were particularly hard on Huguenots, and refused to
recognise their naturalisation. Whereas little support for the cases of Por¬
tuguese refugees was to be expected from home, those of British Subjects,
especially young people, kidnapped by zealous priests or friars, or seduced
by pious mothers of families, were defended tooth and nail, though seldom
with much success. The king of Portugal threatened to put a stop to the
Packet Boats altogether, if help continued to be given to refugees, so protests
had to be confined to clear cases of British Subjects.15
An interesting case was that of Marguerite, the small daughter of a
British merchant named Belange, probably a man of Huguenot origin. He
was a man of good standing, who had taken lodgings at a country villa
belonging to the Marquis of Marialva, the head of a leading family which
was traditionally liberal and friendly to the British, right up to the time
of Beckford two generations later. Also staying at the villa were Marialva’s
secretary, a priest, and a judge named Pedro de Freitas with his three small
children. Belange was pressed to let his seven-year-old daughter play with
13 s. P. 89/25, Worsley, 25 Oct., 30 Nov. 1717. S. P. 89/28, Worsley, 11 Nov.

1720. S. P. 89/32, Newcastle, 20 Sept., 15 Nov. 1726 and 21 Feb. 1727. o. s. Case
of Viana in S. P. 89/91.
14 S. P. 89/25, Worsley, 8 Jan. 1717. S. P. 89/28, Worsley, 15 Jan., 22 June,
Nov. 1720.
15 S. P. 89/28, Mendonga, 8 Nov. 1720. S. P. 89/37, Newcastle, 10 March 1730.
o. s. re Huguenots.
40
the children, and although he was reluctant to allow this, he was persuaded
by his wife to agree. On his return to town he took a house opposite
Worsley’s in order to gain a measure of protection; one day an empty
chaise with two mules drew up and parked near by; Marguerite wanted
to throw herself into it and told her mother that she had spoken with a
servant of Freitas named Rodriguez. A day or two later the child dis¬
appeared. Upon enquiry from Freitas Belange was told that his daughter
had come to no harm and that she would be sent home in ten days. A few
days later he was asked to send two friends, who spoke Portuguese, to
Freitas’s house, and he sent Peter Carney and Mr Auriol Junior. They were
shown a letter from the Marchioness of Marialva asking them to do their
utmost to get the child for her. Afterwards Belange was told that Mar¬
guerite was very happy with the Marchioness, who was the occasion of
her running away. Belange called at the marchioness’s country house and
was told that he would see Marguerite soon, but not just yet, as she was
at the Marialva’s town house. He then heard from the Marialvas that his
daughter would be returned in two weeks time. He saw her and was told
that he could stay with her, if he wished, and she begged his pardon and
asked to come back to him, but as he had business to do, he was obliged
to leave her in order to go home. When he went in a chaise a fortnight
later to pick her up, the child was brought to him by the Marchioness and
several attendants. Marguerite said she would come home with him, but
was taken away into another room, and he was then told that she did
not want to go home after all. Belange said that if the Marchioness was
taking the child, he hoped that he and his wife might be taken too. The
Marchioness replied that certainly he could have his daughter back, but
on condition that he and his wife, and his daughter too, became catholics!
When Mrs Belange tried to see the child, she was twice turned back, and
the third time was threatened by a servant with a stick. Belange was then
summoned by the Judge Conservator to appear at Marialva’s house, but the
three British merchants, whom he took with him, were turned back. He
was able to speak to Marguerite but she would only reply in Portuguese;
when he asked her questions about religion, which she did not understand,
the servants prompted her, and sometimes the Judge did the same, until
tiring of being put off with these set answers he left the room; his wife’s
request to embrace her daughter was refused. Sixty-one members of the
Factory signed a petition about the child and Worsley continued to needle
the secretary of state about her for close on two years, only at last to be
told that the child had only promised to go home out of fear, and as she
was now eight years old and had become a good catholic she had the
right to remain with the Marialvas. So presumably she did and no more
was heard of her. But such cases were not infrequent and show how in¬
flexible the Portuguese could be where religion was involved, even where
a man of the highest rank like the Marquis of Marialva was concerned, an
41
DAVID FRANCIS
‘estrangeirado’ described by our minister de Castres, some years later, as

one of the noblemen best disposed towards us.16
On matters of conscience the Portuguese were even more stubborn
than in mundane matters, but where treaty rights or the Portuguese law
were concerned, they could grudgingly make concessions. By the treaties
British Subjects were allowed freedom of worship; in Lisbon they had
diplomatic protection and could attend services in the legation chapel,
provided that they took care not to outrage the public. Burials had to be
conducted under cover of night between high and low tide mark, until in
Lisbon Consul General Poyntz in 1717 obtained permission to buy a plot
of land for a cemetery. In Oporto the local authorities denied the right
of the chaplain to conduct services at all and contended that the treaty
right to worship only covered family prayers. A long wrangle ensued which
eventually won the right for services to be held and for a building to be
used as a church, provided that it was well screened by a wall and that
no bell or other device was used which might attract public notice and
cause a disturbance. One of the principal trouble makers happened to be
a Spanish missionary friar, and at a time when Portuguese relations with
Spain were strained the king was moved to banish him and to agree to
appoint a new governor, who was less complaisant to catholic prejudices.17
To return to the subject of Brazil and of trade, the Portuguese were
very jealous of foreign infiltration, and trusted neither the British nor the
Dutch, though the integrity of Portuguese dominions overseas as well as
of the homeland was guaranteed by the 1703 treaties. This did not mean
that the Portuguese were less suspicious of the Spaniards, or of the French
who had attacked Rio de Janeiro in the late war and showed a disposition
to develop their trade in the South Seas. They were anxious to continue
doing so, and one of the results of this was to strengthen the determination
of the Portuguese to do away with all direct foreign trade with Brazil
and to begin by abolishing any privilege the British claimed there. In 1715
the Deputy British Consul at Aveiro reported that three French ships were
loading for Brazil and had on board a French consul with all his staff.
At this time Worsiley complained that the French had glutted the market
with their goods to the detriment of the British. On the other hand the
Portuguese Lisbon merchants complained that British goods were finding
their way directly to Brazil and were undercutting those passing through
their hands in Lisbon. Worsley formed the opinion that the direct trade
was a mistake; it might be profitable for one or two individuals but not
16 S. P. 89/28, Worsley, 15 Jan., Burnet, 27 Jan. and Lisbon Factory petition.

S. P. 89/29, Worsley, 13, 29 Sept. 1721.
17 S. P. 89/25, Poyntz, 30 April 1717. S. P. 89/26, Worsley, 7, 18, 30 Sept. 1718.
S. P. 89/28, Worsley, 20 Jan. 1720. Jackson, Oporto, 10 Jan. 1720, also S. P. 89/26,
petition of 14 Nov. 1718. S. P. 89/30, Lumley, 19 Feb. and Mendonca, 15 March
1723.
42
for the trade as a whole; for that the legal trade by way of Portugal was
best. He therefore recommended that H. M. Ships should be forbidden to
carry goods to Brazil. The French sometimes managed to steal a march
or two; in 1718 three French ships put into Bahia on pretence of careening
and managed to sell their cargoes there; a French subject evaded eviction
by securing a residence permit from higher authority in Lisbon. But
although Britain was allowed by the treaties to have four British merchants
in each of the principal ports. Da Cunha in 1718 already asked for them
to be removed; a long quarrel ensued, sometimes a residence permit was
renewed or prolonged; at others the Portuguese cited the names of cathol¬
ics, who had married locally and were almost naturalised Brazilians, as
proofs that the quota had already been filled. Gradually the privileges
were whittled away until neither British nor French were left in Brazil,
although the British continued to trade under cover of Portuguese agents,
and, until they too were forbidden, sent Portuguese commercial travellers,
who took stocks with them to sell directly and bought for the return
journey. Afterwards clandestine trade went on through supercargos with
the connivance of Portuguese governors and officials, but the Portuguese
agents often turned out to be Jews and involved their employers in trouble.
Gulston, a former consul, was allowed to return to Brazil in 1717, and
as late as 1723 one Johnson was permitted to return, if there was still a
vacancy in the quota, but otherwise no more was heard of British consuls
or British residents.18
The French won no exemption from the decree of 1716, which forbade
the entry of all foreign ships into the ports of Brazil for trade and in the
same year Worsley reported that British ships would no longer be allowed
to sail with the Brazil fleets, even if all duties were paid. But the crews
and officers could still be partly British and as late as 1721 Tempest Milner
is recorded as the owner of a Brazil bound ship, but he was the son of
a former British consul general and a resident of well-known Portuguese
connections. In 1722, when the firm of Browne were prosecuted for hiring
a ship to take freight for them to Brazil they found it expedient to sell
the ship to a Portuguese subject, rather than to take the case to the courts.
However British fears that the French would get more favourable treatment
were unjustified and French competition fell off. The Portuguese still
sometimes asked for British protection for their convoys; when this hap¬
pened in 1716 H. M. S. Dragon and Gloucester were sent to Lisbon for
the purpose, but this moved the French to make a counter-offer, and the
Queen of Portugal, who was regent, thought it prudent to accept neither
18 S. P. 89/23, Poyntz, 24 May 1715, Worsley, 10 May, 31 July, 12 Oct. 1715.

S. P. 89/24, Worsley, 24 Feb., 4 July, Poyntz, 4 Dec. 1716. S. P. 89/28, Worsley,
22 April 1720. S. P. 89/30, Lumley, 22 April 1723. In 1670 as many as 10/12 large
British ships traded annually to Brazil. C. Boxer, Golden Age, p. 24.
43
DAVID FRANCIS
offer. The Brazil fleet indeed arrived safely without protection. The British
Factory showed goodwill at this time by subscribing 10,000 cruzados
towards the cost of two ships for a convoy and another donation of
40,000 cruzados towards the king’s naval expenses. A British Subject
named William Warden was placed in charge of the royal dockyard and
held this post for a number of years.19
Even ships genuinely forced into Brazilian ports by stress of weather
were liable to be detained; such was the fate of the St Joseph in 1718; she
was sequestered; she received facilities from the governor of Bahia for
the safe-keeping of her freight but was only released after repeated protests;
yet there were rumours that three French ships from the East Indies had
been allowed to sell their cargos. Meanwhile the contraband trade went
on with a good deal of backing from the Brazilians, who were glad to
buy their goods cheap, while the officials took their rake off. The Brazilians
also fought the attempts of the Lisbon government to control the traffic
in gold. A 1720 decree ordered all gold, whether in coin, bars, or dust, to
be registered on pain of confiscation. An earlier decree had ordered all
gold to be brought to the official smelting houses, exempting only gold
dust used for currency in Minas Gerais. As governor the Count of Assumar
had orders to enforce these decrees, but the mining population revolted
against the long journeys entailed in carrying the gold to the mint or to
the smelting houses and to the expense, which was increased by the
corruption of the officials concerned. Two companies of dragoons were
sent from Portugal to keep order; for Portuguese troops they were very
well maintained and they were to play an important role in the future, but
for the time being the governor was obliged to give in. A few months
later with support from the Paulistas, Brazilian born elements, who hated
the ‘emboabas’, the Portuguese-born from whom most of the miners were
drawn, Assumar re-established the control of his government, repressing
the dissidents but tempering the wind by dropping his insistence that all
the gold should be brought to the smelting houses. Assumar’s successor
Laurenco Almeida governed Minas Gerais only, as Sao Paulo was made
into a separate province; he was ordered to take new measures to increase
the yield from the king’s fifths; he was a tolerant and tactful man and
managed this by persuading the local authorities to compound for the
annual tax by means of a payment of 30, later 37j, arrobas of gold; this
sum was first raised by a tax on each pan used for washing gold; the gold
was mostly alluvial gold; later he also contrived to set up smelting houses
and to establish in some measure the use of these. A good deal of dis¬
satisfaction remained, but there were no more serious insurrections and in
19 s. P. 89/23, Worsley, 18 Oct. 1715. S. P. 89/24, Worsley, 4 July 1716. S. P.

89/29, Worsley, 23 Oct. 1721. S. P. 89/24, Da Cunha, 11 July, o. s. 1718. Santarem,
Quadro Elementar, 18-287.
44
spite of the continuation of contraband, the returns from the royal fifths
improved.20
In Portugal the control of imports was tightened in 1722 by a decree
authorising pilots to board ships entering the Tagus to take declarations
about the cargoes. The decree also sought to restrict the access of consuls,
medical officers, and workmen or lightermen. Somewhat exceptionally all
the consuls in Lisbon united in a protest; these included consuls of Great
Britain, France, Denmark, Spain, Sweden and the United Provinces; as
a result the rigour of the new regulations was relaxed.21
In the 1720s, when Anglo-Portuguese trade reached a peak, about 80%
of British exports to Portugual consisted of textiles; the codfish trade
represented 7%, but in 1718 there were complaints that to be early in the
market the New England fishermen neglected the proper curing of the
fish and produced an inferior product to that brought by the French and
the Dutch. English pilchards could not compete with the Portuguese native
industry, but cod found a ready sale and eVen an overland market in the
adjacent Spanish provinces, although most of the fish for Spain went direct
to Spanish ports. Another secondary British export was com, which ranged
from between 7 to 12% at this period. Even the textile trade suffered from
complaints of shoddy goods, but such grouches, although chronic, do not
seem to have injured the trade as a whole.22
Portuguese exports to Britain remained at a lower level than imports,
though they increased in the 1720s. The chief export was wine, which at
its peak in the 1730s amounted to 88% of the total. Spain exported to
Britain about half as much at the outset but this proportion soon diminished
notably; Portuguese wines also fell from their peak but only by 1015%.
Lisbon wines at first provided a quarter of the total but were rapidly
outstripped by the Oporto wines and dropped to 10%. Other Portuguese
exports were cork, products used for dyes such as shumack, Brazilian
logwoods and hides, and southern fruits, of which more were exported
than from Spain and a surprising quantity from the north of Portugal.
Brazilian sugar mainly went to the Mediterranean and Brazilian tobacco to
Africa, where the natives preferred it to other tobacco and it was the staple
of exchange. An appreciable amount of Atlantic and African trade escaped
the statistics and could be credited to Portugal, but the major part of the
unfavourable balance with Britain was adjusted by the semi-clandestine ex¬
port of bullion from Lisbon.23
20 S. P. 89/26, Poyntz, 23 April 1718. S. P. 89/28, Worsley, 31 March 1720.

C. Boxer, Golden Age of Brazil, 93/6.
21 S. P. 89/30, Lumley, 8 Sept., Burnet, 4 Nov. 1722.
22 S. P. 89/26, Poyntz, 17 Sept. 1718. H. E. S. Fisher, The Portugal Trade,
116, 145.
23 A. D. Francis, The Wine Trade, 319/21.
45
DAVID FRANCIS
While the prevailing winds made it easy to sail to Africa directly, they
obliged those returning to go far out into the Atlantic. Communications
with America either way were comparatively easy, though ships outward
bound had to go as far as the Canaries, or at least Madeira, before heading
westward. This meant that the West African posts were in closer touch
with both Americas than with Portugal and that the efforts of the Lisbon
government to ban the sale of American products by direct trade with
West Africa were doomed to failure. Such products were largely used by
both British and Dutch and by the Portuguese for the purchase of slaves.
Angola, which was even more cut off from Europe and closer to Brazil,
supplied most of the slaves for Rio, but Bahia and the north of Brazil,
which were also cut off from the south of Brazil by wind and current, were
supplied largely from Guinea and the west coast, and were opposed to the
Corisco Company, which had an island in Gabon and nearer to Angola
as its base.24
For the past century the Factories at Lisbon and Oporto had played a
principal part in Anglo-Portuguese trade and had enjoyed greater privileges
than their French, Dutch, or Hamburger counterparts. There were also
small British communities in almost every Portuguese port. The Lisbon
Factory at its peak could command about a hundred signatures of senior
factors for its memorials; the British community in Lisbon included a
number of Irish and Catholic residents as well as temporary Protestant
residents; the total number was estimated to reach 2000. In the latter
years of Queen Anne Roman Catholics had sometimes belonged to the
Factory, but afterwards they seceded, largely in order to evade payment
of consulage; at this time their membership was not rejected; on the con¬
trary there was question of forcing them to pay consulage, but none of
them rejoined and soon their religion was agreed to be a bar to member¬
ship. The Oporto Factory could muster thirty or forty senior members and
was at this time from a third to a half the size of the Lisbon community.
The Factories’ expenses for administrative and charitable purposes were
defrayed from a tax on shipping known as consulage. The income from this
paid for the consular emoluments as well as those of the chaplain. In the
1690s the consul general had drawn about £1000 a year; his emoluments
increased in the prosperous 1720s but fell sharply during the wars with
Spain, particularly in the 1740s. In 1715 Worsley estimated that the con¬
sul general received about 9 milreis or three pounds from consulage on
every British ship, and the viceconsul three milreis, and that about fifty
ships entered Lisbon every month. The number of ships tended to rise and
the consulage from each ship remained the same through the century, but
from the increase of expenses and other causes the consular emoluments
24 F. Verger, Flux et Reflux de la Traite des Negres, Hague, 1968, caps. 4 & 5.
For Atlantic winds see J. H. Parry, Discovery of the Sea, 1975, 101/2.
46
tended to shrink. Even in Worsley’s time there were complaints that the
various fees collected for the expenses of the hospital and the chaplain,
and for the relief of British seamen and distressed subjects, were inadequate.
Foreign consignees were reluctant to pay the four reis per milreis chargeable
on the invoice value of British imports and the Factory proposed in 1715
that an act of parliament should impose a 10% duty on all goods freighted
by masters of British ships. Burnet in 1718 proposed an act similar to that
already in force for Cadiz should be passed, for at present not only Dutch
and other foreign importers on British ships eluded payment, but also Irish
and some English factors. He could take his case to the Portuguese courts,
but this would involve submitting the merchants’ books to the Portuguese
judges, which could not be thought of in view of the need to keep secret
all transactions involving the export of bullion. Therefore the whole burden
of consulage tended to fall on a dozen leading firms, who suffered the
more, as many British merchants consigned their goods to Dutch or Ham¬
burg consignees in order to avoid paying. §o he suggested an act of par¬
liament, which would oblige masters of ships to supply on oath a true
manifest of their cargo and to pay 4% on the freight of all goods itemised
in bills of lading and 200 reis per ton on all goods imported by weight
except barley, rice, and pulse which would pay 100 reis. The Treasurer
of the Factory would give a receipt for the consulage paid and the consul
would not give clearance to any ship without production of this. With the
funds thus collected the Factory would have money to defend all the cases
brought up to the Portuguese lower courts. If foreigners as well as British
paid the tax would average out at 2 reis the milreis. Under the present
system half the goods went to foreigners and the Factory was in debt to
its last Treasurer, to its legal adviser, and to its Judge Conservator. The
Judge Conservator had indeed examined some of the merchants, but they
had threatened to appeal to a higher court and he could do no more. An
act on the lines suggested, styled George I-VlIl-7, was indeed passed in
1721 and this improved the basis for collection, though it did not end all
the difficulties and evasions. However it was not easy to bypass the consul
and most merchants found it expedient to pay; they did so even in Cadiz,
where the Spanish government backed the claim of the Irish to exemption
and their payments were purely voluntary.25
The consul was the titular head of the British community. In Lisbon
he was a commissioned officer, though even in Lisbon until lately he had
tended to be a local man recommended by the Factory. When Thomas
Burnet was appointed from London in 1719, he was happy to get a good
reception, as some dissatisfaction had been expressed that neither Canfield
nor Tempest Milner, members of the Factory preferred by them, had been
25 S. P. 89/27, Burnet, 9 Oct. 1719. S. P. 89/28, Burnet, 5 May 1720. S. P. 89/28,

Worsley, 11 Jan., 8 March, 26 June 1715.
47
DAVID FRANCIS
chosen. Burnet made himself tolerably welcome, but his successors en¬
countered opposition and friction when they tried to assert their authority.
The Lisbon Consul General had authority to appoint the Deputy Consuls
in the smaller Portuguese ports and in the islands but the Lisbon Factory
tried to take from him the right to appoint vice consuls in Lisbon.26
The relations between the Factories and the Portuguese authorities
were more cordial than one would gather from the records, which give
details of the various quarrels but not of their regular co-operation. They
depended much on Brazil and it was the annual Brazil fleets which brought
the money to pay for most of the British goods sold, except in Oporto
where Portuguese wines and other exports did much to balance the trade.
All trade with Brazil had to be handled through Portuguese intermediaries,
and as the Factories grew in prosperity more and more of the donkey
work in Lisbon was done by Portuguese underlings rather than by their
British principals. Disputes with Portuguese Subjects were settled by the
Judge Conservator, who shared their common interests, for his emoluments
were drawn from the Factory’s business. The Portuguese were not above
using British facilities; they travelled on Packet Boats and British war ships,
and although the two Cardinals attending the inauguration of Pope Innocent
XIII in Rome travelled on a Portuguese man of war, their money amount¬
ing to 200,000 crowns was entrusted to FI. M. S. Winchelsea. British Sub¬
jects were often used for government contracts; for instance Arthur Stert
managed the commissariat and installations for the progress to the frontier
at the end of 1729 for the dual Spanish-Portuguese royal weddings. The
Portuguese were sometimes helpful and the Factory forgot its Protestantism
sufficiently to provide money for some years for ship’s captains to fire
a salute, as the Portuguese requested, when the king emerged from his
palace to join the Corpus Christi procession; the salute was to the Virgin
or the Host, but the Factory quieted their consciences by implying that it
was a diplomatic courtesy to the king and had no Romish significance.27
A period of comparative calm followed the Wingfield incident during
the mission of Thomas Lumley. At the outset he had some trouble with
the case of sailors from H. M. S. Lynn, the ship which was to take Worsley
to Barbados; they had been involved in a brawl but it turned out that
some Portuguese soldiers were mainly to blame, and even Mendonca
admitted this. As already mentioned a joint protest from the foreign
consuls secured a modification of the new customs law. The dispute about
freedom of worship in Oporto was far from settled, but at least the newly-
26 Add MSS 15946, John Milner to Craggs, 6 May 1719. S. P. 89/23, Lisbon
Factory memorial of 11 July 1715. S. P. 89/27, Burnet, 15 July, Jackson, 26 June
1719. S. P. 89/28, Burnet, 23 Dec. 1720.
22 S. P. 89/29, Burnet, 10, 27 May 1721. Add MSS 28130, Norris, 19, 20 March
1736. S. P. 89/35, Tyrawly, 30 May 1728. S. P. 89/33, Dormer, 6 April 1726 re
consulage.
48
appointed chaplain Pakenham was allowed to take up residence there,

though Lumley had to warn him to proceed with great caution.28
Brigadier James Dormer was appointed to succeed Lumley early in 1725
and after a delay due to illness arrived in August. He was a soldier who
had served with distinction in the War of the Spanish Succession, and was
promoted to be a Major General while he was in Lisbon. Before leaving
London he had to deal with the quarrel with the Post Office about the
control of the Packet Boat and on arrival he was called upon to dissuade
Portugal from agreeing to guarantee the Pragmatical Sanction. The Emperor
Charles VI was very anxious to secure the succession to the empire for
his daughter Maria Teresa and was trying to conclude commercial treaties
with Spain and with Portugal. He was particularly anxious because at that
time he planned to marry Maria Teresa, then eight years old, to Don Carlos,
eldest son of the reigning queen of Spain and of King Philip by his second
marriage.
Portugal was also negotiating with Spain about a commercial alliance,
but was frustrated by the outstanding disputes regarding the colony of Nova
Colonia, or Sacramento, on the River Plate, and the three ships from Bue¬
nos Aires confiscated at the beginning of the War of Spanish Succession.
However Spain at this juncture was embarrassed by the jilting of the In¬
fanta Mariana Vitoria, who at three years of age had been sent to be
educated in France to become in due course the bride of Louis XV; for
political reasons it became advisable to marry off Louis XV much earlier
and perforce to some other princess; Mariana was back in Spain and
again on her parents hands. They were anxious to find another fiance for
her and therefore agreed to betroth her to the heir of Portugal, Dom Jose,
Prince of Brazil. The Portuguese were eager for the match, the Spaniards
less so, and it hung fire for some time. The Portuguese were anxious
therefore to conciliate Spain. With England Spanish relations remained
chancy; the Gibraltar question always festered and indeed was working
up to another siege, which took place between February and June 1727.29
A by-product of the general international situation was the secret
approach made by the Infante Dom Francisco to Dormer. In April 1726
Dormer, at the request of a Dominican friar sent to him by Dom Fran¬
cisco, agreed to meet the prince on board H. M. S. Gloucester; he was
fond of visiting warships so this could be arranged without attracting
notice. Dormer found no opportunity for a private talk at the meeting on
board, but later received a message asking him to a cloak-and-dagger
assignment at a back door of the palace at seven o’clock in the evening.
28 S. P. 89/30, Lumley, 8 Sept., 19 Dec. 1722. Burnet, 4 Nov., Lumley, 5 Nov.

1722. Burnet, 18 March 1723.
29 Hills, Rock of Contention, 262 et seq. S. P. 89/32, Memo from Dormer,
30 June 1725. Post Office, 9 July 1725. Whitehall memo of 22 July 1725. Newcastle
to Dormer, 16 Aug., 15 Sept. Cambridge Modern History.
49
DAVID FRANCIS
Dom Francisco opened the door himself and Dormer had a long talk with
him, but it was confined to expressions of the prince’s good will towards
England, and his fear that King John might be persuaded to side with
Spain against England. However there was another meeting at which he
came to the point, which was that he was anxious for his agent in London,
a certain Joseph Salpico de Moraes, now resident in Suffolk Street, to be
granted an audience by King George to speak of a most secret matter. At
another interview he said that he had heard that Lord Townshend was
willing to help and asked Dormer to recommend this to him. It transpired
eventually that the Infante aspired to propose to an English princess.
Dormer in his report advised tact in dealing with the prince, as he was
very pro-English and could be helpful, but he was careful to avoid being
implicated. The Infante let drop to Dormer that he had been criticised by
his brother the king for being pro-English and that his friend the Patriarch,
upon seeing seven Portuguese ships in the Tagus out of the palace window,
had remarked how splendid it would be if they could join with a French
squadron to put the Pretender on the throne, but he himself only wished
that a British squadron would come to Lisbon to deter King John from
throwing in his lot with Spain.30 Admiral Jennings did come to Lisbon
towards the end of 1726 and was cordially received, though at Cadiz a
little later he had a chilly welcome. But on his return journey, when he
entered the Tagus with eight ships, two above the number stipulated by
treaty, the Spaniards protested and the Portuguese showed some uneasiness,
particularly when Jennings’s stay had to be prolonged owing to bad weather.
It is not clear how far all these proceedings with Dom Francisco were
unknown to King John. It is probable that the king knew something, and
it was one of the many reinsurance measures he countenanced, for Dormer
heard from London that the Portuguese minister had wind of them.31
Intrigues involving the king’s brothers were not confined to Dom Francis¬
co. When King John was negotiating at length about a cardinal’s hat for
the Nuncio Bicchi, the Spaniards suggested that the Infante Dom Manoel,
who had passed through Madrid on his way back to Portugal after his
long exile in Austria, should be given the red hat. King lohn had embraced
his brother upon his return and had professed himself reconciled, but
disapproved of a ne’er-do-well being made a cardinal and proposed Dom
Antonio, his favourite younger brother, instead. To stress his preference
for Antonio he raised his allowance from 80,000 to 100,000 crowns and
let him have a new palace he had been building for his heir Dom Jose
and his Spanish bride, but failed to win for him the red hat.
30 S. P. 89/33, Interviews with Dom Francisco, Dormer, 21 April, 8 May, 16

June, 2 July, 17, 21 Aug. 1726.
31 Regarding Jennings, S. P. 89/32, Newcastle, 20 Sept., o. s., Dormer 23 March,
14 Oct. Burnet, 7, 23 Dec. 1726. S. P. 89/34, Dormer, 14 Oct. 1726.
50
At the outset of his mission Dormer took pains to cultivate the Por¬
tuguese nobility and in June 1726 gave a lavish party attended by many of
them and by all the foreign ministers. He was therefore embarrassed by
incidents soon afterwards which embroiled most of his noble friends with
the king and resulted in the exile of a number of them to the Portuguese
provinces or even further afield. A servant of Luis Cesar Meneses, a son
of the governor of Bahia, had been arrested for gambling while waiting
outside the Spanish theatre for his master, who with a number of friends
was watching the performance. Luis Cesar protested furiously to the ma¬
gistrate, who was then obliged by the whole party of nobles to release his
prisoner. The king as soon as he heard of this had Cesar arrested and
confined in the common prison pending a judicial enquiry. After the lapse
of some months, during which nobles had committed more acts of violence,
all those implicated, thirty in number, were sent out of Lisbon, while
Cesar himself was exiled to Mazagad in Morocco for five years. Those
sentenced included several distinguished names, such as the elder Count
of Ericeira, the young Count of Assumar, eight counts and two canons of
the Patriarchal chapel. Some of them were pardoned or their sentences
remitted later, but the obstreperous faction had been soundly castigated
and Dormer remarked that he would have to look for a new lot of friends.32
Dormer stopped entertaining and when he had to go into mourning
for the death of George I sold his servants’ liveries. The Consul General
Thomas Burnet on the other hand went on entertaining the younger
members of the nobility. He was a younger son of Gilbert Burnet, the
bishop of Salisbury, and might well have been minister himself, if his
Whiggish father had survived. A former man about town he had the
reputation of having been a Mohawk and was inclined to be brash; as
Consul General in a great commercial centre he held a position of im¬
portance, even vis-a-vis the minister, particularly in time of peace when
trade prevailed over politics. He liked to live it up and to behave more like
a minister than a consul. He reported on political matters as well as on
consular business and was rather encouraged to do so by the secretary of
state. He had been told to treat Worsley with respect and he did not fall
out either with him or with Lumley. Although he tended to duplicate the
ministers’ despatches, this was not noticed in Lisbon, as his office was
separate from the legation and he was authorised to correspond directly
with the secretary of state and the admiralty. There was no need in quiet
times for him to have much to do with the legation and when Lumley
was absent on leave, Cayley, the consul at Cadiz, came to take charge.
For six or seven years and until the arrival of Dormer, a somewhat
peppery old soldier, there was no trouble. As men of some social and even
32 Regarding Infante Manoel, S. P. 89/33, Dormer, 14 Oct., Burnet, 7, 23 Dec.

1726. S. P. 89/34, Dormer, 10 Jan. 1727, Burnet, 21 Feb. 1727.
51
DAVID FRANCIS
literary pretensions Dormer and Burnet might have found something in

common, but Dormer was not the man to tolerate an uppish subordinate,
and he took grave offence when Burnet failed to inform him urgently
about the visit of a British squadron in August 1726. The Commodore,
Lord Vere Beauclerc, received, as soon as he arrived, fresh orders by the
Packet, and decided to sail to Gibraltar next morning and not to wait to
see Dormer, who was spending a few days at Cintra. Burnet explained that
he had forwarded all the mail from the packet, but had not sent a special
message about the naval squadron, as he had no orders to do so. Dormer
sent a very rude reply and Burnet wrote to the Duke of Newcastle to say
that he had always tried to be on good terms with Dormer, but the situation
had become impossible. Newcastle, who was a friend of both men, tried
to appease Dormer, and at the same time told Burnet that the king was
satisfied with his services and he would try to find him a new post, but
meanwhile he must co-operate with Dormer.33 Burnet managed to see Dor¬
mer, but he was not even offered a chair, and was only told by Dormer
that to please Newcastle he would correspond officially with him, but
would not have anything else to do with him. Meanwhile King George
died, and when the time came for the new king’s coronation Burnet felt
that the Portuguese nobility, whom he regularly entertained, would expect
some celebration. As Dormer showed no sign of doing anything he made
preparations to give a party. Dormer perhaps was embarrassed whom to
invite in view of the cloud which hung over most of his Portuguese friends
and also by the fact that the new uniforms for his staff had not yet
arrived: Burnet had perhaps snapped up the old ones. Hearing that Burnet
was going to give a party he voiced his objections and Tempest Milner, a
senior member of the Factory, wrote to warn Burnet that Dormer would
take grave offence. Burnet then wrote to Dormer to suggest that if he were
not giving a party himself he would perhaps do him the honour to come
as his principal guest at his party and might feel inclined to give his own
party a little later on the occasion of the king of Portugal’s birthday.
Dormer replied angrily that he would not tolerate Burnet’s impudence and
that in no circumstance would he accept his hospitality. In spite of this
Burnet not only gave his party, but entertained the nobility for a second
time for the king of Portugal’s birthday. This was a great success and did
not break up until two in the morning. Heedful of Dormer’s dire threats
Burnet had taken care not to go without protection from his house, which
was only about a hundred yards from the legation, to his office in town,
but he did not reckon on being attacked in broad daylight, as he was
getting into his chaise the morning after his second party to go to wish
the king of Portugal many happy returns of the day. Headed by White,
the secretary of legation, on horseback with a drawn sword, a posse of
33 S. P. 89/33, Dormer, 15 June, 11, 14, 19 July 1726.
52
Dormer’s servants dragged Burnet from his chaise, severely pummelled him
and wounded him; he was found by his servants lying prostrate as a
corpse; indeed it took him several weeks to recover. He had already been
notified that the Hon. Charles Compton was coming out to succeed him,
but had not been ordered home. He had sent copies of his complaint to
Newcastle, Lord Townshend and Sir Robert Walpole. But he behaved
discreetly in Lisbon and did not give any evidence to the two Portuguese
judges sent to interrogate him after the attack. However the facts were
public knowledge and deeply shocked the Portuguese court and the king.
Dormer was declared ‘persona non grata’, but he refused to budge until
he had orders from home to do so and expostulated that he had never
intended to murder Burnet, but only to thrash him. The orders for Dor¬
mer’s recall arrived on the same boat as Compton, the new consul general,
but as he had heard nothing of the attack or of its denouement Compton
accepted an invitation from Dormer to stay with him, before Burnet could
contact him. He called on Burnet, but was escorted by Dormer’s servants
and was asked if he came in future, to come alone. He did not call again,
but meanwhile Burnet was in Portuguese eyes charge d’affaires and indeed,
as Burnet pointed out, Compton was not consul general until his patent
had been officially shown to the Portuguese and his exequatur granted.
However Dormer left and Burnet followed as soon as he was fit to travel.
He was not given another foreign post, but pursued a successful career in
the law, which eventually brought him a judgeship and a knighthood. He
had been popular with the Portuguese and the scandal did no good. The
Factory also, which had tolerated Burnet, were encouraged in their distaste
for London-appointed consuls and in their aspirations to run their own
affairs. Troubles between consul and factory, and between factory and
minister increased, and though in 1729 the chilly attitude experienced at
first by the new minister Lord Tyrawly was mainly due to King John’s
preoccupation with Spain, the lowering of British prestige caused by the
unseemly incident contributed to it.34
Lord Tyrawly was also a military man with a warm temper and a
caustic tongue, but he had character and charm and great persistence. He
remained thirteen years as minister in Lisbon and made two more official
visits there in 1751 and 1762; for the next thirty years he was regarded
in Whitehall as the great authority on Portugal, so something needs to be
said of his character and background. The 1st Lord Tyrawly is best known
for his association with the looting at Cadiz in 1701, but he had a res¬
pectable and distinguished military career and ended up as commander
34 S. P. 89/33, Burnet to Townshend, Newcastle and Walpole, 16 Aug. Dormer

to Delafaye, 17 Aug. and private to Newcastle 17 Aug., Burnet to Townshend, 25
Oct., Dormer to Newcastle two of 3 Nov., 26 Nov., 23 Dec. 1726. Burnet to New¬
castle, 16 Aug., 20 Sept., 25 Oct. 1727. Milner to Burnet, 14 Oct. Burnet to Dormer,
15 Oct. 1727. Egerton, M. S., 921, Dormer, 23 Oct. 1727.
53
DAVID FRANCIS
in chief in Ireland. His only son James was gazetted to his father’s regiment,
the Royal Fusiliers, when he was a child, and first saw active service as
a lieutenant at the age of sixteen with the Barcelona expedition in 1705.
He was an Aide de Camp to Lord Galway at the battle of Almanza
in 1707 and rescued him on the stricken battlefield from an enemy sword
thrust. He was also an Aide de Camp to Marlborough at Malplaquet and
again distinguished himself by his gallantry but was severely wounded.
He was not fit for service for some time, but became well known as a
man about town and a Don Juan. He also perhaps found time for some
mild studies, particularly of the law. He saw some active service in Italy
and Sicily in 1719 and by this time his father had given him the colonelcy
of his regiment, the Royal Fusiliers; he had also as a colonel become an
Aide de Camp to King George I in 1717; this could be only an honorary
post, but he served some time personally on the king and also as a di¬
plomatic courier to Italy. In 1721 he was made an Irish peer with the
title of Lord Kilmaine. Even though Irish peerages were sometimes cheap,
this seems a handsome reward for the gallantry of a young captain at
Malplaquet, ten years before, the only reason given in his patent. Through¬
out his life he retained a gift for enjoying the friendship of the right people
and the warm sponsorship of men like Marlborough and Galway may have
gained him the peerage as a sort of consolation prize for the firm refusal
of the king to give the colonelcy of a regiment of horse guards, for which
he had petitioned, to so young a person. The promotion may however have
been a step to ease his succession to his father’s peerage. There is some
evidence in the O’Hara family papers that James O’Hara was only the
adopted son of Lord Tyrawly, though an O’Hara by birth and indeed a
much closer connection of the old family of the O’Haras of Leyney than
Lord Tyrawly himself, whose birth was obscure. When the first Lord
Tyrawly died in 1724 no question was raised, but only a change of title
was involved.35
James O’Hara had expensive tastes and had accumulated a load of
debt, with which he fought a losing battle for the whole of his life. But
his father seemed prosperous enough and no doubt he set his hopes on his
heritage. In any case his indigence did not prevent him abducting a lovely
but penniless school girl named Miss Seal, who was a vague protegee of
the former Barbara Churchill, for many years more than a mistress though
less than a wife of the Duke of York, later James II, and now the respect¬
able wife of Colonel Godfrey; Kilmaine lived conjugally with this girl in
an apartment at Somerset House and introduced her to his friends as his
35 For the background of Tyrawly the principal sources are the Tyrawly papers
arranged by Charles Rainsford, Add MSS 23627/9 and the State Papers, S. P. 89/39
to 48, also the O’Hara family papers in Northern Ireland calendered at Hist. MSS.
Commission.
54
wife. In 1724 Lord Tyrawly died, but rascally stewards and perhaps losses
in South Sea Stock had made inroads on his fortune, so after his widow
and only daughter had been provided for James came in for much less than
he expected. The only solution was to find and wed an heiress. He fixed
on the Hon. Mary Stewart, only daughter of Lord Mountjoy. Miss Seal,
who was in the process of giving birth to a son, heard of this and wrote
to Lord Mountjoy, but too late to prevent the new Lord Tyrawly eloping
with his daughter. Miss Seal indignantly ran back to her mother and Lady
Tyrawly was installed at Somerset House. To his dismay Tyrawly then
realised not only that his wife was plain and short sighted but that there
was little fortune attached to her. He passionately besought Miss Seal to
return to him, but she had gone to Dublin to seek a career on the stage;
she was introduced to society by the kindness of Tyrawly’s sister Miss
O’Hara, and for a time her novelty won her some success. Meanwhile
Tyrawly, who continued to be Aide de Camp to the new king George II,
was offered by him the post of minister aC Lisbon. After much haggling,
which secured a dowry of £4000, he made it up with Lady Tyrawly and
they both reached Lisbon in the spring of 1728. But they soon found that
their only bond in common was a mutual dislike of Portugal and Lady
Tyrawly returned to the apartment in Somerset House, where she spent
the remainder of her life. Miss Seal, hearing of this, repented of her scornful
rejection of Tyrawly’s passionate pleadings and unexpectedly turned up in
Lisbon. Tyrawly welcomed her, but did not invite her to the legation,
putting her up in a boarding house. There she met a sea captain, Bellamy,
who disillusioned her about Tyrawly, who had now found a Portuguese
lady named Dona Anna to keep him company. Miss Seal promptly married
Bellamy and set sail for Ireland, but Tyrawly had already implanted another
pledge of his affections, and when Bellamy realized this, he walked out
and was no more heard of. The child became the famous actress George
Anne Bellamy, who was recognised by Tyrawly as his daughter and in her
prime was able to be very helpful to him.
Little is known of Dona Anna. It appears that she had been a de¬
pendent in some Portuguese noble household, probably a poor relation.
In the course of his Lisbon mission she presented Tyrawly with a number
of children, assisted it appears by one or two other ladies. Portuguese wives
were very restricted socially; as a mistress Dona Anna was perhaps
slightly better off; no doubt she knew the court gossip and had the run
of the priest-ridden backstairs of some noble houses; she reconciled Tyrawly
to Portuguese ways and was probably useful. A tailor’s bill survives for a
new uniform Tyrawly ordered when he became a major general; he also
ordered a get-up with brass buttons for Dona Anna, so probably she was
able to figure at Tyrawly’s bachelor parties. Tyrawly’s domestic arrange¬
ments were never a drawback to him in Portugal, nor was his somewhat
55
PORTUGAL.-5
DAVID FRANCIS
exaggerated reputation as a womaniser, celebrated by Pope; rather the

contrary.36
Tyrawly found the king in a bad mood at the delays of the Spaniards
in completing the arrangements for the royal weddings, and inaccessible to
anybody save the Spanish ambassador. At first he followed Burnet’s example
and tried to cultivate the nobles; he asked to be made an earl, as this
would help his prestige, particularly if he had to attend the royal weddings.
This was refused and he was told he need not attend the weddings, which
were to be held at the Spanish frontier. He soon came to the conclusion
that the nobles were expensive guests and that there was little profit in
running after them, as their influence was waning. Burnet had observed
that their vineyards supplied the Lisbon wine trade; however the Lisbon
trade was already outstripped by that of Oporto, where peasant- and
church-owned vineyards predominated.37
Despite the royal weddings, at the time of Tyrawly’s arrival in 1729,
or soon after, there was a prospect of war with Spain; he had hopes of
joining his regiment at Gibraltar and of seeing active service. The Spaniards
had besieged Gibraltar in 1727, but they found that lacking the com¬
mand of the sea they could not take the fortress by a mere bombardment.
They did not give up their designs, but were diverted for the time being
by the Italian ambitions, which obsessed Isabel Farnese, queen of Spain.
So they agreed to negotiations which ended in 1729 with a convention
with Britain. Meanwhile the weddings of the Prince of Brazil to the still
juvenile Infanta Mariana Vitoria and of the Prince of the Asturias to the
Portuguese Infanta Barbara, at last took place. Mariana was twelve. Bar¬
bara was eighteen. She was bedizened with jewels, but her plump little
figure, her dark complexion, her small eyes and thick lips were not very
attractive. Benjamin Keene, British minister at Madrid, attended the wed¬
ding and placed himself near enough to have a good look at her; he thought
that the bridegroom’s face fell, when for the first time he confronted her,
and that the Spaniards would never compliment her on her beauty, though
they might appreciate what her Portuguese warmth and German fertility
might bring them. He was proved wrong. Her fertility only produced
daughters, but she won the love of her husband and of the Spanish people
by her charm and by her great love of music. These alliances did in future
years improve Spanish Portuguese relations, but their effect for the in-
mediate future was disappointing. Mariana also had daughters rather than
sons but she won her husband’s affections; she was a fetching little person
36 S. P. 89/35, Arthur Stert to Delafaye, 14 Jan., Tyrawly to Newcastle, 30 May,

25 Oct. 1728. S. P. 89/37, Tyrawly to Delafaye, 15 June 1733. For something of
Tyrawly’s private life see The Enchanting Bellamy, C. H. Hartmann, 1956, and
Apology for my Life, G. A. Bellamy, 6 vols., 1785. The tailor’s bill is in corr. with
Newcastle, 1 March 1741, Add MSS 32802.
37 S. P. 89/37, Tyrawly, 13 March 1730.
56
and long remained so, as that connoisseur the Hon. Augustus Hervey
noticed twenty years later. Her passions were hunting and music, both of
which she shared with Prince Joseph and in middle age she became a
tanned and weather beaten figure, most at home in an ancient pair of
leather breeches, which she scarcely troubled to hide under her skirt. It
was some three years before King John could put this small girl to bed
with Prince Joseph and no sons ensued, but he became a devoted father-
in-law. Meanwhile the weddings gave him full scope for his love of
magnificence. All the nobility escorted him to the frontier and a huge
palace was put up half way to accommodate them. Arthur Stert got the
lucrative contract for the commissariat arrangements. The nobles, who
had spent their fortunes to make a good presence, were almost frozen to
death for their pains; it was January and Keene remarked that, although
the district was renowned as the frying pan of Europe, he found it so cold
that he could not hold his pen.38 s
Soon after the exchange of princesses an incident occurred, which
rivalled the Wingfield case. The Brazil fleet was weighing anchor and
during the general commotion a large Portuguese merchant ship lost con¬
trol and was carried down the line of ships, colliding with two Portuguese
ships and then with H. M. S. Lowestoft at anchor. The Portuguese paid
no heed to shouts of advice, and in order to save his ship and prevent
both ships being carried by the current on to the shore and utterly lost
Captain Norris was obliged to order the masts and rigging of the Portuguese
ship to be cut down. The captains of Dutch war ships and of merchant
ships near by unanimously testified that Norris took the only course open
to him and the accident was the fault of the Portuguese ship; but the Por¬
tuguese on shore only saw a Portuguese ship apparently being attacked
and were highly incensed. Perhaps some Portuguese captains might have
backed Captain Norris, but presumably they had all gone to sea with the
Brazil fleet. An embargo was placed on the Lowestoft and the fort fired
on two British ships attempting to leave the river and obliged them to put
back. It was expected that a general embargo would be imposed and
Tyrawly was highly indignant. He wrote, ‘though I have long been prepar¬
ing Your Grace not to be surprised at any insolence you might hear from
the court of Portugal to the king our master’s subjects, yet I do not
apprehend they were altogether so ripe for breaking with us, as I find
they are, and their last proceedings, of which I am going to have the honour
of acquainting you I think can admit of no other construction’. No embargo
was in fact imposed, though the Lowestoft was still detained. Tyrawly
himself said that if the case had been submitted to the Portuguese courts
38 S. P. 89/91, Tyrawly’s offer for active service, 9 June, 17 July 1730. S. P.

89/37, Tyrawly, 13 March 1730, Hills, Rock of Contention, 262 et seq. S. P. 94/
226, Keene to Newcastle, 20 Jan. 1729.
57
DAVID FRANCIS
* V >,
Norris would have been acquitted. But it would have been unthinkable to
submit the captain of a British warship to the mercies of a foreign court.
Queen Caroline, as regent during the absence of King George in Hanover,
was stiff enough on the matter of principle and the dignity of the flag; she
insisted that H. M. S. Lowestoft should be allowed to sail, but offered to
pay full compensation for any damage done to the Portuguese ship. GalvaS,
the Portuguese minister in London, was inclined to blame Tyrawly for
taking so firm a line. This was scarcely fair, for although Tyrawly was
burning to use force, his reports were objective and he was perfectly civil
in his talks with Mendonca. But when the king refused to release the
Lowestoft until compensation had been paid, and Captain Norris recalled
and punished, he vented his personal feelings to Newcastle. 'The Portuguese
are more impertinent than ever. They will continue until I have directions
to tell them that if they don’t release the ship and make some satisfaction
for the insult, a squadron will come and make them doe it; the moment
that is said to them, they will be frightened out of the small stock of wits
God has given them, just as it happened in the case of Wingfield, but
depend upon it, they will stand stiff as long as people will suffer them to
do it and not a minute longer.’39
Newcastle found Galvao difficult and allowed Tyrawly to complain of
him to Mendonca, who agreed, but was unable to move the king. However,
eventually, perhaps because the access of pride following the Spanish
marriage was dissipating, the king agreed to release the ship, if compen¬
sation was paid at once and an enquiry into Captain Norris’s conduct was
assured. Tyrawly ruefully drew bills for 10,000 cruzados, £1437.10.0, and
deposited them personally with the Judge Conservator. But he could not
believe that the case was really settled. He wrote ‘one would imagine when
people obtain all they ask, affairs are all at an end, but that is not the way
of His Portuguese Majesty, for though I am ordered to pay the money when
the ship shall be released, and have promised that the captain’s conduct
shall be looked into, I am not quite without apprehension that seeing we
have yielded them so much, they will now insist on having the money paid
before they set the ship at liberty. I hope it will not come to this, but I
assure you I am under some apprehensions of it’. He added a P. S. that
he had just had a note from Mendonca announcing the release of the ship,
but still wrote ‘I am heartily glad that this vexatious and tedious affair is
over, but we have been so very complaisant on our side that I am very much
mistaking, if we are all long quiet. I will say further and put myself down
to the Tryal, that if I have not some new wrangle within these three
months, I will be contented to know nothing of Portugal or the Portuguese,
39 S. P. 89/35, Tyrawly to Newcastle, private, 2 June, 26 June, 17 July, 7, 28

Aug., 9 Sept., 21 Oct. 1729.
58
but if I should prove to be in the right, I shall then expect that you all
acknowledge at the cockpit that you know nothing of them’.40
As it happened Tyrawly was wrong, for no particular incident arose
in the next few months. But Tyrawly was perfectly right in the sense that
the Portuguese always stood up for themselves, and that once the king had
made up his mind nothing less than the despatch of the fleet would shake
him, and even then some face-saving way out had to be found. But the
British government thought that a bill for 10,000 cruzados was a consider¬
able saving on the cost of sending a fleet and were prepared to continue
a policy of appeasement, as long as only an individual case was concerned
and no matter of principle was involved. Tyrawly learnt to appreciate this
and that the Portuguese, though tenacious of their rights, were willing to
respect the law, and that even the king could be reasonable if he were
approached before he had taken his decision. He therefore began a serious
study of Portuguese ways and personalities. The gloved hand would of
course have had no success, if the king of Pbrtugal had not been prepared
to grasp it. Having achieved the much desired Spanish marriage and
approached the culmination of the great work at Mafra King John for the
first time had leisure to turn to other matters, particularly the question of
Brazil. Though deeply suspicious of any British presence in Brazil he still
had to rely in the last resort upon the British fleet for its protection and
that of the Brazil fleets, and for help against Spain and France both in
Europe and overseas. So although many incidents involving trouble with
Britain flared up and proved hard to settle, settled in the end they had
to be. In 1731 there was the case of Captain Only of H. M. S. Lively and
then of Auriol and Pratviel. Captain Only was arrested during a brawl
on the water front; he was released but it took a year before the ship’s
boat and the arrested members of the crew were freed. The case of Auriol
and Pratviel, leading British merchants, involved the possession of some
gold dust believed to have been smuggled; Tyrawly intervened personally
to resist the arrest of Auriol by an officer without a proper warrant, but
drove him round to the secretary of state, where he agreed to his voluntary
surrender to custody and afterwards secured a settlement without ill
feeling.41
Though Tyrawly continued to grumble and to ask for another post he
was in reality settling down with Dona Anna and his growing Portuguese
family and working to continue his modus vivendi with Portugal. He com¬
plained that we fell between two stools by being neither sweet nor sour;
he would prefer to be sour, but if this was not agreed, we should study
the best way of finding an accommodation, and this in fact might be easier
40 S. P. 89/35, Tyrawly, 19, 21 Oct. 1729. S. P. 89/36, Newcastle to Tyrawly,

12 Oct. 1731, o. s.
41 S. P. 89/37, Tyrawly, 12 Jan., 10, 12 March, 17 June 1732.
59
DAVID FRANCIS
with the Portuguese than with the Factory, who were becoming increasingly
tiresome about their grievances, and inclined to voice them through their
friends in parliament, which at least the king of Portugal could not do.
He studied the Portuguese laws and took particular pains to ensure that
the best man possible was appointed Judge Conservator and that he was
on good terms with him. Belchior de Rego Andrade, conservator until his
death in 1738, was also attorney general. He was of good family and a
leading man in the legal profession. His successor Ignacio da Costa Quin-
tella was one of the editors of the encyclopaedia of Portuguese law being
prepared for publication. Tyrawly made a habit of consulting the Con¬
servator about all disputes concerning British Subjects which were likely
to come up, and of refusing to back them unless they were deemed to have
a good chance of success in the courts. This sort of work really lay more in
the province of a consul than of a minister, and in 1732 Tyrawly gave his
views in a long despatch to Newcastle. ‘A consul,’ he said, ‘should be an
attorney and solicitor to his nation and be well acquainted with the laws
of the country where he resided, and with the forms and proceedings of
the various tribunals. He should also, if possible, cultivate the friendship
of the chief judges of these tribunals, for all our merchants’ business passed
through them eventually and from the nature of it could not do otherwise.’
He said that the present Consul General Compton was a nice enough man,
but not fitted for such duties, as he knew no Portuguese and very little
about commerce. This was unkind, for Compton wrote sensible enough
despatches, even if he had to depend on other people for his information;
but Tyrawly believed that the merchants had no confidence in him and
that as a result cases were passed on to the legation in a half baked state
or insoluble condition, though they might easily have been settled at the
outset, if they had been competently handled. Tyrawly even suggested that
consular and diplomatic affairs might be directed by one hand; in fact he
intervened in a number of commercial matters himself, if they were likely
to give rise to diplomatic trouble or to be dealt with in the Portuguese
courts.42
Portuguese law was slow and tedious, but it eventually ground out
justice according to its own precepts and it provided a sort of brake for
the king, who was able to save himself in a tight corner such as that of
the Wingfield case, by saying he would consult some learned men. But the
king was often the prime mover in such cases and it was important for
Tyrawly to find some means of knowing his moods and of establishing
contact with him. Fortunately after the completion of Mafra and of the
Spanish marriages the king became more interested in foreign affairs,
largely on account of the threat offered by Spain to the expansion of his
42 S. P. 89/37, Tyrawly, 8 Feb., 12 Nov. 1731, 6 June 1732.
60
empire in Brazil. From time to time he needed British help, so when

Tyrawly made efforts to get into touch with the king he was met half way.
At the time of the incident with Captain Only Tyrawly was at Caldas,
a watering place frequented by the court about sixty miles north of Lisbon.
He made friends there with a Jesuit, a confidant of the king, probably Father
Carbone, who had been employed to study latitudes and longitudes in
Brazil, but had been retained by the king to do confidential work and to
supervise an observatory. He was of great help to Tyrawly in settling an
affair in which one of his footmen had killed a Portuguese magistrate.
A complaint had been lodged in London, but Tyrawly was able to produce
evidence that his servant had acted in self-defence and to clear himself
with the king.
Tyrawly never mentioned the names of his contacts, but judging by the
way in which Castres eulogised Carbone on his death in 1750 he was
known to be well disposed towards us. He was an important person some¬
times described as the chief of the invisible ministers. In any case in
June 1732 this Jesuit broached to Tyrawly a subject of deep interest to
the king. Having secured a cardinal’s hat for the Nuncio he was now
preparing another battle of protocol to confirm the precedence of his
secretary of state as an Excellency, entitled to the first call by accredited
ambassadors. It was suggested that Tyrawly ought to be an ambassador,
and if he became one he could help by making such a first visit, and thus
creating a precedent.
Tyrawly was naturally delighted to fall in with this idea and recom¬
mended it to Newcastle, pointing out that he was not moved by personal
ambition but by the conviction that it would be a great help to him in his
official duties. The queen, who was acting as regent at the time during
the absence of the king in Hanover, inspired the reply that nobody was
more conscious than King George of the importance of the Lisbon trade
and the need to strengthen the hand of his representative, but he could
not fall out of line with other sovereigns in this matter of protocol, nor
could he raise the legation to be an embassy. In fact the mission had been
expressly reduced to the status of a legation in order to avoid such dif¬
ficulties of precedence. King John actually achieved a precedent, when the
Spanish ambassador agreed to make the first call, but he retained an
interest in Tyrawly, and even went so far as to make a personal recom¬
mendation that Tyrawly should be given army promotion and transferred
from an infantry to a cavalry regiment. Though maintained that he would
as soon be Bishop of Elvas as accept a Portuguese command, a rumour
circulated that in the event of a show-down with Spain he might be made
commander in chief.43
43 S. P. 89/37, Tyrawly to Delafaye, 26 Sept., 20 Oct. 1731, 12 March, 19 Dec.

1732. To Newcastle, 19 Aug. 1731, 6, 27 June, 6 July 1732, 17 Nov. 1733, 17 April,
61
DAVID FRANCIS
Tyrawly long hankered to take a tougher line with Portugal, and felt
that advantage was taken of his conciliatory attitude, though under ins¬
tructions he loyally maintained it. He found Mendonca friendly, but he
was growing old and sick, and Cardinal Mota was the only man who
had influence with the king. Mota was trying to put his brother Pedro in
Mendonca’s place, so Tyrawly tried to cultivate Mota, though he hoped
Mendonca would remain, as he was an old friend. He said he was now in
favour with the king, he could not imagine why; he was always nervous of
what might happen with such a capricious monarch, but if he was to follow
a policy of appeasement he must humour the king’s foibles. The king was
a man moved by trifles and some little courtesy would do far more to
please him than many weighty arguments. One thing was sure; if he saw
that Tyrawly could do nothing for him, no favour could be expected of
him. He did not think that moderate methods would get us far, and if we
were not prepared to take advantage of the king’s weakness, we would
have to flatter and gratify him in trifles. As it happened the king in the
next years was inclined to look to England for help against Spain and
France, and perhaps in Italy. There was some talk in England of proposing
a fresh alliance, and upon Newcastle’s orders Tyrawly broached the subject
with the king. The king was delighted and though Tyrawly was not always
able to persuade the king to do what he wanted, he found himself appre¬
ciated and received more easily at private audiences, whereas before even
public ones had been begrudged. The king upon one occasion congratulated
him upon his knowledge of Portuguese and Tyrawly at first was interested
in the idea of a new alliance, though afterwards he had doubts whether it
would help much, unless the Portuguese respected it much more than they
did existing treaties. On the whole Tyrawly honoured his orders to follow
a moderate line; he held firm on the question of the carriage of arms by
boat’s crews, but insisted that they should be hidden in the boats or under
cloaks, and that the utmost pains should be taken to avoid giving offence.
On the subject of salutes the Factory encouraged their being given, when¬
ever they were asked for. It was agreed that Portuguese Subjects should
not be allowed on British ships unless they were in possession of Por¬
tuguese passports. Tyrawly argued that the new rule was an improvement,
as the onus of decision as to who should be allowed on board was shifted
from British merchants and captains to the Portuguese authorities. How¬
ever he made it dear that he would not accept responsibility for breaches
of Portuguese regulations by ships’ captains under the orders of the
admiralty, and upon one occasion he was reprimanded by Newcastle for
informing the Portuguese secretary of state of such an incident. But
29 Sept. 1734. S. P. 89/36, Newcastle, 22 June o. s. 1732. S. P. 89/47, Castres to

Bedford, 24 Feb. 1749, 2 April 1750.
62
generally speaking he obtained reasonable satisfaction where the cir¬

cumstances justified it, and, as he reported, nothing more could be got
from the Portuguese without a threat of force.44
Tyrawly’s observation that it might be easier to satisfy the Portuguese
than the Factory, who were able to use their contacts in London to stir
up opposition to Newcastle, was proved true. The Hon. Charles Compton,
being a man of impeccable connections and some personality, was able to
preserve his authority in spite of his ignorance of commerce, but he was
hard put to it in 1733 to settle the dispute about the choice of a vice
consul. The Factory had grudgingly accepted the appointment of a consul
general from home, but they clung to their claim to elect a vice consul
themselves, subject only to the confirmation of the consul general. It had
been expected that a candidate named Challis Hayes would be elected
without difficulty, but at the last minute a man named Walrave Lodowick
was put up. Compton professed not to kno^ him, which is odd, for his
name appeared on a Factory memorial in 1719 and he seems to have
been a respectable person resident in Lisbon for some twenty years. Comp¬
ton wrote home to obtain a ruling on the extent of the powers of his
commission, but was persuaded by the Factory to allow them to hold an
election before a reply could be received. The Factory was believed to
comprise some 200 members though not more than a hundred signed any
memorial. Lodowick was elected by 43 to 38 votes with 14 abstentions.
Compton refused to recognise this result and pointed out that several who
had voted were not qualified to do so, being only temporary residents or
petty tradesmen. Tyrawly reluctantly allowed himself to be drawn in, and
received deputations from both sides; personally he favoured Challis Hayes,
but he suggested that as the finances of the Factory could bear the cost,
both candidates should be elected. Compton raised no objection but doubted
whether he had authority to appoint two vice consuls. But in due course
the reply approved by the Attorney General Philip York laid down that
the consul general could approve or reject the appointment of vice consuls,
as many as he wished, or if he preferred, could refrain from appointing
any vice consul at all and could delegate the work to his personal clerks.
It is curious that when the same question came up again in 1804 and was
submitted to the Attorney General this clear precedent was entirely for¬
gotten or ignored. Upon this occasion the Portuguese merchants in London
favoured the appointment of two vice consuls and this solution was adopted;
the rebel faction acquiesced but this was by no means the last that was
heard of them. The younger men were anxious to make their fortunes
quickly and believed that they could do so by presuming on their privileges
and that they could override the Portuguese. Tyrawly sometimes spoke of
44 S. P. 89/37, Tyrawly, 20 Oct. 1731, 2 May, 27 June, 6 July 1732 to 26 Sept.

Newcastle, to Delafaye, 12 Jan. 1734.
63
DAVID FRANCIS
them as ungovernable and wrote to Newcastle ‘My Lord, our Factory is

a great body of grumbling, troublesome, noisy Englishmen, who like the
majority of their countrymen don’t know what they’re at; to please all
would be impossible, yet I have the pleasure of seeing all men of sense
and reason satisfied with my endeavours for the service’. He also com¬
plained of the naval captains, who put into Lisbon unnecessarily in the
hope of a freight of gold; they could sometimes linger for two or three
months at great cost to the government, and were a chief cause of
complaints.45
In 1734 the question of the control of the Packet Boats arose again;
this time it was not so much rivalry between the Secretary of State and
the Postmaster General, as the desire of the faction in the Factory to
escape from the control of H. M. Minister, and to delegate the decisions
about the times of sailings to a local agent of the Post Office who would
be amenable to their pressure. Tyrawly, who was accused of holding up
sailings unnecessarily, protested that he seldom delayed sailings at all and
never without good reason, and that it would be fatal to delegate the
authority, as the Post Office agent would not be able to prevent undesirable
people boarding the packets and would ruin relations with the Portuguese.
He had some sympathy with refugee Jews and knew it was tempting for
captains to accept offers from them but he could not give official counten¬
ance to them. Newcastle replied that there was no plan to change the
status of the packet boats in view. Tyrawly’s own position with regard to
the Packet Boats was awkward, as the Portuguese Secretary of State often
asked them to be hurried off or delayed, and soon he would also have to
contend with the requirements of the British admiral on the station.46
In 1734 Portuguese feeling against Spain was rising and there was talk
of a plan to abet a rising in favour of the Prince of the Asturias, husband
of the Portuguese Princess Barbara, and to turn out the Spanish Queen
Mother Isabel Famese, who desired the succession for her own son Prince
Charles. Tyrawly did not think King John was likely to risk such a venture,
unless he was absolutely sure of strong backing by Britain. Personally he
was attracted by the idea; he saw himself leading an Anglo-Portuguese
invasion of Spain from Gibraltar. He pointed out that by undertaking
such a war England might win great trade concessions from Spain, and
perhaps acquire Majorca. However he promised never to bring up the
subject again, unless Newcastle approved. Such ideas were not peculiar
to Tyrawly for Santarem quoted a British proposition to the same effect,
which fell into the hands of the French minister Fenelon. These ideas came
to nothing, but a Portuguese plan for an agreement with Spain also found-
45 S. P. 89/37, Compton to Tyrawly, 9 May 1733, Tyrawly to Newcastle, 23 May,

12 June 1733. Attorney General Yorke’s opinion, 25 June 1733.
46 S. P. 89/37, Tyrawly, 29 Sept. 1734, 29 May 1734.
64
ered, when the Portuguese rashly put forward claims for concessions in
Galicia and Cadiz. These were indignantly rejected and a trade war with
Spain followed, in which bans were placed on Portuguese sugars and
Spanish silks. There was also talk of Portugal enlisting the emperor’s help.
Tyrawly reported that popular opinion was very pro-imperial and that even
the ladies talked of it. The Portuguese hoped that the emperor would turn
the French troops out of Italy, and to win the emperor’s favour proposed
that the Ostend Company should be given a base in Lisbon. This was an
unpalatable idea for Britain, but Tyrawly did not think it would come to
anything and positively welcomed the coming to Lisbon of the imperial
envoys Father Agostino and Wassener. The return of the Infante Manoel
to Lisbon after twenty years of imperial service brought a fresh link with
the emperor. His name like that of Tyrawly was spoken of as the possible
leader of an army to invade Spain on behalf of the Prince of the Asturias.
But King John, although he had staged a cordial reconciliation with his
brother, was not willing to back him wholeheartedly, still less to provide
funds for the various projects mooted on his behalf. He was to leave Por¬
tugal again in 1736 on another abortive Spanish plan, this time to initiate
mediation between Spain and the emperor. He was actually employed in
1735 to contact the French consul Montagnac and to encourage mediation
by the French, but for the most part he spent his remaining years until
his death in 1760 upon his estate at Belas and he had no success with any
of his plans or occasional attempts to leave Portugal again. As regards Spain
King John’s attitude wTas ambivalent; Tyrawly thought that basically he
disliked France and would like to attack Spain if a good opportunity
offered, in spite of his genuine aversion to war. The fact was that he had
many irons in the fire, which he kept hot as long as practicable, pending
a certitude which never arose that one of them was the best to use.47
47 S. P. 89/37, Tyrawly, 17 April, 25 May 1734. Santarem, Quadro Elementar,

V-142.
65
1
King John was much inclined to take advantage of any opportunity

which might arise to intervene in Spain on behalf of the Prince of Astu¬
rias, and Tyrawly personally thought it would be a good idea to attack
Spain while she was weak, for she would never forget her resentment
against Britain, and would herself attack whenever she was strong again.
But Newcastle issued firm orders that Tyrawly was to work for peace and
he took pains to comply, observing that if war was out of the question we
must do our best to keep out of trouble and scrabble along as best we
could. After all the balance of trade was more important than the balance
of power. He would do his best to curb any bellicose designs of King John,
but whatever we did, we must make up our minds and not dither between
two courses.1
But the plans for preserving the peace were thwarted, for tension with
Spain had mounted as a result of King John’s demands for territorial con¬
cessions and a brawl in Madrid involving the arrest of some Portuguese
embassy staff led to a rupture of diplomatic relations. Marco Antonio de
Azevedo was sent at once to London to invoke British aid in accordance
with the 1703 treaty and Da Cunha made similar representations at the
Hague.2
Walpole’s government was determined on peace and King George
himself, though often inclined to feel rather martial, on this occasion saw
himself in the role of peace maker. Consequently Azevedo was told that
his fears of Spanish aggression were by no means confirmed. But the British
public were restive. British merchants constantly complained of Spanish
hostility to their trade and of the disappointing results of the treaty of
Utrecht. Gibraltar remained a painful issue, on which Spanish and British
1 S. P. 89/37, Tyrawly to Delafaye, 15 Jan., 2 letters 17 April, 14, 15, 25 May

1734. Santarem, Quadro Elementar, V-xi and cxlviii. S. P. 89/37, Father Agostino
to Rialp, 29 Oct., to Emperor 5 Nov., Wassener to Emperor 5 Nov. Tyrawly to
Newcastle, 13, 27 Nov. 1734.
2 S. P. 89/37, Tyrawly, 14 May, 11 June 1734. Damiao Peres, Hist, de Portugal,
VI-190. S. P. 89/30, Tyrawly 19 March 1734.
66
public opinion were equally stubborn. The merchants also feared Spanish
attacks on the Portuguese Brazil fleets in which they had large interests.
The Duke of Newcastle, who had recently taken over the Southern Depart¬
ment, was inclined to diverge from Walpole and to favour a more positive
policy. So although the Dutch turned a deaf ear to Da Cunha’s represen¬
tations, the British government decided to defer to public opinion and to
agree to send a powerful fleet to Lisbon under Admiral Norris to protect
British trade.3
This was a popular move, but the orders to Norris and Tyrawly made
it quite clear that the fleet was to protect trade and the coasts of Portugal,
but on no account to become involved in a war with Spain, unless Portugal
was directly attacked. This took the gilt off the gingerbread for King John.
He wanted armed help against Spain and he remonstrated that Britain was
doing nothing more than protect the Brazil fleets and was only doing that
because of her interest in the cargoes carried in them. Tyrawly retorted
that this was only natural, for no nation acted save in its own interest,
which in this case was very much the interest of Portugal too. The king
accepted this reply and received Norris cordially enough. Meanwhile
Tyrawly urged Newcastle to supply him with any bits of gossip which
might propitiate the king, and was able to tell him how a British captain
had helped a Portuguese father of the Redemption to free a number of
slaves in Tetuan and how the governor of Bombay from time to time
assisted the Portuguese against the Mahrattas.4
After some years of peace the British Navy was in bad shape and
Admiral Norris had uphill work to prepare his ships and to find men for
them. He was still three or four hundred short when he sailed, but the
fleet which anchored in the Tagus on the 9th June numbered thirty ships
and twelve thousand men. A few ships were detached to cruise in the
Straits and in the Mediterranean and off the coast of Portugal, and several
ships went home a year later, but about half, including the largest ships,
remained in sight of Lisbon for the whole of twenty and one months.5
Although the king had calmed down, he still insisted that he ought to
be helped against Spanish aggression. The Spaniards were indulging in a
good deal of warmongering and ostentatious preparations by land and sea,
but Admiral Norris formed the impression that Spain had no real intention
of attacking Portugal, and was confirmed in this opinion by the reports
he received from frigates at sea and from the various British consuls. It
3 Robert Browning, The Duke of Newcastle, 1975, 75 et seq. Basil Williams,

Carteret & Newcastle, Cambridge, 1942, 191/3.
4 S. P. 89/38, Newcastle to Tyrawly, 9 March, 16 April 1735. Instruction to
Norris, 16 May 1735. S. P. 89/37, Tyrawly, 17 April 1734. S. P. 89/38, Tyrawly,
4 March, 11 May 1735. S. P. 89/40, Newcastle to Tyrawly, 31 Jan. 1738.
5 Adm 1/138 Log of H. M. S. Britannia, Add MSS 28138, Norris’s Journal, 21
May, 9 June 1735. Add MSS 23627, Newcastle to Keene, 12 June, 27 June 1735.
67
DAVID FRANCIS
is doubtful whether King John really believed in Spanish aggression, for

he founded his desire to attack on Spanish weakness, but he tried to take
advantage of the many warlike rumours to involve Britain in a war against
Spain. The presence of the fleet, though inactive, had an appreciable effect.
The Spaniards became unusually civil and released a British ship detained
in Cadiz, while Benjamin Keene, our minister in Madrid, was assured by
the Spanish ministers that Spain had no aggressive intentions. The French
sent some warships to the north of Spain, as soon as they could, and others
towards the Straits, but this took time, and finding that they could not
count on Spain or Sardinia to give them positive help, and that they had
an opportunity to negotiate a settlement with the emperor, they began to
drop any warlike plans against Britain they might have had, and to incline
to a general settlement which would include mediation between Portugal
and Spain. Their offer of mediation somewhat diminished the effect of the
British offer which made little headway, and was for a time halted
altogether by the recalcitrance of Portugal, as rumours and then positive
news came in of Spanish aggression on the River Plate.6
On the British side difficulties arose as a result of differences of opinion
between Tyrawly, the minister on the spot, and Admiral Norris, who had
been accredited as minister plenipotentiary as well as admiral. Tyrawly
announced his intention of co-operating closely with the admiral, and
even of letting himself be guided by him, as he was fresh from Whitehall
and much more conservant with the ministers’ minds than Tyrawly could
be after several years of absence. But the two men were unable to preserve
harmony long. Tyrawly bore the responsibility for good relations with
Portugal and was naturally the more inclined to humour the Portuguese.
Norris was only a visitor, hoping to carry out his orders promptly and to
return home soon; he was quite as fond of having his own way as Tyrawly
and was much the older man. He had the whip hand, in so far as the fleet
was his to command and on the fleet all depended, but only Tyrawly knew
Portuguese conditions, and as Norris spoke not a word of Portuguese, and
not much French, he was much dependent on Tyrawly in all the negotia¬
tions, particularly as the Portuguese insisted on top secrecy, so that both
men had to be their own secretaries, or rather Norris had to use Tyrawly’s
services.7
So though for the first weeks Tyrawly and Norris met almost daily on
the Britannia or at the legation, and were most conscientious about executing
their orders, many circumstances arose to cause friction between two such
determined and obstinate men. Norris was of one mind with Tyrawly in
thinking that the fleet was the determining factor to inspire the respect
6 S. P. 89/38, Consul Cayley’s reports of 5, 10, 25 July 1738 and 25 Jan. 1736.
Norris and Tyrawly to Newcastle, 29 June, 10 July 1735.
7 S. P. 89/38, Tyrawly to Newcastle, 21 June, 7 July 1735.
68
of the Portuguese, but he believed that the talk of war with Spain was so
much bluster. Tyrawly on the other hand was subject to the persistent
solicitations of the Portuguese and many rumours of war, including one
that France in collusion with Spain was planning an attack on Gibraltar,
and possibly a Jacobite invasion of England. Tyrawly was right about
Spanish time-serving with regard to their aggression against Nova Colonia,
though wrong about their plans for aggression in Europe; their reality
indeed would have contradicted his belief that Spain was weak and
therefore it was a good moment to attack her.8
Tyrawly was anxious to go on active service, if any was to be had,
and volunteered to go on board the fleet, an offer which the Queen, as
regent while King George was away in Hanover, politely refused. In Lisbon
it was rumoured that he had been offered the command of the Portuguese
army to invade Spain. Tyrawly protested that he would as soon be made
bishop of Evora, for he would never leave sthe service of King George;
he added that such talk was baseless and he had never encouraged King
John to widen the breach with Spain. But such talk flattered him and
there is no doubt about his personal inclinations, though he kept them
reasonably in check.9
Norris had hoped to go home in the autumn but he was asked to
remain at least until the Brazil fleets were safely home; he agreed though
he was anxious lest his supplies run short. He ordered more at once, but
they did not come until December and he had to go on short rations.
Actually the Rio and Bahia fleets came in safely, but the king still begged
Norris to stay on further, as French and Spanish ships were mobilizing
in Cadiz and a rich ship from the Indies was still due.10
In the autumn Lord Peterborough, an old man near his eightieth year,
came to Lisbon to convalesce but died in his lodging within three weeks.
Although he had been admiral and commander in chief in Portugal in 1705
of the combined Portuguese, British and Dutch forces, no exception was
made to allow of his being given an appropriate funeral. His body was
treated like that of any other heretic. It had to be hurried under cover of
night to Admiral Norris’ headquarters, and thence with like secrecy, with
all the admirals acting as pall-bearers, to a waiting boat. Only when the
body was on board H. M. S. Salisbury could Norris relieve his feelings
with a thunderous salute.
He was anxious to return home, for he was a family man, and had
just lost his son-in-law Aylmer, while his son Richard, a naval captain, was
8 Add MSS 28130, Norris’s Journal, 27 Aug., 9 Oct., 25, 26 Dec. 1735.
9 S. P. 89/38, Tyrawly, 26 Aug. 1735.
10 Add MSS 28130, Norris to Newcastle, 11, 19, 20, 30 Sept., 7, 9, 30 Oct.
1735. Adm 1/136, Log of H. M. S. Britannia, 19 Oct. 1735. Add MSS 23627, Coutinho
to Newcastle, 4 March 1736.
69
DAVID FRANCIS
taken seriously ill and in the Lisbon hospital. But he did not allow public
or private crosses to influence him. He stood no nonsense when he felt he
was within his rights and had to protest about one of his men being
murdered or beaten up; indeed he was ready to carry his grievances
straight to the king, if necessary. As a matter of principle he rejected the
annual invitation of the secretary of state to fire a salute for the Corpus
Christi procession, when the king left his palace to join it. In 1719 Worsley
had made a civil excuse to refrain from a salute, but in 1726 the young
Commodore Lord Vere Beauclerk had fired one, and since then both
Minister and Factory had thought it diplomatic to agree to this courtesy,
excusing themselves on the ground that the salute was to the king rather
than to the Virgin Mary or the Host. In 1731 Captain Only of H. M. S.
Lively refused to fire a salute and was stoutly defended by Admiral Norris,
who was in England at the time and even contradicted Walpole and New¬
castle to their faces. Now in Lisbon he objected to honouring any such
Romish practice and forbade any guns to be fired on Corpus Christi day
or any boats to go ashore save his own pinnace, which he manned with
a selected crew to forestall any incidents. On the other hand, he showed
such courtesy as he could to the Portuguese and when the king’s brother
the Infante Carlos died, he took pains to find out whether a salute would
be welcome and fired 21 guns from his flagship and 17 guns from every
other ship in the fleet at half minute intervals. He also kept a strict dis¬
cipline to minimise as far as possible incidents involving seamen ashore.11
Although Norris was a bluff seaman, known as ‘old foul mouth’ in the
navy, he had had a good deal of diplomatic experience and he tried to
curb his natural downrightness, though the niceties of Portuguese sus¬
ceptibilities, which Tyrawly studied, were beyond him. He showed concern
for the wellbeing of his men and organised facilities both in a hospital
ashore and in a hospital ship which came out from England. To man his
ships the pressgang had combed the alleys for many dribs and drabs, and
the generally poor state of health of the men was further jeopardised by
an epidemic of smallpox, which caused many casualties in the first summer
in Lisbon. But the rations, though short in the first few months, were
regular and the statistics of death and sickness slowly improved. In August
1735 the number of sick was as high as 1790, due not only to the small¬
pox but to the dysentery prevailing in a Portuguese summer, aggravated by
the effect of local meat, vegetables and fruit and unaccustomed wine on
English stomachs. The king’s handsome gift of flesh and fowl and 80 pipes
of wine may not have been an unmixed benefit. The number of sick fell
to 750 in January 1736 before any ships had been sent home. In February
11 Adm 1/138, 1 Nov. 1735. Add MSS 28130, 19, 20, 24 March, 18, 23 Oct.
1735. Add MSS 28131, 19 May 1736. S. P. 89/26, Worsley, 2 May 1719.
70
1737 the last list drawn up before sailing home numbered only 208, a
distinct improvement even for half the number of original ships.12
Generally speaking Norris showed himself amenable to the Portuguese;
he provided convoys for trade and offered to move to the Straits, if it
could be shown that aggression there made his presence necessary. He
kept good order on the Lisbon water front, and although incidents became
rather more numerous after he established his headquarters on land and
more men were ashore to attend to the hospitals and to the careening of
the ships. King John was satisfied and went so far as to say he was obliged
for the presence of the fleet. He also brought himself to say that he would
comply with King George’s wishes for an accommodation to be sought with
Spain. Actually he was making his own efforts to that end by contacting
the French Consul Montagnac through his brother Dom Manoel, and
agreeing to a Jesuit named Louis Goncalves going to Paris to discuss
proposals with the Comte de Vaulgrenel, the French Minister. But news
came from Paris and Madrid of a general move towards mediation, and
after some quibbling and delay Montagnac and the Dutch Resident Van
Thil were given orders to take part. The Portuguese at first refused to
treat with Montagnac on the ground that he was only accredited as a con¬
sul, and Van Thil refused to meet Norris, because Norris had not called on
him. These difficulties were overcome and Norris established good relations
with both though Tyrawly distrusted them. Matters were proceeding well
hampered only by delays in the post due to bad weather, until in the New
Year rumours of war on the River Plate, which belied all the Spanish
assurances of their peaceful intentions, angered the king and brought
negotiations to a halt.13
In October Tyrawly described his procedure for working together with
Norris. Norris had wanted to discuss various points with the king, before
they were taken up with Mendonca. Tyrawly had himself sometimes re¬
commended this method, as it was important to make a favourable im¬
pression on the king, before his ministers or advisers persuaded him differ¬
ently. But this was impossible in harness with Norris, Tyrawly explained;
for in the presence of the king everything had to be done in Portuguese,
and there could be no whispered asides in English, such as were tolerated
by Mendonca. Consequently everything had to be worked out carefully
beforehand with Mendonga in the presence of Norris; after the minutes
of what they were going to say had been cleared with him, Tyrawly had
to write out the minutes, and then at the conference he had to do all the
12 S. P. 89/39, Norris to Tyrawly, 9 April 1736. Adm 1/379, 16 Sept. 1735.

