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REVIJA
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KOPAONIČKA ŠKOLA
PRIRODNOG PRAVA
SLOBODAN PEROVIĆ
Universitas
Iuris
REVIJA Naturalis
Copaonici
KOPAONIČKA ŠKOLA
PRIRODNOG PRAVA
SLOBODAN PEROVIĆ
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA
Časopis za pravnu teoriju i praksu
ISSN 2683-443X UDK 34
Broj 2/2020, Godina II
DOI:10.5937 /RKSPP2001
Časopis izlazi dva puta godišnje
Izdavač
Kopaonička škola prirodnog prava – Slobodan Perović
Krunska 74, Beograd
Tel. 244 69 10, 244 30 24, E-mail: office@kopaonickaskola.rs
www.kopaonikschool.org
Glavni i odgovorni urednik
Prof. dr Jelena S. Perović Vujačić
Zamenik glavnog i odgovornog urednika
Prof. dr Gordana Ilić-Popov
Sekretar
Andrea Nikolić
Redakcija
Prof. dr Gordana Vukadinović, Prof dr Dragor Hiber, Prof. dr Dobrosav Milovanović, Prof.
dr Milan Škulić, Prof. dr Milena Petrović, Prof. dr Vladan Petrov, Prof. dr Nataša Delić, Prof.
dr Maja Stanivuković, Prof. dr Saša Bovan, Prof. dr Nikola Mojović, Prof. dr Goran Koevski,
Prof. dr Predrag Bjelić, Dr Aleksandra Maganić, Dr Zoran Lončar, Dr Milena Đorđević,
Dr Nataša Hadžimanović, Dr Thomas Meyer, Ljubica Tomić, Marie-Christine Cimadevilla
Članovi Međunarodnog naučnog saveta
Xavier Blanc-Jouvan (Professor emeritus at the University of Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne,
France), Don Wallace (Chairman of the International Law Institute, Washington, USA),
Rajko Kuzmanović (President of Academy of Sciences and Arts of Republika Srpska,
Bosnia and Herzegovina), Franco Ferrari (New York University School of Law, Director,
Center for Transnational Litigation, Arbitration, and Commercial Law), Jakša Barbić
(Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts), Larry A. DiMatteo (Florida University, USA),
Tatjana Josipović (University of Zagreb, Croatia), Gian Antonio Benacchio (University of
Trento, Italy), Davor Babić (University of Zagreb, Croatia), Burghard Piltz (Ahlers&Vogel,
Hamburg, University of Bielefeld, Germany), Francesca Fiorentini (University of Trieste,
Italy), Damjan Možina (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia), Dr. Christa Jessel-Holst (Max
Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg, Germany),
Vitomir Popović (Academy of Sciences and Arts of Republika Srpska, Bosnia and
Herzegovina), Zoran Rašović (Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts, Montenegro),
Dr. iur. Simon Gabriel (attorney-at-law, Zurich, Switzerland), Vlado Kambovski
(Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts, North Macedonia), Mateja Đurović (King’s
College London, UK)
Korektura i kompjuterska obrada Dizajn korica
Javorina Beker Uroš Živković
Tiraž: 150 primeraka
Štampa: FUTURA, Petrovaradin
Radovi u ovom časopisu podležu anonimnoj recenziji od strane dva recenzenta. Ocene iznesene u
člancima lični su stavovi njihovih autora i ne izražavaju mišljenje uredništva ovog časopisa ni ustano-
va u kojima su autori zaposleni.
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE
PRIRODNOG PRAVA
ČASOPIS ZA PRAVNU TEORIJU I PRAKSU
Godinu dana života Revije Kopaoničke škole prirodnog prava potvrđuje ideje
kojima smo bili rukovođeni prilikom pokretanja novog časopisa naše Škole. U
prethodnim brojevima, Revija je okupila naučne radove eminentnih autora iz
zemlje i inostranstva, postala poznata domaćoj i inostranoj pravničkoj javnosti
i bila posebno afirmisana njenim predstavljanjem u prestižnom francuskom
časopisu Revue internationale de droit comparé. Danas, naša Revija istrajava u
nastojanju da, kontinuiranim objavljivanjem reči argumentovane naučne misli,
adekvatno izrazi stavove pravne nauke o mnoštvu različitih pitanja koja se javljaju
na širokom horizontu onog prava čija je svrha da služi pravdi kao stožernoj vrlini.
***
Ovo izdanje Revije Kopaoničke škole prirodnog prava okuplja devet naučnih
radova raspoređenih u četiri sekcije: Međunarodni privredni ugovori (I),
Arbitraža, alternativno rešavanje sporova (II), Pravo EU (III) i Međunarodno
privatno pravo (IV). Sa aspekta sistematike Heksagona prirodnog prava, radovi
po svojoj tematskoj sadržini ulaze u oblast katedara Pravo na imovinu i Pravo na
pravdu Kopaoničke škole prirodnog prava – Slobodan Perović.
U prvoj sekciji, prof. dr Michael G. Bridge u članku International Trade and
Transnational Law, razmatra pitanje unifikacije ugovornog prava. U fokusu ana-
lize je Konvencija UN o ugovorima o međunarodnoj prodaji robe iz 1980. godine
(Bečka konvencija), pri čemu je posebno razmotren uticaj evropsko-kontinental-
nog i anglosaksonskog prava na njena rešenja, kao i opšti značaj Konvencije na
planu unifikacije ugovornog prava. Analiza Bečke konvencije praćena je osvrtom
na UNIDROIT Načela međunarodnih trgovinskih ugovora i njihove uloge i znača-
ja u oblasti međunarodnih ugovornih odnosa. U drugom radu sekcije, A Contract
Law for Future Generations autorke prof. dr Cristine Poncibò, analiziraju se ugo-
vorne odredbe o održivom razvoju, sa posebnom pažnjom usmerenom na pitanja
njihovog obaveznog karaktera i uticaja na unapređenje ciljeva održivosti. Sekcija se
zaključuje radom Termination of the Contract under FIDIC - The Perspective of Bosnia
and Herzegovina autora dr Almira Gagule i prof. dr Zlatana Meškića, u kome se razma-
tra pitanje raskida ugovora zbog neispunjenja obaveze prema FIDIC-u sa stanovišta
prava Bosne i Hercegovine.
Druga sekcija obuhvata radove iz oblasti arbitraže i alternativnog rešava-
nja sporova U radu Subjektivni domašaj arbitražnog sporazuma u srpskom pravu
autora dr Uglješe Grušića, analizira se terminologija, merodavno pravo, forma
5
arbitražnog sporazuma i pitanje kruga lica obavezanih arbitražnim sporazumom,
uz kritički osvrt na stavove koje je domaća sudska praksa izražavala u pogledu sub-
jektivnog domašaja arbitražnog sporazuma. Prof. dr Milena Petrović u radu Odbor
za razmatranje/rešavanje sporova: još jedna alternativa državnim sudovima, bavi se
pitanjem pojma i vrsta odbora za rešavanje sporova, ključnih aktivnosti članova
odbora koji sprovode postupak, kao i kvalifikacija koje ti članovi treba da poseduju.
Za treću sekciju, posvećenu pravu EU, prof. dr Tatjana Josipović napisala je
rad Zaštita temeljnih prava u privatnom pravu Europske unije u kome se razmatraju
i komentarišu instrumenti zaštite osnovnih prava Unije u privatnopravnim odno-
sima koji ulaze u domen primene prava Unije. Drugi rad u ovoj sekciji - Evropsko
pravo, nacionalno pravo i pravna (ne)sigurnost čiji je autor prof. dr Gian Antonio
Benacchio analizira pitanje pravne sigurnosti sa aspekta mehanizama Evropske unije
čiji se cilj ogleda u obezbeđenju standardizacije prava u državama članicama Unije.
U četvrtoj sekciji sadržani su radovi iz oblasti međunarodnog privatnog pra-
va. U radu Postupanje javnog beležnika prilikom zaključenja ugovora koji za predmet
ima sticanje stvarnog prava na nepokretnosti koja se nalazi u inostranstvu – nekoliko
napomena iz ugla međunarodnog privatnog prava autora prof. dr Slavka Đorđevića ana-
lizirana su određena pitanja međunarodnog privatnog prava sa kojima se suoča-
vaju javni beležnici u obavljanju javnobeležničkih poslova prilikom zaključe-
nja ugovora koji za predmet imaju sticanje stvarnih prava na nepokretnostima
koje se nalaze u inostranstvu. Prof. dr Maja Stanivuković i prof. dr Sanja Đajić
autorke su rada Hommage jednom zastupniku pred međunarodnim sudovima:
Profesor dr Slavko Stojković, u kome je prikazan životni put i naučni dopri-
nos profesora dr Slavka Stojkovića, diplomate i državnog zastupnika Kraljevine
Jugoslavije.
Poseban prilog ovom izdanju učinili su prof. dr Gordana Vukadinović i prof.
dr Dragan Mitrović putem teksta Pravne iskrice koji predstavlja izvod iz najnovije
knjige ovih autora pod naslovom Uvod u teoriju i filozofiju prava, objavljene u
Beogradu 2020. godine.
***
Sa tim mislima i tom sadržinom, predajemo ovo izdanje Revije pravnič-
koj javnosti, uz posebnu zahvalnost autorima koji su za nju pisali, uprkos teškim
okolnostima koje prate 2020. godinu.
6
PRVA SEKCIJA
MICHAEL G. BRIDGE
INTRODUCTION
Although international trade has been with us for or many centuries, we are
in modern times dealing with a body of global trading activity that in its volume,
intensity and sophistication far exceeds that of the international trade of former
Michael G. Bridge QC (Hon), FBA, Geoffrey Bartholomew Professor of Law, National Uni-
versity of Singapore; Emeritus Professor of Law, London School of Economics; Senior Research
Fellow, Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford, e-mail: M.G.Bridge@lse.ac.uk.
9
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
days. Global supply chains and the standards of safety and quality that have en-
sued from international trading agreements, cross-border relationships and regi-
onal associations of states give trade a systematic character that it did not possess
even a few decades ago.
It would be entirely wrong, however, to say as we forge forward that we are
ignoring the past. It is common nowadays to see and hear references to the lex
mercatoria as a body of law to which these cross-border trading arrangements
are or might be subject. This expression, lex mercatoria, conjures up a roman-
tic historical vision. In our minds’ eyes, we see traders who, even before the fall
of the Roman empire,1 travelled the silk route or ferried porcelain, jewellery, fa-
brics and cotton back and forth between China and central Asia; Romans who
imported large quantities of Egyptian wheat; and Phoenician merchants who
ventured across the Mediterranean Sea and into northern waters, purchasing tin
from Cornish miners and trading in spices and linen. Transnational currencies of
sorts were developed, taking the form of Greek silver coins, Chinese bronze rin-
gs, Indian punched metal discs and even cowrie shells.2 After the fall of Rome, to
take just a few examples, there were Vikings who navigated the inland waterways
of Russia and Ukraine; and Hanseatic merchants in Baltic ports who dealt with
pitch, timber, furs and amber. These examples are arbitrarily drawn from a much
larger stock of examples. From spot sales of goods in these circumstances, trade
evolved over the centuries, to embrace options3 and, despite ecclesiastical opposi-
tion, forward selling.4
Financial instruments like bills of exchange were developed to limit the ri-
sks of peripatetic merchants carrying bullion. Goldsmiths took deposits and gave
notes in return, transforming themselves over time into bankers. Numerous Eu-
ropean cities hosted international trade fairs, with ad hoc netting systems mana-
ged by bankers being created to settle, when the fairs closed, the various cross-re-
mittances arising in the course of trading activity. Later, cities like Augsburg and
1 See Cynthia Postand. Edward Miller, The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Cam-
bridge, 2nd edn, 1987, Vol II.
2 Philip Coggan, More: The 10,000 Year Rise of the World Economy, The Economist Books,
in Coggan, Thales of Miletus, expecting a large olive harvest, took an option on all available olive oil
presses for the post-harvest period. See ibidem, 30.
4 It was not until 1826 that courts in England gave a firm ruling that forward selling was
not an unlawful wager on future prices: Bryan v Lewis (1826) Ry and Moo 386; cf Lorymer v Smith
(1822) 1 B & C 1, 2.
10
Michael G. Bridge: International Trade and Transnational Law
Antwerp thrived and declined as centres of international trade and banking. And
then came the rise of the Dutch Republic and of Amsterdam from the late 16th
century, followed by London in the 17th century and so on.
Complementing this mercantile activity, transnational contract law has also
been present since time immemorial in increasing degrees of development to ser-
ve the needs of cross-border trade. Even in mediaeval times, merchants would
have been conducting business against the backdrop, however hazy and remote,
of a law governing their activities. This body of law, referred to as the lex mercato-
ria, would in mediaeval times have amounted to an agglomeration of usages and
customs, applied by merchants themselves in piepowder5 and similar courts in
the settling of disputes at the periodical trade fairs.6 There was also, even in me-
diaeval times, a transnational admiralty law based on the laws of Oleron, themsel-
ves derived from the ancient customs of Rhodes. Marine transportation was more
secure and rapid in pre-mediaeval and mediaeval times than land transport. We
may have little knowledge of the limited content of this lex mercatoria,7 given the
scanty documentary record, but its prior existence, before the rise of the modern
nation state which captured it and assimilated it as part of a national law,8 is a be-
acon for those who wish to bring it back to life in an enhanced form in modern
conditions. For some idealists, this lex mercatoria is romantically invested with
an idealised and systematic content and scope that could not have existed in its
heyday.
As the modern nation state came into being, a body of centralised law
was created that grew to diminish the role of custom and thus also of a separa-
te, unwritten lex mercatoria. The wholesale reception of Roman law in mediae-
val Europe from the late 11th century onwards9 started with the “rediscovery” of
Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis. Its absorption into the bloodstream of European
law took centuries to achieve, starting with in the bedding down of Roman law
5 A corruption of “pieds poudrés” (dusty feet).
6 The delays in the administration of justice by local courts were intolerable to merchants
who had to be on their way, possibly on the next tide: William John Victor Windeyer, Lectures on
Legal History, Law Book Co of Australasia, Sydney, 1949, Ch XXII.
7 For the view that it was largely confined to rules of evidence, proof of sales and contracts,
and the taking of deposits as earnest money, see Sir Frederick Pollock, Frederic William Maitland,
The History of English Law, SFC Milson, Cambridge, 2nd edn, 1968, Vol. 1, 467.
