884
7, PY 1974
Real-Time Computer Control of Power Systems
TOMAS E. DY LIACCO,
Invited Pa@
Abstract-A dramatic trmsfommtion in system monitoring and
control is taking place in the electric utility industry. Hew control
centers are being equipp& with multiprocessor real-time computers
syming and controlling thegenerationand 1 * *nsystemvia
hqh-qwd data-acquisition subsystems andinteracting with the
human operator via dynamic,color,graphic displays. Within the
computer aa many .as a.hrmdred or more programs are available to
m n in.a multiprogrammirrg environment in response to changing
poner-system conditions and to operator‘s demands.
The main objective of thie new developmentm on-line control is
the enhancement of the security of the power system in order to
matrtrin a high reliability of electric powerservice.
The concept of security control is dimumd and the noteworthy
featurea of its present slate of development in recently designed and
inscalled controlcenters are described.
INTRODUCTION
T
H E EVOLUTION of automationinelectric power
systems has been marked by outstanding developments
intheapplication of state-of-the-art technology in
both instrumentation and control. Manyof these applications
are required for local control to carry out such functions as
regulation, -switching, protective relaying, generator loading,
etc., using measurements obtained locally. In certain cases,
such as in protectiverelaying,the 1-1 control logic also
requires information from oneor more remote jocations, such
information being transmittedviatelephone lines, power-
line carrier, or microwave facilities.
Local controlhas evolved to the point whereminicom-
puters are being used for specific purposessuch as boiler-
turbine controls, or to consolidate at a substation hitherto
separate instrumentation and control functions. There have
been someremarkabledevelopments in the use of digital
computers forlocal control. However, in the discussion of
real-time computer control of power systems, the main em-
phasis of this paper will be on the systemwide control froma
central location. A more comprehensive summary of the de-
velopments in both local and central controls may be found
in [4].
In an overall centralized control system, all local controls
become functionally residenta t t h elowest level of a multilevel
control hierarchy [l], the highest level being at the central
control. I n becoming part of a hierarchy, certain local con-
trols require information links withhigher level controls.
The implementation of central control in power systems
originatedfromtwoindependentcontrolrequirementsand
developed intotwoseparatecentralizedcontrolsystems.
One central control system is for the supervisory control and
indication of transmission and/or distribution equipment. In
addition to equipment status indication and simple alarming
functionsthesupervisorycontrolsystemprovidedthe dis-
patcher at the center with the means to remotely actuate
Manuscript received December 31,1973.
The author is with the Cleveland Electric I l l d ~ t i n gCompany,
Cleveland, Ohio44101.
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PROCEEDINGSOF THE IEEE, VOL. 62, NO.
SENIOR MEMBER, IEEE
variousstationequipment,primarilycircuitbreakers.The
centralization of supervisory control could be carried out at
one location or in several districtoffices, dictated more or less
by the geography of the territory served, and by the organi-
zational structure of the electrical operation division of the
utility company.
Theothercentralcontrolsystem is fortheautomatic
control of the outputsof generating units in order to meett h e
continuous changes in load demands. The central control of
generation which started out as a direct regulatory type of
control to makesystemgenerationmatchtheminute-to-
minute changes in load was improved in the 1950’swith the
addition of an optimizing-control level. The optimizing con-
trolautomaticallyallocatedthegenerationrequirementin
such a way that the total operating cost was a minimum.
This two-level control system for generation soon became a
universal standard.Thedirect-control. level, knowninthe
industry as ‘automatic generation control” (or by the more
commondesignation of ‘load-frequency control”), became
mandatory for power systems which are interconnected; the
optimizing-control level, known as ‘economic-dispatchcon-
trol,” became a necessityfor systemswith a significant
amount of thermal generating units.