Sickness returns of 11 Aug. 1735, 12 Jan, 26 Feb. 1736.
13 Santarem, Quadro Elementar, V-cl. S. P. 89/38, Norris & Tyrawly, 7 Nov.
1735. Add MSS 28130, 27 Aug., 9 Sept., 26 Dec. 1735, 2, 3, Jan. 1736. Add MSS
23627, Van Thil to Tyrawly, 7, 12 Jan. 1736.
71
PORTUGAL.-6
DAVID FRANCIS
talking, even though French was spoken, for Norris did not know enough
to carry on in French himself. Tyrawly also had to take down Mendonga’s
replies in writing, and these had to be explained to Norris, before a final
memorandum translated into Portuguese could be prepared to be passed
to the king at the royal audience. Norris was a plainspoken man, but for
Portuguese consumption some flourishes and courtesies perforce had to be
introduced. Tyrawly was often tempted to amplify or cut down in order
to make his meaning plain, to omit or soften awkward passages, or to
explain them verbally, if Norris was not present.14
In January a letter from Benjamin Keene to Norris alluded to a letter
which Norris had not been shown or did not remember seeing, and some
confidential information sent by Keene about an agreement between the
emperor and France being made independently of England was not disclosed
to Norris. He suspected Tyrawly of going behind his back, and the French
Consul, Montagnac, and the Dutch Resident, Van Thil, were inclined to
make mischief by encouraging these suspicions. There was a misunder¬
standing about a statement imputed to the king, that if he received no help
from King George on the River Plate, he might have to look for assistance
elsewhere. In a letter to Newcastle Azevedo, the Portuguese minister in
London, said that Norris and Tyrawly had been so informed by the king.
Norris attributed to Tyrawly the repetition of the king's remark; it seems
that he read it out from a copy of Azevedo’s letter sent him by Newcastle;
all concerned denied that the king had ever said anything of the sort, though
he had undoubtedly intimated as much. Azevedo’s letter only said that the
king would have no hesitation in accepting outside help to defend himself
on the Plate, but this could have been construed as meaning British help
or any help.15
There were a number of minor disputes between Norris and Tyrawly.
The control of the packet boats had always been a touchy subject; it
was often difficult, when a spell of bad weather caused delays, to keep a
boat available; Tyrawly sometimes held back sailings in the name of the
king of Portugal, who threatened to supersede the British service by one of
his own, if his despatches were delayed. At this stage Tyrawly hoped that
fresh orders from home might agree to more support being given to Por¬
tugal, and was inclined to procrastinate, whereas Norris more often wished
to expedite sailings. On one occasion, when a sailing had been delayed by
the king, and there had been a sequence of delays, Norris took the law
into his own hands and had the boat forcibly towed down the river, only
to be thwarted by a contrary wind. Tyrawly protested that Norris was
altogether in the wrong as the packet boats were under his jurisdiction.
14 S. P. 89/38, Tyrawly, private to Newcastle, 28 Oct. 1735.

15 Add MSS 28130, 3 Jan., 17 Feb. 1736. Add MSS 23627, Newcastle to Norris
& Tyrawly, 15 March 1736 o. s., & Azevedo to Newcastle.
72
Norris countered by saying that they came under his control as admiral
and plenipotentiary and that he had a perfect right to order them to sail
whenever he wished. Norris also insisted that letters addressed to him
and Tyrawly jointly should be delivered to him first, though he agreed not
to open them save in Tyrawly’s presence or after receipt of a message
agreeing to their opening.16
So when a disagreement of principle arose the ground was well pre¬
pared for a break between the two men. In January a Portuguese friend
of Tyrawly, formerly a secretary of Lord Galway, and now employed by
the king as gazetteer, gave him confidential information about the Spanish
attack on Nova Colonia, and French, Spanish, and Jacobite designs against
England. Norris refused to take this news seriously or to write a joint
letter to Newcastle about it, on the ground that it would be premature,
unnecessary and alarmist. Tyrawly argued that Newcastle would hear about
it in any case from Azevedo, and that it wquld be much better to report
the matter at once, for although the gazetteer was not always reliable, he
had often given him useful information. Newcastle was indeed soon con¬
fronted by a memorial from Azevedo, and noticing that no joint letter had
come from Norris and Tyrawly, he told them they must continue to co¬
operate; as he closed his despatch accounts from both men were delivered,
and he added a P. S. ordering them to resume their work together without
waiting for his official reply.17
In Lisbon it was believed that Nova Colonia had fallen, but the reports
received by Norris about developments in Cadiz convinced him that the
alarmist rumours of Spanish warlike preparations were baseless; he in¬
sisted that anything which occurred at Nova Colonia was outside the scope
of his mission. On 19th February Mendonca said that Spanish forces were
approaching Nova Colonia to attack it, that Spanish ships off Monte Video
were intercepting Portuguese ships and had detained two and also a courier
on his way by land to Brazil. The excuse of suspected contraband was not
enough to justify this, for at least one ship was held as a prize. Addressing
himself to Norris he said King John thought the time had come to defend
him against Spanish hostility as he had promised to do. Tyrawly, feeling
that this was Norris’s business, confined himself to interpreting. Norris
said he must have this in writing before he could give a reply. Mendonca
replied that the matter was too secret for this; he would tell the king but
16 S. P. 89/38, Tyrawly to Newcastle, 19 Feb. 1736. Norris, Private, to New¬

castle, 10 Feb. Tyrawly, 19 Feb., 6, 10 March, Tyrawly to Norris, 9 March, Norris to
Newcastle, 6 March 1736. Add MSS 28130, 17, 26, 27 Feb. 1736. Add MSS 28131,
25 Sept. 1736.
17 S. P. 89/38, Tyrawly, 16 Jan., 19 Feb., 6 March 1736. Norris, 16 Jan., 3 March.
Add MSS 23627, Newcastle, 2 letters, 15 March, 26 March 1736. Norris, 13 March.
Add MSS 28130, 4, 6 March, representations about withdrawal of fleet. Add MSS
23628, Newcastle to Tyrawly, 26 March, to Tyrawly & Norris, 26 March 1736.
73
DAVID FRANCIS
he was sure that he would insist upon the same procedure being followed
as before. That evening Tyrawly attended an opera performance in the
queen’s apartment. This is one of the few references to a non-catholic
minister being asked to such an exclusive affair and shows the progress
which Tyrawly had made at court. He found the king much out of humour,
and was told by him, that if Norris wanted to give a negative reply, he,
the king, could equally take up the question directly with King George
through Azevedo. Nova Colonia was as good as taken and he regarded it
as just as much his port as Lisbon. In view of the assurances of her
peaceable intentions that Spain had given, England ought to regard herself
just as much insulted as he did himself, and anyway King George would
feel the loss even more than he did, for Nova Colonia imported more
woollen goods than the whole of Brazil. There were several long and stormy
interviews with Mendonca, at one of which he produced a map of the
River Plate, pointed out a Spanish town, which the Portuguese proposed
to attack, and asked Norris point-blank whether he would send a frigate
to help the Portuguese man of war going there. Tyrawly urged Norris to
write with him a joint letter explaining how strong Portuguese feelings about
Nova Colonia were, and asked him to dinner to talk things over, but Norris
remained adamant.18 The most he would do was to expedite the king’s
despatches to London by offering to send them at once by H. M. S.
Falkland. His offer was accepted; Norris ordered the Portuguese courier
to be accommodated and victualled, and after delay from a broken mast
and bad weather the Falkland sailed, taking also a private letter from
Tyrawly to Newcastle, and one from Norris saying that the king had not
after all said he would look elsewhere if he got no help from King George.
He added that the Portuguese wanted to give the Brazil dispute priority,
but there was no reason to agree to this, for if the British fleet were
withdrawn, Portugal would be too weak to resist Spain and would have
to give in. The last reports from Consul Cayley showed that Spain also
was too weak to do anything serious, and the alarmist reports of war
preparations could be disregarded. King John had no reason to fear or
complain, and the cost to King George of sending the fleet had been three
or four times anything the king of Portugal had had to spend.19
The situation was made still more troublesome by outside factors.
Storms and floodwater caused havoc in the Tagus, where the Britannia
lost an anchor and was driven from her moorings, while all communica¬
tions by sea were held up. Mendonca was taken very ill, and often received
18 Add MSS 28130, 15, 16 Feb. 1736. S. P. 89/38, Tyrawly, 23 Feb., Norris,
24, 28 Feb., Mendonga, 9 March 1736.
19 Add MSS 28130, 17 Feb. 1736. S. P. 89/38, Tyrawly, 15, 17 March, Newcastle,
15 March, Cayley, 23 Jan. 1736. Add MSS 23628, Keene to Newcastle, 6 March
1736, re Spanish assurances.
74
THE REIGN OF JOHN Y, 1736-50
from his bed, when he was able to do so at all. On the 28th April 1736
he dropped dead, when he was walking in his garden. In his last days he
appeared to have lost the king’s confidence, and all sorts of stray priests
conveyed the king’s wishes on small scraps of paper. One of them brought
a message, while Tyrawly was with him. It was unsigned but apparently
conveyed the king’s orders. It read 'Apart from recent developments the
king cannot see how mediation can be successful unless it includes ALL
the matters in dispute, old or new. Now that the position is so much
changed, the king is astonished that ministers insist on urging mediation
on the same terms. While the king has a war on his hands, such an attitude
is impossible. He does not agree that France and Holland would refuse to
include the old disputes on the agenda. He is sure that now that Spain has
broken her formal assurances the mediators will agree with Portugal at
once’.20
Norris and Tyrawly had exchanged some^recriminatory letters, in which
Tyrawly was accused of double dealing and of misinterpreting what the
Portuguese had said. Tyrawly promised to confine himself to interpreting
exactly and to say nothing more, but told Norris he ought to be grateful
for all the interpreting he had done and not doubt his word. Finally on
the 10th March he suggested that they ought to stop writing rude letters
and should not allow disagreements between them to interfere with King
George’s business. Norris then wrote to Newcastle that he could not act
together with Tyrawly or appear at conferences where he understood noth¬
ing and put himself in the power of a man who wished him nothing
but ill. So he would like to be relieved of his diplomatic duties, for
as Tyrawly had said that in future he would only speak for himself, and
the Portuguese wTould not allow him to take his interpreter to secret con¬
ferences, it had been put out of his power to act any longer in joint ne¬
gotiations. Tyrawly wrote that Norris had separated himself from him and
had become quite impossible. He added that the Portuguese all resented
his rough and dry manners.21
No doubt the Portuguese grumbled to Tyrawly about Norris, but it
was soon very clear that Norris was quite right in thinking that the com¬
mand of the fleet gave him the whip hand. He received orders that H. M. G.
were convinced that there was no immediate risk of an attack on Portugal
by Spain and therefore he could send eight ships home. Tyrawly could
consider himself lucky that he did not have to deliver this unpalatable
message; as it was a routine matter Norris was able to inform Mendonca
20 S. P. 89/38, Tyrawly, private, to Newcastle, 17 March 1736. Add MSS 28130,

14, 23 Jan. 1736.
21 S. P. 89/38, Copies of Norris/Tyrawly recriminations, 8/10 March. Tyrawly
to Norris, 13 March, to Queen Caroline, 12 March, Norris to Newcastle, 13 March,
to Tyrawly, 13 Mar. Add MSS 28103, Norris, 1 March 1736.
75
DAVID FRANCIS
personally, taking with him his secretary Bell as interpreter. The king
protested that King George might well rescind his order as soon as he had
the latest news about Spanish aggression on the River Plate, but agreed
that Norris must obey his orders and took no particular umbrage. His
official reply to the intimation that King George was anxious to secure an
accommodation between Spain and Portugal, but saw no ground for any
other intervention at present, was delayed but eventually expressed more
sorrow than anger.22
Newcastle replied as soon as possible to Norris that he had performed
his diplomatic duties to His Majesty’s satisfaction and it would be incon¬
venient to withdraw him from them. He must continue to co-operate with
Tyrawly, and as long as he was abroad he must take orders from himself
as secretary of state. He wrote to Tyrawly in similar terms and his promp¬
titude in calling them to order resulted in their resuming joint action in
mid-April. So many other factors intervened to upset the mediation that
the quarrel did little to make matters worse. On April 17th 1736 they
went together to the king to tell him that King George did not think un¬
confirmed incidents on the River Plate justified any further action on his
part, but he would make enquiries in Madrid. King John said that he had
not expected such conduct from an ally and a friend and stalked from the
audience chamber in high dudgeon. The death of Mendonca followed in
three days and then the death of the king’s brother the Infante Dom Carlos
and the mourning for him. No successor to Mendonca was appointed for
some weeks; the king was civil enough and said he would always be
available for audiences, but all business was held up. In June a new
secretary for foreign affairs was appointed, and also two additional secre¬
taries, one for Home Affairs and one for Brazil and Overseas Affairs, but
Azevedo, who was to succeed Mendonca, remained in London until 1739;
meanwhile Antonio Pereira Guedes acted as foreign secretary as well as
for Brazil, while Cardinal Mota’s elder brother Pedro took over Home
Affairs. Such official talks as concerned mediation took place in London
or elsewhere than in Lisbon.23
In July Newcastle remarked to Walpole that the task of persuading
Portugal to agree to mediation was hard enough though just feasible, but
that of mediating between a rough admiral who only wanted to return
home and a warm discontented minister, was harder still and likely to make
the whole negotiation fall to the ground. He was now inclined to think that
Keene humoured the king of Spain too much and Portugal was being
treated rather harshly, but he doubted whether the Norris-Tyrawly team
22 Add MSS 28130, Norris, 1, 5, 6, 7, 8 March o. s. 1736.

23 Add MSS 23627, Newcastle to Azevedo, 12 March, to Tyrawly, 15 March, to
Morris & Tyrawly, 16 March 1736. S. P. 89/39, Norris to Newcastle, 23 April, Norris
& Tyrawly, 28 April, 4, 10 May, 11 June 1736. Add MSS 28130, 12 April 1736.
76
could tread delicately enough to find the happy mean. Actually after being
disciplined both were a little shame-faced and tried to show their renewed
cordiality to each other by a public demonstration. The opportunity arose
with the celebrations of the marriage of the Prince of Wales; both men,
with the admirals and the captains and the consul general, attended ban¬
quets at Norris’s headquarters and at the legation; Norris said Tyrawly’s
affair was magnificent. Norris now had orders to send Rear-Admiral Bal-
chin home with six more ships, while three fresh ships came out to make
up for some of the loss. Norris had a happy moment pointing out to
Newcastle that he had not confirmed the Admiralty Orders; he was sending
the ships home nevertheless and hoped Newcastle would approve, as the
admiralty had mentioned that the order came from the king, though
strictly speaking he should not act before receiving Newcastle’s confirm¬
ation. Although it went against the grain to take orders from the secretary
of state, Norris had hitherto suffered no embarrassment, as admiralty
approval of Newcastle’s orders had come simultaneously. King John again
made a protest, but it was only perfunctory; he agreed to the departure
of the ships and actually sent a messenger to Rear Admiral Balchin, as he
sailed, to give him a present of a diamond ring. Meanwhile Norris assured
the king that he had enough ships left to defend Portugal, and more would
rapidly be forthcoming, if the need ever arose. At this moment Norris
needed to ask a favour, facilities to careen his ships. He entrusted this
request to Tyrawly; the king made no difficulty and lent a hulk and the
use of his dockyards, which were under the superintendence of his dock-
master, an Englishman named Warden. More than a dozen ships were in
due course careened to the admiral’s satisfaction.24
Neither side retreated from their point of view, and on May 4th Norris
and Tyrawly told the king again that mediation could not take account
of old quarrels and that if the king refused to accept the good offices
offered, he could not count on any more help, but must go it alone. The
Portuguese preserved intense secrecy about events on the Plate, but rumours
continued to come in. It was long believed that Nova Colonia had fallen,
but news of Portuguese counter-measures filtered through and in September
Norris reported that the Portuguese had sent eleven ships to the River
Plate and had taken Monte Video. A Portuguese squadron had indeed
sailed from Rio to relieve Nova Colonia and if possible to take Monte
Video. For some weeks it had dominated the River Plate, but bad weather
and sickness and shortage of supplies drove it back to Brazil again, leaving
Nova Colonia still beleaguered and all its hinterland devastated. A diversion
was caused in the autumn by the attempt of the king’s brother Dom
Manoel to start up a negotiation on his own in Madrid. He had not settled
24 W. Coxe, Walpole, iii-328. Newcastle to Walpole, 17 July 1736. Add MSS

28130, 25, 27, 28, 30 May, 3, 11 June 1736. S. P. 89/39, Tyrawly, 8 June 1736.
77
DAVID FRANCIS
down well after his return home in 1734 and after the failure of the earlier
approach, which the king himself had authorised him to make to the
French, he now escaped to Madrid. However he was given little encour¬
agement there, a circumstance which pleased King John and mollified his
antagonism towards Spain. He was also probably influenced by his lack
of success on the River Plate and moved to think again of ways to take
a hand himself in the mediation upon a more equal basis. He overcame
his scruples about renewing relations with France before he won the point
of protocol, for which he had broken them off in 1724; he managed this
by sending his best ambassador Luis da Cunha from the Hague to Paris,
where France was already reaching agreement with Britain and the Dutch
to bring pressure to bear on Spain and Portugal. As already mentioned
collaboration was gradually achieved, though with some difficulty, between
the British, Dutch and French representatives and the Portuguese. From
time to time they met, and also held discussion with Wassener, the im¬
perial envoy, but it was not until the negotiations moved to Paris that
any real progress was made.25
The British government had already in 1735 mooted the question of
moving the negotiations to London, or the Hague, or to Paris, if King John
could be brought to agree, but it was not until July 1736 that agreement
in principle was reached to base the negotiations on Paris. It was then
announced that the fleet would be kept in Lisbon for as long as was
necessary, but would be withdrawn as soon as Spain and Portugal had
both agreed to mediation. However Guedes, when he began to act as
secretary of state, still hedged and asked for more exact assurances and
proofs that Spain was genuinely prepared to cease hostilities.26
In Paris, nevertheless, collaboration had begun and was shown by the
arrival of despatches for Norris and Tyrawly in the French diplomatic
pouch. This however led to trouble, when a Portuguese courier employed
by Montagnac, carrying French and British despatches and private letters
from the Princess of Brazil to her mother the queen of Spain, was robbed
in August 1736 near the frontier. The duke of Cadaval went so far as to
say that Tyrawly for sinister reasons of his own was responsible for in¬
tercepting the messenger. Van Thil and Montagnac plied Norris with
gossip, which Norris took with a grain of salt but did not entirely dis¬
believe. They quoted such authorities as Wassener’s cook and Van Thil’s
butler; at a dinner party Tyrawly was supposed to have expressed to a
British merchant (probably Arthur Stert, who had interests in selling
25 Gusmao, l-ii-58/81. S. P. 89/39, Norris & Tyrawly to Newcastle, 4 May, 28

July and to Horatio Walpole, 28 July. Norris to H. Walpole, 28 July. Add MSS
28131, 11, 29 Sept. 1736.
26 Add MSS 23627, Newcastle to Tyrawly & Norris, 16 Sept. 1735. S. P. 89/39,
Norris & Tyrawly, 28 July. Add MSS 28131, 28 Sept. 1736.
78
munitions to the Portuguese) his delight at the upset caused by the robbery
to mediation and peace prospects in general. More circumstantially Tyrawly
was said to have attended a meeting with Wassener before his departure
to London attended by Guedes and the king’s confidant Alexander Gusmao.
The subject discussed was said to have been an imperial intervention in
the mediation, on behalf of which Wassener was to go on from London to
Paris. It was alleged that Wassener had obtained a promise from the queen
of Portugal to pass this proposal to her brother the emperor. As the British
had been left out of the entente between France and the emperor, the
British government might have welcomed a rapprochement with him, now
that the awkward question of his plans to develop the Ostend Company
was out of the way. Tyrawly may have toyed with the idea, for he had seen
a good deal of Wassener lately. Wassener had intended to leave on a British
warship, but had deferred his departure, only to advance it again by sud¬
denly taking the packet boat. He left with an unusually handsome present
from King John, who at the same time was despatching a special ship with
a British captain and crew to Holland to take urgent dispatches to his
minister, who was in attendance on King George in Hanover. Undoubtedly
there were several irons in the fire. At the same time Dom Manoel, who
had a strong imperial connection from his long service there, had tried
to improve on his approach through Montagnac by going to Madrid. The
king had tried to stop him, by banning all sailings, but he had gone by
land. Another imperial envoy Count Lingen, who had come to announce
the wedding of Queen Maria Teresa, happened to be waiting to sail home.
He had been in Manoel’s service in Austria some years before, so it was
natural to suspect him of having a finger in the pie. He was summoned
by the queen, who interrogated him, but he insisted that he had never
spoken to Dom Manoel except at court in the presence of third parties and
that he had had express orders to advise him to make it up with his brother
the king of Portugal and to give up any thoughts of returning to the
empire, as he would no longer be welcome there. It is idle to speculate
what Dom Manoel had in mind and how far he acted in connivance with
his brother and how far on his own. He had always been an impetuous
person inclined to dive off the deep end. Alexander Gusmao was later
credited with the correspondence with Da Cunha which led to the transfer
of the negotiations to Paris, while he was also supposed later by the
ambassador of France Chavigny to be hand in glove with Tyrawly. Diogo
de Mendon^a in a memoir also referred to Tyrawly’s relations with Gus¬
mao. No doubt they were in touch and a number of intrigues were carried
on. Meanwhile Norris, whom Tyrawly had styled an ‘unmanageable carriage
horse’, got on well with Van Thil and Montagnac, and, relieved of the
difficulties of language to some extent, for when negotiations included
France and Holland he was able to take his interpreter with him, took a
leading part in the negotiations. No doubt Montagnac who was a loyal
79
DAVID FRANCIS
servant of France, and Van Thil, who was a tiresome busybody but
admitted even by Tyrawly to be no fool, gulled the bluff sailor to some
extent; but the negotiations now passed outside the hands of Lisbon. In
so far as mediation helped to aid a European settlement, it was a success.
But it must be admitted that British appeasement of Spain at the expense
of Portugal was not very fruitful. As King John himself had observed the
trade of Nova Colonia was valuable to Britain; normally Britain was far
too interested in South America for Portuguese liking and when this interest
was resuscitated it evoked keen Portuguese suspicion. But now when Por¬
tugal invited British intervention it was refused.27
While the interruption of the mail by the robbery of the courier was
rumoured to have been a put-up job to delay mediation, the despatch of
mail by the packet boats also caused ructions, as one or other party wished
to expedite the mail or to hold it up. Tyrawly quarrelled with Norris and
Norris got into hot water with the Portuguese on this account. The Por¬
tuguese kept very quiet about their approaches in Paris through Da Cunha,
and it was not until November that this became known, when Montagnac
enraged Tyrawly by saying the French were now in charge of mediation.
However in that month Tyrawly and Norris were instructed to inform the
king that the negotiations had been moved to Paris, and that the mediators
would make a fresh offer to Portugal; if this offer were accepted, they
would insist that Spain suspended hostilities and paid compensation for
any damage done; otherwise nothing more could be done except by
agreement of all the mediators. Guedes expressed thanks but gave a non¬
committal reply, and soon afterwards the Portuguese attitude was stiffened
by news from Nova Colonia in the form of captured orders to the governor
of Buenos Aires, showing that he had been told to attack Nova Colonia
at the very moment when the Madrid government was assuring everyone
of its peaceful intentions.28
Though no fresh open quarrel broke out Tyrawly’s relations with
Norris continued to simmer. Tyrawly said Norris knew more French than
he admitted and heard or ignored what suited him; this meant that me¬
ticulous care had to be taken to avoid any errors in interpreting. Norris on
his side complained that Tyrawly was elusive; he was too often away from
home when needed, or unavailable on the plea of illness. However Mon¬
tagnac died on Jan 6th 1737 and was replaced by Duvernay, who had
been secretary of the French Madrid embassy; this made things easier and
27 S. P. 89/39, Portuguese S. of S. to Norris & Tyrawly, 28 Sept. 1736. Tyrawly

to Newcastle, 20 Aug. and private, 22 Dec. Tyrawly and Norris to Waldegrave,
22 Dec. 1736. Gustnad, 1 l-ii-91. Add MSS 23627, Horatio Walpole to Tyrawly, 23
Sept. 1736. Add MSS 28131, 8 Sept. 1736.
28 Gusmao, l-ii-92/4, & ll-ii-163/7. Montagnac to Louis XV, 28 Aug. 1736 and
Chavigny to Louis XV, 28 July 1740, Add MSS 28131, 28 July, 2, 7, 24 Aug., 29
Sept., Keene 16 Aug. 1736.
80
in January news came that with the participation of Da Cunha mediation

had been agreed in Paris. This meant that Tyrawly and Norris were reduced
to the functions of a letter box, though there was still an interval before
the news was confirmed officially. It came through the Portuguese, who
had the courtesy to pass it to Norris and Tyrawly first, to whom Van Thil
and Duvernay, who only had it unofficially, had to apply for confirma¬
tion.29
The negotiations in Paris now led rapidly to agreement and the news
of the signature of a convention was received on April 11th 1737. The
prisoners from the Madrid and Lisbon legations were released and arran¬
gements begun for the renewal of diplomatic relations. Norris at once
asked and was given leave to go home. For the time being good will
reigned. Norris dined with Tyrawly and the king at his farewell audience
told Norris that he had noted the order and good discipline observed by
the fleet; this had been highly to his satis|action, and it would not be
doing justice to Norris’s merit, if he did not acknowledge it. He sailed
on the 16th April, escorted over the bar by the Infante Dom Francisco
who was given a parting salute of fifteen guns. He sighted the Lizard on
the 4th May. Norris was an expert navigator and had been in company
with Admiral Shovell when he was wrecked on the Scillies in 1707. It
was a comparatively clement season and he encountered nothing worse
than some strong north winds and calms with fog and mist. But the
Scillies were still wrongly marked on the charts some miles north of their
true position, while the same current ran towards them. Norris groped
his way into the mouth of the channel taking many soundings and himself
sighting the Lizard against the sunset through a clearing in the mist, while
some other ships asked their position from chance-met fisher craft. He
was several miles out of his reckoning. Such were still the hazards to be
met even in a fair season and in home waters.30
The signature of the Convention did not take effect in Nova Colonia
until the autumn, and then only secured an armistice, for the colony con¬
tinued to be blockaded and cut off from its hinterland, though both Por¬
tuguese and Spaniards carried on with their contraband trade. In Paris da
Cunha began negotiations for a Family Pact with France and Spain, but
Spain was unco-operative and little progress was made. But Portugal took
active steps to improve her knowledge of the topography of Brazil and to
strengthen and populate the southern provinces, which provided new land
for cattle and corn, and an alternative road of approach to the gold mines.
29 S. P. 89/39, Tyrawly, 22 Aug. 1736. Add MSS 28131, 8 July, 16, 27 Sept.
1736. S. P. 89/36, Harrington, 3 Dec., Newcastle 6 Jan. 1737. S. P. 89/39, Norris,
17 Sept., 1 Oct., 20 Nov. 1736. Add MSS 28131, 17 Sept 1736.
30 S. P. 89/39, Tyrawly, 19, 23 Nov. 1736, 19 March 1737. Add MSS 28131,
27 Sept. 1736, 9, 30, 31 Jan. 1737.
81
DAVID FRANCIS
Ever since the Treaty of Seville in 1729 Britain had been trying to
settle her differences with Spain, both the old one dating from the treaty
of Utrecht and the new ones arising from the interruption of the Asiento
agreement; a commission had gone out in 1732/3; now talks were renewed
and a convention was concluded by which Spain agreed to pay an indemnity
in discharge of her obligations. But in 1739 she defaulted and this led to
the failure of Walpole’s policy of peace and to the outbreak of war with
Spain amid great scenes of public jubilation in England. However a respite
of four years had been gained since the despatch of the fleet to Lisbon
in 1735. The fleet had played a large part in bringing this about and
Admiral Norris had the opportunity to tackle the problem of maintaining
so large a force for so long a period overseas and to prepare the way
for the much needed rehabilitation of the navy undertaken by the admi¬
nistration of Admiral Anson. While in Lisbon he curbed the defalcations
of pursars, improved discipline and supply of provisions and the organi¬
sation of hospitals.31
The main effect on Portugal was to heighten interest in Brazil. The
king’s attention and that of the public was focussed on the need to husband
the royal revenues and to defend Nova Colonia and the southern frontiers
of Brazil from Spain, while not forgetting the risk of French encroachments
in the north. Nova Colonia proved a heavy commitment, which cost as much
as a third of the royal fifths. A first condition for the defence of the fron¬
tiers was to define them and to defend them legally as well as physically.
King John ordered his envoys abroad to collect maps, and employed
scientists, geographers and astronomers to study questions of latitude and
longitude as well as engineers to design fortifications. In Portugal the
Italian-born Father Carbone had his observatory and studied to determine
latitudes and longitudes. In Brazil his compatriots and colleagues ‘the
Mathematical Fathers’, Carpazzi and Diogo Soares and others travelled
about to see where the frontiers lay and to describe the situation and
resources of the adjoining areas. On the political and legal side Alexander
Gusmao played a leading role. It was becoming clear that the western
territories of Brazil were on the wrong side of the Tordesillas line. Nova
Colonia and all the Amazon were found to be west of it. Luckily for Por¬
tugal Spain was behindhand in her studies, so the Portuguese were able
to keep a prudent silence about this difficulty. But sooner or later the
Spaniards would realize it and would be able to claim not only Nova Co¬
lonia but a great part of Brazil. Obviously the Tordesillas line must be
scrapped and some other justification for Portuguese claims must be found.
The inspiration came to Gusmao and his colleagues that if the Tordesillas
line were followed into the opposite hemisphere the Spanish possessions
31 S. P. 89/37, Norris & Tyrawly, 1 April, 16 May 1737. Add MSS 28132,
1, 4 April 1737. Adm 1/4132, Log of H. M. S. Britannia.
82
in the Moluccas and the Philippines would be on the Portuguese side of

it. Surely then it would be better to recognise the status quo and to base
Spanish and Portuguese claims on actual possession and occupation. The
Portuguese had been turned out of the Nova Colonia hinterland which for
a few years had produced cattle and corn, and had lost much of their
territory between the River Plate and the Rio Grande, but now they
planned to develop their territory from the Rio Grande inland and as far
towards the River Plate as they could. These plans took long to develop
and fell short of what was intended, but a fort was built at Fortaleza do
Sul and steps were taken to settle on the island of Santa Catharina; for
once the aim was agriculture rather than the lure of treasure; a fair
number of peasants from the Azores were introduced and a highway plan¬
ned to carry cattle and supplies inland.32
Among others the king sent to Brazil Martinho de Mendonga de Pina
de Proenca, a man of integrity and military experience to examine questions
of government and the chronic smuggling which caused such losses to the
royal revenues. He spent some years as acting governor of Minas Gerais
and part of the time in the far west mining district of Cuiaba. He took
the lead in introducing the capitation tax sponsored by GusmaS and in
drawing up the limits of the diamond district. Proenca was authorised to
consult Brazilian worthies and institutions, so that their views could be
taken into account. It was made plain that in the end only the king could
decide, but it was found advisable to bear Brazilian feelings in mind and
to try to work through the local authorities, even though these were by
no means always submissive and sometimes even persuaded the Lisbon
appointed governors to back them against the Lisbon government. On the
other hand the Portuguese settlers, known as emboabas’, aroused so much
antagonism among the native born, that the latter in the course of local
feuds sometimes supported the Lisbon government against the refractory
Portuguese born colonists.33
The king’s fifth or quinto in the first years of King John’s reign does
not seem to have exceeded 10,000 drams or three arrobas of Brazilian gold,
and a high proportion of this was derived from confiscations of contraband.
The tax was raised by means of dues amounting to eight or ten drams or
otavas of gold on each ‘bateia’ or pan used for washing the gold; this
was not very different from a capitation tax, but only applied to the actual
miners and not to the many ancillary workers in the industry. This rate
was fixed by Antonio de Albuquerque, governor of Minas Gerais and
Sao Paulo; the Lisbon government was anxious to increase the revenue
and to raise a donativo or special levy towards the cost of the Succession
32 Gusmao, lll-ii-96, ll-ii-78. C. Boxer, Golden Age of Brazil, 241/2, 252/41.

33 C. Boxer, Golden Age of Brazil, cap. vii. Southey, Hist, of Brazil, 1862,
V-199/202.
83
DAVID FRANCIS
* * i
War; Albuquerque did his best to put matters on a better footing and to
reconcile the ‘emboabas’ and the Paulistas, who had engaged in what
amounted to a civil war; he largely achieved this, helped no doubt by the
feeling of unity aroused by the French attack on Rio de Janeiro. In Minas
Gerais he founded three municipalities with their Senates at Ouro Preto,
Ribeirao de Carmo and Sahara. The Lisbon government tried to rule
through them, often playing them off against each other. Albuquerque
thought he had acted for the best, but admitted freely that three-fifths of
the quinto would be lost by defalcations, whatever system he adopted.
However his successor Balthazar de Silveira made some changes. He per¬
suaded the three councils to agree to pay a fixed sum of thirty arrobas, to
raise which sum an additional tax on slaves, goods, and cattle, entering the
Minas Gerais, was to be added to the ‘bateia’ tax. In 1718 the next go¬
vernor the Count d’Assumar reduced the fixed commutation to 25 arrobas,
but took charge of the transit duties, which were applied to the expenses
of the Lisbon government in Brazil. These transit tolls named the ‘regis-
tros’ apparently only amounted in 1713 to 3886 drams or a little over an
arroba, but they expanded and many new tolls were introduced, so that
by 1751 they amounted to 31 arrobas. In 1718 the Lisbon government
were not satisfied with Assumar’s new system and gave orders that in
future all the gold must be taken to a mint or regional smelting house,
where the quinto of 12% would be retained by the government and a 5%
seigneurage would be charged for coining or casting into bars the balance
of gold due to the owners. Two troops of dragoons were sent out to
support Assumar, and these regular troops, subsequently increased, were
comparatively well disciplined and maintained, and were to play an im¬
portant role in the future. The introduction of the smelting houses was
very unpopular on account of the expense of transporting the gold over
great distances in difficult country and of squaring the corrupt officials;
bribery was tolerable, when it was kept within the family, but no longer
so when it meant bribing strangers in distant provinces. A revolt was
provoked in Vila Rica of such proportions that Assumar was obliged to
give in for the time being; nevertheless two years later he secured an in¬
crease of the commutation to 37 arrobas and in 1726 he succeeded in
introducing the system of smelting houses, which lasted until 1738; this
brought in a much larger sum averaging 321,859 milreis for the whole ten
years and even more the last five of them. The yields are difficult to
assess, as the arroba varied from place to place and the value of the dram
or oitava also varied; the government paid 1300 milreis but the black
market price was 1500; the composition of the totals was apt to vary
from year to year, so the available statistics cannot be taken as gospel
and no precise computation of the king’s income can be made, the more
as it included invisible items such as the value of the patronage and of
the lucrative appointments in Brazil he was able to bestow, which saved
84
him expense at home; one can only say that until the end of the reign
King John drew increasing amounts from Brazil; some notion perhaps of
the way in which ideas grew larger can be derived from the size of the
donative or so called free gift for the war in 1711 and for the royal
weddings in 1729; in 1711 the total was 17,187 drams or a little under
five arrobas; in 1727 the viceroy planned to raise a donative of seven
million cruzados for the cost of the weddings plus another million for the
Infanta Barbara’s dowry. It is true that this was to be collected over a
period of twenty-five years, but even so the annual cost worked out at
320,000 cruzados or almost 160,000 milreis, roughly 29 arrobas. From
1735 to 1749 after much heart searching in Lisbon the government, which
was still dissatisfield, determined to adopt a system for collecting the royal
fifths sponsored by Alexander Gusmao. This consisted of a capitation tax
to be levied not only on the washers of gold but on all workers, slave or
free, employed in connection with the mining industry. The new system
was no more popular than its predecessor, though it was perhaps a little
fairer, for it applied to all working in the industry, including middlemen,
and not only to those working in the mines. But many of these ancillary
workers, who drew no direct profits from the gold, suffered so much and
created such a burden of debt, that eventually in 1749 the government had
to yield to popular protests and to abandon the system. They then accepted
the proposal made to them in 1730 by the Minas Gerais captaincy, in the
hope of avoiding capitation, to guarantee a minimum of 100 arrobas
annually for the collection of which they would hold themselves respon¬
sible, as also for handing over any surplus over 100 arrobas. Now that the
gold had to be brought to the foundry houses an even greater proportion
was defaulted, but until 1767 the return averaged 103 arrobas, after which
total production and the quota with it appreciably diminished.
The Minas Gerais district was the mainstay of gold production, but
an appreciable quantity came from the backlands, which produced lucky
strikes of alluvial gold and the consequent gold rushes. Most of the de¬
posits were soon exhausted, but after the original rich strike in Cuiaba
in 1718 other finds were periodically made both there and in the Matto
Grosso and Goias regions. The gold had far to travel; the expenses were
enormous and control was hard to exercise. In 1727 Cuiaba yielded
35,210 grammes or nine arrobas to the crown and in 1730 when the
Paiagua, a tribe of wild canoe-borne Indians, attacked a river convoy they
are said to have captured 60 arrobas, which were sold cheaply to the
Spaniards of Asuncion, where contraband from the remote regions often
found its way downstream, but often ultimately into Portuguese hands
through the Jesuits of Paraguay, sometimes through Nova Colonia. The
regular route to Brazil from Cuiaba, the so-called monsoon route to the
neighbourhood of Sao Paulo, by river with various portages, was long
and hazardous and took eight or nine months. Even when the gold reached
85
DAVID FRANCIS
% * 1
the smelting houses sensational frauds could occur, as in 1728, when the
whole of the Cuiaba gold freighted to Lisbon in chests securely locked,
which arrived with the official seals unbroken, was found to have been
replaced by lead. Nevertheless towards 1750 the backlands were believed
to yield as much as a third of the Minas Gerais total.34
From 1730 onwards the newly-discovered diamond mines, also in Mi¬
nas Gerais, added appreciably to the royal revenues. The diamonds were
found near the gold, principally in the Serra Frio, a comparatively small
area. It was therefore possible to delimit a district, at first fifty square
leagues but later enlarged, over which a strict control could be exercised.
No negro freemen could reside there and admission to the district required
a permit from the intendant, who in the first years was Dr Rafael Pires
Pardinho, who happened, with Martinho de Proenca, for some time go¬
vernor, to be one of the few men of absolute integrity gracing Brazilian
officialdom. When the diamonds were first discovered their value had not
been realized, and even for some time afterwards there was a conspiracy
of silence to conceal their value from the tax collector. The authorities
awoke to the value of the discovery in about 1730, when there was such
a boom that the market became glutted and prices fell by two thirds. To
stop this an embargo was placed on the whole industry in 1734 and was
continued until prices recovered. From 1740 the monopoly was leased to
contractors for periods of three years or more; under the regime of Par¬
dinho control was fairly successful, but the third man to undertake the
contract, Felisberto Caldeira Brandt, was an easy-going man and Brazilian
born, unlike his predecessor who came from Portugal; he and the in¬
tendant who followed Pardinho allowed a free rein to the ‘grimpeiros’, or
diamond smugglers, a race of freemen, who concealed their trade under
alibis; the negroes who washed the diamonds were closely watched with
an official proportion of one supervisor to every eight men; a contemporary
picture shows them seated before their troughs in a long shed, with a row
of white men or mulattos on high seats scrutinising them. But diamonds
were easy to hide and though most of them were found near the gold in
well-known places odd stones turned up in less rich fields, where super¬
vision was slacker. Nevertheless during the tenure of the six contractors
between 1740 and 1771 the crown received an annual revenue from
diamonds of 149,812 milreis or about a sixth of the revenue from gold and
indeed a rather higher proportion in the last years. The diamonds were
mostly sold in Amsterdam or London. The Jews were leaders in the diamond
cutting industry, but a British merchant named John Gore advised in the
early days and John Bristow Junior of Lisbon was an important buyer; his
London firm Bristow & Co held the Portuguese contract for the export of
34 Sideri, S., Trade and Power, 1970, p. 50. C. Boxer, Golden Age of Brazil,
197/203 & cap. X. Maxwell, Conflicts, 12 et seq. and App. III.
86
diamonds from Lisbon for the years 1753/5 and bought 121,814 carats,
valued at 1077,198 milreis.35
During the visit of the fleet there had been ample opportunities to ship
gold; these now diminished and Tyrawly complained of the indiscretions
of the press, which gave the export of gold harmful publicity and provoked
the Portuguese to seize consignments. In 1736 new regulations were made
by which all gold, gold dust, and coins brought by the Brazil fleet had to
be registered. Shipping from Brazil to the Atlantic islands was already
restricted and in 1739 permision for ships to sail to Brazil was limited to
those going in convoy. Nevertheless the gold continued to flow and sus¬
tained by the connivance of both Portuguese and Spanish authorities a large
contraband traffic continued through Brazil and Nova Colonia and Santa
Catharina from the Spanish colonies. In 1735 there had been no less than
thirty ships of which four were British in Nova Colonia. This town was
to remain for a generation in dispute between the two countries. The trade
through it was at times very large, but was offset by the heavy expenses
to the Portuguese government of maintenance and defence. Apart from
the venality of local officials there were many interests which supported
the contraband trade and were very willing to frustrate government control
and the high prices it entailed. It was also the aim of middle men every¬
where to avoid the intervention of entities like the merchants of Cadiz or
the capitalists of Mexico City and to sell their goods directly to the public.
In America luxury goods from the Far East filtered in and competed with
those imported by way of Spain or Portugal. A welter of conflicting interests
warred with each other; and sometimes goods entering by the back door
won the lead.36
The interval of calm which followed the departure of Norris’s fleet
did not last long. In order to uphold his ambassadorial rank Tyrawly con¬
tinued to press for promotion without success, though the credit which he
had won with the king of Portugal gained him a recommendation, which
resulted in his promotion to Major General in 1739 and the colonelcy of
a regiment of horse. Tyrawly established good relations with the leading
minister the Cardinal de Mota. The cardinal was affable enough, but in¬
clined to be pro-French and very suspicious of the role played by the
British in Portuguese trade. Indeed he was supposed to have remarked that
it would not be a bad thing if the Lisbon bar rose high enough to stop the
entry of foreign ships altogether. This was a joke, for he was not disinter-
35 C. Boxer, Golden Age of Brazil, cap. viii. Maxwell, Conflicts, 47. J. L. de

Azevedo, Epocas de Portugal Economico, 1947, 355/65. Southey, Hist, of Brazil,
V-35/65. Spanish American Hist. Review, XXIX-iii, 1969. C. Boxer, Brazilian Gold
and British Traders in the first half of the 18th century.
36 S. P. 89/40, Tyrawly to Newcastle, private, 24 Aug., 24 Oct. 1739. For the
complications of Spanish and Portuguese overseas trading interests see G. J. Walker,
Spanish Policies and Imperial Trade, 1979.
87
PORTUGAL.-7
DAVID FRANCIS
ested in trade in itself and indeed participated in the financing of Portu¬

guese industries, particularly of a glass factory. But his regime did not
encourage the efforts of British merchants, who were seeking new outlets
to make up for the loss of the Spanish Asiento. A promising opening
seemed to be afforded by the slave trade, for there was a great shortage
of slaves needed to serve the gold mines in Brazil. The British and the
French and the Dutch competed keenly and were anxious to obtain con¬
tracts to supply slaves. The Royal African Company made several attempts,
but although the king of Portugal was anxious to improve the supply and
quality of slaves, he was suspicious of any project which would give any
foreign company privileges. Tyrawly hoped to find a means by which a
British company could operate in collaboration with or under the auspices
of a Portuguese company, but no agreement was ever achieved.37
In 1739 Marcos Antonio de Azevedo eventually returned from London
to be secretary of foreign affairs and his nephew SebastiaS de Carvalho
took charge of the legation, where he had already been employed for
some time. Though already 39 years of age he was little known. Tyrawly
thought he had a good reputation but Benjamin Keene, who had known
him in London and had perhaps quarrelled with him over South Sea
Company affairs, remarked that he was as poor a pate as ever the Uni¬
versity of Coimbra had seen. Newcastle with more perspicacity formed a
good opinion of him, in spite of the fact that he was a stickler for Por¬
tuguese rights and gave him a great deal of trouble. It was true that
hitherto Carvalho had had little experience of cosmopolitan society and
none of liberal government. With the help of his uncle Paul, an arch¬
priest of the Patriarchal Church, he had tried to make his way in Lisbon,
but after his failure to win the hand in marriage of a daughter of the
house of Tavora, he had retired to live for seven years the life of a country
squire. He was averse to entering the church and after a half hearted
attempt to enter the army gave that up. But eventually he took courage
and eloped with Teresa Noronha, the widow of a nobleman and niece of
the Count of Arcos. Her family disapproved but his marriage gave him
an entry into society. He was then found by his uncle a post in the Academy
of History to work on the pedigree of the House of Braganza. No doubt
he was competent, and the study of royal family history was a branch of
learning which Coimbra took seriously. He had a lively and practical
intelligence and was a man of wide reading, particularly in French. In
London he never mastered English, but he did not waste his opportunities
and he made a number of contacts. His appearance no doubt stood him
in good stead. English people were inclined to expect the Portuguese to
look like small dark monkeys; such little men were quite able to make
37 S. P. 89/40, Tyrawly, Newcastle to Tyrawly 17 May, Tyrawly 22 Aug., 26 Oct.

1740.
88
their mark as in later years the Portuguese ambassador the Marquis of

Soveral proved, but it was undoubtedly an advantage to be six foot tall
and a blond as Carvalho was. He also had a very winning manner sup¬
ported by conversational gifts of no mean order. Even Keene in the course
of time recognised his abilities.38
Carvalho took up vigorously the question of old war debts owed to
Portugal and of the reciprocal privileges to which he claimed Portuguese
Subjects were entitled. He had no luck with the old debts but he had a
‘succes d’estime’ in winning exemption from parochial taxes for Portuguese
residents. Actually there were very few of them, for the majority of per¬
sons of Portuguese origin in London were Jewish refugees and many of
them had changed their names. Reciprocity was not therefore an important
issue, but it was a matter of principle and an obsession with Carvalho, who
found it a useful weapon in his armoury. He was never at home in Lon¬
don; he suffered from the fog and smuts and was depressed by the
difficulties of his station. However in spite of his trouble with the language
he obtained a solid knowledge of British institutions and British com¬
merce. Indeed when he came to power his policies owed much to his
English experiences. His zeal for trading companies was a little late, for in
England they were already passing their prime and in Portugal there was
a lack of the capital and personnel needed for viability. But Pombal had
some success in obtaining a larger share of overseas trade for Portugal,
though it was only after his death that the expansion of world trade in
general helped some of his aspirations to come into their own. The good
sense of many of his views was however shown by the consistency with
which subsequent ministers tried to follow up his policies. In London
in spite of his difficulties he achieved a good position and in this he was
helped by the outbreak of war, which increased the value of Portuguese good
will.39
After the treaty of Vienna in 1738 ended the War of the Polish
Succession, Britain concluded in April 1739 the Convention of Pardo with
Spain. This settled the outstanding trade disputes, renewed the Asiento,
and bound Spain to pay an indemnity, but she defaulted and already in
June 1739 Newcastle told Tyrawly that Britain must be prepared to defend
her interests. The most strenuous efforts of Walpole to counter the rising
38 J. L. de Azevedo, O Marquis de Pombal e sua Epoca, Lisbon, 1922, 29/38.

Byblos, Diario de quarto Conde de Ericeira, Revista de Faculdades de Letras de
Universidade de Coimbra, 8, 29 March, 5 April 1736, 8 April 1739. Conbe de Carnota
(J. Smith), Memoires of Pombal, 2 vols., 1871, ii-21/4. Add MSS 20815 for some of
Carvalho’s London despatches and notes. Sir Oliver Lodge, Corr. of Sir Benjamin
Keene, 72, 441, 492. S. P. 89/39, Tyrawly, 1 Aug. 1739.
39 Add MSS 23628, Newcastle to Tyrawly, 21 June 1739. P. Vaucher, Walpole
et la politique de Fleury, 1925. S. P. 89/40, Newcastle, 21 June, 20 Nov., private,
1739.
89
DAVID FRANCIS
tide of warlike feeling in the City and in the country had proved unavailing.
The South Sea Company had provoked Spain by repudiating debts claimed
from it. Newcastle sided with the war party and a squadron under Admiral
Haddock was ordered to remain at Gibraltar, while in England prepar¬
ations for war went ahead and reprisals against Spanish shipping were
approved. The French Cardinal de Fleury, though ill and expected to die,
was still in power and attempted to keep the peace; Spain herself was not
eager for war, though her Bourbon alliance had been reinforced by the
marriage of the Duchess of Parma, a daughter of Louis XV, to the Infante
Philip. In October 1739 England declared war after Jenkin’s ear had
been taken out of its cotton wool in a box for exhibition to an indignant
House of Commons. Walpole’s peace ended with the jubilation and peals
of bells.40
Tyrawly began to treat for a Convention with Portugal, which would
assure her of the comfortable possession of Nova Colonia and of naval aid.
But the boot was now on the other foot. The king had a happy moment
reminding Tyrawly of the peremptory reply given him by Admiral Norris
to his request for a frigate to defend Nova Colonia and Cardinal Mota
denied that the place was still blockaded. It was now the King of Por¬
tugal’s turn to preach the peace and put a price on his benevolent neutrality.
So the refusal to help Portugal had temporarily set Britain back, but Por¬
tugal in the end had to give up Nova Colonia, and any British attempt
to help would have come up against Portuguese suspicions, for Portugal
was chronically jealous of any British presence in Brazil or on the River
Plate. Carvalho, when he succeeded his uncle as minister in London, sent
in alarmist reports regarding a scheme originated by a Jew named Joao da
Costa and backed by a number of city men. He mentioned no other names
and it is not clear who this particular Da Costa was, though the family
was well known in London and Amsterdam and there had been a leading
banker of that name not long before. Carvalho believed in the reality and
substance of the scheme to set up a British colony in Uruguay and said
that Walpole had opposed it in order to avoid trouble with Spain or
Portugal, but might well change his mind. It is true that Walpole had
discussed loans and financial transactions with certain Jews at this period.
Luis da Cunha, who had Jewish connections, got wind of the affair and
spoke of it to Cardinal Fleury in Paris. He said that an intrigue with the
Jesuits in South America was concerned and the British planned to attack
Buenos Aires. According to a French source Carvalho complained to Lord
Cathcart, commander designate of the expedition to the Caribbean, and
dissuaded him. Cathcart was soon to die and never took up his command.
There is little on record on the subject but in 1739 a bill was submitted to
parliament to authorise adventurers to trade and conquer in South America
40 S. P. 89/40, Tyrawly to Newcastle, 11, 17 July, 1 Aug. 1739.
90
and was opposed by the South Sea Company, who feared a breach of their
monopoly.41
Carvalho wrote that the British would not find it too hard to strangle
the Spanish trade, if they acquired a South American port. Cartagena and
Havana were strong places, but Buenos Aires offered an easier backdoor
to Peru. He thought Britain had long cast a covetous eye in that direction
and would find the River Plate easier to conquer than the Caribbean. He
admitted that the harder alternative had been preferred hitherto, but was
convinced that an attack on Buenos Aires would follow. Da Cunha re¬
marked that Spain being weaker at sea was at least a less dangerous
neighbour than Britain in South America. As the north bank of the River
Plate properly belonged to Brazil, a British occupation even of Buenos
Aires would be dangerous, as hostilities might easily spread to parts of Bra¬
zil usurped by Spain and Britain would take away from Portugal the lion's
share of the contraband trade.42
Carvalho stressed that the finding of capital would present no difficulty,
for it was as easy to raise £5000 in London as 50 milreis in Lisbon. Many
British merchants were concerned but it was the Jewish interest which
seriously alarmed him. This was an obsession soon to be replaced by that
against the Jesuits. It is true that there were many rich Jews dispersed
through Europe and Brazil and Portugal, and that they had friends among
king’s confidants such as Gusmao. Carvalho claimed later that he had
discussed the question with Gusmad and had disturbed British plans. He
thought that Jewish settlers in any British colony in South America would
add strength to the whole network stretching from London, Amsterdam,
Bayonne, and Gibraltar, through Brazil to Surinam, Curacao, Jamaica and
the Caribbean.
In the event no plans to attack Buenos Aires materialised. But Car¬
valho’s warnings helped to stir the Portuguese to reject British offers of
help and to take steps to defend and populate the southern borders of Bra¬
zil. Carvalho emphasized in a note to Newcastle that all the northern shore
of the River Plate as far as Nova Colonia was Portuguese. In his reply
Newcastle gave general assurances, but refused to particularise and Car¬
valho’s fears were not quieted. He saw how strong the feelings of the
commercial world were against Spain and how much enthusiasm was felt
for Vernon’s exploits in the Caribbean. He saw the fury of the opposition
against Walpole and supposed that the death of the Emperor Charles VI
and of the King of Prussia would alter the balance of power in Europe
41 Gusmao, 111-ii-Docs. 47, 48. Azevedo to Luis da Cunha, 14 Jan. 1740, Car¬
valho to Azevedo, 31 Jan. and Da Cunha to Carvalho, 11 Feb. 1740, Doc. 51,
Carvalho to Azevedo, 5 April. There is a possible reference in Add MSS 25561 to
a South Sea plan. S. P. 89/40, Tyrawly, 17 July 1739.
42 Douglas Ford, Admiral Vernon, 1907, 13, 188. Gusmao, 111-ii-Doc. 48 & 50
as above.
91
DAVID FRANCIS
and move Britain to leave the continent to its own devices and to con¬
centrate on America. He thought the construction of small frigates for the
navy presaged coastal work in America and that Carteret and Pulteney,
the opposition leaders, were set on a colonial policy.43 It is true that Car¬
teret had said in parliament 'Take the advice of our admirals and generals.
The king has it in his power to make as great a figure, as any prince that
ever sat on the throne, to have and hold in America. It is in America
that we can make them (the Spaniards) feel most sensibly the weight of
our resentment’. But it was not so easy to eliminate Walpole or the ideas
he stood for. Vernon and Anson’s exploits gave the 'coup de grace’ to the
old Spanish trade system. Already threatened by the opposition of the
Lima merchants and other interests to the control by means of convoys,
the fear of the British navy caused the Flota to Mexico and the Galeones
to the Isthmus to be replaced by single register ships with the consequent
surrender to individual merchants of much of the control of the trade. The
Galeones disappeared for good though the Flota was restored for a time
a few years later. But Vernon’s taking of Puerto Bello was a flash in the
pan; his triumphs and those of Anson frightened the world but they could
not be followed up and though Carvalho continued to fear British designs
in the South Seas his prognostications were not fulfilled.44 In Europe the
Jacobite threat was by no means over and there were many interests, par¬
ticularly those of King George in Hanover, which could not suddenly be
cast aside. France and Spain were for the time being more dangerous to
Portugal in South America than Britain, whose ambitions were fully taken
up elsewhere. Carteret, when back in office, was obliged to plunge into
fresh European entanglements in order to propitiate Prussia, to reconcile
Prussia with Austria, and to persuade Prussia, Austria and Russia to combat
France. Trade interests in Britain were very powerful but they were easily
frightened by war expenditure. Trade rather than conquest was their aim,
and the flag only followed trade with arms and ships when the ground
was prepared and strong local interests were pressing the government. An
expedition to capture Spanish galleons or their treasure at the ports was
popular enough, but a sustained effort for a conquest was another matter.
The idea of a backdoor to Peru was not unfamiliar and had been much
popularised by Defoe’s story of a colony in Patagonia. The setting-up of
the South Sea Company’s factory in Buenos Aires had livened interest in that
quarter, but although Anson put in at St Catherine’s island near Rio to refit,
there is no hint that he ever had the River Plate in mind, though he did think
of the Falkland Isles as a possible base for entry into the South Seas.45
43 Gusmao, 111-Doc. 51, 53, 58, 59, 77, 78, 81 & l-ii-238. Azevedo, Pombal,
19, 24.
44 W. B. Pemberton, Carteret, 1936, 170.
45 Coxe, Walpole, 111-504. Anson, Voyages, 1748, Ed. R. Walter, 47/53, 54/7.
Basil Williams, Carteret & Newcastle, 1940, 117.
92
The Portuguese were not sufficiently impressed by British naval succes¬

ses or intimidated by rumours of Spanish aggression to do more than
receive Tyrawly’s proposal for a convention civilly and to promise to main¬
tain a strict neutrality. There were a number of infringements of neutrality,
which were the subjects of reports by two consuls, Cayley from Seville, and
Parker from Corunna, who were moved to Faro and Oporto as intelligence
officers. They kept agents in Spain and looked after the working of the
cartel for the exchange of prisoners. Parker spent £800 a year on this
service and bombarded Tyrawly with lengthy reports, which he complained
would require fifty packet boats to take them if he forwarded them all. The
packet boats from Corunna were transferred to Lisbon or Gibraltar but
they were growing old and unserviceable and, subject to capture as they
were, the service was much impaired. The prisoners involved several
hundreds and involved a good deal of friction between the navy and the
consuls and between Consul Jackson of Opprto, who dealt with the pri¬
soners taken by privateers, and Parker, who handled the naval and civilian
prisoners. The navy disliked the return of seamen to Spain and often tried
to impress merchant seamen to make up for shortages in their crews. The
Portuguese were often accused of being pro-Spanish; sometimes perhaps
they were, but more often they were only pernickety and bureaucratic. In
Lisbon Tyrawly kept up cordial relations with Azevedo and Cardinal Mota,
and was followed in this by the Hon. Charles Compton, first as consul ge¬
neral and then as minister, but at the best the Portuguese administration
was slow and punctilious. Perhaps they had also taken a lesson from
Tyrawly in the uses of the law. In a dispute whether H. M. S. Romney
had taken a Spanish prize from Portuguese coastal waters, they adopted
Tyrawly methods. They sent engineers to survey the scene of the incident
and to determine its distance from the coast by means of chains and pro¬
duced no less than seventy witnesses with sworn statements to back
their side of the case.46
The navy had hard work to provide convoys and to combat the Spanish
privateers, which were sometimes no more than large row boats, but could
hug the coast to intercept vessels leaving the Tagus or Douro. Before leav¬
ing Lisbon in 1741 Tyrawly delivered himself of a diatribe against the
iniquities of naval captains. He claimed that they should be placed under
the minister’s supervision, so that their sailings could be timed. He com¬
plained that they often hung about in port instead of putting to sea, in
the hope of securing a freight of bullion, and even at sea thought more
46 Southey,Hist, of Brazil, V-385/6. Pemberton, Carteret, 197. Kenneth R.

Maxwell, Conflicts and Conspiracies. Brazil and Portugal, 1750-1808, Cambridge,
1973, 85. Defoe, Coll. Works, 14, New Voyage round the World. F. Wagner, Kaiser
Karl VI und die Grosse Machte, 1938, 278. S. P. 89/40, Compton, 16 March 1740,
25 Nov. 1743.
93
DAVID FRANCIS
of taking prizes than of attacking the enemy or of the safety of our mer¬
chants. Bad cases certainly occurred. In the autumn of 1739 both the ships
supposed to be on patrol were absent and five ships were captured outside
the Lisbon bar by some insignificant Spanish privateers. It transpired that
Captain Ambrose of H. M. S. Greyhound had accepted £200 to convoy
some ships to Oporto. On the other hand the second patrol ship was
justifiably absent on duty at Gibraltar, and although Admiral Haddock had
eleven ships based on Gibraltar, and had recruited some smaller craft for
coastal work to the best of his ability, he was very short; several ships
were undergoing repairs and the larger ships had to winter at Port Mahon;
he complained that only seven of his squadron were seaworthy. As a result
of Tyrawly’s complaint two twenty-gun sloops were sent out for coastal
work but naval resources were always overstretched. The temptations for
captains were considerable; with a commission of 1% Augustus Hervey
seems to have made some years later not hundreds but thousands of pounds
even on legitimate bullion shipments for the garrisons at Gibraltar and
Port Mahon.47
Although Tyrawly’s finances had been eased by his army promotion
he complained that he still needed another £1000 a year to make both
ends meet. He now had bad news that owing to his long absence and
the maladministration of stewards his Irish estates were going from bad
to worse. He had often asked for a move and expressed a wish to revert
to his army career, but hitherto' Newcastle had asked him to stay on and
had pacified him with an occasional dose of soft soap; but now he was
told he could return home. He left in July 1741 on the packet boat, which
deviated from its course to land him at Cork. According to Horace Walpole
he took with him three wives, including a Portuguese lady with plaits of
hair reaching down her back, and fourteen children. This account of his
retinue seems to have been not far wrong. However there was no doubt
that he was popular with the Portuguese. Instead of the usual diamond
the king of Portugal gave him seven bars of gold and the secretary of state
delivered seven more to him on the packet boat; if they were standard
bars to the pattern of the Rio mint in 1730 each bar would have weighed
3 marcs, 7 ounces, one dram and 3 grains and have been worth about
£125, so it was a handsome present. The Infante Francisco in his yacht
escorted him to the bar. In his thirteen years as minister Tyrawly had not
always been successful but he had set a pattern for good relations with the
Portuguese, which was followed by his successors. A year or two later de
Castres still spoke of ‘the dark mysterious court’, but from the time of
47 S. P. 89/40, Tyrawly, 7 Jan., 2, 11 June 1740. Merchants’ complaints of navy,

17 Jan. 1740, o. s. Compton, 31 Dec. 1740. S. P. 89/43, Compton, 16 March, 11 May,
18 Sept. 1743. Southey, Hist, of Brazil, V-205/8. Adm 1/380, Haddock, 9 Feb., 24
March, 10 April 1743.
94
the visit of the fleet Tyrawly had established a liaison with the king; the
king was now to fall ill but Castres was at least able to enquire about him
from the Lords of the Bedchamber and to maintain good relations with
the secretary of state and with Cardinal Mota, and afterwards with close
friends of Friar Gaspar de Encarnagao, if not with him personally. Tyrawly
himself until his death continued to be thought of as the great authority
on Portugal and twice returned there on special missions.48
After a year as Charge Compton succeeded Tyrawly and presented his
credentials to King John. He was probably the last minister to do so, for
the King suffered a stroke in May 1742 and appeared little in public after¬
wards save for worship in the patriarchal chapel. Compton knew little of
law or trade but the Consul General Abraham Castres made up for this.
He was a man of Huguenot antecedents, who had studied at Leyden
University and was a good linguist and eventually became minister in 1749.
Until his death in 1747 Cardinal Mota wassvirtually Prime Minister, and
though the Queen sometimes acted as Regent, she seldom did more than
sign the papers put before her. The Cardinal was inclined to favour the
French and was firmly of the opinion that the presence and influence of
the British Factories was undesirable. All continued to be done in the
name of the king, who still from time to time asserted himself. In 1742
the Infante Francisco died, who had been the only link between the royal
family and the British. He had been an ‘enfant terrible’ but he was the
only prince who knew English and took an interest in Britain and in naval
affairs. His political influence was not great, but one of his last acts was
to denounce French intrigues to Compton and Castres and to protest his
friendship for Britain. He also intervened on behalf of the packet Hanover,
which had been involved in a collision resulting in the death of an old
Portuguese woman and for some time was detained.49
The outbreak of war with Spain in 1749 interrupted the revival of the
Asiento, which had pursued an uneasy course since the treaty of Utrecht.
Few slaves were bought or sold in Portugal, but the Brazil trade in slaves
played a significant part in Anglo-Portuguese economy. Defoe observed of
if ‘The case is as plain as cause and consequence. Mark the climax; no
African trade, no negroes; no negroes, no sugar; no sugar, no ginger, no
indigo, no islands; no islands, no continent; no continent, no trade’. With¬
out slaves there would perhaps have been no gold from Brazil.50
The Spanish asiento privileged the British to carry 4000 slaves annually
48 Horace Walpole, Letters, 1-324, 398. S. P. 89/40, Tyrawly private to New¬

castle, 28 Jan. 1741. C. Boxer, Golden Age of Brazil, 404, n. 45. S. P. 89/44, Castres,
13 Aug. 1746.
49 S. P. 89/42, Castres, 2 May, 31 July 1742. S. P. 89/44, Castres to Stone, 20
Jan. 1744.
50 Peter Earle, World of Defoe, 1971, 55/8, 131. C. E. R. Bacheler, London
thesis 1924, South Sea Co and the Asiento.
95
DAVID FRANCIS
to the Spanish colonies and to freight one annual ship. Only nine annual
ships sailed in twenty-five years and the exaggerated hopes of British
merchants were much disappointed. But the asiento during its currency
undoubtedly gave Britain a foot in the door and facilitated a clandestine
trade. An Argentine writer spoke of 61 ships entering Buenos Aires with
slaves in the pens numbering 18,400, of whom 3771 were forwarded
overland to Chile. The slave trade was in any case a lottery, in which a
few capitalists habitually prospered and some agents and sea captains
drew prizes, but in which the seafarers concerned had a short expectation
of life, as short perhaps as the slaves they carried, for the slaves only had
to survive one voyage.51
Between 1701 and 1745 the average number of slaves crossing the
Atlantic annually was computed to be 42,800, which increased to 60,000
over the middle of the century. Of these about half were carried by the
British, so even the full complement for the asiento only represented a
small proportion of the total. The larger ships hired by the South Sea
Company could take from two to five hundred negroes, but the majority
travelled haphazard in smaller ships and probably in worse conditions
than those afforded by the major companies. British ships had no share in
the direct Brazil trade but they supplied slaves to Portuguese ships and
to their depots in the Cape Verde Islands. In the West Indies Jamaica was
the headquarters of the trade and continued to send slaves clandestinely
to the Spanish colonies after the end of the asiento. During the asiento
the South Sea Company had carried a certain number of slaves to Buenos
Aires from Angola and Madagascar, Afterwards the Portuguese took some
as contraband. The Spaniards did not carry many slaves across the Atlantic
in Spanish ships though their needs were only second to those of the
Portuguese. The French had to meet a demand from their own West Indian
colonies and took part in the contraband trade, as did the Dutch colonies
at Curacao and St Eustatius. The Dutch needed slaves for Surinam and a
few for Curacao, but their considerable trade depended mainly on selling
slaves from their African posts to other countries. The Danes also had
posts in Africa and a flourishing entrepot in the Virgin Islands. Though
Portugal and Spain denied foreign ships access to their colonial ports, the
British, French and Dutch had a big share in the supply of slaves to them.
The Corisco company and efforts to found in Portugal companies to deal
in slaves had little success, because Portugal lacked the capital and per¬
sonnel required, and feared that even a Portuguese owned company would
fall to be dominated by foreigners. The prevailing winds made Brazil
51 H. Deschamps, Hist, de la Traite des Negres, 1960. Brown, J. C., A socio¬

economic history of the Argentine, 1776/1860, 1979, p. 25. The Atlantic Slave Trade,
Philip D. Curtin, Wisconsin, 1969. Zachary Postlethwaite, Dissertation on Trade
and Commerce, 1749.
96
much easier to reach from Africa than Portugal and the tendency was to
use Brazilian exports to buy slaves; the Lisbon government tried to prevent
this, but without success; Brazilian tobacco was in demand in Africa and
British merchants bought it to use as currency and in the course of their
transactions acquired some Brazilian gold, Spanish silver, and African gold
also. The Portuguese in their turn remedied their balance of trade some¬
what by their services in watering, supplying, and refitting ships, which
were obliged to call, or cared to call, in the course of their Atlantic voyages,
particularly outward bound. Even ships bound for the Caribbean or North
America took a southern route, while those going further afield or return¬
ing home kept far out in the Atlantic, but often called at the Azores;
owing to the disposition of the winds West Africa was comparatively
adjacent to Brazil and the West Indies, so that the Portuguese posts in
West Africa were closer to Bahia than Lisbon, and in Angola to Rio, while
the British ones were nearer to Jamaica than London.52
Except for recessions in 1740 and 1744 the war from 1740 to 1748
had surprisingly little effect on Anglo-Portuguese trade, though in January
1744, before France entered the war, Castres complained of the sad re¬
duction in his consulage, much of which was derived from cargoes of wine,
fruit or fish, perishable goods brought by small ships, who could not afford
to wait for convoys and were specially liable to be taken by privateers.
In 1747 the Factory complained that owing to the lack of packet boats and
of safe opportunities to send home their bullion, they had lost £25,000
freight in four months to the Dutch. They were neutral and actually began
to send a monthly warship for bullion. Yet the fluctuations in the exchange
and the price of gold in London were remarkably small, from £3.17.11
to £3.18.11 and 5/2J in 1746. A higher proportion of trade was carried
by neutral shipping, but the total official figures for imports and exports
remained comparatively stable.53
After France declared war she eventually concluded a secret treaty of
alliance with the Pretender in October 1745. In the spring of 1744 troops
had been assembled for an invasion of England but the plan had to be
abandoned when a number of French ships were destroyed in a storm;
in July 1745 the Young Pretender, losing patience with the delays in
French help, started on his fatal expedition which was to meet with
disaster in April 1746 at Culloden after a brief taste of victory. Such help
as was given him was based on France, and not on Spain as hitherto. The
Spaniards were busy in Italy and Portuguese opinion was hostile to Spain
and particularly to the Queen Mother; the Princess of Brazil, who remained
52 S. P. 89/39, Tyrawly to Newcastle, 26 Oct. 1737. P. Verger, Flux et Reflux

de la Traite des Negres, 1968. Add MSS 23624, Tyrawly, 27 Sept. 1737.
53 H. E. S. Fisher, The Portugal Trade, Statistics, Apps. I, VI, VII. Add MSS
32804, Compton, 22 Nov. 1743. S. P. 89/44, Castres, 20 Jan. 1744. S. P. 89/46,
Castres, 13 Feb. 1747.
97
DAVID FRANCIS
% v *
under the influence of her mother, wished the Pretender well but was soon
to be called a ‘petite mechante’ by the queen of Portugal, who with
Azevedo and the king were civil enough, when they heard of the Young
Pretender’s defeat. The Irish in the various convents intrigued as usual and
Jacobite agents figured from time to time, but on the whole the war was
only felt at sea and through the arrival of prisoners and prizes, and after
long delays of the unfortunate factors expelled from the South Sea Com¬
pany’s Factory in Buenos Aires and of the survivors of H. M. S. Wager,
one of Anson’s ships, which had been wrecked in Tierra del Fuego.54
In April 1746 the king of Portugal ordered the packet Hanover to be
stopped on suspicion of carrying a rich Jewish refugee. However she left
the river with two hours to spare, which was lucky, as she was also
carrying 20,000 moidores in gold. Luckily news was coming in of the
defeat of the Young Pretender and also of the acquittal in London of the
Portuguese chaplain, whose imprisonment had given so much umbrage.
Accordingly the Portuguese dropped their threats and took no action
against Captain Esnouf, when he returned in the Hanover. The death of
King Philip of Spain now aroused hopes that Ferdinand VI the new king,
and Barbara his Portuguese queen, would be more favourable towards
Portugal and inclined to peace. The king of Spain did indeed end the
intervention of Spanish troops in Italy and there was talk of mediation in
Lisbon. Castres found himself courted unexpectedly by various personages,
including the Marquis of Tabernuiga, an unofficial Spanish emissary, who
had been used by Newcastle in London, the Visconde de Lima, Portuguese
ambassador designate to Madrid and the Marquis of Candia, the Lisbon
Spanish ambassador, who was on the point of leaving for Denmark.55
Cardinal Mota was at first rather in favour of mediation, which he thought
would redound to Portuguese prestige, and the new Spanish secretary of
state Carvajal and the new Spanish ambassador Soto Maior were well
inclined. Benjamin Keene was accredited to Lisbon to support Castres and
the prospects seemed hopeful. But the Dowager queen of Spain still exercis¬
ed great influence and an essential condition for her compliance was some
arrangement to find a suitable establishment for her son the Infante Philip,
the king of Spain’s halfbrother. Negotiations were begun at Breda, where
it was hoped the Spanish ambassador Macanaz would be helpful, and the
imperial representative Rosenberg made polite gestures, but in the end all
efforts to fit out the Infante Philip fell through and the opposition of the
Spanish queen mother won the day.56
54 Cartas de Rainha Mariana Vitoria, ed. Caetano Beirao, 1936, 17 March 1746.
S. P. 89/46, Keene, private, to Newcastle, 15 April 1747. S. P. 89/42, Compton, 21
July, 11 Sept. 1742. S. P. 89/44, Castres, 20 Jan. 1744. Compton, 31 March 1744.
Castres, 8, 9 March 1745.
55 S. P. 89/44, Castres, 22 Feb., 8 March, 18 April, 27 May, 24 Aug., 5 Sept. 1746.
56 S. P. 89/46, Keene, 21, 26 Jan., 8, 28 March, 26 April 1746. S. P. 89/44,
98
Newcastle did not give up hope and authorised Keene to carry on his
negotiation. It was hoped that the queen of Portugal, who as Regent
exercised some influence, might co-operate with her niece Maria Teresa,
who alone was in a position to set aside some territory in Italy for the
Infante Philip. But Keene reported that no confidence could be placed
in the discretion of the queen of Portugal, who would repeat everything
to Mota, and the cardinal now lost interest in mediation, saying he could
place no reliance on Britain, who would probably let down Portugal as
she had done after Utrecht. So the prospects for Portuguese mediation
faded out. Meanwhile the war situation of Britain deteriorated. The battle
of Fontenoy had been a setback and there were still rumours that the
French would invade England; Da Cunha spoke of 6000 men ready to
embark for Scotland in May 1747. The capture of Louisberg in 1745 had
been a success for Britain, but the defeat of Admiral Matthews off Toulon
in the previous year marked a low point in British naval prestige. Maria
Teresa had been obliged to make peace with Russia and to give up Silesia.
This gave her a little more elbow room to reinforce her troops in Italy,
but the allied arms were not prospering and Britain had to look to it
that she was not isolated. However, though Portuguese mediation for a
peace with Spain finally fell to the ground when the King of Spain refused
to negotiate except together with France, a general peace was concluded
at Aix in 1748. Keene left Lisbon to resume his post at Madrid, and was
succeeded by Castres.57
Meanwhile Portugal tried her luck at mediation again, this time
between the Pope and Maria Teresa. The Pope had refused to give a
cardinal’s hat to the Austrian candidate Bellini and both parties were
involved in a claim by the Elector of Mainz to enlarge his archbishopric
and in a dispute about the election of the Duke of Lorraine. The Portuguese
ambassador to the Vatican Manoel de Sampaio investigated the question
of the cardinal’s hat and recommended that Sebastiao de Carvalho should
be sent to Vienna to second his efforts. But Carvalho was far from an
obedient underling; the two ministers soon quarreled and began to sa¬
botage each other. Carvalho, who was only accredited as an emissary and
not as a plenipotentiary, found himself in a tricky situation. But at that
moment his wife died in Lisbon and he did much to retrieve his fortunes
by courting and marrying Eleonora Ernestina Daun, a niece of the Field-
Marshal and daughter of a lady-in-waiting to Maria Teresa. The Carvalho
family scraped the barrel to finance the marriage and although Carvalho’s
father had been little more than a country squire, his quarterings were
Castres, 13, 14, 24 Aug., 8 Sept. 1746. Gusmau, 11-i-i, Docs. 93/4. Da Cunha to Gus-
mad and reply, 6 Dec. 1746 & 2 Feb. 1747.
57 S. P. 89/46, Newcastle to Keene, 12 May 1746 o. s. Keene to Newcastle, 16
May, 27 June 1747, 17 June 1748, to Bedford, 27 Aug., 23 Sept. 1748. W. Coxe,
Memoirs of Kings of Spain, vols. 3/4, Chapters 46/8.
99
DAVID FRANCIS
found adequate and the queen of Portugal was pleased that her minister
had made an Austrian match. The negotiations were still in the doldrums
but Carvalho won acceptance by the Austrian court and by the empress.
He was still in an awkward situation, blackguarded by Sampaio for being
pro-Austrian, while in Vienna he was accused of being a minion of the
Pope. He tried to escape back to London, where he had not officially
vacated his post, but the appointment of Encerrabodes there deprived him
of this recourse, and when he finally left Vienna in 1749 he was heavily
in debt and had to pawn his valuables and sell the library he had left in
London. The Bellini question had been eventually settled but Carvalho
refused to intervene in the question of the imperial election, and received
no credit for his work. But in spite of this he left friends in Vienna and
the French Ambassador reported that he was on the short list to succeed
Azevedo as secretary of state. When after a protracted journey he reached
Lisbon there seemed little prospect of this and he found that the favourite
scheme which he had planted with Azevedo for the foundation of an East
India Company had come to nothing. Azevedo died and at first there was
no question of his succeeding him, but he had powerful friends, including
the queen of Portugal, and when King John died in August 1750 he was
unexpectedly summoned by King Joseph to act as secretary of state.58
Portugal had used her neutrality to carry on a thriving contraband
trade through Nova Colonia and to carry bullion for the French from
South America and the Canaries. She took the opportunity to tighten the
regulations affecting British trade in the Tagus, obliging ships from Oporto
which came to join a Lisbon convoy to proceed upstream to Belem, where
they had to undergo a second customs’ clearance and to pay for it.
Cardinal Mota, the principal minister since the death of Diogo de
Mendon?a in 1736, died in October 1747. No-one had dared to criticise
him or to cross him save possibly Alexander Gusmao. The French ambassa¬
dor Chavigny thought his death an irreparable loss and he and the con¬
servative nobles had certainly been better disposed to France than to
Britain, though they were primarily Portuguese rather than ‘phils’ or
‘phobes’ for one side or the other. During the last three years of the king’s
life Gusmao shared the power with Friar Gaspar de Encarnacad, known
as the Reformador, an university title which had nothing to do with his
political leanings. Perhaps originally one of King John’s bright young men
he had been a canon of the Patriarchal church at the time of its inaugur¬
ation and had been tutor to two of the king’s natural sons. A son of the
Marquis de Gouveia, he belonged to the old nobility and espoused their
cause. He also had many friends in legal and university circles. In 1749
he filled a number of vacant juridical posts; he naturally made the appoint¬
ments from his own proteges but Castres approved and thought they might
58 J. L. DE Azevedo, Pombal, 55/95. S. P. 89/47, Castres, 25 May 1750.
100
THE REIGN OF JOHN Y, 1736-50
diminish the law’s delays. He usually supported Gusmao, the prime mover
in the boundary treaty for Brazil concluded in January 1750. From 1743
the king had suffered a series of strokes, but he was sometimes viable and
though he was too unwell to receive Castres’ credentials in 1749 there
was talk of it.59
The new reign in Spain did not fulfil Portuguese hopes, for the Spanish
queen mother was still powerful. The treaty of Aix brought peace, but it
did not end the struggle between the anti-French and the anti-British parties
at the Spanish court. Keene fought manfully to improve Anglo-Spanish
relations and managed though with difficulty to conclude a commercial
treaty in October 1750. This was approved on the whole by the British
public, though not by the South Sea Company which had to relinquish the
balance of four years still unused of the asiento and other claims in return
for an indemnity of £100,000. But the commercial privileges given by the
treaty of Charles II’s reign, which had be^n inadvertently omitted from
the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, were renewed, and being purchased in
return for concessions to Spain, could not be equally claimed by other
most favoured nations. Commercial relations with Spain were also im¬
plicated in the Spanish-Portuguese negotiations about the River Plate,
where Nova Colonia continued to be blockaded but still remained the
centre of a flourishing contraband trade. The Portuguese claimed that
the colony had been definitely ceded to them by the treaty of Utrecht
and was therefore unaffected by any question of its situation east or west
of the Tordesillas line, but the Spanish minister Jose de Carvajal retorted
that Spain set as much store by Nova Colonia as by Gibraltar, for since
its foundation the Peru trade passed that way; Spanish ships scarcely
ever passed Cape Horn and the Peruvian silver now came through Nova
Colonia rather than through Porto Bello. When Anson put in at St Cathe¬
rine’s island in 1741 he heard that the annual value of Spanish contraband
silver handled there was £500,000. Carvajal confirmed this, telling the
Portuguese ambasador that the silver finding its way to Brazil and
exchanged for Brazilian gold amounted to five or six million patacas
(£500/600,000). The contraband also included some half million hides.
The South Sea Company Factory in Buenos Aires had sustained the con¬
traband trade, but the British interest, directly or indirectly, undoubtedly
survived the Factory’s demise and silver as much as gold was needed by
British merchants for the East Indies trade.60
The Portuguese had taken an interest in Condaminas’s voyage down
the Amazon in 1744 and Da Cunha in Paris was kept busy looking for
the latest maps of Brazil, procuring amongst others the latest map by
d’Anville. While amassing knowledge they were careful to keep it as secret
59 S. P. 89/46, Castres, 15 July, 15, 21 Aug. 1747.