8 A process that in England was conducted over the 16th and 17th centuries, particularly by
11
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
alongside a variety of other legal measures, notably local regulation, feudal dues,
royal ordinances and local and regional custom.10
With the rise of the modern nation state, there was a discernible movement
in continental Europe away from custom to recorded law. France, as a country
of the civil law, codified the various regional customs of its central and northern
provinces across a period of more than two hundred years, before reorganising
them in the form of a civil code in the early 19th century. Germany, as a newly for-
med nation state, opted at the end of the 19th century for a scientific approach to
codification built upon a systematised re-creation of Roman law rather than upon
regional German customs. England retained its common law, as it had done with
exceptions from mediaeval times.11 It resisted codification but slowly systemati-
sed that law, which consisted not only of the common law in its narrower sense –
the product mainly of the courts of common law – but also of equity. Equity, the
product of the chancery courts, had a methodology and processes wholly distinct
from those of the common law in its narrower sense. It bore down upon the con-
science of the individual, that conscience being subjected to exacting procedures,
and was in no sense a bureaucratic, formulary system like the common law. This
process of systematisation of common law and equity consisted of the improved
reporting of judicial decisions, the rise of authoritative legal treatises and impro-
vements to procedure brought about by statute in the 19th century.12
The common law was exported to British colonies, but only up to a point.
There were areas embedded in local custom, tradition and usage, such as family
law and succession, where the common law was not applied to the native inha-
bitants. France in a similar fashion exported its civil code to its colonies and, in
the wake of Napoleonic conquests, carried it to certain other European countri-
es too. The scientific qualities of Germany’s code made it an impressive volun-
tary export product for use in countries such as Japan13 and Thailand,14 as they
were putting themselves through ambitious programmes of modernisation. The
first translation into English was carried out by a Chinese scholar shortly after the
10 On the interaction of Roman Law and local law, see Raoul Van Caenegem, An Historical
influenced by canon law since the Lord Chancellor was for centuries a bishop, and canon law itself
was heavily influenced by Roman law. Admiralty law was, after centuries of competition between
the admiralty court and the court of King’s Bench, finally absorbed by the common law in the time
of Lord Mansfield in the third quarter of the 18th century.
12 The bulk of English contract law and the law of sale is a 19th century creation.
13 In 1896 and 1898, working off a draft before the German code came into force in 1900.
14 In 1923. In 1926, Turkey adopted the Swiss Civil Code, itself influenced by the German code.
12
Michael G. Bridge: International Trade and Transnational Law
BGB’s enactment.15 All of this may be seen as a wave of globalisation which affec-
ted in particular contracts and contract law.
MODERN TIMES
13
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law. Examples of this are the incorporation of the UN Convention the Internati-
onal Sale of Goods (CISG) into the domestic law of Norway and Israel. The UNI-
DROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) have been bro-
ught in to reshape Lithuanian domestic contract law as the country was converted
from a planned, socialist economy to a western market economy. One of the pur-
poses served by the PICC is indeed “to interpret or supplement domestic law”.17
A third pathway to the globalisation of contract law is seen in the wide-
spread use of particular national laws in international contracting. Take the case
of English law in commodity trading, in very many instances where there is no
physical connection between the contracting parties or the place of performance
and England. English law dominates the trade in grain and soya between North
and South America and northern Europe18 without any significant part in this
trade being played by English (or UK) traders. It plays also a major role in con-
tracts concerning crude oil, again very commonly in cases where the parties and
the performance of the contracts have no physical connection with England.19 In
the commodities trades in general, whether we are looking at physical or deri-
vatives trades, the CISG is excluded in favour of a national law. This has at least
as much to do with an acceptance of the settled state of international trading in
those commodities as it has with some degree of concern about the suitability of
the CISG for dealings in commodities in dynamic and sometimes turbulent mar-
kets. In these markets, the phenomenon of string trading is commonplace, invol-
ving dealings in the same type and quantity (or divisible portions thereof) of go-
ods priced in the same currency as goods, evidenced by paper, pass down from an
initial seller to an ultimate buyer. The choice of the same applicable law down the
string is part of this uniform package and enhances the tradability of the goods
subject to the contract.20 Commodities traders are not nationalistic or sentimen-
tal when it comes to the choice of the applicable law. To take another example, the
preferred choices in the derivatives trades (futures, swaps and options) are En-
glish law and New York law.21
17 Preamble of the PICC.
18 GAFTA (the Grain and Agricultural Feed Association) claims that 80% of world trade in
grains is conducted on the basis of its contract forms. These forms specify the use of English Law
and explicitly exclude the CISG and Incoterms.
19 There are numerous examples, eg Total (France), Chevron (US), Neste (Finland) and Rep-
sol (Spain).
20 The number of contracts concerning cargoes of commodities often far exceeds the num-
Vienna Sales Convention, paras 4.8 et seq. The FMLC’s concerns about the unsuitability of the CISG
14
Michael G. Bridge: International Trade and Transnational Law
UNIFORM LAW
The second and third methods of globalisation stated above repay careful
study but for the remainder of this article I propose to concentrate on uniform
hard and soft law, with particular reference to the CISG as hard law and the PICC
as soft law. These are both substantive law instruments. It goes without saying that
there are also striking examples of measures dealing with procedural issues that
affect the environment of commercial contracts. Examples that come immedia-
tely to mind are those dealing with jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments,
whether stemming from regional initiatives, for example the EU Brussels I Re-
gulation, or from universal initiatives, for example the somewhat limited Hague
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements22 and the New York Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Again, we should
not lose sight of conflict of laws measures, largely stemming from the work of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law, such as the Hague Sales Conven-
tions of 1955 and 1986. In standardising the approach to selecting the law appli-
cable to a contract, they do not as such concern substantive law.
Taking now the case of hard uniform law, a striking example concerns carri-
age of goods by sea. For almost a hundred years, uniform rules adjusting the ba-
lance of hull and cargo interests have been in place. This started with the Brusse-
ls Convention 1924,23 which gave us the so-called Hague Rules on the liability of
cargo carriers. The process then ran on to the variation known as the Hague-Vi-
sby Rules 1968,24 with a diminished number of Contracting States. Concerns that
cargo interests and non-coastal States lacking maritime assets were insufficiently
catered for led to the Hamburg Rules 197825 and finally to the Rotterdam Rules.26
The difficulties of bedding down uniformity in this area arise from the perenni-
al tension of hull interests and cargo interests, the development of containeri-
sed transport, and the question of how far these rules should extent to connec-
centred particularly on the Convention’s potential application to physically settled OTC transactions
in commodity derivatives.
22 In force 2015 with 32 Contracting Parties.
23 The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills
of Lading (“Hague Rules”) and Protocol of Signature.
24 The Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
of Law Relating to Bills of Lading (the so-called Brussels Amendments). A further Protocol dealing
with special drawing rights was concluded in 1979.
25 In force 1992 (but the major trading nations have not adopted the Convention or even, in
15
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THE CISG
It came into force in 1988 and has proved to be a great success, with 93 Con-
tracting States to date, Brazil and Vietnam being among the more recent adhe-
rents. The CISG endured a lengthy gestation period. It was preceded by the efforts
of the great German jurist Ernst Rabel prior to the Second World War, and by the
two conventions on international sale that were the product of a conference held
at The Hague in 1964. But the CISG came into being as a result of the efforts and
energy released in the late 1960s when the newly created UN Commission on In-
ternational Trade Law (UNCITRAL) became involved in the unification project,
largely as a result of the belief that a uniform sale convention could be an instru-
ment of the so-called new international economic order, which was a fashiona-
ble idea at the time.30 The 1964 Hague conventions were unsuccessful, adopted
by only a handful of western European countries, often with substantial opt-outs,
together with Israel and Gambia. Countries with socialist economies, as well as
North America and the world of developing economies, did not participate in the
process of concluding the conventions. It is an elementary proposition that the
chances of widespread adoption of a multi-party convention depend heavily upon
the engagement of as many countries as possible in the process of creating them.
This creates a sense of ownership. As a result of these failings in the 1964 conven-
tions, the way was open for the initiative that gave us the CISG.
27 As amended by a Protocol of 2002. See Paul Mybergh, “A Successful Substantivist Carve-
Out?: The Athens Convention as Uniform International Law”, Journal of Business Law, 2020, 20.
28 A UN Convention has been in force since 1962.
29 An inter-governmental convention concluded in 1980 and containing uniform rules for
passengers (CIV) and for freight (CIM).
30
It occupies a prominent place in the Preamble to the CISG but has had no impact on the
development of the CISG since it came into force.
16
Michael G. Bridge: International Trade and Transnational Law
17
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res are often more a matter of legal method than of substantive legal content.35 No
one should assume that, for example, French and German law in a civil law tradi-
tion stemming from Roman law are as identical as Romulus and Remus, or that
English and US law in the common law tradition finish each other’s sentences. I
propose to select a number of features of the CISG that derive from the separa-
te traditions, and to select also a number of examples that show an interesting co-
njunction between them. I shall begin first from the point of view of the civil law
before proceeding to the common law.
Civil law
The civil law invests much greater importance, in theory at least, to requi-
ring performance as a remedy for breach of contract than does the common law.
It is well known that in common law systems the primary remedy for breach of
contract is damages. Specific performance at common law is a discretionary re-
medy called into play in rare cases where damages would not be an adequate re-
medy.36 In the civil law, on the other hand, there is no corresponding restriction
of a formal kind on the enforced performance of a contract.37 This may originally
have been due to a fuller commitment to the principle of pacta sunt servanda in
the romano-canonical tradition, but what may once have been a matter of faith
can over time become a matter of entrenched habit. This approach to the enforced
performance of contracts is repeated in the CISG in Articles 46 and 62 (though
Article 28 CISG allows common law countries to opt instead for damages in de-
fined circumstances).38 These provisions lay down a right to require performan-
ce, restricted only in the case where a seller has delivered defective goods (Article
46(2) CISG), which amounts to an oblique retention of the otherwise rejected cri-
tical distinction, especially prominent in the civilian tradition, between non-per-
35 In the case of some civil law countries in particular, and partly at least because of the
CISG, there have been significant changes made to update contract law. These countries include
France (Ordonnance n° 2016-131 of 10 February 2016 on the reform of contract and obligations in
general), Germany (Act on the Modernisation of the Law of Obligations, in force 1 January 2002)
and Turkey (Code of Obligations 2012).
36
Sale of land cases constitute an exception to the general disposition not to award specific
performance in view of the (supposed) uniqueness of individual parcels of land.
37 Contracting parties, nevertheless, may well prefer to go to the market place rather than to
await the outcome of litigation for enforced performance.
38
Article 28 CISG does not explicitly mention common law countries but it uses for the
only time in the CISG the common law expression specific performance instead of requiring per-
formance, elsewhere used in the CISG.
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REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
is not something that should trouble courts in civil law countries. It is noteworthy
that Article 8(3) CISG permits a reference to subsequent conduct when a con-
tract comes to be interpreted. This accords with the view that a contract is not so
much an artefact fixing irrevocably the position of the contracting parties at a sin-
gle point in time but rather a continuing relationship. It is necessary to establish
an agreement in the first place so as to bind the parties, but the agreement thereby
reached may evolve into something different.
A celebrated feature of German law, concerning untimely performance, is
the so-called nachfrist doctrine. According to this doctrine, as incorporated in the
CISG, one of the contracting parties, faced with a delay by the other in the per-
formance of the contract, may fix a time for that performance to take place. In the
event that performance still does not occur, the party serving the nachfrist notice
may avoid42 the contract (Articles 49(1)(b), 64(1)(b) CISG). In the case of English
law, the position is complicated by the way that, for delivery in commercial sale
contracts, it has long been the position that time is of the essence of the contract
in the first place without any need of a subsequent notice.43 The opposite is the
case of sale of land, owing to the greater difficulty of establishing title and perfor-
ming the contract. There is in these latter instances a long history of time notices
being served but the efficacy of this process has been called into question, owing
at least in part to the conviction that a contracting party may not unilaterally vary
the contract. If time was not of the essence when the contract was concluded, why
should one party acting unilaterally be able to alter that? There is no statutory en-
titlement to make time of the essence of a contract when it was not already so in
the first place. One judicial attempt to treat failure to comply with a notice as non-
performance rather than merely untimely performance44 came to grief.45 This
complexity does not of course bear upon the provisions of the CISG. That said,
one cannot assume that any complexities associated with the German nachfrist
doctrine in German domestic law should apply also in the case of the CISG. The
provisions of the CISG are clear and should not come with baggage from any na-
tional legal system. Article 7(1) CISG mandates the uniform interpretation of the
Convention in a way that befits its national character.46 The same caution against
importing domestic colouring should also be displayed when it comes to fitne-
42 In the sense of terminate.
43 See, eg, Bunge Corp v Tradax Export SA [1981] 1 WLR 711.
44 See Multi Veste 226 BV v NI Summer Row Unitholder BV [2011] EWHC 2026 (Ch).
45 In Samarenko v Dawn Hill House Ltd [2011] EWCA 1145, [2013] Ch 36.
46 See also below.
20
Michael G. Bridge: International Trade and Transnational Law
ss for purpose in Article 35 CISG: fitness for purpose has been present in English
law since at least 1829.47
A further inheritance in the CISG from the civil law tradition concerns the
price reduction action in Article 50 CISG. Under this provision, the buyer may
unilaterally discount the price of non-conforming goods in line with the degree
of their non-conformity. Common lawyers may believe that this is a type of da-
mages action based on establishing the extent to which the buyer’s performance
interest in the contract has been prejudiced. But the location of the action in the
CISG, where it is distant from the general damages action in Article 74 CISG, is
revealing. Article 50 CISG does not as such constitute a damages action but is in-
stead a provision conferring on the buyer a right to revise the contract in part. In
practical terms, however, the effect of a price reduction action may have some si-
milarity with an action for damages under Article 74 CISG. On its terms, Article
74 CISG is certainly capable of producing an award representing the difference in
value between conforming and non-conforming goods, but the difference betwe-
en the two actions becomes apparent in market conditions, when the timing of
the process differs in the two cases.48 It also becomes apparent in those cases whe-
re the non-conformity of the goods causes no loss to the buyer who is able to use
or dispose of them without incurring any financial loss.49 If the non-conformity
of the goods does not injure the buyer, the buyer may nevertheless claim under
Article 50 CISG for the diminished value of the goods.50
Some emphasis should be placed on features of the CISG representing a
surrender of the civil law position. For example, the notion that damages for non-
conforming goods should not be available in the absence of the seller’s fault51 is
excluded from the CISG. In some systems, this feature has been attenuated by
presumptions of knowledge of latent defects in the case of professional sellers.52
47 Jones v Bright (1829) 5 Bing 533. The civil law guarantee against latent defect is not as such
goods at the time of delivery and the value they should have had at that time if they had been con-
forming goods. The sale price itself does not come into the comparison. Under Article 50 CISG, the
difference between the two values give rise to a fraction that is applied against the contract price.