The supervisory-control and the generation-control func-
tions each had its data-gathering system and its own central
andremotehardware.Generationcontrol evolvedfrom an
analog system to a digitally directed analog and finally, in
the 1960’s,to a direct digital-control systeni. Similarly, super-
visory-controlsystems evolved from one hardwiredmaster
per remote to one hardwired master for several remotes and
finally to a digital-computer master. Thus by the end of the
1960’s there were in service twotypes of digital-computer
control installations-the dispatch computer and the super-
visory-control computer-using small computers and requir-
ing no more data than what was essential either for genera-
tiondispatch or for supervisorycontrol.Digitaltelemetry
was also coming into use to replace analog telemetry. Up to
this time the man-machine interface consisted of stripchart
recordings, loggers, indicatinglights,annunciator windows,
console switchesorpushbutton panels, thumbwheels, and4
other special-pur- hardware.Morerecently,blackand
white and color CRT’s are being used for either the dispatch
computer or the supervisory-control computer.
Over the years the improvements in generation control
and in supervisory control had beenin the hardware used
and in the efficiency of the control techniques. The basic ob-
jectives had remained the same,Le., to control generation and
to control remotely located devices or equipment. Near the
end of the 1960’9,however,power-system engineersbegan
analyzing the entire system operation problem from a sys-
tems viewpoint, motivated by the evident needfor a more
comprehensiveand moreeffective operatingcontrolthan
had been conventionally available to the power-system dis-
 DY LIACCO: COMPUTER CONTROL OF POWER SYSTEMS
patcher. We are now witnessing in the decade of the 1970’s
the beginnings of a new wave of power-system control sys-
tems, much broader in scope of system monitoring and con-
trol due to the integration of operating functions, and the
addition of a new dimension-“system security.”
Theaddition of system-securityconsiderationstothe
strictly generation-dispatch and supervisory-control require-
ments has caused a quantum jump in the evolution of real-
time central control of power systems by digital computer.
This transformation is growing in numbers throughout the
world. In many cases utility companies are in the process of
replacing or augmenting existing digital-dispatch or super-
visory-control computers less than 10 years old with the new
security-control systems of the 1970’s. This paper discusses
the concept of security control and the current state of its
implementation in power systems.
SECURITY CONTROL
Provision for system security has alwaysbeen an inherent
part of sound system design. However, due to economic and
other considerations, only so much security can be built into
a system. I t has generally been assumed that as long as a sys-
tem is builtaccordingto prevailingdesign standards,any
abnormality in operation requiring control beyond that pro-
vided for by conventional, automatic devices would be taken
care of by the human operator. Historically, this assumption
had been blithely made without providing the opqrator with
adequate tools toaid him in the complex decision-making
processes concerning security. In some companies where the
securityproblemhad become quiteacute, procedures had
been instituted to .aid the operator by way of security pro-
grams run off-line on general-purpose computers, in certain
cases using remote terminals or, in a few rareinstances,a
dedicated network analyzer or analog computer. These ap-
plications represent a transitionalstepfromconventional
control to security control.
“Security control” or a “security control system” may be
defined as a system of integrated automatic and manual con-
trols for the maintenance of electric power service under all
conditions of operation [2]. Notefromthis definition that
security control is a significant departure from the traditional
dispatch control or supervisory-control systems. Firstly, the
proper integrationof all the necessary automatic- and manual-
control functions requires a total systems approach with the
human operator being an integral part of the control-system
design. Secondly,the mission of securitycontrol is all-en-
compassing, recognizing that control decisions by the man-
computersystemmust be madenot j u s t when the power
system is operating normally but alsowhen i t is operating
under abnormal conditions. As power systems have grown in
size and have become more tightly coupled, the problem of
makingtherightoperating decisions undervarying condi-
tions has become extremely difficult.
The Three Operating States
In [ l ] and [2] the operating conditions of a power system
are characterized in terms of three operating states-normal,
emergency, and restorative. Let us review this concept as i t
is helpful in the discussion of security control and the current
state of its development.
The power systemmay be assumed as being operated
under conditions expressible in the form of two sets of con-
straints [2], [SI:
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885
G ( x , u ) = O load constraints
H ( x , u ) Z O operating constraints
where G and H are function vectors and
x vector of dependentvariables;
u vector of independent or “control variables.”