60 Byblos, vol. 18, Dec. 1731. Ratton, Recordagdes, 320.
101
DAVID FRANCIS
as possible, for the Spaniards were still thinking in terms of the Torde-
sillas line and though the Portuguese could defend themselves by putting
forward Tordesillas-backed claims in the other hemisphere, they were
biding their time until they could base their claims on actual possession
and occupation. They were in no hurry to conclude their negotiation before
they had sent out a number of settlers and had improved their defences
at Fortaleza and elsewhere in Southern Brazil. However they were gra¬
dually moved to agree to give up the whole of the colony of Sacramento
and Nova Colonia in return for the seven reductions of the Jesuits in Pa¬
raguay on the left bank of the Uruguay river, and to appoint a frontier
commission to delimit the boundaries. There was much feeling in Portugal
against the cession of Nova Colonia, and when King John died there was
question whether the treaty would be implemented. But the frontier com¬
mission was duly appointed and eventually set off, provided with a number
of boundary stones; the Portuguese plans for the occupation of the frontier
regions were far from completed, but enough had been done to show that
parts of the areas claimed were no longer a nomansland.61
After lingering on the brink for some weeks King John died on July
1st 1750 in the odour of sanctity, comforted by the ministrations of the
saintly Jesuit Father Gabriel Malagrida. It was rumoured that the treasury
was empty and that there was no money to pay for his funeral. The king
had been his own treasurer, and no doubt little ready cash could easily
be produced, but there were believed to be hoards of gold and treasure
somewhere stored up. In any case the king was not denied obsequies of
appropriate magnificence, emphasised, to the indignation of the nobles,
but on the insistence of the queen, by a period of a full twelve months
mourning, in spite of a recent decree which restricted mourning to four
months only. However the new king was an amiable figure and reassured
the people by appointing no new ministers at once and by not disgracing
any of the old. The aged and ailing Pedro da Mota became the senior
secretary of state while the affable but ineffective Abbe Diogo de Men-
donca, son of the late minister of that name, became secretary of marine
and overseas affairs; the vacant secretariat of foreign affairs was taken
over by Carvalho, at first in an acting capacity; his friend Luis da Cunha
had died in Paris, but the dowager queen backed him, also the Patriarch
Almeida and the king’s confessor Jose Moreira were his supporters. Ale¬
xander Gusmao, and Friar Gaspar de Encarnacao who for the last three
years had been leading figures, still came to court though they were soon
to be ousted.62
61 Gusmao, 11-ii-Doc. 99. Hocqueler to Rehmeyer, 1 March 1750. S. P. 89/47,

Castres to Newcastle, 29 May 1750. Anson, Voyages, ed. R. Walter, 1740, 47/8,
54/67. Coxe, Memoirs of Kings of Spain, IV-45/57.
62 S. P. 89/47, Castres to Newcastle, 25 May 1750. Add MSS 12301, Rela?a5
de Morte e Caracter del Rey Joao V de Portugal.
102
5
THE AGE OF POMBAL
When King John died at the end of July 1750 Castres reported that
Carvalho might be made secretary of state and feared that he might prove
no friend of Britain, as he had not returned his call and appeared still
to resent the unfortunate circumstances which had deprived him of the
customary ambassadorial leaving present, when he gave up his London
post. There had been a hitch, because his appointment had not been ter¬
minated when he left London but only after his arrival in Vienna; he
had after a delay been offered £300, but had refused this because a
minister of similar rank had lately been given £500. However when Car¬
valho’s appointment was confirmed and his position was secure he forgot
his grudge. He was safe in the saddle, for of the two other secretaries of
state Pedro de Mota, brother of the cardinal, had been confined as an
invalid to his house for the past seven years and the other secretary, Diogo
de Mendoza, though a pleasant man and popular with the diplomatic
corps, was not of the calibre to figure as a rival. Besides Antonio de Aze-
vedo, who had so conveniently made place for his nephew Carvalho, several
other public figures had died or disappeared from court. They included
Father Carbone, one of the most respected of the confidential advisers
of the king, and Tomas de Almeida, the Cardinal Patriarch. Friar Gaspar
de Encarnacao had been chief minister for some three years but he was
an old man and was soon ousted from his position. Perhaps Carvalho’s
most formidable rival was Alexander Gusmao; he did not disappear at
once and as a member of the Council for Brazil drafted a memorial cri¬
ticising Carvalho’s proposals for the abolition of the capitation tax in
Brazil. But he became involved in personal difficulties and, deprived of
royal patronage, he played a diminishing part until death removed him in
December 1753. So in spite of his many enemies Carvalho secured the
mastery over his rivals and used his opportunities to fill many key posts
with his own nominees, as they fell vacant. One of the first was the
governorship of Maranhao, which entailed the superintendence of the fron¬
tier commission for the north of Brazil. He appointed his brother Francis
Xavier de Mendonca to this post. Carvalho had lost a great supporter with
103
PORTUGAL.—8
DAVID FRANCIS
the death of Luis da Cunha, Portugal’s premier ambassador, but he filled

his post with a man agreeable to himself and soon the principal diplomatic
appointments, except that of the Visconde de Ponte de Lima at Madrid,
who retained a certain independence until his recall in 1762, were in the
hands of Carvalho nominees, and were not members of the first nobility.1
King John had seen papers and intervened occasionally until his very
last days, though the queen as regent had at least gained access for Prince
Joseph to be present when business of state was transacted. The Princess
of Brazil in her letters to her mother the Queen of Spain had sometimes
intimated that the prince was dissatisfied with his inactive role and saw
much that needed remedying. She thought that when he succeeded to the
throne he would not allow himself to be ruled by any minister. At first,
though he deferred a great deal to his mother, the new king indeed applied
himself to business and kept a check on Carvalho, though he was very
willing to let him bear the brunt of the work. De Castres reported that he
showed more strength and capacity than the generality of people had been
made aware of, and spent two sessions daily working with his ministers.
When he was in London in July 1751 he reported to Holderness 'as to
the king of Portugal’s character, he bears an excellent one and is univers¬
ally acknowledged to have shown more instances of justice and humanity
than his late father had done through his whole reign. As he is extremely
diffident of himself and conscious his education has been greatly neglected,
he showed at the beginning of his reign a greater suspicion of than con¬
fidence in his ministers, which occasioned at first great delays in the
despatch of his affairs, but his ministers, particularly Carvalho, when once
he began to obtain a competent knowledge of his affairs, began to establish
their credit with him, and since then matters have been carried on with
uncommon expedition, H. M. having in some remarkable instances shown
a docility and patience in despatching what was laid before him much
greater than could be expected from a prince so little used to business, and
utterly deprived of the help of a council, an establishment quite unknown
in Portugal’. It was not quite true to say that a Council of State was
unknown in Portugal; it had fallen into desuetude but was revived in 1739.
In spite of the king’s good beginning the government was generally in a
mess. Castres reported that the army and navy had gone to ruin; the
Treasury was also in a state of chaos, but there was still hope of finding
some money there, as the late king had been his own treasurer and had
hidden away various funds. A country which in 1753 received from the
Brazil fleet treasure computed to be worth three million sterling in gold
and silver cannot have been altogether bankrupt; it was true that 1752
i S. P. 89/47, Castres to Newcastle, 10 Sept. 1747, 23 May, 19 June 1750. S. P.

89/48, Castres to Holderness, 26 Aug. 1752. Azevedo, O Marquis de Pombal e sua
epoca, 1922, 92/8, 95/8, 103, 127/30.
104
THE AGE OF POMBAL
was a bad year for the royal fifth but the next years were good and the
revenue from the dizfmos and entradas was well maintained.2
Unfortunately the king’s good intentions were soon sapped away; his
luck in finding a minister as competent and industrious as Carvalho tempted
him to sign papers without studying them. He was of an indolent and
pleasure loving temperament, and it was not hard to wean him from busi¬
ness to allow more time to go hunting, to listen to music and to play
cards. He had a long backlog of pleasure to make up and the queen, who
also had a passion for hunting and music and during a long series of
pregnancies had suffered particularly from the tedium of the court, had
an even longer one. She was still a young and attractive woman and
enjoyed the affection of her husband, but he was a very susceptible man
and she had to keep a close eye on him to stop his philandering. If he
had been a tougher character he would have carried on regardless, but he
was too domesticated to do that and unfortunately realized that his night
sessions with Carvalho offered admirable opportunities to slip away into
the arms of mistresses, when he was supposed to be deep in state affairs.
This led to a tragic denouement and loss of confidence, and before that
to a fatal habit of leaving all in Carvalho’s hands.3
The new king was no friend of France and the two lords of the bed
chamber, the marquises of Abrantes and Marialva, were inclined to be
pro-British. Marialva’s son was a great favourite at court; his only skills
lay in music, riding and dancing, but he could be a useful friend. King
Joseph favoured a detente with Spain, but the progress of this depended
very much on the precarious health of his sister the queen of Spain, and
on the influence of the queen mother of Spain, which waxed and waned
but was usually very strong. Many Portuguese opposed the boundary treaty
and strove for its revision; Carvalho was inclined to favour them and to
seek means to evade the cession of Nova Colonia, but carried on with the
treaty for the time being. Castres quite soon overcame his distrust of Car¬
valho and established cordial relations with him. Benjamin Keene, British
minister in Madrid, had crossed swords with him over commercial matters
in London and for long lost no opportunity to decry him, though he too
finally acknowledged the merits of ‘Mr Oak’, as he called him in his
letters.4
Carvalho did not confine himself to his departmental duties. From the
outset he interfered everywhere, and attempted many reforms. He tried to
2 Azevedo, Pombal, 99, 118/9, Cartas de Rainha Mariana Vitoria, 1936, ed. Cae-
tano BeiraS, 28 May, 1, 18 Dec. 1743. S. P. 89/48, Castres to Holderness, 3 July 1751.
3 Cartas de Rainha Mariana Vitoria, 10 Oct. 1742, 1, 25 March 1745. Azevedo,
Pombal, 174. Hervey, Memoirs, 172.
4 S. P. 89/47, Castres, 28 Aug. 1750. S. P. 89/48, Castres to Amyand, 11 Sept.
1752, to Payzant, 28 May 1753. Lodge, Correspondence of Sir Benjamin Keene, 72,
487, 492.
105
DAVID FRANCIS
secure adequate salaries for high officials in return for the surrender of
their perquisites; he reduced the duties on sugar and simplified the customs
procedure. In Brazil he ended Gusmao’s capitation system and revised the
diamond contract. He also introduced measures for emancipating the In¬
dians and substituting civil government in the missions for that of the
Jesuits. He was not at first hostile to the Jesuits, and he spoke of found¬
ing new Jesuit missions to assist the Portuguese occupation of the Amazon
frontier area. But his brother reported adversely upon them and their
resistance to his plans soon provoked his enmity. Meanwhile his designs
for increased government control of the Brazil trade took shape in the
foundation of the Maranha5 and Para Companies. In the first elan of
the new reign the reforms abolished some abuses and it was not until
later that obstacles developed.5
During this honeymoon period things appeared to be going smoothly,
and in applying for leave to go to Scarborough to take the waters Castres
said there was little business afoot and Consul General Russell could safely
be left in charge. He duly left in June 1751 but in the following January
Russell died. He was a respectable old gentleman, who had fifty years
service to his credit and was known to the secretary of state Lord Hol¬
derness as a neighbour in London. It appears that he had let things slide.
The Lisbon Factory was left without minister or consul and soon after
the consul's death Holderness was surprised to receive an urgent request
from the Secret Committee of the Factory for help. It was unusual for the
secretary of state to attend to communications abroad except through the
local representative, but on this occasion he acted immediately and not
only sent Castres back to Lisbon at once, but Lord Tyrawly too with a
commission as plenipotentiary.6
The immediate cause for the Factory’s alarm was an attack on a party
of thirteen from H. M. S. Lyme, who were intercepted near the king’s
palace on their way to the water front by a customs guard. An officer and
several men were detained and some gold found on them was confiscated.
The sum of money impounded was not large and in the ordinary course
of events could have been reclaimed through the Portuguese courts, as
indeed it eventually was. Messrs Burrell, the owners of the money, made
no fuss, but the Factory panicked because they feared this was the first
move towards the institution of a rigorous control of the export of bullion,
on which so much of their prosperity depended. They were led by John
Bristow Junior, whose family firm had suffered from a famous incident
concerning the export of bullion some twenty years before. Bristow’s uncle
5 Azevedo, Pombal, 105/115, 123, 127. S. P. 89/48, Castres, 4 Feb. 1754.

6 Add MSS 23634, Committee of Lisbon Factory to Holderness, 7 Feb. 1752.
S. P, 89/49, Ibbetson to Holderness, 30 Jan. 1752. S. P. 89/48, Castres, 15 April 1751,
Newcastle, 22 June 1751.
106
THE AGE OF POMBAL
John Bristow Senior was an influential M. P. and a Director of the South

Sea Company. His nephew was known as something of a hothead and
was a leader of the radical faction of younger men in the Factory, who
were inclined to be arrogant and to think that they could ignore official
advice and have their way by taking the bit between their teeth and
insisting on their rights. They came to be known as the Grumbletonians.7
Tyrawly and Castres arrived in April and promptly interviewed anyone
who they thought could throw light on the situation. They both soon con¬
cluded that the affair had been much blown up. The money confiscated
only amounted to 344 milreis or about £110, and Captain Probyn of the
Lime, though he had been warned not to venture ashore, had in fact
landed several times without ever being molested. His boatswain and two
sailors were still detained, but as they were declared not to have been
carying pistols, but only their swords well hidden by their cloaks, as was
customary, they might well have been released and the case settled and
forgotten, if Bristow had not stirred up thes Grumbletonians. He liked to
play to the gallery and was said to have encouraged Captain Probyn to
provoke an incident by coming ashore and getting himself arrested, in the
hope that the Factory could then show its power by defying the Portuguese
authorities. Bristow was also accused of having offered a bribe of £500
to Probyn and his fellow captains to take all the bullion from his firm,
while denying facilities to his competitors. Bristow felt he could take
liberties, because he not only had influence at home but also was one of
the few British who had penetrated Portuguese circles; however the Hon.
Augustus Hervey, who had brought out Tyrawly and Castres on H. M. S.
Phoenix, was a friend of Bristow and took him to see Tyrawly. According
to William Mawman, a senior member of the Factory, Tyrawly read him
a lecture and Bristow ceased to back the Factory cabal. Hitherto there had
been no evidence to substantiate the alleged threat against Bristow's firm,
but now Bristow showed Tyrawly a letter from a Portuguese friend in the
customs named Antonio Luis Olivares warning him that a marine in the
Customs House named Da Sylva was laying a complaint against his firm.
He also produced a similar warning from the Swedish consul. Carvalho
himself was then interviewed and gave a most affable asurance to Bristow
that no action against his firm was intended. Bristow in fact established
cordial relations with Carvalho and discussed with him ambitious plans for
acquiring in Brazil, Portugal and Spain silver to supply the needs of the
East India Company. The silver was to be imported directly from America
through Lisbon or Cadiz but concessions for mining silver in Spain were
also negotiated in Madrid. Between 1753 and 1755 Messrs Bristow also
held the lucrative contract for the export of Brazilian diamonds from
7 Add MSS 23834, Holderness to Tyrawly, 23 April 1752. Tyrawly, 16 April,

7 May, 4 June 1752.
107
DAVID FRANCIS
Portugal. So it was to Bristow’s interest to turn respectable and no longer

to stir up the Grumbletonians. His prosperity was to be short, for he fell
out with his uncle, and was to be ruined by the 1755 earthquake.8
Tyrawly concluded that though the Factory had some grievances, their
own conduct was much to blame. They had profited by Consul Russell’s
illness to set up a secret committee, which usurped much of his authority.
When the Judge Conservator died they complained that in order to win
favour with authority he had shown partiality to the Portuguese in his
judgments, and they tried to lay down rules for the conduct of his successor.
The king of Portugal then refused to confirm his appointment, but Tyr¬
awly managed to persuade the Factory to hold a second election of the
same man without imposing any restrictions on him. This went through
and the royal confirmation was then given.
Tyrawly had felt his mission was unnecessary and had asked permis¬
sion to return home almost immediately after his arrival, but he stayed
for three months in order to settle as much as he could, and drew up a
full report on the bullion position and other matters. The Portuguese were
well aware that they had an unfavourable balance of trade with England,
and with other countries as well, which could only be paid in bullion, and
were quite prepared to wink at infractions, provided that certain decencies
were observed. This meant that firms who observed discretion and were
careful to keep on good terms with the authorities got their gold on board
the packets or warships without undue trouble. Other firms, who tried
to knuckle into the trade without propitiating the authorities or taking
sufficient pains to be unobtrusive, were prone to provoke incidents. Tyr¬
awly thought that with the arrival of many new firms the situation had
grown worse; perhaps it had, but he was inclined to exaggerate. Twenty
years earlier, when the moderates of the 1750s had been young hotheads,
he had had much the same sort of trouble; he now pointed out that the
Hamburgers prospered well enough without packet boats, warships or
privileges. But it was precisely for these reasons that they were content
to observe the law and take modest profits and to leave the more advent¬
urous trade to the British.9
In England the newssheets published a good deal about the Portugal
trade. A series of letters signed Mercator were published and appeared in
collected form in 1754 under the tittle ‘Mercator’s Letters on Portugal and
its Commerce’. They were dedicated to four leading men in the City, and
argued that the Portuguese bullion law was absurd and obsolete, and that
in any case much of the bullion freighted by the British belonged to Dutch
8 Add MSS 23624, Mawman to Tyrawly, 5 Nov. 1752, Factory to Tyrawly,

5 Nov. 1752. Lodge, Keene Corr, 254, 338. Add MSS 23624, Tyrawly to Holderness,
4 June 1752. Hervey, Memoirs, 89/48, Tyrawly to Holderness, 4 June 1752.
9 Add MSS 23634, Tyrawly to Holderness, 7 May 1752.
108
THE AGE OF POMBAL
and foreign owners. This was true for a sizeable proportion, but the
British owned the main share. Also despite their grumbles the British in
Lisbon did not want the law altered; they preferred existing risks to any
revision of the law, which would free the export of bullion, but would
almost certainly entail the introduction of an export duty. They would
have to pay this and would lose the advantage they enjoyed of shipping
their money on the packet boats and on British warships, which called
much more often than those of other nations. This is probably the reason
why there was no sequel to the offer made in January 1753 by the Por¬
tuguese minister in London to negotiate an agreement about the export
of bullion.10
Tyrawly found no reason to change the view which he had formed
soon after his arrival. He wrote Tt is certain that the king of Portugal's
officers are pretty severe on the king’s subjects, but I am afraid on the
other hand that it is not always without sufficient handle to be given so,
and none of them will deny but they have and doe enjoy many indulgences,
which by process of time they have grown to think are their privileges,
which are to be found in no treaties or stipulations between the crowns
that I have ever seen. A great body of H. M.’s trading subjects reside at
Lisbon, rich, opulent, and every day improving their fortunes and enlarging
their dealings. These people can be said to be under no government but
that of their own opinion, which each man will follow, or take the advice
of H. M. Ministers as best suits his present occasion then, so it is not to
be wondered at, if things sometimes run into a little confusion. I am only
surprised it does not happen more often, and it is my duty to let the king
know that there was no more necessity to send a minister extraordinary
here than there had been or may be at any other time. Mr de Castres is
perfectly acquainted with Portuguese affairs, and since the king has been
pleased to send me here, I believe I can be of some little service under
the present difficulties from my former acquaintance and connections with
this court, but very soon shall become a needless expense here for the
king. As it will probably take two months to get a reply from the duke
of Newcastle please send letters of revocation at once, which I need not
use if a further stay is necessary’.11
So Tyrawly left after a few weeks, but before doing so poured such
oil as he could upon troubled waters. He settled the dispute about the
election of a new Judge Conservator by persuading the Factory to submit
to him the problems raised by the delays in the settlement of debts and by
the encroachments of other Portuguese courts on the Conservator’s juris¬
diction. He also set up a commission to discuss complaints that higher
10 Mercator's letters, 1754. S. P. 89/48, Tyrawly to Holderness, 4 June 1752.

Quadro Elementar, Jan. 1753.
11 Add MSS 23624, Tyrawly to Holderness, 16 April 1752 also in S. P. 89/48.
109
DAVID FRANCIS
duties were being charged than those fixed by the treaties, because the
current values were sometimes lower than those corresponding to the old
Customs’ valuations. The Hon. Augustus Hervey thought that Tyrawly
had not gained one point for the Factory, but this was not quite the case.
Castres hopefully reported ‘The heat and torment which for some months
past had broken out among some of the younger set, and consequently
the most inexperienced in the colony, are by this time pretty well subsided,
and my best endeavours shall not be wanting to prevent their arrival again
upon the coming of the new consul’.12
Indeed for a few months all went swimmingly. Castres got on well
with Carvalho, and was able to entertain him to dinner with ladies, a rare
thing in Lisbon. He even won a few favours. Leave was given for the
Oporto Factory to acquire a cemetery and its members to carry arms
when they went up country to buy wine; they needed to do so, for there
were many bandits and they often had with them large sums of money.
Unfortunately Crowle, the new consul, was not a success; he was an
ex-M. P. for Hull, who had been given a post in the victualling department
by the Duke of Newcastle but had been obliged to solicit employment
abroad in order to escape from his creditors. He started on a bad footing
with the Factory by delaying his arrival for some months and by claiming
payment of the whole of the consulage which had accrued in the inter¬
regnum before his appointment, though the money was needed to meet
expenses and to assist the deceased consul general’s widow.13
Some of the Grumbletonians had talked loudly in the coffee shops
about the measure before parliament for the relief of the disabilities of the
Jews. They were not so much moved by Anti-Semitism as by the fear that
the Jews would win a predominance in the wool trade. Castres was afraid
that the Portuguese would add to the trouble; Carvalho asked for a copy
and translation of the proposed law, but after he had taken a look at it,
he decided that it was of no importance and managed to persuade his
ecclesiastical colleagues to take the same view. Actually the proposal was
dropped, but any hope that the Grumbletonians would now stay quiet
was disappointed by the violent agitation which arose about the corn
trade. There was famine in Spain, particularly near the Portuguese frontier,
and a slump in Cadiz; the Portuguese gave permission for 8000 sacks to
be exported to Spain overland from Portugal, as this was the shorter way
to Extremadura, but they took fright when the Spaniards sought to place
large orders in the Lisbon market and there were rumours of British mer-
12 Add MSS 23624, Tyrawly to Holdemess, 25 June 1752 also in S. P. 89/48.

13 Add MSS 23624, Mawman and Commissioners to Tyrawly, 22 Oct. 1752,
enc. Carvalho to Castres of 9 July 1753. Castres to Amyand. S. P. 89/48, 26 June,
19 July, 12 Aug., to Payzant, 28 May 1753.
110
THE AGE OF POMBAL
chants trying to corner the market and to make bargains with Spanish
buyers at exorbitant prices.14
Soon after reaching Lisbon in October 1752 Consul General Crowle
had reported ‘Since I have been here I have received great civility from
the gentlemen of the Factory, but still a very unpleasant spirit prevaileth
and nothing but grievances are talked of. My predecessor delegated very
extraordinary powers to a Committee, which was proposed for one year
and ended last month. Another Committee was chosen, but not with the
same powers, which I would not consent to, but I hope this violent spirit
will soon cease; but it will be some time before things are brought into
their proper channel, and I hope you will not be alarmed with horrors
and complaints from here’.15
The Secret Committee had apparently existed for some time. One of its
members, William Mawman, said that a clique in it had been troublesome
in Tyrawly’s time. It had criticised and hampered every step he took, and
resented the fact that he did not communicate every word that passed
between him and the secretary of state, and thought His Lordship did not
treat them with the respect which was due to them. This committee had
wrested from Russell much of his authority and now tried to deprive
Crowle of many of his consular powers. Crowle resisted and succeeded in
making them diminish their claims but bad feeling persisted. He also
refused to sign a memorial of complaint, which they proposed to send
direct to the secretary of state Lord Holderness.16
Crowle may have been elderly, tetchy and down at heel, also weak
and conceited, but he seems to have been a gentleman, a description which
every member of the Factory claimed, although for many of them it was
an honorary title. The king himself spoke well of Crowle and the Hon.
Augustus Hervey invited him to share a box at a royal bull fight. Hervey
himself was happy to open a Factory ball with the fair Mrs Boissard and
even the Portuguese nobility were not above showing a leg on such
occasions; some of the Tavoras were actually at such a ball on the night
of the attempted assassination of the king. Hervey often stayed with Mayne
and Burne, who like Bristow were accepted by the Portuguese and owned
country villas; but otherwise he had little to do with the Factory, whom
he described as purseproud people, who were seldom received by the
Portuguese but were envious of the few who were acceptable by reason
of their breeding or their merits. Crowle was far from being a fashionable
spark like Hervey but he probably shared his feelings about the ‘gentle-
14 S. P. 89/48, Castres, private, to Amyand, 26 June, 24 July and to Holderness,

9 July, 6, 11 Sept. 1753.
15 S. P. 89/49, Crowle to Amyand, 5 Nov. 1752. For the Factory imbroglio see
Lodge, Keene Corr., Introduction, xxvii-xxxi.
16 Add MSS 23634, Mawman to Tyrawly, 5 Nov. 1752.
Ill
DAVID FRANCIS
men’ of the Factory, and failed to conceal them. He got on reasonably well
with the Portuguese and seems, not without success, to have followed
Tyrawly’s tactics of careful study and appeasement.17
It was against this background that the disputes in the Factory reached
a climax in the autumn of 1753. In years of good harvests Portugal did
not have to import corn, but she depended on imports in bad years and
in the years 1736/40 had imported an annual average of 84,000 quarters
from England, valued at £114,000 and representing 10% of total English
exports to Portugal. In 1742 corn was short in England too and its export
had been prohibited. Carvalho, who was then minister in London, had
asked for special leave for corn to be exported, and had tried without
success to settle some means by which corn sent to Portugal could be
guaranteed to be consumed there and not passed on to the enemy. In
1753 the boot was on the other foot; the British wished to sell and the
Portuguese to restrict them. The year 1753 was a comparatively small year
with an export of 75,000 quarters, but the average remained high, 8% of
total British exports in the years 1746/55 and 13% from 1761 to 1765.
Speculators were encouraged by the hope of high profits and as Norfolk,
the home of Walpole and his friends, was a principal corngrowing district,
political interest was not lacking.18
The Spanish shortage of corn was most acute near the frontier and
tempted the local Portuguese farmers to export their stocks for high prices,
while at the same time local demand was inflated by the presence of troops
stationed there on account of the uneasy relations with Spain. In Lisbon
a large urban population required to be fed and the Lisbon mob and the
Lisbon market women could frighten even an autocratic government into
taking notice. So strict decrees were issued to oblige all corn entering
Lisbon to be registered and delivered to an entrepot whence the judge
of the corn-market could control its distribution to the Lisbon market
women and prevent it falling into the hands of monopolists or being ex¬
ported to Spain. British importers found that the market women were
more than a match for them in bargaining and preferred to sell their corn
from on board ship to wholesalers; nor did they wish to incur the delays
and loss of profits involved in delivering their corn to a government
warehouse. Corn, particularly United Kingdom corn, was a perishable
product and was apt to deteriorate quickly in damp conditions on board
ship; but if they took it ashore they wanted to store it in their own ware¬
houses and to sell it without restriction.19
17 Hervey, Memoirs, 121, 125, 153. Mrs Hoissard or Haissard was also much
approved by Benjamin Keene, who sent her a kiss. Lodge, Keene, 97, 344.105.
18 H. E. S. Fisher, The Portugal Trade, 116. S. P. 89/49, Da Cunha’s memo to
Holdemess about com of Dec. 1752. Azevedo, Pombal, 25. S. P. 89/49, Crowle to
Amyand, 20 Aug., 11, 13 Sept., 7 Oct. 1753 and petition to Portuguese authorities.
19 S. P. 89/48, Holderness to Castres, 25 Dec. and reply of 4 Feb. 1754. S. P.
112
THE AGE OF POMBAL
There were heated discussions in the Factory on the subject. Crowle

said that some of the so called Grumbletonians were so violent that they
would have preferred to see their corn perish rather than to fall in with
the Portuguese regulations. The hotheads among them were certainly
arrogant and talked loudly of their treaty rights and of confronting the
Portuguese rather than of seeking a quiet and reasonable accommodation.
After Bristow’s secession they had found an eloquent leader in a newcomer
to Lisbon named William Shirley. Crowle called him a comedian lately
employed at Goodman’s fields. He was a little more than this, being
wellknown as a playwright, though rather an unsuccessful one. He wrote
fifteen plays, some of which were published, but only one of them had
some success, The Black Prince. It had been performed four times at
Covent Garden with Garrick playing the leading part and was eventually
revived in 1760. But after his first failure Shirley was glad to accept
employment as acting manager of Chase & Co, a firm whose London and
Lisbon partners had fallen ill. He was no solid business man, but he was
a good politician, and he led the Grumbletonians with such fire and zeal
that for a time even the moderates were moved to rally to him.20
Crowle and Castres were by no means backward in protesting against
the corn decrees and in appealing to article 10 of the 1654 treaty which
guaranteed the freedom of British importers to bring in fish, corn and
other commodities to Portugal without hindrance. Crowle in August 1753
addressed a memorial to that effect to the Portuguese Chief Justice Fonseca
and an appeal went forward to the king. Castres took two deputies from
the Factory to see Carvalho, who was very stiff at first but after long
arguments and explanations of the terms of the 1654 treaty gradually
calmed down and seemed prepared to make concessions. But Shirley’s party
in the Factory were not satisfied and wanted to send a memorial framed
in violent terms to Holderness, the secretary of state. Crowle refused to
sign it, pointing out that there was no precedent for approaches to the
secretary of state directly and not through H. M. minister, and Castres at
first refused to have anything to do with it, though he did his best to
make the peace between Crowle and the Factory and eventually agreed
to allow the memorial to go forward through Baron, the Factory’s agent
in London, after it had been somewhat toned down.21
89/49, John Stubbs to Baron, 2 Jan. 1754. Factory Committee to Robinson, June
1754. Hake and Brome to Baron, 4 Jan. 1754. Crowle to Amyand, 22 Jan. 1754.
20 S. P. 89/49, Crowle to Amyand, 23 Sept., to Holderness, 10 Nov. 1753. Bio-
grafica Dramatica, 2 vols., 1783, ed. D. E. Baker.
21 S. P. 89/48, Castres to Carvalho (confidential), 24 Aug., to Holderness, 6,
11 Sept. 1753. Carvalho to Castres, 20 Aug. Factory to Holderness, 10 Nov., to
Castres, 10 Sept. S. P. 89/49, Crowle to Francisco Galvao de Fonseca, 20 Aug.,
Memorials handed by Baron to Holderness, Aug./Sept., Crowle to Amyand, 11 Sept.
1753.
113
DAVID FRANCIS
During a heated debate in the Factory Shirley declared that anyone

who refused to vote for the Factory’s motion was a traitor to his country.
Crowle was almost forced from the chair, and left the meeting. Through
the efforts of Castres Crowle’s return to take the chair again at a fresh
meeting was near to being arranged, but at the last moment Crowle was
deterred by the receipt of a threatening letter, and somewhat ill-advisedly
took his troubles to the Judge Conservator. The whole affair caused a great
stir in Lisbon and the Portuguese in general were shocked by the ill treat¬
ment of Crowle. The whole story even reached the ears of the king, who
asked the Judge Conservator to report on the subject. When he heard the
details he promptly gave orders for Shirley to leave Lisbon within twenty-
four hours and Portugal within five days for having insulted the com¬
mission to Crowle of his friend King George II.22
This was a thunderclap for the Grumbletonians, who were subdued
for the time being, while the older and more stable members of the Factory,
who had always had their doubts about their violent proceedings, began
to regret having backed them. Castres thought that the difficulties about
corn were on their way to being solved and reported that the members
of the Factory, whom he had consulted, seemed to agree that this was the
case. Carvalho had ultimately promised not to impede British importers
in the sale of their goods and Crowle received friendly assurances from the
various officials on whom he called. The judge in charge of corn, indeed,
on orders from Carvalho directed that ships should henceforward be
allowed to unload their cargoes of corn without impediment. The new
decrees about corn were suspended rather than revoked, and hitches and
delays still arose, but on the whole corn could be sold freely. The Factory
still grumbled, particularly about the regulation that the vendors must still
declare the quantities of corn they sold and the names of the purchasers,
which meant that the details of every transaction had to be checked and
counter-checked by the customs. These measures were perhaps a justifiable
means of control, but they led to expense and delay. Nevertheless Crowle
and Castres flattered themselves that the worst of the trouble was over, the
more so as the last despatch from Lord Holderness had assured them of
his support for Crowle, if he behaved reasonably.23
Crowle was satisfied that he had done well and that he had nothing
with which to reproach himself. Castres had refused to give Shirley asylum
in the legation and had reported that he was 'a cerveau brule’. The reaction
of Holderness therefore came to him as a shock. Tyrawly had made Hol-
22 S. P. 89/48, Castres to Amyand, 6, 26 Oct. 1753. S. P. 89/49, Holderness to

Castres, 4 Feb., 12 Nov. 1753. S. P. 89/49, Crowle to Amyand, 11 Sept., 10 Nov., to
Holderness, 10 Nov. 1753. Royal decree of 5 Nov. 1753.
23 S. P. 89/48, Castres to Holderness, 4 Feb., 6, 11 Sept., to Amyand, 12 Nov.
S. P. 89/49, Crowle to Amyand, 22 Jan. 1754.
114
THE AGE OF POMBAL
derness well aware of the failings of the Factory and of the presumption
of the secret committee, but he was now faced by angry remonstrances
from Da Cunha, the Portuguese minister, by the memorial from the Factory
and by two more memorials signed by 46 and 64 persons in London on
behalf of the ‘Portugal merchants’ and other interested persons. The
British complained bitterly of Crowle and of the alleged ill treatment of
Shirley, while Da Cunha threatened to break all protocol by voicing his
protests to the king in person when he presented his credentials. He was
only stopped from doing this by the postponement of his audience. On
orders from Carvalho he asked for the recall of Castres and twisted to
his discredit some remarks which he had made of a temporising nature.
Having failed to pour out his grievances to the king he set them out in a
long memorial to Holderness, in which he accused the British of breaking
Portuguese laws by trying to monopolise the corn market and to divert
supplies to Spain, and Castres of heading <a cabal against Carvalho. He
made a particular point of an alleged assertion of Castres to Carvalho that
under the treaties British Subjects enjoyed greater rights for the free sale
of corn in Portugal than the Portuguese themselves.24
Holderness blamed Castres for this remark and questioned him closely
about certain admissions that he had made about misdemeanours com¬
mitted by British merchants. Both Castres and Crowle had felt a certain
sympathy for the Portuguese case and had realized that they had no
wish to destroy the corn trade, which served their own interests, but only
to keep down the price of corn imported and to prevent it being diverted
to Spain. Provoked by Da Cunha’s complaints, Holderness insisted that
Castres must take a firm line in resisting any non-observance of the rights
assured by the treaty. He also told Castres to ask for a pardon for Shirley.
King Joseph had no objection to agreeing to this request. He only remarked
that as far as he was concerned Crowle had seemed a good man, but if
King George was content with the treatment he had suffered from the
Factory, it was all the same to him and he would not trouble himself again
about any consul.25
Castres explained that he had only meant to convey to Carvalho that
under the treaty importers from abroad were entitled to sell their corn
freely and were not bound. by the same rules as those which governed
the internal trade of Portugal; further, he had not spoken of trade in
general but only of the corn trade. As for the aspersions he had cast on
certain dealings by British merchants, he admitted that these were hearsay
24 S. P. 89/48, Castres to Amyand, 11 Sept., 12 Nov. 1753. S. P. 89/49, Hol¬

derness to Crowle, 20 June 1753. Da Cunha’s Aide-memoire to Holderness, Dec. 1753,
Memorials to Holderness, 12 Dec., 19 Oct. 1753. Denunciation of Crowle, 10 Nov.
S. P. 89/48, Holderness to Castres, 23, 25 Dec. 1753.
25 S. P. 89/48, Castres to Amyand, 22 Sept., 20 Nov. 1753, to Robinson, 1, 5
June 1754, 12 Aug. 1754.
115
DAVID FRANCIS
\ \ X
but explained that they had been recounted to him by no less a person
than John Bristow Junior. His story was that several firms had appropriated
corn in order to sell it at a high price to Spanish buyers and that a
number of them had confessed their transgressions to Carvalho. It trans¬
pired that only one merchant, a man named John Stubbs, had been to
Carvalho to apologise, while a second charge against another man had
been dropped. Furthermore Stubbs had given a perfectly adequate explan¬
ation that he had by inadvertence imported one consignment from the
Portuguese provinces to Lisbon, but that it was quite untrue that he had
shipped four cargoes to Spain. As for the charge of conspiring against
Carvalho Castres indignantly denied this and was most shocked as he had
believed that Carvalho had now become his friend. He could only account
for Carvalho’s behaviour by supposing that he was suspicious of the old
friendship he had with the new Spanish ambassador Perellada. This could
have been the reason, for Carvalho was worried by the fall from power in
the summer of 1754 of his old friend the Spanish minister Ensenada and
by rumours that Perellada had orders to try to oust him from power.
Carvalho was anxious about his position in Portugal; he still had the
support of the king’s Jesuit confessor Moreira but had made several
enemies and was losing the confidence of the queen dowager. However
the latter died in August 1754 and Carvalho overcame his difficulties and
also his suspicions of Castres. Shirley returned and remained in Lisbon
until after the earthquake in 1755, but his presence led to no further
incidents and the difficulties in the corn trade subsided for the time being.
Though the merchants had suffered many frustrations the whole trouble
had been greatly blown up and the losses of cargoes as reported by Castres
were relatively small. The most serious casualty was the unfortunate Crowle;
he had applied for leave and this had given the new secretary of state
Sir Thomas Robinson the opportunity to end his appointment quietly and
to instruct him to hand the consular archives to the care of the legation,
when he left Lisbon. He was packing up and preparing to embark, when
he succumbed on June 22nd 1755 to a fit of apoplexy. The news of
Shirley’s pardon had been too much for him.26
Crowle’s successor was the Hon. Edward Hay, who was consul at
Cadiz and was very welcome to the Factory, as not long before he had
been employed in Lisbon and had married a daughter of the Factory
named Miss Flower. He was a younger son of the Earl of Kinnoull, and
his brother, the next earl, who had also married a Factory lady, Miss
Auriol, was soon to come out to Lisbon on a diplomatic mission. The
Factory continued to grumble about the corn decrees, but the older
members had had some misgivings about the behaviour of the Grumble-
26 S. P. 89/48, Castres to Holderness, 2 letters, 4 Feb. 1754. S. P. 89/49, Crowle

to Amyand, 7 Jan. 1754. William Crowle to Holderness, 29 June 1753.
116
THE AGE OF POMBAL
tonians and now favoured a more conciliatory attitude. Hay was an able
man; he did not always take the side of the Factory against the Portuguese
but he managed well with them until, after the death of Castres in 1757,
he succeeded him as minister. Castres was for a time nervous lest he
should suffer the fate of Crowle, but he regained the favour of Carvalho
and also the appreciation of the Factory for his services. He was no man
of fashion, but a good office man with a knowledge of the law and of
trade; the aristocratic Hervey said he had lost touch and lived a niggardly
life; he criticised him for knowing nothing of some French ships entering
the Tagus, sixteen hours after they had come in. There was probably a
delay before the news reached him from the shipping office at Belem,
but in fact he reported the arrival of these ships as soon as Hay did, by
the next packet boat. Carvalho again began to treat him with confidence
and after the earthquake Castres showed up remarkably well, taking much
more active and helpful measures of reliefs than there is any record of
Hay having done as consul general.27
In the last years before the earthquake the Lisbon trade fared pretty
well though that of Oporto was entering on a crisis. Carvalho was still
hankering to found an East India Company and ordered two ships to be
built on the Thames to add to the East India fleet. He employed a former
servant of the East India Co named Cleland and an opulent Lisbon mer¬
chant named Feliciano Velho Oldenburg to help him and to find capital,
appropriating for this purpose 600,000 cruzados from the Nuncio’s crusade
fund, but Oldenberg was in course of time disgraced and the company
barely lasted three years. He also gave a charter to a French merchant
named Grenier to freight an annual ship to Goa for five successive years,
but only one such ship sailed.28
Carvalho was inclined to favour nationalist Portuguese opposition to
the Brazil boundary treaty with Spain, which had been Alexander Gus-
mao’s favourite child, but he took no positive steps to obstruct its im¬
plementation. Indeed a Hispano-Portuguese boundary commission was set
up. The commissioners for the Amazon boundary never met but those for
the south, equipped with boundary stones, went to the River Plate and
began to work in that area. In September 1752 Crowle reported that the
Portuguese had taken possession of the Jesuit Reductions in Paraguay and
would hand over Nova Colonia to Spain, as soon as they were in full
occupation of the Reductions. But in February 1753 there was already
news of Jesuit or Indian resistance and of the cession of Nova Colonia
being postponed.29
27 Hervey, Memoirs, 107/8. Lodge, Keene Corr., 163, 363.

28 Azevedo, Pombal, 114/15. S. P. 89/49, Crowle to Amyand, 12 Jan., 1753,
4 Feb., 24 March 1754.
29 Azevedo, Pombal, 124, 136/7. S. P. 89/49, Crowle to Amyand, 11 Sept. 1753,
24 Feb. 1754.
117
DAVID FRANCIS
% * 1
In Brazil Gusmao’s capitation system, by which the royal fifths were

collected by means of a poll-tax on all men, slaves or free, employed in
the mining industry, was replaced by a system already used before its
introduction, which obliged the miners to take their gold to mints or
smelting centres set up by the government, where after subtraction of
the costs and of the share due to the government the balance was returned
for registration and shipment on the Lisbon bound fleet. Gusmao, who
until his death in 1753 retained a seat on the Overseas Council, protested
strongly, alleging it would be impossible to prevent contraband. He
thought that it might have been possible twenty years earlier, when the
population was smaller and there were fewer roads, but now that there
was a choice of roads from the mines to the ports, the smugglers in a
short time would evolve many and devious means of eluding the police.
The government might retain the upper hand, but it would not be for
long. GusmaS judged rightly, for official corruption and smuggling activ¬
ity and the expense of control increased mightily, but the effect on govern¬
ment revenues only made itself seriously felt some years later, when the
production of the mines ceased to increase and then appreciably de¬
clined.30
Though King Joseph kept his popularity his zeal for hard work soon
evaporated, as he devoted increasing time to his pleasures. Carvalho was
indefatigable and full of ideas, and at first gave a great impetus to the
administration, but he was better at talking than executing; and he tended
to accumulate mountains of paper, which buried him more and more.
After the death of Friar Gaspar de Encarnacao his party composed of
nobles formed an opposition, but they could not hold their own against
Carvalho. The Marquis of Alorna, who on his departure to Goa as Vice-
Roy had been personally seen off by the king and in India had won
victories against the Mahrattas, received on his return no thanks for his
distinguished service and a cold welcome. Even before the queen mother’s
death her protege the Visconde de Ponte de Lima, the last of the old
nobility to hold an important diplomatic post, was recalled from Madrid.
While the blue-blooded Starhemburg represented Austria in Lisbon the
Portuguese minister in Vienna was the plebeian Encerrabodes. Already
in the later months of 1751 several nobles, including the Counts of Sao
Vicente and Atoguia and the young Marquis of Tavora, were exiled from
Lisbon for offences against a girl. At the request of the king’s sister, the
queen of Spain, they were pardoned after a month or two, but the fact
of their punishment was a sign of the times. The young Tavora joined his
father in Goa, leaving the field clear for the king to court his wife. There
was discontent amongst the nobles and resentment of Carvalho’s fiscal
30 Gusmad, i-i-349/404. Maxwell, Conflicts, 16.
118
THE AGE OF POMBAL
reforms, but he was able to ignore this and to acquire an ever tighter
hold of the reins of power.31
Relieved of much of the labour of government the king and the favoured
circle around him gave themselves up to pleasure. The memoirs of the
Hon. Augustus Hervey, who was often in and out of Lisbon with his
ship, give us a rare glimpse of this fabulous world. The splendid new
opera house was inaugurated, and whether Carvalho was successful or not
in increasing the king’s revenues, the king had no lack of funds to spend
on entertainments, royal progresses and hunting expeditions. Hervey was
one of the very few Englishmen invited to take part. He was a great friend
of Dom Joa5 de Braganza, a natural son of the late Dom Francisco, the
king’s uncle, who had been recognised as a royal relative and had become
a favourite at court. He took Hervey everywhere; like his father he was
fond of sailing and Hervey often went on the Tagus with him and took
part in such fashionable events as Lisbon coidd offer, bull fights, operas,
and the society of elegant nuns at Odivelas or other convents. Even the
Nuncio came with him once to have a good look through the convent
grilles, and on another occasion Hervey was regaled by the Cardinal Pa¬
triarch with chocolate. The Infante Manoel still held his small court at
Belas and introduced him to more parties with nuns. Hervey was on good
enough terms with the queen and the royal princesses to be chaffed about
the good time he was having. He enjoyed these occasions though the con¬
vivial cardplaying and drinking at the Factory rather bored him. Portuguese
noblemen atended the Factory’s balls but they seldom entertained in return.
John Bristow and a few others such as the wealthy Mr Levious, who had
a beautiful wife and gave a magnificent ball himself, mixed with the Por¬
tuguese nobility, but they were the exceptions. Within the charmed circle
the favours of Portuguese belles were not hard to come by, and Hervey
made the most of his opportunities. He was kidnapped one evening by the
minions of a noble lady and spent an Arabian night with her. She pre¬
served a total secrecy about her identity and address, but Hervey was
determined to find out who she was, and she turned out to be a gay
widow, the French-born Duchess of Cadaval. When she married in 1739,
Mariana Vitoria, then Princess of Brazil, remarked that it was lucky she
had been brought up in a convent, for at least she would find herself at
home in Portugal. The young future queen found Portuguese court life
inexpressibly boring and perhaps did not appreciate yet what convent life
could offer. Hervey soon found out and acquainted himself with all the
scandals of the court; he was quick to spot that the king was making eyes
31 Azevedo, Pombal, 126. S. P. 89/49, Consul Russell, 17 Aug., 27 Sept., 10 Oct.,

20 Dec. 1751.
119
PORTUGAL.—9
DAVID FRANCIS
% '*1
at the young marchioness of Tavora, as much as he dared in the same

room as the queen.32
Hervey was not only a pleasure lover; he was not above doing a bit
of business. He gives us a naval captain’s view of the bullion trade. While
other captains were agreeing to take a }% commission he insisted on 1%.
He took 80,000 moedas to England on one occasion and two shipments
of 85,332 and 33,353 moedas for the Mediterranean on others. One of
these was a legitimate remittance of money for the garrison of Gibraltar.
He did not have all the commission for himself, as his commanding officer
Admiral Byng was entitled to a third. British warships also sometimes
carried money for the kings of Portugal or Spain, for instance to Genoa
for the expenses of a Portuguese cardinal in Rome, and to Naples for the
Spanish troops there.32
Another glimpse of Portuguese society is afforded by the affairs of
Alexander Gusmao in his later years. They reveal that the authoritarian
Portuguese state was not as monolithic as it appeared to outsiders, but full
of individual passions and factions. Gusmad was involved in the scandal
of the convent of the Claristas at Santarem. This was a very select institu¬
tion of nobly-born nuns of the Puritan persuasion, which did not mean that
they were excessively particular about their morals, but that they were
fanatical on the subject of purity of blood and birth. But a number of
Brazilian nuns had gained access to their sanctuary. Many of them were
friends or relations of Gusmao, and Gusma5’s sister Brigita Vitoria was
one of them and finally won promotion to be mother superior. She ran into
stiff opposition from the noble nuns, when she tried to tighten up the
discipline, and this increased to such a degree, that she was no longer able
to keep order. Friar Faustino de la Rosa, Provincial of the Franciscan
order, was reputed to have seconded Gusmao’s recommendation of his
sister in return for the promise of a bishopric. Friar Gaspar de Encarna-
ca5 was also a Franciscan, so Gusmao could count on his support. But
the Cardinal Patriarch Tomas de Almeida took the side of the nuns and
invoked the intervention of papal authority; so the Patriarch annulled the
Provincial’s order for the removal of some of the offending nuns. Though
usually on the side of the nobles Friar Gaspar in this case was against the
nuns and, exercising the royal authority, he sent the pious Marquis de
Marialva to turn them out. But after the death of King John and the fall
of Friar Gaspar papal authority, supported by the Patriarch, gained the
upper hand. The excommunication of the nuns was suspended and after a
further enquiry the cause of the Brazilian nuns foundered.33
32 Hervey, Memoirs, Lisbon visits, passim. Cartas da Rainha Mariana Vitoria,

11 Aug. 1739.
33 Hervey, Memoirs, 76, 126, 143, 176. S. P. 89/49, Crowle to Amyand, 5 Nov.
1752. For an earlier account of prize commerce see J. Bromley, The French Privateers
1702-13. Historical Essays Presented to David Ogg.
120
THE AGE OF POMBAL
Like many brilliant men Gusmao was not clever in the management
of his own affairs; he held several sinecures, but he lived high and ran
into debt. He had acquired some property in the Tagus marshes and had
leased them to his proteges the authoress Teresa Margarida de Orta and
her husband Pedro Jansen. Gusmao had practically adopted their son Henry
and had paid for his education in Paris. But in return they defrauded
GusmaS of his rent, and the steward of the property, Father Agostinho de
Correia, involved him in a dispute with the ground landlord, who happened
to be none other than the Patriarch. The latter over-rode the proceedings
Gusmao had taken for his defence. The Patriarch personally was a kindly
and pious old man, but his officials no doubt shared the feelings against
Gusma5 and Friar Gaspar which arose after the king’s death; a popular
song said they both deserved the attention of the Inquisition and the old
charges against Gusmao of Judaism were revived. The properties of persons
guilty of Judaism were considered to be adjust perquisite of the church
and ecclesiastical authority to be morally justified in laying hands on it.34
Gusmao was no more in favour of the nobles than Carvalho, and though
he disagreed with him about the capitation fee, he was equally against the
contrabandistas and in favour of reforms in Brazil. But some people at
least, including Benjamin Keene, thought of him as a possible rival ‘who
kept Carvalho in awe, and no one ever stood more in need of a bit to
stop, or reins to guide a wild career, than he, I hint at’. Keene sincerely
regretted the death of Gusmao, though earlier he had spoken of his pride
and folly; whether he really had a chance of winning against Carvalho
or of doing better than him, if he did so, is questionable. As late as
October 1750 he was given a property by the new king in recognition of
his services, but at the time of his death his influence was fast declining.
His death removed perhaps the most significant obstacle to Carvalho’s
supremacy, which was soon to be sealed by his prowess after the great
earthquake.35
34 Gusmao, l-ii-413/15, 430.

35 Gusmao, ll-ii-90, Doc. 42. Lodge, Keene Corr., 248, 341.
* 1
THE LISBON EARTHQUAKE AND AFTER
The Lisbon earthquake came without warning at 9.30 a.m. on All

Saints Day, 1755, which was a fine Sunday morning. The churches were
packed, particularly with the poor, who came to the earlier services;
many buildings crumbled to the ground, and panic-stricken people who
ran to the open square by the waterside were overwhelmed by a thirty-foot
tidal wave, which flooded the lower part of the town and swept away the
principal quay. Numerous fires followed, which incinerated many refugees
among the ruins. The Patriarchal Church, the Royal Palace and Library,
innumerable churches, dwelling houses and convents were destroyed by
the first or succeeding shocks or gutted by the raging fires.
Many nobles lost their lives, but the poor who lived in the centre of
the town suffered most. The Royal Family were at Belem and all survived,
though they were reduced to living in wooden hutments and did not dare
to move from them for some years to come. Carvalho made his head¬
quarters in a coach in the Belem palace garden; his house in town in the
Rua Formosa survived; when the king remarked that this was a dispen¬
sation, the Count of Sao Lourenco, an enemy of Carvalho, who was stand¬
ing by, observed that the Rua Suja, a principal street in the red light
district, had survived too.
Of the ministers Pedro de Mota was old and bedridden; and Diogo
de Mendonca fled in a panic; only Carvalho remained to face the situation
with fortitude, backed it must be said by the king and queen, who behaved
calmly. The king asked him what was to be done, and he is credited
with the famous reply ‘Bury the dead, Sire, and feed the living’. Whether
Carvalho himself said this or not, he was resolute, cheerful and indefa¬
tigable, and determined to treat the disaster as a natural phenomenon and
not as a punishment for the sins of the people, an idea which inspired
great devotion among the priests to administer last offices and bury the
dead, but inclined the populace to a passive fatalism. Carvalho combatted
this by active measures. Fires were still blazing and thousands of people
were homeless and starving. The riff-raff were looting and sometimes
themselves starting fires to increase the panic and their chances of plunder.
122
An English eyewitness was particularly struck by the plight of the many

abandoned animals, who were left to starve. Carvalho did his utmost to
reduce chaos to order; he called in troops from the provinces, placed an
embargo on all shipping, and sequestrated all supplies. Luckily there had
been a good harvest, so the food problem was not bad, particularly as the
needs of Lisbon had been much reduced by the number of deaths and the
flight of so many people.1
Many of the Factory lived in the suburbs, where the damage was less
serious, so the total British deaths numbered only 78, of whom a number
were obscure Irish catholics. 49 of the dead were women including two
senior Factory ladies, Mrs Hake and Mrs Perochon, the former a sister of
Admiral Sir Charles Hardy; plans were made to repatriate about 300
destitute and a number of the Factory families planned to leave, but some
were prevented and others changed their minds. Castres’ friend, the Spanish
ambassador, was killed by a falling doorpost, but Castres himself escaped
by jumping out of a second-floor window* his house, though damaged,
remained standing, and he soon had the Dutch minister and his family
and a number of refugees camping in his garden. The consul general
Edward Hay was safe at a quinta out of town. The damage to property
was far more serious; the loss to British traders was estimated at 160
million livres tournaisis; the second largest loss was that of the Hamburgers,
40 million out of a total of 224 million. But the more solid British
merchants only had about a third of their capital locked up in the Lisbon
warehouse; their direct losses were thus limited, but they suffered greatly
from the insolvency of most of their Portuguese debtors.2
A personal account has survived by a young member of the Factory,
aged twenty-six, named Thomas Chase, of the firm which employed
William Shirley. He fell from the fourth floor of a house on the edge of
the old part of the city and survived among debris in the basement with
a broken arm and a number of bruises. With the help of a Hamburger
named Forge he found his way to the garden of a house higher up the
street, but after a time he left this refuge with the idea of finding a boat
across the river, but was caught by a fire and took shelter among the
gutted ruins of the royal palace, where the walls were still standing, but
there was nothing more to burn. Thence he gradually made his way with
the help of some negroes and Portuguese boatmen to a quinta belonging
to Christopher Hake of the Factory, and after some days found a boat to
take him across the river and on board a British merchantman. He des-
1 Pombal, 141/4. Marcus Cheke, Pombal, 60/72. Marco Domingues,

Azevedo,
O Marquis de Pombal, 132/41. Sir Thomas Kendrick, The Lisbon Earthquake, 1956.
Carlos Estorninho, O Terremoto de 1755, Separata de Revista de Faculdade de
Letras de Lisboa, 2 serie, 1922, XXII-69-75.
2 S. P. 89/50, Castres to Robinson, 6 Nov., 18 Nov., 27 Dec. 1755. Azevedo,
Pombal, 145.
123
DAVID FRANCIS
cribed the stench, and the corpses among the flaming ruins, the devotion
of the priests and the praying multitudes, and the rapacity of the boatmen,
who were torn between their desire for a rich reward and their itch to
lynch the heretics and the black negro devils with them. But a Portuguese
lady, who knew his father, gave him a melon, and many friars and priests
were unflinching in caring for the sick and disposing of the dead. The
Sebastianist part of their nature responded willingly to such an apocalyptic
event, and was encouraged by further shocks, particularly a bad one later
in November, which led them to believe that a final retribution was nigh,
and in the meanwhile little could be done save to show their repentance
by mortifying the flesh and continual prayer. The Jesuits suggested that
the anniversary of the earthquake would see the last judgment come, but
when the fatal day passed without incident common sense and the reason¬
ing of their actual Sebastian, Carvalho, slowly began to prevail. More of
the Factory decided after all to remain and on 24th November fifty heads
of houses signed a memorial about their troubles. There were also many
humbler folk outside the Factory who made up Tyrawly’s estimated total
of 2000 British subjects. The Factory families were often numerous; there
were two Christopher Hakes who signed memorials, but Chase’s account
mentions Abraham and Joseph Hake too, and Dr Scratton, the Factory
doctor, and other worthies, such as Houston, the coffeehouse keeper, and
McBride, the shoemaker. According to a Portuguese account there were
not only 100 principal firms in Lisbon but also a number of tanners,
cobblers, tailors, barbers and even starchers. Little record of them has
survived, but they undoubtedly existed, though in the tightening of the
police regulations which was to some extent made necessary by the dis¬
orders following the earthquake, a number of small businesses were
squeezed out of existence.3
The British reaction to the news of the earthquake was generous and
parliament at once voted £50,000 in aid and the despatch of food and
supplies for a like value; bad weather held up the convoy, so the first
relief ship from Ireland only reached Lisbon in mid-January, and H. M. S.
Hampton Court, under the command of Captain Broderick, with the last
of the supplies over a month later. Other nations also offered help;
Hamburg sent shiploads of timber, which was hard to come by in Lisbon
and much needed; the French offered condolences but little help followed;
Spain sent supplies free of duty from Badajoz but the Portuguese decided
they could not be accepted duty free without infringing international
treaties and they had to be returned by sea to Cadiz, though a generous
personal gift in cash from the queen of Spain was accepted. The Portuguese
were very cagey about putting themselves under an obligation by accepting
3 Thomas Chase the Gentleman’s Magazine, 634-105/10, 121/6.

in Azevedo,
Pombal, 210. S. P. 89/53, D. Clerk to James Grosett, 4 Dec. 1760.
124
charity and were inclined to demur even at the British offering. A large
share of the relief money was given to nobles and the well off rather than
to the poor, though one noble at least, the Marquis of Valenga, refused
an aid of 18,000 cruzados so that a better use could be made of it. The
Portuguese were appreciative of British generosity and announced that the
British poor should be served first and given whatever proportion the
Factory thought appropriate. The Factory settled for a thirtieth, and this
proportion of the corn and beef available was placed in a special warehouse
under the care of an Irish merchant named Phineas Barrett, who was
appointed superintendent in charge of the distribution of all the cargoes.
£2000 in cash was also allotted and was paid to Consul General Hay.4
In April, after the death of Pedro de Mota, Carvalho took his place,
and Luis da Cunha, a nephew of the great ambassador of that name, left
the embassy in London to become secretary of state. He greeted Castres
as an old friend and both he and Hay always found him very helpful.
He now assisted in a difficult case in whibh the Bishop of Oporto had
caused the arrest of a young Englishman named Pawson. He had been
educated in England as a Protestant, but had an Irish mother and had
actually been bom in Oporto and christened with some ceremony in the
cathedral there as a catholic. An approach had been made to the Inqui¬
sition to find out whether Pawson could safely come back to take charge
of his father’s business, as his father wanted to retire; the Inquisition had
given their clearance, but the bishop, who was a fanatical old man, had
intervened. Da Cunha after a long delay and a great deal of trouble
managed to settle the case and even to have the bishop’s administrator
dismissed. Da Cunha was co-operative in other minor matters too, stopping
for instance a Portuguese ship which was loading guns and ammunition
probably to supply a French privateer.5
After they had had time to take breath the Factory found they had
lost less than they feared. They salvaged some of their property from their
houses and from the customs warehouses. In this the Portuguese were
helpful, allowing them to search for what could be saved, provided they
obtained a licence from the fudge Conservator. In May 1756 Hay reported
Tn general our affairs are upon no bad footing in this country. We have
the pass of all other nations in point of trade, and it may be the most
prudent part to stand our ground rather than to attempt any innovations’.6
The innovations he meant were a proposed revision of the customs’
tariff, which still observed valuations fixed in 1695, which sometimes told
against English goods, though in general they paid less than the maximum
4 S. P. 89/50, Credentials of Charles Townshend, issued in the belief that

Castres was dead, and cabinet minutes about aid. Castres to Richardson, 10 Nov.
1755, to Fox, 27 Dec. Azevedo, Pombal, 144.
5 S. P. 89/50, Castres to Fox, 10 May, 11 Aug. 1756.
6 S. P. 89/50, Flay to Amyand, 8 May 1756.
125
DAVID FRANCIS
of 23% allowed by the 1654 treaty. But the matter which soon had the
Factory up in arms was the levy of 4% additional duty on all imports
to defray the cost of a new custom-house to replace that destroyed by the
earthquake. The Brazil merchants had offered to pay this and naturally the
king had willingly accepted. The British pointed out that the new tax
would infringe the treaty and besides would bear hardly on all importers,
whether in Portugal or Brazil, while the Brazil merchants themselves, who
had made the handsome offer, would escape scot free, for buying their
goods on credit for six or twelve months or until the arrival of the Brazil
fleets, they could pass the cost of the 4% to their customers. But the
Portuguese insisted that the tax was essential, and would do no more than
exempt goods arriving before 2 January 1756; it was pointed out that the
British had had the use of the customs warehouses to store their goods, and
would suffer if they were not replaced. Consul General Hay admitted this
and advised the Factory not to make any public remonstrance, which would
only exacerbate the situation, but to allow the affair to go quietly through
official channels; the Factory in a somewhat chastened mood took his
advice.7
The Factory gave thought to devise special measures to relieve their
distress and suggested the setting up of a court of equity to consider hard
cases and all the post-Earthquake problems. But the Portugal merchants
in London raised objections, pointing out that the allotment of compen¬
sation would be very difficult. In any case as the months passed several
of the proposed articles fell out of date and some questions began to settle
themselves. To avoid hurting the Factory’s feelings and to mark Hay’s
favoured status the objections were transmitted indirectly by means of a
letter to Hay from his brother the Bishop of St Asaph. Hay was thus able
to drop the matter without causing any ill will.8
However the cordial relations which the earthquake had generated with
Portugal were soon clouded by more disagreements. Ever since his studies
of conditions in England Carvalho had been planning to set up trading
companies to enlarge Portuguese influence. His first venture had been the
East India Company, but his enthusiastic efforts had petered out. Just
before the earthquake he had founded the Grand Para and Maranhao
Company with extensive monopoly privileges in North Brazil and an es¬
tablishment and Judge Conservator of its own. The Junta de Bern Commum,
a kind of Lisbon chamber of commerce, protested on behalf of the Brazil
merchants against the new company’s privileges and was promptly sup¬
pressed, and replaced by an institution of Carvalho’s own named the Junta
7 S. P. 89/50, Castres to Fox, 4, 11 Feb., 8 May 1756.

8 S. P. 89/50, Factory memorial of 24 Dec. 1755. Fox to Flay, 16 Feb. 1756, Hay
to Fox, 15 March, 16 June 1756. A Ferrao, O Duque de Lafoes e Marques de Pombal,
1938.
126
de Comercio. The company’s privileges impinged on those of the Jesuits,

whose protests became a primary factor in Carvalho’s quarrel with them.
The first repercussion for British trade was the loss of the share of the
Oporto Factory in the wine trade with Brazil. The Portuguese sector as
well as the Brazil part of the trade was lost, for the Douro was now
monopolised by the Douro Company, which sold it direct to the Para
Company. Da Cunha assured Castres that the action of the companies
would actually benefit the wine trade and stop the falling off which
resulted from adulteration and other bad practices. It was a fact that
port-wine was acquiring a bad reputation as a result of the widespread
demand in England for any liquor, however inferior, which was strong
and could serve as a substitute for gin. The duke of Lafoens, who had
been spending some months in England, remarked how hard it was to
convince people that Portuguese wine was anything but black-strap and
that he was trying to persuade them to try^some good Lisbon. This might
have been prejudice, but a little later in Vienna he remarked that there
were many Englishmen there and that if one spoke of Portuguese wine
they only made a face. However according to Hay it was doubtful whether
the Oporto trade had really diminished, or if it had, whether the loss had
not been compensated by an increase in the export from Madeira and the
islands. He denied that the recent increase in the English customs duty
had made any difference, for the increase bore equally on all, and the
middle men did not escape, as they did in the case of the 4% increased
export duty in Portugal. Upon reflection he did not forward the Oporto
protest about the Brazil trade, as he found that an article of the 1654
treaty exempted any Portuguese company trading with Brazil, and it was
only because no such company had existed before that the Factory had
been free to export wine to Brazil. By its statutes of 10 September the
Wine Company also acquired the monopoly of wines sold in Portugal.
The resulting rise in prices benefitted the growers for a time but deprived
British exporters of the power to influence prices or to buy or sell wines
locally. Two members of the Oporto Factory were taken to see Carvalho
by Castres. They complained of having to submit their wines to the judge¬
ment of the company’s wine tasters on the quay and of being obliged to
sell any wine rejected to the company. But Carvalho replied that no-one
but the king of Portugal could interpret his own laws, and therefore he
could not accept any memorial on such a subject. Some new decrees were
issued to protect the trade from the delays, defalcations, and adulterations
of the Douro boatmen, but in a letter to the Wine Company Carvalho stated
unequivocally that it was necessary to set up the wine company in order
to prevent cut-throat competition between private firms and to support
the trade. A further British complaint was that not all wines grown in the
demarcated area turned out well, but such as had been passed by the
127
DAVID FRANCIS
* \\
company to the Factory and turned out badly could not be sold as second-
class wine; on the other hand the company acquired much good wine,
grown outside the Upper Douro, and were able to sell their second class
wine or Ramo wine to Brazil, or even to the British navy, and threatened
to send it to the Channel Isles, where it would be made up to compete in
England with the regular export port.9
It was not only the Factory which complained of the Wine Company.
All the carriers on the river and their contacts in Oporto, especially the
tavern owners, suffered, and on Shrove Tuesday 1757, a day of carnival,
on which wine flowed freely, there were riots. The rioters consisted
mainly of riff-raff, but they gained the upper hand and forced the city
magistrates to declare the Company abolished. They enjoyed a short period
of licence, but retribution was to come. Carvalho was glad to take the
opportunity to make an example of them, as the Jesuits, against whom
he was beginning to campaign, could be blamed; they were accused of
abetting the rioters, and of declaring that the Company’s wine was not fit
for use for the Eucharist. Friar Joao Mansilha, the originator of the plan
to found a Wine Company, which had taken Carvalho’s fancy, was a
Dominican, an order hostile to the Jesuits, and this may have been a factor.
Troops were sent to Oporto to repress the rioters with the utmost severity
and teach a lesson to all those who dared to resist authority. The rioters
proved to be poor and ignorant people, but the most was made of their
trial, which resulted in the execution of fourteen men and four women,
the condemnation of twenty-eight to the galleys, the exile of eighty-six and
the condemnation of fifty-eight to minor penalties.10
Meanwhile hostilities were breaking out between Britain and France
in America; the two powers recalled their ambassadors in August 1755,
and though Spain offered her mediation as late as March 1756, war was
declared on 17th May, when France was already attacking Minorca, which
surrendered on the 20th May. An attack on Gibraltar was expected to
follow, but this did not materialise, and hostilities were confined to India
and America, while Spain remained neutral. Castres proposed to follow
the practice of the last war towards French prisoners and to deliver them
to the French Consul against a receipt and a promise of reciprocity. Prizes
began to be brought into Lisbon and there were the usual disputes about
infringements of neutrality. The Portuguese were nervous of Spain and
France, but tried to be impartial between the belligerents. They refused
leave to a French squadron to bring more than the customary six ships up
9 S. P. 89/50, Hay to Amyand, 8 May, to Fox, 14 Aug., 13, 28 Sept. Castres to

Fox, 11 Oct. 1756. Carvalho to Wine Co, 5 Dec. 1756. A. D. Francis, The Wine
Trade, 1974, cap. X.
10 S. P. 89/51, Hay to Pitt, 14 March, 29 Oct. 1757. Mario Domingues, O Mar¬
quis de Pombal, 188/95.
128
the river, and treated a French squadron which appeared at Rio with
firmness and caution. They still remembered the French attack on Rio
in 1710 but on this occasion they had orders to go to India to attack the
British there, so there was no risk for Brazil.11
On 3rd May 1757 Abraham Castres died. He had been ailing for some
time but was active until the end. Hay, who now succeeded him, spoke
of him warmly, and said his co-operation had made both their businesses
easy. When Castres had quarrelled with Carvalho and had been somewhat
under a cloud, Hay had perhaps been tempted to try to outshine him, but
he had received no encouragement to do so, and Carvalho’s relations with
Castres had again become cordial. As consul general Hay was succeeded
by another well-connected man, Sir Harry Frankland Bart, lately collector
of customs at Boston in New England. There was now a proper British
cemetery, and though the Castres funeral procession still had to go by
night to avoid provoking the Lisbon mob, did so in decency and good
order with a cavalry escort and guards, provided by the secretary of state,
to protect it. This was an improvement on the funeral of Lord Peterborough,
twenty years before, when the admirals acting as pall bearers had to
hustle the coffin down to a ship’s boat under cover of darkness. This time
the procession was led by a mounted servant with a torch and was followed
by several members of the Factory in their chaises, while the coffin, draped
in black, was mounted on a carriage from the legation. The burial took
place in daylight the following afternoon, and the service was read by
two clergymen in surplices to the sound of a salute fired by the ships in
the river, including H. M. S. Mermaid.12
The tense situation inside Portugal over-shadowed events abroad. There
had been rumours in 1756 of arrests and Castres had observed that Luis
da Cunha, the foreign secretary, was much preoccupied. On 10th August
without warning and immediately after an official dinner to the diplomatic
corps Da Cunha came to the house of Diogo de Mendonca, escorted by a
troop of cavalry, with a summons for his dismissal and banishment. Men-
don?a made no resistance and retired quietly to the house of a friend near
Oporto. It transpired that he had been involved in a plot to set up a
Council to be named the Junta de Confidencia, consisting of leading nobles,
which was to oust Carvalho and take over the government. Latterly Men-
don$a had openly criticised the government and had also planned to bring
the Infante Luis of Spain to Lisbon to further a marriage between him
and the Infanta Maria instead of with her uncle Dom Pedro. Portuguese
ministers abroad were involved; Lacerda, the Paris ambassador, was
recalled, and later the London minister Encerrabodes was found to be
11 S. P. 89/50, Castres to Fox, 30 March 1756, 23 July 1756. S. P. 89/51, Hay

to Pitt, 9 Dec. 1757.
12 S. P. 89/51, Hay to Pitt, 3, 7, 20 May 1757. Lodge, Keene Corr., 423n.
129
DAVID FRANCIS
implicated. For the time being one of the ringleaders, Antonio da Costa
Freire, was left at liberty but two Italian friars, who had prophesied doom
after the earthquake but had gained favour at court during the general
excitement, were sent to a monastery. Other arrests included a lawyer
named Xavier de Texeira Mendonga, author of a pamphlet accusing Car¬
valho of speculation, and Martinho Velho Oldemburg, a wealthy merchant,
who had been a favourite of Carvalho and a supporter of his East India
Company plan. Carvalho at this time did not care who married the Infanta
Maria, but he would not tolerate anyone who criticised or questioned his
authority, and he was much against any who attributed the earthquake
to the wrath of god and not to a natural phenomenon.13
A leader of the wrath of god school was the famous preacher and friend
of the Indians in Brazil the Jesuit Father Gabriel Malagrida. This fanatical
but saintly old man had been in Lisbon at the time of the death of King
John and the monarch had derived much consolation from his ministra¬
tions during his last hours. He had returned to Brazil, but came back
again in 1754 in the hope of comforting the queen mother during her last
illness. He was not allowed to attend on her but was banished to Setubal,
where he preached fiery sermons to many of the courtiers from Lisbon
and their ladies. It was in the middle of one of these that he sensed the
queen’s death and announced it at the exact moment when it occurred.
His prestige much revived, he played a leading role after the earthquake
and published a pamphlet entitled ‘The Real Cause of the Earthquake’, of
which he had the temerity to send a copy to Carvalho himself. By order
of the Nuncio he remained at Setubal and abetted the prophecies popular¬
ised by the Jesuits that a second manfiestation of God’s wrath would
occur on the anniversary of the earthquake.14 A shock did actually occur
about that time but it was only felt in the Azores.
Hitherto Carvalho had owed much to the Jesuits and when he appoint¬
ed his brother Francis Xavier de Mendonca Furtado to be governor of
Maranhao the latter still supported the foundation of fresh missions by
them to stabilise the Amazon frontier, though the complaints of the co¬
lonists soon moved him to recommend their secularisation. The Jesuits
had played a considerable part in trade, monopolising some branches of
it, particularly with the Far East; they enjoyed privileges which enabled
them to evade custom’s duties and were the vehicle by which a good deal
of contraband gold and silver from Spanish America and Brazil reached
Portugal; all this naturally aroused the jealousy of the lay commercial
community. The liberal reforms, which gave freedom to the Indians, accus-
13 S. P. 89/50, Castres to Fox, 11 Aug., 11 Sept. 1756. S. P. 89/51, Hay to Pitt,

2 Oct. 1758. M. Cheke, Pombal, 65/74. Maxwell, Conflicts, 17/18.
14 Domingues, Pombal, 174 et seq. Almeida, Hist, de Portugal, V-315/16. Cheke,
Pombal, 93/6.
130
ed the Jesuits of ill treatment of them and a legend to this effect was
sufficiently successful to be believed by a British minister; in fact they
treated the Indians better than lay plantation owners and at least gave them
the consolation of a colourful religion; but the Indians could not adapt
themselves to European customs or stand up against European diseases;
the Jesuit missions had constantly to be sustained by new raids on the
untouched tribes in the interior and when this resource began to fail through
exploitation their colonies declined; given their so-called freedom, Indian
labour was of little use to plantation owners and was replaced by the more
resistant negroes. This increased production but Pombal himself admitted
that the imports and remittances from Jesuits had played a part and that
their disappearance was a perceptible loss. Their devoted cure of souls
after the earthquake bolstered their prestige and the acceptance by the
king of St Francis Borgia, a Jesuit saint, as intercessor for Portugal, passed
without demur. But Jesuit opposition to th$ Para Company inspired the
1755 decrees, which freed their Indians and reduced the Jesuits to the
status of parish priests, while their jurisdiction in secular matters passed
to government officials. The publication of these decrees was delayed
until 1757, but already in 1752, at the request of his sister the queen of
Spain, King Joseph agreed to furnish Portuguese troops to assist the
Spaniards to place Portugal in possession of the Jesuit Reductions in
Paraguay ceded to Portugal. The Jesuit Provincial ordered the fathers in
the Reductions to comply, but they had neither the will nor often the
authority to do so, and the outbreak of Indian resistance alienated Spain
as well as Portugal. A Jesuit preacher named Ballaster defended the Jesuit
case with passion in a sermon in the Patriarchal Church in Lisbon, but
was duly punished together with his colleague Santo de Fonseca. The
Mesa de Bern Commum, a sort of Chamber of Commerce in Lisbon, pro¬
tested against the Para Company, but was promptly suppressed. Meanwhile
the Jesuits lost good friends in the queen-mother of Portugal and in the
queen of Spain, who died in 1754 and 1758. Tomas de Almeida, the
Patriarch, who was well inclined to the Jesuits, died in 1754; his successor,
one of the Tavoras, Manuel Jose, soon died and the next Patriarch, Fran¬
cisco de Saldanha, a young prelate of the Patriarchal church, was a
protege of Carvalho. Envoys abroad were now largely nominees of Car¬
valho; Saldanha’s brother Antonio went to Paris and at Rome a cousin
of Carvalho named Francisco de Almada de Mendonca became ambassa¬
dor; he worked indefatigably against the Jesuits, who were already in
trouble with various accusations including an undue part in trading activ¬
ities and in contraband traffic. Almeida produced damning evidence of
Jesuit activities in Paraguay and circulated a pamphlet in various languages
entitled ‘Brief Account of the Republic founded overseas by the Jesuits in
the Portuguese and Spanish Colonies’. Pope Benedict XIV was anti-Jesuit,
131
DAVID FRANCIS
and Almeida just before the Pope’s death secured from him his appoint¬
ment as Visitor and Reformer of the Jesuit Order. It was only after the
accession of the new pope Clement XII that the friends of the Jesuits
began to rally; feeling in Rome hardened against Almeida and his gener¬
ous bribes to appropriate cardinals yielded diminishing returns. But in
Portugal already in September 1757 the attempt of the king’s confessor
Father Moreira to defend the Jesuits in Brazil resulted in his dismissal
and that of all the Jesuit royal confessors, who were replaced by Fran¬
ciscans. The Jesuits had already been saddled with the blame for the
Oporto rising in February 1757 and, though their participation in the
resistance in Paraguay was grossly exaggerated and the story of the Indian
or Jesuit sponsored King Nicolas largely a fairy tale, Carvalho could
convict them as trouble makers not without justice. In September 1757
there was a bad earthquake in the Azores, but it was not felt in Lisbon,
and the Jesuit prophecies of gloom were gradually losing their appeal.15
On September 3rd 1758 the court was in deep mourning for the death
of the queen of Spain and no-one was supposed to enter or leave it. This
did not prevent King Joseph from taking advantage of the night hours,
when he was supposed to be closeted with Carvalho and transacting urgent
state business, to steal out of the palace to visit his mistress the young
Marchioness of Tavora. This affair, already remarked by Augustus Hervey
three years before, had prospered during the absence in Goa of her young
husband, who had himself been in trouble for insulting a girl and had
perhaps thought it wise to absent himself with his father, who had been
appointed viceroy in India. The king usually went to his assignments
with a confidant named Pedro Texeira, the two travelling in separate
carriages, but on this occasion he returned in the same vehicle, which
belonged to the royal stable but bore no particular markings. He was
intercepted by three masked men and was then met by a second ambush
and several shots, but missed a third band waiting for him by turning
about and galloping straight to the house of his surgeon. He was wounded
in his right shoulder and arm, and his coachman was hurt also, only Te¬
xeira escaping injury. The conspirators later argued that they had not
intended to fire on the king but only on Texeira, for they thought the
king had passed in the first of the two carriages, which actually had been
empty. This excuse seems dubious though there was an allegation of a
private grudge against Texeira. For the time being the truth was kept
secret and it was only announced that the king had suffered a fall and that
during his convalescence the queen would be regent. Nevertheless the news
that an assassination had been attempted was all over the town and was
duly reported by Frankland and Hay. The latter was received by the king
15 S. P. 89/48, Castres to Holderness, 4 Feb. 1754.
132
in December very graciously; he thought that the King looked thinner,

but otherwise well.16
Carvalho held his hand for some weeks to collect evidence. He inter¬
cepted mail addressed by Jesuits including Malagrida in Brazil; he only
found vague fulminations and prophecies of divine retribution, but there
was no doubt that their tenor was hostile to the government, and they
served his purpose to provide evidence of Jesuit subversion, though there
was little in them to indict the Jesuits of any positive part in the conspiracy
to kill the king. More to the point was evidence obtained of weapons borrow¬
ed by the conspirators and of words dropped by the duke of Aveiro himself,
overheard by a servant who was hiding in his courtyard to keep an assigna¬
tion with one of the maids. Armed with these proofs Carvalho published a
manifesto accusing certain persons of prophesying the death of the king and
then conspiring to bring it about. He appointed a special judge to try the
accused and on 13th December 1758 placed an embargo on all persons
seeking to leave Lisbon and proceeded to arrest the duke of Aveiro, the
old and young Marquis and Marchioness of Tavora and others accused.
The Marquis of Tavora was away from home, but when he heard what
was happening, he called on the king in order to explain himself, but was
promptly arrested. There had been no warning of the arrests and several
of the noblemen were attending two balls in the town, one of them at the
British Factory. The trial went forward in the greatest secrecy, the ex¬
amination of the witnesses being entirely left to Carvalho and to Pedro
Gon£alves Cordeiro Pereira, the presiding judge. The accused were given
no opportunity to make any declarations before their execution, which took
place on the 13th January at Belem, when nine of them were put to death
with barbaric cruelty; only the elder Marchioness of Tavora, a very proud
and beautiful woman, was decapitated without being tortured. Hay re¬
ported that the Duke of Aveiro had been convicted out of his own mouth
and had been guilty of dynastic ambitions for himself; he had been
specially incensed by the refusal of the king to allow his son to marry a
sister of the Duke of Cadaval, at a time when the duke was still a minor,
so that if he failed to produce an heir the estates of the two great families
would be united. The Tavoras admitted nothing, but the old marchioness
had been a disciple of Malagrida and very indignant at the failure of the
king to give her husband a dukedom for his services in India. Also there
was the delicate matter of the young marchioness; the adultery of a king
was normal practice and the Tavoras had been ambivalent; such a liaison
could be dishonourable, but royal blood was a coveted distinction. Resent¬
ment no doubt entered the picture; it was an added reason for reticence
16 Cheke, Pombal, 114/5. Hervey, Memoirs, Azevedo, Pombal, 174 et seq. S. P.

89/51, Frankland to Pitt, 18 Dec., Hay, 30 Dec. 1758.
133
DAVID FRANCIS
about the trial, for look at it as one might, the king had been placed in an
unfavourable and even ridiculous light.17
However public opinion, both at home and abroad, was favourable to
the king after this dastardly attempt, and when he made his first public
appearance, waving his handkerchief first with one hand and then with
the other to show he was unharmed, he was warmly acclaimed. Nobody
commented on the brutality of the executions; this was accepted every¬
where as a matter of course. For Carvalho the conspiracy was a godsend,
of which he took full advantage to crush his enemies and to seat himself
more firmly in the saddle. The removal of the Duke of Aveiro enabled him
to take a further step into the inner circle of the court by succeeding him
in the office of Lord Chamberlain of the royal household, previously held
as an hereditary office. He also replaced a number of diplomatic repre¬
sentatives and officials, including the British Judge Conservators at Lisbon
and Oporto and several judges, by his own nominees. For the British the
immediate result of the crisis was a hold up of a convoy which was
preparing to sail. Da Cunha was anxious for the convoy to sail and per¬
suaded two of the British naval captains concerned to co-operate by
guaranteeing that they would not receive any persons suspected of com¬
plicity with the conspiracy on board; but Captain Dennis of H. M. S.
Dorsetshire, who was senior to the captains of H. M. S. Mercury and
Nottingham, arrived to join them and was less compliant. He refused to
attend with Hay at Da Cunha’s office to make the required declaration,
on the ground that he was ill, but explained that he would not have come
anyway as he had positive orders to return by a certain date, and would
have to sail at once, even if the embargo was not lifted, as he was already
a month overdue. Da Cunha said that he could not possibly show such a
letter to the king; however he explained the matter as well as he could
and the king still insisted that the three captains should make a solemn
promise in the presence of Hay and da Cunha not to receive any refugees
on board. Though intransigent Dennis did bring himself to write a grudg¬
ing letter promising not to receive any refugees. On the strength of this
Da Cunha managed to get leave for the convoy to sail, immediately after
the execution of the conspirators but before the raising of the embargo.
Whitehall reprimanded Dennis for his conduct and the admiralty gave
strict orders for all ships to be searched for possible refugees. Apologies
for the behaviour of Dennis at such a critical time were also made to the
king of Portugal.18
The Jesuit convents had been encircled by troops; a number were
imprisoned and the remainder were not allowed to officiate or to move.
17 Domingues, Pombal, 230/6. Hay to Pitt, 20 Jan., 16 Feb. 1759.