49 Bence Graphics International Ltd v Fasson UK Ltd [1998] QB 87.
50
And if the non-conformity causes damage over and above diminished value, the buyer
may claim additionally damages under Article 74 CISG.
51 On the fault principle, see Hein Kötz, European Contract Law, Oxford, 2nd edn, 2017,
244-48.
52 Under Article 1645 of the French Code civil, a seller’s liability in damages, going beyond
the restitution of the price, is confined to cases where the seller knew of the defect. The courts have
21
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
German courts, for example, have loyally declined to give an excessively wide in-
terpretation to Article 79 CISG, which exempts parties from liability where events
render impracticable the performance of a contract, so as to exonerate a seller
who is free from personal fault.53 Similarly, again in connection with non-con-
forming goods, a long-standing distinction, particularly apparent in German law,
between non-performance and non-conforming performance, has been given
up.54 The effect of a global instrument on domestic law should be noted here. In
2002, Germany revised its civil law so as to remove this feature from its civil code
and, in certain other respects too, to bring the code into line with the CISG.55 A
systematic codal system is naturally intolerant of incongruities between domestic
law and an international convention as incorporated in national law. A common
law system, in comparison, can shrug off such incongruities.56 Tidiness is not a
characteristic of the common law.57
Common law
Certain features of the CISG have specifically been drawn from Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), thus reflecting the energy that the Uni-
ted States pours into the various projects carried on in UNCITRAL (a clear exam-
ple of this is the work on secured transactions reform). Perhaps the most pro-
minent feature is the doctrine of cure, for which, at least in the French case law,
there is no precedent.58 The essence of the seller’s right to cure is that the seller in
developed an evidential presumption of fault in the case of professional sellers: Cass. Civ. 1re, 24
November 1954; JCP 1955.II.8565.
53 Bundergerichtshof 24 March 1999 (the Vine Wax case).
54 But Zimmermann asks the question whether a seller who delivers a bag of coal instead of
a Picasso has to be treated as having delivered a defective Picasso. See Reinhard Zimmermann, The
New German Law of Obligations, Oxford, 2005, 116.
55 See ibidem, 40.
56 Hence, when the European Directive on the sale of goods and associated guarantees
(1999/44/EC) was transposed in English law (first as Part 5A of the Sale of Goods Act, then subse-
quently by the Consumer Rights Act 2015), its features concerning enforced repair and substitution
had no effect on the general attitude towards specific performance in the law of contract.
57 Lord Diplock once memorably described the common law as a maze and not a motorway
(droit de “porter remède”). See also Michael Will, “Article 48”, Commentary on the International Sales
Law, Michael Joachim Bonell, C. Massimo Bianca (eds.), Milan, 1987, 437–448. Absent in the for-
mer provisions of the French Code civil, cure was not incorporated when the contract provisions
were recently revised.
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Michael G. Bridge: International Trade and Transnational Law
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REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
In a given case, it might lie somewhere in a range stretching from soothing wor-
ds to a performance bond, though the latter might seem to be an extreme form
of assurance in view of the cost it imposes on the party required to provide assu-
rance. It is fair to say that what amounts to adequate assurance is in both general
terms and in the specific case hard to state with any precision, but the presence of
this rule again serves to blunt the edge of strict termination rights. Once again,
the absence of such rights in the CISG, where the adequate assurance rule opera-
tes somewhat differently to the way it does in Article 2, points to the transplanta-
tion of a rule into a different setting (the CISG) where its purpose, effect and uti-
lity are very difficult to determine.
More effective imports from the common law exist. The rule of mitigati-
on of damages, which prevents an obligee from sitting on its contractual rights in
the face of a breach, when it might have exercised self-help to stem losses flowing
from the breach, has no specific equivalent in French law, for example.60 Another
point of departure from French law concerns the common law’s greater willin-
gness to enforce a contract that contains no mechanism for determining the pri-
ce. The CISG is notoriously opaque in that it contains seemingly conflicting pro-
visions (Articles 14 and 55 CISG) that give comfort to both positions.61 The
process of creating uniform law is perfectly capable of producing a compromise
text that makes conflicting parties content, or at least not discontented, which is
a common feature of the diplomatic process. This is a matter of some discomfort
for some American academic lawyers who see compromises of this sort as leading
to inefficient outcomes.62
A global instrument that draws from more than one legal tradition to crea-
te a composite whole can acquire internal tensions from that dual inheritance. We
have already seen the tension that exists between the seller’s right to cure and the
buyer’s right to require performance. A further example often mentioned is pre-
sent in Article 8 CISG, which seeks to balance civilian subjectivism and common
60 Despite the adoption of the CISG by France, the mitigation rule has not been incorporat-
ed in the revised provisions of the Code civil.
61 Article 14 CISG appears to require the price to be determined whereas Article 55 CISG
clearly recognises that the price may not, whether expressly or impliedly, be fixed.
62
And some English judges too, mindful of the adage that a camel is a horse designed by a
committee. See Sir John Hobhouse, “International Conventions and Commercial Law: the Pursuit
of Uniformity”, The Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 106, 1990, 530.
24
Michael G. Bridge: International Trade and Transnational Law
25
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 would not equip
courts with adequate tools to exercise control of these awards.
64 Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts.
26
Michael G. Bridge: International Trade and Transnational Law
Al Kritzer.65 Regrettably, the website has not been updated in the last few years. It
still has some utility, albeit diminishing, in setting out in accessible form a bank
of books, articles, essays, theses and notes dealing with the CISG, much of which
may be fully downloaded. One criticism, however, is that the website in its abun-
dance does not differentiate between the good and the bad and mediocre, which
diminishes its utility for judges and practitioners. The first port of call for them
has become the various commentaries on the CISG. More important than the re-
cord of writings on the CISG is the way that the Pace website, relying upon vo-
lunteer translators, records well over a thousand decisions that have been transla-
ted into English. Uniform law does not survive linguistic misunderstanding or
ignorance, and this initiative builds upon the widespread status of English as a se-
cond language. Similar in a way to the Permanent Editorial Board of the Ameri-
can Uniform Commercial Code is the CISG Advisory Council,66 of which I am
the current chair. The Council, taking references from individuals and instituti-
ons, issues pronouncements on particular problems or particular provisions of
the CISG in the form of black letter rules and commentary. The black letter ru-
les constitute the first port of call with the commentary coming into play when
further elucidation is needed. As a private and independent body, the influence
of the Council is measured by the quality of its work. To repeat a statement made
about Roman law in mediaeval Europe, it is authoritative imperio rationis and not
ratione imperii.
There are also other forces of uniformity at work. Not to be underestima-
ted is the effect of students studying the CISG in other countries as part of their
LLM studies, or taking part in mooting competitions like the Willem C Vis Moot.
In time, many of these students will in turn become judges and arbitrators. The-
re is now a large global community of CISG scholars and exponents and they talk
to each other. This does not mean that the distorting effect of national legal cul-
ture has been effaced for evermore. The first few years of a legal education are the
most critical in influencing a lawyer’s development. The different ways in which
the line is drawn between questions of fact and questions of law threatens distor-
tion, alongside different approaches to the location of the burden of proof. Loca-
ting the boundary between the law of tort (or delict) and the law of sale is another
area ripe for divergence. There is also the issue of gaps in the CISG, which I shall
turn to when considering the PICC.
65 See www.cisg.law.pace.edu.
66 See www.cisgac.com.
27
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
PICC
28
Michael G. Bridge: International Trade and Transnational Law
instrument. It is rather like an artist’s assertion of moral right so that the integrity
of a work of art may not be compromised by outside interference in its presentati-
on.69 The same objection to the self-proclaimed binding force of the PICC cannot
be made of the Preamble’s claim that they may serve as a model for national legi-
slators, but the further claim that “[t]hey may be used to interpret or supplement
international uniform law instruments” is more problematical. That is a matter
for the organisation promulgating the uniform instrument and for Contracting
States. These latter cannot be bound by the pretensions of an outside entity, in this
case UNIDROIT.70
In this last regard, let us consider now the relationship of the CISG and the
PICC. We may begin with the observation that a country’srules on contract law
are embedded in a greater whole of rules dealing with matters such as property
law and civil liability for torts or delicts. A country that incorporates the CISG for
international sale contracts is incorporating something that does not come with
collateral support and boundary definition in the shape of uniform general con-
tract, property and tort rules. If we could confine ourselves to their style and si-
milarity of approach, there is a case to be made for combining the CISG and the
PICC, though such a combination will amount to less than a comprehensive body
of private law embracing the whole of the law of sale.71 The PICC were inspired
by the success of the CISG and a number of the persons taking part in national
delegations leading up to the CISG were also rapporteurs for the PICC. Given
that the PICC cannot of their own motion supplement the CISG to create a grea-
ter global law of contract, can this be achieved by other means?
First of all, there is the possibility that the parties themselves may choose
the PICC as the applicable law of the contract alongside the CISG. It is debata-
ble whether this will be effective in later judicial proceedings; it depends upon
whether a country’s rules of private international law will accept as the applicable
69 In the 1980s, an artist, whose work included a skein of wild geese suspended from the
ceiling of a shopping centre in Toronto, successfully challenged the hanging of Christmas ribbons
from the geese: Snow v Eaton Centre Ltd (1982) 70 CPR (2d) 105.
70 Some sense of the sensitive character of the relationship between the CISG and the PICC
can be gained by comparing the initial and subsequent drafts of a document (Legal Guide to Uni-
form Legal Instruments in the Area of International Commercial Contracts (with a focus on sales)),
March, 2020, issued under the joint aegis of the Hague Conference on Private International Law,
UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT. The original document is available at https://www.hcch.net/en/govern-
ance/council-on-general-affairs and the document containing the adjustments, a UN document, is
available as A/CN.9/1030.
71 Neither instrument deals with the transfer of property rights.
29
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
law a body of rules that is not state-based law. This is not the case, for example, for
EU countries subject to the Rome I Regulation,72 though this restriction does not
affect the choice of the PICC in the case of arbitration.73 Furthermore, although
the CISG, when otherwise applicable, may be excluded by the parties themselves
(Article 6 CISG), it is not clear what the effect of an applicable law clause would
be. Would it signify an attempt to exclude the CISG altogether, or to exclude the
CISG only when its rules are at variance with the PICC, or merely to supplement
the CISG when this instrument is otherwise silent (either because a contractual
issue does not pertain to the special case of sale or because, while it does, there is
no express or implied rule in the CISG that meets the case)?
Assuming there is no applicable law clause favouring the PICC, may they
be brought in to assist the CISG by virtue of the CISG itself? In a famous provisi-
on, Article 7(2) CISG, the CISG states that, where the CISG is silent on an issue
that falls within its scope, recourse may be had to the general principles on which
the CISG is based, failing which resort may be had to the applicable law. Now, it
is perfectly possible to discern from the CISG general principles such as estoppel
(or in civilian language non venire contra factum proprium) and the avoidance of
economic waste, and possibly even the principle of good faith and fair dealing.74
Although there is a case for having a general convention on substantive contract
law that sits comfortably with the CISG,75 the patient, deliberate and time-consu-
ming process of interpreting the CISG and filling its gaps can be taken so far that
there is either no or very little utility in bringing in the PICC to supplement the
72 In the drafting process, an attempt was made in Article 3(2) but later abandoned to ren-
der certain instruments that were not state-based law eligible for treatment as the applicable law
(“the principles and rules of the substantive law of contract recognized internationally or in the
Community”). The existence of a role for non-state law is permitted by the Inter-American Conven-
tion on the Law Applicable to International Contracts 1994, Articles 9 (duty of court to “take into
account the general principles of international commercial law recognized by international organ-
izations”) and 10 (“The guidelines, customs, and principles of international commercial law as well
as commercial usage and practices generally accepted shall apply in order to discharge the require-
ments of justice and equity in the particular case”).
73 See, for example, Article 28(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration (“such rules
of law as are chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute”).
74 The difficulty in this instance lies in determining the meaning of the rejection on an ex-
30
Michael G. Bridge: International Trade and Transnational Law
CISG.76 Apart from validity and property, the CISG governs the rights and obli-
gations of seller and buyer without any further exclusion.77
Assuming however some utility in the process (methods of payment be-
ing a good example), a question that must be answered concerns the legitimacy
of invoking the PICC. There is the obvious difficulty of invoking a later instru-
ment, the PICC, as a foundation for the earlier CISG. How can it be said that the
PICC were the basis upon which the CISG was concluded? Apart from Article
7(2) CISG, however, there is Article 9 CISG which deals with the role accorded
to usage. Usage is formed by established practices between parties, whether it is
the parties to the existing contract or parties in the trade in general. The whole of
the PICC, which amount to something in the nature of a contract code far tran-
scending trade practices, cannot be taken to be usage. An area omitted from the
CISG is vitiating factors such as duress and fraud. These are dealt with amply by
the PICC but how can it be said that these rules are a matter of usage? Moreover,
the Preface to the PICC makes it clear that rules were selected because of their in-
trinsic merits and not because of their widespread recognition. Particular rules,
however, might pass the usage test but this can only be settled on a rule by rule
basis. The rules on payment and related matters in the PICC78 might just pass the
usage test, but the result of this investigation overall is that the PICC adds little to
the CISG. This is in part due to the scale of the CISG itself which contains nume-
rous rules, express and implied, that could sit well in a general contract law.
Turning our attention now to the PICC as a global expression of contract
law, a perceptive survey of them has been made appraising the extent of their use-
fulness and success.79 It points out how little use is made of the PICC in the selec-
tion of an applicable law but that arbitrators do make use of them, though as in-
dividual rules rather than an overall system, even in the absence of choice by the
parties. This latter finding is not surprising. The PICC represent an attractive al-
ternative to invoking a complex choice of law process to reach the relevant rule in
a national set of rules that might be difficult to discern and understand. The selec-
tion and application of the law applicable to a contract by arbitrators is often an
76 Michael Bridge, “The CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts”, Uniform Law Review, Vol. 19, 2014, 623.