Sollberger [SI, in extending the concept of security control
to industrial systems in general, calls one set of constraints
the “load constraints” and the other set the “operating con-
straints,” and generalizes both into inequalities. In our dis-
cussion the equalities are the load constraints while the in-
equalities are the operating constraints. Fundamentally, the
load constraints impose the physical equations which satisfy
the requirements that the load demands will be met by the
system; while the operating constraints impose maximum or
minimum operating limits(e.g., loading limits, voltage limits,
etc.) on variables associated with the component parts of the
system.
If both the load and operating constraints are satisfied,
the system is said to be in the normal operating state. In re-
sponse to the relatively small minute-to-minute changes in
load, a power system may be considered as going from one
normal state to another and each normal state may be as-
sumed to be a quasi-steady-state condition.
On the occurrence of a severe disturbance (e.g., a large
load change, a loss of generation, a short circuit) a system
may settle down to anew normal state or may go to either an
emergency or restorative operating state. In the emergency
state the operating constraints are not satisfied. In the restor-
ative state the operating constraints aresatisfied but not the
load constraints.
Two types of emergency may be noted. The first type oc-
curs when, afteradisturbance,the power systemremains
stable and continues operating but with the operating con-
straintsnot fully met, i.e., with some equipmentloading
limits exceeded or withabnormalvoltage levels at certain
locations. This type of emergency condition which we shall
refer to as “steady-state emergency” may be tolerated for a
reasonable period of time, generally allowing corrective action
to be taken. Such corrective action shouldbe effective enough
toprevent or limitdamagetothe overloaded equipment.
The second type of emergency occurs when, because of a dis-
turbance, the power system becomes unstable, during which
timeboththeoperatingandthe load constraintsarenot
being met. This type of emergency condition which we shall
refer to as “dynamic instability” takes place in a very short
period of time and, unless a proper fast corrective action is
taken, ends up with the power system in the restorative state,
i.e., in a partial or a total shutdown.
The overall objective of security control may be restated
as follows: to keep the power system operating in the normal
state, i.e., to prevent or to minimize the departures from the
normalstateintoeitherthe emergency or therestorative
state. To realize an effective strategy for carrying out this
objective let us look more closely into the concept of system
security.
The Concept of System Security
Systemsecuritymay be considered as theability of a
power system in normal operation to undergo a disturbance
without getting into an emergency condition. The system is
then said to be “secure.” On the other hand, a normal operat-
 886 PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE, JULY 1974

ing system would be ‘insecure” if there is a disturbance which Security monitoring involves the processing, of the measured
could bring about an emergency operating condition. If one data to determine the system operating conditions and the
considers all possible disturbances i t would be impossible to violations of the operating constraints H(w, u)BO. Also part
find a securepowersystem. I n practicesystemsecurity is of securitymonitoringis the on-linedetermination of the
determined with reference to an arbitrary subsetof the com- network topology as required for display and for models used
pletedisturbanceset.Thissubsetis called the “next-con- by other on-line functions.
tingency”set.The choice of the composition of thenext- The large amount of telemetry required, with its attend-
contingency set is dictated by the probability of occurrence a n t problems of errors in measurement and in data trans-
of the contingency within the next short period of time (in mission, has justified considerations of exploiting redundan-
the order of minutes) and the consequences to the system cies in measurement so as to obtain “best”estimates of the
shouldthecontingencyoccur. I n mostpower systems the system variables using Kalman filtering and other stochastic
next-contingency set includes, as a minimum, the following approximationmethods.Thisfunction, referred t o h the
types of disturbances: industry as “state estimation” [lo]-[14], [26],isbecoming
accepted as a necessary part of security monitoring.
1) any circuit out;
We see then that just the addition of security monitoring
2) any generating unit out;
t o conventional functions creates a new type of system con-
3) any phase-to-phase or 3-phase short circuit.
trol using state-of-the-art hardware systems and sophisticated
Other types of disturbancesmay be added,themore dis- data-processing methods.
turbancesincludedinthenext-contingency set the more Security Analysis: Security analysis is the determination
stringent the system-security requirementsbecome. of the security of the system based on a next-contingency set.