18 S. P. 89/51, Hay to Pitt, 16 March, 8 May, 27, 28, 30 Dec. 1758 to Dennis,
Pitt to Hay, 27 Dec. 1758, 11 Jan. 1959. Cleland to Dennis, 16 Jan. 1759.
134
The pope’s leave had been obtained to try those Jesuits who were accused
of complicity with the plot, but the pope refused to believe that a repetition
of such dreadful crimes was at all likely, or that there was any need to
modify the ruling that the clergy were exempt from the civil courts.
Nevertheless after some argument he reluctantly agreed to the Jesuits being
subject to the courts in future, but only if a papal delegate participated.
He sent a note to that effect to the Lisbon Nuncio accompanied by an
admonitory letter to the king of Portugal. He had also asked that Sal-
danha’s appointment as Visitor should be cancelled, but this request was
rebuffed, and the letter to the Nuncio was intercepted and steps taken to
conceal the papal sentiments from the public and also from the king.
Before he knew of the pope’s feelings on the subject the king issued the
decree condemning the Jesuits as rebels and ordering them to be proscribed
and deported. Advantage was also taken of a fortuitous incident to order
the Nuncio to leave Portugal. In June 1760^ the wedding of the Infanta
Maria and of Dom Pedro finally took place. It was an occasion for fire¬
works and illuminations but was officially treated as a private ceremony
in order to save expense. The Nuncio was not officially informed or in¬
vited and failed to illuminate his house. A guard was sent to escort him to
the frontier and after some protest he left without resistance. The per¬
secution of the Jesuits now began in earnest. Those abroad were recalled
and were either imprisoned, or deported to papal territory at Civita Vecchia.
A first batch consisted of 250 and were joined by many more. Others were
tried and found guilty. Some were executed; others remained in prison,
often until their death. The great occasion was the Auto da Fe, after which
Malagrida and forty more were executed. The Count of Oeyras, as Carvalho
had now become, decided that he should be tried by the Inquisition
rather than for high treason. This was easily arranged, as the Inquisitor
General Dom Jose, one of the Palhava brothers, had been moved and the
office was in charge of Oeyras’s brother Paul. It was not hard to find
damning evidence against Malagrida. He was convicted of blasphemy and
erroneous doctrines on the evidence of his letters to friends in Brazil and
of his draft taken from him in prison for his life of St Anne, mother of
the Virgin Mary, alleged to have been dictated to him by the saint herself.
One judge, a Dominican, objected but he was promptly exiled to an over¬
seas bishopric for his pains. After the Auto da Fe the guilty were handed
over to the secular arm with the usual recommendation to kind and com¬
passionate treatment not leading to pain of death or effusion of blood. This
meant in the case of Malagrida that he was strangled without bloodshed
and that his remains were burnt, so that no place of burial for his memory
should be preserved. Oeyras continued for years to come to be obsessed
by the Jesuits and to attribute all mischief to them, wherever it occurred.
He worked hard on a vast volume edited for him by Jose de Seabra which
135
PORTUGAL.-10
DAVID FRANCIS
contained all the correspondence revealing the Jesuit crimes, of which

he presented copies on publication in 1765 to all foreign ministers, and
he continued to ban the publication of all papal bulls in their favour.
He met with considerable opposition to his propaganda and a number of
pamphlets hostile to him were published. Among others burnt at the time
of Malagrida’s Auto da Fe was a work entitled ‘A pathetic discourse of
the present calamities in Portugal’,'published in French and also in English
by the Cavaleiro de Oliveira, an exile from Portugal, who had become
a Protestant and was living in London. He ascribed the wrath of god to
the idolatry of the Portuguese and their support of the Inquisition. Oli¬
veira, an eloquent and brilliant but unbalanced man, was apparently con¬
vinced that this appeal to the king of Portugal for a change of heart would
move him, and the argument about the wrath of god no doubt appealed to
Protestants as well as to Catholics, though for different reasons. British
representatives, however, and public opinion in general, took the punish¬
ments meted out to those guilty of the plot against the king as a matter
of course and much sympathy was felt for the Portuguese royal family. The
general effect of the earthquake and of the assassination plot was to arouse
a new interest in Portugal of a romantic nature and to encourage travellers
there for reasons of health, instruction or pleasure.19
Carvalho, from June 1759 Count of Oeyras, was now supreme; he
acquired more and more key posts for his supporters and recalled his
brother Xavier de Mendonca from Brazil to assist him in the ministry
of marine affairs. As far as Hay was concerned he was very affable and
bent over backwards to be cordial in international affairs, though he re¬
mained unyielding on internal questions touching British trade. The for¬
tunes of war were now going quite well for Britain; in July 1759 a number
of French ships were destroyed at Cherbourg and in the autumn Quebec
fell, while Louisberg had been retaken in 1758. In August Admiral Bos-
cawen destroyed four French ships near Lagos on the Algarve coast.
Hitherto King Ferdinand and still more his Portuguese queen Barbara had
preserved Spain’s neutrality, but Barbara died in 1758 and Ferdinand in
the next year; though Charles III began his reign with assurances of
friendship for Portugal, Spain’s attitude in the future was uncertain;
Oeyras for a time looked more towards the English alliance and handled
infringements of Portuguese neutrality by the British gently.20
The Boscawen incident, which caused so much trouble and eventually
19 Azevedo, Pombal, 171/208. S. P. 89/51, Hay to Wood, 28 April, to Pitt,

19 May, 16 June, 20 Sept., 11 Oct. 1759. S. P. 89/55, Hay to Pitt, 26 Sept. 1761.
Kendrick, Lisbon Earthquake, pp. 102/9. The bound volume of PombaTs case against
the Jesuits was sent to London and is to be found in S. P. 89/61. Azevedo, Pombal,
186/9.
20 S. P. 89/51, Hay to Lempriere, 26 Sept., to Pitt, 2 Oct., 11 Oct., Pitt to
Hay, 12 Sept., 28 Nov. 1759.
136
in 1762 was to be one of the pretexts used by Spain to declare war on

Portugal, ocurred in August 1759 when a French squadron commanded
by Admiral de la Clue confronted Admiral Boscawen. De La Clue had
not been in the least worried about meeting the British, but in the night
the weather had separated five of his ships and he unexpectedly found
himself in a situation of inferiority. Three of his major ships, the Ocean,
the Redoutable and Temeraire, were pursued right under the guns of the
Portuguese forts, while two more were attacked at sea. The British fired
at the three ships, which had run aground, though not at the Portuguese,
but could not avoid killing one or two Portuguese bystanders and even
knocking a piece of parapet off the wall of one of the forts. The French
set fire to their ships and the British put a landing party ashore and took
a number of prisoners, while De la Clue himself who had been badly
wounded and a number of others took refuge with the Portuguese. With¬
out waiting for the Portuguese to complain, both Hay in Lisbon, and Pitt
as soon as he heard the news, hastened to offer warm assurances to the
secretary of state and the Portuguese minister, that although the navy
had been carried away in the heat of battle and by the urgent need to
destroy a squadron which was intended to join the French fleet at Brest,
and perhaps to collaborate in an invasion of England, they had no inten¬
tion of offending Portugal. Pitt at once said he would be prepared to show
his good will by sending a special ambassador to explain the situation and
he followed this up by saying he was appointing the Earl of Kinnoull,
Edward Hay’s elder brother and a man of the greatest distinction, to go
to Lisbon to discuss the Boscawen incident and any other outstanding
questions.21
Kinnoull arrived in Lisbon in March 1760 and was very well received.
Meanwhile the Portuguese ambasador in Paris had been hauled over the
coals for his country’s favouritism towards the British and in Lisbon the
French Ambassador the Comte de Merle did his best to make trouble.
He hoped to stage a confrontation with Kinnoull over the question of
precedence and with that aim donned his army uniform and went down
to the king’s palace to offer his congratulations on the king’s birthday
escorted by a number of French subjects. The British Factory would have
dearly loved to take part in a counter-demonstration, but Kinnoull wisely
managed to arrange to be received privately beforehand and to avoid a
meeting. On other occasions he had cordial meetings with the king and
with Oeyras, and the unusual privilege of taking part in a party given for
the royal family by the Infante Dom Pedro at Queluz. This was one of
the midsummerday celebrations and a wellknown occasion. Nobody was
invited except members of the court, but would-be spectators including
21 S. P. 89/52, Lord Kinnoull’s Instructions, 11 Jan. 1760. S. P. 89/51, Pitt to

Hay, 12 Sept. 1759. Hay to Pitt, 2 Oct., Pitt to Hay, 28 Nov. 1759.
137
DAVID FRANCIS
members of the Factory used to watch from the top of a neighbouring hill.
Kinnoull was invited to a tent put up by a leading British merchant named
Mayne, where a good view could be had of the Queluz gardens and of
the bullfight and some of the goings on. The first day was spoilt by
rain but the second day, that of St Peter, which followed St John, provided
a perfect serene evening. Oeyras had placed guards outside the tent to
keep away the crowd, which was in itself an unusual favour. Unexpectedly
a royal servant appeared to conduct Kinnoull in the mysterious Arabian
nights’ manner beloved of the Portuguese to the palace garden. At the
gate he was met by a Major Domo who escorted him by devious paths
through the bushes, until suddenly he found himself in the royal marquee
in a place just behind the queen’s chair, where he could see all that was
happening. He was then taken to share a sumptuous supper in another
marquee with the nobles and led back to a spot at the foot of a canal,
where a concert took place and the queen and her daughters sang, after
which there was a display of fireworks and a masque. No foreign minister
had ever been so privileged and diplomacy no doubt favoured Kinnoull’s
account; but the queen and her daughters were genuinely musical and had
talent and fine voices, so his enthusiasm for the queen’s performance and
particularly that of her second daughter Maria Anna may have had real
substance. The Portuguese were good at such gestures and the Count of
Oeyras indulged in several; for instance when the consul in Madeira asked
leave to buy land for a cemetery, pointing out that without one British
subjects had to be buried at sea from small boats, and when bad weather
delayed this the results were very disagreeable and malodorous, Oeyras im¬
mediately ordered the governor of Madeira to give a plot of land for the
purpose. On another occasion he showed his confidence in Britain and
his broad mindedness by asking for our intervention in Constantinople on
behalf of two Franciscans, who were touring Europe on a mission to get
help to recover some places of worship in Jerusalem which had been
appropriated by Greeks under Turkish protection. Oeyras said that as
the Turks were receiving nothing for these places and might hope the
Franciscans would pay them a rent, such a request might very well
succeed.22
But while Kinnoull’s orders were to be very conciliatory about Bos-
cowen and the Portuguese met him halfway, he had other harder nuts to
crack. There were the two longstanding questions of the Douro Wine
Company and of the Humphrey Bunster incident. Bunster, an employee
of the Hanover packet, had been arrested in May 1755 on his way to his
ship’s boat, while carrying 1400 moidores tucked away in small pockets
22 Azevedo,Pornbal, 222, 226. S. P. 89/53, Kinnoull to Pitt, 29 March, 14, 16

April, 7, 21 June 1760. S. P. 89/53, Kinnoull to Pitt, 30 June 1760. S. P. 89/52,
Kinnoull, 21 June 1760. S. P. 89/54, Hay to Pitt, 14 Jan. 1761.
138
sewn into the linings of his clothes. Although he was arrested in the open
street the way in which he was carrying the money indicated that he
intended to smuggle it. Hay had to fight hard to secure a court decision
on the case, but when he finally succeeded the sequestration of the gold
was confirmed. The case involved a grave question of principle, for
previous seizures had always been ultimately restored, unless they were
actually made upon the water or positive proof was forthcoming that the
money was intended to be exported. But if British Subjects could not
carry money about the town in the course of their usual business they
would be liable to arrest at any time, as most of their offices were close
to the water front.23
Pitt rather reluctantly approved of Kinnoull’s caution in avoiding an
incident with the Comte de Merle, but ordered him to dispute precedence
with him in future, unless some compromise could be worked out with
him on a basis of reciprocity. This put Kinnoull in a dilemma, as he could
not find any way out, but he was most unwilling to provoke an incident
which would embarrass the Portuguese. The Boscawen case also reached
a deadlock. Oeyras and Da Cunha went out of their way to be obliging
and took the unusual step of giving him copies of the correspondence with
Merle and also with Salema, the Portuguese ambassador in Paris, who
had conveyed the sentiments of the Due de Choiseul, demanding the res¬
titution of the two ships taken by Boscawen off the Portuguese coast and
satisfaction in two other cases, naval incidents in the Algarve and at
Vianna. Oeyras explained that the king of Portugal did not really expect
the restoration of the two French ships and was most appreciative of King
George’s expressions of friendship, but had been unable to avoid passing
on the French request. But the king would like to know whether in the
event of a break with France he could rely on British armed help and if
so on what help he could count. Pitt replied with equal civility that King
George had no intention of eluding his obligation to help Portugal, but
the precise nature of his help would necessarily depend on events. How¬
ever the French demands were out of the question and could not be
discussed. Kinnoull and Oeyras and Da Cunha between them contrived
to shelve the Boscawen issue and also the question of precedence between
Kinnoull and Merle.24
The secret committee of the Factory submitted to Kinnoull through
Consul General Sir Harry Frankland a long and detailed memorial of
complaints against the newly-founded trading companies. They still main¬
tained a rather uncompromising attitude, preferring to stand upon their
23 S. P. 89/52, Kinnoull’s separate instructions, 18 Jan. 1760.

24 S. P. 89/52, Pitt to Kinnoull, 29 April 1760. Kinnoull to Pitt, 29 March, 14,
16 April 1760 and encs. Salema to Da Cunha and Da Cunha to Kinnoull, 26 March
1760. S. P. 89/52, Pitt to Kinnoull, 8, 21 June. S. P. 89/53, 30 June.
139
DAVID FRANCIS
rights rather than to resort to arguments more likely to persuade the Por¬
tuguese. They claimed that the man responsible for drafting their memorial
was noted for his clever use of subtleties. Nevertheless they had been
somewhat cut down to size by Pombal’s police state, for they refused to
sign the memorial on the ground that to give their names would lead to
inconveniences and difficulties and was not customary. In fact they had
not failed to sign before, but they now felt it would be risky to allow
their names to be publicised. They acted prudently, for Kinnoull felt him¬
self unable to agree with their contention that they were entitled to resist
measures which hurt their interests, to the point of interfering with regu¬
lations made by the king of Portugal for trading by his own subjects in his
dominions. Tyrawly had pointed out that the treaty rights on which they
based their claims were largely obsolete and that there was no way to
oblige the Portuguese to observe them short of force, which meant sending
out the fleet. The Portuguese were more likely to make concessions if it
was pointed out that the companies had many weaknesses, which must be
remedied if they were not to fail. Hitherto the Factory had allowed the
Brazil merchants two or three years credit and a similar credit to agents
working in the interior of Brazil. Such facilities and the clandestine
methods, which were an integral part of the system for the export of
bullion, would not be possible for dealings with an official trading com¬
pany. The Factory was not unaware of these aspects and particularly of
the clandestine trade with the River Plate, which had flourished during
Britain’s last war with Spain and brought large profits, as was evidenced
by the quantities of Spanish silver brought by the Brazil fleets. Britain
indeed imported bullion, which meant silver as well as gold, in a big way,
through Lisbon and the West Indies. Masterman, a bullion buyer, though
not one of the largest, estimated that he had bought silver to the value
of £320,000 in the years 1762/5. Trade in woollens and other European
goods with Buenos Aires through Nova Colonia was considerable and was
paid in silver and in hides. King John told Ty rawly in 1735 that there
were more British woollens sold through Nova Colonia than to all the
rest of Brazil. In 1752 the Portugal merchants denied this but various
references show otherwise. In 1738 there were thirty ships laden with
goods said to be lying in Nova Colonia including four British ships with
Portuguese passes. A 1725 figure mentioned a ship from there with 10,000
hides and 70,000 patacas, and the 'Description de Lisbonne’, published
in 1736, spoke of an annual export of 50,000 hides and much silver. A
1756 report spoke of the Brazil fleet bringing two million cruzados and
3000 chests of silver and of four million cruzados in 1761. On the eve
of the 1762 war Consul General Frankland observed that if Portugal re¬
mained neutral the Factory would do good business through Nova Colonia,
140
though the Spaniards might use the opportunity of Portuguese neutrality

to ship their bullion safely in Portuguese bottoms.25
In October just before Kinnoull’s departure Oeyras treated him to a
long discourse on the commercial questions. He spoke in a general way
and promised to send further details by Da Cunha. He made it clear that
he was not going to budge on the question of his cherished companies,
which he stoutly maintained would help trade in general and the interest
of the commonalty, British and Portuguese, even though some individuals
might suffer. He said that the Wine Company would improve the quality
of Portugal’s most precious product and rescue the trade from the ruin
into which it was falling, to the benefit both of Portuguese producer and
British exporter and British consumer. Only in the matter of the export of
bullion was Oeyras a little more flexible; he admitted freely that Portugal
had to export bullion in order to pay for her imports, but argued that
ancient laws must be respected, and while he had no objection to firms
of credit meeting their obligations by exporting bullion, he would not
tolerate petty smugglers. Some of the larger firms, as well as Bristow, had
already shown signs of ganging up with Oeyras and it would have suited
him to allow a few firms to have the monopoly, a method which would
keep them under his control and might lead later to an enlargement of
Portuguese participation. Not much is known about Oeyras’s connections
with members of the Factory, but he was in close touch with John Bris¬
tow Junior over the diamond contract and the trade in silver; later his
connection with Bristow was severed but he let his house in the Rua For¬
mosa to the leading firm of Purry, Mellish and de Visrnes, and there is
no doubt that some of the substantial firms managed to run with the
hounds to the disgust of their weaker brethren. Oeyras seems to have
been prepared to concede the Bunster case and according to Da Cunha
the king himself was so inclined, but whether Oeyras was insincere, or
whether the judges occasionally had wills of their own, the appeal when
it was finally sent to the court of Desembargo was again rejected after a
delay of over a year. When the grant of the appeal was first announced
a party from the packet boat Prince Frederick was attacked by customs
officers, posibly the same or friends of the ones involved in the original
Bunster incident.26
With regard to the Wine Company it is clear that some of the company’s
officials showed spite in their treatment of British exporters; these had
25 S. P. 89/50, Hay to Fox, 13 Nov. 1758. S. P. 89/52, Factory memorial with

Kinnoull to Pitt, 7 June 1760. L. S. Sutherland, A London Merchant (Braund), 193,
211/12. S. P. 89/55, Frankland, 5 Jan. 1762. S. P. 89/53, Kinnoull to Pitt, 11 Oct.
1760. S. P. 89/53, Factory memorial 22 Sept. 1760. Guerra Tenreiro, Conclusoes,
100, 105/6.
26 S. P. 89/53, Kinnoull to Pitt, 11 Oct. 1760. Da Cunha to Kinnoull, 20 Oct.
re Judge Conservator and Wine Co.
141
DAVID FRANCIS
been arrogant in the past so they were pleased to get their own back.
Messrs Case & Page complained that six pipes of a consignment from the
Upper Douro had been condemned, but at a second inspection the company
tasters passed the six and condemned another lot of eleven pipes from
the same consignment, saying they were sorry the firm had been dissatisfied
with the previous judgment and they hoped they would now be content.
Actually the Company’s buyers had offered a good price for the same
wine before it left the Douro. It is hard to know how far these cases
represented small feuds between the Company’s officials and particular
firms, and how far they typified the Company’s behaviour to the trade as
a whole. But there is no doubt that the Company did its utmost to su¬
persede British domination, appropriating the trade with Brazil and even
that of supplying the British Navy, and also trying to send the cheaper
wines, which the British were excluded from handling, directly to England
in Portuguese ships or to Guernsey, where they were used for making up
adulterated Douro port. Nevertheless the new rules probably did effect
some improvement in the quality of the Douro port. In the well-known
exchange of letters between the Factory and the Douro producers the
former accused the growers of taking insufficient care of their wine, of
adding brandy too early to stabilise it, and of mixing it with inferior
wine from the cold country outside the Douro limited district. The pro¬
ducers retorted that they had done their utmost to meet the wishes of
the Factory at great labour and expense, but that to combat the Factory’s
complaint that their wines were tasteless they had been obliged to add
brandy to give odour and elderberry to give colour, and the Factory had
still not been satisfied; they had sought to exceed the bounds of nature
and to have wines which burned in the stomach, and flashed like gun¬
powder if they were thrown into the fire, wines as dark as ink, having the
sweetness of the sugar of Brazil and an aromatic flavour like the spices
of the Indies. It was true that the Company could do something to eliminate
the elderberry and the premature addition of brandy up the Douro, but
the maturing of the wine and the final addition of brandy took place in
the lodges, after the wine had passed the Company’s inspectors. Stocks
held in the lodges for this purpose amounted to as much as 30,000 pipes.
Discerning people like Castres and Henry Pelham sought a good whole¬
some wine, such as the Company claimed to produce, but a large British
public only sought sweet stuff with a kick, which could compete with
gin or spirits. According to the official statistics exports dropped to a low
figure of 12,211 pipes in 1756, the year of the foundation of the Company,
but rapidly picked up to 19,425 in 1759 and averaged 20,254 pipes in
the decade 1760/69 compared with 15,435 pipes for the years 1750/59.
No doubt the Company had muscled in on the English trade, but the
Factory was scarcely ruined, and if the Company was intolerant of the
British exporters, the feeling was fully reciprocated. As it was impracticable
142
to beat the Company, the sensible course would have been to join it, an
alternative which was open to foreigners, who could buy shares though
they could not take part in the management. Only one Englishman or
Scotsman Diogo Archbold ventured to do so; he was promptly made an
inspector of brandies and was scathingly condemned by the Factory for
his conduct.27
Meanwhile Oeyras was establishing his regime in Brazil and the period
of co-operation with Spain initiated by the boundary treaty of 1750 was
drawing to its close. In 1760 and even in 1761 Oeyras expressed no fear
as yet of the new king of Spain joining the French, though in 1760 he
was somewhat anxious lest the French should attack the northern frontiers
of Brazil, from Cayenne, where he said there were a number of Jesuits to
inflame them. He remarked that the Portuguese had no forces there to
oppose an invasion, but he counted on the British Navy holding the seas,
so that the French would be unable to send reinforcements and could only
make temporary conquests. It was now in 1760 that the Jesuits were being
expelled, and being imprisoned or sent to Civita Vecchia in papal territory,
though as long before as 1754 Oeyras’s brother Xavier had written from
Brazil that the Jesuits were the worst enemies of the state, like ‘Manuel
Pereira Sampayo’, his brother’s bugbear during his mission to Vienna.
In 1755 decrees had been issued freeing the Indias and abolishing the
Jesuits’ political authority, but they were not published or executed until
1757, when government intendants were placed in charge of their missions
and the share of trade, which they had enjoyed largely free of customs’
control, was taken over by the companies.
The system for collecting the quinto, which had superseded Gusmao’s
capitation system since 1750, worked reasonably well until 1767; smuggl¬
ing of gold was rife but enough gold was brought to the smelting houses,
to enable the provincial authority to supply the agreed annual quota of
100 arrobas, except when as in 1758/9 the Brazil fleet was delayed, caus¬
ing an acute shortage of cash in Lisbon. In 1767 the amount supplied fell
to 87 arrobas and in the following years the sum of 100 arrobas was no
more reached and the total steadily diminished.28
The work of the execution of the boundary treaty was carried on, at least
in the south. King Joseph agreed, though with reluctance, to the proposal
of his sister the queen of Spain that Portuguese troops should assist the
Spaniards to evacuate the Jesuits and their Indians from the seven Re¬
ductions in Paraguay, so that the Portuguese could take possession. It
had been anticipated that all would go smoothly, but it soon became clear
27 S. P. 89/52, Kinnoull to Pitt, 21 June 1760. Azevedo, Pombal, 161, 227/9.

Southey, Hist, of Brazil, VI, 27 et seq. and cap. 39.
28 Gusmao, 11-ii, 26 Dec. S. P. 89/49, Crowle to Amyand, 24 Feb. 1754. Aze-
vedo, Pombal, 132, 136. Almeida, Hist, de Portugal, IV-302/5.
143
DAVID FRANCIS
that difficulty and delay and even the suppression of armed resistance
would be entailed. The cession of Nova Colonia was postponed and the
fathers in the Reductions asked for at least three years to complete the
evacuation in compliance with their orders from their Provincial. The Por¬
tuguese insisted that it should be done in three months, but this was out
of the question, for the transfer of a whole population was not the easy
matter it was thought to be by European Chancelleries. It involved a trek
by the Indians with their cattle and their families across hundreds of
miles of wilderness to locations which must first be determined, and
could not possibly provide subsistence before they had been cleared,
even if they had potential pasturage and resources, and security from wild
Indians. In spite of the dissatisfaction both in Portugal and Spain with
the treaty. King Joseph loyally tried to carry it out, and King Charles
after his succession in 1759 did not at first try to upset it. But after
spending six million cruzados to very little effect King Joseph complained
that the treaty involved the cession of a valuable fortress in return for
remote territories of doubtful value, if they were not entirely worthless.
Oeyras also feared that the conclusion of the treaty might lead Britain to
renounce her treaty obligation to defend the Portuguese dominions, for
certain clauses of the treaty, binding Portugal and Spain to defend each
other’s possessions in South America, might be construed as infringements
of the treaty of Utrecht. But a sufficient reason for abrogating the treaty
was the impractibility of fulfilling that part of it which concerned the
Seven Reductions. By mutual agreement the treaty was annulled in
February 1761, and Oeyras informed Hay of this with satisfaction. Such
of the Indians as had survived were left free to remain where they were
or to return to their homes.29
Oeyras preserved the British alliance, but yielded little in commercial
questions. The Grumbletonians had not lost their will to ventilate their
grievances and in Oporto the Factory created a Committee, on which the
Consul was only the figurehead. But as the power of Oeyras increased,
the Lisbon Factory found it wise not to advertise itself, and to treat
Minister and Consul with respect. However it by-passed them to some
extent by submitting complaints to the secretary of state through the Por¬
tugal merchants in London, who had been recruited by several merchants,
who left Lisbon after the earthquake. One of them named James Grosett,
who had suffered heavy losses in the earthquake and naturally felt resent¬
ful, requested an interview with Pitt several times through his secretary
Wood; he wrote on behalf of the Portugal merchants and alleged he
had the support of the Lord Mayor. He wished to complain that under a new
sumptuary law certain British stuffs containing silk were being prohibited
29 S. P. 89/52, Kinnoull to Pitt, 8, 21 June, 4 Aug. 1760. S. P. 89/54, Hay,

Secret, 28 March 1761.
144
by the Lisbon customs, while similar French stuffs were allowed. He sub¬
mitted samples and said that a certain Spitafields weaver, owner of a hun¬
dred looms, had been completely ruined. He also complained of post-earth-
quake regulations designed to put out of business riff-raff, who robbed by
night and sold spurious goods by day. In practice these regulations hit honest
British small traders. Another grievance was a matter of principle, the im¬
possibility of claiming against debtors whose property had been requisition¬
ed by the Inquisition. The debt he cited was one recently contracted, which
the Portuguese alleged was a subterfuge to save Jewish property. From
French complaints it is clear that the admission of French prohibited stuffs
was not general, but there was some substance in both complaints. Pitt re¬
fused to see Grosett, who then tried with the help of a Lisbon friend named
John Hunter to arrange for the Portugal Merchants to appoint him and his
Lisbon friends to a committee to approach Pitt. The Consul General Sir
Harry Frankland was asked by Hunter to nominate the members for this
committee, but refused to do so, reporting ''that Grosett was a man of a
restless and turbulent disposition, who was trying to raise a flame in the
Factory. He added that he was on very good terms with the most sensible
of the leading members of the Factory and would do all he could to keep
our affairs as quiet as possible, for the publication of memorials could not
but be disagreeable and probably attended by ill consequences. Nevertheless
the proposed committee was not without substance, comprising respectable
old Factory members in London like Philip Jackson, Hoissard, and John
and Philip Mayne, presumably relatives of the leading Lisbon merchant
Robert Mayne. But on the whole the Factory found it prudent to pipe
down and accept diplomatic or consular advice. This did not mean that
they had not reason to complain, but international politics took precedence
over local issues and the British government was increasingly loath to
antagonise Oeyras over comparatively minor matters. In May 1762 how¬
ever the Lisbon Factory had a more viable complaint. Britain exercised
naval supremacy and British privateers and frigates were bringing in prizes
from time to time, but a gap had been left between the squadrons based
on Gibraltar and the Channel, and for a few weeks the French with a
couple of large privateers and a warship were able to blockade the Tagus
and hold up the sailing of a convoy. Admiral Saunders, when appealed
to at Gibraltar, refused to believe that the French would risk a warship
off the Portuguese coast and said in any case he had no ships to spare;
it was true that the French were not masters of the Tagus for long but
they took several prizes and their success caused indignation and alarm.
But the war with France was now moving towards an escalation, in which
Spain and Portugal would also be involved.30
30 S. P. 89/53, Grosett to Wood, 29 Nov., 6 Dec., Wood to Grosett, 2 Dec. 1760.

S. P. 89/54, Frankland to Wood, 24 Jan. 1761. Oporto Factory memorial of 5 July
1759.
145
'x
THE 1762 WAR WITH SPAIN
In June 1761 the Portuguese minister in London, Martinho de Melo e

Castro, complained that France was trying to stir up trouble between
Britain and Portugal at the Augsburg conference, and pressed for Britain
to insist on the insertion of an article by which France would condone the
Boscawen incident, so that it could no longer be used as an issue with
Portugal. The return of the exiled minister Ensenada to Madrid, and the
renewed influence of the Spanish queen mother, were already causing
Oeyras anxiety about the attitude of Spain, but it was not until November
that he became seriously alarmed and ordered Melo to discuss the question
of British aid to Portugal in the event of war. But he did not breathe any
word of this to Hay; warning had come from London in November that
Spain might be entering the war aginst Britain, and that the Earl of Bristol,
our ambassador, might be leaving Madrid at any moment, but nothing
as yet was heard from him.1
Charles III, King of Spain, had begun by professing good will towards
Portugal, and until her death in 1760 was restrained by his consort Amelia
of Saxony. But he felt to the full the old Spanish grievances against
England, and he lost his stake in the succession to Portugal when his
brother the Infante Luis failed to marry the Princess of Brazil, the heiress
to Portugal, whose husband and uncle Dom Pedro then belied the asper¬
sions cast on his virility by fathering an heir. France also had been faring
rather badly in the war and had been thwarted of peace by the warlike
spirit of Pitt. She determined to draw Spain and Portugal into an alliance
and to make a last effort to undermine British naval supremacy by domin¬
ating all the peninsular ports. So King Charles was persuaded to conclude
a Family Compact with Louis XV in August, which Portugal would be
pressed to join. This was not published until January, but Oeyras heard
in November 1761 that a French Minister was to be sent to Lisbon to join
the Spanish Ambassador in coercing Portugal to renounce her alliance
1 S. P. 89/54, Hay to Pitt, 18 July 1761. Melo to Pitt, 16 June. S. P. 89/55,

Hay to Egremont, most secret, 17 Jan. 1762. Egremont to Hay, 9 Feb. 1762.
146
with Britain. Jacques O’Dunne reached Lisbon in February with orders to

approach the Portuguese in a friendly manner, but, if necessary, to follow
up with an ultimatum that if Portugal declined to join the Family Compact
and to renounce her ‘aggressive’ alliance with Britain, Spanish and French
troops would cross the frontier in the most peaceable manner in order to
deliver the Portuguese ports from the British thrall. Before his arrival
Oeyras at last took Hay into his confidence. The rupture between Britain
and Spain had taken place in December and the Earl of Bristol had passed
through Lisbon on his way home. Oeyras explained that he had for some
time felt an increasing distrust of Spain and that the object of O’Dunne’s
mission, in collaboration with the Spanish ambassador Joseph de Torre-
ros, was to force Portugal to declare for France. He now repeated the
request made in London for armed help, which should include the despatch
of some experienced officers as military advisers who might appropriately
be led by Lord Tyrawly, a general of reputation and an old friend of
Portugal. Hay in due course received copies of the correspondence with
Melo and was surprised to note that the appeal was not based on any of
the several treaties of alliance but solely on the needs of the Common
Cause. This disposed of the French argument that the treaties were
aggressive and not defensive, but, as Hay observed, deprived Britain of a
good argument for the closer observance by Portugal of her obligations
under the treaties, which were a chronic subject of dispute.2
O’Dunne and Torreros left Lisbon on 27th April after the exchange
of various notes of increasing sharpness. Oeyras had spun out the negotia¬
tion as long as possible, but King Joseph replied to the plenipotentiaries’
third memorial unequivocally. He insisted that the treaties of alliance with
Britain were defensive and not aggressive, and that he was a lover of peace
and would gladly mediate between Britain and France and Spain, if the
chance were given him, but that he would rather suffer the last tile to
be beaten from his palace, and to lose the last drop of his faithful subjects’
blood than to submit to the French and Spanish proposals. Nevertheless,
when Tyrawly in response to the urgent request for his services arrived
promptly in mid-March, Oeyras told Hay that he would have preferred
Tyrawly to wait for the despatch of the troops and stores or at least to
have come incognito and to have communicated with him only through
third parties. Tyrawly agreed that it was wise to avoid any step which
might provoke Spain, but was offended that the Portuguese found his
presence embarrassing, and thought Oeyras’s obsession with secrecy was
silly, for it was already publicly known that troops were being readied
for embarcation for Portugal, and his own presence could not be concealed.
2 Recueil des Instructions anx Ambassadeurs de France. Portugal. O’Dunne,

312/40. S. P. 89/55, Hay to Egremont, 17 Jan., 19 Feb., 12 March 1762. Lord
Tyrawly, 12 March, Hay, confidential, 29 March. Melo to Egremont, 8 April 1762.
147
DAVID FRANCIS
% \ 1
He wrote ‘The Portuguese cry aloud for the king’s assistance, but are afraid
to avail themselves of it for fear of giving umbrage to the Spaniards. The
king must either assist them or not assist them. I see no middle way
between these two extremes, nor can I find out from their discourse which
is the option’. On 29th March, still it must be admitted before the king
of Portugal’s staunch defiance, but after Tyrawly had been publicly re¬
ceived and had presented twelve land and sea officers, Oeyras still obliged
Tyrawly to drive his coach into his backyard under cover of dusk, where
he was met by a special valet at an obscure backdoor and led finally by
many dark passages to Oeyras’s study. ‘All this secrecy’, Tyrawly wrote,
To disguise “le secret de la Comedie” seems to me so exceedingly silly,
that I am ashamed of it even for my own person, “a plus forte raison”
for the honour of the king’s commission.’ Certainly Oeyras was obsessed
with secrecy, for the Spaniards knew very well what was going on, but
the care taken to avoid provoking them perhaps gained valuable time.
At the outset Oeyras had freely admitted that it was impossible to defend
the frontiers and that the best that he could do was to cover Lisbon by
mobilising an army near Abrantes and by patching up the defences on
the Tagus. At Oeyras’ and Hays’ request Admiral Saunders spared three
ships from Gibraltar to look in at Lisbon; they stayed there a few
days and helped to tide over the time until preparations for defence
had matured a little more; but Admiral Saunders could ill afford to let
them go and Oeyras himself was anxious to avoid any action which might
provoke the Spaniards. Accordingly after a stay of a few days the three
ships returned to Gibraltar in March; on 9th July when Count Lippe
arrived to assume command of the Portuguese army the Tagus forts were
in a good enough state to enable him to profess himself satisfied. Mean¬
while Tyrawly could not complain of Portuguese procrastination too much,
as long as British delays in sending help matched them. Troops and stores
could not be got ready as quickly as Tyrawly and a few officers. The first
stores arrived at the end of April and the two Irish regiments and Bur-
goynes’s dragoons a few days later; Lord Loudoun and the four regiments
from Belle Ille, the French island occupied by the British, only reached
Lisbon in mid-July.3
Tyrawly found it hard to extract from the Portuguese the information
he required about their preparations and he was not encouraged to go to
the frontier to see for himself; however he himself thought that he would
do best to remain in Lisbon, and in fact he could not do anything else,
for his health broke down and refused to mend, so that he could not even
mount a horse. As soon as the plenipotentiaries had left, he was able to
send his son, Lt. Col. Charles O’Hara, with Major General Crawford to
3 S. P. 89/55, Da Cunha to Hay, 5 April, Hay to Egremont, 15, 20 Feb., 12 March.

Tyrawly, 12, 29 March 1762.
148
report on the frontier defences, and the Portuguese politely offered him
the command of their army; he declined, pending a reference home, and
soon afterwards begged Lord Egremont to be excused altogether on the
ground that he could not accept the responsibility for an army so ill
equipped and under-officered. Soon after he had to admit that he was
unfit to carry on and was obliged to ask to be recalled. Nevertheless he
was much put out to receive with suspicious speed news that Count
Schaumberg-Lippe-Buckemburg had been appointed Portuguese command¬
er-in-chief in his stead. He accused the Portuguese of double dealing, for
on comparing dates he found that Melo had been looking for another
candidate at the very moment when he was being offered the command
with flattering asurances that he would be a second Schomburg and the
saviour of Portugal. Melo had no doubt had an early warning that Tyrawly
might prove to be unfit; officially speaking ministers were covered, for
Lippe’s appointment was made after receipts of Tyrawly’s final refusal of
the Portuguese command, but a letter from John Calcraft, the army con¬
tractor, dated 30th March, had already apprised him that Count Bevern
was being considered for the post and consoled him for his disappoint¬
ment, so there was some reason for annoyance at the way in which the
matter had been handled. A great recommendation of the final choice,
Count Lippe, in the eyes of the Portuguese was the fact that he was a
reigning count (even though a small one) and a grandson of George I
and the duchess of Kendal. But he was also a keen artillery man and pro¬
ficient engineer, with a good record of active service in Germany. But
he had been an ensign in the British Army when Tyrawly was a Major-
General, and Tyrawly could not bear the idea of having to take orders
from him. Lippe's appointment was given a further royal flavour by the
appointment of the queen of England’s brother Prince Charles of Meck¬
lenburg to go with him. He was given the command of a Portuguese cavalry
regiment. Lippe arived on 9th July and Lord Loudon took charge of the
British forces from Tyrawly on the 24th July. Major Charles Rainsford,
Tyrawly’s secretary, was seconded to Lippe and was subsequently made
a Brigadier and Inspector General of the Portuguese army.4
The first stores had now arrived and there was no longer any excuse
for the cloak-and-dagger methods which Oeyras had used even to send
his despatches down to the British packet boat. The Marquis of Sarria
assumed the command of the Spanish armies which threatened the Beira
and the Alentejo, but no movement was reported except in the Tras os
Montes, where a third force crossed the frontier and rapidly overran
the greater part of the province. The towns of Chaves and Braganza were
practically open towns; only Miranda, just north of the point where the
4 S. P. 89/55, Tyrawly to Egremont, 7 April. S. P. 89/56, 8, 19 May. Egremont

to Tyrawly, 15 June, to Loudoun, 22 June. Oeyras to Hay, 29 May 1762.
149
DAVID FRANCIS
* 1
Douro enters Portugal through a deep gorge, was expected to hold out,
but an explosion of a magazine opened a breach in its walls and it capitul¬
ated at once. For some time no reliable news of what had happened reached
Lisbon. The governor of Tras os Montes was an octogenarian, who re¬
treated before the enemy, and, as Oeyras observed, would have been happy
to go on doing so until he reached Jerusalem.5
It was easy going over the plateau of the Tras os Montes and it was
only when they entered the rough country near the Douro that the invad¬
ers began to run short of food and to meet opposition. The Spaniards hoped
that the Portuguese would be overawed into submission and at first their
conduct was exemplary; Charles O’Hara said they were the quietest of
all enemies, for they paid double price for everything they wanted and had
not discharged one single firelock since they had been in Portugal. All
the same he found it not surprising that all the inhabitants had fled, as
the province was absolutely defenceless without soldiers, arms, powder, ball
or provisions, and it was impossible to paint the scandalous condition of the
defences. Almeida as a fortress could not be held long and he advised the
governor to put his troops to better use by distributing them over the
countryside, which was easily defensible against a host. But the governor
said he could not withdraw a man without orders. On the other hand
Spanish deserters numbered hundreds and he believed with a little money
their whole army, which comprised many Irish, Germans and Flemings,
could be easily bought and they took no proper precautions, not an outpost
before Miranda, where a sizeable force could have driven them into the
Douro. He could not believe that the Spaniards were serious, for if they
had been, nothing could have stopped them from marching to Oporto;
perhaps the whole affair would blow over in a cup of mild ale.6
O’Hara’s plans for the defence of both the Beira and the Alentejo,
based on the slender resources available, were thankfully accepted. He then
went to Monte do Corvo in Tras os Montes and afterwards to Lamego and
Vila Real. The natives of Beira had manfully told Oeyras that they could
defend themselves and would not need regular troops. In fact they made
a very good effort; the Tras os Montes invasion was turned back and
fortunately the larger army approaching Almeida was delayed. Charles
O’Hara was an attractive young man in his early thirties or late twenties
with a fluent command of Portuguese, which was his mother tongue; he
also had an Irish liking for a scrap, great energy, confidence and ingenuity.
He marshalled his peasants with love. Finding himself suddenly a com¬
mander-in-chief he told his father T wish Your Lordship could see my
5 S. P. 89/55, Hay to Egremont, 27 April, 29 May. Tyrawly, 29 March, 19

May 1762.
6 S. P. 89/56, Hay to Egremont, secret, 29 May. Tyrawly, 5 June. Add MSS
23635, O’Hara to Tyrawly, 19, 21 May 1762.
150
forces; nothing could be half so ridiculous; such an assemblage of old

fire-locks without locks, musty swords with daggers, pikes, halberds,
scythes etc*. But he added ‘Such as they are, MM. les Ennemis have
endeavoured hitherto in vain to pass’.7
He crossed the Douro to try to organise some defence by auxiliaries
and peasants; quite an action had taken place there but he had to return
north of the river, before the enemy occupied Monte do Corvo. He mar¬
shalled some 1500 peasants, who were joined by 500 more from S. Joao
de Pesqueira lower down the river. He removed or sank all the boats on
the Douro and posted the 600 men who had guns of some sort at the
river crossings. The peasants manned the hill tops and cliffs and were
helped by women and children, who uttered blood-curdling yells. After
a few attempts the enemy gave up trying to cross the river and retired
whence they had come; many of them were presentable troops in blue
uniforms with white facings and brass kettles for their cooking slung about
them, but they were only lightly armed and were running out of food and
cartridges.8
There was great alarm in Oporto where the Factory feared for their
wine and effects. Some 30,000 pipes were said to be awaiting shipment.
No more than an occasional British frigate or privateer was available for
coastal protection, and there were said to be ten Spanish men of war at
El Ferrol and French ships in the offing. Fortunately no major naval
attack materialised even on the convoys, which were taking the British
troops to Lisbon, and by August when the transports, which had brought
the troops, were available to ship the wine, the danger to Oporto was over.
But in early June about 1500 Spaniards penetrated as far as Vila Real and
threatened to infiltrate the neighbourhood of Oporto. But they were lightly
armed and poorly supplied and the governor of Oporto was quite active in
strengthening the defences on the river Tamega. On the south bank O’Hara
was at Lamego, where a considerable Portuguese regular force was
mobilizing, and in the mountains near Vila Real the enemy were afraid of
being cut off by the auxiliaries there and found it prudent to retire. In the
north the fortress of Valenca on the Minho and the troops there were in
comparatively good shape; nevertheless General Carey, who was given the
command in the Minho, was at the end of August in a state of despair.
By rashly accepting the command he had offended his colleague General
Crawford, who had rejected it, and who remained at the Portuguese Head
Quarters in the Beira; he did not know a word of Portuguese and after
the withdrawal of Lord George Lenox with the troops under his command
7 S. P. 89/56, Tyrawly to Egremont, 7 April, 6 May. Add MSS 23635, O’Hara

to Tyrawly, 26 April, 7 May 1762.
8 S. P. 89/56, Hay to Egremont, 29 May, 28 June. Whitehead to Hay, 2 June.
News from Beira, 12 June. Add MSS 23635, O’Hara to Tyrawly, 6 May, to Oeyras,
29 May 1762.
151
PORTUGAL.-11
DAVID FRANCIS
felt himself a lost soul though he still had one good British officer to
help him, Colonel Smith, whom he appointed his Adjutant General. His
anxiety was reasonable, for there were constant alarms of the army prepar¬
ing for attacks either from the Minho or from the Tras os Montes, and his
force was continuously depleted to meet even greater dangers elsewhere.
Moreover the peasants who had so enthusiastically supported O’Hara
decamped to tend their vineyards when no enemy was immediately visible,
and complained when Carey wanted to destroy roads likely to be used by
the enemy, or to make them work on defences. However he took up
his stance in Vila Real and did what he could. He was not called upon
to meet any serious attack and the peasants were justified, for the vintage
for 1763 attained an export of 12,242 pipes; this was far less than the
27,087 pipes of 1762, but more would have been exported if the Factory
had not limited their purchase on account of a quarrel with the Wine
Company, for there was a plentiful vintage.9
From May onwards, Tyrawly, and then Lippe and Loudoun, had a
hard struggle to activate the Portuguese army and to get the facilities they
needed for British troops. Twenty-six British officers and four foreigners
were seconded from Whitehall and the Portuguese co-opted a number
more; there were at least eight British colonels and four generals in the
Portuguese service; they received a step up in rank and double Portuguese
pay; this gave rise to much jealousy, though they were not better paid
than in the British army, though Generals Carey and Crawford were re¬
garded in Portugal as overpaid with 7.20 milreis a day and 24 rations.
Certainly when foreign generals were the fashion a generation later their
salaries seem to have won a good deal of affection and sometimes to have
effectually restrained them from sending in their resignations, when on
other grounds they would have wished to do so. These foreign officers
had to face much opposition when they proposed any change or reform,
but they served to stiffen the Portuguese cadres and a fair number re¬
mained in the Portuguese garrisons for a generation to come. One or two
of them of unusual merits or tact, or lucky enough to marry an heiress,
survived to reach the highest ranks.10
9 S. P. 89/55, Hay, 24 April, 6 May. Frankland, 6 May. S. P. 89/56, Portuguese

account of invasion 29 May. Hay, 21, 29 May, Frankland, 29 May, William Babington,
23 May. Oeyras to Hay, 29 May. Tyrawly, 29 May, 22 June, Whitehead, 2 June.
News from Beira, 12 June, Hay, 25 July. Townshend Papers, MS, at Army Museum,
General George Carey, 22 Aug., 9, 10, 12, 28 Sept. 1762.
10 The official list of British officers is in Add MSS 23635 with Tyrawly’s of
9 May. Coelho Latino in Hist. Polit. e Militar de Portugal, 1891, iii-72 lists as
English colonels Richard Vaughan, Pascual Pepper, James Money, James Anderson,
Sir James Foulis, Charles Lee, John Forbes of Skelleter (a Catholic who rose to be
a Lt. General), Brevet Captain Calder of Griffin’s regiment, who died in 1800 a
Portuguese Lt. Gen. To these must be added Tyrawly’s son Charles O’Hara, and
his secretary Charles Rainsford, who became Inspector General of the Portuguese
152
Oeyras was reluctantly persuaded to supply a figure for the Portuguese

army; he spoke of 30/40,000, but it was believed that 17,000 under arms
was nearer the mark. In London the Portuguese minister had promised
that horses, mules, and carts would be provided. No doubt Oeyras had a
better idea of the many shortages than he was prepared to admit, though
he himself was often misled. He banked, not without justification, on an
equal display of inefficiency by the enemy, and refused to be ruffled,
promising everything blandly and supplying what he could. While the
French and Spanish ambassadors were still in Lisbon he had shown
excessive caution, but afterwards his sangfroid was remarkable; perhaps
he bore in mind the advice given by Luis da Cunha some years before and
recently publicised in England in a pamphlet entitled 'Mr Punch’s polit¬
ics’, that in the last resort the Royal Family and the Government could
take refuge in Brazil. Indeed according to St Priest he actually took the
first steps to prepare the Portuguese fleet for such a contingency. This
idea, which after remaining dormant, was to come to life again a gener¬
ation later, was no new one. Indeed it had already been spoken of in
the time of John IV and of the Restoration. Later the ambassador Luis
da Cunha had outlined the advantages of such a scheme; he had pointed
out that Brazil was not only famous for gold and diamonds but for the
growth of many natural products, and whereas Portugal would always
need some imports for her subsistence, Brazil was quite capable of learning
to produce the commodities she lacked and to become self-sufficient. If
the king of Portugal established himself there he would be in a central
position for trade with Africa and the Far East and free of the shortages
and weaknesses which beset Portugal. It would be necessary to reach
agreement on the boundaries of Brazil to the north and on the Rio de la
Plata, but Brazil was not an easy country to attack and once the govern¬
ment was established there it could build up its strength and easily resist
any danger of attack by France and Spain. Indeed such was the resent¬
ment which the Spanish colonies felt against the hard treatment they
received from their king that there was danger of their revolting, so the
king could not afford to offend Portugal, who might take over some of his
dominions. By going to Brazil the king would indeed be in a better posi¬
tion to assert his independence of England, who now regarded Portugal
as the best of her colonies. Indeed the only unanswerable objection Da
Cunha found to his plan was the lack of snow in Brazil; some other
method of cooling their wine would have to be discovered.11
forces and collected the Tyrawly MSS now in Add MSS. C. Boxer, Golden Age of
Brazil, 323/4. Add MSS 23635, Loudoun, 13 April, Crawford to Tyrawly, 13 June
1762. S. P. 89/56, Tyrawly, 29 March, 2, 26 June 1762. Pamphlet, Mr. Punch’s
Politics, 1762.
11 Add MSS 2365, Loudon, 13 April. Instrucgoes Ineditas de L. da Cunha a
Antonio de Azevedo Coutinho, Ed. Coimbra, 1929, 211/18. St Priest, Memoirs,
153
DAVID FRANCIS
* 1
Charles O’Hara wrote that the Portuguese rank and file were as fine
fellows as ever he saw, and seemed to desire nothing more than to meet
the Gallegos, as they called them. Given arms, food, and leadership, they
could do as well as any, but more often than not they lacked all these.
They lacked horses too, which were the Spaniards’ most dangerous arm.
Often their horses could not stir from their stables for want of fodder
and during Burgoyne’s exploit at Vila Velha eight Portuguese horses died
of exhaustion. But if the men only needed a square meal, a musket and
a coat to their backs, the officers required a total metamorphosis. They
knew nothing and they refused to learn; the generals huddled together in
one place because it was the custom, and obdurately rejected any proposal
to split into brigades. There were one or two exceptions like the Count
of Santiago and the infantry general Fernando de Noronha, whom O’Hara
described as a very gentlemanly fellow who, for an officer of no ex¬
perience, had more sense than anybody he had ever heard of. But even he
was cashiered at a later stage for negligence. Marshal Fernando Lobo,
Count of Oriola, Baron Alvito, known as the Conde Baron, was described
as a mere driveller and a man of no service, but, if so, he at least redeemed
himself by handing over the command to Count Lippe without demur.12
The British contingent was by no means all of the first quality; Du-
mouriez, a French officer visiting Portugal, said that 2000 of the Irish
regiments had been no better than the Portuguese; certainly some were
poor stuff, for Loudoun spoke of half drafts and recruits who had never
seen a firelock. Though the British in general fared better than the Por¬
tuguese some of them at the end of the campaign were half starved,
barefoot and in rags. Loudoun had a ceaseless struggle to provide them
with bare necessities and they suffered greatly from dysentery and the
heat, until the autumn when torrential rains promoted other sicknesses.
Loudoun at the start had to leave nearly a thousand sick at Coimbra. A
return for the beginning of September for all the regiments save Burgoyne’s
listed 5212 men of whom 862 were sick. Yet the organisation of the
hospitals at Coimbra, Lisbon and Santarem was a model for the times and
under the superintendance of John Hunter, who was to become a very
famous surgeon.13
1929. Rodrigues Cavalheiro, on St Priest, Temas de Historia, 1938, Oporto, 192/

202. Crawford to Tyrawly, 14 June. S. P. 89/56, Tyrawly, 21, 29 March, 26 June
1762. Pamphlet, Mr. Punch's Politics, 1762. Memoirs, 1929.
12 Add MSS 23644, Rainsford, 29 May. Add MSS 23635, O’Hara, 20 April,
2 May 1762. King’s Library (at British Library 236), Campagne de Portugal, 1930,
vol. 1, 192/202. The Conde Baron was so styled because he was Count of Cariola,
but only Baron of Alvito, the much older title, until it was promoted to a Marquisate
in 1766. His son of the same name and title was a Lt. Gen. C. Selvajem, Portugal
Militar, 1931.
13 Dumouriez, Etat de Portugal, 255/6. S. P. 89/57, Loudoun to Ligonier, 9
Nov., 10 Sept. The Loudoun papers at the Royal College of Surgeons, contain an
154
The Irish regiments made the worst showing; they included a high
proportion of inexperienced recruits and for the most part served in the
Alentejo, where the summer heats were very trying and the supply lines
from Lisbon were badly served. Burgoyne’s regiment with its grenadier
companies was constantly employed on active missions, while other troops
save for some strenuous marches at the outset were immobile in the trying
heat of the lowlands. Only a detachment of Burgoyne’s had seen active
service, when employed at Belle Ille, but they had been personally re¬
cruited by Burgoyne two or three years before and constantly exercised.
As Light Dragoons they were a new branch of the service modelled on
the Hussars of Austria-Hungary and had aroused much interest, being
paraded before the king. Lambert’s regiment, the 67th, was also actively
employed in the cooler hill country of the Beira and had better access to
supplies. Crawford’s, the 85th, shared some of these advantages and the
rate of sickness in these regiments was the lowest. Among the Portuguese
the grenadiers were mentioned favourably ''and Colonel Hamilton’s vol¬
unteers did good service; they consisted mostly of selected Portuguese,
but included British and Foreign detachments, both mounted and on foot.
They were used mostly for scouting and intelligence along the whole enemy
occupied territory, but took part in some spirited skirmishes including a
cavalry attack on the enemy rear-guard at the close of the campaign.14
Lord Loudon, who took charge of the British forces after Tyrawly’s
departure, was not perhaps an outstanding general; indeed he had lately
been demoted from his supreme command in America, though this may
have been principally due to political reasons arising from a quarrel with
Pitt. Personally he was a leading Scottish peer with wide interests including
a taste for botany, and a good deal of social charm. He was also a con¬
scientious worker though a hard taskmaster. He was too impatient and
imperious by nature to suffer Portuguese bureaucracy gladly, but though
he was not a conspicuous success in Portugal, he was conscientious and
loyal and carried out his difficult role as a subordinate to Count Lippe
without any open quarrels. Both he and his officers, used to the standards
current in Germany or at worst in America, found it hard to make allow¬
ances for the completely different conditions obtaining in Portugal. The
Portuguese bakeries for instance used different sorts of corn and mixed
it in different proportions; they wished to follow their own system; the
British objected, first because they disliked the resulting Portuguese bread,
account of the hospital administration of John Hunter, later the celebrated surgeon.
The Santarem hospital could take 600 sick. The 91st and 83rd regiments had a
hundred or more sick, while Lamberts and the 85th only had 10/20.
14 For the background of the regiments see Regimental Histories also Townshend
MS, King’s Library 236, Campagne de Portugal, and Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga,
New York, 1979, 26/27.
155
DAVID FRANCIS
secondly because it was desirable to keep the flour for British use separate,
if much of it was not to be diverted to the Portuguese commissariat. When
the oats and hartley were shipped, it was found that the wheat intended for
the troops was wind-bound in King’s Lynn; frantic efforts were made to
make last minute purchases in Portsmouth and to avoid the Irish, who were
the first to reach Lisbon, finding themselves without bread. In Lisbon there
was a muddle about the distribution, which led to the dismissal of the com¬
missary, Mr Ward. When the troops arrived in parts of the country where
local supplies were to be had, they fared reasonably well, but elsewhere
there were many hold ups. The unfortunate Irish, when they moved to
Abrantes, had further periods of forty-eight hours without bread; on one
occasion General Townshend had to intercept a Portuguese convoy destined
for their own troops in order to save his men from starving.15
The Portuguese had also undertaken to provide animals and transport;
the troops had brought few horses and there was a great shortage of mules.
Oeyras professed to do his utmost and ordered all the mules in Lisbon to
be commandeered for Loudoun’s inspection. Some of the mules were
looked at three times but found useless. Oeyras maintained that they might
not be much to look at, but they were adequate and such as were in
common use. The British, it is true, were apt to judge by appearances, and
to expect fat and sizeable beasts. The Portuguese made do with little
runts, equine or asinine, who were able to live on the local forage and
less of it, and were often better suited to Portuguese mountain trails. But
they were not strong enough to draw the long carts used in Germany for
carrying wounded and particularly for drawing guns. Small tumbrils had
to be used, or ox carts, which were interminably slow. At the end of a
month of effort Loudoun had only found 183 mules for the baggage and
none for the artillery. For the latter his demands were perhaps excessive,
for he asked for 850 mules for an artillery party consisting apparently
only of twelve guns of varying calibres, though this figure presumably did
not include field guns. It is not surprising that feeling became tense between
Loudoun, who was hurrying to leave for the front, and Oeyras, who was
receiving impossible demands, much larger, as he thought, than he had been
led to expect. Finding that conferences resulted only in promises Loudoun
tried to reduce his requirements to black and white in notes written in
French, but finally in despair resorted to plain English. Oeyras could not
be doing with this and Hay pointed out that there was no-one in Oeyras’s
office capable of coping in English. He brought the two men together,
and after a long discussion, a compromise was reached; but baggage was
often left lying, troops contracted sunstroke from escorting crawling ox
carts through the baking day, and suffered frequent hunger and thirst.
15 S. P. 89/57, Loudoun, 26 July, Oeyras to Loudoun, 24 July, Loudoun, 3,

11, 20, 23 Aug. 1762.
156
Nevertheless at the end of August the troops somehow managed to reach

Abrantes; most of them had to march at once from there to meet an alarm
in the Coimbra area and to trudge immediately back again.16
Count Lippe arrived in mid-July and went to the front. He found
things very different from what he had been led to expect in Lisbon,
where under the eye of Oeyras preparation went on with some vigour,
zeal and vivacity. The enemy had retired in the Tras os Montes, but they
were massing before Almeida, so Townshend was hurriedly sent to the
Beira with a Portuguese force and Lippe followed him to Coimbra. The
threat was diverted southwards and both British and Portuguese returned
to the Alentejo, leaving Lambert’s 67th in the Beira. Lippe planned to
make a counter-attack in the Alentejo to relieve the attack on Almeida.
Burgoyne with some of his dragoons, 200 of Crawford’s 85th and 100
grenadiers was sent to attack Valencia de Alcantara, the nearest town in
Spain, where there were believed to be large Spanish magazines. He was
to have been supported by a sizeable Portuguese force, but they were held
up at Gaviao by the failure of their bread supplies to meet them there.
But after five days of forced marches Burgoyne succeeded in taking Va¬
lencia by surprise. Galloping on ahead his dragoons and grenadiers, some¬
times two to a horse, decimated five companies of the Seville regiment;
he did not find the expected magazines, but he cleared the district of the
enemy and left the town undamaged in return for payments of a year’s
taxes to be rendered in corn. He also took a major general and several
officers prisoner; it was not a great victory, but it startled the Spaniards
and gave a great fillip to Portuguese morale; the king rewarded Burgoyne
with a large diamond and the gift of the colours he had captured. Un¬
fortunately Almeida, which according to the advice of the governor Col
McClean ought to have held out for a week or two, fell at once on 25th
August, so no further advance could be made into Spain.17
The great question now was to predict where the enemy would aim
their main attack. They had been joined in the Beira by 12 French
battalions under the Count of Beauvais. These were fewer than had been
expected and they did not co-operate well with the Spaniards, but they
occupied Celerico, Guarda, Idanha and the Coa valley for a time and
further south reached the Zezere. They also by a threatening ultimatum
occupied Alfaiate without a blow. Loudoun with four British regiments
was sent on a forced march to Sobreira Formosa to help the Count of
St Iago, who was holding the passes at the head of the Alvito river, in
16 S. P. 89/57, Townshend, 7, 22 July, Oeyras, 14, 24 July 1762.

17 S. P. 89/57, Burgoyne, 3 Aug. E. A. Pereira Salas, O Conde de Lippe em
Portugal (indexed under Schaumberg), Vila Nova de Famalica, 1938. Townshend
MS Lambert, 31 Aug., 3, 9, 14, 27 Sept., Lippe, 1 Aug., 2, 5, 7 Sept. Howson,
Burgoyne, 39/44.
157
DAVID FRANCIS
the south of the Beira. Aided by some Portuguese grenadiers Loudoun

covered St lago’s retreat. The enemy moved to Castel Branco, which they
occupied and took the old castle of Vila Velha on the Tagus, just before
Burgoyne could arrive to relieve it. Vila Velha was the highest ford on the
Tagus, before a tongue of Spanish territory occupied the south bank.
Together with Rainsford Burgoyne had recently made a careful survey of
the terrain and was able to cross the river with his horse and to surprise
the enemy outposts there. The garrison had been depleted to send reinforce¬
ments against Loudoun but a battery of eight guns was in the process of
being installed. Burgoyne spiked the guns and captured sixty artillery
mules; he also did considerable execution among the remaining Spaniards
and killed a general and several officers. The attack was led by Lt. Col.
Charles Lee of the Dragoons of whom some, perhaps the majority, were
Portuguese. Burgoyne set up a battery on the south bank to command the
Castel Branco/Abrantes road, which ran along the north bank through a
gorge. The enemy had used it to pass along a rough mountain road to the
Perdigao heights but Burgoyne’s battery prevented them using it any
longer, though they retained a small garrison in the old fort at Vila Velha
until they retired in October.18
In early September the ambassadors were already gathering in Paris to
discuss peace preliminaries, but no notice was taken of this in the theatre
of war. Townshend’s diversion in the north had cleared the French from
part of the north Beira and Lippe felt that the enemy’s main threat was
directed against the Alentejo. Rainsford was kept busy inspecting the
several fortresses in the province; he found many of them inadequate and
proposed moving some of the larger guns away from risk of capture to
strengthen the more defensible places. But nearly all the action took place
on the Zezere, where the enemy were constantly probing and Lambert’s
regiment was active in strengthening the defences, driving enemy country
for supplies and destroying roads likely to be useful to them. Townshend,
after a brief excursion to Extremadura, returned to the north of the Beira,
where he was reinforced by Lord George Lenox with a Portuguese force
withdrawn from General Carey’s command on the Douro. When the enemy
retired he re-oocupied the valley of the Coa and the towns of Celerico
and Guarda. Colonel Hamilton continued to reconnoitre and to indicate
every scrap of news, which might reveal the enemy’s intentions. By this
time summer heat was ending but it was not until the middle of October
that the rains began and flooded streams blocked operations in the moun¬
tains.19
18 Townshend MS, Lippe to Townshend, 20 Aug., 3, 5, 9 Sept. S. P. 89/57,

Cotterell, 1 Oct., Hay to Egremont, 4 Sept., Loudoun, 9 Oct., Burgoyne, 9 Oct. 1762.
For a French account see Comte de St Priest, Memoires, 1929, 68/73. Col. Charles
Lee later fought against Burgoyne in the American War of Independence.
19 S. P. 89/57, Egremont to Hay, 7 Sept, and Add MSS 23644, Rainsford to his
158
In the crucial month before mid-October the armies marched and

counter-marched. The Portuguese may have had only a stage army but it
made the right entrances and exits. As a Portuguese account put it melo¬
dramatically ‘The Portuguese soldiers endured hardship and marched very
well; wearing out their shoes they marched gaily over the sharp stones,
leaving them stained with their blood’. Actually they were more used than
the British, except perhaps the Irish, to go barefoot, and even the British
sometimes only had one shoe to three men. Certainly the Portuguese could
live on less and were accustomed to the native food and the native wines
while the British officers in particular yearned for a land where cuckolds
were better regarded; unversed in the customs of the country they too often
ended with cold steel in their vitals from a jealous swain or on a diet of
mercury. But the ones whose health held up, even the sprigs of fashion,
were usually gallant in action and had some regard for their men. Some of
the Irish officers, Lambert noted, were poor creatures, whom he wished
heartily back to their bogs and their potatoes. When he was moved to the
Alentejo front he was disconsolate to see a British soldier with one sleeve
to his coat and no breeches, but he had nothing but praise for the steady
courage of the rank and file. He tried the experiment of embodying one or
two Portuguese companies in his regiment in exchange for the loan of some
of his own men to his colleague Brigadier Melo. He remarked that many of
the Portuguese under his command were like children in leading strings;
if he crossed the river for a day or two to inspect the posts he would
return to find all puzzlement and confusion. But the two companies he
took into his regiment improved fast. ‘I can boast of many alterations in
my Portuguese; they are punctual to hours, and, in general, orders, and
they keep their arms clean.’ Not all British officers were as good as Lambert
but some success was achieved. On the other hand the difficulties were
matched by equal weaknesses in the enemy, who comprised many foreigners
in the Spanish forces as well as their French allies. Desertions were numer¬
ous and sufficed to recruit two growing allied regiments; however the
chief use of deserters was to give intelligence. Not a day passed without
several coming in and though their information was often wrong, they
provided enough to give an idea of the movements of the enemy, and
once the British pursestrings were loosened, labourers for the defences
and the services of spies, even to go into Spain, were readily procurable.20
Although the Alentejo favoured large scale manoeuvres and the superior
Spanish cavalry, no offensive materialised there. The Marquis of Sarria
father, 14 Sept., 5, 25 Oct. Townshend MS Lippe to Townshend, 12, 14, 18 Sept.,

8, 22 Oct. 1762.
20 King’s Library 326, Campagne de Portugal. Townshend MS, Lambert to
Townshend, 9, 23 Oct., 22 Nov. Add MSS 23644, Fraser (private) to Rainsford, 8
March 1763.
159
DAVID FRANCIS
took charge as commander in chief in the spring but he was disliked by

the king of Spain and soon replaced by Aranda. He had adopted the Tras
os Montes plan, which aimed at a drive at Oporto. This might have succeed¬
ed, if it had been pushed forward at once and the capture of Oporto
would have been a severe blow to British trade, and have stiffened Por¬
tuguese resistance and particularly that of the Spanish-born queen of
Portugal less than an advance against Lisbon. But the Spaniards had no
idea of the extent of the mountain area barring their way to the sea and
having hesitated lost their chance of success. They failed to attack in the
Alentejo, either because they feared the heat of the plains, or because
Count Lippe enticed them to pursue him into the mountains, where they
were gradually brought to a halt by sickness and the shortage of supplies
by long lines of communication. The allies managed to drag their cannon
to emplacements on the plateau, which commanded the enemies' advance
along the valley. Even so Spanish raiding parties began to approach
Abrantes, but then they were halted by the rains. They were anxious to
occupy any territory they could afterwards claim, and threatened Abrantes,
and Elvas, and the frontier town of 01iven?a to the last moment, but on
24th November hostilities ceased and Portuguese territory was evacuated
except for Chaves and Almeida, which the Spaniards retained for another
three months.21
Although the duke of Bedford had strict orders to agree to nothing in
Paris, unless Portugal was kept completely in the picture, Oeyras continued
to be suspicious of Spanish intentions. He feared that Melo would not be
given equal treatment as plenipotentiary and that the withdrawal of the
British troops would prove to be premature. He had some justification,
for the Spaniards made difficulties about evacuating Chaves and Almeida
and tried to make the Portuguese in the district pay Spanish taxes. Lord
Loudoun was anxious to remove his troops as soon as possible and
evacuated them in April, after some delay and failure to persuade the
Portuguese to buy the horses and mules which had cost him so much to
acquire. Reluctantly the Spaniards complied with the peace terms which
included the return of Nova Colonia.22
Oeyras had received the news of the fall of Nova Colonia on 18th
April and had not been too downcast as he had counted on the success
of a strong relief force, which was to set out from Rio de Janeiro. Two
British privateers, the Lord Clive, 60 guns, and the Ambuscade, 40 guns,
had called at Lisbon in August and had been given letters of marque.
The Lord Clive left behind her a trail of deserters, but both ships joined
21 King’s Library 236, re guns on the mountains. S. P. 89/57, Hay to Egremont,

17 Nov., 18 Dec. 1762.
22 S. P. 89/58, Hay to Halifax, 23 Jan., 11, 22 Feb. 1763. Loudoun, 20 Feb.,
13 March, Hay, 19 April 1763.
160
the Portuguese expeditionary force at Rio de Janeiro and sailed for the
River Plate. They drove off all Spanish ships and attacked the Spanish
garrison with some success in spite of the strong resistance under the
command of Ceballos, the governor of Buenos Aires. They seemed to be
on the point of capturing Nova Colonia, when an explosion and a fire
on the Lord Clive completely destroyed the ship; the Ambuscade was
dismasted and the whole force had to beat a hasty retreat, leaving the town
in Spanish hands. The colony was returned after the peace to Portugal for
a few more troubled years but the rich contraband trade hitherto handled
there now rapidly declined.
Oeyras took to heart the British warnings not to allow Portugal to be
caught napping again by her inability to defend herself. He retained Count
Lippe and several British and foreign officers to reorganise the army.
Lippe remained for over a year and Charles Rainsford with him. Several
officers stayed longer and Simon Fraser, later Lord Lovat, became a go¬
vernor of the Minho and Tras os Montes; he was an M. P. and spent
much of his time in England but he retained his post until 1775. Great
improvements were said to have been effected, and when Lippe inspected
the Minho in 1763, he highly praised the Chaves cavalry regiment, which
Colonel Smith had brought into very good order. But many years were to
pass before the next war in Portugal and by that time the much vaunted
improvements had been forgotten.23
23 S. P. 89/58, Hay to Rivers (Halifax’s secretary), 18 Sept. 1762. S. P. 89/58,

Whitehead to Hay, 20 Oct. 1763. S. P. 89/59, Whitehead, 3 March, 28 May, 19 Sept.
1764. Twiss, Richard, Travels through Portugal and Spain, 1775 speaks of McClean
and Calder at Almeida.
161
1
LAST YEARS OF POMBAL
The years following the 1762 war marked the apogee of the Count
of Oeyras, Marquis of Pombal. British Ministers reported from time to
time that there was a strong underground opposition to him and that his
power would collapse, if any misadventure occurred. This was likely
enough; he was often ill and as early as 1766 in a pensive mood he said
that there were many who differed from him and he did not know who
would succeed him. In 1769 and 1770 his brothers Paul and Xavier de Men-
donca, President of the Senate and Minister of Marine, died; in the face
of strong opposition he had just secured a cardinal’s hat for Paul and the
loss of his brothers was a blow to him. He secured the succession to
the Presidency of the Senate for his own son, but the opposition had
stirred and there had even been talk of the Count of Arcos, a son of his
enemy the Marquis of Marialva, getting the post. At this time Martinho
de Melo e Castro, minister in London, succeeded Xavier and began to play
a large part in foreign affairs. The king was believed to have arranged
this without consulting Oeyras, but if the appointment was unwelcome,
Oeyras did not show any resentment. Melo always took a slightly inde¬
pendent line, but he co-operated with Oeyras and continued to do so until
the king’s death. But Oeyras reinforced his position by appointing his
friend Joseph de Seabra to be secretary of state and was believed to be
grooming him to be his successor. He also called in Jose da Cunha to be
a minister and made him a cardinal. Da Cunha, though a relative of the
Tavoras, served Oeyras slavishly until the death of the king when he
promptly turned against him. Seabra fell into disfavour and all plans for
a successor came to nothing, but so did all intrigues against him; even
at the moments of his greatest triumphs threats persisted, but to all appear¬
ance he reigned supreme, and he even felt able to forego his personal
attendance on the king during the latter’s frequent absences from Lisbon
in the country.1
1 S. P. 89/70, Lyttleton, 5 Jan. 1770, 20 Jan., 23 April 1770. S. P. 89/73,

Walpole, 24 July 1772.
162
Some idea of Pombal’s personality can be gleaned from the despatches

of various ministers and a good picture of him at home is given by the
Italian adventurer Gorani. He came with a warm recommendation to
Eleonora Daun, Marchioness of Pombal, from her sister who was a relative
by marriage. He began his stay in Lisbon by landing in a considerable
scrape after a night spent with a lady who relieved him of his purse. He
then bethought himself of using his letter of introduction. Luckily the
owner of his hotel was a friendly compatriot, who advised him that, if
he proposed to call on the Chief Minister, he must do so in style, and
fitted him out with a generous loan. So he hired a ‘sege’, a sort of fashion¬
able two-wheeled gig with an uniformed postilion. The marchioness looking
out of her window saw him alighting therefrom. He looked a smart young
man and he was brandishing a large official envelope which contained his
letter of introduction and another letter from the Portuguese minister in
Turin. So he managed to pass the Major Domo and to deliver his cre¬
dentials. He was most graciously received anch asked to dine and play cards
that very day. To all appearances he found himself in a large jolly family
frequented by Pombal’s two brothers and various relatives. Gorani was
soon given a commission in the Portuguese army and persuaded the Mar¬
chioness to intercede for a better one, as he did not think the first one
was good enough. Pombal thought he would make a good envoy and
gave him every opportunity to learn about the Portuguese administration
and to groom himself for some important mission. At first he was dazzled
and delighted, but he soon perceived that he was skating on thin ice. His
eyes were opened after he had been arrested for being seen talking to a
suspicious character, even though he was rescued from prison by Paul de
Mendonga. To learn an object lesson he was sent to attend a review of
the Royal Regiment of Strangers. This was a regiment largely composed
of Swiss, the nationality of their colonel Graveron. It had given good
service in the 1762 war but it was expensive to keep up and Pombal
suspected its loyalty, and had decided to break it. After the review without
a word of warning the regiment was ordered to lay down its arms and was
dismissed, while Graveron was arrested on a charge of defalcations and
executed. After this experience and a trip to the north of Portugal during
which Gorani noticed that his companion, a magistrate, was keeping a
very close eye on him to test his reliability, he realised that the slightest
failure to observe Pombal’s exactest wishes, and even letting slip an
innocent but misplaced word, might change the smiles which were lavished
on him into scowls, and expose him to instant destruction. The benevolent
host who played whist badly every evening and was full of jokes might
suddenly turn into an ogre. Some of the jokes gave a hint of this. The
sufferings of Malagrida and of the victims of the assassination plot were
considered fit subjects for funny stories. Pombal had a career mapped out
for Gorani and even a suitable wife chosen for him. But Gorani determ-
163
DAVID FRANCIS
ined to escape and contrived to do so by arranging to receive news that

his father was dangerously ill in Italy.2
Pombal stretched family connections to the utmost so that no cousin
need fear unemployment, but he found it hard to recruit other com¬
patriots whom he felt were both trustworthy and competent. So he
employed many foreigners of all nationalities in the army and services.
The teachers in the school for nobles which he founded at Coimbra were
almost all Italians. He was kind to his dependants as long as they were
in favour, but had no mercy on them if they fell from grace. He had at
heart many liberal ideas; he freed the Indians and did away with the
distinction between Old and New Christians. He took pride in the reduction
of the privileges of the clergy and of the Inquisition. His school for nobles
was modelled on the curriculum of an English public school and he
planned to set up a system of liberal education throughout Portugal. His
Coimbra college disappointed expectations, but it lasted some time and
educated several Portuguese statesmen including Rodrigo de Sousa Cou-
tinho. His new censorship, removed from episcopal jurisdiction, took a
number of books off the index, including works of Rousseau. But his nature
was suspicious to the point of persecution mania. He had begun with a
prejudice against the Jews, but he became quite fond of them, and in his
later days his obsession was against the Jesuits; all evil in his eyes stem¬
med from them, but anything which crossed his wishes or even his whims
could arouse his fury and send all his liberal ideas tumbling to the ground.
Even the imperial representatives, who enjoyed a special relationship
through PombaEs Viennese wife and the king’s Austrian blood, condemned
him for his cruelty; they were indeed more critical than British ministers,
who on the whole were humoured by him and mixed their impatience
and frustration with admiration. Double-faced, as he often was, and brus¬
que in sweeping aside British merchants’ grievances, there was an element
of constancy in his adherence to the British alliance from which he seldom
diverged. In private life he was the fond paterfamilias, and though he
delighted in his public pomp and in the jingling cavalry escort which the
king gave him after an attempt upon his life, he was not personally
extravagant. Jacome Ratton testified that he was very frugal and that his
wealth was derived from his economies and not from robbing the state.
For his private use he kept the same old coach and one or two faithful old
servants. When the king took the waters at Estoril, he stayed in Pombal’s
house and must have found it adequate, but Pombal let his Lisbon house
to a British firm and his residence at Belem was modest; his personal staff
consisted of a French butler, a negro servant and a sort of accountant.3
2 Memoires, 1944, 388 et seq. For account of Pombal se also St Priest,

Gorani,
Memoires, 1929, and Rodrigues Cavalheiro, Temas de Historia, 1938, 193/202.
3 Hay, S. P. 89/54, 18 May 1760. The school for nobles was modelled on an
164
Although Pombal’s word was law nothing was done except with the
authority or over the signature of the king. Joseph I was a gentle man
who had suffered an apprenticeship of enforced idleness. He soon gave
up any pretentions to diligence and was content to leave everything to his
minister. The queen disliked Pombal but refrained from interfering and
was content to keep the king occupied with his favourite diversions of
hunting, shooting, and music; as long as he was on horseback or playing
at cards under her eye, he had little opportunity to renew the amorous
escapades which had afforded such an opening for his would-be assassins.
His influence was still occasionally felt, in favour of Spain for instance,
and he protected his old friends. Pombal was able to make life uncomfort¬
able for the Marquis of Marialva, by holding back the supplies he needed
as master of the household, but he never succeeded in getting rid of him.
The monarch had a certain physical advantage over his ministers; Pombal
towered six foot high, but with his bad leg he must often have suffered
from pain and exhaustion, when forced to sland for long hours at royal
audiences. It was not until 1772, late in Pombal’s life, that the kindly
king gave leave for ministers to be seated in his presence. If the king for
some whim chose at the end of a long session to sustain some objection,
it must have been hard to refuse him and no doubt from time to time
he flavoured his ministers’ government, usually in the direction of moder¬
ation and good sense. But he had been thoroughly frightened by the so-
called Jesuit plot and did not stand up for them.4
Amid all his other preoccupations Pombal never forgot that his first
aim was to bring about the entire suppression of the Jesuits. They had
been expelled from France in 1764 and from Spain in 1767, but they still
had many adherents particularly in and around the Vatican. Portuguese
relations with the Vatican had been interrupted since the expulsion of the
Jesuits from Portugal in 1760, though from about 1764 tentative moves to
renew relations had been made, and this was one of the matters in which
King Joseph took an interest and exercised some influence. But Pope
Clement XIII was a partisan of the Jesuits and to confront him Oeyras
devoted himself to an intense propaganda campaign supported by the
publication of his great indictment of the Jesuits, the ‘Deducsao Chrono¬
logical composed largely by himself but edited by Joseph de Seabra.
The Deduc9ao had a great effect and in 1768 when the Pope tried to
depose the Duke of Parma, after he had expelled the Jesuits from his
dominions, it looked as if France and Spain would unite to bring pressure
to bear on the Pope. But as the Pope was frail and likely to die soon, they
preferred to wait for the succession of a new pope. Clement XIII died in
English public school. The Winchester curriculum in 1914 still bore much the same
imprint. Jacom£ Ratton, Recordagdens, 1813, 179, 187.
4 Revue Historique, Paris, vol. 59-9-11. S. P. 89/73, Walpole, 26 July 1772.
165
DAVID FRANCIS
February 1769 and after many intrigues Cardinal Ganginelli succeeded

him. He was supposed to have given some assurance about the suppression
of the Jesuits, but once enthroned he began to prevaricate. Finding that
he could not count on any positive support from the two Bourbon kings
Oeyras decided to renew relations with the pope even if it meant allowing
the Jesuits a respite. The return of the Nuncio was settled on very good
terms except for the lack of immediate measures against the Jesuits and
in June 1770 the Nuncio was rapturously received in Lisbon with all
possible honours. But the authority which the papacy previously held over
the Portuguese church was not restored. During the interregnum the church
had enjoyed independence, appointing bishops when vacancies occurred,
and not forwarding revenues to Rome. The episcopal appointments were
now confirmed and the Archbishop of Coimbra, whom Oeyras had accused
of ruling tyrannically and who had defied the transfer of the censorship
to the civil authority, remained in prison. The Italian adventurer Pagliarini,
who had been expelled from Rome for his attacks on the pope and had
been burnt in effigy there, but had been employed by Oeyras as a pam¬
phleteer, now received a papal pardon. Oeyras was made Marquis of
Pombal, and finally Clement XIV, who had already been nicknamed the
Protestant pope for his willingness to submit the church authorities to the
secular state, completed PombaPs triumph by decreeing in 1773 the entire
suppression of the Jesuits.5
After the 1762 war Egremont told Hay that he approved of his efforts
to cope with commercial affairs, but the king could not but see with concern
the inflexibility of Oeyras and the very unsatisfactory way in which he
avoided giving any direct reply to his minister’s renewed representations. The
grievances of the Factories, particularly of Oporto, had been referred to the
Board of Trade and had undergone a long process of digestion, but were
now at last thoroughly considered, so that a list of them could be sub¬
mitted to the Portuguese government. But Oeyras was impermeable to all
arguments, insisting that the king of Portugal had a perfect right to order
things as he wished in his own dominions and to regulate the doings of
British Subjects. He also insisted that the treaties had not been properly
observed, for the Portuguese enjoyed no reciprocity and were subject in
the United Kingdom to all manner of disabilities, having to pay aliens’
duties, higher duties on Portuguese wines, and to submit to the restrictions
of the Navigation Act. Far from expressing gratitude for the services rend¬
ered in the late war he maintained that the boot was on the other leg and
5 J. L. de Azevedo, Pombal, 283/316. S. P. 89/63, Lyttleton, 1 Sept. 1767.