77 Article 4 CISG.
78 Articles 6.1.7 et seq PICC.
79 Ralf Michaels, “The UNIDROIT Principles as Global Background Law”, Uniform Law
Review, Vol. 19, 2014, 643.
31
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
occult affair. Their awards are not open to external scrutiny except in extreme ca-
ses80 and the presence of a body of decisions amplifying and clarifying the me-
aning of the PICC is not to be found. This may explain the reluctance of parties
and their legal advisers when it comes to selecting the PICC, which represent the
equivalent of a Potemkin village (or something in a Hollywood backlot), all faca-
de and nothing behind them. The above survey,81 however, sees no small measu-
re of success in the PICC as “global background law”, operating “more as objective
law than as an object of choice”. They operate not so much as a global legal instru-
ment but rather as a touchstone against which legislators and courts measure na-
tional legislation and decisions. This is an intriguing idea but this overall finding,
that the PICC are not unimportant, amounts to significantly less than their succe-
ss as an expression of global contract law.
CONCLUSION
We remain a long way from achieving a global contract law. The CISG has
been remarkably successful in the particular case of sale, but a count of the num-
ber of Contracting States gives less than an account of how often the CISG appli-
es to contracts of sale. In fact, it is positively misleading to count the number of
Contracting States and then to recite the percentage of world trade for which the-
se States are responsible. The CISG is very commonly excluded in international
contracts and, in my experience, is almost always excluded in the sale of commo-
dities. This is largely because its commitment to keeping the contract alive does
not sit well with the harsh economics of dynamic and shifting markets. For many
traders participating in international commodity sales, they may as well be dea-
ling with an abstract entity such as a swap or an option. They will never see the
physical goods and may not even see the shipping documents if provision is made
for a truncated collection at the end of a sales string. It is also because market par-
ticipants, believing they already have a measure of legal certainty, are resistant to
legal change. There is no real prospect of UNCITRAL or UNIDROIT devoting
extensive resources to the creation of a global contract law given the pressing na-
ture of the need to deal with vital developments, such as dealings in demateria-
lised securities and international security interests. It is likely to be the case for
80 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
1958, Article V.
81 R. Michaels, op. cit., 643.
32
Michael G. Bridge: International Trade and Transnational Law
some considerable time to come that cross-border contracts remain subject to na-
tional rules, with the choice of law process continuing to play a prominent role.
René David once remarked that choice of law should not impede the expansion of
uniform law by according to national law too great a role, even when visited thro-
ugh uniform rules of private international law.82 That said, evolution in biological
terms is a slow process and, even in those cases where it picks up speed, its pro-
gress is measured in generations. This summary so far pays scant regard to the
globalised use of standard form contracts. It is hard to overestimate the importan-
ce of these forms in promoting the process of globalisation in contractual matters,
but in furthering the use of a particular national law they do not create a globali-
sed contract law. The same might be said for the banks of precedents compiled by
multinational law firms.
Rezime
Predmet ovog rada odnosi se na globalizaciju ugovornog prava. U radu je najpre data isto-
rijska analiza ovog pitanja, a zatim je učinjen pogled na različite vrste uniformnih pravila. Neka od
njih predstavljaju “tvrdo” pravo, kao što su multilateralne konvencije, dok druga ulaze u kategori-
ju pravila “mekog” prava, koja uključuju neobavezujuće pravne instrumente koje ugovorne strane
i suverene države mogu primenjivati. U tu kategoriju ulaze ugovorni opšti uslovi (npr. Incoterms
2020) i model ugovori (npr. ISDA ugovori), kao i model zakoni UNCITRAL-a. U radu je učinjen
osvrt na ulogu nacionalnog prava u procesu globalizacije, putem uticaja na zakone drugih država
ali i kroz doprinos u stvaranju uniformnog zakona. U radu su analizirana pravila Konvencije UN
o međunarodnoj prodaji robe (CISG), razmotren je uticaj kontinentalnog i anglosaksonskog pra-
va na njena rešenja i podvučen je značaj uniformnog karaktera Konvencije. Na kraju rada, pažnja je
posvećena ulozi i značaju UNIDROIT Načela međunarodnih trgovinskih ugovora (PICC) u oblas-
ti uniformnog ugovornog prava.
Ključne reči: lex mercatoria, tvrdi zakon, meki zakon, uniformno pravo, nachfrist, otklanjan-
je neispunjenja, ublažavanje
International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Vol II: The Legal Systems of the World/
82
Their Comparison and Unification, Ch 5 “The International Unification of Private Law”, Brill, 1981,
para 62.
33
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Article history
Received: 07.09.2020.
Accepted: 25.09.2020.
ORIGINAL SCIENTIFIC PAPER
34
UDC 341.24
DOI: 10.5937/RKSPP2002035P
CRISTINA PONCIBÒ
While attention for the social and environmental impacts of international busine-
ss is certainly not new, the past years have seen renewed interest due pressing global pro-
blems such as climate change, poverty, and human rights violations. Multinational enterpri-
ses (MNEs) are increasingly called upon to play an active role and thus contribute to a more
sustainable development. Interestingly, legal scholars are studying how MNEs are adopting
codes of conduct advancing sustainable development goals to rule their commercial relati-
onships with their suppliers in global supply chains. Some of these goals are incorporated in
contractual terms when the company insert sustainability contractual clauses in internati-
onal supply agreements. These contractual provisions dealing with public values represent
“irritant clauses” for contract theory and pose some challenging questions to contract law
scholars. The article considers, in particular, the following research questions: firstly, are the-
se contractual provisions binding and enforceable by the parties or by a third party to the
contract? Secondly, are they really “part of the contract” or do they play many functions?
Thirdly, do they have an impact in advancing sustainability goals? Finally, the case of sustai-
nability contractual clauses confirms that a new, specifically intergenerational, contract the-
ory is needed.
Key words: comparative contract law, contract theory, private actors, global value
chain, sustainable development goals, environmental sustainability
Cristina Poncibò, Associate Professor of Comparative Private Law, Turin University, e-mail:
cristina.poncibo@unito.it.
35
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
IRRITANT CLAUSES
tions, 2018; United Nations, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Develop-
ment, New York, United Nations, 2015.
3 Lorenzo Cotula, Investment contracts and sustainable development. How to make contracts
for fairer and more sustainable natural resource investments, London, 2010; Katerina Mitkidis, Sus-
tainability Clauses in International Business Contracts, The Hague, The Netherlands, 2015. See also
Katerina Mitkidis, “Sustainability Clauses in International Supply Chain Contracts: Regulation, En-
forceability and Effects of Ethical Requirements”, Nordic Journal of Commercial Law, No. 1, 2004,
1–31. Cristina Poncibò, “The Contractualisation of Environmental Sustainability”, European Review
of Contract Law, No. 4, 2016, 335–355.
36
Cristina Poncibò: A Contract Law for Future Generations
The MNEs mostly drafted and adopted their codes and then incorporated
them into their contracts without consulting suppliers. In most cases, this was a
unilateral initiative on the part of the MNE, rather than a process of negotiation.9
4 Hinrich Voss, “Implications of the COVID-19 Pandemic for Human Rights and Modern
Slavery Vulnerabilities in Global Value Chains”, Transnational Corporations Journal, Vol. 27, No. 2,
2020, 113–126; Gary Gereffi, Global Value Chains and Development. Redefining the Contours of 21st
Century Capitalism, Cambridge, 2018; Gary Gereffi, John Humphrey, Timothy Sturgeon, “The Gov-
ernance of Global Value Chains”, Review of International Political Economy, No. 12, 2005, 78–104.
5 Klaas Hendrik Eller, Jaakko Salminen, “Reimagining Contract in a World of Global Val-
ue Chains”, European Review of Contract Law, 2020, 16, 1 fs. and Fabrizio Cafaggi, Paola Iamiceli,
“Regulating Contracting in Global Value Chains. Institutional Alternatives and their Implications
for Transnational Contract Law”, European Review of Contract Law, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2020, 44.
6 Jaakko Salminen, “The Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh: A New Par-
adigm for Limiting Buyers – Liability in Global Supply Chains?”, The American Journal of Com-
parative Law, Vol. 66, No. 2, 2018, 411–451. The Accord is a contract between apparel brands, re-
tailers and importers, on the one hand, and international trade union federations, on the other. It
sits almost entirely apart from domestic law and regulation, or public international law. Funded by
the private sector, garment industry signatories, it provides for a system of oversight, credible in-
spections, mandatory remediation, and transparent reporting. Those contractual obligations are en-
forceable through international commercial arbitration, at the suit of the signatory unions.
7 Gunther Teubner, “Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends
GVCs. See Claire A. Cutler, Thomas Dietz, The Politics of Private Transnational Governance by
Contract, Abingdon, 2017.
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REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
Mapping
A first question here is to fix the legal meaning of SCCs. In order to answer
this question, the few empirical studies show that MNEs tend to adopt a variety
of similar contractual provisions ranging from vague (non-binding) assertions to
more precise contractual obligations.
First, some SCCs contain a clear, binding and verifiable clause (“express
term model”). In this case the issue of whether SCCs clauses are binding and en-
forceable depends on the way they are drafted in the contractual text. Generally,
unspecified and generic promises are not considered as contractual terms. A good
question is whether the model clause here mentioned is sufficiently detailed and
precise to create an obligation between the parties and, thus, enforceable.
Second, certain SCCs consist in referring to the code of conduct of the com-
pany (“reference model”). They may also refer to an international sustainability
standard, a national legislation (“reference to international standards, guideli-
nes”).
Still, the question of whether or not SCCs are binding depends on the wor-
ding of the provision of the code of conduct or standard. Thus, in three cases here
considered, the binding force of SCCs depends on their wording and clarity. In
practice, MNEs usually frame the requirements in broad terms when drafting
SCCs, especially when they adopt the reference models. Although general terms
might be intended to reach a broad audience and retain rule flexibility, the ter-
minology risks to be so vague that no clear obligations can actually be extracted
from the text.
Long-term commitments based on cooperation
between MNEs and suppliers
These provisions are part of contracts to “govern” the global values chain
so that they contribute in setting the legal framework for exchanges between the
parties over time and, in pursuing this goal they provide mechanisms of coop-
eration and control over their suppliers (e.g. monitoring, training, auditing and
certification).10
Analysis
The empirical studies about SCCs show that they may – or may not – being
enforceable depending on their wording. Often, the reference to environmental
10 Stefan Grundmann, Fabrizio Cafaggi, Giuseppe Vettori, “The Contractual Basis for Long-
Term Organizations – The Overall Architecture”, The Organizational Contract, (Eds. S. Grundmann,
F. Cafaggi, G. Vettori), Abingdon, 2013, 10–11.
38
Cristina Poncibò: A Contract Law for Future Generations
sustainability and the “rights of future generations” remains vague, imprecise un-
der contract law theory. In very few cases, the parties give binding effect to SDGs
standards (that are otherwise) not binding on the parties.
Clearly, vague clauses – from which no specific right or obligation can be
deduced – will not be enforced under the law of contracts. If an obligation is not
clearly stipulated, there may be no breach. Therefore, the mere fact that these pro-
visions are incorporated into the contractual text will not remedy their vagueness.
Interestingly, while they often result in non-binding legal statements contained in
contracts, MNEs adopt SCCs in contracting with suppliers to play another (and
interesting) function that we discuss in the paragraph about the many functions
of Contract Law.
remedies”, Uniform Law Review, 2015, 1–45. The article focuses on food global value chains.
12 Ian Roderick Macneil, “Reflections on Relational Contract”, Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics, 1985, 541–546. The network theory of contract law may also be useful to ex-
plain the framework for SCCs. It is not possible to develop this point more in the article, see for ref-
erence Hugh Collins, “Introduction to Networks as Connected Contracts”, Networks as Connected
Contracts, (Eds. Gunther Teubner & Hugh Collins), Oxford, 2011, 14–15.
39
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
knowledges that Pirelli has the right, at any time, to verify, either directly or through third parties,
compliance by it with the obligations herein undertaken. (…) 5. The Supplier may report to ethics@
pirelli.com any breach or suspected breach of the “Values and Ethical Code”, the “Code of Conduct”
and the Pirelli Group policy “Social Responsibility for Occupational Health, Safety and Rights, and
Environment” or any applicable laws; reports may be anonymous but shall contain a description of
the events that constitute the breach of the provisions contained in the above mentioned Pirelli doc-
uments, including information about time and place of occurrence of the relevant events, as well as
the persons involved. Pirelli will not tolerate threats or reprisals of any kind against employees and
third party collaborators arising from such reporting and shall adopt all appropriate actions against
any persons engaging in any such acts of threat or reprisal. Furthermore, Pirelli shall ensure the an-
onymity of those reporting the breaches, subject to the requirements of applicable law”.
Anna Beckers, Enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility Codes On Global Self-Regulation
15
and National Private Law, Oxford, 2015. Anna Beckers, “Towards a Regulatory Private Law Ap-
40
Cristina Poncibò: A Contract Law for Future Generations
Ex ante perspective
proach for CSR Self-Regulation? The Effect of Private Law on Corporate CSR Strategies”, European
Review of Private Law, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2019, 221–243. Andreas Rühmkorf, Corporate Social Respon-
sibility, Private Law and Global Supply Chain, Cheltenham, 2015. Anna Louise Vytopil, Contractu-
al Control in the Supply Chain. On Corporate Social Responsibility, Codes of Conduct, Contracts and
(Avoiding) Liability, The Hague, The Netherlands, 2015.
16 J. Salminen, op. cit., 411–451.
17 Jennifer Bair, “Contextualising compliance: hybrid governance in global value chains”,
New Political Economy, 2017. Professor Bair offers a sociological perspective on compliance and
auditing.
18 Ibidem.
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REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
Ex post perspective
Also important, strategies to remedy ex post a breach of SCCs are, for exam-
ple, whistle-blower strategies and corrective action plans. In the latter case, if non-
compliance is discovered, the buyer will usually work with the supplier to find so-
lutions. For example, the most common tool that companies use is a “corrective
action plan”, under which the parties agree what the supplier must do to remedy
the breach. Sometimes, the buyer will even provide a supplier with capacity buil-
ding resources, such as training or assistance.
In this respect, blacklisting or name-and-shame strategies may also be re-
levant. MNEs also adopt “name-and-shame strategies”, practically consisting in
the establishment of a database of compliant suppliers: the members of the spe-
cific initiative can no longer use a supplier, who is erased from such a database
or, worse still, listed as non-compliant (“blacklisting”). This information, despite
its possible incompleteness, is essential for implementing any practical change in
suppliers’ behaviour through various soft and hard remedial strategies.