For a givennext-contingency set, the set of allnormal While a security analysis may be made for both steady-state
operating states may be partitioned into two disjoint sub- emergency anddynamicinstabilitythetrendhasbeento
sets-secure and insecure. T h a t is, a normal operating system have a separate analysis for each of the two types of emer-
is either secureor insecure. We see then that for security con- gency. One reason for this is the extreme difficulty of imple-
trol t o accomplish its objective of preventing or minimizing menting a dynamic security analysis with present methodsof
departures from the normal state itwould be highly desirable stability evaluation. On the other hand, for steady-state se-
t o be able to manipulate the system so that it stays as long curity analysis several approaches are possible and are in use.
as possible in the secure region of the normal state. This is a Basically,theseapproaches start with a knowledge of the
remarkablydifferentcontrolphilosophyfromthat of the present state of the system as obtainedfromthesecurity
traditional dispatch computer. Its implicationsinterms of monitoring function. The system is then tested for various
d a t a requirements,information processing, controldesign next contingencies by, in effect, solving forthe changes in the
and algorithms, man-machineinterfaces, and computer re- system conditions for a given contingency and checking the
quirements canbe readily appreciated. new values against the operating constraints.
Pattern recognition has been tried with some promising
Strategy for Security Control results [SI, [IS], [I61 as an alternative approach to security
T h e effectiveness of security control in keeping the power analysis but the method has not been put to use on-line. Es-
system secure for as long as possible depends heavily on the sentially, a small set of on-line measurements are used as se-
control done during the normal operating state. Wewill refer curity indicators. A security function of these indicators will
to this control as ‘preventivecontrol”since its preventive then classify the state of the system as being secure or inse-
character is what distinguishes i t from conventional control. cure. The security function or pattern classifier is derived by
Preventive control should not only take care of all of the tra- a learning algorithm based on a training set of off-line studies.
ditional functions involved in controlling generation t o meet The appeal of the pattern-recognition approach is the trans-
the load but should also determine the actual operating con- fer of the needfor full-scale simulationstudies (especially
ditions of the system, assess system secudtyfor bgth types of dynamic stability studies) from the on-line computer with
emergency (i.e., steady-state emergency and dynamic insta- limitedcapabilities to an off-line computerwithmoreand
bility), and determine the corrective action to be taken in better modeling and computation resources.
However,
case the system were insecure. Consideration of these tasks further work remains t o be done to develop a satisfactory
leads us to the discussion of three important ideas: security pattern-recognition method for on-line implementation.
monitoring, security
analysis, and
security-constrained Security-ConstrainedOptimization: If thesystem were
optimization. found t o be insecure by the security-analysis function the next
SecurityMonitoring: Securitymonitoring is the on-line problemis todeterminewhetherthesystemcan be made
identification and the dynamic display (to the human oper- secure. This becomes a security-constrainedoptimization
ator) of the actual operating conditions of the power system. problem where we have t o find the best operating condition
Security monitoring requires a systemwide instrumentation which satisfies not only the load constraints and the operating
on a greater scale and variety than that required by a control constraints but also the security constraints. That is, mini-
system without security monitoring. To gather all the system mize F ( x , u ) subject to
data every few seconds and bring it to a control location re-
G ( r , u)=O load constraints
quires a high-speed digital data-acquisition system interfaced
H(w, u)hO operating constraints
with a central computer system. The central computer sys-
S(x, u )2 0 security constraints
tem operates in real-time andsupervises the data acquisition,
processes the data received, and supports the display sub- where F is the operating cost function.
system.Finally,the man-machine requirementsentailthe The security-function vectorS may consist of all the load
the use of devicessuch as color CRT’s for display and as and operating constraints for each of the next contingencies
interface for operator inputs and operator-initiated controls. whoseoccurrenceswouldcauseemergencies [17], [18]. Or

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 DY LIACCO: COMPUTER CONTROL OF POWER SYSTEMS
S(x, u ) L O may be the single security function used in the
pattern-recognition method of security analysis [SI. The se-
curity-constrainedoptimization would determinethebest
corrective action for making a system secure. The extra cost
involved inimplementingthiscorrectiveaction would be
presented to the operator who would then decide whether to
carry it out or not.