S. P. 89/65, 10 April 1768, Shelborne, 2 May 1768. S. P. 89/66, Hort, 3 Oct. 1768.
S. P. 89/75, Walpole, 2 Oct. 1773. S. P. 89/69, Lyttleton, 1 July, 26 Aug. 1769.
S. P. 89/70, 21, 31 March 1770.
166
argued that the Portuguese alliance was essential to Britain for the well¬
being of her trade and her use of Portuguese ports, and therefore implied
a bounden duty to repel any invasion of Portugal. He added that Portugal
could have kept clear of the war, if she had wished to do so, and had only
entered it in order to fulfil her treaty obligation to Britain. Such were his
high principles; minor matters he regarded as unsuitable for discussion
between two kings and he referred Hay to Martinho de Melo as the expert
on the subject. After his return from the peace negotiations at Paris Melo
was in Lisbon for a short while before resuming his post in London, but
he carefully avoided Hay or any discussion with him, and talked of other
things even when Hay inveigled him to come to dinner.6
The pile-up of minor cases in which British Subjects failed to get
satisfaction was due as much to the customary delays of the Portuguese
courts as to any policy. Oeyras from time to time made a handsome
gesture and the picture no doubt looked blacker than it was, because only
the bad cases reached the record. But there was reason for bitterness and
the story of two of the most important cases, which had the highest official
backing, may serve to give an idea of the situation. One of them was the
claim of John Bristow, the well-known merchant already mentioned, the
other the case of the privateers Lord Clive and Ambuscade.
Bristow was now claiming for debts owing to him of more than
£100,000, and in May 1763 came to Lisbon with his family to fight his
case and remained there until his death in August 1768. He had connect¬
ions in Portugal, one daughter being married to Simon Fraser M. P., a
Lt. General in the Portuguese army, and another, later, to William Henry
Lyttleton, British Minister from 1768 to 1771. He brought with him re¬
commendations from the secretary of state and was taken at once to see
Oeyras and Melo. Hay thought his case was well-founded, but the Portu¬
guese decided that they owed him nothing and that he could only claim
from his principal creditors Manuel Gomez Carvalho and Feliciano Olden¬
burg any money left over after they had paid their debts to the Portuguese
government in full. They assured him amiably that he would be welcome to
any money which was left over, but as the months and years slipped by, it
became increasingly apparent that there would be nothing. Bristow eventually
collected some minor sums of £3000 and £5000 and even after his death
his son-in-law the Hon. Henry Hobart submitted to Lyttleton a claim for
£15,000, which he was instructed to include in his list of grievances.
Lyttleton also made a special appeal on behalf of his widow Judith;
6 S. P. 89/58, Egremont to Hay, 18 Jan. 1763. Hay to Egremont, 18 March, 19,

22 April, 22 Aug., 5 Sept., 5 Nov. 1763. S. P. 89/62, Conway to Hay, 18 Feb. 1765.
S. P. 89/58, Hay, 22 Aug., 5 Sept. 1763.
167
PORTUGAL.-12
DAVID FRANCIS
Oeyras promised to speak to the king about it but there is no record of

any further satisfaction being given in spite of all the powerful backing.7
The Lord Clive and the Ambuscade were privateers fitted out by 108
shareholders of which a man named Hutchinson held 24 shares and Lord
Clive and others one or more shares each. Their services on the River
Plate were offered to Portugal. They were well received in Lisbon and
sent with a recommendation to .the governor at Rio de Janeiro and an
understanding that they would be hired at a rate of £10,000 a month and
receive a share of any proceeds. They planned to attack Buenos Aires or
Monte Video but were diverted by the governor at Rio to attack Nova
Colonia, which had just been taken by the Spaniards. Their attack began
well with a landing and the capture of some prisoners but was brought
to a sudden end by an explosion on the Lord Clive, which destroyed her
and sent to their deaths a number of the crew. The Ambuscade was after¬
wards used for the defence of the island of Saint Catherine, while her
captain was given the command of a Portuguese man of war. The owners
claimed £15,000 compensation for their losses, but Oeyras said they had
joined up of their own free will for the common cause; if the expedition
had succeeded they would have had their share of the spoils, but in the
circumstances they were entitled to nothing, for there had been no contract.
Melo at first refused to consider the claim at all, but afterwards agreed
to look at the papers. The owners then agreed to settle their case with him
rather than to get it included in Lyttleton’s general list of grievances, and
some minor satisfaction was given in the form of payments of salaries and
expenses.8
Other minor issues, both those of principle such as that status of the
Judge Conservator, and individual merchants’ grievances, made little pro¬
gress. Oeyras periodically expressed enthusiasm for the old alliance but
was seldom inclined to indulge in any appeasement. This seems strange
in view of the fact that Portugal was a weak power dealing with a powerful
ally, and that Oeyras was keenly aware of the various dangers threatening
his country. Indeed he sometimes even exaggerated them in order to un¬
derline the British obligation to give naval aid. But he was as suspicious
of Britain as he was of Spain and France. While constantly complaining
to British ministers of the menace from the latter, he was instructing the
Viceroy to make sure of the defences of Southern Brazil, but on no account
7 S. P. 89/58, Hay, 9 May, 5 Nov. 1763. S. P. 89/59, Bristow to Halifax, 28

July, 4 Aug., Hay, 28 July 1764. S. P. 89/71, Rochford, 27 Dec. 1771. Pombal pro¬
mised to speak to the king about Judith, Bristow’s widow. Nothing came of it.
Actually Bristow, when he died, had some £20,000 from the sale of his English
estate, so his widow cannot have been too badly off. S. P. 89/69, Lyttleton, 1 July
1769.
8 S. P. 89/62, Owners of Lord Clive, 7 Aug. 1766, Hay, 29 Nov. 1766. Melo,
25 March 1767 to Shelbourne. S. P. 89/66, Lyttleton, 29 Oct. 1768.
168
to provoke Spain, for Britain was a greater danger than either Spain or
France and with her natural arrogance heightened by her recent victories
would use any pretext to conquer the dominions of other powers, and had
shown her ability to do so by the occupation of Manila and Havana. Yet
only a few years earlier he had expressed the hope to the British minister
Hay that Britain would be in no hurry to give up these places as their
occupation was a curb on Spain.9
However though Oeyras thought Britain required watching like any
other alien power, he had no real doubts about the British alliance, and
meant what he said when he assured Lyttleton that he hoped the alliance
would be ‘eternal’, and that there was no more chance of France achieving
an understanding with Spain than of the Koran being found compatible
with the Bible. This conviction did not prevent him indulging in numerous
intrigues, for he felt that the British alliance was so sound that he could
afford to take liberties with it.10
His desire to conciliate Spain did not defer him from taking defensive
measures in Southern Brazil and in 1767 he prepared a force under Bri¬
gadier Bohm, a former Aide de Camp of Count Lippe, to repel Spanish
aggression. These troops eventually stabilised the frontier, but meanwhile
news came from Madrid of the so-called rising of the Sombreiros, princip¬
ally inspired by grievances about taxation but named after a regulation
restricting the use of the traditional broad-brimmed hats. Oeyras decided
he would benefit from Spanish weakness by seeking a rapprochement rather
than by adopting an aggressive policy and persuaded the Spanish am¬
bassador to agree that the fighting in Brazil was a purely local affair. The
historian Azevedo remarked that Oeyras’s fears of Spain vanished like
magic, and in order to make common cause with Spain and with Rome
against the Jesuits he lent a ready ear to a proposal for a treaty with
Spain. It was true that he welcomed the opportunity to strike a blow
against the Jesuits, but he was perfectly aware that any detente with Spain
would not outlast the period of her weakness, during which the threat from
her on the River Plate was temorarily in abeyance.11
Oeyras did not deny that the expulsion of the Jesuits and the cessation
from 1762 of the valuable contraband trade through Nova Colonia had
diminished trade with Brazil and the valuable British share in it. He spoke
of the decline in the flow of Brazilian gold, though in fact this did not
become very noticeable until after 1770; until that date the yield of the
royal fifth was maintained at 93 arrobas, though it fell rapidly in the
following decade to an average of 73 arrobas. But there had been other
9 Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico de Brazil, 1872, vol. 35-227. Max¬

well, Conflicts, 34/6. S. P. 89/58, Hay, 9 May 1763.
10 Revista, op. cit., 20 June 1767. Azevedo, Pombal, 261/3. S. P. 89/63, Hay,
29 June 1767. Lyttleton, 7 Oct. 1767.
11 S. P. 89/66, Lyttleton, 29 Oct. 1768.
169
DAVID FRANCIS
disasters; the fire at the Lisbon customs house in 1764 was estimated to
have cost British merchants £200,000, even more than the earthquake. The
losses from the earthquake had in fact been offset to some extent by the
increased imports needed to repair the damage, particularly of timber and
building materials. As the people of Lisbon were now afraid to live in
structures of stone and even the royal family lived at Belem for many
years in hutments of wood, it was Scandinavia rather than Britain which
principally benefited, but textiles had been in demand too. Nevertheless
the exports of British woollens had declined and were suffering from
heavy French competition. Oeyras agreed that trade had declined but
refused to admit that this was in any case due to Portuguese policy or
restrictions. He also maintained that the British Factories exaggerated their
losses. He was right in so far as trade in general had been maintained and
though British exports to Portugal had fallen off, imports, particularly of
wine, which was after all a British interest, had increased. The total of
trade had also been supplemented by the increase of the carrying trade to
the Mediterranean and to America and of the British share in it. British
ships still brought most of the corn imported by Portugal, though the rise
in domestic demand and in prices had stopped the export of English
corn.12
After 1762 Oeyras had some success in his measures to improve the
Portuguese economy. He cut down the expenses of the royal household
and of the colonial establishment dating from the heyday of the empire.
The loss of Mazagao, the last Portuguese outpost in the north of Africa,
saved a good deal of money, and an agreement was reached with the pope
to compensate for the loss of a 10% tax on the bishoprics in Brazil, which
had been granted for the crusade against the Moors and should now have
lapsed. The Portuguese were also now able to conclude a truce with the
Moors, which they had been precluded from doing before. This eased
their task of policing the straits against the corsairs from Algiers and Tunis
and enabled them to assist their newly founded companies in Brazil by
releasing shipping from the obligation to sail in convoy. After the cession
of Mazagao there was even talk of giving up Goa to the French or Dutch;
this came to nothing, but the expenses of the government for the colony
were reduced. At home Oeyras introduced a system by which the tax
farmers no longer paid their money to the departments concerned, but
delivered it directly to the Treasury; this took the money out of general
circulation, and did not help trade, but it gave Oeyras a priority in the
allotment of funds, which he could now apply more easily for the rehabili¬
tation of the armed services. The expulsion of the Jesuits was also at first
12 S. P. 89/59, Hay, 3 June 1764. S. P. 89/65, Lyttleton, most secret, 10 April

1768. S. P. 89/88, 8 May 1769, complaints of Lisbon Factory in 30 articles. S. P.
89/69, Lyttleton, 21 June 1769.
170
helpful to the Treasury. The untold wealth rumoured did not exist. The
Jesuits had played an appreciable part in trade, but they had devoted the
proceeds to the furtherance of their order and had not hoarded their funds.
Nevertheless the confiscation of Jesuit properties was lucrative and had
provided Oeyras with money to spend and lands with which to reward
his friends and propitiate his foes. A generation later the traveller Mawe
described the extent of the former Jesuit properties possessed by the Prince
Regent at Santa Cruz near Rio de Janeiro. The Para and Pernambuco
companies destroyed the flourishing trade which the Jesuits had established
on the Amazon using forest products and even making successful use of
Indian labour, but they imported negroes to work the plantations of tobacco
and cotton and at first had some success in stimulating the Brazilian
economy. The general use of Brazilian tobacco as the staple commodity
for the purchase of slaves in West Africa enraged the Lisbon government,
whose control it escaped, but benefited trade in general. The British Min¬
ister Lyttleton was able to agree that Oeyr&s had done much to restore
the Brazil trade and that his companies, if carefully administered, had a
fair chance of success. He concluded that the king of Portugal’s revenues
were sufficient to cover his expenses.13
Having no immediate fears for the future and confidence that the
grievances of British merchants were only minor irritations, which would
not provoke their government to any violent reaction, Oeyras took a stiff
line. He was obliged to drop his contention that treaties only retained their
validity as long as no single one of their articles was infringed, and to give
up his contention that his companies’ bonds should be recognised as the
equivalent of cash, but on the question of reciprocity and of the excess of
British privileges in general he remained adamant. To counter his com¬
plaints about the lack of reciprocity the Board of Trade produced a list
of the disabilities applying to aliens in England, showing that these were
of ancient origin and existed long before the Portuguese treaties, but Oeyras
would not accept their contention. The Brazil trade and the British wine
trade were in fact flourishing, and Oeyras was able by his measures to
enlarge the share of Portuguese middlemen at the expense of British mer¬
chants. He was aided in this by a certain complacency on the part of the
British government. They were not altogether unsympathetic to Oeyras’
view that the complaints of the merchants were rather small matters and
not important enough for discussions between king and king. Nevertheless
the files of grievances piled up and the Board of Trade could not ignore
13 John Hemming, Red Gold, 1979, 477. C. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne
Empire, 1969, 227. S. P. 89/60, Oporto Factory, 30 April 1765. S. P. 89/69, Lyttleton,
21 Jan., 9 Sept., 11 Oct. 1769. S. P. 89/67, Lyttleton re Mazagao, 2 April 1769. S. P.
89/72, re Goa, 12 May, and Rochford, 2 June. Walpole, 18 July 1772. Celso For-
tado, Formation Economique de Brasil, 1972, 79.
171
DAVID FRANCIS
them; but for a long time they contented themselves with demands for
further information and it was some years before they were moved to take
more decisive steps. In October 1766 they appointed William Henry Lytt-
leton to go on a special mission to Lisbon to thrash out the question. He
eventually arrived there in August 1767.14
Lyttleton was a man of good social connections and some literary pre¬
tensions. He was perhaps the most successful British minister in establish¬
ing cordial relations with Oeyras. He was blandished with invitations to
dinner and even to stay for the week-end. Oeyras used to stroll with him in
the garden and to discuss all sorts of high matters, which gave the illusion
of confidence, though often they had little to do with England. In general
conversation Lyttleton found Oeyras very affable, but he soon found that
he was very tough on matters of principle and even on smaller matters.
However Lyttleton managed to divert him from discussion of the treaties,
on which Oeyras’s views were quite unacceptable, and to confine him to
cases, which only involved matters of fact. He had collected an increasing
dossier of statistics to back his arguments but found himself engaged in an
altercation even about these. In London Melo tried to smooth over matters
and denied that there had been any untoward differences. Meanwhile
Oeyras had tried to soften up Lyttleton with a good deal of propaganda
about his liberal measures, his good treatment of the Indians, who had
been so ill-used by the Jesuits, and his transformation of the Inquisition
into a civil court, which observed like principles and inflicted similar
penalties. Count Lippe assured him that Portugal was now well able to
defend herself, both at home where the frontier fort at Elvas had been
greatly enlarged and was now deemed impregnable, and in Brazil. Lyttleton
attended an army review held before the king and was favourably im¬
pressed. This confirmed a 1765 report of Hay, who thought the army made
a good appearance and was well clothed and regularly paid. This did not
apply to the officers; even a colonel only received £114 a year. In England
a Lt. Colonel had £200 and complained bitterly that it was too little.
However there were a certain number of foreign officers to stiffen the
ranks, especially in the artillery, and these received double pay. Oeyras
also presented Lyttleton with a copy of the Deduccao Chronologica, the
great work attacking the Jesuits, for which he was responsible though it
was published over the name of de Seabra. H. M. Government condemned
him severely for his weakness and puerility in ascribing their resolutions
to the arts of the Jesuits. Such remarks deserved no serious notice, for
14 S. P. 89/59, Halifax, 30 Oct. 1764. S. P. 89/66, Weymouth, 30 Dec. 1768.

S. P. 89/67, Lyttleton, 5 Feb., 2 April 1769. S. P. 89/63, Lyttleton, 9 Dec. 1767.
S, P. 89/65, Shelburne, 3 May 1765, re treaties. S. P. 89/68, Lyttleton, 31 July 1768
re company’s bonds. S. P. 89/63, Lyttleton’s instructions, 25 June 1767. S. P. 89/66,
11 Oct. 1768, Observations of Commissioners of Customs. S. P. 89/62, 14 Oct. 1766,
Lyttleton’s appointment.
172
he must know that the Jesuits were as much an object of contempt in

England as they were of terror in Portugal. They complained of his evasions
and procrastinations and told Lyttleton to say how unworthy it was and
useless to try to break the fair and candid discussions offered by King
George by inadmissible delays. Nevertheless soon afterwards they advised
him to use a friendly and moderate tone and to confine himself to par¬
ticular points, about which he should obtain full information in confidence
from suitable merchants. This was easier said than done, for the Factory
were reduced from the uppish days of William Shirley and were now too
much afraid of Pombal’s police to sign their names to any public memorial.
They disagreed among themselves and it was hard to obtain any considered
and adequately backed support from them. Only the Oporto Factory, pros¬
pering on the expanding wine trade, could still sometimes summon up the
courage to be obstreperous, so that Pombal could not bear to hear their
name mentioned. His Douro company’s monopoly was not perhaps as
complete as he wished, for we hear at this^time of an independent Por¬
tuguese company alarming both Company and Factory by trying to preempt
the vintage.15
The Consul General Sir John Hort agreed that the Factory must be
cautious, and when on 6th May 1769 a deputation of five members
submitted a report in 30 articles on their grievances to be forwarded home,
they insisted that the names of the signatories should be omitted. Their
main concern was with the wine and Brazil trades. Four years before the
Oporto Factory had maintained that though the ostensible object of Oeyras’s
Douro company was to improve the quality of the wine, its real purpose
was to take the trade out of British hands. Lyttleton in his appraisal
admitted that the trade had had its troubles and had declined in the years
before the foundation of the Douro Company, but he blamed the British
for having adulterated the wines and pointed out that in the last eight
years, after the foundation of the Company, the average export had improved
from an annual value of £220,913 to £249,069. This had not benefited
the growers much, but he thought the Factory were doing pretty well and
that in spite of their complaints they were often content to buy their wines
from the Company. He admitted that the powers possessed by the Com¬
pany could be burdensome but did not think that they had been exercised
severely so far. In spite of its privileges the Company had not altogether
won the upper hand; it had not been able to open a new market in Scan¬
dinavia or to make any impression on the domestic market in England.
15 S. P. 89/65, Lyttleton, 4 July, Shelburne, 3 May 1768. S. P. 89/63, Lyttleton,

1, 28 Sept., 4, 9 Dec. 1767. S. P. 89/66, Shelburne, 16 Aug. 1768. Lyttleton, 17 Aug.,
14 Sept. 1768. S. P. 89/67, Lyttleton, 14 Jan., Weymouth, most secret, 14 March,
Lyttleton, 25 March, 2 April 1769. Latino Coelho, Hist. Polit. e Militar de Portugal,
1891, 78/86. S. P. 89/60, Hay, 18 May 1765.
173
DAVID FRANCIS
* 1
On the other hand both Company and Factory had benefitted from the
growth of the English demand; this was not due to the merits of either
but to other causes such as the increase of luxury among the English
lower classes and the increased strictness of the Customs in excluding
French wines posing as Portuguese.16
Lyttleton also disagreed with the Factory’s complaint that the Maranhao,
Para, and Pernambuco companies had ruined the Brazil trade and their
share of it. It was true that the trade used fewer ships, but they were larger
and not subject to the delays which had occurred when convoys were
compulsory. No complaint could arise about the loss of trade in wine
and brandy with Brazil, for this had never been considerable. On the
other hand trade in general, mostly in natural products, had greatly in¬
creased. He found it hard to obtain precise figures but according to Por¬
tuguese statistics the British share of the Brazil trade amounted to £956,260
in 1766 and to £818,260 in 1767. Contrary to the Factory’s allegations he
believed the Brazil companies were quite good payers and imported many
goods direct from England, which perhaps did not profit the Lisbon
merchants but was scarcely a reason for complaint. However he agreed
that many customs regulations and small taxes were burdensome, as also
the denial of ‘franquicia’, the right to enter a second Portuguese port
without the need for a second clearance. He thought the burdens placed
on retailers were unfair but did not think it advisable to complain, as it
was not to our interest to encourage British artificers and small business
men to settle in Portugal and to impart their skills.17
Lyttleton was now tired of Lisbon and applied for a transfer to Ma¬
drid which was refused. He went home on leave in May 1770, but expected
to come back and did not even appoint Sir John Hort to be Charge.
However he did not return, though asked to do so at the end of the year,
and Hort had to cope with an anomalous situation until the arrival of the
Hon. Robert Walpole on 26 Jan 1772. During this interregnum little more
is heard of the grievances, either because Hort was powerless to do much,
or because some of them had been settled and Lyttleton’s conclusion that
the major complaints about the Wine Company and the Brazil companies
were not so very serious had been accepted. In any case when Oeyras
assured him that commercial matters would not suffer from Lyttleton’s
absence, and that he thought he had shown that the grievances were un¬
justified and that Portugal also had to complain of infringements, his
statement was accepted. Oeyras was pleased at the confidence shown
in him. The position had been changed lately by the return from London
of Martinho de Melo to be Minister of Marine with a large participation
16 S. P. 89/60, Oporto, 8 March 1765. S. P. 89/66, Lyttleton, 3 Oct. 1768. S. P.

89/68, 6 May 1769, list of Factory grievances. Hort, 6 May.
17 Lyttleton, 21 June 1769.
174
in British affairs. Lyttleton complained that he had been told nothing

about this; Oeyras who at first had apparently not been best pleased by
the appointment, professed to know nothing about it. Melo called on
Lyttleton and was very fulsome but was no more ready to make con¬
cessions than Oeyras. He cooperated fully with Oeyras, and whatever rift
there had been between the two men was not allowed to appear.18
At first all went well; one or two minor cases were satisfactorily
settled and the superiority of the Judge Conservator of the Oporto Factory
to the judge of the Company was finally confirmed. In 1765 the Factory
had failed to choose a new Conservator so at the moment the man acting
in that capacity was a royal nominee. But now the case of Daniel O’Connell
arose to trouble the waters; he had been arrested by a junior magistrate,
styled an Almotacel, without the intervention of the Judge Conservator,
for refusing to pay brokerage to the official brokers on the sale of a parcel
of butter. Both the right of the brokers to intervene in such transactions
and the right of an Almotacel to arrest a British Subject were hotly denied.
Lyttleton wrote from London to Oeyras to congratulate him on his eleva¬
tion to be Marquis of Pombal and to complain about the case. Pombal
replied that he had been ill and out of business and knew nothing of the
case, but he believed that it was in the hands of the Lisbon Senate, an
independent body something like the London Guildhall. Pombal was equally
civil and equally non-committal to Hort; he added that the case really fell
within Lyttleton’s provinces, as Hort’s commission did not cover such
matters, but he was not a man of formality and he would keep Hort in the
picture. However when a new serious case came up about the seizure in
Rio of a ship named the Argyle, and of her crew and cargo, he did not
keep his promise and left Hort in the dark.19
The case of Daniel O’Connell had become a test case in the dispute
about the status of the Judge Conservators of the Factories, and Hort had
forwarded home a Jong list of all the Judge Conservators in Lisbon, which
included such exotics as the Judges of the Royal Chain, of Knighthood,
and of India, and the Mines. The secretary of state Lord Weymouth wrote
that the jurisdiction of the Judge Conservator was the bulwark of British
trade and no better issue could be chosen to establish clearly what the
Portuguese meant in their dealings with various commercial grievances.
If the conservatorial powers were denied security would become nugatory.
Therefore he requested Lyttleton to return to Lisbon as soon as possible
in view of the great difficulties that Hort was experiencing. However
Lyttleton was taken up with his family affairs, and eventually in June 1771
18 S. P. 89/70, Lyttleton, most secret, 5 Jan. 1770, 13, 20 Jan., 15 Feb., 23

April 1770.
19 S. P. 89/70, Hort, 13 Sept., 30 Oct. Weymouth, most secret, 18 Sept. Lyttleton
to Pombal, 2 Oct. and reply, 23 Oct. 1770.
175
DAVID FRANCIS
resigned. When Walpole arrived the O’Connell case was still in the hands
of the ministers at court; Pombal would give no details and insisted that
the arrest was in order and that redress through the Judge Conservator
could only be sought afterwards. O’Connell was frightened and inclined
to give in by signing the brokers’ book, but Walpole encouraged him to
hold out and eventually he was provisionally released and assurances were
even given that the Almotacel would be punished. As O’Connell was no
more molested, Rochford the secretary of state was inclined to drop the
case, even though the Almotacel was never punished. But he persisted in
denying the claims of the brokers to intervene in ordinary commercial
transactions and to deny the jurisdiction of the Almotacels. There were
twelve of them and the Senate represented that they were a very ancient
and honourable institution. The British Minister was ready to recognise
the seniority of a number of the Judge Conservators, but not that of the
Almotacels, who were thought of as mere subordinate hangers-on of the
Lisbon Senate. The brokers, whom Hort described as that body of turbulent
knaves, by no means desisted from their pretensions, and in 1776 Walpole
reported that all foreign merchants and even the Portuguese were com¬
plaining about their excessive powers.20
The corresponding test case concerning Brazil was that of the Argyle,
held in Rio on a charge of entering the port without permission and of
carrying contraband. Her papers were not altogether in order or her conduct
above suspicion, but the British government after a moment of doubt
decided to give her case full support. She carried 100 brass and iron guns,
which she had taken to Cape Verde for trans-shipment for the East Indies
but had then proceeded to Rio, where she had gained an entry by pleading
bad weather and the need for repairs. She asked for leave to transfer
her cargo to an East India Company ship, but was suspected of planning
to barter her cargo for Brazil goods, which fetched a great price in India.
This was a practice which had been condoned by previous governors, but
the Marquis of Lavradio, who had taken up his appointment recently and
was a keen and competent man, would have no truck with such dealings.
The Argyle’s Captain Robertson and his first mate were sent to Lisbon
to be imprisoned. Hort was ordered to protest. Britain still claimed the right
for her ships to enter Brazilian ports, though Portugal had long denied
these and even British ministers doubted whether such rights were to be
found in the ancient treaties, though they did not care to say so. However
it was eventually admitted that the Argyle had entered the port with the
consent of the governor and was innocent of offence unless she was proved
20 S. P. 89/70, Hort, 13 Sept. 1770, list of judges. S. P. 89/72, Walpole, 4 Feb.,

18 May, Rochford, 9 June, 8 July 1772. S. P. 89/75, Walpole, 3 Nov. 1773. S. P.
89/77, Walpole, 4 July 1774. S. P. 89/78, Walpole, 19 Oct. 1774. S. P. 89/73, Hort,
12 Aug. 1772, re brokers and S. P. 89/82, Walpole, 17 April 1776.
176
guilty of contraband. After two years or so one of her officers was sent
back from Lisbon to Rio and she was brought to Lisbon with a Portuguese
crew and handed back with her cargo. But no reparation was ever made
for damages.21
Walpole could not present his credentials for six or seven weeks, as
the king was at Salvaterra, but he saw Pombal, who was affable enough
and promised to reserve time for him to discuss British business. He said
that all the papers about the Argyle case were with Melo, and later that
all British affairs were in Melo’s province, though previously he had pro¬
mised to discuss them. There were persistent rumours that Pombal was
negotiating a treaty with the French, but he had talked at length to Walpole
about all he had done to favour the British against the French and par¬
ticularly about the steps he had recently taken to prevent the illicit import¬
ation of French woollens. Walpole said that Pombal was very artful but
he could not believe that he could be quite so double-faced as to be making
a treaty with the French. In July he reported that Pombal was in entire
charge of the government, but that he was disliked by the queen and the
royal family, and would fall at once, if anything happened to the king.22
As regards the complaints of the Oporto Factory, Walpole, who in London
had been making a lengthy study of all the files containing the Factory’s
grievances, was at first inclined to think that Lyttleton had allowed himself
to be blandished by Pombal, though later he swung round to the extent
of agreeing that any decline in British trade was due to external causes,
and not to Pombal’s measures as the Factories vociferously maintained.
When shortly after his arrival the Oporto question came up again Hort
deferred his leave and both men saw Pombal together and tried hard to
argue the case. Pombal was inflexible and in August told Hort that the
matter had been referred to the Wine Company, who were the proper
people to deal with the question, and he had not even read Walpole’s
letter and was unprepared to discuss details.
Hort felt then that there was little point in a British minister or consul
remaining in Portugal. Walpole was inclined to agree. Though Pombal
continued to be polite, he was often ill and inaccessible, but assured
Walpole that he would always be glad to have a talk, but could not
interfere with English affairs, which were in the department of Melo and
Seabra. Although Pombal had insisted that the Oporto question was entire¬
ly a matter for the company, which was not a rival trading company but
acting in a magisterial capacity to administer impartial justice and to do
21 S. P. 89/72, Walpole, 4 Feb. 1774. Rochford, 18 Feb., Walpole, 17 March,

21 March. 15 April 1772. S. P. 89/73, Walpole, 8, 24 July, 19 Aug., Rochford 14
july 1772. S. P. 89/75, Walpole, 5, 10 July 1773, 3 Nov. 1773.
22 S. P. 89/72, Rochford, 31 March, Walpole, 17 March (2 letters), 15 April,
24 July 1772.
177
DAVID FRANCIS
the king’s will, Walpole thought that he would be bound to come to his
senses in the end, because his extreme measures would ruin the trade.
When the rumours about a treaty with France were proved baseless he
even admitted that Pombal was perhaps sincere in saying that he preferred
British trade to that with France. But Pombal described the Oporto com¬
plaint as ill grounded, indecent and disrespectful to the Portuguese courts;
he also produced a voluminous and convincing reply to the Oporto com¬
plaints. The Factory had alleged that they could not bring their wines down
the river without a permit and even then they had to be submitted to the
wine tasters who were employees of the Company. Further the sales of the
wine were not allowed to take place before a date fixed by the company,
which was liable to be postponed, although the Company used the opport¬
unity in the meanwhile to pre-empt for themselves all the best wines.
Pombal’s reply contained detailed statistics of the wines sold to about forty
British firms in recent years down to 1771, showing that they had never
been starved of supplies. The Factory came up with the same complaint
about the 1772 vintage, saying that the public sales had been delayed until
March by which time all the best wines, even those promised them by their
oldest clients, had been bought up. However the Company denied that they
had bought up more than 6700 pipes and it was admitted that the vintage
had been plentiful, amounting to 24,000 pipes even after the deduction
of 6000 pipes condemned by the Company as having been brought in from
outside the delimited area. Walpole forwarded the Factory and Pombal’s
retort without comment and the wine question vanished from the records
for the next four years, so one supposes that Pombal on this occasion had
the better of the argument, though no doubt the Factory had been obliged
to pay fat commissions to Portuguese middle men to procure the wines
credited to them. But they sometimes found it more convenient to do so
rather than to go up the Douro to look for the wines themselves and the
wine trade on the whole showed few signs of suffering; export in 1770
fell to 16,469 pipes, but increased to 22,363 and 20,358 pipes in 1771
and 1772, while the 1770/80 decade showed a 10% increase over the
previous ten years from an average of 20,254 to 22,846 pipes.23
Pombal had been thoroughly riled by the recalcitrance of the Oporto
Factory and perhaps some of Walpole’s derogatory remarks had come to
his ears, for in March 1773 Walpole was reliably informed that Pombal
had said he would use any means to get him recalled to England, as he
23 S. P. 89/72, Hort, 26 May 1772. S. P. 89/71. Walpole’s long draft reply to

the Portuguese re commercial grievances and Rochford’s comments of 27 Dec. 1771.
S. P. 89/73, Walpole, 26 Sept., 7 Aug. 1772. Deducgao Compendiosa, Pombal’s
account of wine Oporto firms had received in recent years. S. P. 89/72, 18 May,
Statement of the Portuguese case delivered by Melo. S. P. 89/73, Walpole, 26 May
1772, Hort, 13 Aug., Walpole, 7 Aug., 19, 20 Sept. 1772. S. P. 89/77, Walpole,
4 July 1774.
178
was insolent and cavalier in his representations, so Melo would play for
time by acting the ignorant and indecisive part. As soon as Rochford
received Walpole’s report he assured him that no hint of Pombal’s dis¬
content had reached him and that his conduct was entirely approved and
should be continued in the same spirited way regardless of Pombal. Melo
at this time was even slightly critical of Pombal’s stiff attitude in the
Argyle case. Restored to good humour perhaps by his final triumph in
securing the total suppression of the Jesuits by a papal decree, we find
Walpole again dining with Pombal in October 1773 on terms of amity.
Though a great Factory man, and not unconvivial, Walpole was a dryer
character than Lyttleton and no soft touch; Pombal learnt to treat him
with respect. Walpole served as minister until 1798, long surviving Pom¬
bal, and Sir John Hort remained nearly as long.24
Now that the wine question was for the time being shelved, Walpole’s
talks with Pombal on commercial matters centred on Brazil and on Africa,
where the Portuguese were suffering from the competition of the Dutch.
In both quarters Britain had a certain interest in helping Portugal to defend
herself. In Brazil Pombal still feared Spanish encroachments and also
French infiltration on the side of Guyana. He said the French controlled
two thirds of the Cadiz trade and had a large share in the trade with Bue¬
nos Aires, which now took many slaves and other commodities destined
for Peru, as the route by sea past Cape Horn was found too costly and
dangerous. Pombal’s main concern was with the Spaniards though he did
not think they were strong enough to attack for the time being and he
believed Brazil could defend herself. Luis Pinto therefore caused surprise,
when after his arrival in London as minister in August 1774 he described
the Spanish situation as very alarming and asked for help, the more so
as under the treaties no help was due, unless there had been an actual
breach of the peace. Pombal hedged and said Pinto had exceeded his
instructions but still insisted that the situation was dangerous. Rochford
said he would be glad to use his good offices with Spain but he saw no
reason for alarm. When it was suggested that he might show appreciation
of Britain’s kindly attitude by taking some steps to redress her merchants’
grievances Pombal became very much disturbed. He asked ‘What griev¬
ances?’ and when it was pointed out that he must know very well what
they were for they had been carefully listed for him, he replied ‘that it
was not the time to set up such trifles in contradiction to the great business
in question, which was no less than the loss or defence of the dominions
of Portugal’. Rochford remarked that he was sorry to say he saw a per¬
version on the part of Pombal to draw Britain into a scrape with Spain
24 S. P. 89/74, Walpole, 20 March 1773. Rochford, 6 April 1773. S. P. 89/73,

Hort, 13 Aug., Walpole, 8 July 1772. Melo ref. S. P. 89/74, 24 April 1773. S. P.
89/75, Walpole (dined with P), 25 Oct. 1773.
179
DAVID FRANCIS
‘bongre malgre nous’. It was absurd to expect that Britain in a time of

profound peace would declare war on Spain on account of pretensions,
however well founded, of the court of Portugal. Nor could he believe that
Spain had encroached further in South America, for Portugal had voluntar¬
ily dropped the negotiations on the subject in 1766 and until lately had
made no complaint. Britain herself was needing support at the moment,
for the War of Independence had broken out in America and there were
many rumours of contraband trade with the rebels. But it was difficult
to obtain confirmation of these and Pombal assured Walpole that there
would be no difficulty in stopping the smuggling of gunpowder, and in
July 1778 banned American rebel ships.25
In 1775 the Spanish minister Grimaldi had made an overture to discuss
the situation in South America but Pombal regarded Grimaldi as a friend
of the Jesuits and would have no truck with him. Moreover he argued that
there was nothing to discuss; all that the Spaniards had to do was to
evacuate the territories they had illegally ocupied. In July 1776 it was
reported that the Spaniards were being aggressive, and that Brigadier
Bohm, who had been much criticised for doing nothing, had finally counter¬
attacked. But Weymouth, now secretary of state, heard that the Portuguese
had been the aggressors. Pombal had in fact shown some signs of being
a little less intransigent and had agreed that the Madrid government might
be inclined to moderation, but insisted that these views did not extend
to South America, where Ceballos the governor of Buenos Aires was very
aggressive and a former friend of the Jesuits. But on the whole he resisted
British admonitions and refused to be pacified. He himself was frequently
ill and in November 1776 the king fell seriously ill and on the appoint¬
ment of the queen as regent, it was proposed that she should write to her
brother the king of Spain, as she was willing to do, and thus prepare the
way for a negotiation. But Pombal would have none of it.26
25 S. P. 89/75, Walpole, 3 Nov. 1773. S. P. 89/76, Walpole, 18 Jan. 1774. S. P.

89/77, Rochford, 2 Aug., Walpole, 1 Aug., 31 Aug. S. P. 89/78, Grantham, 19
Oct. 1774. 9 Oct., Rochford, 20 Dec. 1774. S. P. 89/79, Walpole, 29 March 1775.
2 Sept., Rochford, 7 Nov., Weymouth, 19 Dec. 1775. S. P. 89/82, Weymouth, 16
July 1776. Walpole, 20 July, Walpole, 17 Aug. S. P. 89/83, Weymouth, 21 Dec. 1776.
26 S. P. 89/81, Walpole, 24 Jan. 1776, 16 March, Weymouth, 30 April. Roch¬
ford, 16 July, Walpole, 20 July, 17 Aug. S. P. 89/83, Walpole, 26 Nov. 1776. Wey¬
mouth, 21 Dec. S. P. 89/84, Walpole, 11 Jan. 1777.
180
9
THE AFTERMATH OF POMBAL AND REIGN OF MARIA I
On 22nd November 1776 King Jose was so ill that he asked for
Extreme Unction. Pombal denied that he was in danger and enlisted the
aid of an English doctor named Wade, who at first took an optimistic
view and the king rallied a little. But the Court Party, which had un¬
expectedly been joined by the Cardinal de Cunha, hitherto a keen supporter
of Pombal, insisted that Extreme Unction was due and it was administer¬
ed by the Cardinal Nuncio. Pombal countered by organising a Te Deum
to celebrate the king’s supposed recovery, but a decree, still signed by
the king, was issued to appoint the queen as regent. At this stage Walpole
believed that Pombal would hold his own and be able to govern through
the queen, while da Cunha would live to rue the day. Pombal was still
powerful and had recently shown it by securing the appointment of an
uncle of his new daughter-in-law the Countess de Redinha to succeed the de¬
ceased Cardinal Patriarch Saldanha, though he had no other known quali¬
fications. In diplomacy he was obstinate as ever. Lord Weymouth had
pointed out that Pombal owed it to his own reputation to take advantage
of the opportunity offered by the queen’s regency to seek a reconciliation
with Spain through a rapprochement with her brother the king. He em¬
phasised that Spain might not confine her aggression to South America
and could well invade Portugal, but Pombal took no notice.1
Yet signs of an imminent change were not wanting. Members of the
Marialva family and other nobles, who were friends of the king but not
of Pombal, were being given promotion. Though the king had rallied a
little, he could articulate only a few words barely understood by his
servants, and Pombal had access to him no more. Finally on 23rd February
Pombal had a signal rebuff, when the bishop of Coimbra was released and
came to court, where he was warmly embraced by the Prince of Brazil.2
1 S. P. 89/83, Walpole, 18, 30 Nov., 2, 10, 31 Dec. Weymouth, 10, 21 Dec.,

1776. S. P. 89/84, Walpole, 1, 11 Jan., 4, 23, 28 Feb., 1 March, Pombal, 1 March
1777.
2 Caetano Beirao, Maria I, 1934, 178. J. L. de Azevedo, Pombal, 1922, 342/8.
181
DAVID FRANCIS
The king died early in the morning of 24th February 1777. There was
already talk of the prisoners held in the Junqueira prison since 1758 being
freed and crowds were gathering outside to see them come out. Within a
week Pombal’s resignation was accepted and soon afterwards Melo and
Ayres de Sa delivered to him the new queen’s decree that in view of his
services and of the late king’s high regard for him no enquiry would be
made into his ministry or the charges brought against him, and he could
retire to his home at Pombal. Until the last moment Pombal had believed
that he would be kept on, so this was a shattering blow. There was an
outburst of popular hatred for him and he was in danger of his life, if
he appeared in any public place. He left Oeyras late at night in an in¬
conspicuous vehicle and travelling several days by by-ways through the
torrential winter weather reached Pombal unmolested; there he lived
quietly and even recovered a little of his health.3
After an interval the Junqueira prisoners were unobtrusively released
except for some of the nobles, who in spite of their pitiable state of health,
insisted on remaining until their cases had been reviewed and their in¬
nocence recognised. Many of the original prisoners had died or were
reduced to living skeletons; only 45 of the original 124 Jesuits were still
alive. There was great rejoicing at their release and both church and nobles
looked to the new queen and her devout husband to restore the Jesuits
to power and prestige, but the queen could not put the clock back or
restore the property which had been split up or passed to other hands.
The Jesuits received much sympathy and some were given pensions, but
there was little question of the restoration of the order. The Nuncio was
accorded great honour and proved a useful instrument to judge church¬
men such as the Almoner Mor, a protege of Pombal, who had been arrested
on a charge of defalcations. But wherever the privileges of Nuncio or
Church encroached on the powers of the queen’s government Pombal’s
changes were largely preserved.4
Pombal’s posts of Secretary of the Treasury, and of Home Affairs were
given to the Marquis of Angeja and the Viscount of Vila Nova, members
of the old nobility. Angeja at 68 years of age was not very active but was
reasonably competent. He was accused of money grubbing and was careful
of the interests of his many noble relatives, but these charges may have
been inspired by resentment at his economies, for he dismissed many
redundant government employees. He complained that the Treasury was
empty and Pombal was accused of having peculated government funds.
3 S. P. 89/84, Walpole, 4, 28 Feb., 19, 29 March 1777. Beirao, Maria /, 5. For

an anthology of views on Pombal see A. D. Rodrigues, O Marques de Pombal e
seus Biografos, Lisbon, 1947. Comte de St Priest, Memoires, 1929. Cavalheiro Ro¬
drigues, Temas de Historia (on St Priest), Porto, 1938, 193/202.
4 Beirao, Maria /, 1/6, 117. S. P. 89/84, Walpole, 26 Feb. 1777.
182
THE AFTERMATH OF POMBAL
Many creditors had thought it prudent not to dun the dictator and Pombal
had accumulated wealth, though it does not appear that he had unduly
instigated malversations. But he had left his accounts in chaos and had
prudently salted away some government funds in places where it was hard
to find them. The contractors owed great debts for the king’s fifths and
taxes. It took a long time to sort out the position, but when the reserve
funds were located it was not so bad as it had been depicted. Angeja
remained in power until his death in 1788, a staunch conservative but a
man of education with an interest in the sciences and especially in botany.
Vila Nova was equally conservative and like Angeja related to the long-
imprisoned conspirators. Indeed his father had died in prison; unlike
him he was no friend of Britain, and was indeed most obstructive, but he
was honest according to his lights and also a man of some learning, par¬
ticularly in theology, but he knew nothing of finance or business. From
1773 Martinho de Melo e Castro, formerly minister in London, was
Minister of Marine and increasingly concerned with English affairs. He
was an able man, not ill disposed towards Britain, and keen to promote
his country’s defences and to rehabilitate the navy. He gave priority to
the old alliance, but like Pombal firmly resisted the claims of the Factories
to excessive privileges.5
A reading of Beckford’s journal inclines one to regard conservative
Portuguese ministers as mere puppets jigging in the extravaganzas of the
Portuguese court. They were better than this; they were mostly a dutiful
and pious set of men much burdened by protocol. Their piety led them
to encourage the excessive devotions of the queen which hastened the onset
of her dementia. Beckford described Vila Nova kneeling before the queen
with all the abject devotion of a Mussulman before the tomb of the
Prophet. Great fatigue attended the service of all eighteenth-century mon-
archs, as Fanny Burney found even at the comparatively liberal court of
George III; Marialva, as Lord of the Bedchamber, admitted that it was
a gruelling servitude. Portuguese ministers were not more venal, or less
patriotic, or even more sluggish than ministers elsewhere but they were
stifled by protocol and administrative delays, which pressed equally hard
on Pinto and Melo, who had lived abroad and had wider views. British
ministers were naturally critical and disappointed when friendly ministers
back from London like these two proved as stiff as their predecessors.
Martinho de Melo e Castro was describe by Costigan as fiery, passionate
and lively. Even in Pombal’s day he had held himself a little apart, though
on the whole he followed Pombal’s policies. As Ayres de Sa, the foreign
minister, was not very active, he bore the brunt of foreign affairs as well
5 J. L. Azevedo, Pombal, 345/8. Beirao, Maria I, 78, 137/9. S. P. 89/84,

Walpole, 1, 19 March 1777. Damiao Peres, Hist, de Portugal, VI-253/4. Ratton,
Recordagdes, 1-813, 320, 330/3.
183
PORTUGAL.-13
DAVID FRANCIS
as of naval and maritime matters and those touching Brazil. Both he and
Pinto retained the favour of the queen though they were neither of them
very pious. Pinto favoured the subordination of the church and once
confided to Walpole that a new road to Oporto would be more worth¬
while than a convent. Melo defending a new tax on imported salt-fish said
it helped Portuguese fishermen but anyway the chief consumers were the
inmates of convents who could well afford to pay. Pinto had imbibed
some French liberal ideas and was on record as having befriended a lodge
of Freemasons in Madeira. Pombal had disliked his appointment to London
but had become reconciled to him. Madame Pinto made her mark, where
few women managed to do so. When she boarded the packet for Falmouth,
she alarmed the powers that be by the advanced state of her pregnancy,
but successfully delivered a baby boy in Falmouth, who grew up a gener¬
ation later to be a good English speaker and a kind host in Oporto to a
wounded British officer. From the first she made a brave effort to learn
languages; Horace Walpole reported that no-one could understand a
word she said, but after a year in London she emerged speaking French
and much more English. Horace Walpole was still critical of her accent
but praised her as a hostess and a poetaster. Back in Lisbon she and the
poetess the Marchioness of Alorna set up a salon. To the British ministers’
disgust she became very pro-French, supporting a Portuguese peace with
France and patronising aristocratic emigres. Though Portugal had an ami¬
able queen it cannot be said that her reign saw much progress for women.
Madame Pinto was a rare exception. Pinto himself was always very affable,
though much less pro-English than he made out; he was so smooth of
tongue that it caused much amusement when he was ennobled under the
title of Visconde de Balsamao: ‘Viscount of Embrocation’; in fact he had
a good reason for this as Balsama5 was the name of a family estate.6
Foreign policy changed surprisingly little after Pombal’s fall. The
exception was the reconciliation with Spain, which Pombal had obstinately
opposed. As regent the queen mother was nothing loth to begin a friendly
correspondence with her brother and on her succession as queen her
daughter was equally willing. The queen mother’s invitation to King Charles
to visit her did not come off, but she brought off a visit to him in Madrid.
A convention with Spain ensued, but in spite of the affectionate tone of
his letters the king of Spain was careful not to commit himself politically.
He was waiting at the time of King Joseph’s death for news about Santa
6 A. W. Costigan, Sketches of Society and Manners in Portugal, 2 vols., 1787,

ii-114. Beckford, Italy with sketches of Spain and Portugal, Ed. Boyd Alexander,
1954, 233. Tomkinson, Diary of a cavalry officer, 1971, 13. Horace Walpole, Letters,
vi-468. S. P. 89/75, Walpole, 3 Nov. 1773. S. P. 89/76, Walpole, 9 April 1774. F. O.
63/38, Frere, 25 Aug. 1801. Ratton, Recordagoes, 324. F. O. 63/12, Walpole, 28
Nov. 1789.
184
Catharina and Nova Colonia; the governor of Nova Colonia apparently

had orders not to resist and Santa Catharina also fell. However a storm
dispersed the Spanish squadron and prevented a projected attack on Rio.
Also operations on the Rio Grande were halted. A reinforcement from
Portugal had been sent to Brazil in 1765. Its commander Brigadier Bohm
was a taciturn native of Bremen but eventually he made himself at home
in Brazil, and even, before his death in 1783, forsook the Lutheran for
the Catholic faith. Following the example of his former chief Count Lippe
he created a tolerably well disciplined army of 7000 men, which managed
to hold its own on the Rio Grande, even though the governor of Buenos
Aires Cebellos was a very active opponent. Even a generation later a
British visitor found this force had preserved its smartness and discipline
and commented favourably. In 1776 the king of Spain decided to rest
on his laurels and he agreed to conclude the treaty of San Hildefonso in
May 1777 by which Nova Colonia was left in his hands but St. Catharina
was restored to Portugal. He also agreed to a new boundary treaty but
this was never implemented. Neither side renounced its claims but in
practice the frontier was stabilised on the Rio Grande, while the Spaniards
occupied both shores of the River Plate. The peace with Spain did not
profit Britain much for within two years war broke out again and Gibraltar
was being besieged.7
In September 1776 the Oporto Factory renewed their complaints and
were supported by the Board of Trade, who asked for immediate action.
The papers were laid before Pombal and were in his hands at the time
of the king’s death and of his leaving office. They alleged that the Douro
Company, no longer content with the monopoly of brandies and of second-
class wines for domestic consumption, were trying to extend their control
to export wines and also to infiltrate the British domestic market. They had
appointed new directors, who were no longer country gentlemen with
little knowledge of the trade but all experienced wine merchants, and
agents in all the English ports, who advertised that they had bought up
the best wines and could undersell the Factory. It was notable that they
offered wines of different vintages and asked higher prices for older wines.
Twenty-two firms of the Factory signed a petition saying they had sub¬
mitted patiently to buying wines from the company, as long as the terms
were not too onerous, but they were now being coerced into buying 10,000
pipes, which probably came from outside the delimited district and for
whose quality they had no guarantee whatever. There was dissension in
7 Beirao, Maria 1, 198 et seq. S. P. 89/83, Weymouth, 21 Dec. 1776. S. P. 89/84,

Walpole, 21 June, 14 July, 9 Aug., 27 Sept. 1777. Southey, Hist, of Brazil, VI, 299
et seq. S. P. 89/85, Walpole, C. H. Oberacker, J. H. Bohm in Revista de Historia,
San Paolo, 1959. Vol. 18-329/57. Life of Sir R. Wilson, 1862, 1-275, 345, and Revista
do Instituto Historico Geografico de Brazil, vol. 321-1978.
185
DAVID FRANCIS
the Factory itself between the old stalwarts, who preferred to go up the
Douro in spite of the opposition from the Company and to buy from old
friends, and those who took the easier course of buying in Oporto from the
Company or from middlemen, who had used their privileges to lay in
wider ranging stocks. The latter were the majority and when Consul
Whitehead came to Lisbon for consultation he was accompanied by their
leader, a man named Hesketh, but he himself and his nephew William
Warre sided with those who bought directly from the Douro. Whitehead
said that the 1776 vintage had been plentiful and there had been no
difficulty in buying what was needed; the London committee admitted
that there had been enough wine available but insisted that they had been
obliged to buy wines from the company at export prices, which the company
had brought from outside the limited district at half the price.
The Company had in fact been authorised by a recent decree to pre¬
empt half the vintage, but the Company, whose twenty years charter had
come up for renewal, had its own troubles. It had to face the competition
of a number of Portuguese middlemen, who bought up the wines, and
now that there were three factions concerned the Portuguese government
was more inclined to act as honest broker than to favour the Company
exclusively. The Company was accused of corruption and mismanagement
and Pombal’s crony, Pedro de Mansilha, the original founder and inspiration
of the Company, was accused of defalcations and imprisoned. His successor
was a man of good reputation, more agreeable to the Factory, named An¬
tonio Feliciano de Andrade. One of the new directors was a Hamburger
named Kopke, who promptly brought to Oporto three Hamburg ships to
load wine, but these attempts to find a market in the north had little
success. The Factory continued to complain that they were obliged to buy
inferior wines from the Company at high prices but the Company were
not qualified to penetrate the English home market and their efforts in
this direction made little progress. The British had quite an advantageous
position and their protests were rewarded by promises of changes and the
setting up of a commission of enquiry. As a result in January 1778 a decree
was issued that in future the Company must confine itself in its purchases
to a perfect concurrence with lawful exporters without making use of any
means for preference except those allowed in good faith and reason of
commerce. The decree came too late to affect the 1777 vintage, but it
happened to be a plentiful one, and the situation was eased for future
vintages by an extension of the delimited district. In 1779 war risks began
to take precedence and exporters became more concerned with outwitting
privateers than each other. In June 1779 Britain was at war with Spain
and France and also America and Oporto had forty ships and 40,000 pipes
waiting for a convoy.8
8 S. P. 89/84, Walpole, 2 July. Oporto memorial of 24 Oct. 1776 and London
186
After its reorganisation the charter of the Douro Company was renewed.
In Brazil, where there were no foreign factories and the opposition to the
companies came entirely from Portuguese merchants, the Maranha5 and
Para and Pernambuco companies were allowed to expire. At the outset
they had helped the development of the north, particularly by the im¬
portation of negroes. A propaganda campaign, which convinced even the
British minister, made it appear that the Jesuits had treated their Indian
slaves very badly; their lot had not always been an Arcadia, but on the
whole they probably fared better in the hands of Jesuits than of lay plant¬
ers, though in the employment of both their mortality was high and after
their nominal emancipation they disappeared altogether. The negroes were
more resistant to disease and better fitted for manual labour; the Indians
only survived when their natural aptitudes could be used, as canoemen
or trappers, or as searchers for drugs or timber as the Jesuits had used them
in the forests of the Amazon or in the backlands of Sao Paulo. The mort¬
ality among negroes was also high, and there was no natural increase;
their numbers were only kept up by fresh arrivals. The Brazilians were
not positively inhumane to their slaves, only indifferent. Slaves who were
worn out by age or sickness might be discarded or thrown out on the
street, but Anglo-Saxons were amazed at the way in which domestic
slaves were allowed to answer back and were treated as members of the
family. Masters ill used their slaves when the mood took them, but in
general were inclined to leave them alone as long as they did what was
required of them. This involved obvious services by the better favoured
females, who often enjoyed good positions, and slaves in domestic service
played cards, made music and even danced with their masters. They were
their absolute property, but a fair number earned or were bequeathed their
freedom. The abolition of the companies hastened the disappearance of the
Amerindians but with the increase of negro labour the production of the
plantations mounted up. The change in the set-up was less than might have
been expected, for much of the companies’ administrative machinery was
retained and their power was transferred to the rich merchant oligarchs,
whose growth had been favoured by Pombal.9
After the recognition of the U. S. A. by foreign governments in 1778
the War of Independence was no longer an insurrection, but an interna¬
tional conflict. War then broke out between England and France; a year
later Spain followed suit and in December the Dutch. However the Por-
Committee, 10 March 1777. S. P. 89/85, Walpole, 28 Feb. 1778. S. P. 89/83, Walpole

to Pombal, 21 Dec. 1776. S. P. 89/86, Consul Whitehead, 4 July 1779.
9 K. R. Maxwell, Conflicts, 72/4. S. P. 89/84, Walpole, 9 Aug. 1777. P. R. O.
50/8/35, Admiral Donald Campbell’s report on Brazil, Part II. Thomas Lindley,
Voyage to Brazil, 1808. Gilberto Freire, The Masters and the Slaves, New York,
1956. Beirao, Maria I, 278/9. For colonial Brazil see H. V. Livermore, Portugal &
Brazil, Oxford, 1953.
187
DAVID FRANCIS
tuguese government did not favour rebels and denied belligerent rights to
the Americans. The disturbances in South America were becoming serious
and were arousing apprehensions in Portugal. Consul General Hort heard
that away from the coast and the main centres Indians were in control in
the Spanish colonies. He thought that it was largely a war against taxes as
in North America and also against arrogant Spanish officials and im¬
migrants. The Spanish born were out to make their fortunes and to return
home; even priests did so and after four or five years went home with
50,000 pesetas in their pockets. But there was not an illiterate Indian who
did not know about the American War of Independence and they were
rebels to a man. A Peruvian refugee had approached him with assurances
that a British force, provided that it was made quite clear that no per¬
manent settlement or conquest was intended, would meet with universal
support and after an easy conquest of Buenos Aires could set up an inde¬
pendent Spanish state. Britain was to be tempted by such offers in future,
but this refugee inspired no confidence and was not taken up. Portugal
found at first that American privateers were as great a danger to her
shipping as to that of Britain and was not disposed to sympathise with a
revolutionary regime. But as Britain became harder pressed Portugal began
to think of reinsuring herself. There were still occasional rumours that
Spain might renew her aggression against Portugal, but these were ignored
and Portugal even reduced her land forces but tried to enlarge her navy.
Infringements of neutrality multiplied, and when at the end of 1779
Spain blockaded Gibraltar, Portugal warned her shipping against going
there, excusing herself to the British minister by saying that this was only
a warning of the risk entailed and not a prohibition. But in September
1780 the further step was taken of prohibiting the entry into Portuguese
ports of privateers and of their prizes; this measure, which favoured the
French and Spaniards, who had their bases near at hand, was partly a
propaganda exercise to mollify Spain and was at first not strictly enforced.
But Spanish goods were increasingly carried in Portuguese ships and this
culminated in a particularly flagrant case, when the treasure from a Spanish
registered ship was landed in the Azores; the ship, the Buen Consejo,
was driven out to sea again by bad weather and intercepted and captured,
but a Portuguese warship brought the bullion valued at £800,000 to Lisbon
past a British privateer, which refrained from attacking her. In 1780 a
Russian squadron entered the Tagus and was well received; there were a
number of British officers in the Russian service and this gave rise to the
story that Walpole had been lavishly entertained at a dinner on the Russian
flagship at which his health and that of King George had been drunk.
This was the case, but the French and Spanish ambassadors had been
bidden to similar parties with the appropriate toasts to their sovereigns.
The Portuguese refused a Russian request to use Lisbon as a base for
their Mediterranean operations, but their presence was helpful to Britain,
188
in so far as it stopped the Portuguese from extending their ban on pri¬

vateers to one on all foreign ships of war. The Russians also broached the
question of Portugal joining the Armed Neutrality Agreement to legalise
the carriage of belligerent goods in neutral ships. The interception by the
British of a Dutch convoy had stirred neutral opinion to agitate for this
and Russia had taken the lead in promoting the agreement. Portugal did
not join until August 1782, when the war was nearly over, but to the
detriment of Britain she tried to abide by this principle, when war broke
out again.10
British successes in the southern states of North America revived her
prestige somewhat in 1779/80, but were succeeded by the final defeat at
Yorktown and the recognition of American independence. In the peninsula
the war had its ups and downs.
When war broke out with France and Spain in 1779 the navy was at
a low ebb and hard put to it to guard the Channel from the threat of an
enemy invasion, to blockade the French ports, and at the same time to
spare ships for the Mediterranean. French ships successfully broke out
from Brest to operate in the West Indies and to play an important part in
the War of Independence in America, but Spain was diverted by her
obsession with Gibraltar from concentrating on an invasion plan. Eventually
a Franco-Spanish force of 30,000 men was employed in the three years
siege, but most of the Gibraltar peninsula, though not the greater part of
the town, was out of range of the batteries and major ships. Protracted
bombardments therefore destroyed the town but did little to injure the
garrison and assaults proved impracticable. The main danger was starvation,
as during the blockade only small craft could enter, and after Spain con¬
cluded an agreement with Morocco in January 1781, supplies from Africa
were cut off. However in January 1780 Admiral Rodney intercepted a
Spanish convoy off Finistere and soon afterwards won a considerable naval
action off the Algarve, in the course of which he captured the Spanish
Admiral Langara. This enabled him to break the blockade of Gibraltar
which was twice more relieved, once by Admiral Darby in April 1781 and
finally by Admiral Howe in October 1782 at the end of the siege. Spain
had been deterred from making a serious assault not only by the difficulties
but by the hope of achieving her objective by secret peace negotiations.
Commodore Johnstone, who was in command of the Lisbon station, con¬
tacted the Spanish minister Floridablanca through a Portuguese East India
merchant named Cantofer. Little notice was taken of this but the Rev.
Thomas Hussey, a former chaplain of the Spanish embassy who was look-
10 S. P. 89/87, Walpole, 26 May, Hillsborough, 13 Oct., 9 Dec. 1780. F. O.

63/2, Hort, 7 July, 8 Aug. 1782. F. O. 63/3, Walpole, 23 Nov. 1782. S. P. 89/85,
Walpole, 13 April, 19 Sept., 3 Oct. 1778. S. P. 89/86, Walpole, 18, 20 Aug. 1779.
G. Hills, Rock of Contention, 306/32. Isabel de Madariaga, Britain, Russia and
Armed Neutrality, 1962, 301/2. Beirao, Maria I, 222/5.
189
DAVID FRANCIS
ing after Spanish interests, made an approach in London, and was sent
with Richard Cumberland, secretary to Lord St. Germains, the secretary
for the Colonies, on a secret mission to Lisbon. Hussey went to Madrid
and reported discouragingly, but Cumberland thought a chance should be
taken and spent several months in Madrid, posing as a tourist. He had
some talks with the minister, but returned in 1781 having achieved nothing;
but the negotiation had slowed down the attack on Gibraltar. A violent
bombardment after the entry of Admiral Darby’s squadron caused great
destruction in the town but did not seriously weaken the defences, though
it laid bare a number of cellars, and gave rise to such scenes of looting
and drunkenness in the garrison that if the Spaniards had then attacked,
they might well have succeeded. Instead they diverted their efforts to Mi¬
norca, which they eventually took early in 1782. Before this the island
had been the subject of a curious proposal to cede it to Russia. The
empress had rather liked the idea, but it came to nothing. After their
capture of Minorca the Spaniards eventually launched their most serious
attack on Gibraltar in 1783. They prepared a number of floating batteries,
reinforced against shell or fire damage, which were to be towed inshore
so that the defences could be destroyed by a devastating barrage to be
followed in small boats by French and Spanish troops. The batteries came
close to success, but at a crucial moment two of them blew up and the
remainder had to be withdrawn to escape destruction by the red hot shot,
of which General Elliot had been sedulously practising the use. The land¬
ing from small boats had to be abandoned. The bombardment was con¬
tinued for a while, but bad weather set in and drove out an enemy line
of battle ship to be wrecked on the African coast. A month later Admiral
Howe’s squadron appeared and entered the bay at a moment when a strong
Levanter succeeded the strong west wind which had driven the enemy
into the Mediterranean. Peace was concluded soon afterwards with France
and Spain and the independence of the U. S. A. was recognised. Britain
was actually prepared at this moment to give up Gibraltar in return for
the cession of Minorca, Puerto Rico and perhaps Oran, but the French
feared that the cession of Guadalupe and other French islands would
strengthen Britain too much in the Caribbean and by talk of offering
Florida, Louisiana and the French part of Santo Domingo to Spain they
persuaded her to forego her insistence on Gibraltar.11
During the blockade Gibraltar could not be used as a naval base and
part of the dockyard had to make room for a battery for the defence of
11 S. P. 89/85, Walpole, 13 April 1778. Hills, Rock of Contention, 305/54.

Adm 1/387, Journals of Admiral Duff and Commodore Johnstone. S. W. G. Pack,
Sea Power in the Mediterranean, 1971, 76/8. Isabel de Madariaga, Britain, Russia
and Armed Neutrality, 301/2. Richard Cumberland, Memoirs, 2 vols., 1807, i-415/31,
ii-1/11, 35/41, 47/58, 75/6, 111, 142. S. P. 89/87, Hort, 19 Aug., Walpole, 1
Oct. 1780.
190
the town. The defence of the coast had to be centred on Lisbon, where
the Portuguese observed a neutrality of reasonable benevolence, but under
pressure from Spain increasingly imposed restrictions, particularly on the
movements and handling of prizes. Commodore Johnstone, as an ex-colonial
governor and member of parliament, had a wider experience than the
average naval officer; he was inclined to be impetuous, but he understood
the difficulties of the Portuguese, and did his best to humour their many
complaints of infringements of their neutrality. With only a few small
ships under his command and a wide coastline to protect he had a difficult
task to judge between the many claims upon him. The admiralty felt they
had done enough if they provided fleets to watch those of the enemy and
a few large convoys in the course of the year to look after trade. Johnstone
found that his first concern was to provide intelligence on the movements
of the French and Spanish fleets. In May 1780 he had to use three ships
out of a force of five to ensure that Admiral Rodney in Barbados received
news of the departure of the Spanish fleet 'from the Straits. Later in the
year he spent the whole of August reconnoitring off Finistere in case an
invasion fleet should approach England. He and Walpole, the British
minister, were hard put to it to find out whether the enemy had left Cadiz
or not; it had been expected that Admiral L’Estaing would join the fleet
for the invasion attempt, but in fact he was delayed in Spain, and his
plans were to attack Gibraltar or Minorca rather than to enter the Channel.
On the other hand the British Factories expected Johnstone to protect the
coast, particularly against the Spanish rowboats, which worked in-shore
on a small scale but did a great deal of damage. Johnstone did his best
and bought a small cutter for in-shore work, only to be admonished by
the Admiralty for incurring this expense without sanction. Sir John Hort,
when pressed by the Oporto Factory about his alleged failure to keep the
port open for shipping, actually tried to complain over Johnstone’s head
to a senior naval officer who happened to be visiting Lisbon to repair his
ship, but the latter refused to intervene.
The navy was not spared disasters, as in August 1780 when a Spanish
squadron intercepted a convoy with 1500 troops on board bound for
Jamaica and destroyed 53 ships. But a few weeks earlier an Oporto convoy
with H. M. Aeolus had a lucky escape by a few hours or miles, when it
avoided meeting a Spanish squadron. Johnstone took his prizes too, in¬
cluding a well-found French frigate, the Artois. Oporto convoys were hard
to arrange, for opportunities to enter or leave the Douro were very chancy,
and as the wind in summer mostly blew from the north, it was really easier
for ships to creep down the coast to join their convoy in the Tagus. How¬
ever the convoys from Oporto, Lisbon and Gibraltar were somehow main¬
tained and at least twice by means of careful reconnaissance beforehand
and by sending messages overland Johnstone succeeded in co-ordinating
the provision of an escort and the departure of a convoy from the Douro.
191
DAVID FRANCIS
Three ships had to be left behind, but in December 1779 thirty ships
left Oporto with 12,000 pipes of wine and in July 1780 another convoy
left with 10,000 pipes.12
Johnstone was also responsible for arranging the exchange of Spanish
prisoners with British prisoners from Spain. There were many difficulties
raised by Portuguese regulations and a serious incident arose when the
customs’ guard found some Portuguese seamen who had been hired to man
a British prize. There was a scuffle and Melo complained that it was the
worst infringement of Portuguese neutrality since the Boscawen incident.
But he calmed down and for their part the British government realized that
the Portuguese must be humoured and ordered Walpole to go gently. About
the commercial grievances he could do little more than protest and in
particular had to tolerate the vexations of the new customs tariff. The
Factories were inclined to exaggerate the burdens imposed by this, but
the new system by which the traditional form of valuation, in which the
advice of Consul and Factory had participated, was replaced by an arbitrary
system of valuation determined by government officials, constituted a
genuine grievance. The Portuguese were not disposed to relax, except in
the few instances where it was to their interest to do so; the Irish were
in a position to hit back by raising the duties on Portuguese wine and Melo
agreed therefore that the question should be discussed with Pinto in Lon¬
don. The Portuguese were also more amenable in questions generally con¬
cerning the wine trade; they could not afford to go too far, for where
wine was concerned Britain was almost their only customer. Such was the
position when the war came to an end and Walpole went home to take
eighteen months leave.13
The general situation was however gradually mellowing. More visitors
were coming to Portugal now for health and curiosity; ever since the
earthquake Portugal had acquired a romantic interest. Beckford’s journals
give us a closer picture of Portuguese society and manners. The influence
of a widening world was making itself felt and the mild character of the
monarch also had perhaps some effect. In an absolute monarchy the
personality of the sovereign necessarily sets the tone, even when the monarch
is a mediocrity. Even the easy-going King Joseph had made his mark by
choosing Pombal and by sheltering his friends from the great man’s animos¬
ities. Men who were the king’s friends, such as Angeja, Vila Nova, and
12 Adm 1/387, Johnstone, Hort to Wallis, 19 Feb., Johnstone to Hort, 24 Feb.,

Admiralty, 19 Aug. 1780, etc. S. P. 89/86, Hort, 20, 21 Nov. 1779. S. P. 89/87,
Hort, 6 July, 19 Aug. 1780. Adm 1/387, Duff, 23 Aug. 1779, 4 March 1780. Packe,
Sea Power, 76/80. Adm 1/399. Log of H. M. S. Romney, 23 Aug. 1780. G. Lacour-
Gayet, Hist, de la Marine Militaire, 1905, 318.
13 Adm 1/387, Johnstone, 9 June 1780. S. P. 89/87, Walpole, 15, 19 Sept.,
1 Oct., 6 Nov. Hillsborough, 13 Oct., 19 Dec. 1780. F. O. 63/1, Hillsborough, 26
,
Feb., 13 June, 24 Sept., 30 Oct. 1781. Walpole, 31 Oct. 1781. Beirao, Maria I 221/2.
192
Marialva, survived to form the framework for the reign of Maria I and
to prevent the chaos which the fall of Pombal might otherwise have
occasioned. There they remained until they died for neither the queen
nor her good humoured spouse, nor her son, were likely to disturb them.
The royal couple infused an element of humanity and moderation into
the new reign. The queen, 43 years of age at her accession in 1777, had
had little education or preparation to fit her for the affairs of state. But
she had application and some common sense, and took pains to try to
understand the papers submitted to her and to give sensible replies. Luckily
her marriage to her uncle Dom Pedro was a happy one, and she and her
husband shared a devotion to music and religion. But in spite of their
churchiness they were not unduly bigoted and were inclined to be kind.
When the case of the kidnapping of a British Subject came up, the queen
showed herself broadminded. The clergy were naturally feeling somewhat
elevated now that Pombal was removed so when Mrs. Crispin, the wife
of a British merchant in the Algarve, lost her wits and was heard crying
out ‘Alleluia, Santa Maria’, much as the queen did in her later years of
madness, a local priest hailed it as a sign of her conversion and thought
it was only right to abduct her for the laudable purpose of easing her entry
into the bosom of the church. Appeals to the local authorities were vain
and finally Walpole brought the Consul’s protest to the ears of the se¬
cretary of state, who told the queen. Her Majesty at once exclaimed that
these were very strange goings on and gave orders for Mrs. Crispin to be
restored to her husband. In her lucid moments Mrs. Crispin was in fact
a firm Anglican and so remained until her death, which came very soon.
The queen showed her benevolent nature in other small instances. Her
concern for the fisher folk moved her to do away with some taxes; she
improved the status of her ‘Acafatas’ or junior women in waiting. When
there was a poor vintage on the Douro she ordered exports to be cut, so
that enough wine remained for the consumption of the people. Her re¬
ligious charities were bountiful and extended to the encouragement of
education, hopitals, music, and the arts. She enjoyed the opera and the
theatre and even showed an inclination to enliven her court by allowing
the egregious Beckford to be presented to her. For her confessor, and
finally Inquisitor General, she chose no Torquemada, or even Malagrida,
but the rotund, jocose Archbishop of Thessalonica described by Beckford.
She was eager to reform the abuses of the church and to collaborate with
the Pope in doing so; but the result was to pare away privileges and to
reduce excessive revenues and overmanned ecclesiastical establishments
rather than to restore the clergy to their full hegemony. The Nuncio was
again treated with veneration and given back his ecclesiastical jurisdiction,
but where his authority or that of the church conflicted with that of the
crown the latter’s supremacy was firmly retained. The censorship of books,
193
DAVID FRANCIS
which had been a source of such conflict with the bishop of Coimbra,
though much discussed, was never entirely restored by the lay authorities
to the church. The Tnconfidencia’, the secret court, which could imprison
without trial, was suppressed, and though many prisoners continued to be
detained interminably, this was now in practice rather than in principle.
The Inquisition was reduced, as Pombal had explained to Lyttleton in
1767, to an organ of state prescribing penalties in line with those of the
civil courts for similar offences. An Auto da Fe was held in October 1778
amid the usual scenes of popular enthusiasm, but it was a comparatively
mild affair. Ten persons were punished for blasphemy and the possession
of heretical books and a number were censured, but no-one was burnt.14
Although the old nobles were predominant in the government their
privileges were gradually being whittled away. The remains of their feudal
jurisdiction were not finally abolished until 1790, but they now had to
toe the line, and in 1793 Pedro Manique, the head of the police, dared
to arrest the Duke of Cadaval for a smuggling offence; he was allowed to
return to Lisbon after a brief period of banishment, but a precedent had
been set. Many of the nobles were arrogant, ignorant and extravagant, but
others had good qualities. The traveller James Murphy said that although
they had large patrimonies, their rents were small, so they were not rich
and did their best to live splendidly on a modest income. They spent their
time on their duties at court and family parties. Not many of them knew
much about the fine arts, but they led virtuous family lives, and though
far from brilliant were amiable, religious, temperate and generous. They
were faithful to their friends, charitable to the poor, and warmly attached
to their sovereign. They were much obsessed with keeping up appearanees,
as was the custom also in Brazil, but they were on intimate terms with
their servants and could play dominoes with their footmen and in moments
of emotion embrace their cooks. They all smelt equally of garlic, so this
presented no class impediment. The few, who had the money, were be¬
ginning to entertain more and in Beckford’s time the duke of Cadaval gave
a masquerade at which all were welcome and tailors rubbed shoulders
with counts. The new merchant class encouraged by Pombal impinged on
society; some were foreigners like the Dutch Consul Gildermeester or the
British Subject de Vismes, but Portuguese families such as the Quintellas,
the Cruzes and the Bandeiras, had also ammassed riches, mostly out of
government contracts and tax farms, but others like the Irishman Street by
capturing a Portuguese heiress. Their parties were sometimes a free-for-all,
whence the guests emerged with all the food they could stuff into their
14 Italy with sketches of Spain and Portugal, 1954, and Monasteries

Beckford,
of Batalha and Alocobaca, 1825. Beirao, Maria I, cap. iii & 24/6. S. P. 89/84,
Walpole, 29 Nov. 1777. S. P. 89/85, 17 Oct. 1778. Ameal y Cavalheiro, Errata,
104/8. For Pombal on inquisition see S. P. 89/63, 26 Sept. 1767.
194
pockets. The contents of the noblest houses were often a medley of treas¬
ures and bric-a-brac, like those of Indian rajahs in recent times. Some
devoted themselves to art and literature, but on the whole life lacked
distractions and it is not surprising that the younger Marialva, having
contracted a positive passion for Beckford, thought that his presence would
enliven the royal circle and perhaps even please the queen. But there was
a political motive too, which caused dignitaries like the Marquises of
Angeja and Lavradio to become interested. They probably over-rated the
value of Beckford’s English connections and the chances of his conversion
to the Faith, but his wealth, also probably exaggerated, was a solid
attraction, and he could perhaps serve to help their cause and widen their
access to the royal presence, and to offset the influence of Walpole and
his persistent presentation of British grievances.15
Naturally Walpole’s violent opposition to his presentation at court made
him a pet aversion of Beckford, who described him as that malevolent
cuckold, the ridiculous hot-brained Walpole. Meeting him driving in the
street on his way to call on the secretary of state he described Walpole’s
countenance as boiling hot, swelling with malice like a venomous reptile,
and his nose a coal of fire. It was true that Walpole was a crusty bachelor
of 44 when he married a daughter of the Factory named Miss Diana
Grosett; and he was much worried lest he should be unable to keep her.
Horace Walpole wrote ‘my kinsman has brought over a young wife, who
is the phenomenon of the day. She is a regular beauty but in my eyes less
pleasing than my nieces the Miss Waldegraves or Miss Keppel’. Before he
had actually met her he was even more enthusiastic and wrote to the
Countess of Ossory, ‘she is to efface all Venuses and Helens past and
present. I have not yet seen her, but I mean to do so soon, lest she should
be poisoned by some of the reigning beauties who have views of the
Prince of Wales’. Death was the successful rival for Walpole’s bride, but
he soon replaced her by Miss Sophia Stert, another Factory beauty. More
than any other British minister perhaps Walpole was a Factory man.
Though well into middle age he evidently fancied young beauties; the
Factory girls were a saucy lot and may have justified Horace Walpole’s
sneers by favouring younger suitors. They would also have encouraged
Walpole’s dislike of types like Beckford; their tongues did not spare Lord
North’s son, who was no paederast but of puny physique. Walpole no
doubt had a porty complexion, as Beckford described it, but it is unlikely
that his grim look had any reference to Beckford; he was probably on his
15 Beckford, Sketches, 19, 44, 102, 141. Costigan, Sketches of Society, 2 vols.,
1776, ii-75. Beirao, Maria I, 75/9. James Murphy, Travels in Portugal, 1795, 175/9.
James Norris on Murphy in Brit. Hist. Soc. Portugal, 1975, 23/32. Gorani, Memoirs,
1944, i-421.
195
DAVID FRANCIS
* n
way to a gruelling interview with the secretary of state and had other things
to think about.16
The disappearance of Pombal had done little to ease Walpole’s way.
Portuguese policy towards Britain, as directed by Melo e Castro, remained
much the same. The old alliance kept its priority, but concessions on
commercial matters were as hard to come by as ever. However issues far
afield began to have some influence. Portugal felt the need of British help
from time to time, against the Mahrattas in India, in the commercial
disputes about the slave trade and the trading posts in West Africa, and
on the coasts of Brazil. In the case of Cabinda, a post set up in Angola
by the French in 1784 which threatened the Portuguese posts south of the
Congo, the British sided with the French and Dutch, and suppressed the
attempt of the Portuguese to set up a fort at the same place, but at other
times they backed the Portuguese. Brazil procured most of her slaves from
Angola, which had outstripped the Mina coast, and the safety of her posts
from the Congo southwards was important. Portugal sought the mediation
of Spain and concluded a convention with France, which guaranteed Por¬
tuguese sovereignty over the disputed territory provided that nothing was
done to hamper the British and French slave trade. The pressure engendered
by these overseas commitments tended to soften Portuguese intransigence
towards foreign ships using her colonial ports, but it was a slow process.
In the later days of Pombal the Count of Azambuja, Viceroy of Brazil, had
received strict orders to deny facilities to foreign ships. When Captain
Cook called at Rio in 1768 on his first South Sea Voyage, he received a
cold welcome. The Viceroy refused to recognise the Endeavour as a man
of war or to allow the scientists, including Banks, to land. It was true that
the Endeavour packed with scientific equipment was a very special ship
and did not look like a navy ship. In 1781 British ships ran into trouble
in Rio and Commodore Johnstone was accused of infringing Portuguese
neutrality in the Cape Verde islands and again when he landed troops on
the uninhabited island of Trinitv off the coast of Brazil. However these
incidents were settled and it began to be realised that facilities were ne¬
cessary, as ships on their way to India, and soon to Australia, increas¬
ingly needed to call at Bahia or other Brazilian ports. In 1782 a naval
squadron calling at Madeira was well received and matters began to
improve. In 1787 Melo did not altogether reject a request for East India
Company ships to be treated as if they belonged to the Royal Navy. Go¬
vernor Phillips on his way to Botany Bay in 1787 was well received and
in general ships under official protection experienced few difficulties. As
16 Sketches, Ed. Boyd Alexander, 42, 125. Horace Walpole, Letters,

Beckford,
to Mann, 29 May, from Mann, 28 June, to Countess of Ossory, 25 April 1783.
196
early as 1782 sixty soldiers and sailors had to be left sick in Rio and
the authorities behaved well and allowed leave to men to come ashore.17
It was a different tale for those who had no cast-iron justification for
calling or were suspected of contraband. Local authorities often connived
at smuggling offences, if they thought they could escape detention, so this
severity was reasonable, but there were some hard cases. One of them
was that of a New England whaler named Lathrop, whose ship the Le¬
viathan was obliged by rough weather to put in to Rio in 1775. He was
alternately cajoled and persecuted until he revealed all he knew about the
whaling grounds and undertook to guide Brazilian whale fishers to visit
them. He was promised substantial rewards but between his voyages to
the whaling grounds he was imprisoned, while his ship and cargo was
impounded. After four years he died in prison and so did his first mate;
it was only after protracted diplomatic negotiations that ship, cargo, and
the surviving members of the crew were finally released. No compensation
was ever paid, though the knowledge imparted did much to help set up
a flourishing whaling industry, for which the Quintella family contracted
at a rate of 32,000 milreis a year for 1775/77, 40,000 milreis 1777/9 and
48,000 milreis for 1789/1801. The Viceroy, the Marquis of Lavradio,
handled Lathrop’s case personally, and this seems shabby conduct on the
part of a great gentleman. But he had his orders and where British com¬
mercial interests or British know-how were concerned, the British author¬
ities were equally relentless. Nevertheless the conditions for the entry of
British ships to colonial ports were slowly relaxed; in the Tagus the
contrary was true; in 1784 the captain of the packet Hampden was accused
of smuggling and was arrested and all the packets in the river were de¬
tained. Visits of inspection began to be made to the packets, and the local
post office representative, when Sir John Hort referred the question,
submitted to the new regulations. The government at home had their own
smuggling problems and were inclined to sympathise on this point with
the Portuguese.18
When Walpole returned from leave in October 1784 he found the
dispute about commercial questions had made little progress. Whitehall had
not ceased to brood over the trade grievances and to collect statistics. The
Portuguese were invited to produce figures too and eventually began to do
so. Fortified by their statistics the government eventually decided to send
17 F. O. 63/3, Walpole, 12 June. Admiral Keppel, 30 June 1782. Fox, 15 July,

4 Aug. 1782. F. O. 63/5, Hort, 19, 27 Aug., 9 Dec. Walpole, 20 Oct. 1784. F. O.
63/6, Walpole, 13 Jan. 1785. F. O. 63/9, Walpole, 12 May 1787. F. O. 63/10, 29
Dec. 1787. Maxwell, Conflicts, 256. Revista do Instituto de Hist, e Geografia de
Rio, 1862, vol. xxv-479/82. J. H. Parry, The Discovery of the Sea, 1975, 101/2.
C. N. Oberackar, Article on Pastor Langstadt and Captain Cooke.
18 Maxwell, Conflicts, 261/2, re Quintella whaling contracts. S. P. 89/86, Wal¬
pole, 18 Sept. 1779, re Lathrop. F. O. 63/5, Hort, 27 Aug. 1784.
197
DAVID FRANCIS
out a Board of Trade expert named William Fawkener to support Walpole.