Analysis
42
Cristina Poncibò: A Contract Law for Future Generations
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) le-
ading to its termination.20 Usually, a fundamental breach is found when the main
obligation under a contract is not fulfilled, or when the parties expressly agreed
on the fundamental role of certain obligations under the agreement.
This is the case of the example mentioned before: “(…) 4. The Parties here-
by agree that Pirelli may terminate the Contract/s and/or the Order/s in the event
that the Supplier should be held responsible for any breach of any of the provisions of
paragraph 2 above.”
Nevertheless, in other cases, the breach of SCCs may result in a non-funda-
mental breach. This when considering SCCs as posing ancillary obligations. If it
comes to a formal disagreement about the right to terminate, the court would have
to establish whether the breach in question amounted to a fundamental breach.
Interestingly, a fundamental breach must also be foreseeable according to
the general rules on contract interpretation. The main aspect to examine in this
respect will once again be the language of the SCCs and/or the manner in which
the supplier was informed of the buyer’s standards with respect to sustainable de-
velopment.
Coming to contractual damages, in order to claim damages for the breach
of SCCs, the buyer then has to prove a breach, a damage that was foreseeable and
a causal relationship between the two (e.g. Article 45(1), and 74 CISG).21
20 Arts 49 (1) and 25 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (Vienna, 11 April 1980). Art 49 (1) states that: “The buyer may declare the contract
avoided: (a) if the failure by the seller to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this
Convention amounts to a fundamental breach of contract; or (b) in case of non-delivery, if the se-
ller does not deliver the goods within the additional period of time fixed by the buyer in accordan-
ce with paragraph (1) of article 47 or declares that he will not deliver within the period so fixed”. Art
25 precises that: “A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results
in such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect
under the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same
kind in the same circumstances would not have foreseen such a result”.
21 Art. 45(1) of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (Vienna, 11 April 1980). Art. 45 (1) states that :”If the seller fails to perform any of his obli-
gations under the contract or this Convention, the buyer may: (a) exercise the rights provided in ar-
ticles 46 to 52; (b) claim damages as provided in articles 74 to 77”. Art. 74 of the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 11 April 1980). precises that
“Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of
profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach. Such damages may not exceed the
loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the
contract, in the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have known, as a
possible consequence of the breach of contract”.
43
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
All aspects may pose problems in relation to SCCs. Firstly, a breach can oc-
cur only where there is a binding obligation. As noted, the binding nature of SCCs
is dependent on the relevant provision’s form and specificity. Secondly, the causal
relationship between breach of an SCC and relevant damage will often be a con-
troversial matter and it will be even harder if a buyer claims a future loss, which
must be proved with reasonable certainty. It may be impossible to reach reasona-
ble certainty, unless the buyer, for example, faces litigation by third parties due to
the breach in question and expects to lose it.
Additionally, if an SCC is breached, most likely a non-pecuniary damage
will occur - usually reputational harm. Whereas UPICC and PECL expressly pro-
vide for the possibility of recovering non-pecuniary loss, the same is the subject
of an academic discussion and contradicting court decisions under CISG.
Indeed, the most common and probably the most detrimental consequence
of suppliers’ breach is the buyer’s damaged reputation. Specific performance is in-
consequential, because the buyer cannot recover the loss suffered. Claiming dam-
ages might be more helpful for the buyer, but establishing a link between the sup-
plier’s breach and any loss suffered by the buyer may be difficult. Furthermore,
calculating damages is problematic. Damages often include non-monetary dam-
age such as future loss of profit due to harmed reputation.
The breach of SCCs does not influence the tangible quality of goods so that
the legal consequences of their infringement do not follow the usual reasoning
according to Article 35(1) CISG requiring the seller to deliver “goods which are of
the quantity, quality and description required by the contract”.22
22 Art. 35 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Go-
ods (Vienna, 11 April 1980). Art. 35 states as folllows: “(1) The seller must deliver goods which are
of the quantity, quality and description required by the contract and which are contained or pac-
kaged in the manner required by the contract. (2) Except where the parties have agreed otherwise,
the goods do not conform with the contract unless they: (a) are fit for the purposes for which go-
ods of the same description would ordinarily be used; (b) are fit for any particular purpose expre-
ssly or impliedly made known to the seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract, except whe-
re the circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or that it was unreasonable for him to rely, on
the seller’s skill and judgement; (c) possess the qualities of goods which the seller has held out to the
buyer as a sample or model; (d) are contained or packaged in the manner usual for such goods or,
where there is no such manner, in a manner adequate to preserve and protect the goods. (3) The se-
ller is not liable under subparagraphs (a) to (d) of the preceding paragraph for any lack of confor-
mity of the goods if at the time of the conclusion of the contract the buyer knew or could not have
been unaware of such lack of conformity”.
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Cristina Poncibò: A Contract Law for Future Generations
Whilst Article 35(1) deals with what the contract actually requires, Article
35(2) sets out a series of objective criteria used to determine conformity. It is a
subsidiary definition, which only applies to the extent that the contract does not
contain any, or contains only insufficient, details of requirements to be satisfied
under the said provision. Thus, the primary consideration is whether the contract
requires the goods to be produced by safeguarding certain sustainability goals.
If these goals are not expressly required by the contract, Article 35(2) re-
quirements can then be considered. Indeed, the way of producing the goods in-
fluences their value on the market: a buyer may be willing to pay a higher price
for goods manufactured and traded by respecting the environment and other
values.
Following that reasoning, one may say that the goods produced under con-
ditions violating these goals are not of the quality impliedly asked under the con-
tract (Article 35(1),(2) CISG).
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REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
force a contract that they are not party to, even if the contract has been expressly entered into for
their benefit. The Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 opens up the possibility for such third
parties to derive enforcement. The first avenue for such a right it that a term of the contract express-
ly provides that the third party may enforce a right in its own right, or when the third party is a ben-
eficiary to the contract. In such a case the party has to be identified in the contract with the name or
as a member of a group or according to a particular description.
25 Cass Sunstein, “On the Expressive Function of Law”, European Constitutional Law Review,
Vol. 5, 1996, 66–72.
46
Cristina Poncibò: A Contract Law for Future Generations
legal duty to be transparent and the case of a ‘safe harbor’”, Law and Responsible Supply Chain. Con-
tract and Tort Interplay and Overlap, (Eds. Vibe Ulfbeck, Alexandra Andhov, Katerina Mitkidis),
UK, 2019, 110 fs.
47
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
between companies. Thus, similar clauses have the capability to reach global mar-
kets and societies, especially through the web, and social media. While the theo-
ries of the expressive function of law focus on formal law and soft law, we argue
that, in this specific case, these contractual provisions are advertised to markets
and societies, and for this reason, they may have an impact.
Secondly, SCCs and provisions having a similar scope in supporting SDGs
are becoming standardised in contracting within GVCs. The standardisation im-
plies that they are commonly designed and used among traders and, more im-
portant, this process entails a proliferation of these clauses in international supply
agreements. One may argue that such process may amount to establishing a trade
usage and its legal consequences according to CISG.
Thus, such a theory invites us to consider how rules alter the social meaning
of behaviour and promote the adoption of laws creating new norms of behaviour.
Informing
The expressive effect of contracts is also connected to their informative
role. New information about risks of a specific behavior may shift relevant social
norms. It is, therefore, desirable that MNEs accompany their contracts and codes
of conduct by the underlying explanations, because providing information may
have even greater effect on compliance than enforcement.
Signalling
In addition, an author notes that the relevant law is a signal or statement
unaccompanied by much in the way of enforcement activity. There is a large set
of instances in which laws that (a) aspire to announce or signal a change in soci-
al norms are nonetheless (b) accompanied by little enforcement activity.28 In our
case, the contractual form, even though the undertaking may not be legally en-
forceable, signals the seriousness of the issue towards suppliers. The increased
credibility of commitment with contract might compensate for the low possibi-
lity of non-compliance detection. If they do not comply, suppliers may therefore
fear adverse consequences, although these may not amount to any formal dispute
resolution.
Taking a moral obligation
By taking on the contractual form, the supplier comes under a moral im-
perative. A signature may seem unimportant if the incorporated SCCs is draf-
28 C. Sunstein, op. cit., 66–72.
48
Cristina Poncibò: A Contract Law for Future Generations
ted in vague terms or its enforceability is otherwise doubtful; but it makes a clear,
almost symbolic demarcation of what is considered a part of the deal and, is the-
refore, ethically binding.
A consensus exists that a legally valid contract also imposes certain mo-
ral obligations on a promisor; therefore, a supplier will probably feel obliged
to comply with the code, irrespective of its actual legal force. Under the moral
approach to contracts, a contractual commitment creates pressure on the promi-
sor, who strives for consistency of behavior with the contract.
appeal concerned claims brought by 1,826 Zambian citizens who allege that they have suffered dam-
age as a result of toxic discharges from one of the world’s largest copper mines. The mine is owned
and operated by the second defendant, Konkola Copper Mines plc (“KCM”), a Zambian company.
49
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
lity of effective global supply chain governance. These provisions risk not to be
designed to address the underlying problems that would lead to the far-reaching
changes to labor and environmental standards that some civil society actors are
calling for. Rather they tend to contribute in preserving the status quo that hinges
on rewards from cheap labor, cheap goods, low prices, and short-term purchase
contracts.
Promoting change
Here the conclusive point is that, even MNEs use SCCs purely for strategic
purposes and do not truly strive to bring the change in their global value chains,
SCCs may still induce behavioral change just by relaying on the “persuasive force”
of Contract Law. The same contract will lead to different expressive effects in dif-
ferent jurisdictions. Where the content conforms to local social norms, suppliers
and vice versa will easily internalize it. Local cultural and social norms are hard to
change through top-down international law. Private contracts, representing a bot-
tom-up approach, may be more successful in changing the social norms. The ���������
arti-
cle does not claim that many functions described in this paragraph are decisive or
that they cannot be countered by a demonstration of bad consequences. It states
that they play a role in our case study.
CONCLUSIONS
The interplay of Public International Law and Contract Law
The first defendant is KCM’s ultimate parent company, Vedanta Resources plc (“Vedanta”), which is
domiciled in England.
30
Auret van Heerdenn, Sabrina Bosson, “Private Actors and Public Goods – A new role
for the Multinational Enterprises in the global supply chain”, Management & Avenir, Vol. 23, No. 3,
2009, 36–46.
50
Cristina Poncibò: A Contract Law for Future Generations
International treaty law accommodates trade law and other interests rela-
ting to SDGs and finds expression in other treaties between trade partners. This
process is two-pronged: it is triggered by the choices of private actors which
express community interests recognised at international level under the SDGs:
conversely, it ultimately has effects on private contracts which underpin trade
flows. Principles of conduct in international soft law instruments, without being
legally binding on States and individuals, have prompted private actors to incor-
porate sustainability in their contractual relations. It is becoming a common stra-
tegy to adopt contractual clauses for suppliers within the area of human rights,
labour conditions, environmental protection, business ethics and sustainable de-
velopment, as in the case considered here. Formulating these clauses in internati-
onal supply agreements is certainly a helpful first step in communicating MNEs’
values and expectations towards commercial partners, addressing societal con-
cerns about respect for SDGs, and protecting their reputations.
It should be underlined that the insertion of contractual provisions dea-
ling with public values in contracting over GVCs could be better explained by
considering the role assigned to MNEs in promoting values along making pro-
fits because of the failure of global politics. The above-mentioned interplay betwe-
en public and private actors creates an example of a hybrid regulatory system. An
author notes that the concept refers to a system in which different forms of regu-
lation interact, such as contract law (or generally private law), public law, hard
and soft law relying on both standards developed by international organisations
and private regulation by and between companies.31
Indeed, reliance upon private law tools to render sustainability legally bin-
ding, on the one hand, and upon private remedies to enforce sustainable conduct,
on the other hand, could be seen from a double perspective: it could equally be
said that businesses are called to act as either delegates or agents by internatio-
nal institutions setting principles and voluntary standards. Vice versa, private to-
ols employed in global production can be seen as pursuing public or community
interests which have been identified and endorsed at international, multilateral
level.
Interestingly, an assessment of whether the current public/private interplay
in pursuing sustainability in international trade operations is satisfactory from a
legal point of view mainly depends on the enforceability of the obligations that
31 Kasey McCall-Smith, Andreas Ruhmkorf, “From international law to national law: The
opportunities and limits of contractual CSR supply chain governance”, Law and Responsaible Sup-
ply Chain. Contract and Tort Interplay and Overlap, (Eds. V. Ulfbeck, A. Andhov, K. Mitkidis), Rout-
ledge, 2019, 37.
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REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
bind private actors. The problem here is twofold. First, while private actors are
not directly bound by international law, private law – and specifically contract law
- has not been designed to assume a public, regulatory function and has proven to
be ill-equipped for pursuing public goals. Second, whereas a contract often requ-
ires precision, SDG standards are usually identified vaguely and imprecisely. Mo-
reover, the mere incorporation of SCCs into contracts does not make them for-
mally enforceable.
Our case study confirms the trend consisting in pursuing public goal by pri-
vate contracts. Indeed, it creates a hybrid regulatory system including public inter-
national law (e.g. sustainable development goals, in particular) and contract law.
In particular, the case considered here also confirms that contracts in the
global supply chains can serve as vehicles to promote SDGs goals in European
and non-European jurisdictions: thus, it is possible to say that contract law in the
context of GVCs contributes to the politics of rights in our contemporary era.32 It
is becoming ������������������������������������������������������������������
a common strategy to adopt contractual clauses for suppliers with-
in the area of human rights, labor conditions, environmental protection, business
ethics and sustainable development, as in the case here considered. Formulating
these clauses in international supply agreements is certainly a helpful first step
in communicating MNEs” expectations towards commercial partners, addressing
societal concerns about the respect for SDGs, and protecting their reputations.33
The problem here is that private law, and precisely contract law, was not
designed to assume a public, and precisely a regulatory function and results ill-
equipped in pursuing public goals. The article stresses the scares effectiveness of
enforcement mechanisms between the parties and by third parties to contracts.