Theoretically, the optimizing level of preventive control
may be formulated from the very outset using the complete
set of constraints, as indicated in the preceding paragraph.
I n practice this is not necessary nor is i t desirable. The opti-
mizing-control algorithm would not only be too complex to
implement on-line but would result in anunnecessaryin-
crease in operating expense and in computer overhead.
The combined strategy of securitymonitoring,security
analysis,andlastlysecurity-constrainedoptimization is a
correct and practical approach. For the present it is the only
viable approach to on-line preventive control. I t is a good
illustration of the power of decomposition and multilevel
organization of acontrolsystemto accomplish a complex
control objective [6]. To summarize, the strategy works as
follows: The optimizing control is formulated as simply as
possible using only the load constraints and a very small sub-
set of the operating constraints (e.g., only the generator lim-
its but not the equipment loading limits). In most cases, the
optimizing control is decomposed into the real power optimi-
zation (or economic dispatch) and the reactive power optimi-
zation (or var dispatch). Since the changes in var dispatch are
for many systems less frequent than the changes in economic
dispatch,vardispatch is usually treatedasan open-loop
adaptive control. Further simplification of the economic dis-
patch is obtained by using for load constraints a single func-
tion equating the algebraic sum of the power injections and
the system losses to zero. The security-monitoring function
working independently of the economic dispatch detects on-
line when certain operating constraints become semi-binding
or binding. When this happens the economic dispatch should
be modified so that the semi-binding and binding constraints
are included in the set of operating constraints. That is, the
size of theoperatingconstraintset considered is adjusted
with the number of likely and actual violations. The security-
analysis function, either working independently or triggered
by the security-monitoring function, checks the security of
the system.If the systemwere insecure, a security-constrained
optimizing program would then be run to find the corrective
action.
I t is readily evident that the development of a good pre-
ventive control enhances tremendously the ability of a system
to stay secure and therefore minimizes the departures into
theabnormalconditions of theemergencyandrestorative
states.Bothemergencycontrolandrestorativecontrolare
still needed for a complete security-control system. However,
these controls are difficult to develop and implement for a
variety of reasons. Let it suffice for this paper to remark that
preventive control is relatively easier toimplement being
well within thecapabilities of present-day technology and
analysis. Furthermore,the
fact
that
preventive
control
offers a workable control strategy gives impetus to its higher
priority of development. Thus most of the applications of the
security-controlconceptthatare beingdevelopedin the
power industry are in the area of preventive control. The de-
velopment of emergency controlandrestorativecontrol is
currently of a lower priority and no significant innovations
have as yetbeen implemented.
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887
MODERN CONTROL-SYSTEM INSTALLATION
Theimplementation of securitycontrolsystems which
started with the coming of the 1970’s is gaining momentum
throughout thepower systems in the world. By the endof 1973
there were approximately 30 systems in operation, under con-
struction, or on order, which fall in the category of the new
generation of modern, state-of-the-art control systems.
Based on what is being developed in the power industry a
compositemodern control system for a bulk power system
would have the following features andon-line functions.
1) Hierarchical structure consisting of severallevels of
computer systems. Examples: a) National center, regions, di-
visions. b) Power pool, member companies,divisions. c)
System center,divisions or substations.
2) Hierarchicalstructure of control functions,i.e., pre-
ventive, emergency, restorative, and each divided into 3 layers
d i r e c t , optimizing, adaptive.
3) Dualprocessors or multiprocessorsplus redundant
peripherals.
4) High-speed digital data telemetry and state-of-the-art
data-acquisition equipment.
5) Color CRT’s with graphics for interactive display.
6) Dynamic, color, wallboard group display.
7) Automatic generation control.
8) Economic dispatch control.
9) Automatic voltage (var) control.
10) Automatic circuit
restoration
[19]. (Re-energizes
circuits which have been dropped out of service by a disturb-
ance.)
11) Supervisory control (breakers, capacitors, transformer
taps, generating unit startup, and shutdown).
12) Scheduling of generation resources, Le., fossil, hydro,
nuclear (long term, medium term, and short term).
13) Security monitoring.
14) State estimation.