He reached Lisbon in October 1786. Walpole, who knew him well, was
delighted, and was ordered to hurry up the Portuguese, as Fawkener had
to be back in England in a month for the parliamentary session. The session
was postponed and he did not actually return until January. Melo received
him amiably enough, but he was growing old and deaf, and was far from
well; diplomatic colleagues signified with many nods and winks that his
illness was diplomatic, but when he was able to receive Fawkner after some
weeks delay he had difficulty in doing business and Fawkener had no
doubts about the reality of his sickness. Fawkener found the situation far
from hopeful and thought it would be hard to move the Portuguese, when
all that he could say had already been said a dozen times before. Melo
echoed this feeling, saying that the whole subject had been thrashed out with
Lord Kinnoull in 1760 and he himself had discussed it ad nauseam with
Halifax, Chatham and Lansdowne, and had never thought it would be
revived. He inveighed against the rapacity of the British merchants and the
scurrilous nature of the English press. It would be very disagreeable to moil
over the whole question again; it could be done if Fawkener insisted, but
he had better make up his mind to make a long stay. Walpole pointed out
that in a free country scurrilous pamphlets were a nuisance which had to be
borne and the fact that the complaints were twenty years old did not impair
their justice. Melo complained of the unfairness of the Navigation Aets,
which favoured even the U. S. A., though only the other day Britain had
been grateful enough to Portugal for blocking trade with the American
rebels. He added that he would like to see the jurisdiction of the Judge Con¬
servator abolished altogether or at least confined to purely commercial cases.
Walpole retorted that practically all cases were commercial cases and they
could not be distinguished. Finally although Walpole had assured him that
the recent commercial treaty with France would have no ill effects for
Portugal, Melo denied this and said he could not admit that Anglo-Portu-
guese relations should be regulated by a treaty with France.19
Melo continued to insist that the 1654 treaty was no longer valid and
that the Methuen treaty had been infringed. He said that if the preference
on Portuguese wines was allowed to lapse the queen would denounce the
treaty. She was prepared to be reasonable but not to tolerate a knife at
her throat. He only conceded a few points, allowing that the Irish question
could better be discussed by Pinto in London, giving some slight but not
very firm assurances that the question of the Judge Conservator and of the
Franquicia would be looked into, and also a few points about the Wine
19 F. O. 63/7, Walpole, 4 Sept., Carmarthen to Pinto, 29 Sept. 1786. F. O.

63/8, Carmarthen, 3 Oct. and private, 3 Oct. Fawkener to Carmarthen, 31 Oct., 1,
11, 16, 20 Nov., 8 Dec. 1786. Walpole, 5, 31 Oct., 21 Nov., 19, 20 Dec. 1786. F. O.
63/9, Walpole and Fawkener to Carmarthen, 14 Jan. 1787, to Factory, 28 Dec. 1786.
198
Company. Fawkener’s stay ended amiably enough with a dinner, at which

Melo spoke kindly of England. Fawkener reported that he and Walpole
had taken great pains to avoid growing heated and had preserved a cordial
atmosphere. But Melo indignantly denied that the New Customs Tariff was
unfair, and argued that British trade so far from diminishing was shown
by the Factory’s own statistics to be flourishing and that the Factories
were negligent and lacking in good faith. Fawkener took a project for a
new commercial treaty home with him, but no action was taken on it
by Pinto in London.20
In April 1787 Walpole was able to inform Melo that the reduction of
customs duty on French wines made under the French treaty would be
extended to cover Portuguese wines. Melo was not in the least appreciative
and said the reduction of duty was a treaty obligation and not a favour and
that he objected to the way in which the name of Portugal had been
bandied about by parliament. He said that Britain appeared to prefer
France to Portugal and expressed his resentment at the abolition of the
slight preference which Portuguese had hitherto enjoyed over Spanish
wines, though Spain had done nothing to merit any favour. His indignation
was not unjustified, for British ministers had made a determined effort
to capture a share of trade with France, even at the cost of Portugal, but
the detente with France was of short duration, and as it happened Portugal
did not suffer; on the contrary imports of Portuguese wine and of Madeira
almost doubled in the following decade; the figures for 1777/87 were
11,300 and 548 tuns for Portuguese wines and Madeira respectively, and
for 1787/97 19,794 and 981 acording to Schumpeter and even more accord¬
ing to other estimates; French wines rose from 436 tuns but only to a
maximum of 2/3000 tuns, after which they fell off again.21
Early in 1787 the Irish parliament provisionally annulled the increase
of duty on Portuguese wine, and after an interval the Portuguese removed
the impediments to the entry of Irish woollens. Walpole hoped to obtain
a reduction of the customs duties on salted fish, as the queen had recently
lowered some local dues on fish and had been jubilantly greeted by the
fisherfolk, when she landed at the Praca de Comercio and went on foot
through cheering crowds to her palace. But he obtained no redress on fish
and was soon coping with further complaints from the Factories about
their privileges and the new customs tariff. An offer was made to favour
the re-export of Portuguese colonial exports such as rice and tobacco on
a reciprocal basis, but Melo was adamant on the question of the new tariff
20 F. O. 63/8, Fawkener and Walpole, 6, 8, 16, 19, 27, 30 Dec 1785. F. O.

63/9, Walpole, 28 Dec. 1796, 22 Jan., 23 Feb., 5, 31 March. Carmarthen to Pinto,
20 March 1787.
21 F. O. 63/9, Walpole, 21 April, 5 May 1787. A. D. Francis, Wine Trade, 245/9,
320, 322. A. K. Manchester, British Pre-eminence in Brazil, 1933, 50-52.
199
PORTUGAL.-14
DAVID FRANCIS
and on all else except a few concessions he allowed to the wine trade. He
agreed to an extension of the delimited area and to longer notice being
given of the date for the opening sales of the vintage. He also promised
to make more generous provision for the service of boats on the Douro
and in a generous moment even admitted that the Oporto Factory was an
useful and necessary body, which alone could give a sufficient vent to
wine, that important product of Portugal. Some impediments which ham¬
pered the Factory in buying the wine they needed were removed and the
losses by the new customs tariff were admitted by them to be less than
had been apprehended. But Melo questioned the accuracy of the Factory’s
statistics valuing their trade, and no progress was made towards a new
treaty or the settlement of a number of points in dispute. When in 1789
Pinto returned from London to be secretary for foreign affairs great hopes
were entertained of him, but though he proved as affable as ever, he was
no readier to make concessions than Melo had been. It was unrealistic to
expect any Portuguese minister to behave otherwise. Pinto eventually
produced in 1790 a reply to Hort’s 1786 project, but it was far from
explicit and Pinto himself admitted that it was no more than a preliminary.
It took a great change of the international situation to inspire any mo¬
dification of Portuguese policy.22
The Factories complained that their trade was suffering from the new
tariff and oppressive duties, which weighed particularly heavily on bays,
which were still a major part of the exports of woollens. But they admitted
that in spite of the high tariff woollens were still introduced being almost
indispensable to Portugal. Walpole brought up the question of woollens,
but Melo denied that they had suffered much from the tariff, which he
averred bore most heavily on mixed fabrics of French origin. He admitted
that they had sometimes been let in as Dutch, but promised to stop this
practice. He pointed out that the number of British ships using Lisbon
remained high and that although the important export of corn from the
United Kingdom had largely ceased, the carrying trade in corn from
America, the Mediterranean, Ireland and the Baltic stayed in British
hands. The corn trade, which affected the bread of the people, was a
political as much as a commercial question and caused a great stir. To
keep down the price of bread, and to placate the Lisbon retailers, a body
largely composed of redoubtable market women, who intimidated even the
government, the Lisbon Senate renewed the decrees of a generation before
that importers should bring all their corn ashore to be delivered to govern¬
ment granaries. Their endeavours to implement these regulations led to
long struggles with the British Factory, but gradually delivered the retail
22 F. O. 63/9, Walpole, 16, 30 June, Factory re new tariff, 30 June. F. O.

63/10, S. of S. 28 Sept., Walpole, 1, 7 Dec. 1787.
200
trade into the hands of Portuguese middlemen, though the import trade
up to the point of landing remained in British hands.23
Even the Marquis de Vila Nova admitted sometimes that the customs
duties were too high, though he thought the Factories’ statements should
be taken with a grain of salt, and Melo in his easier moments was prepared
to discuss the tariff reasonably. Walpole himself was not uncritical of the
Factories and occasionally admitted that any diminution in British trade
was due to general reasons and not to Portuguese taxes and obstructive
regulations. Direct Anglo-Portuguese trade had undoubtedly fallen off.
Exports to Portugal dropped from an average of £1,301,000 in the years
1756/60 to £622,000 in the years 1761/85; on the other hand imports
from Portugal rose from £257,000 in 1761/5 to £365,000 in 1785/90.
The loss in exports was offset to some extent by the increase of trade carried
in British ships from American, Irish and Mediterranean ports. The pros¬
perous trade between Brazil and West Africa also brought many gains to
British traders, which escaped the statisticians. Brazilian tobacco was the
staple commodity for the purchase of slaves and the slave trade offered
many opportunities for the exchange of Africa, American and European
commodities outside the purview of British or Portuguese custom houses.24
Though little of the trade with Brazil was carried in British ships or
under British names, the British interest in it was very strong. Towards
the end of the century an appreciable trade, much of it in clandestine
goods destined for Spanish America, found its way to Brazil by means of
transshipments in the free port of Lisbon. The flow of gold from Brazil
fell off after 1770 and the time came when Brazilian exporters required
to be paid in gold and remittances of £10,000 from London to Lisbon
were recorded. The proceeds of the Royal Fifths fell from 86.2 arrobas of
gold annually in the years 1752/67 to 44.4 for 1788/1801. But the exports
of natural products such as sugar, rum, tobacco, indigo, and above all,
from 1780, cotton expanded. The growing cotton industry of the United
Kingdom accounted for an import of Brazilian cotton in 1792 of 7.7 million
pounds out of a total of 34.9 million.
The Portuguese government could not claim much credit for these
23 F. O. 63/7, 1 Feb. 1786, statistics of British shipping. F. O. 63/9, Walpole

and Fawkener, 28 Dec. 1780. F. O. 63/8, Fawkener, 16 Nov., 16, 19 Dec. 1780.
F. O. 63/11, S. of S., 8 Jan. Walpole, 12, 20 Jan., 23, 29 Feb., 8 March, 26 April,
10, 24 May, 6 Dec. 1788. F. O. 63/12, 2 Jan. 1789. F. O. 63/13, 28 April 1790.
F. O. 63/15, 29 Jan. 1792.
24 F. O. 63/8, Walpole, 16 Nov. 1786, 16, 19 Dec. 1786. F. O. 63/9, 26 Dec.
1786. E. B. Schumpeter, British Overseas Trade Statistics, 1687/1808, Oxford, 1960.
H. E. S. Fisher, The Portugal Trade, 116. Maxwell, Conflicts, 181. F. O. 63/14,
Walpole, 27 Sept., 3 Oct. 1787. F. O. 63/16, Hort’s trade reports of 13, 17 March
1793. F. O. 63/8, Fawkener, 16 Nov. 1786. S. P. 89/77, Walpole, 4 July 1774, said
P. taxes not to blame for decrease of trade.
201
DAVID FRANCIS
developments. They made some half hearted attempts to encourage Por¬

tuguese exports to Brazil, but their policy in general imposed so many
restrictions and taxes, that the growth of Brazilian trade and industry was
impeded. But the wars in Europe and the Atlantic and stoppage to trade
caused by the negro revolution in Santo Domingo enhanced the value of
Brazilian products, so that there was a revival of demand even for Bra¬
zilian sugar and at times something of a boom. The development of the
Rio Grande region had rendered Brazil self-sufficient in meat and corn,
and the demand for foodstuffs from the gold mining area had resulted in
the creation of a varied agriculture in Minas Gerais, though other provinces
consisted mainly of large plantations, where only one crop was cultivated.
In spite of the loss of gold and diamonds Minas Gerais remained until
after the turn of the century the most populous and prosperous province
of Brazil. A conservative estimate of the total population in 1776 was
li million; by the end of the century it was believed to be 2 million and
rising rapidly, while the population of Minas Gerais rose from 319,764
in 1776 to 504,321 in 1821.
At the end of the century Brazil remained the mainstay of Anglo-
Portuguese trade, paying for the large unfavourable balance with hides,
indigo, tobacco and cotton. Brazilian imports of English textiles on the
other hand declined. The value of the exports of cotton, as of other pro¬
ducts, is hard to compute precisely, as it was reckoned variously in bags,
arrobas and pounds, and the size of the bag and arroba in particular varied
according to time and place. However both the price and the exchange
value of the milreis rose and in 1792 a total of 46,628 bags worth
£582,850 was reckoned. Hort spoke of a total production of 55,000 bags
of which Britain took 45,000.25
Pombal had always been jealous of the designs of foreign powers on
Brazil and conscious that he could not rely upon the help of allies and
that he must endeavour to enable Brazil to provide for her own defence
without help even from the mother country. When Luis Pinto took up
his post in 1767 as governor of Matto Grosso Pombal wrote to him: ‘The
people you are to govern are loyal to the king; common sense teaches that
forced obedience is violent and suspect, and voluntary obedience secure
and firm, so do not alter anything with force or violence; when reason
allows and it is necessary to abandon abuses and to destroy pernicious
customs to the benefit of the king, justice, and the common good, act with
much prudence and moderation, a method which achieves more than force.*
25 Maxwell, Conflicts, 181. Harlow, 2nd British Empire, n. 282. F. O. 63/14,

Walpole, 1 Oct. 1791. F. O. 63/15, Hort, 23 Aug. 1792. F. O. 63/16, Hort, 13 March
1793 and statistics, 17 March. D. Alden, Royal Government of Colonial Brazil, 1968,
366. Pernambuco bags were 140 lb., those of Maranhao 200 lb. Pernambuco accounted
for 34,146 bags in 1791; Maranhao, 15,853.
202
These lofty sentiments were not always put into practice, but the stifling
control of the Lisbon government was eased by the need to strengthen
Brazil for her own defence. To encourage local institutions Brazilians bom
were sometimes appointed to important posts and the tendency to favour
the Portuguese born was diluted. The Portuguese regiments sent under
Brigadier Bohm were recruited in Brazil and soon became an entirely
Brazilian force. After the accession of Maria I the Spanish threat was
checked, and the French confined themselves to minor infiltrations over
the Guyana border. Britain did not escape suspicion; her occupation of
the Falkland Islands was unwelcome as also her interest in the South
Atlantic whaling industry. Her sympathy with South American indepen¬
dence movements might well have extended to Brazil, where Minas Gerais
in particular was spoken of as a province capable of sustaining indepen¬
dence. As early as 1790 Miranda's plans for British aid to the rebels in
South America were seriously considered and might well have sparked
off similar movements in Brazil. However <the Brazilian militia with a
stiffening of regulars proved sufficient to deter Spain, and to curb smuggling
and sedition. Detachments of troops from Brazil were occasionally used to
keep order in Africa.26
As the common use of the plural term the Brazils suggests, there was
a certain distinction between the north and the south. The voyage to the
Amazon was relatively easy, but it was harder to reach Rio, which was
in closer touch with Africa and even the Far East. Until the abolition of
the convoy system in 1767 the regulations were obstructive to coastal
traffic, which in any case was not favoured by the winds. Only at the
end of the century the needs of Bahia and the north led to the growth
of a great trade in meat and grain from the Rio Grande do Sul northwards.
Any distinction between the two Brazils promoted by the means of access
did not extend to their products; the cattle industry had centres in the north
east, the centre and the south; mining was concentrated in the Minas Gerais
reaching in the case of gold far westwards into the interior; the mining
industry, which was mainly alluvial, employed small concerns while a
larger capital was used in the plantations of the north and in the sugar
mills, which were to be found in the centre and south. The Minas Gerais
developed a mixed economy of smaller holdings, conditioned by the mining
industry and serving the needs of a growing urban population of con¬
tractors, lawyers and entrepreneurs, who had grown rich on the proceeds
26 Maxwell, Conflicts, 46/7, 88, 107/10. Revista do Instituto de Geografia e

Historia de Rio, vol. 25-479/87. P. R. O. 3/8/345, Admiral Campbell’s report on
Brazil, 1803. F. O. 63/14, Walpole, 2 Nov. 1791. F. O. 63/15, Hort, 23 Aug. 1792.
F. O. 63/20, Walpole, 11 Feb. 1794. C. Boxer, Golden Age of Brazil, 204/25. Vin¬
cent Harlow, 2nd British Empire, 287, etc. Hispanic-American Hist. Review, vol. 43-
1463. Dauril Alden on population of Brazil. Balbi, Essai Statistique, 2 vols., Paris,
1822, i-431, 442.
203
DAVID FRANCIS
of the mines. They formed an urban society in Vila Rica and the principal
towns, who often sent their sons to Europe to be educated. This cosmo¬
politan and literate class provided a hot-bed to nurture the first infection
of republican sentiment and desire for Brazilian political independence.27
It fell to Martinho de Melo e Castro, as Minister of Marine, to cope
with this. During his long years of office and until his death in 1795 he
was very conscious of the importance of Brazil. Instructing the Viceroy in
1779 he said ‘The conservation of Brazil, especially in Rio, is absolutely
essential, as it is demonstrably certain that Portugal without Brazil is an
insignificant power, and that Brazil without armed forces is a precious
treasure delivered to the first enemy that comes’. He added that the first
priority was to defend religion and to look after the people, but that good
government and defence were essential, for three regiments from Portugal
were not enough, so most of the army must be raised locally and there
was need for care and discipline. He was most anxious therefore for Brazil
to be self-sufficient, but this aim conflicted with the determination not to
allow Brazil to outstep the role of a dependent colony. For this reason
his efforts to encourage Brazilian trade and production and Portuguese
exports to Brazil were half-hearted and were offset by the burden of
taxes and the restrictive practices of an over-large bureaucracy. A de¬
termination to collect the last penny due to the royal revenues took
priority. In 1750 the Minas government had agreed to pay an annual
lump sum of 100 arrobas and to make up any deficit, if called upon to
do so. This was a progressive step in so far as the responsibility for collect¬
ing the Royal Fifth passed from Lisbon to the Brazilian provincial author¬
ities. This worked well until 1767 after which the various contractors
and tax farmers responsible for collecting the Royal Fifth and also the
‘entradas’ or provincial customs dues fell increasingly into arrears. After
many heart-searchings Melo finally in 1788 issued a lengthy order, which
provided for many reforms, and also for the imposition of a poll tax for
the collection of all arrears, known as the ‘derrama’.28
The situation had become chronic and the contraband position was
acute; British ships bound for Brazil were openly insured in London, and
the number of such sizeable ships annually delivering their wares was said
to be twelve. There was talk of opening up direct trade, but Melo opposed
this and decided to close all loopholes. The contraband trade had extended
even to diamonds, which were smuggled with the connivance of Minas
Gerais officials. A heavy task as a new broom therefore faced in 1788 the
27 For Atlantic winds see J. H. Parry, The Discovery of the Sea, 1975, 101/3
and attached charts. Maxwell, Conflicts, 39, 87/98, 214, 217. John Hemming, Red
Gold, 222/3.
28 Maxwell, Conflicts, 107/10. Southey, Hist, de Brazil, VI-292/3. Admiral
Campbell’s report, 30/8/345. Revista do Instituto Historico de Rio, 25-479/82, 1862.
204
new governor of Minas Gerais, the Visconde de Barbacena, a keen young

man and a disciple of Melo. He had to face a body of wealthy contractors,
who were seriously worried by their enormous debts to the government.
The gold and diamonds, which had been the basis of their wealth, were
declining, but in the decaying town of Vila Rica the well-heeled offspring
of the contractors were ripe to imbibe radical ideas, even if they had not
had direct access to them through education abroad. The American Re¬
volution had shown a respectable way of emancipation from a greedy
metropolitan government without involvement in considerations of colour
or class. French republican ideas were more dangerous still. A Brazilian
student at Montpellier named Jesus Joaquim Maia distributed pamphlets
representing that dissident groups in Brazil were powerful and ready to
declare a republic. He wrote under the name of Vendex and was in touch
with Jefferson, then American minister in Paris. The infection spread; many
of the converts were contractors, lawyers and business men, others vision¬
aries and poets. The latter dreamt of republics; the former only wanted
to shake off their servitude to Lisbon, in order to rid themselves of their
debts and to prevent the introduction of reforms which would put a stop
to their malpractices. They were stirred up by the arrival of Barbacena,
and in December 1788 a group of conspirators met at a house in Vila Rica
belonging to Francisco Freire de Andrade, Lt. Col. of the Minas Dragoons
and a natural bom nephew of a very famous governor of Minas and Rio.
The conspirators were mostly important wealthy personages; there were
only one or two exceptions such as the lowly born Portuguese Joseph de
Silva Xavier, whose only claim to social distinction was the liaison of his
illegitimate daughter with a Lt. Col. of the Minas cavalry; he was nick¬
named Tiradentes, because he earned a living by drawing teeth in his spare
time, but he had commanded a company of cavalry which surveyed the
diamond route to the coast, and was allotted the task of suborning the
cavalry and kidnapping the governor.
The plans of the conspirators were vague and they had not even decided
whether the governor was to be assassinated or only apprehended. Further
their plans were upset by the delay in the declaration of the ‘derrama’,
which was to have been the signal for their rising. They did not know
that the governor had decided that in view of the strength of the opposition
it would be prudent to postpone the ‘derrama’. Before they took any action
they were betrayed to the governor by one of their number, a contractor
named Silverio de Reis, who hoped by this means to take a short cut
to the annulment of his debts. The governor himself, Barbacena, was
somewhat involved with the dealings of the contractors and he advised
the viceroy, his uncle Vasconcelos de Sousa, to be prudent and to take
no further action than the postponement of the ‘derrama’. But de Sousa
was expecting his successor to arrive and felt he must do more to cover
himself; he asked for de Reis to be sent to Rio for trial and arrested
205
DAVID FRANCIS
Tiradentes, who had come to Rio. Barbacena still favoured a cover up

operation, but he now arrested a number of suspects and started an in¬
vestigation of his own, which for the next two years was to compete with
that set up by the viceroy. The final trial was then conducted by judges
sent from Lisbon by the new government which included de Seabra and
Luis Pinto as ministers. Melo was somewhat embarrassed, as his own
severe recommendations had precipitated the crisis, Meanwhile the events of
the French revolution had stressed the dangers of revolutionary insurgence,
but had also frightened the men of property, who were now inclined to
rally to the established government. One of the judges, Antonio Diniz de
Cruz e Silva, had had considerable experience of Brazil having taken
part in the enquiry into the contraband of diamonds; he was among other
things a famous poet, the author of ‘Hyssope’; several of the conspirators
were also literary characters and old friends. After long deliberation the
judges decided that there had been much jealousy between the Portuguese
and the Brazilian born, but that there was little evidence that the rich
men concerned were republican or unamenable to reconciliation. Only six
persons were condemned to execution and these were exiled to Africa
except for Tiradentes, who was hanged, beheaded, and quartered. He had
been the life and soul of the conspiracy and in later years was acclaimed
as a hero and a martyr for the republican cause. He had indeed been
perhaps the only sincere republican among the conspirators.29
Only garbled accounts of events in Brazil reached Portugal. Republican
ideas were widespread and found many sympathisers among aristocrats,
even in Portugal, where the old duke of Lafoens was supposed to have
toyed with them and even to have entertained Freemasons. Freemasonry in
England was respectable enough, but elsewhere it was a vehicle for re¬
publican ideas and was given exaggerated significance. Only a few clan¬
destine lodges survived in Portugal; in Brazil there was more tolerance and
freemasonry attracted many respectable citizens. In 1803 Thomas Lindsay
met many freemasons in Bahia and was cordially welcomed by them. In
1805 Sir Robert Wilson on his way to the Cape of Good Hope with Home
Popham found he was cordially received when it became known that he was
a freemason. Freemasonry could be revolutionary and an organ of French
propaganda, but it is evident that the respectable element played a large part
still. Republican leanings were curbed by the reaction against the excesses of
the revolution and by the negro risings in Santo Domingo and elsewhere;
so when a rising with a definitely revolutionary and mulatto flavour broke
out in Bahia no man of standing joined it and it was easily suppressed.30
29 Maxwell, Conflicts, 143, 166, 172, 190/6. Beirao, Maria I, 350/62. Southey,
Hist, de Brazil, VI-291/303.
30 F. O. 63/12, Walpole, 14, 26 Sept., 7 Oct. 1789. Thomas Lindley, Voyage to
Brazil, 1803, 175. Sir H. Wilson, Life, 1882, 1-277. Maxwell, Conflicts, 218/22.
206
In 1790 the emperor and the German princes were sufficiently moved
by the horrors of the revolution to declare their support of the French
monarchy and Spain spoke of joining them. But no decision was taken
and Britain was not ready yet to forsake her neutrality. British relations
with Spain were upset by the Nootka Sound incident and a rupture of
relations was only narrowly averted by a mission led by Fitz-Herbert,
which in October 1790 succeeded in concluding a convention. Before this
Pinto had for a time been enthusiastic for an Anglo-Portuguese alliance with
Spain, but he would not adhere to the Convention or do more than give
assurances that Portugal would always follow Britain’s lead. In 1792
Prussia took the lead of the anti-French party and Austria invited Portugal
to join, but Pinto steadily avoided committing himself. France was ne¬
gotiating with Spain and was threatening Italy, where the pope was asking
for British help. However the execution of Louis XVI drove Spain to turn
again against France and in January 1793 Britain warned her subjects that
war with France was imminent. To Pinto’s indignation Spain did not
consult Portugal and, fearing a French attack on Brazil, Pinto suggested
that British naval help might be welcome. In February France declared
war on Britain, the United States and Russia; Pinto again only heard of
this from the newspapers and as neither Portugal nor Spain had been
mentioned in the declaration of war, maintained that Portugal could remain
neutral.31
During the last years of peace Portugal had remained quiet and trade
had flourished. She had suffered nothing worse than some minor troubles
in Brazil and in India, where the Mahrattas had been restive and some
republican-minded friars had attempted a rising in Goa. There was also
slave trade trouble in Angola, where a few years earlier the French,
British and Dutch had suppressed a Portuguese fort at Cabinda. Now the
Portuguese were accused by Lord Lansdowne in the House of Lords of
causing loss and damage to a British and a French fort at Ambrize in
Angola. The Mayor of Liverpool had submitted a memorial claiming
£200,000 damages on behalf of a number of Lancashire merchants. How¬
ever it transpired that the signatories of the memorial were employees of
the complainants but had not been on the spot, and that they had ignored
the evidence of various British captains anchored off the coast who had
testified in favour of the Portuguese. The truth was that a native chief
styling himself the Marquis of Mossula had invaded Angola and threat¬
ened Luanda; the Portuguese had sent a force against him of 200 regulars
from Brazil and a number of auxiliaries raised locally, magnified by the
complainants to 2000 men. The damage to British or French property had
31 F. O. 63/13, Walpole, 6 Nov. 1790, 11 Dec. F. O. 63/15, Walpole, 16 Dec.

1791, 24 Feb. 1792, 9 June, Osterwald, 4 Dec., 23 Dec. 1792. F. O. 63/16 Osterwald,
23 Jan., 2 Mar. 1793.
207
DAVID FRANCIS
not been great, for there were only a few British and French settlers in
the neighbourhood, who made a living by trading with the Marquis of
Mossula who had access to regions of the interior, where there was still
a demand for trinkets, which could no longer be sold on the coast, and
where slaves could be brought cheaply. The British government therefore
took little notice of the complaint and accepted the Portuguese explana¬
tion.32 \ >
The slave trade with Brazil reached its peak in the last decade of the
century with a total for the ten years of 221,000 compared with 178,100
for 1780/90. The majority came from Angola and in 1815 Portugal agreed
to stop the export of slaves from places north of the equator, but there
was a revival of the Costa de Mina trade in the years 1790/1810, when
the total rose from 24,200 in 1780/90 to over 53,000 in the years 1790/
1810. However many of the slaves sent to South Brazil were smuggled
with the connivance of the Spanish authorities to the River Plate. In 1788
Walpole was asked for a report on the slave trade; the government was
eager to collect statistics to help their trade negotiations and as a result
of the anti-slavery movement were beginning to take notice of humanitarian
considerations. Exact figures were hard to come by, as slaves were always
paid for in trade goods and not in cash. The Portuguese had been stepping
up their West African trade and adult slaves were fetching 50/60 milreis
in Africa and 50% more in Brazil. The Brazil ships called ‘samaccas’ were
mostly of 2/300 tons and carried one slave per ton, though some of the
ships from Lisbon were larger and coasted along the shores of Africa,
picking up slaves as they went. It was believed that conditions on the
voyage had improved somewhat and that sickness and death during the
crossing had diminished. Not much was done to christianise the negroes in
Africa, but in Brazil they were mostly converted and this enabled them
to take some part in the social life of the country, which was entirely based
on the church. They had some African priests and even an occasional
bishop. This system enabled the authorities to acquire information about
what was going on from the priests and sometimes to anticipate any dissi-
dence or conspiracy. It was believed that the negroes were better treated
than elsewhere; the slaves often had plots of their own, which they were
able to cultivate on Sundays and holidays, and were able to take their
produce to market, as indeed they also did in Jamaica. They enjoyed at
least in theory some protection from the law. Masters were not supposed
to inflict severe punishments themselves, but to hand over transgressors
to the magistrates. Thomas Lindsay, who spent some time in Bahia at the
turn of the century, confirmed the impression that slaves were treated
with relative humanity in Brazil. He said that blacks and whites freely
32 F. O. 63/14, Hort, 30 June 1791, Walpole, 13 July, Walpole, Pinto, 12 Aug.

1791, 24 Sept.
208
intermixed and many slaves won their freedom. In Minas Gerais in 1784
slaves composed 47.9% of the population; by 1806 the population had
grown by 20%, but the slave percentage had fallen to 34.3%. The
majority of blacks were still slaves and the decrease chiefly affected the
mulattos. Admiral Campbell, who visited Brazil at this time, thought the
slaves had been better treated in the time of the Jesuits. The Jesuits had
been perhaps slightly more efficient, and a little more humane; on their
forest plantations they had had even relative success in employing Indians,
but they had had no more success in keeping their slaves alive and there
had been no natural increase. According to Campbell the Brazilians were
not particularly inhumane but were largely indifferent. They left their
slaves alone as long as they gave no trouble. But conditions in the slave
markets were bad and many died soon after their first arrival. The laws
of the kings of Spain and Portugal were undoubtedly more humane than
those elsewhere, but living conditions were better in North America, where
there was no chance of escape and surveillance could be less rigorous than
in Brazil, where coloured people circulated freely and many obtained their
freedom, so that in the cities slaves had to be closely guarded. In North
America all coloured persons were black, unless they managed to pass,
whereas in South America they were surrounded by free men of the same
religion and similar colour. White men bedded black girls freely enough
in both Americas and often treated them well, but in North America they
were branded by their colour, whereas in South America they could
improve their status.33
Tobacco was the basic medium of exchange in West Africa and this
trade was out of the purview of Walpole or the Consul General. Otherwise
they reported on all the branches of trade with Portugal and Brazil. The
Brazilians were very jealous of this trade and particularly disliked British
whaling activities in the Falkland Islands. With some difficulty it was
ascertained that Brazil produced 14,000 tons of whale oil in the years
1787/91, while British imports had been 14,000 tons annually but had
dropped to 11,000 tons, so fresh sources of supply were needed. At this
period in 1793 Melo was worried about the future of Brazil and said that
British naval aid might be needed there; so he gave an assurance that
British whalers were now well treated in Brazilian ports.34
In 1792 the Oporto Factory rivalled Lisbon, and even Madeira could
33 F. O. 63/11, Walpole, Aug. 1788, report on slave trade. P. R. O. 30/8/345,

Admiral Campbell’s report on Brazil of 1803. Maxwell, Conflicts. 226/7. For an
objective view of the whole Iberian slave question see C. Boxer, The Church
Militant and Iberian Expansion, 1440/1776. Baltimore and London, 1976. Historical
Association. P. E. M. Hair, The Atlantic Trade and Black Africa.
34 F. O. 63/15, Report on whale fisheries, 14 Jan., 17 March 1792. F. O. 63/14,
Hort, 11 Dec. 1791. Reports on cotton, sugar, etc. F. O. 63/15, 7 Sept. 1792. F. O.
63/16, 16 April 1793.
209
DAVID FRANCIS
collect the signatures of 21 merchants, and claim a trade of £225,000 a

year, mostly in British hands. Lisbon trade amounted to £771,000 and
Oporto to £701,100 for wine alone. Much general trade in Lisbon did not
enter into these figures, and as the totals were calculated in various ways,
there was much argument about them, but these figures can serve as a
rough guide. In 1793 the Oporto Factory asked for an allotment of 34,000
pipes of the 1792 vintage, double the amount they had required a few
years earlier. They now complained of only receiving 32,000 pipes and
that 6000 pipes of the best wine had been pre-empted by the Company.
It was true that the 1791 vintage had been a small one, so that their
stocks were low, but Pinto thought they were prevaricating and certainly
the Portuguese export figures did not indicate any scarcity; their figure
showed 55,123 pipes, which suggested that if the Company only took 6000
pipes, there must have been a number of interlopers to make up the grand
total. The next vintage, that of 1793, was only 31,113 pipes, but the
average for the decade rose to 47,000 pipes. The Factory’s request for
an extension of the delimited area had been granted and the distinction
between export and domestic wine had become even more blurred. The
Factory never ceased to complain but they were doing well enough, and
it was now that they were building the Factory House, which is their me¬
morial to this day. The expansion of the trade and the increase of compe¬
tition began to inspire the production of choice vintages, but it must be
admitted that much of the wine was blackstrap to suit the common thirst.
A generation earlier Castres had been obliged to buy claret, because he
found that soon after the vintage it was impossible to find any wine
which was not highly fortified and a muddy turbid brew. This was still
the case and in England the demand was for a wine with a kick, which
could vie with spirits; good port was rare, as the Hon. John Byng found
in his travels round England on horseback. The defect was natural to port
wine and had been a source of complaint since King William’s day. Good
wine had to be a natural wine, or to be treated with care and discretion
over a number of years, if it were to emerge with nobility from a powerful
infusion of brandy. What is very strange however is that in the last decade
of the century British travellers like Costigan, Murphy and Twiss com¬
plained about the wines served them in the Factory itself, though they
praised highly the quality of its hospitality in all other respects. The
allegation of the Douro Company that it sold the best wine may have had
an element of truth, for it could pre-empt the best natural wine and the
Portuguese had a prejudice against fortification.35
35 F. O. 63/18, Walpole, 31 March 1794. Hort, 4 Feb. 1793 gives a 1792 figure
for exports from Oporto of 54,258 pipes valued at £1,139,418 which corresponds
to the Portuguese statistic quoted by A. Guerra Tenreiro in Douro, 1944. This
suggests that the Company and the interlopers competed more successfully with the
210
Sir John Hort spent 2\ years on home leave and only resumed his
post in February 1789 after the Factory had complained of his prolonged
absence. He had not been idle in London, for he had been busy advising
the Board of Trade, but neither Walpole nor the Portuguese appreciated
his intervention, and Melo had expressed the hope that he would not be
returning. On his return he further embarrassed Walpole by taking up the
cause of the Roman Catholics, who sought to profit by their improved
status in England to be admitted to the Factory. Though not of Irish birth
Hort had been brought up and had property there; also lately he had
married a sister of the Earl of Kerry. He was inclined to trespass on
Walpole’s province by keeping in touch with Portuguese ministers. Pinto
said that he had never heard of a Portuguese consul being received by a
minister. But the Consul General in Lisbon had long held a special po¬
sition, and on the subject of the Roman Catholics and the Factory he was
acting well within his rights. They had quitted the Lisbon Factory of their
own volition in about 1714 in order to avoid having to pay consulage;
they had formerly been all Irish and consequently tainted with Jacobitism;
now they were loyal and there were English as well as Irish among them.
Recently the Irish College and the Irish nuns had combined to give a con¬
cert to celebrate the recovery of King George Ill’s health, and this had
been attended by Walpole and his wife and assisted by some of the queen’s
own musicians. Even under Queen Maria tolerance was growing and the
Lisbon British catholics had been heartened by the ruling of the British
Attorney General that the Factory, being outside the United Kingdom, was
not a corporation under English law and ‘ipso facto’ closed to Roman
Catholics, and he saw no reason therefore why they should not take part
in the deliberations of a mercantile concern. However the Factory, led by
their chaplain, naturally voiced strong objections and these were supported
by Walpole, who advised Hort not to carry out the order he had received
to sponsor the admission of catholics until further advice had come from
the secretary of state. Actually Hort had already caused a minute to be
entered in the Factory record book to the effect that applications for
admission from the Roman Catholic British merchants had been received.
The next step would be a general meeting to consider the applications,
but Hort was able to hold up the procedure by refraining from calling any
general meeting for this purpose. The result was that the question remained
in suspense; when the Factory wished to submit a memorial to ask for a
convoy they eluded calling a general meeting by submitting a petition not
in the name of the Factory, but of all the British merchants including some
Factory than is usually supposed. See also A. D. Francis, The Wine Trade, 1972,
220/4. F. O. 63/11, Walpole, 29 Feb., 8 March 1788. F. O. 63/12, 21 Feb., 7 Oct.
1789. F. O 63/13, 9 Jan 1790, F. O. 63/15, 18 July 1792 Hon J. Byng, Torrington
Diaries, Ed. J. B. Andrews, 4 vols., 1934.
211
DAVID FRANCIS
Catholics. These as a result of the growth of trade with Ireland had become
more numerous of late and seventeen of them had applied for admission
to the Factory. The Protestants therefore had reason to fear that if Ca¬
tholics were admitted, they would equal or even exceed their own dimi¬
nishing number.36
As the shadows of war deepened over Europe domestic misfortunes
befell the Portuguese court. The queen lost her husband in 1786, her eldest
son and heir Dom Jose in 1788, and soon afterwards her daughter in Spain
the Infanta Maria Vitoria and her new-born son. Her cheerful father
confessor the Archbishop of Thessalonica also died and was replaced by
Jose Maria de Melo, bishop of the Algarve, who was described by Beckford
as a fanatical interested priest; others thought better of him, but he was
addicted to talking of the terrors of hell and may well have contributed
to the onset of the queen’s melancholy mania. The queen had always
suffered from the burden of her office and been tormented by a sensitive
conscience. The new confessor was no help to keeping her on an even
keel, nor was the distressing news of the Red Terror in France. Rumours
of the declining state of the queen’s mind became common in the latter
part of 1791; in February 1792 she was falling prey to increasing fits of
lassitude alternating with others of violent excitement, and these grew to
such a pitch that Dom Joao, Prince of Brazil, the new heir apparent, was
reluctantly persuaded to accept a decree authorising him to assist the queen
in her government for the duration of her illness. The queen remained
incapable of any public act, but the prince was very unwilling to intervene
and insisted on carrying on all business in her name for a long time yet.
Dr. Willis, fresh from his success in the treatment of King George, was
summoned to Lisbon after a board of seventeen doctors had discussed the
queen’s condition and had pronounced an unfavourable verdict. Dr. Willis
was at first optimistic and made progress with his gentler methods of
treatment, so that she was occasionally well enough to show herself on
the balcony of her palace. But his efforts to sedate the queen were per¬
sistently thwarted by the horde of pious old women who frequented the
court, and even by responsible but religious minded noblemen like Ma-
rialva and Vila Verde, who encouraged her to go to mass and to attend
religious services which only served to excite her. As a last expedient
Dr. Willis recommended a sea voyage. The queen rather liked the idea,
and as the Prince of Brazil agreed the Medusa, the only man-of-war fit
for service, was hastily got ready, but objections multiplied and the plan
was first cut down and then abandoned. Dr. Willis found his situation
36 F. O. 63/12, Hort, 8 June, S. of S., 12 June 1789. Walpole, 2 May, 5 Dec.

F. O. 63/13, Hort, 7 Feb., 30 March 1790. F. O. 63/14, Hort, 19, 29 June. Factory,
19 June 1791. F. O. 63/15, Hort, 13 May, 23 Sept., 29 Nov. 1792. S. of S., 1, 28 Oct.
1792. F. O 63/16, Koster, 30 Jan., merchants’ petition, 9 July 1793.
212
increasingly difficult and to the regret of the Prince of Brazil and of the
queen herself returned home, leaving directions as to the treatment to be
followed. Pinto now gave up all hope of the queen’s recovery, but the
prince would not do anything which might not have the queen’s full agree¬
ment, still less assume the regency. Seeing that there was now no prospect
whatever of negotiating a new commercial treaty Walpole asked for three
months’ home leave. Any innovation in the government was entirely ruled
out. The Prince of Brazil was almost incapable of taking any firm decision.
He was only twenty-three years old at the time of his mother’s illness and
until the death of his elder brother three years before he had not been
heir to the throne and he regretted the loss of a quiet life. Personally with
his clumsy figure and almost negroid features he was remarkably ugly.
Madame Junot said he had a bull’s head with something of the expression
of a wild boar. She tended to exaggerate, but there was no doubt that he
was unprepossessing and indeed only equalled in that respect by Carlota
Joaquina his wife. But unlike her he had a kind heart. There was no
malice in him and all agreed that he was that exceptional character, a
really good man. He was very timid and conscious of his defects and found
it hard to speak articulately or with authority. He was very shy of public
life but did not lack a certain shrewd common sense and in his tortuous
course turning from confronting one peril only to shrink from another he
somehow brought Portugal through the dangerous years to a point where
salvation from her complete subjugation was on the horizon. He was a weak
man, but he was after all an absolute ruler and from time to time amid
the rival factions which jostled him, he was called upon to give the casting
vote. He cannot therefore be disregarded as a mere dummy; he played
willy nilly a part, even a leading part, in the fortunes of his country. His
kindness of heart made him personally popular and in a quiet way he
took a genuine interest in questions of defence and of the rehabilitation
of his navy, but it was torture to him to take a decision.37
The queen his mother during the life of her husband had at least been
helped by a happy conjugal life. Prince Joa5 was not to be so lucky. He
acquired the Spanish Princess Carlota Joaquina as his wife in June 1785,
but she was only ten years old and it was four years before the marriage
could be consummated. She was an odd little figure of dwarfish stature
and the gossip went that she would bear no children. She belied this by
producing a numerous family including Dom Pedro and Dorn Miguel and
several daughters some of whom, surprisingly enough, were good looking.
She remained a Spaniard first and foremost and her temperament and
tastes were quite incompatible with those of her husband. From a small
37 F. O. 63/11, Walpole, 6, 20 Dec. 1788. F. O. 63/15, 16 Dec. 1791. 4, 14 Jan.,

1, 14, 24 Feb., 3, 17, 28 March, 28 April, 23 May, 4, 18 July, 4, 22 Aug. 1792.
Beirao, Maria /, 408 et seq.
213
DAVID FRANCIS
tease and termagant she grew up to be a positive witch. In her later years
her intrigues did much to sabotage what little taste Dom Joao had for
active government and her way of life caused great scandal. As for the
mad queen, she was to survive until 1818, and as late as 1803 her in¬
fluence was still dimly felt as an excuse for the court to remain in the
country, which the prince vastly preferred with its hunting and shooting to
residence in or near town. But the queen never recovered her wits.38
38 Marcus Cheke, Carlota Joaquina, 1947, 3/5. Damiao Perez, Hist, de Portugal,
VI-204/5. F. O. 63/41, Fitzgerald, 21 Feb. 1803.
214
10
THE YEARS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
When the chronic nature of the queen’s illness was confirmed Walpole
felt that he could make no progress with his negotiations for a new com¬
mercial treaty and went home on leave from October 1792 to March 1793.
Before his return Louis XVI had been executed and France had declared
war on Britain, Russia and Holland. At this moment of danger Portugal
became more conciliatory towards Britain and the Charge d’Affaires, Os-
terwald, reported that there was now hope of settling several outstanding
minor grievances. These concerned the duties on cod fish, facilities for the
Oporto Factory to buy a fair share of the vintage without impediment,
and the recognition of British claims on the assets of bankrupts, to which
the government had hitherto asserted priority.1
Although war between Spain and France ensued in April 1793 Por¬
tugal claimed to remain neutral, even though she undertook to follow
England’s lead and to help Spain against any French attack. She sent an
expeditionary force to fight alongside the Spaniards in Rousillon, but in
spite of this and of the fact that the French were attacking Portuguese
shipping she allowed a French unofficial agent named Darbault to stay
in Lisbon and obstinately denied that she was at war with France. England
too did not give up hope of a settlement and sent Lord St. Helen’s to
Madrid to mediate. There were also frequent rumours of peace moves
between Spain and France.2
In December 1792 the Pope had asked Britain for help and for a naval
squadron to be sent to the Mediterranean. There was not a single British
ship there but in fanuary 1793 Lord Hood entered the sea and blockaded
Toulon. When a royalist faction won possession of the port an English
garrison was landed there. But the French Republicans, in an attack in
which the young Bonaparte played a leading part as an artillery officer,
won a victory in December, in which a number of prisoners were taken
1 F. O. 63/16, Osterwald, 13 Feb. 1793.

2 F. O. 63/15, Osterwald, 3, 24 Nov., 23 Dec. 1792. F. O. 63/16, Osterwald,
20 Feb., 2, 19 March 1793.
215
PORTUGAL.-15
DAVID FRANCIS
* \ t
including the British general Charles O’Hara. An allied evacuation followed;

for a time the British presence was maintained by the occupation of Corsica
and the blockade of Toulon was kept up, but in 1796 renewed French
success and particularly the loss of Leghorn obliged Britain after a tem¬
porary occupation of Elba to evacuate the Mediterranean until April 1798.3
The reaction of Portugal was quite active. The Duke of Lafoens was
asked to produce a plan of campaign and did nothing, but Martinho de
Melo was eager to rehabilitate the navy and Pinto took such steps as he
could. Two British officers in the Portuguese service, Forbes and Calder,
were given high commands. Forbes was appointed to Brazil, but proceeded
instead to Roussillon. Only one line of battle ship and one frigate were
found to be fit for service but by March six line of battle ships and six
frigates were said to be ready, or nearly so; plans were made to recruit
British naval officers and to send a ship of the line to Gibraltar; Melo
was very anxious for the navy to acquire status by the despatch of ships
to join the British Channel Fleet and in September a convoy was assembled
to embark 5000 men to join the Spanish army in Catalonia.4
From 1790 Melo worked to improve the pay and status of naval officers.
He persuaded the Prince of Brazil to take an interest. In a country where
royal patronage counted for so much and naval social status for so little,
this was a great step forward. The prince personally welcomed a batch of
naval recruits from Oporto and with the princess saw the squadron set
off for England in May 1793. Unfortunately it ran into a storm and had
to put back for repairs. A second attempt was made to sail in July, but
Admiral Esquivel, and the Marquis of Niza of the ship Vasco da Gama,
and his cousin Joao de Gomez Silva Tello, protested that their ships were
not fit to go to sea. Probably they were justified, though Walpole thought
the reason was their reluctance to take orders from British officers. When
Melo insisted they resigned from the service. Niza, who was a son of the
Conde de Ponte de Lima, a leading neutralist, felt the disgrace of his
leaving the navy, and whether he agreed with the war or not, volunteered
for service with the army in Spain; he did not stay there very long, but
he fought gallantly. Next year he was reinstated in the navy and served
in the Channel and afterwards in 1798/9 in the Mediterranean. Nelson
complained that he would not take orders from his brave captains and
St. Vincent grumbled that he did not expect the Portuguese ships to be
any use with Niza in command, unless the British captain seconded to
him, Captain Retallick, took charge. But the admiralty appreciated the
value of Portuguese ships appearing side by side with the British and in
3 S. W. C. Pack, Sea Power in the Mediterranean, 1971, 89/97. F. O. 63/15,

Osterwald, 4 Dec. 1792.
4 F. O. 63/16, Osterwald, 20 Feb., 2, 18 March. S. of S. 20 Feb., 12 March.
Walpole, 31 March 1793.
216
1799 a letter recalling Niza from the Mediterranean was held up by

St. Vincent for this reason. Also Niza seems to have lived and learnt;
St. Vincent backed him up when he asked whether it was not beneath
the dignity of an admiral to agree to chase privateers with only one ship,
and in 1798 described him as looking much like an officer, when he called
and supplied useful information. This was condescending but it was at
least a step forward.5
At their third attempt under a new admiral the Portuguese safely got
to Portsmouth. They could have rendered real service by escorting a large
convoy, which was waiting to leave the Tagus, but nobody thought of
arranging this. However the Portuguese were delighted to hear that they
had crossed the sea safely and as they supposed had joined Admiral Howe.
But Howe was at sea and no co-operation could take place until he had
been consulted and had arranged the necessary table of signals. Howe
returned for a few days to Tor Bay but put 4o sea again at once. Autumn
came before anything could be done to enable the Portuguese to join him.
Meanwhile as soon as they arrived sickness had removed 400 men to the
Haslar hospital. William Warre, an Oporto merchant, who had been
appointed liaison officer, reported that the squadron was scarcely fit to
go to sea in high summer, and certainly could not do so when the autumn
storms set in and the damp and cold made the sickness still worse. The
admiralty, knowing how touchy the Portuguese were, were most em¬
barrassed; all they could do was to suggest as tactfully as possible that the
squadron should return to Lisbon very soon in order to be ready in the
spring, when they could no doubt render good service by joining the
Mediterranean squadron, where the conditions would be more familiar.6
In spite of these heavy hints the Portuguese proposed to send a squadron
to the channel again in 1794. Melo ran into great difficulties, and falling
ill, had to beg Walpole to go to Pinto on his behalf to persuade him to
overcome the fears of the Prince of Brazil that they might be intercepted
by the French. The prince was brought to agree and they set sail only
to encounter further misadventures. Niza’s ship ran aground on the Tagus
bar, and the flagship supposed to join him was detained in Catalonia. It
must be said that running aground in the Tagus was a common accident
shared by all, including Captain Campbell, a British captain in the Por¬
tuguese service. The ships left one by one and managed to reach Spithead
in July and to join the Channel Fleet; they again suffered much from
sickness and had to make an early return, but they served without discredit.
They were perhaps a liability rather than an asset but it would not do
5 F. O. 63/13, Walpole, 6 Feb. 1790. F. O. 63/16, Walpole, 27 May, 16 July

1793. Naval Records Society, Spencer Papers, ii-429, 453, 474. F. O. 63/28, Walpole,
23 July 1798.
6 F. O. 63/17, Koster, 30 June, 16, 20 July. Henry Warre, 17, 19, 27 Aug. S.
of S., 24 Aug. Walpole, 23 Aug., 18 Sept. 1793.
217
DAVID FRANCIS
to be too critical; even the proud fleets of Britain and France were by
no means immune from bad weather, sickness, shortage of supplies and
quarrelling admirals. In 1779 the French fleet had to leave the blockade
of Plymouth and to drop plans for an invasion of England in order to
return to Brest with 2000 sick; in 1780 Admiral Geary’s squadron suffered
from a similar epidemic and had to put back to Plymouth. The mutinies
in 1797 showed what could befall the Royal Navy and although the Old
Tarpaulins from the time of Pepys onwards suffered less from pretentious
and aristocratic colleagues than the Portuguese, or the French, the corres¬
pondence of Nelson and St. Vincent shows that British admirals could be
pernickety enough. In any case thanks to Melo’s hard work the Portuguese
navy functioned; it ferried an army to Catalonia and helped to police the
Straits. Occasionally it convoyed ships to Ireland and even the Baltic, as
well as to Brazil.7
During the first reaction against the Red Terror the Republican govern¬
ment had serious reverses; the armies of the encircling powers and royalist
risings in France threatened to topple the Directory. But Toulon was soon
retaken, the insurrections were gradually put down, and the monarchs
hesitated and quarrelled among themselves. In Portugal there was much
anti-republican feeling, but Ponte de Lima and many men of influence
were ill disposed towards the British, and Pinto, though reputedly pro-
British, clung to the Armed Neutrality Agreement and declined to recognise
that Portugal was at war with France, even when the Portuguese navy
was co-operating with the British navy and the army was fighting along¬
side the Spaniards against the French in Roussillon. Portugal had signed
a provisional defensive convention with Spain in June 1793 and had agreed
to send an expeditionary force. After much argument as to ways and means
the force was landed at Rosas near the Catalan border in November.
Meanwhile the Portuguese tried to save themselves from corsairs by author¬
ising the British consuls in Algiers and Tunis to parley on their behalf;
truces with both were actually agreed, but the Portuguese wanted better
terms than were offered and did not carry through with them.8
As the Marquis de Minas was too infirm to take up his command John
Forbes of Skelleter was appointed Lieutenant General in Catalonia. He
was not a very distinguished general, but a gallant soldier, and much
respected character, who had seen thirty years of service in Portugal. Some
of the Portuguese regiments, such as the 2nd Oporto regiment, had had
training from British or foreign officers and there were three British captains
in the naval squadron; one Brigadier named Fleming was British and there
7 F. O. 63/19, Walpole, 14 June, 2, 12, 25 July, 8 Nov. 1794. Grenville, 2 Aug.

1794. Naval Records Society, Spencer Papers, ii-43, 417, 450, 452. Pack, op. cit., 78.
8 F. O. 63/16, Walpole, 4, 8, 10 June 1793. F. O. 63/17, 17 July. S. of S.,
17 July, Walpole, 20 July, 18 Sept., 9 Oct., 4, 16 Dec. 1793.
218
were a few other British officers. Enslaved by the miseries of their service
it was the primary ambition of many Portuguese service men to desert;
the authorities were so afraid of large scale desertions that the cavalry
regiment at Oeyras was detailed to keep a close watch on the place of
embarkation. However the army was seasoned by a few officers and men
who had had proper training, and by a fair number of volunteers who
were gallant if inexperienced. There was a sprinkling of noblemen inspired
by old fashioned ideas of glory; they included the Portuguese Marquis
of Niza and Count of Assumar, and the British Duke of Northumberland.
They mostly tired of campaigning after a few weeks, but upon occasion
fought bravely; there were some humbler volunteers too; out of an unit
of three hundred men commanded by the Scottish John McIntyre a hundred
volunteered. The Spaniards were as ill supplied and organised as the Por¬
tuguese, so fighting alongside of them the Portuguese were able to shine
by comparison.9
Held up by storms and contrary winds tfte expeditionary force took two
months to reach Catalonia and only reached the Pyrenees in December,
where they met very bad winter weather. They numbered 5000 men, but
there were as many sick as fit, and in January they could not count on
more than 1500 for active service. The Spaniards were far more nu¬
merous, but they had no plan of campaign, and the Portuguese did not
fight as brigades, but were cut up into small units, who took part haphazard
in chance actions. But until Toulon was retaken on 17th December the
French could not reinforce their army, and though they were full of
revolutionary zeal to match the Portuguese chivalry, they were also raw
troops and ill supplied.
When the Portuguese joined the Spaniards, the troops were strung
along the valley of the river Tech, which was in flood, and they were in
danger of being cut off from their supplies; however the 2nd Oporto
regiment won a brisk action at the small town of Ceret; the line of the
Tech was held and another minor success was gained at the village of
Villelongue; the allies suffered a reverse a little later at the same village,
but succeeded in advancing towards the coast, where they occupied several
villages including Banyuls and Callioure. The Portuguese complained that
the Spaniards did little to help them and denigrated such successes as they
won. The Count de la Union was helpful but most of the other Spanish
generals were neither competent nor obliging. Indeed Forbes was moved to
write to Luis Pinto that if the Portuguese conquered the whole of France
on behalf of the Spaniards, he believed the Spaniards would not thank
them. Nor did the Spanish government give much thought to reinforcing
and supplying their own troops. However the army survived the vicissitudes
9 Latino Coelho, Hist. Polit. e Militar de Portugal, 1891, iii-89/90, 93/4,
219
DAVID FRANCIS
of the winter campaign, after which both sides took a rest for a few
weeks.10
The French then began to attack and gradually pushed the allies back
over the frontier until by the end of 1794 they were threatening Gerona.
The Spaniards appointed Urrutia, one of their better generals, to the com¬
mand, and had more troops in the field than the enemy, but they were
decimated by sickness and their morale was very low, while the French
were elated by republican victories elsewhere. The Portuguese asked to
repatriate 500 men, but the Spaniards suspected this was a ruse to reduce
their force and were reluctant to let them go. It is true that there were
many malingerers, who added to the number of sick, numerous enough
already. The Portuguese were tired of the war and would gladly have
replaced their troops by the payment of a subsidy. Several of the Spanish
generals had opted out or died. Forbes himself retired to hospital and the
two Noronhas, the next in command, were also laid low. Most of the noble
volunteers had gone home after the winter campaign. The command de¬
volved for a time on Colonel Gomez Freire, one of the more active and
enterprising Portuguese generals, courageous, but lacking in professional
knowledge or any sense of discipline, though he had seen service in Russia
and Austria. At one moment he was so insubordinate to Forbes that he had
to be imprisoned. Fie had objected to criticisms of the way he handled
his regiment and had challenged a French officer named Clavier, who was
Adjutant to Forbes, to a duel, and also another officer of foreign origin
named Mestral. Having many friends at court, including the Prince of
Brazil, Gomez Freire was in a position to denigrate all his rivals and had
no scruples about doing so, though he had shown himself much wanting
as a general, particularly in the defeat of his attempt to stage a counter¬
attack into Spanish territory at Monterey in 1801.11
In spite of all these troubles and the successes of the French the war
dragged on into 1795; the Spaniards were alarmed to find the enemy
well within their frontiers and made an effort to strengthen their resistance;
even the decimated Portuguese sometimes put up a good performance.
Rosas withstood a siege for some time and only fell after a valiant re¬
sistance. The Spaniards attacked Puigcerda and won back the Spanish
part of the valley of the Cerdagne. But the coalition against the French
republic was breaking up; in April the Directory made peace with Prussia
at Basle, and peace with Spain followed on 22nd July. Spain was to cede
her part of Santo Domingo to France, but otherwise all occupied territory
was to be restored. Portugal had not been consulted but was amiably
10 Latino Coelho, op. cit., iii-97/8, 160/3, 186/91, 229, etc. F. O. 63/17,
Northumberland to Walpole, 14 Dec. 1793.
11 Latino Coelho, op. cit., iii-215/8, 220, 228, 368/71, 429, 521, 526/30. Ameal
e Cavalheiro, Errata, 170.
220
offered the mediation of Spain; Portugal refused, because she did not
admit the need for negotiating a peace with a country with which she was
not yet officially at war. In Spain the peace caused jubilation and Manuel
Godoy, Duke of Alcudia, was rewarded with the title of ‘Prince of Peace’.
This joy spilled over into Portugal; Spain agreed to convey the Portuguese
army home, though at Portuguese expense. They arrived back at Christmas
1795, that is as many of them as survived, for they had lost about a third
of their number. They were given a hero’s welcome. The Prince of Brazil
met them and there were many promotions and decorations; it was like
the last scene of one of the operas to which the two courts were so
addicted. In the hour of triumph all was forgiven and Gomez Freire as
well as Clavier were remembered. Forbes was made a knight of the high
Spanish order of San Carlos. The Prince of Brazil was delighted and
allowed him to go to Madrid to be invested. This was a costly business,
but in Portugal he was given something more remunerative, a commanderie
of the order of Aviz valid for two lives. The nobles had for a short time
faced the real sufferings of war in Roussillon but they were more at home
in the pageant which they organised in Lisbon. Three teams of the first
nobles of the land showed their prowess at jousting on the finest horses
procurable. It had been rather hard to get together a sufficient number
and the event had to be put off, until the Marquis of Niza, one of the
principal performers, returned from a cruise; however in November 1796
the pageant took place with great splendour before an enraptured mul¬
titude. There were fireworks and a generous distribution of food and
wine. The Lisbon Chamber of Commerce entertained everybody of sub¬
stance, even the members of the British Factory, at a grand banquet and
gala. In the world of fancy the nobles could still shine and days of past
greatness could be enacted.12
Britain and Portugal had concluded an agreement for mutual aid on
23rd September 1793, but so far this had been confined to naval co¬
operation. The Spanish fleet had also been allied but Spanish naval help
had become increasingly tenuous. At the evacuation of Toulon Sir Sidney
Smith had together with the Spanish admiral been assigned the task of
destroying the French men-of-war in the harbour. The attempt was only
partially successful and fifteen ships survived to form the nucleus of the
French Mediterranean fleet in the next war. Sidney Smith was blamed, but
the Spanish Admiral had been remiss and admitted later that the des¬
truction might be in the interest of Britain, but not necessarily in that of
Spain. In 1794 the British made up for the loss of Toulon by occupying
Corsica, where the local leader Paoli made some show of inviting British
12 Coelho, op. cit., iii-305, et seq., 443 et seq., 521 et seq., 526/30. F. O. 63/19,
Walpole, 2 July 1794. F. O. 63/20, 25 March 1795. F. O. 63/21, 18 Nov., 24 Dec.
1795.
221
DAVID FRANCIS
rule. The French planned a counter-attack but were foiled by Admiral

Hotham, though he did not press his advantage as vigorously as he could
have done. Fortunately the Brest fleet after eluding the British blockade
in an attempt to sail to the Mediterranean were driven back into Brest by
a bad storm with serious damage. In 1795 Admiral Sir John Jervis
relieved Hotham and blockaded Toulon more effectively. Admiral Howe
blockaded Brest and in 1794 had won the victory of the glorious 1st of
June, in which six French ships of the line were sunk and a seventh
captured, but a number of merchant ships carrying corn escaped.13
On the whole the British maintained their blockade. The French had
some successes, particularly in 1795, when a squadron returning from
Africa captured three rich Brazil ships, another squadron out of Rochfort
intercepted a convoy, and a number of merchant ships with H. M. S.
Censeur were caught between Gibraltar and Lisbon. The packet boats were
harassed and many individual merchant ships were taken by privateers or
even by row boats off the Portuguese and Spanish coasts, but the regular
convoys to Portugal, the United Kingdom, and America, passed for the
most part unharmed under the protection of quite small escorts. In 1796
the Portuguese were alarmed by the long delay of the Brazil fleets, which
were held up for close on three years. Their value was variously estimated
between three and five million pounds. The Admiralty were dilatory, but
eventually in May Lord Grenville warmly recommended the provision of
a convoy and ships of the line under Lord Hugh Seymour were sent to
the Azores, while Rear Admiral van der Put was sent to protect the coast
of Portugal. The Brazil ships took a southerly course to evade an enemy
squadron and made no contact with any of our ships until they were
entering the Tagus. However they came in safely and at least a gesture had
been made. Only two ships were lost, one to the French far out in the
Atlantic, one by running aground on the Tagus bar.14
Luis Pinto, the foreign secretary, had been much pained when he had
not been told when was broke out between Spain and France; he now
had further reason for complaint, as he had not been informed from Ma¬
drid of the peace. He had reason for alarm. In July 1796 Spain concluded
a treaty of mutual support with France and in October she declared war
on Britain. In order to exclude British ships from Portuguese ports France
was following the precedents of 1762, bringing more and more pressure
to bear on Spain to invade Portugal or to allow a French army to march
through Spain for that purpose. Meanwhile the first coalition against France
was breaking up under the stress of allied quarrels and of French victories
13 Pack, op. cit., 91/5.

14 F. O. 63/21, Walpole, 22 Aug., 17, 21 Oct. 1795. F. O. 63/22, Walpole, 9,
11, 23 March, 16 April, 18 May, Spencer to Grenville, Grenville, 20 May. Walpole,
27 May 1796.
222
in Italy. At the end of 1796 Britain was forced to withdraw her fleet from
the Mediterranean, first evacuating Corsica and then Elba. This brought
the danger nearer to Portugal, but in some ways helped her naval pro¬
tection, which now had to be based on Gibraltar and Lisbon.15
In most aspects Spain showed herself increasingly hostile, but the king
of Spain continued to declare, even at the moment of the break with Britain,
that he would never attack his children. Indeed early in the year the two
royal families foregathered near the frontier and exchanged many fond
embraces. Spanish ministers made it clear that no political commitments
were involved, but the king of Spain continued to write affectionately to his
daughter the princess of Brazil. The Spanish ambassador had a special right
of entree as a family ambassador and Pinto was flattered by the award of
the order of the Golden Fleece. All the same he was genuinely alarmed, and
while protesting that Portugal would never yield and would abide by the
alliance with Britain, he did his utmost to court the Prince of Peace in
order to avoid a break with Spain and through Spanish mediation to reach
an understanding with France.16
Manuel Godoy, since the treaty with France styled the Prince of Peace,
had come to power by winning the affection of the queen, but managed to
remain in the king’s good graces, even when the queen’s fancy was turning
elsewhere. In order to retain the royal favour and to avoid, if possible, Spain
being driven into a corner by France, he was inclined to favour Portugal
even at the risk of French displeasure, which he incurred in 1798 for a time,
when he was ousted from court. At times he hinted that he would be glad
to enter into some secret negotiation with Britain. But more often he took
the easier course of insisting that Portugal should join Spain in breaking
with Britain. In July, Almeida, the Portuguese minister in London, told
Grenville that the Prince of Peace had threatened that if Portugal rejected
the French peace terms, which included the right of free navigation of the
Amazon, he would accept the French offer of 150,000 men to invade Por¬
tugal. Almeida added that Portugal was prepared to resist, if she could count
on powerful British aid including the provision of at least 10,000 British
troops. Grenville replied that Britain had already shown her good will enough
by sending Admiral van der Put to protect the Portuguese coast and a
squadron to convoy the Brazil fleet. He insisted that Portugal for her
own purposes was grossly exaggerating the danger.17
Although the Brazil fleet had failed to contact the British ships sent
to convoy it, it arrived safely at the end of July 1796. There were constant
15 F. O. 63/21, Walpole, 22 Aug. 1795. Damiao Peres, Hist, de Portugal,

vi-269/78.
16 F. O. 63/22, Walpole, 20 Feb., 9 March, 11 March, 3, 6, 16, 27 April, 26
June, 6 Aug., Koster, 3, 10, 28 Sept. 1796.
17 F. O. 63/22, Walpole, 6, 13 July. Grenville, 8 July, Walpole, 27 July, Gren¬
ville, 24 Aug., 6 Sept., 23 Nov. Koster, 3 Sept. 1796.
223
DAVID FRANCIS
rumours of Spanish troops mobilizing, but the British continued to belittle

these and in September a week or two before the Spanish declaration
of war Van der Put, finding the situation less alarming than he had been
led to believe, actually released three Spanish ships, which he had brought
as prizes into Lisbon. War broke out, but it must be remembered that
Lord Malmesbury was still negotiating in Paris, and until the rupture
with Spain Lord Bute had been trying to reach a settlement in Madrid.
Pinto now said that Spain was going back on all her previous assurances
and was insisting on the exclusion of British ships from Portuguese ports
and sending troops towards her frontier. He aded that Portugal would
never submit.18
Portugal herself was now stirring a little, and was proposing to raise
troops and to engage the services of a foreign general or generals. It was
even suggested that money might be raised by imposing a tax on the
clergy, but a British loan was hoped for. This was agreed by Lord Gren¬
ville, who also undertook to send out an auxiliary force of 4000 men, of
whom one third would be British and two thirds foreigners. In October
Colonel Ramsey was sent to Portugal to report on the potentialities of
defence.19
The Hon. Charles Stuart was to command the auxiliary force. A younger
son of George Ill’s minister Lord Bute, he was the brother of the Lord
Bute who had been negotiating at Madrid, and was regarded as one of
our best generals. Fortescue indeed thought that if he had not died early
he might have proved as good a general as Wellington. In Portugal he had
to contend with great difficulties, not the least of them the personality
of the Portuguese commander in chief, the Duke of Lafoens.
The duke was a grandson of King Pedro II and his French mistress
Madame Laverger. At the age of about thirty-five he had gone abroad,
where he had travelled much and spent some years at Vienna. His de¬
parture may have had a political reason as he had been friendly with the
Tavoras, though too much of a gentleman, according to Pombal, to be
implicated in any assassination plot. Pombal also remarked that he was
crazy, but he had sufficient confidence in him to entrust him with delicate
diplomatic missions in Vienna, where he had been popular and had won
the friendship of the imperial family. When he left Portugal he had in¬
tended to devote himself to military studies and in Austria he had been
present at various campaigns and had fought at the battle of Maxen. But
his incompetence as a general after his return to Portugal was universally
recognised. Perhaps he had only held honorary posts in the imperial army;
18 F. O. 63/23, Koster, 28 Sept. 1796. Grenville, 14 Oct., Walpole, 7, 18

Oct. 1796.
19 F. O. 63/23, Koster, 3 Sept., Grenville to Ramsay, 19 Sept., Walpole, 6, 12
July, 10 Sept. 1796.
224
he took a great interest in uniforms and in the organisation of camps but

as a general was hopeless. He was a witty and cultivated man with a
knowledge of the arts and a real interest in music, but he had become
a tiresome old man. Beckford said he liked to style himself the Duke of
Braganza, but Duchess of Braganza would have suited him better. ‘He is
like an old lady of the bed chamber, as fiddle-faddle and as coquettish and
gossiping. He has got on rouge and patches, and though he is seventy years
old, contrived to turn on his heel and to glide away with youthful agility.
After lisping French with a most refined accent, and complaining of the
wind and the roads and the state of architecture, he departed to mark
the site for the encampment of the cavalry.’ Beckford was a little peevish,
because Lafoens had just married for the first time, and his bride was
Henriqueta, the fifteen-year-old daughter of the Marquis of Marialva, who
had been spoken of as a fiancee for Beckford himself. A clique at court
had imagined that the opulent Beckford, if^he became a convert to the
Catholic faith, and absorbed by Portugal, might be quite an asset. The
marriage had scarcely been Beckford’s inclination, but he had nevertheless
been flattered. The duke for his part showed his manhood by promptly
begetting an heir.
The duke loved to discourse at great length on a variety of subjects.
He was very knowledgable, and if General Stuart had found time to listen
to him, he might have been more amenable, and less of an implacable
obstacle to anything Stuart cared to suggest. But it is doubful whether
more diplomacy would have made much difference, for Lafoens was an
honest man and firmly convinced that Portugal must avoid war and
becoming a cat’s paw of Britain. At home Stuart had been assured that
all possible efforts would be made to bring about the duke’s retirement,
but upon arrival in Lisbon he found not only that Lafoens was determined
to stay in the saddle, but that the Portuguese with the knowledge of the
British government had been negotiating to engage General Mack or some
other good German general and that failing Mack they had taken on the
Prince of Waldeck. Worse still, the Count de la Rosiere, a French emigre
and friend of Pinto, was being given a separate command. Stuart gave
him a bad character, though Ramsey had thought well of him. Actually
he did not interfere much and came seldom to Lisbon. Waldeck had to
be treated as senior by Stuart and was well meaning enough, but made
little impact. To cap all the greater part of Stuart’s force was held up in
Elba, and did not arrive until June, so he brought with him only a small
force of emigres instead of a sizeable corps. Even when the rest of the
troops arrived they left much to be desired. The Dillon and Rolls regiments
were demoralised and sick, while the emigres were unreliable and ill dis¬
ciplined. They had been enlisted under all sorts of capitulations and
contradictory orders about them were constantly being received. At the
225
DAVID FRANCIS
time of their enlistment there had been much sympathy for them and as
many of them were aristocrats they had been received socially, and were
well placed to lodge their complaints with influential people and to make
mischief with the gossip they picked up. However Stuart showed firmness
and tact in dealing with his motley force and was successful in disciplin¬
ing them.20
An additional difficulty for Stuart was his relationship with Henry
Dundas, the secretary of state, a fellow Scot, with whom he had lengthy
contentions, and not very respectful arguments. In a changing political
situation Dundas often did not know himself what he would do next and
sent contradictory orders. Some of the Portuguese like Lafoens were po¬
sitively obstructive; others were only incompetent or fearful, but all were
jealous of British domination and inclined to regard the British troops as
a pawn for their politics rather than as an arm for use. Stuart was inclined
to exaggerate their ill will; naturally the Portuguese did not relish a body
of foreign troops almost in occupation of their capital and Stuart had
thoughts of taking over the Tagus forts and even charge of the royal
family; but the move of Portuguese troops from the Alemtejo to Lisbon
in the autumn was a normal seasonal operation and when the Prince of
Brazil went to Mafra, he may have been glad to put a little distance
between himself and Stuart, but the move was an usual one.21
The arrival of Sir John Jervis’s squadron in the Tagus in December 1796
did much to revive the prestige of Britain. He was greeted, as Admiral
Norris had been a generation before, with a royal gift of provisions. This
time the 400 bullocks and 400 sheep and provisions to match were
supplemented by chocolate and China tea, and the fifty-six pipes of wine
included twenty pipes of superior quality. The impression made was soon
to be deepened by the victory of Jervis (now to be created Lord St. Vicent)
at the battle of Cape St. Vincent, won over a more numerous enemy by
his superior seamanship. Stuart complained that the news was kept quiet,
though every French victory was publicised, but the dominance of the
fleet in the Straits and Lisbon could not be ignored. Cadiz remained bottled
up throughout 1797, the difficult year of mutinies, and the spread of
disaffection to St. Vincent’s fleet was firmly and successfully prevented.
St. Vincent was a redoubtable character and not a man easily to be crossed,
but he managed to have his way without undue friction with the Portuguese.
He was lucky to have the co-operation of Pina Manique, head of the
police and customs and the most important official on the water front.
20 Fortescue, Hist, of the Army, VI-ii-601/6. W. O. 1/217, Stuart’s instructions,

3 Dec. 1796. Stuart to Dundas, 5 Dec. 1796, 12, 22 Jan., 15 Feb., 9, 24 April 1797.
Dundas, 6 May, Stuart, 14 June. A. Berrao, Duque de Lafoens e Marquis de Pombal,
1935, for early life of Lafoens. W. O. 1/218, Stuart, 2 July 1797.
21 W. O. 1/218, Stuart, 10 Aug., 11 Sept., 21 Sept., 9, 19 Oct. 1797.
226
Martinho de Melo had died in March 1795, but after a brief period during
which a Board of Admiralty took charge, had been succeeded as Minister
of Marine, by Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho, Count of Linhares. He was
a liberal statesman with Brazilian connections and a godson of Pombal.
He proved a staunch friend and in January 1797 readily agreed to second
a Portuguese squadron to the British service. But in August 1797 the
bad news came that the Portuguese minister in Paris, Antonio Araujo e
Azevedo, had made a treaty agreeing to the closure of Portuguese ports
to British shipping. British ministers had hoped that the Prince of Peace
would turn against the domination of France and had expected that
Araujo’s negotiations in Madrid would be co-ordinated with those taking
place at the Hague. It must be admitted that they had hinted that Portugal
might have to go it alone and the Portuguese were led to believe that
Britain would make peace with Spain. But when the Prince of Peace
held to his alliance with France, Araujo made the best terms he could,
though these were damaging to Britain. Pinto alleged that he had acted
without authority but he evidently had substantial backing from home,
for he was rewarded with promotion and the gift of the commanderie
of a knightly order to his brother. But the British were horrified by the
turn that things had taken and Lord Spencer wrote to St. Vincent that
he hoped Pinto would regard the interests of his country enough to reject
the disgraceful terms of the treaty, but as the guiding emotion of the
Portuguese appeared to be fear, our best chance would be to convince
them that they had as much reason, or more, to fear us than either France
or Spain. St. Vincent appears to have achieved this without discarding
the velvet glove. Anson’s life of St. Vincent relates that on one occasion
he threatened to blow up Lisbon, if any further attempt was made to stop
his ships coming up above Belem, when they needed to do so. The
message was said to have been delivered by Isaac Coffin the naval com-
misioner, to Sousa Coutinho. Certainly the fort at Belem had fired on
H. M. S. Dragon, when she was escorting a Spanish prize to a safe
anchorage up the river, and Walpole suggested that St. Vincent should
do his own protesting. But whatever Coffin said in private there is no
hint of any threat in the official correspondence. On the contrary Sousa
called on St. Vincent with an apology and said the man who fired the
shot had been cashiered; St. Vincent then asked for him to be pardoned,
as he had only been doing his duty by carrying out his orders. Pinto, as
secretary of state, took a firm and dignified line, saying regulations must
be observed, but that facilities would always be granted, if application
were made in the proper way. This sounded very good, but was not so
easy, for the need was usually urgent, and although the question was a
naval one, the ultimate permission for ships to pass Belem rested with
227
DAVID FRANCIS
* \ \
the titular governors of the fort, who were the Marquis of Marialva and
the duke of Lafoens.
St. Vincent complained that Pinto was weak and unreliable and he
had a very poor opinion of the Portuguese ministers except Sousa, who
was helpful but lacked political pull. But he kept his masterful tempera¬
ment under control and above all never quarrelled with Walpole or
Stuart. Later in Italy he was to say Stuart was no friend of the navy, but
he made no complaint of him in Portugal, and only had one small tiff
with Walpole about delays in the delivery of the mails.22
When the news arrived of Araujo’s treaty with France Pinto protested
to Walpole that Araujo had acted without his authority and explained that
the Prince of Brazil had been so alarmed by the appearance of pacification
between Spain and France, that he had decided to sign the French treaty
without reservation. He supposed Lafoens had engineered this at Mafra
and had asked the Conde de Vila Nova what had occurred, but the Count
professed his ignorance. He added that as soon as he heard of the decision
he had tried to resign; his resignation had been refused, but he had
succeeded in persuading the Prince of Brazil that he ought to consult
British ministers and tell them about the compulsive reasons which had
obliged him to agree to the treaty. Then, if British ministers acquiesced,
the ratification could be presented in Paris through the Spanish ambassador
there. However he doubted whether the French, exalted and arrogant as
they were after their victories, would accept the ratification.23
Stuart heard later that Pinto had gone to Mafra and had a violent
quarrel there with Lafoens; the duke had refused to be in the same
room with him, and throwing his field marshal’s patent on the floor had
stormed out. The Prince of Brazil sent the Count of Vila Nova after him,
who retrieved him when he was already halfway to Lisbon. However
although the Prince then confirmed Lafoens in his fullest favour, he was
just as frightened of Britain as of France, and persuaded Lafoens to send
a crony of his named the Conde de Pombeiro on a confidential mission
to London to explain the situation. Pinto’s insistence that Portugal was
not pledged to France was only half true, but his prediction that the
French would reject the ratification proved correct. Indeed they arrested
Araujo and kept him imprisoned for some time.24
22 For de Sousa see Maxwell, Conflicts, 179, 206, 238, etc. F. O. 63/23, Walpole,
30 Dec. 1796. F. O. 63/24, Walpole, 18 Jan. 1797. Naval Records Society, Spencer
Papers, ii-385, 415/6. Check, Life of St Vincent, 1913, p. 139. F. O. 63/27, St Vin¬
cent, 7 March, Pinto, 7 March 1798.
23 F. O. 63/26, Walpole, 2 Sept. 1797. W. O. 1/218, Stuart, 22 Nov. 1797.
F. O. 63/26, Walpole, 22 Nov. 1797.
24 W. O. 1/218, Stuart, 5, 9 Oct., 25 Oct., 10, 22 Nov. ]unot, Abrantes
Memoirs, 1-83.
228
Stuart had a stormy interview with Lafoens, who had weakened the
British position in Lisbon by recalling a number of troops from the Alen-
tejo. This was a seasonal transfer, which applied to the British as well as
the Portuguese, and involved a move from summer encampments to winter
quarters. Lafoens hoped that Stuart would be obliged to withdraw some
distance from Lisbon, but fortunately his Quarter Master General Colonel
Oakes was on good terms with the Portuguese authorities and had managed
to find them a lodging in the neighbourhood. According to Madame Junot
some of Stuart’s men had been helping to garrison the Belem forts, and
even if this was not true, the story gave the Portuguese grounds for
suspicion.25
Pinto detested Lafoens and was willing enough to agree with British
complaints of him. He was certainly a disaster from the point of view of
Britain and perhaps of Portugal too. It was generally agreed that Portugal
had the human, topographical, and financiaL resources to defend herself,
if only she were well administered. With a competent general she might
have avoided the shameful climb down of 1801 and possibly the disaster
of 1807. Lafoens was the first to criticise all departments save his own,
and was genuinely patriotic, but his management of the army was corrupt
as well as incompetent. His secretary was said to have made a fortune
by selling exemptions from military service. In the provinces it was a little
better, but the recruits in Lisbon were drawn from the dregs of the
population.
While Madame Pinto cultivated the aristocratic emigres Lafoens pre¬
ferred republicans; like so many of his class he was sympathetic to the
revolution until he was daunted by the Red Terror. The Portuguese nobility
were to be the first to resent the arrogant behaviour of the French Am¬
bassador General Lannes, but they were slow to discard their republican
sympathies and to realise the danger presented not only by the republic
but by Bonaparte. Many of the merchants also felt that any war would
be ruinous and everything must be done to stave it off. So it was not
only the Lisbon mob which was anti-British; the adherence of Lafoens to
the cause of peace was shared by many, if not the majority, of his count¬
rymen. This patriotic feeling was personally a virtue, but he had also
became a very wayward and perverse old man and was in a position to
give free rein to his whims. His wealth and rank enabled him to exercise
wide patronage and to employ spies at court and even at embassies abroad.
25 W. O. 1/218, Stuart, 17 Dec. 1797. F. O. 63/26, Walpole, 18 Oct., 13, 22,

24 Nov., Canning, 1 Dec. 1797. F. O. 63/27, August 1797 conditions for payment
of indemnity to France by Portugal. Walpole, 20 Jan. 1798. Grenville, 3 Feb. 1798.
F. O. 63/27, Walpole, 16 Feb.
229
DAVID FRANCIS
But his largest source of power was the remarkable hold he held over
the Prince of Brazil.26
Lafoens told Stuart that Pinto might command the Prince’s head, but
he commanded his heart. Yet the Prince had no personal liking for the
duke; Frere, the British minister, said that in so far as any man so
essentially good as the Prince could wish for any man’s end, the Prince,
at least by 1801, would have been glad to see Lafoens’ demise. But his
palace at Belem was small and he had no place in it he could call his
own except one small study. He was pressed on every side by supporters
of the duke and no word or gesture passed unobserved; all was blabbed
and embroidered. Only at Mafra and Salvaterra where he spent an increas¬
ing amount of time was there a little more space. He was naturally a
bumbling man and it was not surprising that in this atmosphere he took
refuge in mumbling or silence, a means used by many of his Habsburg
forbears to preserve their inscrutability. He was a conscientious man and
wanted to be punctilious but the effect was that he did little or nothing.
Fortunately for Britain his fear of Lafoens and his cronies was equalled
by his concern for the British alliance. So at a moment when Frere thought
the French were having it all their own way Madame Junot believed he
was petrified by the English.27 However obsequious he appeared to be to
the French he always kept in touch with the opposing side. At one mo¬
ment when Lannes was getting the upper hand Frere in desperation count¬
ered by trying to cut out all intermediaries in order to deal with the Prince
directly; the Prince was very forthcoming, but failed him on account of
his incomplete command of French which obliged him to use an amanuen¬
sis; the result was that the talks at once leaked and aborted. The swash¬
buckling General Lannes did better; for all his bullying he was agreeable
enough socially and Madame Lannes was a charmer; the Prince, once he
had got used to people, loved their company and seemed to be dominated
by the Lannes on terms of complete intimacy. But this did not prevent
him having talks with Admiral Campbell, a Scottish naval officer in his
service, about possible plans for a flight to Brazil. The Prince liked Lannes
and was incapable of hurting the feelings even of people he disliked.
So he hesitated to get rid of Lafoens, even when his confessor turned
26 For Lafoens earlier career see S. Ferrao, Duque de Lafoens e o Marquis de

Pombal, 1935, Cambridge Hist., viii-783 refers to Lafoens patronage of Masons.
W. O. 1/217, Stuart, 22 Jan., 15 Feb., 3 April 1797. W. O. 1/218, Stuart, 11, 21
Sept. 1797. W. O. 1/219, 18 Feb. 1798. F. O. 63/29, Grenville, 11 Dec. 1798. F. O.
63/30, Walpole, 5 June 1799. F. O. 63/32, Arbuthnot, 23 June 1800, quoting Ponte
de Lima. F. O. 63/34, Arbuthnot, 29/30 Sept. 1800 and 20 Nov., W. O. 1/223.
27 F. O. 63/32, Arbuthnot, 23 June 1800. F. O. 63/35, Frere, 18 Jan. 1801.
F. O. 63/36, Frere, 16, 26 Feb., 5 March, 23 May 1801. F. O. 63/37, 28 June 1801,
29 July 1801. Stewart, 7 Aug. 1803, Abrantes Memoires, vol. 6-5.
230
against him and refused him absolution unless he did so. In the same
way he deferred the dismissal of General Goltz and of the Minister Joao
de Almeida, even though in his heart he desired these changes.28
Although Admiral Duncan’s victory at Camperdown in October 1797
destroyed the Dutch fleet and removed the danger of an invasion of
England or Ireland from the north, it was still a time of crisis, and Stuart
prepared to evacuate his troops if Portugal ratified the French treaty.
Dundas was inclined to believe the alarmist reports which the Portuguese
made the most of in order to stimulate British aid, but Stuart reported
that there was little evidence of any build-up in France or Spain for an
invasion of Portugal. The Portuguese wanted money rather than troops
and did little to improve their defences. The French, until February, when
Bonaparte inspected the Channel Coast and advised against it, had been
taken up with plans for an invasion of England; afterwards they had too
much to do in Germany and Italy to contemplate invading Portugal and
were also turning their thoughts towards Eg^pt and India. Bonaparte set
sail from Toulon for Egypt on 19th March 1798.29
Stuart had been recalled but postponed his departure until the end
of fune 1798. Lafoens continued to thwart him, but Stuart managed to
visit the frontier to do good work in welding his motley troops into a
respectable force. Pinto failed to produce any plan for the defence of
Portugal and Stuart was never consulted by the Portuguese on any matter
of military importance; however when he left Portugal both Pinto and
the Prince of Brazil joined Walpole in giving him unstinted praise. Walpole
said that the auxiliary force would much regret his going; he had estab¬
lished discipline with justice and humanity and had done remarkably
well, considering the heterogeneous nature of his troops, for he had
assimilated the whole into one body compact in sentiment and conduct,
and all those whom he had questioned had agreed with this good opinion.
The truth of this was proved in 1801 when he was unanimously preferred
to all other candidates to return as commanding general.30
The year 1797 had been bad for Britain, a year of French victories
abroad, of threats of invasion at home, of rebellion in Ireland and of
mutinies in the navy. However by the exercise of firm discipline St. Vin¬
cent had put down disaffection in his fleet, and in Lisbon had kept up
an impressive naval presence; he had sent home a particularly recalcitrant
Admiral, Sir John Orde, and this had caused murmuring, but he had
won the day. He had the backing of Stuart’s force to guard the Tagus
28 W. O. 1/218, Dundas, 19 Aug. 1797. F. O. 63/26, Walpole, 7 Oct., 13, 22

Nov., 23 Dec., Grenville, 24 Nov. 1797. W. O. 1/219, Stuart, 9 Feb. 1798.
29 W. O. 1/218, Stuart, 13, 17 Dec. 1797. W. O. 1/219, Dundas, 3 Feb., Stuart,
20 Jan. 1798, 18 Feb. 1798. Cambridge Hist., viii-594/5.
30 F. O. 63/28, Walpole, 23 June 1798. W. O. 1/218, Pinto, 19 Aug. 1797. F. O.
63/5, Frere, 9 Feb. 1801.
231
PORTUGAL.-16
DAVID FRANCIS
forts and co-operated well enough with the Portuguese authorities to over¬
come their opposition to sending a Portuguese squadron under the Marquis
of Niza to join him in the Straits. He re-entered the Mediterranean in
April 1798, renewed the blockade of Toulon, and then intervened in
Sicily and took General Stuart to Minorca, which he occupied in No¬
vember. The French had safely reached Egypt, but their fleet was des¬
troyed in August 1798 by Nelson at the battle of the Nile, and Valetta,
which Bonaparte had captured en route, was besieged by a British force
supported by rebellious Maltese.31
The arguments about a possible invasion of Portugal and the need for
British troops there continued. British ministers were short of troops and
anxious to use those they had elsewhere. They proposed to remove three
regiments to India where a native rising threatened. The Portuguese
protested and eventually only one regiment, the 51st, was embarked for
India in October. In December Stuart asked for the 50th and the 1st
Foot, the Royals, which had remained in Lisbon, to be sent to join him
in Minorca. The Portuguese went on protesting though assured that all
three regiments would be replaced and would be reinforced by two regi¬
ments of cavalry; their protests were the more vehement because the use
of British troops in the Mediterranean would provoke Spain. The Royal
and the 1st Foot were sent to Ireland, but the Roll's and Dillon’s regiments
eventually went to the Mediterranean in July 1797, as discreetly as possible
to avoid aggravating the Portuguese. Stuart had been particularly anxious
to have the Roll’s regiment, because it was largely made up of Swiss and
Germans, whose presence might encourage many of their compatriots
in the Spanish service to desert.32
From mid-March 1799 Austria was again at war with France; Britain
again commanded much of the Mediterranean and the Russians occupied
Corfu. The Directory was facing many troubles, but even before the
return of Bonaparte from Egypt in the autumn of 1799 and the coup d’etat
of the 18 Brumaire, the allies were defeated again in Holland, Switzer¬
land and Italy. In April 1799 Admiral Bruix evaded Lord Bridport’s
blockade of Brest and successfully entered the Mediterranean; jeopardising
St. Vincent’s supremacy and preventing Stuart going to the help of the
Austrians in Italy; he also interrupted the plan for attacking Cadiz, but
although he was joined by some Spanish ships from Ferrol, he missed
joining the Spanish fleet off Cadiz. He was in sight of the British fleet,
but both sides were dispersed by a gale, and the Spanish fleet was so
31 F. O. 63/32, Almiral Keith to Marquis of Ponte de Lima, 6 Feb. 1800, F. O.