Where contract often requires precision, SDGs standards are usually framed in a
vague and imprecise way. Also important, contract law is used as an instrument
of regulation: it is��������������������������������������������������������������
used as a means to give force to SDGs through specific provi-
sions of international supply agreements.34 In other words, SCCs are means to
“regulate” supplier’s behaviour over the global value chain. Legal scholars have ex-
tensively studied “contracts and regulation”, “contract governance” and contrac-
32 Ben Golder, Foucault and the Politics of Rights, Stanford, 2015.
33 Martijn W. Hesselink, “Five Political Ideas of European Contract Law”, European Review
of Contract Law, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2011, 295–313.
34 Kenneth W. Abbott, Engaging the Public and the Private in Global Sustainability Gov-
ernance. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1966730 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.1966730 (accessed 12 October 2020).
52
Cristina Poncibò: A Contract Law for Future Generations
tual regulation of the global supply chains. Supply agreements often imply long-
term contractual relationships between the parties and these contracts are often
parts of a larger network of relationships over the supply chain.35 Such literature
is very insightful for placing SCCs into the comprehensive theoretical framework
of contract governance.36
The sole incorporation of SCCs into contracts does not make them for-
mally enforceable; it does not help in overcoming the deficiencies of the supply
chains. SCCs remain generally unilaterally imposed, vague and formally hardly
enforceable.
So is there a reason to adopt SCCs? The article argues that SCCs, and con-
tract law in general, play a sort of expressive function in this particular case.
Thus, the “hidden life” of SCCs is more interesting for the researcher because
here contract law triggers legal, psychological and social processes with respect
to suppliers, but also third parties. In other words, SCCs shape our social norms
and perception of right versus wrong. Thus, they have an impact in fostering soci-
al values. Their increasing adoption by MNEs in contracting with suppliers offers
a very promising research agenda for comparative contract law scholars. It does
not matter that MNEs are attempting to legitimate the status quo or avoid liability
before third parties and society. In this respect, the article has underlined many
functions of Contract Law that can help us in finding an explanation with respect
to the increasing presence of irritant contractual provisions concerning the envi-
ronment, civil rights, equality, poverty in international commercial contracts.
Finally, the coordination of treaties and contracts in the global market,
which could be enhanced by treaties that expressly impose on the State parties
the obligation to regulate and enforce sustainable business conduct at home and
abroad, has not (yet) been achieved. Here the point is that without understan-
ding the interplay of public international law and contract law on the matter, legal
scholars will struggle to reconcile the presence of non-binding international goals
and irritant contractual provisions in terms of the environment, civil rights, equa-
lity, and poverty in international trade.
35 Stefan Grundmann, Florian Möslein, Karl Riesenhuber, Contract Governance Dimensions
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REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
Dr CRISTINA PONCIBO
Vanredni profesor, Univerzitet u Torinu
Rezime
Iako izučavanje društvenih i ekoloških uticaja međunarodnog poslovanja zasigurno nije nov
trend, proteklih godina ponovo se javlja interesovanje za ove teme zbog aktuelnih globalnih prob-
lema poput klimatskih promena, siromaštva i kršenja ljudskih prava. Multinacionalna preduzeća
(MNE) se sve više pozivaju da se aktivno uključe i na taj način doprinosu borbi za održivi razvoj. Za-
nimljivo je da pravnici izučavaju kako MNE sve češće usvajaju kodekse ponašanja koji unapređuju
ciljeve održivog razvoja, a koji se primenjuju na njihove poslovne odnose sa dobavljačima u glo-
balnim lancima snabdevanja. Neki od tih ciljeva uključeni su u odredbe o održivom razvoju ugov-
ora koje kompanije zaključuju. Ugovorne odredbe koje se odnose na javne vrednosti otvaraju više
spornih pitanja. Posebna pažnja u radu posvećena je sledećim dilemama: da li su pomenute ugov-
orne odredbe obavezujuće i primenljive za ugovorne strane ili za treće lice u ugovoru; da li ove
odredbe zaista čine deo ugovora i najzad, da li one utiču na unapređenje ciljeva održivosti.
Ključne reči: uporedno ugovorno pravo, teorija ugovora, privatni akteri, globalni lanac vred-
nosti, ciljevi održivog razvoja, ekološka održivost
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available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1966730 or http://dx.doi.org/,10.2139/
ssrn.1966730, 2020.
Adar�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Y.��������������������������������������������������������������������������������
, Gelbard�����������������������������������������������������������������������
M.��������������������������������������������������������������������
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Beckers A., “Towards a Regulatory Private Law Approach for CSR Self-Regulation? The
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Cristina Poncibò: A Contract Law for Future Generations
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Contracts, (Eds. Gunther Teubner & Hugh Collins), Oxford, 2011.
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don, 2017.
Eller K.H., Salminen J., “Reimagining Contract in a World of Global Value Chains”, Euro-
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view, Vol. 94, 1999-2000, 737 and I. Macneil, “Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term
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Golder B., Foucault and the Politics of Rights, Stanford, 2015.
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ons – The Overall Architecture”, The Organizational Contract, (Eds. S. Grundmann,
F. Cafaggi, G. Vettori), Abingdon, 2013.
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56
UDC 341.24(497.6)
DOI: 10.5937/RKSPP2002057G
ALMIR GAGULA
ZLATAN MEŠKIĆ
Dr. Almir Gagula, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Zenica; Law office Gagula,
e-mail: almir.gagula@gagula.ba.
Prof. Dr. Zlatan Meškić, Full Professor, College of Law, Prince Sultan University; Riyadh,
e-mail: zmeskic@hotmail.com.
57
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more efficient manner. The construction law is not an exception from the trend.
Erasing, or at least softening the borders in international trade is the goal of all
stakeholders evident in the construction sector. Several driving forces are mov-
ing this process forward: international character of contractual relations calling
for application of the rules of Private International Law1; different (legal) origin of
the employer, the contractor and the engineer; significance of the economic inter-
ests involved.
FIDIC’s Forms of Contract (FIDIC) that are aiming towards that goal,
gained its part of international fame, especially in the Middle East, Southeast
Asia and Eastern Europe.2 It is not our intent to describe the details of FIDIC,3 let
alone explain its historical perspective and development route, it has already been
done many times elsewhere.4 It is rather our intent to focus on specific issues of
termination as one of the remedies granted to the employer and contractor under
said forms. We shall also try to shed some light on the interplay between Bosnian
law and FIDIC, when Bosnian law is agreed between the parties as the applicable
law for their contract.5 We shall further discuss how FIDIC rules on termination
fit in the context of Bosnian law and also limits of their applications. Bearing in
mind that the core of the contract law in ex-Yugoslav republics is still SFRY’s Law
on Obligations 1978 (LOO),6 such an approach might not be only useful (strictly)
for and from Bosnian law perspective.
Since FIDIC Forms are produced in different versions, covering different
types of contractual relations within the construction industry, in order to nar-
row the scope of our article we shall specifically focus on the Conditions of Con-
tract for Construction for Building and Engineering Works Designed by the Em-
1 The unification of the substantive law heads for the same goal. Cf. Zlatan Meškić, Slavko
Đorđević, Međunarodno privatno pravo I – Opći dio, Sarajevo, 2016, 29.
2 Ellis Baker, Ben Mellors, Scott Chalmers, Anthony Lavers, FIDIC Contracts: Law and
Practice, Informa Law from Routledge, 2009, 14-15.
3 Sometimes referred even as the dispositive law of international construction arbitration:
Klee Lukas, International Construction Contract Law, 2nd edition, John Wiley & Sons, 2018, 257.
4 Branko Vukmir, Kratki komentari FIDIC-ovih općih uvjeta građenja, RRiF-plus, Zagreb,
2013, 3-12.
5 Axel-Volkmar Jaeger, Götz-Sebastian Hök, FIDIC-A Guide for Practitioners, Berlin, Hei-
45/1989 and 57/1989, Službeni list Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, No. 2/1992, 13/1993 and
13/1994, Službene novine Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine, No. 29/2003 and 42/2011, Službeni
glasnik Republike Srpske, No. 7/1993, 3/1996, 37/2001, 39/2003 and 74/2004.
58
A. Gagula, Z. Meškić: Termination of the Contract under FIDIC ...
ployer (1st edition, 1999), more famous as the Red Book. To the extend necessary,
we shall emphasize the specifics of 2nd edition of Red Book (2017) – FIDIC GCC.7
The remedies provided by the FIDIC Red Book can be divided into two
groups: the Employer’s remedies and the Contractor’s remedies. In general, the
Employer’s remedies are dependable on certain breaches of the contract by the
Contractor and related to the time-aspect of the project or the quality of the
Works performed. In terms of time, the Contractor has a general duty to com-
plete the Works within the Time for Completion.8 Should he fail to do so, the Em-
ployer shall be entitled to request agreed Delay Damages, as the remedy being
somewhere in between the Common Law’s Liquidated Damages9 and Contrac-
tual Penalty10 specific for the civil law legal systems.11 Likewise, should the Con-
tractor perform the Works, but with some defects, the Employer shall have a right
to reject the works12 or request remedial works.13 In case that the Works cannot
be used for the intended purposes, the Employer has a right to request extension
of Defect Notification Period.14 Should the Contractor fail to remedy the defects,
the Employer is entitled to self-help15 or to reduction of the price.16 The Employer
is also entitled to the costs suffered, at least in certain situations.17
On the other side of the spectrum, the Contractor is not left without own
remedies for the Employer’s breach. First and foremost, should the Employer
fail to pay the price as agreed, the Contractor shall be entitled to the financing
7 Conditions of Contract for Construction, General Conditions, International Federation
dated Damages and Extensions of Time in Construction Contracts, Willey-Blackwell, 2009, 71 et seq.
11 The FIDIC Contracts Guide, FIDIC, First Edition, 2000, 177.
12 S-C 7.5.
13 S-C 7.6.
14 S-C 11.3.
15 S-C 11.2.a.; E. Baker et al., op. cit., 423-424.
16 S-C 3.5.
17 E.g. S-C 7.5, 7.6, 8.6, 9.2.
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charges,18 which might call for additional care of the parties in terms of possible
application of certain mandatory rules from the applicable law.19 Aside from the
financing charges which are intended to be clear and easily established, more im-
portant Contractor’s remedies are related to the time and the costs generated by
the events in responsibility of the Employer. In case of various situations where
the Employer is direct cause of prolongation, or at least contractually responsi-
ble for its effects, the Contractor shall be entitled to a remedy in a form of Ex-
tension of Time for Completion (EoT).20 Second most important remedy linked
to the Employer’s responsibilities, is entitlement for additional money payment.21
However, most radical and thus highly important remedy granted to both parties
in certain situations is entitlement to the termination of the contract. Those enti-
tlements are to some extent different in terms of conditions and application, thus
deserve separate observation.
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A. Gagula, Z. Meškić: Termination of the Contract under FIDIC ...
nation of the agreement for insignificant failures,24 but rather calls for preserva-
tion of the contract (in favorem contractus). Significance of the Contractor’s fail-
ures to perform shall be assessed against the facts of the case. The purpose of a
notice is to allow the Contractor to remedy the failure, and while doing so it must
not be prevented or hindered from performing his obligation.25
Apart from (non)rectification of the failures in the fulfilment of the Con-
tractor’s obligation, the entitlement of the Employer to terminate the contract is
further linked to specific events, giving rise to the Employer’s right to terminate
the Contract. Looking at the FIDIC Forms, it seems that FIDIC provides rath-
er detailed list of the situations giving rise to the entitlement for the Contract ter-
mination, instead of providing for a general clause as used in Bosnian law.26 The
Employer under FIDIC Forms has the right to terminate the Contract in the situ-
ations listed in the following table.
15.2.a.
15.2.a. 15.2.e.
Failed to provide Performance Security or to
4.2 3.7 (Agreement or
comply with the Notice to Correct
15.1 Determination)
21.4 (DAAB’s decision)
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List of the grounds for the termination is not exhausted with the above, but
the right exists also in other situations, e.g. in case of failure to pass the Test on
Completion, to Remedy the Defects, in case of Force Majeure etc.27
In case of the events or circumstances listed in S-C 15.2, the Employer
shall firstly have an obligation to issue the (first) notice to the Contractor, with
a 14 days deadline for compliance with the Notice. This notice prior termination
should not be confused with the general notice to correct defined by S-C 15.1,
where in case of general failure to comply with the obligation from the Contract,
the Employer has an obligation to issue first Notice to Correct, followed by no-
tice prior termination under S-C 15.2. The Notice to Correct within additional
14 days is a general rule, subject to certain exceptions (S-C15.2.2). First, in case
of bankruptcy, insolvency or similar proceedings against the Contractor, the Em-
ployer shall not have an obligation to issue Notice to Correct but will have a direct
right to terminate (Notice of Termination). Bankruptcy or similar proceedings
against the Contractor are showing that the Contractor is not able to perform its
obligations under the contract (i.e. to pay workforce, sub-contractors, head office
costs, machine rentals, materials etc.), as such endangering the whole Works. Sec-
ond, in case of the acts of bribery or similar.
FIDIC Forms 99 did not make a specific linguistical distinction between
two or even three possible notices related to the Employer’s entitlement for termi-
nation. Even though careful reading of the Clause 15 leaves no doubt, there might
be some confusion as to how many notices the Employer should submit in order
to achieve a lawful termination under FIDIC. It should be clear that the Notice to
Correct within a reasonable time (S-C15.1) should not be confused with 14 days’
notice prior termination (S-C15.2) and final Notice of Termination. This means
that even in case of unresolved Notice to Correct (S-C15.1), the Employer has an
obligation to issue additional Notice with 14 days deadline (S-C15.2), before fi-
nally terminating the contract with (final) Notice of Termination. Notice to Cor-
rect therefore is not per se a Notice from S-C 15.2.
When comparing Bosnian law general termination regime with FID-
IC, there are some similarities. Under Bosnian law, the creditor wishing to ter-
minate the contract must issue a notice granting additional reasonable time for
fulfilment,28 and if that notice is of no avail, another notice of termination shall be
necessary.29 However, the notice shall not be necessary for the transactions with
27 E. Baker et al., op. cit., 438.
28 Art. 126 LOO.
29 Art. 130 LOO.
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A. Gagula, Z. Meškić: Termination of the Contract under FIDIC ...
fixed deadline, where the contract shall be terminated ex lege.30 In contrast, FID-
IC Forms do not recognize automatic termination of the contract. FIDIC Forms
17 made a distinction with rather clear wording. Firstly, there is a clear and de-
tailed provision of S-C 15.1 describing in details the content of the Notice to Cor-
rect.31 Unlike in FIDIC Forms 99, the Notice to Correct now must not only de-
scribe the Contractor’s failure, but also state exact provisions of the Contract it
relates to, and also the reasonable time for remedying the failure, that shall not re-
sult with extension of the Time to Complete.