15) Steady-state security analysis.
16) Dynamic security analysis.
17) Automaticsystemtroubleanalysis [19].(Processes
breaker and protective relaying operations to analyze system
disturbances.)
18) On-line load flow. (An interactive load flow available
to the system operator to determine power flows in the net-
work for a given set of conditions.)
19) Optimum power flow. (An optimal load-flow solution
where the load-flow equations are solved with an optimization
routine to minimize the objective function, usually, but not
necessarily, the total operatingcost.)
20) On-line short-circuit calculation.
21) Short-term load forecast.(Predictsthenext 24-h
load curve.)
22) Bus-load forecasting. (Predicts the load a t each indi-
vidual load point.)
23) Various support programs for generation dispatching,
such as: schedule for startup and shutdown of units, power
interchange transactions with neighboring systems, calcula-
tion of generation reserves, etc.
24) Logging and historical data management.
There is no control system that has all of the functions
just enumerated. Ingeneral, except in thecase of a few power
systems, the control systemdesigns that have been developed
possess only rather small subsets of this list. In the Appendix,
Table I lists somebasic data on control systems which are
in service, under construction, or on order, as of November
1973. This table is intended to convey a rough picture of the
 888 PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE, JULY 1974

.*w w . 1 sW,.avc

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 DY LIACCO: COMPUTER CONTROL OF POWER SYSTEMS 889

TABLE I (Continued)

la
I In 1973
./ '
I
'
I s
A

Implemented by analog controller.

Legend for on-line functions:
ACRAutomaticCircuitRestoration. OLF On-Line Load Flow.
AGCAutomatic Generation Control. OPF Optimum Power Flow.
ASTA Automatic System Trouble Analysis. OSC On-Line Short Circuit.
AVC AutomaticVoltage/VarControl. SA Steadyatate Security Analysis.
E C Emergency
Control.
SBC Supervisory Breaker
Control.
E D C EconomicDispatch Control. SE State Estimation.
NOX Minimum NO. Emission Dispatch. SM Security Monitoring.
SVCSupervisory Voltage Control.

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 890 PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE, JLXY 1974

types of systems that have been or are beingdeveloped in ing system usually has to be modified in order to support the
the power industryinapproximatelythe first half of this requirements for the following.
decade. 1) A dualcomputer configuration withintercomputer
In Table I several hierarchical computer systems are in communication.
evidence, most of them being 2-level hierarchies. System 24 2) Provisionsfor maintaining backup for critical control
is a 3-level hierarchy, while the combination of Systems 2 and funLtions and for automatic failover in case of various types
15 forms a 4-level hierarchy. of failure.
Of the systems already inservice, System 7 is of particular 3) A multiprogramming environment where various
interest.Controlling a small power system, consisting of 9 modes of program execution are required.
busses and 3 major transmission lines [25], the Tokke control 4) Interfacing with the data-acquisition system and non-
center of the Norwegian Water Resources andElectricity standard peripherals.
Board has the distinction of having the first on-line applica- 5 ) System initialization for various modes of startup.
tion in the world of state estimation for security monitoring 6) Provisions for testing and for training.
of a power system. I t also has an emergency control function
which automaticallyreducesgeneration at the appropriate CONCLUSIONS
plant in case of problems resulting froma transmission outage. The need for security control is not unique to the power
For a large, interconnectedsystemthe first successful industry [SI. However, because of the uniqueness of the prod-
experimentalresults of stateestimation were obtainedin uct that the power industry supplies plus the unceasing need
September 1972 in a portion of the American Electric Power to maintain that supply, the implementationof security con-
system [26]. trolwiththeaid of real-timecomputers is being pursued
Another interesting development is the use by System 11 perhaps more vigorously in utilities than in other industrial
of the optimum power flow for calculating cost coefficients processes. The power industry, in developing this new type of
which are factored in the economic-dispatch-control calcula- control system, has taken advantage of advances in real-time
tions. The vectorX of cost coefficients is given by computer design, state-of-the-artdevelopmentsin.datar
acquisition systems, dynamic and interactive displays, sys-
X = ( -F)-*
grad, Pr
tems engineering concepts and algorithms in mathematical
where J T is the transposeof the Jacobian matrixof the power- programming, stochastic
approximation,
and
estimation
flow equation G(x, u ) =0, and grad, P, is the gradient of the thepry.