63/30, Walpole, 26 Jan., 24 April 1799. Warner, Oliver, Life and letters of Vice
Admiral Lord Collingwood, 1968, 86/88.
32 W. O. 1/220, Dundas, 26 June 1798, Fraser, 3 Aug., 26 Sept., 22 Dec. 1798,
18 Jan. 1799. W. O. 1/221, Dundas, 6 April, Cuyler, 5, 22 June, 20, 24 July 1799.
232
damaged that after leaving Cadiz it had to put into Cartagena for lengthy
repairs. So Bruix failed to relieve Malta, Minorca or the French army
in Egypt and was obliged to pass the Straits again in August 1799 without
having done any serious damage.33
Pinto had to admit early in 1799 that Portugal had been forced into
war with France and to abandon the pretence that she had remained
neutral. He admitted that Spain was powerless to deny the passage of a
French army, but still hoped to pacify France through the Prince of Peace,
while in Madrid the Portuguese minister Manoel Gomez Calvalho tried
to pretend that Niza’s squadron, which had ultimately been quite useful to
St. Vincent, had taken no active belligerent part. This was clearly untrue,
but as the ships needed to be recalled for refitting, the difficulty was for
the time being shelved though this did not occur until the middle of the
year and St. Vincent was reluctant to let them go. There was no doubt
the danger still threatened. The Portuguese continued urgently to ask for
aid. Lafoens was pleased at his success in retaining the Prince’s favour and
accepted that on the question of the British alliance the Prince was un¬
usually firm. Both Generals Cornelius Cuyler and Simon Fraser had greater
success than Stuart in buttering him up; Fraser apparently had the advan¬
tage of being an old acquaintance. They had long and cordial interviews and
were entertained by him. Lafoens now spoke with more appreciation of
the value of British help and sometimes hinted that he would like to retire
and would be willing to cede the command to Abercromby, if he came
to Portugal. These hints never matured, but in April 1800 he stooped so
far as to have a brief reconciliation with Pinto, and in September he was
rather in favour of a war with Spain, and told Fraser that if he were going
to be eaten up, he would rather have the British do it than the Spaniards.34
However Lafoens never ceased to resent the smallest challenge to his
supreme command. Pinto’s protege de la Roziere kept in the background;
he fell ill and went on leave, after which he took up a command in the
Minho, where he found the Portuguese troops in comparatively good shape
and even capable of a counter-offensive against the Spaniards in the Ciu¬
dad Rodrigo area. The Prince of Waldeck arrived in 1797 soon after
Stuart; he had a very cordial interview with the Prince of Brazil and
eventually managed to tour the provinces, but he exercised no influence
33 Dunfermline, Sir R. Abercromby, 1861, pp. 218/39. F. O. 63/34, Arbuthnot,

21, 27 Oct. 1800. Fortescue, Hist, of Army, IV-ii-799. Jurien de la Gravier, E.,
Guerres Maritimes sous la Republique et VEmpire, 2 vols., i-371/8. Naval Records Soc.,
Spencer Papers, iii-43, 103.
34 F. O. 63/30, Walpole, 26 Jan. 1799, 6 April 1799. F. O. 63/32, Walpole,
15 April 1800, 3 May, Grenville, 20 May, 7 June, Arbuthnot, 23 June. F. O. 63/34,
Arbuthnot, 29 Sept. 1800. F. O. 63/35, Frere, 16 Jan., 18 Feb. 1801. W. O. 1/222,
Fraser, 13 March 1800, 29 March, 18 April, 20 July, 30 Aug., 28 Sept. 1800, 27,
29 Jan. 1801, 8, 22 Feb., etc.
233
DAVID FRANCIS
whatever and he died in September 1798. There was then question of

Sir Ralph Abercromby succeeding him; the Portuguese were polite but
evasive and the nature of his command was never put to the test, as he
by-passed Lisbon and went straight to Gibraltar to command the force
being assembled for operations in the Mediterranean. General Goltz, lately
in the Danish service, came in his stead, arriving in October 1800. He made
equally little headway and Hookham Frere, the British minister, found it
useless to consult him, as he had acquired little knowledge of the defence
situation. In better circumstances Goltz was a competent soldier, but he
was not tactful, and he was too fond of his emoluments either to resign
if he did not get his way or to keep up the style of living required to
inspire the respect of the Portuguese. So the slight hopes that Lafoens
sometimes held out of retiring came to nothing. In July 1799 with the
support of Lafoens the Prince of Brazil reluctantly assumed the Regency,
and the shadow of the mad queen left the government. Lafoens had
benefited by its shelter to retain his command, but no doubt now felt
that with the Prince definitely in charge he could manage even better. In
January 1801 his authority was extended to the ministry of war and he
became practically prime minister with the privilege of seeing all papers,
which were otherwise confined to their own particular ministries. So he
completed the build up of his power, which had been growing ever since
the altercation at Mafra.35
In June 1799 Grenville wrote that the rapid and brilliant successes
of the allies on the continent and the certainty that the whole of the dis¬
posable forces of France and most of those of Spain were locked up in
the Mediterranean, where they could be closely watched by a superior
British force, placed the security of Portugal on a much better footing
than any since the alliance of France and Spain, and there was no need
to keep an Auxiliary Force locked up in Portugal any longer. Enemy
successes were to bely this view at once, though a further two years were
to pass before Portugal was invaded. Meanwhile efforts to make peace
continued. One demarche was made through William Gregory, a former
consul general at Barcelona, who had many Spanish connections; he was
sent to Lisbon early in 1798 and got into touch with Pinto and also with
the Prince of Peace in Madrid, where his brother Thomas was residing as
Commissary for the exchange of prisoners. There were other possible
channels of communication and Stuart offered to secure the services of a
connection of Bonaparte, who was willing to sell intelligence and said that
a correspondence could easily be kept up through influential merchants.
35 Damiao Peres, Hist, de Portugal, vi-281. W. O. 1/221, Fraser, 2 Oct. 1799.

W. O. 1/222, 13 March 1800. F. O. 63/32, Walpole, 15 April, 17 May 1800. F. O.
63/31, Walpole, 15 July 1799. F. O. 63/35, Frere, 8 Jan. 1801. F. O. 63/36, 16
April 1801.
234
Portugal had been making overtures through the Prince of Peace, who
had promoted Portugal’s ratification of the peace, and was anxious to
avoid a fresh war, which would entail the passage of a French army
through Spain. When he fell out of favour in 1798, he ceased to be of
help, but he returned to court in 1800 and again exercised some influence
in trying to moderate the exigencies of France. But when Lucien Bona¬
parte succeeded Berthier as ambassador in Madrid the French tone stiff¬
ened. In 1880 Diogo de Noronha was sent by the Portuguese to Madrid
to try to detach Spain from France; through the good offices of Talleyrand
he was even allowed to proceed to Paris but was soon sent back. Mean¬
while Robert Walpole, who had been British minister for twenty years,
fell sick and retired in June 1800. He was awarded the unusually generous
pension of £2000 a year, and continued to give advice on Portuguese
questions in London. He deserved this recognition, for during his long
mission he had achieved unusually smooth relations both with the turbulent
British Factories and with the Portuguese. The Consul General Charles
Arbuthnot took charge until the end of the year, when John Hookham
Frere became minister. Both had foreign office experience and had been
members of parliament. After the battle of Marengo in June 1800 it was
a crucial time for Britain, so it was useful that her representation in Lisbon
continued in good hands.36
In July 1800 a British force made unexpected landings at Ferrol and
at Vigo, but re-embarked at once. At Ferrol the navy were very indignant,
as by failing to assault the place they missed capturing several Spanish
ships of the line in the port. The fort was too strong to take so the
decision was probably right, but it engendered ill feeling between the
services. The expeditionary force proceeded to Port Mahon with a view
to a landing in Italy, but this had to be given up in view of the French
successes there. So the 10,000 men, so laboriously assembled, returned to
Gibraltar at a loose end. Cadiz, so near at hand, was an obvious objective
and Sir Ralph Abercromby also thought of going to Portugal. Fraser had
suggested a march to Madrid and Pinto, in spite of his ardour for making
a peace with Spain, quite liked the idea. It was generally agreed that with
ten thousand men Madrid could be reached, provided the question of
supply could be solved. But both Arbuthnot and Simon Fraser advised
against bringing an allied force to Portugal, as they were convinced that
Portugal had no serious intention of breaking with Spain and were only
asking for allied troops in order to better their position for bargaining.
36 F. O. 63/30, Grenville, 18 June 1799. F. O. 63/27, 3 Feb. 1798. Memorandum

for William Gregory. F. O. 63/27, Walpole, 16 Feb., Gregory, 18, 24 Feb., 4, 14
March. F. O. 63/28, 13 June. F. O. 63/29, Almeida to Hawkesbury, 3 Aug. 1801.
Damiao Peres, Hist. de Portugal, vi-276/8. F. O. 63/33, Note from Madrid of 25
July 1800 re Prince of Peace’s return to power.
235
DAVID FRANCIS
Their presence in Portugal would certainly do this, but they would be

bottled up and do no harm to the enemy. Pinto himself agreed that what¬
ever Spain’s ultimate designs were, she had no intention of attacking at
once, for she was more interested in protecting her ports from the British
than in invading Portugal. She did have troops near the Portuguese frontier,
but they were mainly there for domestic reasons, particularly the formation
of a ‘cordon sanitaire’ to protect the rest of Spain from the spread of the
current epidemic in Andalusia and to prevent contraband.37
The Cadiz plan was adopted and Abercromby summoned the town
without success, but after some days of indecision Admiral Keith decided
that a landing to assault the town would be too risky. If he had studied
the century-old records of Admiral Rooke he might have realized sooner
that Cadiz offered a dangerous lee shore with the approach of autumn. As
it was, rough weather caused him some anxiety and prevented him from
engaging the French fleet, which lay within sight for some days equally
storm tossed. The risk from the epidemic raging ashore also had to be
taken into account. The upshot was that Abercromby took the major part
of his force up the Mediterranean, eventually to land in Egypt. Aber¬
cromby was killed in action, but the French army stranded there surrend¬
ered on 31st August 1801 just too late to influence the terms of the peace
of Amiens with France. In spite of the Egyptian expedition and the decision
to evacuate the Auxiliary Force from Portugal Abercromby detached 5000
men under Sir James Pulteney to land in Portugal in November 1800. But
they left after a very brief stay as did also the other British troops including
the two regiments of dragoons, which had become unserviceable owing
to the lack of fodder for their horses; only the three emigrant regiments
remained. The Portuguese protested as usual at the departure of the troops,
but they had shown no practical concern with the Spanish danger, which
they so loudly advertised, and the British Government were also exasper¬
ated by the protection given to Spanish trade, and in particular by the
arrival with the Brazil fleet of seven Spanish ships with valuable cargoes,
including probably a large quantity of bullion, which had been transferred
to Portuguese men of war. Frere’s instructions had emphasised that Por¬
tugal would only be in danger in the improbable event of Austria making
peace with France. Napoleon’s victory at Marengo changed all this and
Britain modified her attitude. Frere had been told to threaten to withdraw
all protection if satisfaction was not given about the Spanish ships. His
revised orders denied that any threat was intended and explained that the
British troops were being withdrawn entirely on general grounds and would
be replaced whenever the need for them arose. Meanwhile he was to
37 F. O. 63/33, Arbuthnot, 2, 4 July. F. O. 63/34, Arbuthnot, 30 Sept. 1800.

2, 5 Aug., 6, 15, 22 Sept. F. O. 63/34, Arbuthnot, 3 Oct., 8, 20 Nov. 1800. Aber¬
cromby to Arbuthnot, 14 Sept., Grenville, 21 Oct. 1800.
236
congratulate Portugal on having emerged scatheless. Pinto protested that

the danger was by no means over. He had intended to go to Madrid him¬
self, but gave up this mission, probably because he was afraid that his
enemies would take the opportunity of his absence to oust him from office.
However Sousa Holstein was sent to negotiate in Madrid, though a pro¬
posal to send him there in 1798 had been turned down on the ground that
he was entirely in the pocket of Lafoens. Holstein’s mission failed and in
February 1801 France and Spain signed a convention, which obliged Spain
to support an attack on Portugal by occupying three Portuguese northern
provinces, while British ships would be excluded from Portuguese ports
until peace was concluded and Minorca and Trinidad restored. But at this
very moment Grenville’s successor as secretary of state, Robert Bankes
Jenkinson, Lord Hawkesbury {later Lord Liverpool), was making a fresh
British effort for peace.38
So far the Portuguese efforts to preserve her neutrality had paid off.
Many merchants had been hard hit by bad 'debts in France, but trade in
general had prospered. Port wine exports were exceptionally high in most
years from 1790 to 1803 and went in appreciable quantities to the Baltic
as well as the United Kingdom, while exports of wine from Lisbon and
Figueira were considerable. The cotton trade flourished and imports from
Portugal in thousands of pounds annually for the years 1796/1810 and
1801/5 were £700,000 and £980,000. Exports for the same periods
averaged £810,000 and £1,000,000. The usual mainstay of British exports
to Portugal, woollens, decreased, but a large quantity of foodstuffs was
exported, much of which went forward to France and Spain, as did a large
increase in Portuguese imports from Brazil. The figures for the United
Kingdom did not include the Atlantic trade or the considerable trade with
Ireland, though the Union with Ireland occurred in 1800. The statistics,
sometimes computed in cruzados, sometimes in milreis, are confusing, and
Sided has pointed out that two such eminent authorities as Macedo and
Balbi sometimes fell from grace in computing one in terms of the other.
The milreis was a currency of account and at least in terms of its London
exchange value very stable throughout the century, averaging about 5/6,
though it was lower at the turn of the century, and varied annually accord¬
ing to the state of the market, which was largely dependent on the arrival
of the Brazil fleets. The cruzado was a coin; the new cruzado was worth
480 reis, the old cruzado 400 reis, but the rate of 400 seems to have been
usual at the turn of the century for statistical purposes. Statistics are ha¬
zardous things, but when sets of figures for different years can be taken
38 W. O. 21/222. Fraser, 7, 9, 13 Nov., 16 ec. 1800. F. O. 63/34, Grenville to

Arbuthnot, 21 Oct., 19 Nov. To Frere, 10 Oct. and 18 Dec., instructions 14 Oct.
Arbuthnot, 21, 23, 27 Oct., 8, 20 Nov., 4, 11 Dec. 1800. F. O. 63/35, Frere, 5 Ian.
1801. Fortescue, Hist, of Army, IV-ii.
237
DAVID FRANCIS
as based in the same way they show increases or decreases well enough.
One is safe in concluding that in the last years before 1807 the Portuguese
merchant class and the government fared well enough, though the people
may have suffered from inflation.
The creation of a free port at Lisbon in 1796 had facilitated its use
as an entrepot for the passage of a great quantity of goods, both legally
and as contraband, towards European countries and outwards to Brazil
until it began to be closed down in 1806. So Portugal was less daunted
than might be expected by the large indemnities demanded by France.
These in any case could be regarded as a profitable affair by international
bankers and it is interesting that in 1802 two British bankers came to
Lisbon to discuss a loan of a million and a half sterling, ostensibly to
redeem the Portuguese paper money, but in reality, it was rumoured, to
go towards the French indemnity. In June 1800 Rodrigo de Sousa was
very critical of the wretched financial management of the government, as
indeed was everybody, including Lafoens. Sousa said there was plenty of
money in private hands in Portugal, and Portugal would be well off if
she were properly administered. In February 1801 he undertook the task
himself, and hoped, if he were given time, to introduce order into Por¬
tuguese finances. Meanwhile he spoke of needing £800,000, £400,000 in
cash and £400,000 in the form of a loan on the security of diamonds.
The House of Commons voted £200,000, increased later to £300,000;
when peace came they objected that the money had been granted for
making war and not for making peace, but nevertheless paid up. It was
alleged that many Lisbon merchants habitually hoarded specie, which they
would be glad to convert into interest bearing stock, but a cash subsidy
was finally agreed. Most of it was spent in England; the bill for the
purchase of supplies until the end of 1800 came to £282,000, of which
military supplies came to £152,000.39
In February 1801 the Portuguese clamoured for 10,000 troops (Seabra
later said 5000 would be enough) and a general, preferably the Hon.
Charles Stuart. The Spanish ambassador was talking of leaving, but signs of
war preparations in Spain were few and the Prince of Peace did not assume,
as predicted, the command of the army. In a last attempt to get rid of
Lafoens Frere arranged the private interviews with the regent, which as
related came to nothing. All the same the regent was sympathetic and there
was talk of a separate command being set up in the north and of the Prince
himself taking up the command in the Alentejo, measures which might
39 F. O. 63/33, Arbuthnot, 23 June 1800. F. O. 63/34, 20 Nov., 4 Dec. 1800.

F. O. 63/36, Frere, 27 Feb., 28 March 1801. E. B. Schumpeter, English Overseas
Trade Statistics. F. Crouzet, Le Blocus Continental, 2 vols., 1952, pp. 144/5, etc.
Balbi, Essai Statistique, 1-431-442.
238
have reduced the powers of Lafoens for mischief. Frere indeed after the
Spanish declaration of war on 2nd March 1801 thought that the attack
would come from the north where the best generals, including Forbes and
Gomez Freire, were posted. Goltz also was proposed for the north but
was stopped by the difficulty of defining his powers. On 27th February
Grenville in his last despatch before handing over to Lord Hawkesbury
wrote that King George was too ill to have papers laid before him, and
that ministers could spare no troops to help Portugal and could only
recommend her to make the best terms she could. However, if the regent
was determined to resist, parliament would advance £300,000 as a subsidy
and would try, as soon as the possibilities of the money market had been
explored, to raise a loan of half a million pounds.40
The Factories now began to be anxious. The Lisbon Factory no longer
represented the whole of the British community. Roman Catholics were
still excluded and in spite of the legal judgements in their favour nothing
had been done in Portugal to help them. However memorials to the min¬
ister were now sometimes signed not by the Lisbon Factory as such but
by all the leading merchants resident in Lisbon and orders from home about
measures to protect British Subjects sometimes mentioned that they must
be applied to all British Subjects and not to members of the Factories
only. But one gathers, reading between the lines, that the Factories were
as jealous as ever of their independence and of official interference. Frere
paid tribute to Arbuthnot for conducting the Factory affairs very tactfully
and on Arbuthnot’s advice he abstained from attending Factory meetings.
He observed that it was a very difficult and delicate business, for the
jealousy of official interference which prevailed in the Lisbon Factory,
and as he believed in most similar bodies, formed one of the chief
difficulties with which Arbuthnot had to contend. The Factories were now
inclined to voice their grievances in London rather than to consul general
or minister, and in March had obtained a hearing from the Privy Council
for two representatives each of the Lisbon and Oporto Factories. As a result
facilities for the shipment of British goods in case of war in Portuguese
or neutral ships were promised and also for their acceptance by the British
Customs without immediate payment of duty. It was the Portugal merchants
in London rather than those in Portugal who had taken fright; Frere found
the Lisbon Factory steady and discouraged them from hasty measures to
send away all their goods. Nevertheless without too much commotion they
disposed of a considerable proportion. Lafoens at one time threatened to
prevent merchants leaving, but assurances were obtained that even in the
40 F. O. 63/35, Frere, 9 Feb. 1801. F. O. 63/36, 9, 26 Feb., 5, 23 March. Gren¬

ville, 27 Feb. 1801.
239
DAVID FRANCIS
event of peace with France British Subjects would not be detained nor
their property confiscated.41
It was nearly the end of May 1801 before the invasion began. Mean¬
while Lafoens was inveighing against British perfidy. Even Rodrigo de
Sousa was indignant, but he stoutly maintained that Portugal was not San
Marino, to be conquered in a day. Roziere reported favourably on the
situation in the north and the auxiliary force was embarked for Oporto to
assist him, but the order was countermanded and they were sent to the
Alentejo instead. Lafoens was perhaps responsible for sending Araujo on
a mission to France, and after a great deal of mystification he set sail for
Brittany at the beginning of April; his instructions were not divulged,
but Frere had a long talk with him before he left, during which he de¬
fended his secret negotiations with France and made a rather favourable
impression. Pinto claimed to know nothing of Araujo’s mission and himself
left at the end of May for Badajoz to treat with the Spaniards. Meanwhile
there had been many conflicting rumours about events in Spain and the
mobilization of French forces there. Lafoens had at least the fortitude to
go to the Alentejo, where the better generals, Forbes, Gomez Freire and
the Marquis of Aloma, had now been sent to support him. At the end of
March Lafoens reported that he had adequate funds for the army and
Frere thought that the army and particularly the militia were in better
heart. They had been given some pay and General Fraser thought that
if they were properly fed they might prove adequate. But he still de¬
precated the idea of any British troops being sent, saying that a few well
armed light troops might be of service, but a larger force would be a
waste of money and in grave risk of sharing any disaster which befell the
Portuguese. The complaints of Lafoens and of Sousa of the lack of British
aid were met by the firm rejoinder that His Majesty’s Government were
the best judges of the situation, which entirely depended on the outcome
of the negotiations with France. In the event of peace being concluded
Britain would safeguard the interests of Portugal, but in case of the con¬
tinuation of war would send help in time. On the eve of the invasion
Frere said that in the event of war the position would be critical, not
on account of any deficiency of Portugal’s potentialities for defence, but
by reason of the utter supineness and incompetence of the Portuguese
government and of Lafoens.42
On the naval side the situation was better. The Brazil fleet had arrived
safely and convoys passed to and fro; the entry of shipping was interrupted
for a few weeks from July, when there was danger of Lisbon being
41 F. O. 63/36, Frere, Hawkesbury, 6, 7 March. Frere, 2, 23, 28 March, Arbuth-

not, 28 March, 8, 9, 22, 30 April. F. O. 63/7, Merchants Memorial of 7 June 1801.
42 F. O. 63/36, Frere, 28 March, 8, 16 April, 9, 15 May 1801.
240
occupied, but there was news of a naval success at Copenhagen and most
of the British property held by the Factory had been safely shipped home.
Sousa had asked for a British force to blockade Cadiz and Admiral Saus-
marez was promptly sent out; he arrived at the end of June and was soon
joined off Cadiz by three more ships; soon afterwards he defeated a com¬
bined French and Spanish squadron with troops on board, perhaps intended
for an attack on Lisbon. Letters were received in the Lisbon post office
addressed to French officers expected to have joined the garrison at
St. Julian.43
The auxiliary force went by boat up the Tagus and marched to join
the Portuguese army. They were only two or three thousand men and their
reliability had been questioned both by British and Portuguese as they
consisted mostly of French or Germans, but Fraser thought they were loyal
and had now been brought into good shape. They were given no opportun¬
ity to prove their metal, for they met the retreating Portuguese at Gaviao
not far beyond Abrantes and saw no actidn. From Badajoz a consider¬
able Spanish force had entered the Alentejo, mopping up Olivenga and
several small towns without meeting any resistance. They summoned Elvas,
but Fort Lippe there was a serious obstacle, and they did not venture an
assault; Porto Maior, the other principal fortress, rejected a summons but
capitulated after a siege of fifteen days. An incompetent commander incurred
losses at Arronches, but otherwise there was little fighting. Lafoens made
no attempt to relieve Porto Maior but retired in all haste towards Abrantes,
as soon as the enemy approached him at Porto Alegre. He showed incom¬
petence and senility, breathing fire and slaughter against the unfortunate
officer who had evacuated Juremenha, although he had signed the order
to him to do so; when confronted with it he merely remarked that one
could not remember everything. There was no military rhyme or reason for
the retreat, only a complete break down of supplies, which were scarcely
better even when the army was back in GaviaS. Meanwhile Araujo had
been allowed to land in France, in spite of his lack of a passport to do
so, and even to reach Paris, but had achieved nothing. On 9th June Fraser
heard from Lafoens that according to a message from the Prince of Peace
Pinto had concluded at Badajoz a treaty of peace with France and Spain.
Pinto had only been to glad to sign it at the cost of a large indemnity
payable to France, the cession to Spain of Olivenca and an undertaking
to close the ports of Portugal to the British. Fraser asked at once for leave
to withdraw his troops, but he had to wait until Lafoens had confirmation
from Queluz of the conclusion of peace. It was September before his troops
regained Lisbon and July 1802 before they finally left Portugal.44
43 F. O. 63/36, Frere, 15 May. F. O. 63/37, 25 June, Arbuthnot, 29 June,

Hawkesbury, 9, 28 June, 24 July 1801. W. O. 1/222, Fraser, 24 July 1801.
44 W. O. 1/222, Fraser, 9, 10 June 1801. F. O. 63/37, Frere, 28 June, 7, 20,
241
DAVID FRANCIS
Lafoens was rather pleased than otherwise that his Cassandra-like

prophecies of doom had been justified. In 1797 he had demurred at giving
Stuart leave to inspect the defences with the remark ‘You may be our
Ally today, but tomorrow you may be our enemy’. He now observed to
Fraser ‘Now we are at war’. Fraser retorted ‘You need not be afraid;
we only wish to run away from you as fast as we can’. In Lisbon there
was a general outcry for the recall of Lafoens. Even now his dismissal
hung fire and it was not until mid-July that he embarked on the Tagus
to return to Lisbon. He was forbidden access to the court but to the
surprise of all accepted his relegation with a civil protest of loyalty. After
a further interval Goltz at last took charge and went up to Abrantes; but
he was not satisfactory and was soon replaced by a French emigre general
named the Marquis of Viosmenil, who after long arguments about his
emoluments and powers eventually arrived with a recommendation from
England. Meanwhile Bonaparte expressed dissatisfaction with the Badajoz
treaty though it had been signed by his brother Lucien. Nevertheless on
24th July the peace with Spain was celebrated in Lisbon with illumin¬
ations, though Bonaparte threatened to renew the war in order to conquer
the northern provinces of Portugal and in Portugal there was talk of
resistance. However Britain had signed a treaty with Russia, Austria was
marking time with a view to resistance and the attitude of Prussia was
wavering. The news of the capitulation of the French army in Egypt had
not yet been received, but things were going badly for Bonaparte there,
and feeling in need of a respite he resigned himself to accepting a peace
for the time being. But there was still talk of a further ultimatum to Por¬
tugal and of French troops replacing Spanish troops there. Lucien Bona¬
parte had made it clear in Madrid that his object was to close Portuguese
ports to the British but not to indemnify Spain by the conquest for her
of a Portuguese province. On the Spanish side the Prince of Peace had
intimated to Portugal that he would welcome a British approach leading
to a secret understanding. In return Britain promised military aid to
Portugal, if she could detach Spain from France. There were civil dis¬
turbances in Valencia and financial stringency in Spain, as well as the
epidemic now drawing to a close in Andalusia. Therefore the Prince of
Peace was anxious to economise by withdrawing his troops. He was in
no mood to keep them under arms in order to assist French conquests. The
British in September approved the approach to Spain and agreed to sign
a separate treaty with her if necessary. However the prospects for a General
Peace had improved and Britain undertook to insist on the integrity of
29 July. Copy of French Treaty, 6 June. Almeida to Hawkesbury, 3 Aug., 17, 27

Sept. Hawkesbury, 2 Oct. Comte de Rochemont, Memoires, Paris, 1933, described
in Cavalheiro Rodrigues, Temas de Historia, Porto, 1938.
242
Portugal and her dominions in the course of the negotiations. But in spite
of the progress of the peace negotiations the French were still demanding
additional concessions in Brazil and the surrender of the Portuguese men
of war, who under the Marquis of Niza had assisted the British Navy. A
French squadron under Admiral Linois was spoken of as intended to
attack the Azores or Madeira. There was also the threat of a French
invasion of the north of Portugal, though de la Roziere reported that his
troops could resist and in the Portuguese Council of State Sousa and his
old schoolmate Joao de Almeida, though not Pinto, spoke in favour of
resistance. The Prince of Peace said he was in no position to support
Portugal, if she resisted, and advised acceptance of the French terms. But
in early October H. R. H. the Duke of Sussex, who was staying in Lisbon
for the sake of his health, met the Spanish Duke of Infantado at the
opera and was told by him that peace was likely to be concluded between
England and France very soon. In fact copies of the articles of peace
arrived on 25th October. These preserved Portugal’s integrity, as defined
by the treaty of Badajoz; Almeida and Sousa had warmly pleaded for
insistence on the retention of Olivenca, but British ministers, having turned
down French demands in Guyana, felt they could not insist in this minor
matter.45
Britain had undertaken one land operation to aid Portugal, the occu¬
pation of Madeira by Colonel Clinton with the 85th regiment of foot and
1100 men. It had not been practicable to give notice of this, and Almeida,
though he was a friend of England and perhaps because he was vulner¬
able to criticism on that score, gave Frere a severe dressing down. He
protested at British perfidy in sending a force to plunder their colony at
the very moment when no troops were said to be available to defend the
frontiers of Portugal. What an opening this would give to Lafoens, and
as to Madeira there had been no mention of the place hitherto by the
French. Frere was able to rebut this by pointing out that the Portuguese
minister in Madrid had reported a French plan to attack Madeira, but
he was much embarrassed, the more so because he was aware that a
British garrison had just arrived in Goa, and Lima, the Portuguese minister
in London, had been reporting stories of British expeditions against Por¬
tuguese colonies, including Brazil. However the regent himself took the
initiative in the Council of State by proposing to write to the governor of
Madeira to tell him that a British force was coming to aid the defence of
the island. But in spite of this it appeared later that he deeply resented
45 W. O. 1/222, Fraser, 10 June, 12 Sept. 1801. W. O. 1/217, Stuart, 15 Feb.

1797. F. O. 63/37, Frere, 9 July. F. O. 63/38, 25 Aug. 1801. Hawkesbury, 27 July,
5 Sept. 1801. Almeida to Hawkesbury, 2 Aug. Frere to Keith, 5 Aug., Frere to
Hawkesbury, 25 Aug., 13, 17, 27 Sept., 4, 9 Oct. 1801. Damiao Peres, Hist, de Por¬
tugal, vi-287.
243
DAVID FRANCIS
« * i
that he had not been properly forewarned. Luckily the landing was
effected without incident; this was largely due to help given by the Deputy
Consul John Cock, who was also a leading merchant; with the co-operation
of Thomas Murdoch, another prominent merchant, he arranged the landing
of a naval lieutenant to explain the situation to the governor. Clinton had
grave suspicions that the governor was unfriendly and was corresponding
secretly with the anti-British faction in Lisbon, and that given the chance
he would encourage the local population to resist, but the wealthy mer¬
chants, British and Portuguese, were pro-British, and apart from a few
minor incidents outwardly cordial relations were maintained with the
Portuguese authorities, until after the conclusion of peace the troops were
withdrawn. Madeira with its export of 15,000 pipes of wines was a valuable
place in itself and a useful port of call on the way both to the Americas
and the Indies.46
46 Madeira Papers. W. O. 1/352, Clinton, 27, 31 July, 17 Sept., 18 Nov. 1801.

F. O. 63/37, Frere, 20, 25, 29 July. F. O. 63/38, 21, 25 Aug., 17 Sept., 18 Nov. 1801.
244
11
THE FLIGHT TO BRAZIL
After the invasion of 1801 the old alliance entered a bad patch. There
had always been grumbles on both sides. The Portuguese complained
that the British enjoyed many privileges, but that the aid they gave was
always too little and too late. The British jfelt that their privileges were
constantly denied them and that the Portuguese, who were always asking
for help in one form or another, seldom appreciated it when it was forth¬
coming, and indeed when the help consisted of troops, slighted the British
generals and frustrated all attempts to dispose of the troops usefully. It
was true that the Portuguese normally resented any British presence and
only felt reconciled to it in the rare instances of some striking success such
as that won by Burgoyne at Valencia de Alcantara and Vila Velha in
1762. Otherwise they belittled the part played by British troops and
magnified that taken by their own. So in March 1801 when Frere was
trying to encourage Pinto by saying that Portugal should take steps to
defend herself, as she had so often done in the past, Pinto eagerly seized
the opportunity to claim that in 1762 only two English regiments had
taken an active part.1
The British could be excused for impatience with an ally who was at
the same time so intransigent and so helpless, but the policy of the younger
Pitt, which expended so much of Britain’s resources on distant expeditions,
was subject to much criticism. It had been otherwise in the Seven Years
War in the days of his father, when the same policy, sustained by allies,
had been able to keep up a competent army in the heart of Europe as
well as to retain the command of the sea for distant expeditions, and had
won rich rewards. But now with Napoleon the master of the continent
only the extremities of Europe, and overseas territories, were vulnerable
and distant expeditions were the only practicable ones. But there were
few troops to spare for Portugal, where it was doubtful whether they were
seriously needed or would be appreciated or properly used. So in spite
of Portuguese protest the auxiliary troops were withdrawn except for
1 F. O. 63/36, Frere, 23, 28 March 1801.
245
DAVID FRANCIS
three small regiments of emigres. Arbuthnot justified this by denying that

there was any danger of an enemy invasion and by saying that although
no troops could be spared for the present, in case of need no possible aid
would be withheld. He added emphatically that the withdrawal of the
troops could not possibly be regarded by Portugal as a betrayal.2
The threat of war soon revived after the treaty of Amiens and Por¬
tuguese ministers felt justified in their sense of grievance. They had been
particularly irked by the British occupation of Madeira and there were
rumours that Britain had it in mind to occupy Goa, and Brazil too, as
well as Madeira. It was alleged that British troops in Madeira were boasting
of their future conquests in Brazil. The British minister argued that the
need for some military protection for Goa had been agreed and that
while the troops in Madeira were helping the common cause, the despatch
of troops to Portugal would only have ensured their participation in a
common disaster, but the Portuguese remained unconvinced. It was a fact
that the three emigre regiments had been allowed no opportunity to render
any active service, and that the presence of foreign troops was always
resented in Portugal, while the Portuguese public entirely failed to appre¬
ciate the less obvious benefits afforded by naval protection and the guar¬
antee of supplies. The later made a large total. An account rendered in
December 1800 spoke of £183,813 worth of military stores and £102,000
for ordnance.3
Nevertheless the alliance went on working. At Amiens a general
guarantee of the integrity of Portugal was extracted from Napoleon. He
gave up his plans to partition Portugal with reluctance, but Spain was
being recalcitrant and the Prince of Peace was showing signs of changing
sides, so for the time being a respite was welcome to him. Britain had
ensured the preservation of Portugal, but failed to redress some minor
grievances, which rankled even more than the major ones. One of them
was the Spanish occupation of Olivenca and of the small enclave of Ju-
remenha. The regent never forgave this and years later was to say that if
only he had Olivenca back he could begin to sleep soundly at nights.
British ministers could hardly be blamed for failing to win back what the
Portuguese themselves had ceded by the treaty of Badajoz, but the Por¬
tuguese continued to argue that if they had concluded the treaty at once
instead of waiting until they were sure of British agreement, they might
have got better terms and perhaps have saved Olivenca.4
2 F. O. 63/34, Arbuthnot, 4 Dec. 1800.

3 F. O. 63/34, Arbuthnot, 11 Dec. S. of S., 18 Dec. 1800. F. O. 63/37, Frere, 20,
29 July 1801. F. O. 63/38, Frere, 25 Aug., 3, 17 Sept. Ameida, 23 Aug. S. of S., 5
Sept. 1801.
4 F. O. 63/36, Frere, 23 March. F. O. 63/37, Frere, 25 June, 27 July. F. O.
63/38, Frere, 5 Aug., 17 Sept., 19 Oct. Ameida, 3 Aug. S. of S., 5 Sept. 1801. F. O.
63/55, Stranford, 14 Oct. 1807.
246
This feeling that they had been let down influenced Portugal through¬
out the following years when they became more and more submissive to
France. Nevertheless they continued to try to humour England and to
make some show of resistance. The insufferable Duke of Lafoens was at
last dismissed, and the inadequate General Goltz after many hesitations
was replaced by Viosmenil, a Frenchman who had been in British service.
Four councillors were appointed to advise the regent of whom only one,
the Count of Vila Verde, was actively hostile. The other three were Joao
de Almeida, Pinto now Viscount of Balsamao, and Rodrigo de Sousa
Coutinho. Pinto, though a slippery customer, was not ill disposed and
Almeida and Sousa were friendly. Sousa remarked to Frere that he had
been only too ready to report the follies and foibles of Lafoens, so he
hoped that he would now mention that there were also good and loyal
men in the government. There was now some hope that Portugal might
stand up for herself but French pressure proved too strong.5
The French minister General Lannes arrived in April 1802. When he
landed after crossing the Tagus he was met by a royal coach which was
an unprecedented honour. He brought with him some magnificent presents,
which were all accepted except a musical clock for the young prince of
Beira. He was not offensive at first save in some minor matters and the
lavishness of his mission cast all others into the shade and assured him
of popular acclaim. So when a British midshipman happened to go ashore
at the same time as a French frigate captain he was hissed, while the
Frenchman was cheered. The Portuguese were riled because the copy of
the treaty of Amiens, which Lannes brought with him, showed that their
envoy had not been admitted to participate and they blamed the British
for not doing enough to secure good terms for Portugal. There was a
feeling of Chauvinism abroad, and great trouble with sea captains, who
were accused of smuggling; this affected the British most of all but the
French did not escape; even a French secretary was apprehended and
Lannes got into difficulties about contraband entering with his luggage.
Also though his ostentation won him cheap popularity, Lannes as a bluff
soldier knew nothing about the niceties of diplomacy and protocol and
cared less. His policy was to crash through and he did this with some
success, but not without arousing resentment. He hastened the departure
of the three emigre regiments and also of General Viosmenil, though the
latter tried to ingratiate himself with him. Colonel Fraser ordered his regi¬
ments to leave off wearing the white cockade of the Bourbons and tried
to resist the demands of Lannes that they quit the Lisbon area. However,
when pressed, he agreed that he must obey the command from his Portu¬
guese superior to move them, as this was an operational question, though
5 F. O. 63/37, Frere, 29 July. F. O. 63/38, 3 Sept. 1801. F. O. 63/39, 5 Jan., 25

May 1802.
247
PORTUGAL.-17
DAVID FRANCIS
Frere tried to sustain that it was a political issue. The regiments moved in
the first instance to Cintra, which was a normal operation at the time of
year, but were obliged to leave Portugal altogether in July. Lannes told
the regent that he had been obliged to come to him direct, because he
found the Portuguese ministers impossible. He protested about his personal
effects being held up in the customs and demanded that all French goods
should be allowed to enter freely and that no more customs guards should
be placed on French ships, and that Manique, the chief of police, should
be dismissed.6
Almeida wished to ignore Lannes’ request but upon orders from the
regent informed him that Manique could not be dismissed, and that
the French would receive most favoured nation treatment and no more.
Lannes then flounced out of Portugal without taking leave; all commu¬
nications between himself and Portuguese ministers had already ceased,
but the final cause of his departure was a dispute about a parcel of his
personal linen held up in the customs. Almeida deplored his violent and
inadmissible conduct and Lannes himself said that his departure could
be regarded as tantamount to a declaration of war. But Bonaparte was not
ready for war yet and wrote an amiable letter to the regent, in which he
regretted Lannes’ conduct, but also disapproved of that of Almeida, whose
dismissal he requested. Even in Paris many thought that Lannes had behaved
badly, but Almeida was distressed to decide what he should do next and
asked what help England could give. The reply came that Almeida’s con¬
duct was certainly approved and all possible aid would be given but that
no troops were available for despatch for the moment. M. Herman arrived
as French Charge with orders to treat for a settlement but not to negotiate
with anyone except Balsamad or the regent. Balsamad refused to inter¬
vene in Almeida’s department and Herman saw the regent, who gave a
temporising reply which was kept secret.7
Hookham Frere was transferred to Madrid in November 1802 and
succeeded in Lisbon by Lord Robert Fitzgerald, a younger brother of the
Duke of Leinster. He was a respectable nobleman of unfailing courtesy
and sustained his mission well enough, though he was hampered by fam¬
ily affairs. He had a large and tactless wife, a numerous family and little
money. Then death of his brother leaving a minor as his heir obliged him
to take home leave twice in two years and he cannot have been helped
by the fact that one of his brothers was an Irish rebel. He was succeeded
by another Irish peer. Viscount Strangford, who had come out to Lisbon
as secretary in 1804. He was twenty-five years of age and distinguished
himself by taking a diplomatic bag to Madrid in the hottest days of summer
6 F. O. 63/39, Frere, 5 Jan., 20, 28, 31 March, 1, 7 April 1802. F. O. 63/40,

14 May, 14 July, 12, 19 June 1802.
7 F. O. 63/40, Frere, 3 July, 12, 13, 22 Aug., 15 Sept., 19, 20 Oct. 1802.
248
in the very good time of four days. He published an English edition of

some poems of CamSens and made many Portuguese friends. Byron ce¬
lebrated him with the lines:
Hibernian Strangford, with thine eyes of blue,

And boasted locks of red and auburn hue.
The eyes of blue, alas, were shockingly short sighted and, according to
the gossipy Madame Junot, often closed in the intervals between translating
Camoens. Also his health was not very good. But his nonchalant airs were
deceptive for he proved himself a forceful and energetic minister both in
Portugal and Brazil. He and the rumbustious Consul General Gambier made
a good team. The latter was a nephew of Lord Gambier and a friend of
William Pitt and apt to give himself airs, but he was efficient. Both men
suffered from the penurious Treasury; Strangford was eventually made
Minister, but when he became Charge d’A{faires was warned that this
did not entitle him to promotion or any increase of allowances. Gambier
was worse off still; he depended on consulage, which diminished as the
war affected trade.8
In spite of his many indiscretions Lannes was clearly a good man to
browbeat the Portuguese and he was sent back to Lisbon in March 1803.
Meanwhile there had been a certain respite but Fitzgerald could not deny
that the French invasion of Switzerland augured ill for small nations and
that Portugal could not do much on a basis of British promises of aid
unsupported by troops. However he pointed out that although Bonaparte
could find a pretext for war whenever he chose, he did not want war yet
and would be bound to take notice of Britain’s firm attitude. For the time
being Almeida retained his office and the regent kept him in attendance,
declaring that he would not receive Lannes and keeping out of sight in
the country at his various shooting boxes. But Lannes, who brought all
his family with him, bypassed the Portuguese ministers and gate-crashed
on the regent at Mafra on the pretext that he had a letter to deliver. The
regent’s French was not equal either to arguing with him or to dismissing
him, but he did manage to reject an offer to restore 01iven9a in return
for an indemnity, saying that when he had Olivenca he might think about
paying for it.9
However the pro-British ministers Sousa Coutinho and Almeida were
soon obliged to relinquish their posts. Meanwhile Lannes was working to
remove Pina Manique from his posts in the police and customs’ service.
8 F. O. 63/41, Fitzgerald, 21 Feb., 9 May 1803. F. O. 63/42, 20 Oct. 1803.

F. O. 63/45, 7 Sept. 1804. F. O. 63/47, 15 July 1805. Abrantes, Memoires, 12 vols.,
1835, vol. 6, 19/21.
9 F. O. 63/40, Fitzgerald, 11 Dec. 1802. F. O. 63/41, 2, 13, 22 Jan., 1, 21 Feb.,
12, 14, 27 March, 16 April, 8, 18 May 1803.
249
DAVID FRANCIS
He was regarded as pro-British and had been a great help to maintain

order on the water front and to pick up British naval deserters. Lannes
disliked him because he upheld the law to stop smuggling, in which he
had some private ventures of his own, and also to suppress Free Masonry.
Masons were regarded by most respectable Portuguese, as the ‘reds under
the bed’, particularly so by the Prince regent, and any public figure of
liberal tendencies, such even as Rodrigo de Sousa and the reputedly pro-
French Araujo, were liable to be accused of masonry. Many masons were
of the respectable British kind, but the masonic lodges were often vehicles
for revolutionary ideas and found useful for French propaganda. They
were undoubtedly quite numerous, though their number and sinister in¬
tentions were exaggerated.10
Manique did not actually leave the police until his death in 1805, but
he was discredited and retired from the Sugar Customs Administration four
days after Lannes’ return. He was blamed for the Ourique riots, which
resulted in the dismissal of the Count de Novion, the head of the Lisbon
Customs’ police. Novion was a French emigre, who subsequently earned
the warm praise of Madame Junot when he welcomed Junot’s army and
kept order on his behalf, but he seems only to have been doing his duty
as a policeman when he suppressed the riots. This imbroglio was in essence
a fight between the troops in Lisbon, principally Gomez Freire’s regiment,
and the customs’ police. The soldiers resented the rival authority of the
police and aspired to be a law unto themselves and to indulge in smuggling.
In this they were supported by the fidalgos who equally disliked being
called to order. Lannes maintained that the whole affair centred on a
British plot to down the French party by countering Free Masonry and
winning the favour of the army to influence the Prince regent. Although
Gomez Freire later joined the French camp he was at this time reputed
to be pro-British. The British implication was also suggested by the
behaviour of Prince Augustus, Duke of Sussex, who after the riots per¬
sonally took Gomez Freire to call on the Prince regent. His motive in
doing so may well have largely been one of personal friendship; Gomez
Freire had been educated in Vienna and was good company, particularly
in comparison with the rather frousty Portuguese nobles. But there was
probably a political factor too, and there is a suggestion that Prince
Augustus had been helped by Gomez Freire in a plan to recruit French
and German refugees for a regiment being assembled in Gibraltar. In any
case the regent was annoyed and intimated that the intervention of Prince
Augustus was not welcome; the Prince did not leave Portugal until almost
a year later, but he lost favour at court and Freire was ordered to be court
martialled, though a few months later both he and Novion were reinstated.
Meanwhile Lannes had come out rather well, for he had won his private
10 F. O. 63/41, Fitzgerald, 16 April, 30 Aug. 1703.
250
quarrel with the customs and police, and had made a step forward in the
French interest. The position with regard to the French was very confusing,
as many emigres were divided in their allegiance, and inclined to switch
towards Napoleon, now that the worst of the revolution was over and he
headed a stable government. But Lannes still opposed French royalists,
for instance the Due de Coigny, the most respected leader of them, whose
departure from Portugal he was able to bring about. He had apparently
tamed the regent to eat out of his hand, but appearances were deceptive;
the regent was still very cordial to Fitzgerald and in response to his protests
at the numerous favours and private interviews accorded to Lannes, assured
him that he would always be welcome whenever he chose to visit him.11
The news came in May 1803 that Whitworth had abandoned his ne¬
gotiations in Paris, and on 18th May war with France was declared. Spain
delayed declaring war on Britain until the end of the year. In such days
of French triumphs, with Spain submissive and Napoleon’s armies poised
on the channel coast, it was not surprising that Portugal could only struggle
to postpone the day of reckoning by continuing to buy off France. The
question of the closure of the Portuguese ports, which had been temporarily
shelved by the peace, was bound to arise again, and to ease the position
the British Admiralty gave orders for no prizes to be taken into Portuguese
ports and for the use of them in any action against the enemy to be
discontinued. But to restrain Spain Hookham Frere was instructed to inti¬
mate to the Spanish government that any admission of French troops into
Spain would be regarded as equal to a declaration of war. Spain was still
trying to avoid complete submission to France and was anxious to await the
safe arrival of a treasure fleet believed to be carrying 36 million dollars. Na¬
poleon too was willing to exercise a little patience. He was engrossed in
his plan to invade England by means of hundreds of small boats, which
would cross the channel on a foggy night. In the spring of 1804 he
discarded this plan as impracticable, but he still hoped to entice the British
fleet elsewhere and to command the channel for a period however brief
to enable his army to cross. The British countered by launching attacks
against the French channel ports; these caused some alarm but had little
substantial success. Bonaparte observed ‘Let us be masters of the channel
for six hours, and we shall be masters of the world’. The six hours were
not granted him, and in August 1805 he moved his troops from the channel
coast. Shortly afterwards at the end of October the battle of Trafalgar
struck a further blow for the naval supremacy of Britain. This was a
turning point, but it was some years before it became apparent; mean-
11 Ameal e Cavalheiro, Erratas, 181/93 re Gomez Freire. F. O. 63/44, Fitz¬

gerald, 3 Aug. F. O. 63/45 Fitzgerald re Barbier case, 31 Oct. 1804, 16 June 1804.
F. O. 63/43, 23 Feb. 1804. Abrantes, Memoires, vii-295/6.
251
DAVID FRANCIS
while Napoleon enjoyed the apogee of his imperial glory and there was
little reason for Portugal to take heart. Napoleon became emperor in May
1704, and was readily recognised by Portugal, who sent a special am¬
bassador to congratulate him.12
But in spite of their policy of appeasement and even after the renewal
of war the Portuguese continued to enquire about the possibility of British
aid and in June 1803 the regent supplied particulars of his needs and of
the state of the Portuguese army. But Lannes was extracting promises of
further subsidies and at the end of August Almeida was forced to resign
and was soon followed by Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho. The government
remained for the time being in the hands of the Counts of BalsamaS and
Anadia, but Anadia was a man of straw and BalsamaS (formerly Pinto)
had given up the unequal struggle.13
Although Lannes objected as soon as he could he was unable to stop
the arrival at the beginning of August of a military mission arranged by
Domingo de Sousa, the Portuguese minister in London, to look into the
requirements of the Portuguese army on the basis of a report from General
Viosmenil. This mission, led by Lt. Col. Richart Stewart and Major Hudson
Lowe (the future gaoler of Napoleon), contrived to visit the frontier and
most of the garrisons of Portugal. Stewart only remained a month; Lowe
stayed a little longer and then departed to Gibraltar to superintend the
recruitment of a volunteer emigre force. Viosmenil had diplomatically left
Portugal some time before, ostensibly to fetch his family, but he had been
waiting in Gibraltar and was able to come back for a short time for con¬
sultation. Stewart could only confirm the general impression that under
the existing government Portugal could not possibly resist a joint French
and Spanish invasion and that any small British expeditionary force, de¬
pendent on Portuguese help and supplies derived from Portugal, would
inevitably perish. Only a large army bringing its own supplies and muni¬
tions, and capable of undertaking the whole defence of Portugal on its
own, could have any chance of success. This was a lesson to be remem¬
bered for the Peninsular War, though this report, which contained inform¬
ation about Portuguese forts and the guns in them, was given little attention
when it was brought up in 1810; it was minuted ‘only contains inform¬
ation of contemporary use and none of a local nature’. Nevertheless Well¬
ington had a copy of it in 1807, and being informed of its existence by
Lt. Col., now Brigadier, Stewart, Lt. Col. Murray asked to see it. Con¬
ditions in the north of Portugal were reported to be a little better; General
Forbes could advise on this subject and in September 1801 the French
12 F. O. 63/41, Fitzgerald, 26 May 1803, 6, 29 June, 29 Sept., 1 Oct. Fortescue,

Hist, of British Army, V-191/5, 216/7, 227/8, 234/5, 263.
13 F. O. 63/41, Fitzgerald, 6 June, 29 June. Viosmenil, 23 July, 30 Aug., 31
Aug. 1803.
252
emigre general de la Rosiere had claimed that he was strong enough to

counter-attack and to repel an invasion from Galicia. Stewart also observed
that nature had provided Portugal with good defences and with people
who had many good qualities if properly led and administered. The truth
of this was also to be proved, when in 1808 a resistance movement de¬
veloped in the north of Portugal and Wellington was able to get good
service out of Portuguese levies.14
Another measure of reinsurance which was still discussed by the regent
in 1803 was the defence of Brazil. Rear Admiral Donald Campbell, a
Scotsman who had served for several years in the Portuguese navy, had
just come back from commanding a squadron in Brazil, and had submitted
a full report, of which he had sent a version to the British secretary of
state. He gave his views to the regent about the defence of Brazil against
a possible French attack, and the need to strengthen the Portuguese navy
for this purpose and to convey the regent and his family to a place of
refuge in case of need. In his report to London he said that the Portuguese
government had done everything to block the development of Brazilian
trade and manufacture, but that Brazil was capable of winning and
maintaining her independence, and that even some of her provinces were
strong enough to stand on their own feet. But if the regent did not identify
himself with Brazilian aspirations Portugal would sink to become a mere
province of Spain. The British secretary of state was interested and instruct¬
ed Fitzgerald to co-operate with Campbell and to talk to the regent. He
was to emphasise that Britain had no selfish interest in the matter, but
was only bringing it up at the request of Domingos de Sousa. It is inter¬
esting that he admitted that although there was much to be said for the
Brazil plan, it might all the same be more advantageous for the regent to
remain in Portugal, unless the French actually invaded his country. Do¬
mingo’s brother Rodrigo, until August 1803 the Minister of Marine, was
one of the few influential Portuguese who had no fear of exile in Brazil
and persistently supported the plan; he had indeed a Brazilian-born grand¬
mother and property in Brazil. Fitzgerald was also to support Campbell’s
recommendation for the strengthening of the navy and the detachment of
a strong squadron under his command to Brazil to escape from the French
sphere of influence. At the end of September Anadia had already succeeded
Sousa, but he approved of Campbell’s recommendations for changes of
personnel and the removal of a squadron to Brazil. Even in November,
when Vila Verde had become head of the government and Araujo foreign
secretary, the regent was still professing to Campbell and Fitzgerald his
willingness to accept the friendly offer to assist his passage to Brazil. To
do him justice he never changed his mind about this, though he constantly
14 Stewart’s mission is in W. O. 1/223. Wellington’s Despatches, Ed. Wellington,

1860, VI-130. F. O. 63/38 Frere, 3 Sept. 1801.
253
DAVID FRANCIS
found fresh reasons for postponing the evil day. But in his discussion with
Balsamao Fitzgerald found that his supposedly secret talks with the regent
had leaked and the opposition was aroused. Campbell later said that the
regent had been in favour of the Brazil plan until July and only then
had concluded that religion, morality, and patriotism bound him not to
abandon his country and his people, as long as a possible alternative was
left. In fact it appears that the regent was always ambivalent and did not
change his views much, and indeed he still hoped to preserve Portuguese
neutrality and to escape the need for flight, so that his attitude after the
renewal of the war and the increase of French pressure did not alter as
quickly as might have been expected. However one new point had cropped
up, and that was the fear of black rule stirred by the revolution in Santo
Domingo; there had been mulatto disturbances in Bahia too, which were
to recur in 1807, and the regent had probably been reminded of these by
his new Councillor of State, Fernando de Portugal, who had just come
back from being Vice-Roy in Brazil. The influence of Lannes also brought
about with the usual Portuguese delays the change of ministers he desired.15
Fear of France played a great part, but Lannes also achieved a signal
advantage by the personal intimacy he succeeded in establishing with the
regent. In the circumstances of the Portuguese court this was no mean
achievement, but the regent was a withdrawn and lonely soul who yearned
for agreeable company; both Lannes and Junot and their young, beautiful
and lively wives were ready to enter into the prince's interests in hunting,
shooting and music, and to jolly him along. Once they had gate-crashed
and the regent had grown used to them, they became almost house guests.
Madame Junot perhaps could not altogether conceal her boredom but
Madame Lannes coped splendidly. However, as late as the autumn of
1803 Campbell retained a certain influence and managed to dissuade the
regent from attending a theatrical performance at which Lannes had plan¬
ned to show off his influence with the regent, who tried to make amends
for the undue favours he showed Lannes by assuring Fitzgerald that he
was just as welcome and would always find a special apartment ready for
him, if he chose to visit Mafra. But on the subject of Brazil the regent
showed himself increasingly embarrassed and would only promise a reply
in writing. Lannes was invited to a shooting party alone and accorded the
unprecedented honour of a seat at dinner at the regent's own table, which
neither the Duke of Cadaval or the Duke of Sussex had ever enjoyed. So
when the Council of State met to discuss the Convention with France,
Lannes took his station in the next room, where the regent constantly
15 Campbell’s report on Brazil in P. R. O. 30/8/345 and F. O. 63/44, 11, 23

Sept., June 10, 1804. S. of S., most secret to Fitzgerald, Oct. 1803. Fitzgerald, 13
Nov. 1803. Anadia to Campbell, 28 Sept. 1803. F. O. 63/55, 23 Aug. 1807. Funchal,
O Conde de Linhares, Lisbon, 1908, 44 et seq., 186, Doc. 65, F. O. 63/42, Fitzgerald,
31 Oct., 13 Nov. 1803.
254
darted out to consult him. Balsamao denied to Fitzgerald that any Conven¬
tion had been concluded, telling him that all that he had heard was ‘false,
factious, and without foundation’. To do him justice he was no longer kept
informed and he did his utmost to hold up its signature, which took place
in December, but was only acknowledged some months later and ratified
in April by Napoleon after a good deal more haggling. BalsamaS fell very ill,
but he tried to keep in touch with what was going on; when his efforts
failed he quarrelled with Lannes and refused to have anything to do with
the implementation of the Convention, which was left to a protege of
Lannes named Manoel Pinto.16
Campbell too fell from favour; he had to give up his post in the navy
and was rumoured to be in danger of arrest; he returned with his family
to England, but still seems to have been vaguely attached to Sousa’s legation
there. British ministers, who had given him so much encouragement, grew
tired of him, but the regent did not forget him and after a while offered
him employment, if he returned to Portugal. He was given no encourage¬
ment in London, except that the promise of a life pension for his wife
was confirmed but he was told that there was no objection to his re-entering
the Portuguese service on his own responsability. The Portuguese wanted
a good naval officer to take charge of their squadron in the Straits, where
they had made a truce with the sultan of Morocco, but still were at war
with the corsairs from Tunis and Algiers. They asked Fitzgerald to re¬
commend someone; he was reluctant to intervene, but Araujo appointed
Campbell, who duly proceeded to the Straits. He was able to render signal
service there by warning Nelson in May 1805 of Admiral Villeneuve’s
departure to the West Indies. There had already been rumours of this, but
Campbell’s report was the final news which sent Nelson in hot pursuit.
Nelson was discreet about his informant, except that in a private letter
to Emma Hamilton, he referred to a visit by the Count of Cyrillo and
‘the Abbe Campbell’. But Campbell’s service did not escape the notice of
the French ambassador in Lisbon. He was dismissed the Portuguese service
and no more is heard of him, though another Admiral Donald Campbell
figured in the British service in Brazil.17
In February Fitzgerald was still trying to obtain the copy of the Con¬
vention, which he had been so often promised. The regent brushed him
off with amiabilities and expressions of regret that he had seen so little
16 F. O. 63/42, Fitzgerald, 13, 14, 24, 28 Nov. 1803. F. O. 63/43, Fitzgerald,

7 Jan., 13, 23 Feb. Abrantes, Memoires, 5-188/90, 6-8/10, 56.
17 F. O. 63/42, Fitzgerald, 26 Nov. F. O. 63/46, Campbell, 19 Feb. 1805. F. O.
63/47, Fitzgerald, 4, 14 April 1805, 15 May. F. O. 63/49, Consul Cartwright, Algiers,
3 May 1805 and 63/48, 2 May 1806. Blenchley, 23 Sept. 1807. Carola Oman, Nelson,
1948, 569. Pettigrew, Memoirs of Nelson, 2 vols., 1840. Nelson to Emma Hamilton,
13 May 1805.
255
DAVID FRANCIS
lately of the Duke of Sussex. Fitzgerald explained that H. R. H. Prince

Augustus was in Lisbon for reasons of health and could not attend court
functions often. The duke was in fact an invalid who until his death at
the age of seventy spent much of his life abroad. He remained incognito
during his stay in Lisbon from December 1801 to July 1804 and used the
name of Count of Diepholz, but was well received and was lodged in
the Palace of Necessidades. Personally he was a liberally inclined man and
seems to have used his rank to exercise some discreet diplomatic activity.
He reported any useful news he heard and arranged for instance for the
Marquis of Niza to take in London on his way to his diplomatic appoint¬
ment in Russia. Niza accompanied his brother, the Conde de Ponte de
Lima, who was going as ambassador to London and took the opportunity
to follow up his claim for prize money, earned when his Portuguese squa¬
dron co-operated with Nelson at Malta and Naples. His claim was even¬
tually recognised. The duke also submitted to the regent a plan for raising
a foreign legion and placed his stables at the disposal of an emigre officer
named Barbier, who was recruiting for the Baron de Rolls’ regiment at
Gibraltar; Barbier was eventually arrested and according to a Portuguese
historian the duke was asked to leave Portugal as a result of his activities.
There is no reference to this in the state papers and the extent of his
activities is not known. £6000 was remitted for his expenses and journey
home but this is all that is on record.18
The British Factories chose this difficult time to erupt with a revolu¬
tionary fervour of their own. They had always been impatient of official
control and of the appointment of consuls from Whitehall rather than of
their own candidates. Sir John Hort had had trouble and so had Arbuthnot.
These came to a head with the arrival of John Gambier from London in
June 1803, after a rather long interregnum since the departure of Arbuthnot
in September 1801. The Lisbon Factory had welcomed the acting appoint¬
ment of John Hunter, as he was a man of business himself and had been
consul general in Seville. He returned there after the treaty of Amiens and
was replaced in an acting capacity by John Bell, a local worthy of good
reputation, who years before had been interpreter to Admiral Norris and
incidentally was a scholarly man with Portuguese as well as English
friends. The Factory petitioned for his substantive appointment as consul
general and gave John Gambier a cold welcome when he was sent out
from home instead, but Gambier was a pushing man of character and a
personal friend of William Pitt, so he was able to establish his position,
although this had been made more difficult by the delay before his arrival
18 F. O. 64/34, Frere, 15 Dec. 1800. F. O. 63/38, 15 Aug. 1801. F. O. 63/39, 14

April 1802. F. O. 63/44, Fitzgerald, 11 July 1804. F. O. 63/45, Barbier case, 31
Oct. 1805. Damiao Peres, Hist, de Portugal, VI-296/7. W. O. 1/222, 5 Oct. 1802.
256
during which another man from home had been appointed but had failed
to proceed.19
However when the veteran consul Whitehead died at Oporto in De¬
cember 1802 there was no opposition to the appointment of the local
candidate, a wine shipper named William Warre, who was Whitehead’s
nephew. Warre claimed that Oporto, which now handled more British
trade than Lisbon, should be made into a separate consulate general, par¬
ticularly to obviate the French consul outranking him. This change had
already been warmly recommended by Walpole in 1793 at a time when
Whitehead proposed retiring, but v/as turned down. Warre accepted this
and after some delay paid the share of consulage claimed by Gambier and
somewhat reluctantly complied in other ways with Gambier’s superintend¬
ence. However he continued to bypass Gambier, when the opportunity
offered, and Gambier’s claim to appoint or reject deputy consuls involved
him in considerable trouble. Rival candidates fought for recognition in the
Azores and the worst difficulty arose with the Deputy Consul in the
shipping office at Belem, whose irregularities had given Gambier just cause
to complain. All ships had to report at Belem to the Portuguese authorities
before proceeding to Lisbon. Arbouin, the vice consul, was not strictly
speaking a deputy consul, but only an honorary vice consul originally
employed for their convenience by the merchant shippers there, to whom
he had been accountable rather than to H. M. Consul General. After the
renewal of the war he had become responsible for the issue of certificates
of neutrality to enable British goods to be shipped on alleged neutral vessels.
The status of his office had crept into recognition so that a recent circular
regarding quarantine regulations had been addressed to him rather than to
the Consul General. The issue of these certificates was a valuable privilege
and no doubt some of the British shippers were not too particular about
the applications being genuine. Gambier found that many irregularities had
been committed in cases where goods of enemy origin or destination were
concerned. He was anxious to dismiss Arbouin and wrote home to obtain
a ruling regarding his powers over deputy consuls. Meanwhile he refused
to call a general meeting of the Factory to discuss the question and was
assailed by a number of complaints, that he had traduced William Warre,
that he had behaved unjustly towards the rival candidates in the Azores,
and that in trying to dismiss Arbouin, he was exceeding his authority.
Arbouin, who was definitely at fault, solved his question by resigning, but
then a new problem arose about the choice of a successor. Gambier’s
conduct was also attacked on general grounds and his difficulties were
increased by the revival of the claims of the Roman Catholic British to be
19 F. O. 63/38, Arbuthnot, 26 Sept. 1801. F. O. 63/40, S. of S., 18 July 1802.
257
DAVID FRANCIS
admitted to membership of the Factory and to take part in the election of

Vice Consuls.20
William Pitt was out of office at the moment, but took a great interest
in Gambier’s case and forwarded his own views to the secretary of state,
but Gambier’s legal position was weak, and the attorney general, who at
first had hedged, concluded that Gambier’s actions had been irregular. He
could refuse or reject the Factory nomination of a vice consul, but he had
no right to dismiss a vice consul or to appoint one himself. Gambier was
therefore obliged to call a general meeting and to agree to the appoint¬
ment of the preferred candidate Williamson. His own candidate had been
named Russell, and Williamson soon complained that Gambier was trying
to foist Russell on him as an assistant, who would usurp a major part of
the office business. Both Williamson and Russell had sons who were also
candidates for employment. After all this clamour and backbiting the
secretary of state tried to make the peace by laying down that in future
the Consul General must behave regularly and not aspire to run the ship¬
ping office personally, as this was neither fitting nor proper. But deputy
consuls must be subject to the consul general, as they were in Spain, and
must report to him on all other than routine matters and not directly to
H. M. Minister or to the secretary of state. The Factory meanwhile had
tended to abate its opposition to the admission of Roman Catholics, though
no more was done for them than a promise that their case would be
considered. The fears that the Catholics might come to dominate the Factory
were not unjustified, for they could now muster twenty-three signatures to
the Factory’s thirty-three; further, as conditions worsened, more of the
Factory went home and the Protestant members tended to go first.21
In spite of the vehement opposition he encountered, Gambier, who
was an active and determined man, won his way, so much so that in
January 1806 after Trafalgar he felt able to ask for leave and was given
it on condition that it was not prolonged and that he made very good
acting arrangements; in fact he left Lord Strangford in charge and did not
20 F. O. 63/42, Warre to Gambier, 7 June, 24 July 1803. J. Bell, 24 Dec. 1803.

F. O. 63/43, Warre, 6 June 1804. F. O. 63/45, Gambier, private, 8 Sept. 1804.
F. O. 63/39, Walpole, 4 Jan. 1802. F. O. 63/41, Oporto petition to king, 9 March
1803. Gambier’s appointment, 2 June 1803. Lisbon petition for appointment of John
Bell, 22 Jan. 1803. F. O. 63/40, Oporto re death of Whitehead, 16 Dec. 1802. F. O.
63/40, J. Bell, 22 Dec. 1802. F. O. 63/42, Gambier, 2 Oct. 1803. F. O. 63/43,
Gambier, 17 Dec. 1803. James Warre, 11 Feb. 1804. Attorney General, 31 May 1804.
William Pitt to Harrowby, 31 May. Fitzgerald, 9 May, Petition of 23 Roman
Catholics, 9 May. Gambier, 10 May. Factory meeting, 14 May 1804.
21 F. O. 63/44, Murdoch to Eliot, 13 June, Gambier, 16 June, 1, 7 July, Factory
of 7 June, Pitt to Harrowby, 9 July, Arbuthnot, 24 July, Factory to James Burns,
11 July, Gambier 25 July, S. of S., to Gambier, 9 Aug., William Burns, 8 Aug. 1804.
F. O. 63/45, Gambier, 31 Aug., Burns, 15 Sept. F. O. 63/46, Sampson to Gambier,
10 Dec. 1804. W. Pitt, 20 Jan. 1805. Gambier to a friend, 13 Dec. 1804.
258
TOE FLIGHT TO BRAZIL
return until September 1807. In London he was in a position to vet any

approaches to the secretary of state by representatives of the Factory, while
from his more exalted position as Charge and then as Minister Strangford
could superintend without difficulty. No doubt also the dissidents were
bome along by the tide of events and having more serious risks to face
were less disposed to be fractious and more inclined to seek official pro¬
tection.22
Lannes was ordered home, but lingered until the end of July 1804 in
the hope of screwing more money out of the Portuguese; he did so as
much for his own ends as for those of his country and got away with some
sizeable gifts of diamonds for himself, though the Portuguese still managed
to hang back on the larger payments they had promised in return for an
agreement reached in June to respect their neutrality. Lannes' mission on
the whole had been successful, though his reputation for open-handed
liberality was rather spoilt by the return of the Portuguese warship which
had conveyed Madame Lannes to Lorient with the news that none of the
expected tips had been lavished on the Portuguese crew. Lannes had
recently received a letter from Napoleon saying ‘Tu seras ici, quand il
sera le temps de frapper le grand coup’, and he confidently supposed that
he would soon be on English soil at the head of a French army marching
to London. In Portugal there were persistent rumours that the Portuguese
had made further concessions but with equal persistence these were always
denied. Napoleon was busy arranging his coronation as emperor and was
content to leave Portugal alone, as long as she did not default too intoler¬
ably on her subsidies. Junot did not arrive to succeed Lannes until Feb¬
ruary 1805 and only remained until October, when Rayneval took his
place as Charge d’Affaires. He was so comparatively inoffensive that Strang¬
ford positively regretted his departure. He left the task of badgering the
British to the Spanish ambassador the Conde Duque de Campo. This
gloomy conscientious old man, abetted by his truculent looking secretary
Castro, kept up a string of complaints against British infringements of
Portuguese neutrality either by armed intervention in Portuguese waters or
by buying supplies in Portuguese ports.23
Junot was a very good looking man and dazzled the regent with his
magnificent hussars uniform, even though he outraged Portuguese protocol
by keeping on his headdress in the royal presence. Madame Junot like
22 F. O. 63/49, Fitzgerald, 11 Feb. 1806. F. O. 63/53, Ward to Gambier, 31

Jan. 1806.
23 F. O. 63/44, Fitzgerald, 10 June, 31 July. S. of S., 23 July, Gambier, 25 July
1804. F. O. 63/46, Fitzgerald, 20 Feb. 1805. F. O. 63/47, 23 April, Strangford, 23
June. F. O. 63/48, 30 Sept., 11 Oct. F O. 63/49, Fitzgerald, 13 March 1806. F. O.
63/54, Strangford, 19 April 1807. Abrantes, Memoires, 1883, 6-22. The 1883 edition
has been edited and omits some of the gossip and polemics of the original 1833
edition.
259
DAVID FRANCIS
Madame Lannes was a very beautiful and attractive young woman and it
is not surprising that the Prince regent learned to like their company. Her
vivacious memories, though prejudiced and written with hindsight long
after the event, throw an interesting light on the French point of view. It
appears that to the French British domination appeared just as vexatious
and oppressive as French superiority appeared to the British. To the British
the French seemed to be having it their own way but to Madame Junot
the Portuguese nobles, in spite of all the official buttering up that went
on, were just as antagonistic to the French as to the British and took every
opportunity to be rude to them. Indeed, while the British minister thought
the regent was entirely submissive to the French, Madame Junot thought
it was the other way about and that he was terrified of the British. She
had little use for Portuguese society and was as scathing about their habits
and their absurd protocol as any Englishman could wish. Indeed she had
rather less sympathy for the Portuguese than they had.24
For Fitzgerald and for Strangford after Fitzgerald’s final departure in
May 1806 Antonio Araujo de Azevedo was the principal Portuguese min¬
ister; after the death of Vila Verde in December/1806 he was even more
so. Vila Verde had been regarded as indubitably pro-French, though cap¬
able of taking an objective point of view. Araujo was a very cultivated and
cosmopolitan man and of undisputed ability; from the professions that
he made before he was established in office it was hoped he would be
more amenable. Strangford veered wildly in his estimates of him, sometimes
regarding him as venal and hostile, sometimes speaking of him as co¬
operative, and indeed as a personal friend, in spite of the leading part
which he had taken in the secret negotiations with France, which won
Portugal her neutrality for an appreciable period though on a very expensive
and precarious footing. But his experiences with the French had not been
too happy; after the Prince regent had overrun the time limit, and the
French had refused to ratify the treaty, they had kept him in prison for
four months. Bonaparte was known to have spoken very scathingly of him
and convinced though he was that an alliance with France was the lesser
of two evils and to be sought at almost any price, he drew the line at
a French occupation of Portugal. He was not above accepting presents
and favours for himself and his family and he did his best to ingratiate
himself with the French, but he was civil to all, and it is probable that
his claim to be nothing else than a patriotic Portuguese was justified,
though later in Brazil he was regarded as an inveterate enemy of Britain.
But he cannot have remembered his imprisonment in Paris with pleasure
nor the insults imputed to Napoleon. On the other hand he had formed
a bad opinion of the insolence and drunken habits of the Royal Navy,
though he owed the salvation of his precious library to them, when it
24 Abrantes, Memoires, 6-6/9, 38, 57. F. O. 63/47, Fitzgerald, 3 May 1805.
260
had been rescued on its way from Hamburg after capture by a privateer.
He had been educated in Oporto, and had a brother who became a judge
in Lamego and had to do with the wine trade; he was born at Ponte de
Lima in the Minho, so must have been familiar with English trade problems
there and he had visited England and had met men of science and learning
there, such as Joseph Banks. At the last moment he embarked on the
Medusa with the Portuguese fleet, when the royal family left for Brazil,
and it is clear that he had always meant to do so, for he had given orders
for his library to be packed up and catalogued and made ready for
embarkation some weeks beforehand. Rodrigo de Sousa told his brother
Domingos in London that Araujo was an ‘Afrancesado’, a Frenchified man,
but this was only a term of abuse used by a personal enemy. Certainly
Araujo was helpful, as far as he could be, to Strangford for most of the
period preceding the flight to Brazil except the last two weeks and his
conduct then seems to have been very much part of the Portuguese system
by which one minister placated the British, While another truckled to the
French, without being told much what the other was doing. Araujo how¬
ever often filled the double role and was sometimes frank enough, saying
Portugal had to live, even if she had to crawl, and could not be expected
to resist, when Prussia had failed to do so. A pleasant tale is told of him
which pays tribute to his objective views. When the swashbuckling General
Lannes by accident on purpose drove into and overturned Fitzgerald’s
coach on the way to Queluz and was proudly congratulating himself on
his prowess, Araujo is said to have remarked ‘Why, when you saw Sir
Robert so discomforted did you not offer him a seat by your side? After
all you were alone and there was room. Don’t you think that might have
been a perfect way to behave towards your enemy?’ Araujo believed that
Napoleon’s self-interest would prompt him to refrain from driving Por¬
tugal to desperation, though in the meanwhile he would extort as much
as he could from her. He was genuinely anxious for Portugal to stand on
her own feet and to restore her armed forces by giving them regular pay
but his efforts were constantly thwarted, so that he admitted that he could
not hope for success for some years. In minor matters he often humoured
Britain, and a pleasant instance was the attitude of the regent and of the
Portuguese authorities in the case of the disaster to a British convoy
wrecked between Aveiro and Figueira in April 1804.25
In this case immediate orders were given to afford all possible help.
25 F. O. 63/45, Fitzgerald, 1, 22 Nov. 1804, 11 Dec. 1804. F. O. 63/46, 10 Jan.