Secondly, the Notice prior termination (under S-C 15.2) must also describe
itself as a notice under S-C 15.2.1, in order to avoid any misunderstanding32
whether this is just a Notice prior termination or Notice of termination itself.
Thirdly, now the Notice of Termination is described in clear words as the
“... second notice”.
Even though this approach made a distinction clearer, more could be
achieved by naming the notices as: Notice to Correct, Notice prior Termination
and Notice of Termination. That would erase, to the best possible extent, any con-
fusion that might arise between the parties, and consequently prevent rather ex-
pensive disputes over the nature and effect of specific notice. Should the Contrac-
tor fail to comply with the Notice prior Termination (or in case of bankruptcy
and bribery immediately), the Employer shall be entitled to terminate the con-
tract with a Notice of Termination. Consequences raised by the termination of
the Contract are rather serious. The Contractor shall leave or be expelled from
the site and deliver the Goods, Contractor’s documents, or the design documents
(S-C 15.2.3 and 15.2.4).
After the notice of termination becomes effective, the Engineer has an im-
portant obligation to settle the outcome of the termination.33 The Engineer shall
have to perform the valuation after the termination and issue its determination
with the goal to either agree, or in absence of the agreement between the par-
ties, determine the value of the Works, Goods and any Contractor’s documents,
as well as any sum due to the Contractor. Immediately thereafter the Employer
shall be entitled to submit its claims pursuant to S-C 2.5 and to withhold any fur-
30 Art. 125.1 LOO.
31 This was also suggested to be an understanding of the advisable application of FIDIC
Forms 1999 as well, e.g. Michael D. Robinson, A Contractor’s Guide to the FIDIC Conditions of Con-
tract, Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, 52; E. Baker et al., op. cit., 405.
32 In order to avoid any disputes, the same request of self-describing is highly advisable for
63
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ther payment until all the costs for remaining works, the delay damages and oth-
er costs have been established. It shall also be entitled to recover any extra costs of
completing the works. After the Employer recovers its losses, damages, and extra
costs, it shall pay any balance due to the Contractor.34
Another type of the termination by the Employer is the termination for
convenience under S-C 15.5. The Employer is entitled to terminate the Contract
at any time, with 28 days’ notice, provided that the Works shall not be executed
by the Employer or another contractor. In this specific case the Contractor shall
be entitled to the payments pursuant to S-C 19.5. The same option is given to the
Employer under Bosnian law, where the right to terminate the contract is also
granted only to the Employer.35
Ammar, “The Guide to Construction Arbitration”, Global Arbitration Review, Law Business Re-
search Ltd, 2017, 70.
41 Željko Popović, Odštetni zahtevi u građevinarstvu, Građevinska knjiga, Beograd, 2009, 224.
42 William Godwin, International Construction Contracts – A Handbook with commentary
on the FIDIC design-build forms, John Wiley & Sons, 2013, 67.
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A. Gagula, Z. Meškić: Termination of the Contract under FIDIC ...
In terms of the procedure, the Contractor may terminate the Contract with
14 days’ notice, except in case of a prolonged suspension affecting the works and
bankruptcy of the Employer, where no such notice is necessary. The termination
of the Contract shall come into effect after the Contractor issues the Notice of
Termination. This essentially generates a need for two notices (one prior to ter-
mination and notice of termination itself).43 As is the case with Termination by
Employer, FIDIC Forms 17 did provide some clarity in terms of the procedure,
essentially emphasising that there are two notices, explicitly naming the notice
of termination as “second Notice”.44 Effects of the Contractor’s termination are
similar to the effects of the Employer’s termination. The Contractor shall have an
obligation to cease all further works, hand over the Documents, Plan, Material
43 S-C 16.2. On this part this regime is distinct to the termination under dispositive rules of
LOO in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where after the creditor grants additional time for fulfilment, and
the debtor fails to rectify, the contract is terminated without further need for any notice, i.e. ex lege,
Art. 126 LOO.
44 S-C 16.2.2.
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and other works paid, remove all the goods from the site and finally leave it.45 In
terms of monetary consequences, the Employer shall thereafter have an obliga-
tion to return the Performance Security, pay all the amounts due as well as any
loss or profit or other loss and damage sustained by the Contractor as a result of
the Contractor’s termination.46
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A. Gagula, Z. Meškić: Termination of the Contract under FIDIC ...
the laws fall into this category is a matter for a conflict of law analysis,52 being ea-
sed by the reference of FIDIC Forms to the issue of laws, which are mostly linked
to the laws of the country in which the site is located.53 Certainly, the importance
of the mandatory rules of the applicable law agreed between the parties is not le-
sser. Many of the mandatory rules consisted in applicable law shall have a direct
influence on the application of the contract terms.54
The provisions of the applicable law that falls into the category of ius dispo-
sitivum lie on the other side of the spectrum. They apply in the case that the par-
ties did not agree on different terms and therefore allow the parties to accommo-
date their needs.55 And precisely there, relationship between Bosnian dispositive
rules and FIDIC shows the advantage of FIDIC’s detailed regulation of the termi-
nation against general regime of the termination under LOO in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina.
In this section we shall focus on the interplay between LOO in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and FIDIC Red Book, and and at least endeavor to establish that: a)
dispositive nature of Bosnian law enables and goes hand-in-hand with detailed
regulation of termination under FIDIC, b) Bosnian rules regarding insignificant
non-fulfilment as a corrective measure for the termination are not directly appli-
cable to FIDIC Forms of Contract, c) other less harmful remedies are not an ob-
stacle for the termination under FIDIC Forms of Contract, d) principles of good
faith and prohibition of abuse of rights apply to the termination under FIDIC
as well.
Termination of the contract under the Bosnian law is one of the methods of
the cessation of the contractual obligations.56 As such, it is complementary with
52 Linda Silberman, Franco Ferrari, “Getting to the Law Applicable to the Merits in Inter-
national Arbitration and the Consequences of Getting it Wrong”, Conflict of Laws in Internation-
al Commercial Arbitration, (eds. Franco Ferrari, Stefan Kröll), European Law Publishers, Munich,
2011, 257-324.
53 S-C 1.1.6.2.
54 Davor Babić, Fran Pecilarić, “Validity of the Time Bar under FIDIC Sub-Clause 20.1
in Croatian Law”, Construction Arbitration in Central and Eastern Europe, Contemporary Issues,
Wolters Kluwer, 2020, 138.
55 Abedin Bikić, Obligaciono pravo – Opći dio, 3. izm. i dop. izd., Sarajevo, 2013, 20.
56 Bogdan Loza, Obligaciono pravo – Opšti dio, 4. dop. i izm. izd., Beograd, Službeni glasnik,
2000, 154.
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universal methods of the termination of the contract57 in the modern legal sys-
tems. Irrespective of the different conditions for the termination, different meth-
ods, and various legal effects, it is a common ground that the termination of the
contract is universally accepted in the Contract Law. One of the many specifics of
the FIDIC contracts is that the arbitration is a first option for final dispute resolu-
tion, after passing through preceding stages of FIDIC’s multi-tier dispute resolu-
tion clause.58 This is precisely the reason for lack of FIDIC related court case law
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This in and of itself raises various questions regarding
application of FIDIC in conjunction with Bosnian law as the applicable law. One
of the key issues is the termination of the Contract.
Starting point is that provisions of the contract law in Bosnia and Herze-
govina are indeed mostly of dispositive nature.59 Those rules are equally appli-
cable ex lege as the rules of mandatory nature.60 Should the parties agree on dif-
ferent terms of the contract, dispositive rules shall not apply and vice versa.61 The
authorities are in unison62 regarding dispositive nature of the rules of LOO reg-
ulating the termination and its consequences,63 as well as the case law.64 Disposi-
tive nature of the provisions of LOO regarding the termination opened the possi-
bility for the parties to agree on the specifics of the termination: conditions, way
of termination and its consequences. This is precisely what FIDIC Forms establish
with their provisions in Clauses 15 and 16. Both of these clauses, from the per-
spective of Bosnian law, are to be considered as the termination based on the will
57 Živomir Đorđević, Vladimir Stanković, Obligaciono pravo – Opšti deo, Beograd, Naučna
observed in relation to the provisions and the approach of Lex arbitri. E.g. French courts established
strict and consistent approach to the issue of Iura novit curia in international arbitration, request-
ing from the arbitral tribunal not to exceed the boundaries of the pleadings of the parties. Cf. Mar-
ta Viegas de Freitas Monteiro, Jura Novit Curia in International Commercial Arbitration, Helsingfors
universitet, 2013, 70-73.
61 Zoran Rašović, Građansko pravo, Podgorica, 2006, 33-34.
62
Almir Gagula, “Usklađenost instituta raskida ugovora u pravu BiH sa Načelima evropskog
ugovornog prava”, Pravna misao, Sarajevo, br. 7–8, 2010, 13.
63 Vesna Klajn-Tatić, Docnja prodavca sa predajom stvari, Beograd, 1983, 111. Cf. Prof. Loza
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A. Gagula, Z. Meškić: Termination of the Contract under FIDIC ...
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gers the main goal of the agreement.68 The main criteria is that partial fulfilment
of the obligation should correspond with legitimate expectations of the parties,69
and this in turn calls for determination of the intent of the parties at the moment
of the contract’s conclusion, and also estimation how partial fulfilment is contra-
ry to such expectations of the parties. In doing so, one must take into account that
provisions of Clauses 15 and 16 are precisely aimed at resolving this issue. Conse-
quently, in order to terminate the contract, conditions from these clauses must be
met, irrespective of assessment if this falls into the scope of Art. 131 LOO. Simply
put, Art. 131 LOO shall not be applied and cannot be used as a corrective meas-
ure against application of Clauses 15 and 16 FIDIC.
The right to termination exists regardless of the fact if the creditor has at its
disposal another, less harmful remedy that would be less detrimental to the in-
terests of the other party, i.e. debtor. Although this argument is not developed in
scholarly work, it is not rare, at least from the personal experience of the authors
of this article. In short, the argument is framed in a way that the employer, pro-
tected by security in a form of the Advance Payment Guarantee (S-C 14.2) or the
Performance Security (S-C 4.2), should be prevented from terminating the agree-
ment even if conditions from Clauses 15 and 16 are met. Irrespective of lack of
logic of such argument (the Employer always has the Performance Guarantee),
there is no exact legal ground for such an approach. Clearly, FIDIC Forms do not
provide any clause that can be used as a basis for such an argument. As far as
LOO is concerned, when conditions provided for in Art. 124 et seq. LOO are met,
the creditor is able to choose one of the remedies that it has at its disposal. It shall
be either entitled to request fulfilment of the obligation or termination, and in
any way the creditor shall be entitled to pursue its claim for damages suffered as a
result of delayed fulfilment of debtor’s obligation.70 To that extent, existence of the
various guarantees in favour of the creditor is not an obstacle for the termination
of the agreement, so it remains within the boundaries of sole discretion of the
creditor to terminate the agreement or not. Sub-Clause 15.2 explicitly emphasis-
es that the decision of the Employer to terminate the Contract shall not prejudice
any other rights the Employer has under the Contract or otherwise (i.e. under ap-
plicable law). The same is provided for the Contractor’s termination in S-C 16.2.
68 Boris Vizner, Komentar Zakona o obveznim odnosima, Knjiga 1, Zagreb, 1978, 524.
69 A. Bikić, op. cit., 207.
70 Art. 124 LOO.
70
A. Gagula, Z. Meškić: Termination of the Contract under FIDIC ...
It is therefore understandable that the Contractor or the Employer are not under
the obligation to choose a remedy that is less detrimental for the other party.
Above said does not exclude the application of the general principles of
LOO. The starting point for observation of the interplay between general princi-
ples on one side, and FIDIC’s provisions on the termination on the other, should
be the principle of freedom of contract. Pursuant to Art. 10 LOO the parties are
indeed free to determine their contractual relations as they wish, provided that
they stay within the limits defined by the Constitution, mandatory rules and good
practice. Freedom of contract is precisely the source of contractual regulation of
unilateral termination.71 On the other hand, this principle finds its boundaries
within the scope of mandatory rules of Bosnian legal system. As far as business-
to-business relations are observed, there are no exact provisions of the law limit-
ing the freedom of the parties regarding the right to unilateral termination. How-
ever, widely recognized72 principles of good faith73 under Art. 12 and prohibition
of abuse of rights under Art. 13 LOO are corrective factors to the freedom of con-
tract and the usage of the rights. One might also argue that existence of these cor-
rective instruments in Bosnian law is not surprising,74 due to the transnational
public policy that the principle of good faith is a part of.75 Likewise, Lex Construc-
tion, as Lex Mercatoria in general, relies on the good faith principle in terms of fa-
cilitation of performance of the contract and disclosure of the information rele-
vant for the contract.76
Under Art. 12 LOO the parties have the obligation to respect the principle
of good faith while entering into the obligations and when exercising the rights
arising from those obligations. Its purpose is to be used for the interpretation of
other legal provisions,77 but also the rights and obligations of the parties, whereas
it enables determination of ancillary obligations which were not agreed between
71 A. Bikić, op. cit., 206; B. Vizner, op. cit., 507; Đorđe Nikolić, Obligaciono pravo, Beograd,
2006, 69.
72 Klaus Peter Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, The Hague, London,
71
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
the parties, but are necessary for fulfilment of their obligations and good faith
principle. The good faith principle also includes prohibition of contradictory be-
haviour78 (venire contra factum proprium),79 known as estoppel by representation
in common law countries or as the principle of consistency in French law.80
The good faith principle interferes with the principle of prohibition of abuse
of rights81 established in Art. 13 LOO. Within the wording used, LOO expressly
prohibits only usage of the rights against the goal that was basis for establishment
of such right. However, the prohibition should be observed a bit more extensive-
ly. In general, the right of one person is not unlimited, but it finds its bounda-
ries against the rights of other parties or public interest.82 The main consequence
of the breach of this prohibition is liability for the damages caused.83 An applica-
tion of these two limitation principles should be careful. The court or the tribunal
should firstly establish the source of the obligation in order to apply the principles
on concrete, not abstract obligation of the parties.84
Bearing that in mind, approach to the provisions of Clauses 15 and 16 sho-
uld be that they fall under the scope of ius dispositivum from perspective of Bo-
snian law, and as such, their application cannot be generally considered as a bre-
ach of principles of good faith and/or prohibition of abuse of rights. The facts
of each case should be observed in order to make a conclusion that the usage of
either clause 15 or 16 by the Employer or the Contractor should be prohibited.