power at the reference bus used in the power-flow equation. More work remains to be done in the other more difficult
This is the first on-line application to economic dispatch of a areas of security control such as dynamic security analysis,
concept rigorously treated for both real and reactive power emergencycontrol,andrestorativecontrol.Researchand
dispatching with equality and inequality constraints by Car- analysis efforts are continuing to resolve some of these re-
pentier [24] in 1962. maining problems. Doubtless the years beyond 1975 will bear
Unique among those systems in service or under develop- witness to further advances in the real-time computer control
mentistheautomaticsystemtroubleanalysisfunction of power systems [7].
implemented in System 11. This function requires the moni-
toring of protective relaying operations, both primary protec- APPENDIX
tion and backup protection,in addition to monitoring circuit- Table I is presented to give a n overall picture of the new
breakeroperations. Inothersystemsonlycircuit-breaker types of control systems that are being implemented in the
status is monitored to obtain information about a short-circuit power industry. These control systems are designed for the
type of disturbance. central control of the overall power system and are distin-
The inclusion of a short-circuit calculation as an on-line guished from earlier types of automatic control by the pro-
function by System 4 is another unique feature not found in vision for system security.
other systems. Table I is fairly complete as far as the following criteria
The control-system features and on-line functions men- are concerned :
tioned in this section have been described rather sketchily, 1) central control for generation and transmission;
the objectbeing to present an overview of what is being done. 2) use of dual or multiprocessors;
More details of specific control systems and of various func- 3) use of color CRT’s for interactive display;
tions, some of which may not have been referred to in this 4) inclusion of, at least, the security-monitoring function
paper, may be found in the literature [8], [9],[19]-[23]. for security control.
As mentioned earlier most of the systems are implement-
ing only a small number of on-line functions. However, even Some systems not fully meeting these criteria have been
a minimum of security-controlfunctions would entail a included because of certain security-control features.
rathersophisticated assemblage of computers,displayde- Although the author tried his best to gather as much in-
vices, data-acquisition systems, and a host of real-time pro- formation as possible about what is going on in the industry,
grams. therearedoubtless some state-of-the-artsystems which
The requirements for the new type of control system have have escaped his attention, The author apologizes for these
also caused demandsfor real-time computer operating systems omissions.
which initiaIly were either nonexistent or inadequate for the Many new, but strictly supervisory-controlor generation-
application.Development efforts have been expendedin control systems, are not included in Table I except as they
creating special operating systems where none were available belong to a computer hierarchy and satisfy criteria 2) and 3).
or in augmenting the real-time capabilities of what the com- I t should be mentioned, however, that these strictly supervis-
puter manufacturer had tooffer. A standard real-time operat- ory-control systems have becomemodernized to the extent

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 DY LIACCO: COMPUTER CONTROL OF POWER SYSTEMS
that dual processors, mostly minicomputers, and color CRT’s
are being used.
I t should also be noted that many of the companies in
Table I which have new control systems under development
alreadyhave existing generation-andsupervisory-control
systems using digitalcomputers, some withCRT’s, which
had been placed in service only a few years ago.
The last column of Table I liststheon-linefunctions
planned for each control system. Only the majoron-line func-
tions are enumerated. Standard support programs and off-line
functions which form a large part of the software of these
control systems are not included.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The author wishes to thank his many industry colleagues [la] Edison
in the United States, Europe, and Japan for their cooperation ‘ k u r i t y evaluation in power systems using pattern recognition,”
in putting together as up-to-date an information summary as
possible for the tabulation (Table I) of modern, state-of-the- [If] J. W. Carpentier, ‘Differential injection methods, a general method
art, control systems. Permission was obtained from each of
the utilities represented to use the data in this paper. The
data for theJapanesesystem were obtainedthroughthe
good offices of theCentral Research Institute of Electric
Power Industry in Japan.
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