F. O. 63/47, 23 April 1805. F. O. 63/48, 10 Nov F. O. 63/50, Strangford, 1 July 1806,
6 July, 22 Sept., 28 Oct. F. O. 63/54, Strangford, 31 Jan. 1807, 13 March, 5 July,
13 Aug. 1807. Funchal, O Conde de Linhares (Araujo), Lisbon, 1908. 23 et seq.
Abrantes, Memoires, 6-6/9, 29/30. Alan K. Manchester, Revista do Instituto His-
torico y Geografico de Brasil, vol. 277, 1967. A transferencia de Corte de Portugal
para o Rio de Janeiro.
261
DAVID FRANCIS
The British vice consul from Figueira and the Portuguese local authorities
were on the spot as soon as possible. It was in the interest of all parties
to salvage the wreckage and to prevent it falling into the hands of local
peasants and smugglers. As it was a desolate part of the coast bordered by
sand dunes and miles of forest it took some time before the local villagers
were alerted, and many of them in fact helped in the rescue operations.
The fleet, consisting of some sixty ships, was on its way to the West Indies
under the convoy of H. M. S. Apollo and Carysfort. The route to America
did not strike across the Atlantic before Madeira or the Canary islands, but
the coast of Portugal was well known to be dangerous and the prevailing
winds often blew onto it. It seems odd that the convoy did not steer well
clear of it and that the commodore refused to tack even when many of the
merchant captains believed that the time had come to do so. The result
was that the fleet completely lost its bearings and in the small hours of
a stormy night ran onto the sandy shore a few miles north of Cape Mon-
dego. H. M. S. Apollo beached on a shoal and split in two, suffering the
loss of 150 men; the remainder of her crew were eventually rescued after
being marooned on the surviving half of the ship. Although the shore was
not far off even strong swimmers could not reach it. The smaller ships
were driven further in shore and fared better. H. M. S. Carysfort and
about twenty ships managed to change course in time. A good deal of
merchandise was saved and the loss of life was not as bad as at first had
been feared. A customs officer named Bras Chabres rendered signal service
and was rewarded by the British admiralty with a hundred guineas.26
Among those rescued were a number of ships’ boys who were placed
in a lodging house in Lisbon and asked to volunteer for naval service.
A naval officer went down to visit them with a patrol and was accom¬
panied by Consul General Gambier. During the inspection of the boys a
naval deserter was spotted in the lodging house and the patrol tried to
apprehend him. This led to a violent scuffle, and Gambier was accused by
his enemies in the British colony as well as by the Portuguese of having
fermented the trouble. Actually he had done his best to preserve order and
eventually Araujo recognised this, but in the meanwhile this was an addition
to Gambler’s difficulties. But in spite of these and the heavy pressure
from France and Spain to which the Portuguese were subjected, Gambier
held his own. An attempt to make British merchants contribute to a special
subsidy towards meeting the French demands was largely turned aside, and
although Araujo frequently passed on enemy complaints about the supply
of fresh meat and other necessities to the British Navy he always pro¬
fessed anxiety to arrange supplies provided that the greatest discretion was
26 F. O. 63/43, Strangford, 2, 4 April 1804. Marshall, Naval Biographies,

Supplement II, Capt. Edward Hervey. For Atlantic Winds see J. H. Parry, The
Discovery of the Sea, 1975, 101/2.
262
used. He indeed volunteered to organise supplies himself in return for

advance payments, but Strangford fought shy of this proposition and the
possible rake-off. But the Navy was lucky in the employment as purveyor
of Setaro, a very competent Portuguese ex-consul; naval captains were
urged to go carefully and, though supplies were diminished, they were by
no means cut off.27
Another test of the influence of the rival powers was provided by the
arrival at the mouth of the Tagus on the 5th May 1805 of a large convoy
under Rear Admiral Knight with troops on board commanded by General
Craig. They were anxious as to the whereabouts of Admiral Villeneuve’s
squadron and Gambier went on board at once to give them the latest
news. The decision was taken to seek refuge in the Tagus. It was made
plain that if there was no alternative the Tagus forts would be attacked
without scruple, but otherwise not a single soldier would be disembarked
and only two ships of the line would actually enter Lisbon. The French
and Spanish representatives at once protested;*.they accused the Portuguese
of offering to hand over the Tagus forts and said that the fleet must leave at
once or they would ask for their passports. The regent confined himself to
a friendly message expressing the hope that the stay of the squadron would
be brief, and Fitzgerald, who was on the point of embarking for England
on leave, took this message on board the flagship, but before he had time
for discussion another note came from Araujo conveying more angry
protests and threats from the enemy ministers. Fortunately H. M. S. Orpheus
arrived at this juncture with news of the arrival of Nelson off St. Vincent.
The squadron sailed at once to Lagos, where they met Nelson and the news
that Villeneuve was gone to the West Indies. Nelson sailed in pursuit and
Knight, after putting in at Gibraltar, continued to Malta and eventually
to Sicily.28
In November 1805 another convoy with two regiments on board made
an even longer stay in the Tagus. They again had the excuse of distress
due to bad weather but were actually seeking refuge. The news of the
battle of Trafalgar came while they were still in the river and the salute
they gave in honour of this great victory riled the Spanish ambassador even
more than their presence. It was also at about this time that officers from
H. M. S. Constance mistook Araujo’s house for an inn and roused him from
his bed by their brawling. The naval authorities agreed that they had
behaved badly and were in no particular hurry to deliver them from prison,
but the insult to the Portuguese minister was taken rather lightly. It is not
surprising that Araujo retained the opinion he had formed some time ago
27 F. O. 63/44, Gambier, 12 June. Fitzgerald, 13 June, Murdoch, 13 June,

Melville to Hardwicke, 9 July. S. of S. to Sousa, 20 July, Araujo, 27 July 1804.
28 F. O. 63/47, Knight and Craig, 6 May 1805. Adm 51/1470. Log of H. M. S.
Queen. Adm 51/1512, Log of H. M. S. Orpheus.
263
PORTUGAL.-18
DAVID FRANCIS
of the bad habits of British naval officers. Nevertheless he made some

effort to contrive the continuation of supplies to the navy, in spite of the
remonstrances of the Spanish ambassador, who objected even to their
receiving water. The entry into Lisbon of some of Nelson’s prizes was
glossed over and it became evident that the British navy had the upper
hand. Enemy squadrons broke the blockade rather often and in 1805 the
Rochefort squadron had inflicted grave damage in the West Indies and
off Madeira, but they were confined much of the time to their own ports,
while regular British convoys travelled safely to and fro; for instance in
1807 a convoy of 52 sail carrying 15,000 pipes of wine made the passage
from Oporto with no more than one escort ship, H. M. S. Nemesis. Ships
who did not wait for a convoy ran greater risks; but if they carried
perishable goods it was often profitable to face them. British privateers
were active, but enemy privateers had more to prey on and Spanish row¬
boats based on Vigo or Cadiz captured many prizes. These craft could
not easily be distinguished from harmless fishing vessels, and equipped
with sails as well as oars could use the latter to escape from any impasse
and to make for the shore or the nearest small port. In response to many
complaints the Admiralty eventually sent out some smaller craft and vessels
like H. M. S. Milbrooke, which were better fitted for inshore work, and
in January 1807 Strangford spoke of a convoy of 200 sail passing the mouth
of the Tagus with only one man of war to escort it. But quite a small row
boat could overpower an isolated vessel and one armed with one gun
took a number of prizes within sight of the Lisbon bar before she was
captured. In December 1807 the vice consul at Viana reported that as many
as twenty-five Spanish row boats were employed to attack Oporto shipping
and ten larger ones, some of them heavily gunned, to serve off Lisbon.29
Although Minorca had been restored to Spain by the treaty of Amiens
Britain still held Malta as a Mediterranean base from which troops could
be sent to Italy. Britain dominated the Mediterranean and Atlantic sea
routes, and the victorious Napoleon was not safe from farflung attacks by
land. In July 1806 a victory was won at Maida in Calabria and, though the
remainder of the campaign petered out, Sicily was preserved; the road
to India was safeguarded by the occupation of Cape Town and, although
the capture of Buenos Aires proved to be a flash in the pan, the presence
of a British force on the River Plate showed that the British Navy could
render practicable a landing anywhere. Araujo felt able to scoff at the
notion that the French offered any danger to Brazil, as long as the British
Navy was supreme. However Austerlitz came soon after Trafalgar and
Maida was not a sufficient success to offset Jena; the Portuguese were
29 F. O. 63/47, Strangford, 12 May, Gambier, 8 June 1805. F. O. 63/48, Fitz¬

gerald, 18 Nov., 2, 20, 28 Dec. 1805. F. O. 63/49, Fitzgerald, 9 Jan. 1806. F. O.
63/50, Strangford, 23 Nov. 1806.
264
naturally more conscious of armies which could threaten them at home

than of distant victories, but they were still an ocean-wide power and even
the home-tied Portuguese nobles for the most part had relatives in govern¬
ment posts in Goa or Brazil. The influence of Britain was a backdoor one,
and even British authors became known through French translations and
British progress through French media, but it was not ignored even by
the most francophile of Portuguese ministers.30
Early in 1806 there were rumours that the regent was suffering from
absence of mind and fits of giddiness and it was feared that he was going
to lose his wits as his mother had done. He remained for weeks at a time
out of sight at one of his shooting boxes and the Princess of Brazil, Carlota
Joaquina, who had not hitherto figured in public life, began to be spoken
of as a possible regent. Fitzgerald thought that with the help of the Council
of State the Princess might do good, as she had high spirits and correct
political sentiments. In view of the very bad character with which she
was later discredited, and of her particular*, hatred of all things British
with the exception of Admiral Sir Sidney Smith, it is interesting that until
the time of the flight to Brazil, she was always favourably mentioned by the
British Minister as a staunch upholder of the Brazil plan and an offset to
the perpetual hesitations of her husband. No doubt as a Spanish princess
she had ambitions of her own, to rule on her own either in America or
Portugal, but whatever they were, they were defeated by the regent him¬
self, who recovered his health and appeared at her birthday party in
May 1806 in the usual manner. Before this he had quarrelled with her;
a reconciliation was affected by the intervention of the Spanish ambassador,
but this was only for the sake of appearances; resentful perhaps of her
attempt to supplant him, the regent henceforward regarded his wife with
a lasting dislike and saw as little of her as possible.
Soon after this the surprising news was received that the British govern¬
ment, the so-called ministry of all the talents which followed the death
of Pitt with Fox as foreign secretary, had decided to send a special mission
to negotiate with Portugal supported by a body of British troops and a
squadron under the command of Earl St. Vincent. Lord Rosslyn was to
head the diplomatic side and General Simcoe, a veteran of the American
war, was to command the troops. All three men were to have credentials
as plenipotentiaries, but in fact only Rosslyn presented and used them;
Simcoe’s force was to consist of 10,000 men and was to follow him as
soon as practicable; indeed it was supposed to have sailed but was delayed
by bad weather, after which its departure was deferred.31
It may seem strange that this sudden move was made at a time when
30 F. O. 63/49, Strangford, 13 Jan. 1807. F. O. 63/52, Rosslyn, 1 Sept. 1806.

31 F. O. 63/49, 9, 19 Jan., 13, 24 March, 8 May 1806. F. O. 63/52, Rosslyn, 29
Aug. 1806. M. Cheke, Carlota Joaquina, 1947, 6/7.
265
DAVID FRANCIS
it was generally acknowledged that the Portuguese army was past praying
for and that to send troops to Portugal would be pure waste, but the
ministry having had to withdraw the British troops from Germany was
unexpectedly left with troops in hand and no very clear idea how best
they could be used. But the 10,000 men in question were nearly as many
as those sent two years later with Wellington and could have been aug¬
mented; so they could perhaps have borne the brunt of the whole defence
of Portugal against the invasion which was supposed to be imminent.
St. Vincent was ordered to quit his station off Brest urgently in order to
save Portugal. Certainly there were many rumours of an army being got
ready at Bayonne but these were conflicting and continued to be so until
two years later, when the French army actually began to march. The more
solid cause for alarm was the bellicose statements of Talleyrand that an
invasion was about to take place. Possibly he meant business but he may
only have been using diplomatic guile to tempt British troops to Portugal,
where they could do less harm than elsewhere. At the moment the last
minute refusal of British ministers to cede Sicily had vexed Napoleon,
and he was anxious to divert British troops from there.32
However another motive had arisen for intervening in Portugal and
this was the hope that Spain might be detached from France in spite of
the general hostile conduct of Spain, for there were disputes between
France and Spain, and the Portuguese ambassador in Madrid reported
that the Prince of Peace had assured him that he would join Britain when
the moment came; he doubted whether the moment ever would come,
but the Russian Minister Strogonoff had offered to try to persuade the
Prince of Peace to accept mediation with Britain. Araujo poured cold
water on this idea, saying that Strogonoff, whom he had known in Russia,
was no good as a diplomat, and that the Prince of Peace was a Judas in
whom no trust could be placed; but the British entertained hopes and
there was talk of sending Brougham, the future Lord Brougham, who had
accompanied Rosslyn as his secretary, to Madrid to spy out the prospects.
It was decided however to leave the matter to Strogonoff, and Araujo,
though he set no store by the Prince of Peace’s approach, held the opinion
that Spanish military preparations were really intended to further their own
protection against France rather than an invasion of Portugal.33
The Portuguese were dismayed by the appearance of St. Vincent; he
only had with him the statutory six ships, but they feared that his name
and reputation would be regarded as provocative. Araujo tried to play
down the Bayonne threat and to represent that Talleyrand’s talk of an
32 Fortescue, Hist, of British Army, V-308, 327, 333, 371. F. O. 63/52, Rosslyn,
1 Sept. 1806.
33 F. O. 63/50, Strangford, 6 July, 14, 24 Aug., 26 Sept., 14, 22 Oct., 9 Nov.
1806. F. O. 63/51, Rosslyn, 25 Sept. F. O. 63/52, Rosslyn, 8 Oct. S. of. S., 9 Aug. 1806.
266
immediate invasion was so much bluff, as the practical difficulties of

finding subsistence for an army marching through Spain were very great.
But he admitted that an invasion could be staged without long warning
and that he would like to see British troops always available though he
deprecated their immediate coming. It had to be explained to him that he
could not have his cake and eat it; if the troops were not used at once
in Portugal they would have to be sent elsewhere.34
St. Vincent gave the strictest orders to keep his men on board and to
avoid the risk of the slightest awkward incident; nevertheless the Por¬
tuguese court was in confusion, the regent was somewhere up country and
Strangford had to send couriers in five different directions to look for him
somewhere between Peniche and Mafra. Eventually contact was made and
even Vila Verde received Rosslyn civilly, but the regent was very apprehen¬
sive and while expressing his appreciation of the British desire to help him
asked for the sailing of the troops to Portugal to be postponed and for
St. Vincent to leave. The troops had been held up by contrary winds and
counter-orders were given them before they were able to sail.35
Just before St. Vincent's arrival Strangford reported that Araujo was in
an unco-operative mood and on very good terms with the French Charge
and receiving from the French valuable gifts of furniture. However a
week or two later he said that he had really behaved rather well, and that
he had been excluded from the new Council of State and perhaps was not
aware of what was going on. Strangford had suspected the conclusion of
a new convention with France through the mediation of Spain, but Araujo
vehemently denied this. The Pope was putting up a show of resistance to
Napoleon’s demands and the Nuncio in Lisbon and the Swedish envoy
were friendly. The Princess of Brazil was also said to have welcomed the
news of St. Vincent’s arrival and to have exclaimed, ‘Now we shall see
who are our real friends’. But Araujo admitted frankly that Portugal was
not in a position to lift a finger to defend herself. He agreed that in the
last resort the flight of the Royal Family to Brazil might be the only
solution, but pointed out that the regent had a horror of the sea and the
situation of the queen and of the royal family presented the greatest diffi¬
culties, so that although the plan had been much discussed, it had never
been seriously considered.36
St. Vincent had been instructed to persuade the regent to go to Brazil
with as many Portuguese men of war as possible, if the need arose. He
had also to go into the question of occupying the Tagus forts. He concluded
that it might be possible to take them, but it would be difficult to hold
34 F. O. 63/50, Strangford, 24, 26 Aug. 1806. F. O. 63/52, Rosslyn, 9 Aug. 1806.

35 Adm 50/54, Admiral St Vincent’s Journal on Hibernia. F. O. 63/50, Strang¬
ford, 17 Aug. F. O. 63/52, Rosslyn, 29 Aug. F. O. 63/51, St Vincent, 9 Aug. 1806.
36 F. O. 63/50, Strangford, 9, 19 July, 17, 24 Aug. 1806. F. O. 63/51, St Vincent’s
Instructions. F. O. 63/52, Rosslyn’s instructions.
267
DAVID FRANCIS
them without substantial reinforcements. Araujo mocked the idea, stoutly

maintaining that there would be a gun on every hillock, adequate to deal
with a man of war. Meanwhile Brougham was sent to Oporto to find out
what news he could of the preparations in Bayonne; reports from there
continued to be conflicting and Brougham learnt little conclusive in Opor¬
to, so that in spite of the positive declarations of Talleyrand to the contrary
the conclusion was reached that the danger of invasion had receded. The
Portuguese were told of the reports that Napoleon had decided to partition
their country, but they took little notice and were more apprehensive of
the immediate danger presented by the presence of St. Vincent. Accordingly,
on the ground that there was now no immediate danger of an invasion,
the mission and the squadron were withdrawn in October 1806 having
achieved no result except the possibility of Russian mediation in Madrid
and the endorsement of the conviction that Portugal was beyond help by
British land forces unless sufficient were sent to bear the whole burden of
defence. The Portuguese had been so far from welcoming the aid proffered
to them that it had been touch and go whether a decision to oppose any
landing by British land forces would not be taken.37
Portugal was to enjoy her existence ‘during pleasure’ for another year
and as late as August 1807 Strangford saw no sign of its immediate ter¬
mination. In January Araujo had remarked, ‘though this may seem odd to
you, I confess that I have enough faith in Bonaparte to believe that he
will continue to humour us’. He argued that Bonaparte could easily have
invaded Denmark, which was in much the same situation as Portugal, if
he had chosen to do so, but had found it to his interest to refrain. ‘How
could Portugal resist, when Prussia had failed to do so’, and ‘one must
live, even if one has to crawl’. A joint Franco-Spanish attack would involve
aggrandising Spain at the expense of Portugal, and this was something
which Bonaparte would never allow and therefore precluded the danger of
a Franco-Spanish invasion.38
As regards Brazil Araujo thought there was nothing to fear; the
situation was quite different there to that in Portugal, as Brazil was de¬
fensible and France could gain nothing by attempting to attack her. His
optimism was perhaps excessive as regards internal conditions, for there
was a tendency to unrest among the mulattos of the north and there had
been serious riots in Bahia in 1797 and 1807. But although there were
some poor accounts of the army in Brazil, the hold of the government on
both the northern and the southern frontiers had been much improved, and
by sea Melo felt that he could always count in the last resort on Brazil
being defended by the British navy. This confidence had been somewhat
corroded by a suspicion that Britain might share the covetous designs of
37 F. O. 63/54, Strangford, 26 Aug., 8 Sept. 1806. F. O. 63/52, Grenville to

Rosslyn, 13 Sept. 1806.
38 F. O. 63/54, Strangford, 21 Jan., 5 July, 2 Aug. 1807.
268
France and Spain on Brazilian territory, but had been alleviated oddly
enough by the failure of Sir Home Popham in 1806 to retain Buenos Aires
after he had captured it. The Portuguese felt that if the Spaniards could
beat off a British attack by land, they could do so equally well, and there
would be no risk from Britain at least, if their government was transferred
across the ocean. But with the exception of Sousa Coutinho, who had a
Brazilian grandmother, and estates near the Vila Rica gold fields, nearly
all the Portuguese who counted detested the idea of exiling themselves from
Portugal. The nobles and official classes were altogether against it and most
of the merchants shared their feelings. In spite of their groans about taxes
and war losses they were not unprosperous, and were therefore anxious to
preserve Portuguese neutrality. Meanwhile the long term aim of ousting
the British and other foreigners from their dominance in commerce was
making progress. The wine trade flourished and losses in direct trade
with Britain were offset by gains in general trade. Portuguese middlemen
extended their sphere and the British were hit by the restriction and then
closure of the Free Port of Lisbon, which had been of great help to trade
with Brazil and with Europe, and also to the clandestine trade. Bad debts
in France had hit the Portuguese but, legally or otherwise, trade with Eu¬
rope had grown not without profit to some British merchants as the
troubles about certificates of neutrality went to show.39
The tendency is shown by the following statistics published in 1822:
Imports to Portugal and exports in thousands of milreis

to the nearest thousand
Imports Exports
Britain .. ... 1796 1806 1796 1806

and
Wales. 4951 6587 4887 8201
France . 245 1287 23 5395
Holland . 807 875 495 1058
Spain. 382 1205 634 1462
Italy . 1135 1234 2598 3386
Hamburg . 1644 1242 5475 2809
Barbary .. ... 814 120 789 180
Total . 12653 16440 16013 23256
Brazil . 12477441 1450758 6950293 8358085

Asia . 1667063 1794679 40796 1622806
39 F. O. 63/54, Strangford, 13, 24 Jan., 4 Feb. 1806. Sir R. Wilson, Life of

1862, p. 343. Instituto Hist, e Geografico de Brazil, April 1933, quoted by Maxwell,
Conflicts, 238, n. 2. Glover, M., A very slippery customer, Life of Sir R. Wilson,
1978. F. O. 63/55, Strangford, 3 Oct. 1807. Andrew Grant, Hist, of Brazil, 180/9.
269
DAVID FRANCIS
The totals include the smaller countries. Barbary is specified, because

Britain did most of the carrying trade while Portugal was at war with
Algiers and Tunis. The principal increase of Portuguese imports was in
foodstuffs, from a total of 3200 to 7394. The import of corn for instance
rose from 84,194 moyos in 1796 to 98,823 moyos in 1806 with an even
greater increase in price from 44.6 to 80.9 moyos costing 3753 and 8847
cruzados.
Below is a list of ships calling at Portuguese ports, which shows that
in spite of increased trade, there were fewer ships, with Portuguese ships
taking a much larger part. These no doubt were coastal ships and some
of the increased traffic with France went by land.
Number of ships calling at Portuguese ports
1796 1806
Lisbon Foreign. 956 686

Portuguese . 381 476
Oporto Foreign . 325 237
Setubal Foreign . 514 132
Portuguese . 18 385
Faro Foreign . 38 6
Portimao Foreign . 6 5
Portuguese . 6 26
Aveiro Foreign . 5 1
Portuguese . 23 101
Vila de Conde Foreign . 7 1
Portuguese . 92 95
Vianna Foreign . 52 17
Total Foreign . 1903 1085

At the beginning of August 1807, when Strangford was reporting opti¬

mistically, a French ultimatum was already on the way. After the treaty of
Tilsit Napoleon felt he was the master of Europe and could now undertake
the reduction of Portugal. He demanded the closure of Portuguese ports
to British ships, the arrest of all British Subjects and the confiscation of
all British property. The Portuguese ministers were thrown into constern¬
ation, but still hoped that Britain would make peace or accept a compromise,
40 Balbi, A., Essai Statistique, 182, 431, 442. See also Sideri, S., Trade and
Power, Rotterdam, 1970, Tables, pp. 234/240.
270
and that somehow Portugal would escape her fate. Napoleon himself be¬
lieved that Britain would have to make peace and so informed the Portu¬
guese ambassador, adding that in any case Portugal must break with Britain.41
Araujo was sure that Portugal would be ruined if Britain persisted in
carrying on with the war, and urged the impolicy of allowing Portugal and
the whole peninsula to fall under the domination of France. He besought
Britain to make peace even if only to show her appreciation of the sacrifices
which the regent had made to preserve Britain’s friendship. Rayneval, the
French Charge, had now delivered a note saying that if the regent con¬
tinued to court the British, this would amount to his abdication. Araujo
said that he would do his best to play for time and meanwhile the regent
had refused to arrest British Subjects or to confiscate their property. At
this time Araujo, although he was so pessimistic about the power of
France, was on very good terms with Strangford and sincere in his deter¬
mination to remove the royal family to Brazil, if a French invasion com¬
pelled this step.42 s
Rodrigo de Sousa was the only member of the Council of State to advise
armed resistance. He confirmed that the regent had signed a treaty of
Neutrality with France and had promised to pay an indemnity, but de¬
clared that no trust could be placed in Bonaparte, who was determined
to crush Portugal, and that even if active measures to defend Portugal
by land and sea were unsuccessful the regent’s departure for Brazil should
be ensured and reliance placed on Britain to chase the Spaniards from
South America and ultimately to recover Portugal. He was unfortunately
a rival and enemy of Araujo, though many of their ideas on policy were
in common. However the Council of State, which now included Joao de
Almeida and Fernando de Portugal, who were friendly to Britain, though
convinced that Portugal was about to be invaded and resistance was im¬
practicable, were agreed on the need for the flight to Brazil.43
At a meeting on 3rd September the Council did not discuss defence
measures, but only whether, if the worst came to the worst, French troops
should be allowed into Portuguese garrisons and any French offer to
compensate the regent by allotting him a principality in Italy or Germany
should be considered. But the regent turned down any suggestion of a
Braganza marriage alliance with the Bonaparte family, and although Souza
disagreed, it was decided that the Prince of Beira should be sent on ahead
to Brazil, and received royally, though no part would be given him in
the government there.44
41 F. O. 63/55, Strangford, 13 Aug., 20, 21, 23, 29 Aug., 8 Sept. 1807.

42 F. O. 63/55, Strangford, 29 Aug., 3 letters, 8 Sept. 1807.
43 F. O. 63/55, Strangford, 21, 23, 29 Aug. 1807. Funchal, Conde de Linhares,
304/8. Alan K. Manchester in Revista de Instituto Historico e Geografico de Brazil,
vol. 277, 1967.
44 Funchal, Linhares, 308/12. F. O. 63/55, Strangford, 8 Sept. 1807, 3 letters.
271
DAVID FRANCIS
The Council of State wasted time in idle discussions and vain hopes
that Britain would patch up a peace with Napoleon, but they still favoured
resistance and hesitated to close the ports to the British or to molest British
property. Araujo took the embareation of Beira much to heart, and defeatist
though he was in other respects, did his best to keep up the regent’s spirits.
When the Spanish ambassador the Count Duke of Campo took advantage
of his privilege as Family Ambassador to call on the regent on his birthday
in the hope of intimidating him, the regent was heartened by a note from
Araujo, saying, ‘If H. R. H. weakens, we are lost’. The ambassador was
startled to hear the regent say ‘If you choose to leave Portugal, I cannot
help it, for nobody has the right to detain you a moment longer than you
are pleased to stay’. For the time being the regent seemed almost reconciled
to the prospect of sailing to Brazil. But he was surrounded by the defeatist
hangers-on of the court and by the women of the court, who, with the
exception of the queen, who was suspected of intriguing against him,
howled, wept and protested at the idea of sending away the ten-year-old
Prince of Beira. Araujo had become quite a friend of Strangford, but
Strangford fell ill, and it was unfortunate that Rodrigo de Sousa, who was
at daggers drawn with Araujo, intrigued against him through his brother
Domingos de Sousa, the Portuguese minister in London. A god-son of
Pombal, de Sousa was as staunch a Portuguese nationalist as Pombal had
ever been, but a friend of Britain and of democratic though not revolution¬
ary ideas; with a Brazilian grand-mother and property in Brazil he fa¬
voured the removal of the royal family there.45
Hopes that Britain would make peace with France were now finally
disappointed, but the Council of State still clung to the hope that British
ministers would acquiesce in a sham declaration of war against them, and
meanwhile they sent a number of diamonds to Brito, their remaining
representative in Paris, to soften French hearts. They forebore to con¬
fiscate British property and said that all that they required in return was
non-interference with their trade and their colonies. They promised to
give no Letters of Marque to Portuguese privateers to attack British ship¬
ping and hinted they might perhaps do something to ease direct British
trade with Brazil. Araujo declared that he would rather make war with
France than admit French troops to Portuguese garrisons and made a show
of activity in the dockyards to put the navy in order. The regent even told
the Nuncio that he could always take refuge in Peniche and escape from
there in a British man of war. One ship would be enough to take him.
Araujo contested this and the prince soon agreed that one ship would
not be enough, but Araujo played down the invasion scare and in the
Council of State it was suggested that Junot had been sent to Bayonne
45 F. O. 63/55, Strangford, 29 Aug., 8 Sept., 23, 25 Sept. 1807.
272
as a punishment for seducing Madame Marat, that is for political and

not military reasons.46
The regent hated the idea of going to Brazil, and only agreed to it as
a last resort, but after long arguments about protocol the embarcation of
the Prince of Beira seemed to be settled and Domingos de Sousa was told
to conclude a convention on the subject in London. Concessions for British
trade, such as the use of the island of Saint Catherine as a free port, were
proposed, but the Portuguese soon went back on these and confined
themselves to agreeing grudgingly to the protection of Madeira by British
troops, if this should be necessary. But for a short time serious preparations
for the Prince of Beira’s departure were continued.47
There was a lull for a time, as the Spaniards showed signs of cooling
off. The Prince of Peace remarked ‘Better a bad Convention than a good
War’, and made some effort to persuade Bonaparte to be satisfied with the
concessions which Portugal had already made. The expenses of an army
were proving heavy and he was anxious to avoid having to bear the brunt
of a war against Portugal and the danger of a French army in his country.
Bonaparte realized that the Prince of Peace was inclined to let him down,
but decided to forego revenge for the present and to cajole him by the
offer of a principality carved out of Portugal. The Portuguese, seeing a
gleam of hope, haggled more determinedly with Britain. The regent still
resented the occupation of Madeira in 1801 and Strangford had to soothe
him by promising him that nothing would be done without forewarning.
He extracted a promise that the governor of Madeira would be told to be
friendly and to stop any French or Spanish officers using the island as
a staging point on their way to America.48
At the end of September the French Charge Reyneval again asked for
his passport, but this was taken as no more than a gesture, such as
Talleyrand had described a similar move not long before. Strangford tried
to stir the regent by reminding him that his vacillation on a similar occasion
had brought him bad luck, the death of his oldest son and one of the
princesses. The regent admitted that the Prince of Beira and he too would
have eventually to go to Brazil, but upbraided Strangford for thinking of
British trade and British interests there rather than the protection of Por¬
tugal. Strangford warned that with the best will in the world King George
could not feel the same towards the regent, if he became a vassal of
France. Reyneval changed the word ‘confiscation’ to ‘sequester’ in his de-
46 F.O. 63/55, Strangford, 8 Sept., 25, 26, 27 Sept., 14 Oct. Funchal, Linhares,
278. Strangford to Azevedo, 11 Oct. 1807. Azevedo to Strangford, 17 Oct., pp. 277,
281. Proceedings of Council of State, 307.
47 F. O. 63/55, Strangford, 3 Oct., 14 Oct. 1807. Funchal, Linhares, 273, 275.
Credentials to Domingos Sousa to conclude a Convention and Azevedo to Sousa,
17 Oct.
48 F. O. 63/55, Strangford, 8 Sept., 21 Sept., 27 Sept., 3 Oct. 1807.
273
DAVID FRANCIS
mands, but this was not enough, and in October he finally left with the
Spanish ambassador, though both of them lingered near the Spanish
frontier. The regent issued an edict saying that the departure of the two
envoys was regrettable but not irremediable.49
In an unofficial letter, marked as such by being written in French,
Araujo gave a further assurance that Beira would be embarking, and the
regent came to Lisbon to make the final arrangements. The ships were
ready and a farewell party was given on one of them. But after a further
wail from the women of his household and a family protest from the
court of Spain the regent changed his mind again. He told Araujo to stop
urging the prince’s departure and said that he could not spare the ships
for two royal expeditions as his own departure was growing near. Without
telling Araujo he summoned Strangford and told him that he had heard
that a British squadron was on its way to seize his ships. If the seizure
was called off he would not hold up the Prince of Beira for one minute.
Strangford replied that Beira’s sailing had already been unconditionally
agreed and that he could not accept this new demand. The idea of using
Peniche as an impregnable stronghold was still spoken of and there was
question of appointing the Scot, John Forbes, to undertake its fortification
and the defence of northern Portugal. The regent asked him whether he
had qualified for a Portuguese command by being naturalised, but Forbes
told him ‘No’, though he would fight for Portugal against anyone save
Britain. The Admiralty gave orders to arrange a direct correspondence with
Mafra to cope with any contingency there, but nothing came of the Peniche
and the regent was again in a non co-operative mood. He even chose this
moment to grumble again about the cession of Olivensa. Araujo was very
distressed to hear what had occurred and spoke of resigning. He said that
he did not think the regent would ever sail according to plan, but if he
did so, it would be all of a sudden, moved by fear. Strangford agreed, but
thought that in spite of his timidity the regent would depart, but not before
the French army was in sight, and his flight would be to escape danger and
not a positive step. Strangford was inclined to doubt Araujo’s sincerity, but
the regent’s volte face seems to have been a genuine disappointment to him
and on 17/19th October his despatch to Domingos de Sousa shows that
he was seriously planning the departure to Brazil, though he still hoped that
the French preparations were against England rather than Portugal, and
that the necesity for abandoning Portugal would not arise.50
In London Canning and Domingos de Sousa had agreed to the terms
of a Convention, which included provisions for the occupation of Madeira
49 F. O. 63/55, Strangford, 29 Aug., 25 Sept., 26 Sept., 2 letters, 3 Oct. 1807.

50 F. O. 63/55, Strangford, 3 Oct., 14, 20 Oct. F. O. 63/56, 2 Nov., 27 Oct.,
28 Oct., 29 Oct. S. of S. to Strangford, 22 Oct. Funchal, Linhares, 275/7. Araujo
to Sousa, 17/19 Oct. 1807.
274
but no longer any undertaking by the regent to leave Portugal rather than
to agree to French demands for the confiscation of British property; he
only promised to leave if the French actually invaded Portugal and de¬
manded to install French garrisons. The British demand for part of the
Portuguese fleet to be sent ahead to Brazil was rejected, as also the request
for all naval officers to be subjected to vetting for their political reliability.
Araujo ridiculed this proposal; asking ‘What politics has a sea captain?’,
and doubting whether the British Admiralty would have any idea whom
to select, even if a complete Portuguese Navy List was given to them. The
embarkation of the Prince of Beira was left in abeyance rather than count¬
ermanded, and the momentum of naval preparations was not entirely lost.
Work continued in the dockyards and a quantity of plate and of other
valuables was placed on board; as far as British property was concerned
the Portuguese were anxious to rid themselves of any obligation towards
it, and urged its shipment as soon as possible. Gambier was very active
and on the 17th October sixty ships left sLisbon under the convoy of
H. M. S. Lively and were joined off Oporto by another forty-six ships.
While still in London Gambier had sent a supply of blank certificates to
Warre at Oporto to enable him to licence the embarkation of British goods
on neutral ships, and H. M. Customs had been ordered to allow the goods
thus shipped to be placed in bond and to defer the payment of duty. Lists
of the property left behind and its value were drawn up. The total value
for Lisbon was reckoned to be 2726,408.724 milreis or £761,176,17.4 at
67^ to the milreis, but the actual total was perhaps less, for more goods
were sent away after the lists had been drawn up. The Oporto total was
2900,564 milreis in debts plus the value of the Factory House and of the
cemetery of £20,000 and £2000. Much of the wine, in which the capital
of the Oporto Factory was sunk, was able to be shipped.51
The convoy was only just in time, for the decree closing Portuguese
ports to British shipping was issued on 20th October 1807. However the
authorities were not too strict, allowing some belated arrivals and latitude
in borderline cases. They stopped the entry of a Newfoundland convoy, but
they badly needed the fish, and permitted the retail sale to small boats
visiting the fish ships at their anchorage off Cascais and had no objection
to it being fetched from such ships as went on to Gibraltar. There was
still hopeful talk that the French would attack Gibraltar or Ireland rather
than Portugal; the internal situation at Gibraltar was worrying after the
mutinies there, for the efforts of the Duke of Kent to improve discipline
by putting down the drink trade had aroused the animosity of the trades’
people. The local Spanish authorities were already beginning to turn
51 F. O. 63/57, Draft Convention signed by Sousa and Canning, 28 Sept. F. O.

63/56, Strangford, 3 Nov. 1807. F. O. 63/63, Gambier, 4, 16, 18 Oct. 1807, 12 Jan.
1808.
275
DAVID FRANCIS
against their government and were inclined to be friendly, but Jewish

Spanish elements were in touch with the French and with disaffected
Irish officers in the garrison. A family named Benolion were involved in
a conspiracy to take Gibraltar, and one of them, a resident of Sevilla, was
apprehended in Lisbon. They were assisted by a Jewish banker, a friend
of Napoleon named Seror. In Spain there was dissidence and the Prince
of the Asturias was found in league with the French to be involved in a
plot against his father the king. Napoleon therefore planned to use French
troops for the invasion of Portugal and to divert a number of Spanish
troops to France, where they could be used for garrison duties. In Portu¬
gal the Marquis of Alorna was placed in command of the troops in the
Alentejo and ordered to resist any Spanish encroachments. It was doubtful
whether he would oppose the French and according to his nephew’s
account he received specific orders not to do so. The same source said
that Gomez Freire, though he cast in his lot with the French, would now
have fought the French if he had been placed in command at Lisbon, but
he was away at Peniche and the first he knew of the Regent’s flight was
the sight of the disappearing ships when he came to Cascais to find out
what was happening.52
Lourenco de Lima arrived back from Paris at the beginning of No¬
vember with terrifying accounts of French threats against Portugal, but
the French and Spanish envoys were lingering near the frontier, so there
was still a possibility of their return, and there was talk of sending Lima
at once back to his Paris embassy. He did not proceed, but the Marquis
of Marialva was sent in the first instance instead. Strangford suspected
that fresh concessions had been offered, but Araujo vehemently denied
this. Strangford told the regent that if the Prince of Beira did not sail at
once as had been agreed, some compensation would be due. The regent
again said that the Prince of Beira would embark at once, if an undertaking
was given not to molest his fleet. News now came that French troops had
crossed the Spanish frontier and were on their way to Salamanca. Admiral
Sir Sidney Smith sailed from Cawsand Bay on 10th November and re¬
ceived the news of the closure of the ports just before doing so. His orders
were to act on the advice of Strangford, but fresh ones followed him at
once to blockade Lisbon if the Portuguese failed to ratify the Convention
or to hand over their fleet.
Work was proceeding on the habilitation of the Tagus forts, and when
Gomez Freire enquired whether the defence of the frontier or of the Tagus
was to have priority, he was told to defend the forts first. Although the
Convention had been signed on 23rd October the British demands had
52 F. O. 63/55, Strangford, 14, 20 Oct. F. O. 63/56, 2, 5, 7 Nov. 1807. G. Hills,

Rock of Contention, 382, 386. Alorna, Marquis of, Memoires, 2 vols., 1926, 1-28/9,
33, 47. F. O. 63/63, Gambier, 28 Oct. 1807. F. O. 63/62, 8 Nov. 1807.
276
not been met in full and there was talk of Sousa being recalled. By No¬
vember 9th British ships were being embargoed. All the same the regent
was said to be very much upset and to have thrown away his pen five
times before he brought himself to sign the decree for the closure of the
ports. He was probably sincere, even though he had done his utmost to
conciliate Napoleon. Araujo, who was in a deep state of depression, con¬
fided to Strangford that while St. Vincent was in Lisbon and the regent
was professing friendship, he had signed a letter to Napoleon, dictated
by Vila Verde, to assure him that he had not invoked the assistance of
England and that he entertained no doubts about the honour and integrity
of France.53
The unfeigned grief and regret of the regent at the breach with Britain
and the declarations of war by France and Spain did not prevent an inti¬
mation to Strangford that his departure and that of Gambier would be
helpful. Araujo still hoped that a fresh approach to Paris might yet bring
France and Spain to a more reasonable frame of mind. Having closed his
legation Strangford was only a private individual, but he was kept informed
of what passed in the Council of State by Joad de Almeida and the Nuncio.
The Nuncio, Monsenor Laurengo Cal(l)eppe, was a leading diplomatic
character; he wore green spectacles to enhance his inscrutability and
astonished Napoleon by his cunning and duplicity. Madame Junot had
regarded him as a warm friend and related one occasion when he
abandoned discretion. This was at a famous party on board the French
frigate, Topaze, whose gallant Captain Baudin was some months in Lisbon
repairing his battered ship and waiting an opportunity to elude the British
Navy, and meanwhile was putting up the best show he could to offset
Trafalgar. The Nuncio, after imbibing an astonishing amount of port,
madeira and canary, could not be restrained from bursting into song and
drinking to the perdition of the scoundrelly English at the top of his voice.
But usually he was an impenetrable though charming diplomat and he
now proved a friend in need to Strangford, interceding among other things
for the release of the two brigs on which a number of distressed British
Subjects had been embarked by Gambier. He failed to board the regent’s
fleet and was soon doing his utmost to ingratiate himself with Junot, but
at this time Napoleon was the enemy of the pope, so his friendliness to
Strangford was probably genuine. After a week or so he disguised himself
as a fisherman and risked a hazardous escape to join a British warship
and go to England. From there he went to Brazil, where he spent the rest
of his life and was made a cardinal. In Brazil he opposed bitterly the efforts
53 F. O. 63/56, Strangford, 28, 29 Oct., 2, 5, 25 Nov. 1807. S. of S., Instructions,

22 Oct. 1807. Admiral Sir. S. Smith’s orders of 30 Oct. in Adm 50/50. F. O. 63/57,
28 Sept, for copy of Conventions.
277
DAVID FRANCIS
of the British Minister to curb the rights claimed by the Inquisition to a

first share in debts owed by convicted heretics.
Joao de Almeida and also Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho were again
attending the Council of State. Almeida stoutly defended the British case
and as a result orders for the defence of the Alentejo were given and the
preparation of the fleet and the embarkation of valuables were speeded up.
Meanwhile Strangford was in a quandary, for no ship had come to
fetch him, and he was being pressed by Araujo not to stay longer. He
declined the offer of a passage on a Portuguese frigate, but obtained per¬
mission for H. M. S. Raven to fetch him under a flag of truce. She was
prevented by bad weather, but Strangford was saved from further em¬
barrassment by the appearance off the coast on the 17th November of
Sir Sidney Smith’s squadron. He embarked in a fishing boat and after a
stormy passage joined the Admiral on H. M. S. London, transferring with
him on 24th November 1807 to the Hibernia. Gambier stayed on a few
days to arrange the departure of two brigs which he had hired to convey
distressed British Subjects, which had been held up by the Portuguese. It
was agreed that the further protection of British Subjects should be en¬
trusted to }. Bell, the former Factory candidate for consul general, who
had been appointed commissioner for the exchange of prisoners. Gambier
left on one of the brigs on 21st November. He passed on his way down
the river H. M. S. Confiance, which was arriving with despatches from
England but did not join the fleet off the coast until the next day. As
mentioned above there had already been signs of a more favourable
reaction, before Strangford’s departure, in the Council of State. Strangford
had made it clear to Araujo that his favourite notion that France could
be propitiated by a Portuguese declaration of war against England, which
would be disregarded by England and treated only as a pretence, was
entirely unacceptable. The Council at least decided to defer a declaration
of .war for the time being.54
On 16th November a new factor appeared, when two Russian men
of war put into Lisbon under stress of weather and were soon followed
by a whole squadron consisting of five more ships of the line and three
frigates under the command of Admiral Sincevin. He had recently been
co-operating as an ally with the British at Corfu, but now Russia had
joined Napoleon and it was rumoured that the squadron were intending
to co-operate with the French in an attack on Lisbon backed by French
ships making a sortie from Cadiz. But the Russian arrival was unexpected
in Portugal, and though some such steps had perhaps been mooted in the
54 F. O. 63/56, Strangford, 22 Oct., 6, 17, 19, 20 Nov. 1807. Adm 50/50, Admiral
Sir S. Smith’s Journal, 18 Nov. Adm 51/1966, Log of H. M. S. Confiance, 21 Nov.
1807. Abrantes, Memoires, 1883, 447/8 and Biography, 1893, 3-189/9, 6-29, 127/32.
F. O. 63/63, 9 Nov.
278
highest quarters the Russian admiral did no more than attend to the
repair of his much-battered ships and prepare to carry out his original
orders to return to the Baltic. The Portuguese vindicated their neutrality
by demurring at the entry of more than the six ships of war allowed by
treaty, and to satisfy them the powder from three major ships was removed
and deposited on shore. Nobody knew what attitude the Russians would
take, but Sir Sidney Smith contacted a Russian frigate in need of supplies
and helped her out. There is no record of correspondence with the Russian
Admiral but there were probably links. General Gomez Freire for instance
had served in Russia, and so had Setaro, the invaluable purveyor of naval
stores, who had been Portuguese consul general there. The Russians threw
a few parties in Lisbon but otherwise remained quiet and Admiral Sincevin
at the time of the Convention of Cintra, after having been blockaded by
the British, refused to co-operate with Junot and insisted on negotiating
the terms for his departure separately with Admiral Cotton.55
The primary object of Sir Sidney Smiths mission was to escort the
Portuguese fleet to Brazil, but as this was ruled out at the time of his
arrival, Strangford took the initiative in advising the admiral to declare
a blockade of Lisbon and Setubal. The admiral readily fell in with the
proposal, and the specific orders to declare a blockade in the circumstances
which had now arisen were received next day by the Confiance. The
admiral's declaration of a blockade was notified to Araujo by a letter taken
in by H. M. S. Confiance under a flag of truce on 24th November and
delivered to the regent at Mafra by a ship’s officer. Sir Sidney Smith’s
orders authorised him to occupy the Tagus forts in case of Portuguese
recalcitrance, but he decided that although it would be practicable to do
so, provided that the Russians remained neutral, a withdrawal afterwards
would be very difficult and a permanent occupation impracticable without
the help of a considerable body of troops. Furthermore, even if the troops
had been available, there was no safe anchorage in the approaches to the
Tagus, so that it would be necessary to land a second force at some other
place, say Peniche, to cover any joint attack on Lisbon. Actually there
were two expeditionary forces in the offing, one already embarked to
proceed to Madeira, the other under General Moore rumoured to have
reached Gibraltar, but in fact delayed by bad weather somewhere in the
Mediterranean. But it should be added that British naval power was
stretched to the utmost, as a number of ships were needed to maintain
Admiral Collingwood’s endless vigil to blockade Toulon and French naval
movements through all the Mediterranean.56
55 F. O. 63/56, Strangford, 10, 17, 20 Nov. 1807. Adm 51/1730, Log of H. M. S.

Hibernia. Abrantes, Memoires, III-186. Ferrao, Antonio, Gonzales Freire etn Russia,
Coimbra, 1912.
56 F. O. 63/56, Strangford, 20, 24 Nov., 30 Nov., 1 Dec. 1807. O’Neill,
279
PORTUGAL.-19
DAVID FRANCIS
H. M. S. Confiance had also taken a request from Strangford for an

audience with the regent. Though he no longer had any official standing
he felt that it would be worth while to use his unrivalled knowledge of
the regent's character and foibles to make a final effort to persuade him.
Actually with a safe-conduct for Strangford the Confiance brought back
the news that the Council of State had at last on 24 November reached
a decision and that the regent was preparing to embark. Strangford rather
slurred over the circumstance at the time, but it was confirmed by Sir
Sidney Smith and by the letter which Araujo wrote on the 25th to Do¬
mingos de Sousa in London to tell him to address no more despatches to
Lisbon. The Council did not meet again after the 24th so it must have
taken this decision then. The admiral thought that his declaration of a
blockade had played the decisive part, but this does not seem to have been
the case, though no doubt the fear of it was an important factor. Strangford
at his audience with the regent on the 28th November was also supposed
to have influenced him by showing him a copy of the Paris Moniteur,
which declared Napoleon’s intention of partitioning Portugal, but Strang¬
ford himself said that nothing of the sort appeared in the Moniteur until
later. Actually Napoleon’s intentions towards Portugal had already been
divulged to the Portuguese ambassador Lima at a party for the queen
of Holland in Paris on 23rd October, and Sousa in London had heard of
Napoleon’s plans and his treaty with Spain at Fontainbleau to partition
Portugal and had reported the news. All these factors counted, but it
appears that what finally goaded the Council and the regent to take the
irrevocable step was the news brought by Lt. Col. Lecors, an officer of
the Marquis of Alorna, definitely confirming the entry of French troops
into Portugal on their way to Lisbon. The regent was ready to concede
all else but not to tolerate an invasion of his country, and he stuck to
his point.57
Strangford had a rough passage to the bar on the 27th November and
then, when the wind dropped, up the Tagus. The Confiance had to use
her sweeps and could only progress slowly in a heavy cross sea against
a strong ebb tide. He was put ashore late in the evening and had to find
Lt. Count Thomas, Account of the proceedings of the squadron of Sir S. Smith,
1809. Memoirs of Sir S. Smith, 2 vols., 1839. Admiral Collingwood, Life of and
Letters, Oliver Warner, 1968. Alan K. Manchester, Transfer of the Portuguese Court
to Brazil in vol. 277, 1967, of Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico Brazileiro
de Rio de Janeiro. Adm 51/1966, Log of H. M. S. Confiance, Dec. Adm 50/50,
29 Nov.
57 Adm 51/1966 and 1730, Logs of H. M. S. Confiance and Hibernia. Adm 377,
1048, Muster roll of H. M. S. Confiance. Adm 50/50, Admiral Smith’s Journal. Sir
Charles Oman, Hist, of Peninsular War, 192. C. Napier, Hist, of P. War, 1835.
Strangford, Further Observations, 1838. F. O. 63/57, Lima to Araujo, 7 May 1807.
F. O. 63/56, Strangford, 2 Nov. Funchal, Linhares, 94, Alorna, 1-29.
280
his own way to Araujo’s house, which was bolted and barred. The town
was in a state of chaos with bands of armed men roaming the streets to
the terror of the inhabitants. He eventually traced Araujo on board the
Medusa and learnt from him that the regent and his family were also
embarked and ready to sail as soon as the wind allowed. After several
days of strong west winds an easterly wind was setting in, which lasted
a few hours, just long enough to enable the fleet to clear the river. A last
emissary of Araujo had just returned from meeting Junot on the river
Zezere and had been finally repulsed by him. Strangford wrote at once to
the regent, but Araujo told him that the regent was anxious to see him,
and to know whether he would now be regarded by the British as a friend
or an enemy. He also let slip that the regent had not even now altogether
given up hope of a settlement. Strangford hurried on board the regent’s
flagship El Principe Real, and this was where he was able to play an
useful part, for the regent was still capable of scuttling on shore again,
if he felt that running from the French intosthe arms of the British was
only to jump from the frying pan into the fire. The regent already knew
all Strangford’s arguments only too well, but Strangford was able to
elaborate them again and to tell him that all was forgiven and forgotten
and he would be treated by the British as an old friend. He was able to
paint a bright picture of the glamorous future awaiting him in his Bra¬
zilian empire and also to play upon his fears. Hitherto his fear of the sea
and of uprooting himself, his scruples about abandoning his people and
about the hardships entailed for his mad mother and her young children,
had outweighed his fear of staying. But he had now been alarmed by an
alleged plot against his life among the nobles and daunted by his passage
through the streets of Lisbon, where the crowd was menacing and cries of
‘Death to the prince, who abandons us’, were becoming common. Strang¬
ford had passed through the Lisbon streets later still and could paint an
even darker picture of the danger to the regent, if he ventured to set foot
ashore. At Mafra, according to the account of Lt. Count Thomas O’Neill,
who had it from a member of the court, the regent’s mind was already
made up as nearly as it could be. He said to the princess, his wife ‘We
are actually betrayed. The French troops are on their march to Lisbon.
Take care of the queen, my beloved mother, and you and your daughters
follow me to Lisbon without loss of time’. The family did in fact follow
him and embarked; the queen and the Prince of Beira with him, the
rest on separate ships. Strangford remained on board the Principe Real
to hold the regent’s hand until he had crossed the bar.58
Strangford had noticed a change in Araujo lately and certainly during
the last days in Lisbon had received scant courtesy from him. There is no
58 F. O. 63/56, Strangford, 24, 29 Nov. O’Neill, Lt. Count Thomas, Account

of the proceedings of the squadron of Sir S. Smith, 1809.
281
DAVID FRANCIS
doubt that Araujo until the very last moment spared no effort to reach
an accommodation with the French. But it appears that like the regent
himself he drew the line at letting the French occupy Portugal; he had
shown this by packing up his precious library, embarking it on the Medusa
on 23th November, and then going on board himself. There was dreadful
confusion while hundreds of courtiers with their women-folk and depend¬
ents and bits of luggage scrambled on the quays, and the whole operation
gave the impression of an unpremeditated rout. But the Portuguese, whilst
not good at orderly proceedings, were nevertheless working on a considered
plan, which just scraped through to success. Those who found a place on
board endured the utmost discomfort and even starvation, but most of
them survived to reach Brazil. The fleet carried with it not only the royal
family and members of the government, numbering some eight to fifteen
thousand persons, but half the money in circulation and treasure worth
80 million cruzados.59
It was natural that both Strangford and Sir Sidney Smith felt that they
had taken the major part in bringing about the regent’s departure. To the
navy, who were the principal British witnesses of the denouement, to Lt.
O’Neill, who published a widely read account of the proceedings, and to the
general public, Strangford’s part was unknown and the admiral was the only
figure of importance. Afterwards politics stirred up a controversy which
raged for years in press and parliament on the merits of the two men. Later
in Brazil Strangford and Smith quarrelled bitterly, but there is nothing in
the admiral’s reports to discredit Strangford’s account of his conduct in
Portugal, or even in the life and letters of Sir Sidney Smith published
twenty years later. Strangford had played a great part in the earlier dis¬
cussions with the regent and a useful role in his last talk with him,
when he escorted him over the bar. The admiral had been responsible for
carrying out the blockade, though his declaration was made in accordance
with orders from home by agreement with Strangford and was therefore
a joint decision. He carried out his orders to the letter and co-operated
with Strangford in concerting their attitude towards the Prince Regent
and the Portuguese. It appears that neither played the decisive part in
bringing about the final decision. This was left to Junot’s troops.60
From the Hibernia the first Portuguese ships were seen to emerge from
the river at about 11.15. It was an impressive sight as the fleet passed
through the lines about four o’clock and were saluted with twenty-one
guns. It had been a narrow shave; a French officer reached one of the
59 F. O. 63/56, Strangford, 20 Nov. F. O. 63/62, Strangford, 9 Nov. 1801.

Historia e Memorias de Academia Real das Sciencias de Lisboa, vol. 8, Part ii.
Elogio de Conde de Barca (Araujo). Alan K. Manchester in Revista, op. cit. British
Pre-eminence in Brazil, 1933, 63/67.
60 O’Neil, op. cit., Memoires of Admiral Sir S. Smith, 2 vols., 1839. Strangford,
ii-88/9, 93. Further Observations, 1838. C. Napier, Hist, of Peninsular War, 1835.
282
Tagus forts to fire a parting shot without success. A westerly gale began
to blow almost at once and Sir Sidney Smith said that if the fleet had
delayed sailing two hours longer they would have been held up. A gale
blew for several days and the fleet suffered a severe battering. Many an
earlier fleet had been caught outside the bar by a similar change of
weather and had put back to port, but if there were any thoughts of doing
so on this occasion they were foiled by Sir Sidney Smith, who carefully
shepherded them and helped to repair and supply those ships which
suffered most. The happy future predicted by Strangford for the regent
was indeed still some way off. He visited the Principe Real on 3rd
December; he found a state of chaos; there were said to be sixteen hundred
persons on board with little food or shelter, many of them nobles or
women unused to hardship. The Duke of Cadaval actually died, it was
said from want of food. The regent himself however was bearing up with
great resignation; he at least had the consolation that his wife was on
board another ship. At first it was feared tl^at a number of ships would
be unfit to cross the ocean but although one or two naval captains were
churlish and refused help, most of the fleet rallied to assist the Portuguese,
and finally all were able to continue to Brazil, except one ship which had
to go to England.61
The regent reached Bahia and after a rest went on to Rio, where he
received a warm welcome. The Brazilians were soon to resent the burden
of the presence of the Court and of the swarms of Portuguese, who filled
all the public offices, but for the time being it was a glorious occasion
and enthusiasm reigned. The regent soon found Brazil much to his taste,
and was as anxious to remain there as he had been reluctant to leave
Portugal. In Portugal the people suffered hard times and it was little
consolation that Junot’s conquering army turned out to consist not of
heroes of Austerlitz but of a tattered remnant of fourteen hundred men,
many of them raw recruits; fourteen thousand men had left Bayonne, but
to this the drenching winter weather and lack of shelter had reduced them.
The Portuguese could have stopped their advance, though they could not
have withstood the reinforcements which followed. However the bumbling
policy of the regent had postponed the evil day as long as possible, and
though the price paid had been high it had come out of the profits of a
general increase in trade. The British Factories had incurred losses, but
even they had had time to ship off their assets, and the bulk of the
Portuguese people away from the capital and coast pursued its immemorial
way, at subsistence level, but little affected by the ups and downs of
foreign trade and politics. The Portuguese merchants had been able to
pay the French subsidies from their gains, which had increased as they
won a larger share of trade from the British and other foreigners. Portugal
61 Adm 51/1966. Log of H. M. S. Confiance, Adm 50/50.
283
DAVID FRANCIS
was not rid of French troops until 1812, but was totally occupied for a few
months only and profited from the invasion having been staved off so
long.62
The arrival of the Portuguese government in Brazil achieved for Britain
an aim which had eluded her for the whole of the century, the opening
of direct trade. The Brazilian trade had always been a mainstay of British
interest in Portugal, but her rights to maintain consuls and representatives
in Brazil had been whittled away and all the trade had to go through
Lisbon and be handled by Portuguese intermediaries. For the whole of
the century Brazil had been inaccessible to foreigners; now the ports of
Brazil were opened to the ships of all nations, which meant that Britain
had a monopoly for the remainder of the war. Industries in Brazil were
progressing very slowly and the falling off of gold production was matched
by a period of decline, which was only offset as long as the war lasted
by a boom in the exports of cotton and sugar from the Maranhao. In 1812
British exports to Brazil exceeded £2,000,000 whereas the total exports
to Portugal in 1808 had totalled £811,000 only. Home Popham at the time
of his brief triumph in Buenos Aires had glowing reports of the prospects
of trade with Brazil; this had resulted in a boom and the despatch of a
plethora of goods, many of them quite unsuitable, including the despatch
of skates to Rio. A severe slump followed, which was enhanced by the
death of Rodrigo de Sousa and the return to power of Araujo, who made
a determined attempt to reduce British domination. The efforts of Britain
to abolish the Brazilian slave trade also aroused bitter hostility. Never¬
theless after Araujo’s death in 1817 a favourable treaty was concluded
which allowed British goods to enter at a reduced rate of 15%. It took
some time for the bad effects of the excess of British goods sent to Brazil
to be eliminated but in due course the Brazilian economy began to expand
and British trade there won a lasting pre-eminence.64
62 F. O. 63/66, Letters of 29 Nov. and 3 Dec. were marked as carried by packet

Townshend, one of them received on 22 Dec. Gambier took some letters on Trafalgar
and Strangford had copies with him on Confiance to England. Maxwell, Conflicts,
238/9.
63 Adm 51/1730, Log of H. M. S. Hibernia. F. O. 63/66, Strangford, 3 Dec.,
30 Nov./2 Dec. 1807. A. K. Manchester, British Pre-eminence in Brazil, 1933,
pp. 76/97.
64 Celso Furtado, La Formation Economique du Brazil, Paris, 1972, 78/81.
284
APPENDIX
THE STRANGFORD / SYDNEY SMITH CONTROVERSY
The controversy as to whether Lord Strangford or Sir Sydney Smith

deserved the credit for bringing about the departure of the Prince Regent
of Portugal and his government to Brazil lasted a whole generation. The
onslaught on Strangford was led by the historian Charles Napier in various
polemics, and in his History of the Peninsular War published in 1835,
and ended with Strangford’s refutation in 1838. The two most specific
accusations, which were relatively unimportant, alleged that Strangford
had not accompanied the Prince Regent in the Principe Real over the bar
and that he had written his despatches in Bruton Street some weeks later
and not at the time. Napier claimed to have seen a letter from Lieutenant
Smith, who had accompanied Strangford directly on board H. M. S. Hi¬
bernia. This letter has not come to light, but the existence of Lt. Smith
is confirmed in the acount of Lt. Count Thomas O’Neill, the officer who
took Admiral Sir Sidney Smith’s declaration of a blockade to Mafra on
24th November. Lt. O’Neill published an account of what occurred. He had
no knowledge of what passed in higher quarters, but he reported factually
what he actually saw, such as the attempt on Fort Bugio. His foreign title
of Count probably gained him an entree to high society and helped the
circulation of his work, which was well patronised by the best people.
He did not contradict Strangford in any way but scarcely mentioned him,
and as a naval officer naturally reflected the prevalent view that Sir Sidney
Smith played the major part. The subscribers to his booklet numbered
several hundreds and included several royal princes.
A principal snag to Strangford’s account is the mention in the log
of H. M. S. Confiance that he came on board at 8 a.m., just when the
Principe Real was casting off or possibly a little afterwards. Strangford
himself said that he had sent his letter to the admiral by a fishing boat;
he could well have taken it on board H. M. S. Confiance himself and
have returned to the Principe Real, which was seen out on the river at
9 a.m.; the Confiance telegraphed the news to the Hibernia but the Prin¬
cipe Real only seems to have passed the Confiance going down the river
an hour or two later. Perhaps the fishing boat under the command of
285
DAVID FRANCIS
Lt. Smith took Strangford out to the Principe Real. In any case Strangford
specifically stated that he only left the regent after he had crossed the bar
in order to fetch the admiral from the Hibernia, to present him to the
regent. There is nothing in the admiral’s account or in the log of H. M. S.
Hibernia to contradict this.
The second charge against Strangford was that he had not written his
despatches at the time but had concocted them in Bruton Street some
weeks later. He himself explained that he had written two or three letters
at the time in haste and had made the fair copy of his final despatch
in Bruton Street, with a few modifications made with the approval of
Canning to avoid giving any offence to the Portuguese in the published
version. This consideration was still in his mind even in his final observ¬
ations in 1835. The original versions in the Foreign Office files are marked
as received on the 22nd December except for one copy, sent separately
with Consul General Gambier, which was undated. Strangford landed at
Fishguard on 17th December and Canning returned to London on 19th
December. The existence of a copy taken by Gambier and the marking
of others to go by the Townshend packet confirms that the original des¬
patches were written in Portugal. Strangford’s explanation is reasonable
and, as he pointed out, the substance of his despatches was the same,
whether he wrote them on shipboard or in Bruton Street.
286
LIST OF WORKS CITED
Manuscript Sources
At Public Record Office
State Papers, Portugal, 1716 to 1808.

S. P. 89/16 to 91
F. O. 63/1 to 63
State Papers, Spain, S. P. 94/81, 89, etc.

War Office Papers, Portugal, W. O. 1/217 to 222, and 1/352 Madeira.
P. R. O. 30/8/345, Admiral Campbell’s report on Brazil.
Log books and naval papers:
Adm 51/138 Log of H. M. S. Britannia
Adm 51/379 » » »
Adm 51/4/32 » » »
Adm 51/151 » » Orpheus
Adm 51/1736 » » Hibernia
Adm 51/1470 » » Queen
Adm 51/1966 » » Confiance
Adm 50/50 Admiral Sir S. Smith’s Journal
Adm 50/54 Admiral St Vincent’s instructions
Adm 327/1046 Muster roll of H. M. S. Confiance
At British Library:
Add MSS 12301 King John V’s funeral

» » 15946 Craggs corr.
» » 15956 Carteret Corr.
» » 22206 Bolingbroke
» » 23627/9 Tyrawly 1728/41
» » 23634/5 Tyrawly 1752 and 1762
» » 23644 Rainsford
» » 28015 Carvalho in London
» » 23828 Newcastle
» » 28130/1 Norris
» » 30339 Silver trade
» » 32794 Tyrawly (Newcastle papers)
» » 32802 Newcastle
Kings Library 326, Report on 1762 campaign.

Egerton 921, Walpole papers.
287
DAVID FRANCIS
Townshend MS at Army Museum for 1762 campaign.

Stanhope papers at Maidstone County Record Office.
Hof. Archiven, Vienna, for corr. of Duke of Moles.
Published Books
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Alorna, Marquis of, 2 vols., 1926.
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— Life of St Vincent.
Ano Historico y Noticioso, Ed. L. M. Mattoso, 1748, Ed. Costa Veiga, 1939.
Azevedo, J. L.: Epocas de Portugal Economico, Lisboa, 1947.
— O Marquis de Pombal e sua Epoca, Lisbon, 1922.
Bacheler, C. E. R., London Thesis, 1924, ‘South Sea Co and the Asiento’.
Balbi, Adriens: Essai Statistique, 2 vols., Paris, 1822.
Beckford, Ed. Boyd Alexander, 1954: Italy with sketches of Spain and Portugal.
Beirao, Caetano: Maria I, 1934.
Bellamy, G. A.: Apology for my Life, 6 vols., 1785.
Bernades Branco, M.: Portugal na Epoca de foad V, 1885.
Biografica Dramatica, Ed. D. E. Baker, 2 vols., 1943.
Boxer, C.: The Golden Age of Brazil, University of California, 1962.
— The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, London, 1969.
— The Church Militant and Iberian Expansion, 1978, Baltimore and London.
Blyth: History of Falmouth, 1863.
Brazao, Eduardo: Relagoes Externas de Portugal, Reinado de Joao V, 2 vols.,
Lisbon, 1938.
Bristol, Earl of. See Augustus Hervey.
Brown, Jonathan C.: A Socio-Economic History of Argentina, Cambridge, 1979.
By bios, Diario de Conde de Ericeira, 18 vols., 1732.
Byng, Hon J.: Torrington Diaries, Ed. J. B. Andrews, 4 vols., 1937, for St Priest.
Carnota, Conde de (J. Smith): Memoirs of Pombal, 2 vols., 1871.

Cartas de Rainha Mariana Vitoria, E. Caetano Beirao, 1936.
Cavalheiro, Rodrigues: Temas de Historia, 1938, Porto.
Chalmers: Anthology.
Clapham: Hist, of Bank of England, 1944.
Chatelet, Due de: Voyage en Portugal, 2 vols., 1795.
Cheke, Sir Marcus: Pombal, 1938.
— Carlota Joaquina, 1947.
Coelho Latino: Hist. Polit. e Militar de Portugal, 1891, vol. 3.
Costigan, A. W.: Sketches of Society and Manners in Portugal, 2 vols., 1778.
Coxe, W.: Walpole, Life and Administration of Sir R. Walpole, 3 vols., 1798.
— Memoirs of Kings of Spain, 2 vols., 1788.
— Memoirs of Horatio, Lord Walpole, 2 vols., 1808.
Crouzet, F.: Le Blocus Continental, 2 vols., 1952.
Cunha, L. de. Corr. with Duke of Cadaval, Ed. V. Rau, 1947: Instruccoes Ineditas
a Marco Antonio de Azevedo, Ed. Azevedo Baiao, Coimbra, 1926.
288
LIST OF WORKS CITED
Cumberland, Richard: Memoirs, 2 vols., 1807.

Curtin, Philip D.: The Atlantic Stave Trade, Wisconsin, 1964.
Dalrymple, W.: Travels through Spain and Portugal, 1776.

Defoe, D.: Coll. Works, 1903. A New Voyage round the World.
Deschamps, H.: Hist, de la Traits des Nbgres, 1960.
Dominguez, Marco: O Marquis de Pombal.
Dumouriez, C. P.: Etat de Portugal, 1766.
Dunfermline: Sir R. Abercrombie, 1861.
Earle, Peter: World of Defoe, 1971.

Ericeira. See Byblos, also C. Boxer in Bulletin de Vlnstitut Frangais de Portugal.
FerraO, Antonio: Gomes Freire em Russia, Coimbra, 1917.

— O Duque de Lafoens e o Marquis de Pombal, 1938.
Fisher, H. E. S.: The Portugal Trade, 1700/70, 1971.
Ford, Douglas: Admiral Vernon, 1907.
Fortescue, Hon J. W.: History of the British Army, vols. 4/6.
Francis, A. D.: The Methuens and Portugal, 1966.
— The Wine Trade, 1972.
— The First Peninsular War, 1702/13, 1975.
Freire, Gilbert: The Masters and the Slaves, New York, 1956.
Funchal. See Linhares.
Furtado, Celso: La Formation Economique de Bresil, Paris, 1972.
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Gorani: M&moires, 1944.
Grant, Andrew: Hist, of Brazil, 1809.
Graviere, Jurien de la: Guerres Maritimes sous la Republique et VEmpire, 2 vols.
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Gtjsmao, Alexander: A. Gusmao e o Tratado de Madrid, Ed. Jaime Cortesao. Rio
de Janeiro, 1956, in three parts in nine vols.
Harcourt-Smith.See Smith.
Harlow, Vincent: 2nd British Empire.
Hartmann, C. H.: The Enchanting Bellamy, 1956.
Hervey, Hon. Augustus (Earl of Bristol): Journal, Ed. David Erskine, 1954.
Hills, George: Rock of Contention, 1974.
Howson: Burgoyne of Saratoga, New York, 1979.
Junot, Madame, Duchess de Abrantes: Memoirs, 2nd Edition, 1835, 12 vols. Auto¬
biography.
Kendrick, Sir Thomas: Lisbon Earthquake, 1956.
Lacour, Guayet: Hist, de la Marine Militaire, 1909.

Latino. See Coelho Latino.
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Lisboa, 1908.
Livermore, H. V.: Portugal and Brazil, Oxford, 1953.
— New History of Portugal, Cambridge, 1966.
289
DAVID FRANCIS
Lodge, Sir O.: Correspondence of Sir B. Keene, 1933.

Luz Soriano. See Soriano.
Macartney's Embassy to China, Ed. Staunton, 2 vols., London, 1797.

Macaulay, Rose: They went to Portugal, 1948.
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Madariaga, Isabel: Britain, Russia & Armed Neutrality, 1962.
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Maxwell, Kenneth: Conflicts and Conspiracies, 1973.
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Naval Biographies, Ed. Marshall.
Naval Record Society, Spencer Papers.
Neil, Adolphus: Vindication of Masonry, Hull, 1810.
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Oman, Carola: Nelson, 1948.

Oman, Sir Charles: Peninsular War, 6 vols., 1902.
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1809.
Pack, S. W. C.: Sea Power in the Mediterranean, 1971.

Parry, J. H.: The Discovery of the Sea, 1975.
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Pettigrew: Memoirs of Nelson, 2 vols., 1840.
Postlethwaite, Zachary: Dissertation on Trade and Commerce, 1749.
Priest. See St. Priest.
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Recueil des Instructions aux Ambassadeurs de France, Portugal, vol. Ill, 1885.
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— Anastasio de Cunha: O olente Penitenciado, Lisbon, 1938.
Rodriguez, A. D.: O Marquis de Pombal e seus Biografos, Lisbon, 1947.
St. Priest, Comte de: Memoires, 1929. See also Cavalheiro: Temas de Historia.
Sales, E. Pereira: O Conde de Lippe em Portugal (listed under Schaumberg), Vila
Nova de FamalicaS, 1938.
Santarem, Visconde de: Quadro Elementar, 18 vols., Lisbon, 1860.
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Selvajem, C. S.: Portugal Militar.
Sideri, S.: Trade and Power, Rotterdam, 1970.
Slavery in the New World, Ed. Laura Foner and Eugene R. Genovese, New Jer¬
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Soriano, Luz: Hist, do Rei Dom fose, 2 vols., 1867.
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Smith, J. See Carnota, Conde de.
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Sutherland, L. S.: A London Merchant (Braund), 1933.
Tenreiro, A. Guerra: Douro, Esbogos para a sua Historia Economica, Separata dos
Anais do Instituto de Vinho de Porto, 4 vols., 1942/4.
Tomkinson: Diary of a Cavalry Officer, 1971.
Trend, }. B.: Portugal, 1957.
Twiss, R.: Travels through Portugal and Spain, 1795.
Vaucher, F.: Walpole et la Politique de Fleury, 1927.

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Walker, G. J.: Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1979.
Walpole, Horace: Letters.
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Wellington’s Despatches, Ed. Wellington, vol. VI, 1860.
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Wilson, Sir R.: Life, 2 vols., 1862.
291
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Prefatory note. vii

1. Portugal after the treaties of Utrecht. 1

2. King John V, the Faithful, the Magnanimous. 7

3. The reign of John V, 1715-35. 31

4. The reign of John V, 1736-50 . 66

5. The age of Pombal. 103

6. The Lisbon earthquake and after. 122

7. The 1762 war with Spain . 146

8. Last years of Pombal. 162

9. Aftermath of Pombal and reign of Maria I . 181

10. The years of the French revolution. 215

11. The flight to Brazil. 245

Appendix. The Strangford-Sidney Smith controversy . 285

List of works cited. 287

PORTUGAL AFTER THE TREATIES OF UTRECHT

Portugal did not do badly out of the treaties of Utrecht. Nevertheless

2 Add MSS 22206 Bolingbroke to Bishop of Bristol, 379, 402.

and a great commercial centre, Portugal produced a distinguished band of

5 Eduardo Brazao, Relagoes Externas de Portugal, reino de Joao V, 2 vols.,

7 Santarem, Quadro Elementar, 10 vols., Lisbon, 1860. 5-CLXXXVII. In 1713

KING JOHN V, THE FAITHFUL, THE MAGNANIMOUS

It is no longer fashionable to divide history into the reigns of kings,

3 Damiao Peres, Hist, de Portugal, VI-180/2, 571, etc.

4 S. P. 89/48, Castres to Holderness, 3 July 1751. Santarem, Ed. Rebelo e

6 Soares da Silva, Gazeta em forma de Carta, Memorias, Oeyras, 1931, 159,

7 Hofarchiven, Vienna, Moles to Emperor, 16 April 1710. S. P. 89/29, Dormer

9 S. P. 89/42, Compton to Newcastle, 28 May 1742. Alexandre de Gusmao, e o

small, but in a priest-ridden country like Portugal they had a certain

10 Gusmao, l-i-99, 110/1, 321. S. P. 89/33, Worsley to Stanhope, 16 Nov. 1715.

11 Almeida,Hist, de Portugal, IV-287. Cartas de Rainha Mariana Vitoria, Ed. Ga-

12 Brazao, Joao V, ii-79 et seq. S. P. 89/23, Worsley to Methuen, 14 Feb. 1717.

13 S. P. 89/34, Worsley to Stanhope, 24 Feb., 14 March, 8, 19 Aug. Poyntz,

14 S. P. 89/23, Worsley to Stanhope, 30 Nov. 1715. S. P. 89/24, 31 Jan., 14

followed tradition and gave priority to ecclesiastical history, to long lists

16 Manoel Eduardo Portugal na Epoca de Joao V, 1885, 147, 175.

would have been capable alone of the government of the kingdom, if

18 Santarem, Quadro, V-8. Almeida, Hist, de Portugal, IV-280. Damiao Peres,

19 S. P. 89/33, Arthur Stert, 28 July 1726. S. P. 89/27, Worsley, 3 June 1719.

22 Hist, de Portugal, V-269/78. Experiences Aeronauticas de Bartolo¬

23 S. P. 89/37, Tyrawly to Newcastle, 17 April 1734. C. Boxer in History Today,

chamber of halbardiers, everyone could see what had happened to them.

25 Santarem, Quadro Elementar, 5-256. Add MSS 32794, Tyrawly to Keene,

26 S. P. 89/37, Tyrawly to Delafaye, 7 April and private to Newcastle, 28 Sept.

THE REIGN OF JOHN V, 1715-35

1 S. Harcourt Smith, Alberoni, 1943. Cartas de Luis da Cunha para o Duque

2 S. P. 94/89, R. Johnston, 9 Aug., Cobham, 7 Sept., 18 Oct, Wade, 11 Oct.

4 S. P. 89/24, Poyntz, 10 March 1716. Worsley, 24 Feb. 1716. S. P. 89/28,

The Packet Boats were usually five in number. They tended to be

6 S P. 89/26, Poyntz, 21 May, Worsley, 9 Sept. 1718. S. P. 89/28, Worsley,

Sweden, which revoked the prohibition of the export of gold. Mendonga

7 Recueil des instructions aux Ambassadeurs de France, vol. 3, Portugal, Abbe

9 S. P. 89/35, Tyrawly, 3 June 1729.

11 S. P. 89/28, Burnet, 3 March, 14 Oct. 1720.

13 s. P. 89/25, Worsley, 25 Oct., 30 Nov. 1717. S. P. 89/28, Worsley, 11 Nov.

‘estrangeirado’ described by our minister de Castres, some years later, as

16 S. P. 89/28, Worsley, 15 Jan., Burnet, 27 Jan. and Lisbon Factory petition.

18 S. P. 89/23, Poyntz, 24 May 1715, Worsley, 10 May, 31 July, 12 Oct. 1715.