It is not enough to make an arbitrary approach and consider mere usage of clear
clausulae iritatoriae as being contrary to these, indeed important principles.
78 Principles of European Contract Law, (eds. Ole Lando, Hugh Beale), Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, 1st edition, 1999,114.
79 D. Stojanović, op. cit., 107 et seq.; ICC Interim Award to Case No. 10671, Clunet 2006,
1417, para. 53; ICC Second Preliminary Award Made In Case No. 1512, YCA 1980, 175 (also pub-
lished in: ASA Bull. 1992, at 505 et seq.).
80 Philippe Fouchard, Emmanuel Gaillard, Berthold Goldman on International Commercial
Arbitration (eds. Emmanuel Gaillard, John Savage), The Hague, 1999, 820, para. 1462; Rolf Herber,
Beate Czerwenka, Internationales Kaufrecht, Munich, 1991, 50.
81 Prohibition of Abuse of Rights is also principle of European Community law. EuGH
72
A. Gagula, Z. Meškić: Termination of the Contract under FIDIC ...
Dr ALMIR GAGULA
docent Pravnog fakulteta Univerziteta u Zenici
Advokatski ured Gagula, Sarajevo
Dr ZLATAN MEŠKIĆ
redovni profesor Univerziteta u Zenici,
profesor na College of Law, Prince Sultan University
Rezime
FIDIC Opšti uslovi su u posljednjim godinama često korišteni za uređenje prava i obaveza
između investitora i izvođača na građevinskim projektima u Bosni i Hercegovini, posebno ugovo-
rima o građenju autoputeva, željeznica i brana. Većina projekata je završena bez značajnih sporova
između strana. Međutim, u određenim slučajevima sporovi između stranaka eskaliraju do te mjere
da jedna od strana odluči da raskine ugovor. S obzirom na ozbiljnost finansijskih posljedica raskida,
nužno je naglasiti uzajamno dejstvo između Zakona o obligacionim odnosima u Bosni i Hercegov-
ini i FIDIC Opštih uslova. Pažljiv pristup pitanju raskida ugovora bi mogao spriječiti komplikovane
i skupe arbitražne postupke.
Ključne riječi: FIDIC, raskid ugovora, savjesnost i poštenje, zloupotreba prava, posljedice
raskida
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Article history
Received: 05.10.2020.
Accepted: 14.10.2020.
ORIGINAL SCIENTIFIC PAPER
75
DRUGA SEKCIJA
ARBITRAŽA, ALTERNATIVNO
REŠAVANJE SPOROVA
UDK 347.918(497.11)
DOI: 10.5937/RKSPP2002079G
UGLJEŠA GRUŠIĆ
U oktobru, 25. 2018. godine Vrhovni kasacioni sud doneo je, u srpskim ar-
bitražnim krugovima sada već čuvenu presudu Prev 37/20181, u kojoj se, između
ostalog, bavio subjektivnim domašajem arbitražnog sporazuma u srpskom pra-
vu. Za pravnike koji se bave arbitražnim pravom u Srbiji ova presuda je od veli-
kog značaja. S jedne strane, domaći autori više ne moraju da pišu o subjektivnom
79
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
TERMINOLOGIJA
vembra 2001. godine, navedeno u Mirjana Cukavac, “Dejstvo arbitražnog sporazuma na treća lica”,
Pravo i privreda, Tom LVI, br. 4–6, Beograd, 2018, 308, 314.
5 Službeni list SFRJ – Međunarodni ugovori, br. 11/81.
6 UNCITRAL Model Zakon je dostupan na www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/
ml-arb/06-54671_Ebook.pdf, 30.09.2020.
80
U. Grušić: Subjektivni domašaj arbitražnog sporazuma u srpskom pravu
Usklađivanje poslovnog prava Srbije sa pravom Evropske unije – 2019, (ur. Vuk Radović), Beograd,
2019, 370, 391.
8 M. Cukavac, op. cit. (u celini).
9 Dejan Janićijević, “Proširenje dejstva arbitražnog sporazuma”, Zbornik radova Pravnog
fakulteta u Nišu, tom LXII, 2012, 283, 291; Gašo Knežević, Vladimir Pavić, Arbitraža i ADR, Beo-
grad, 2009, 58 (koji govore o “rastezanju” domašaja arbitražnog sporazuma na treća lica).
10 Rajko Ignjačević, “Proširenje arbitražnog sporazuma na nepotpisnika sa osvrtom na dve
arbitražne odluke”, Liber amicorum: Gašo Knežević, (ur. Tibor Varady i ostali), Beograd, 2016, 267.
11 Mirko Vasiljević, “Arbitraža bez arbitražnog ugovora (direktnog ili indirektnog)”, Pravo i
privreda, br. 10–12, tom LVII, 2019, 7. V. takođe Maja Stanivuković, Međunarodna arbitraža, Beo-
grad, 2013, 3.182.
12 M. Cukavac, op. cit., 325.
13 G. Knežević, V. Pavić, op. cit., 2019, 58; Uroš Živković, “Subjektivni domašaj arbitražnog
sporazuma i treća lica: izuzeci od principa inter partes u zasnivanju nadležnosti arbitraže”, Pravo i
privreda, Tom XLX, br. 7–9, 2013, 437.
81
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
82
U. Grušić: Subjektivni domašaj arbitražnog sporazuma u srpskom pravu
83
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
MERODAVNO PRAVO
International Conflicts – Liber Amicorum Tibor Varady, (ur. Tibor Varady, Peter Hay, Lajos Vekas, Ye-
huda Elkana, Nenad Dimitrijević), Budimpešta, 2009, 213, 218–225; U. Živković, op. cit., 441–448.
20 Jelena Perović Vujačić, “Ništavost ugovora o arbitraži”, Pravo i privreda, br. 4–6, Tom
84
U. Grušić: Subjektivni domašaj arbitražnog sporazuma u srpskom pravu
85
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
86
U. Grušić: Subjektivni domašaj arbitražnog sporazuma u srpskom pravu
đeni međunarodni ugovori sastavni deo pravnog poretka Republike Srbije i neposredno se prime-
njuju, pod uslovom da su u skladu sa Ustavom.
30 M. Stanivuković, op. cit., 3.197–3.198; V. Pavić, op. cit., 2019, 387.
87
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U. Grušić: Subjektivni domašaj arbitražnog sporazuma u srpskom pravu
sporazum koji je zaključen u formi koju priznaje pravo koje je merodavno za for-
malnu punovažnost arbitražnog sporazuma može da obavezuje i nepotpisnike.
U arbitražnom pravu, pisana forma je uslov punovažnosti arbitražnog spo-
razuma, tj. konstitutivni sastojak ugovora. Kao takva, ona ima dva osnovna cilja.
Prvo, pisana forma služi kao sredstvo dokazivanja postojanja i sadržine arbitraž-
nog sporazuma. Drugo, pisana forma služi kao upozorenje licima koja žele da za-
ključe arbitražni sporazum na značaj ovog sporazuma, koji ne samo što daje nad-
ležnost arbitrima da u jednostepenom postupku donesu odluku koja je po svojim
dejstvima izjednačena kao konačna sudska odluka, već i derogira nadležnost su-
dova da reše meritum spora i stoga predstavlja odricanje od osnovnog prava na
pravično suđenje pred nadležnim sudom. Prva uloga pisane forme arbitražnog
sporazuma je uglavnom ispunjena čak i ako arbitri ili sud nađu da je nepotpisnik
obavezan arbitražnim sporazumom. Ovo je stoga što u ovom slučaju arbitraž-
ni sporazum koji je zaključen u pisanoj formi dokazuje postojanje i sadržaj arbi-
tražnog sporazuma. Druga uloga pisane forme takođe može biti ispunjena. Ne-
potpisnik koji iskazuje svoju volju da bude obavezan arbitražnom sporazumom
u obliku koji ne zadovoljava propisanu formu to čini u pogledu arbitražnog spo-
razuma koji između potpisnika zadovoljava propisanu formu. Nepotpisnik stoga
može imati tu formu u vidu kada iskazuje svoju volju da bude obavezan arbitraž-
nim sporazumom. Na taj način nepotpisnik može biti upozoren na značaj tog ar-
bitražnog sporazuma. Ukoliko je nepotpisnik obavezan arbitražnim sporazumom
usled primene pozitivnog propisa, onda taj pozitivni propis ima prvenstvo u od-
nosu na propisanu formu. Međutim, glavni razlog za obavezivanje nepotpisnika
arbitražnim sporazumom leži u želji da se izbegne zloupotreba, odnosno da se za-
dovolji cilj pozitivnog propisa koji služi kao osnov proširenja arbitražnog spora-
zuma.36 Stoga je i dominantno rešenje u uporednoj arbitražnoj i sudskoj praksi da
je pitanje kruga lica koje arbitražni sporazum obavezuje odvojeno od pitanja da li
arbitražni sporazum zadovoljava pisanu formu.
Iz ovih razloga je domaća sudska praksa zabrinjavajuća. U Prev 37/2018,
u kojoj se, između ostalog, bavio subjektivnim domašajem arbitražnog sporazu-
ma u srpskom pravu, Vrhovni kasacioni sud je usvojio veoma nezadovoljavajuće
tumačenje čl. 12 Zakona o arbitraži. Agencija za privatizaciju je 2007. godine za-
ključila ugovor o prodaji akcija jednog srpskog akcionarskog društva. Ugovor je
sadržao arbitražnu klauzulu koja je u slučaju spora predvidela nadležnost Spolj-
notrgovinske arbitraže pri Privrednoj komori Srbije i sedište arbitraže u Beogra-
du. Merodavno pravo je stoga bilo srpsko. Agencija za privatizaciju je 2010. godi-
ne podnela zahtev za arbitražu sa zahtevom da se kupac obaveže da plati Agenciji
36 V. Pavić, op. cit., 2009, 216–218; V. Pavić, op. cit., 2019, 395–396; M. Vasiljević, op. cit., 10–11.
91
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ZAKLJUČAK
95
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
Summary
This article deals with the personal scope of arbitration agreements in Serbian law and cov-
ers issues of terminology, applicable law, form of the arbitration agreement and determination of
persons covered by the arbitration agreement. The judgments of the Supreme Court of Cassation in
Prev 58/2016 and Prev 37/2018 are criticed. The article reaches two general conclusions. First, the
departure from the UNCITRAL Model Law in Article 13 of the Serbian Law on Arbitration has led
to unpredicted problems and an unacceptable interpretation of Article 13, according to which this
provisions lays down a numerus clausus of the grounds on which an arbitration agreement can be
held to be coveringnon-signatories. Second, Serbian courts have not shown that they are up to the
task of establishing a favourable environment for the development of arbitration in Serbia.
Key words: arbitration, arbitration agreement, personal scope, Serbian law, Supreme Court of
Cassation
Literatura
Cukavac M., “Dejstvo arbitražnog sporazuma na treća lica”, Pravo i privreda, br. 4–6, Tom
LVI, Beograd, 2018.
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tražne odluke”, Liber amicorum: Gašo Knežević, (ur. Tibor Varady i ostali), Beograd,
2016.
Janićijević D., “Proširenje dejstva arbitražnog sporazuma”, Zbornik radova Pravnog fakul-
teta u Nišu, Tom LXII, 2012.
Knežević G., Pavić V., Arbitraža i ADR, Beograd, 2009.
Paulsson J., “Arbitration without privity”, ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal,
Tom 10, br. 2, 1995.
Pavić V., “Non-Signatories” and the Long Arm of Arbitral Jurisdiction”, Resolving Interna-
tional Conflicts – Liber Amicorum Tibor Varady, (ur. Tibor Varady, Peter Hay, Lajos
Vekas, Yehuda Elkana, Nenad Dimitrijević), Budimpešta, 2009.
Pavić V., “Osvrt na praksu Vrhovnog kasacionog suda u arbitražnoj materiji”, Usklađiva-
nje poslovnog prava Srbije sa pravom Evropske unije – 2019, (ur. V. Radović), Beo-
grad, 2019.
Perović Vujačić J., “Ništavost ugovora o arbitraži”, Pravo i privreda, Tom LVII, br. 4–6,
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UDK 341.62
DOI: 10.5937/RKSPP2002099P
MILENA PETROVIĆ
99
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
UVOD
100
M. Petrović: Odbor za razmatranje/rešavanje sporova: još jedna alternativa ...
dok je prvo zvanično delovanje Odbora za rešavanje sporova bilo 1975. godine u toku izgradn-
je tunela Ajzenhauer u Koloradu. Potreba za njegovim formiranjem i delovanjem je nastala zbog
prekoračenja i vremena i novca utrošenih na rešavanje brojnih sporova prilikom izgradnje prve tu-
nelske cevi u okviru ovog projekta. Uvođenje odbora u rešavanje sporova se pokazalo kao veoma
uspešno budući da su sporovi koji su se javljali i prilikom izgradnje druge cevi tunela rešavani brzo
i efikasno pa je ova praksa počela da se sprovodi širom SAD. V. M. Goodrich, Dispute Adjudication
Boards: Are they the future of dispute resolution?, dostupno na: https://www.whitecase.com/publica-
tions/article/dispute-adjudication-boards-are-they-future-dispute-resolution.
3 R. Hunt, op. cit., 1.
4 Svetska banka od 1995. godine preporučuje DRB klauzulu za ugovore koji prelaze 50 mil-
iona dolara. Praksa je pokazala da je upotreba odbora finansijski isplativa upravo pri ovoj vrednosti
ugovora. V. R. Hunt, op. cit., 4.
5 U godinama između 1988 i 2001, broj projekata u kojima je korišćen ovaj metod je po-
rastao sa 18 na 800. V. R. Hunt, op. cit., 1. Prema podacima iz 2018. godine, prosečno svake go-
dine preko 200 građevinskih projekata započinje sa ugovornom klauzulom da će se sporovi rešavati
preko jednog ili drugog oblika odbora. Pri tome, praksa pokazuje da manje od 3% sporova koji
su upućeni na odbore završavaju pred arbitražom ili sudom. V. Stephen Rayment, The use of Dis-
pute Boards for International Disputes, Februar 19, 2018, dostupno na: www.systech-int.com/use-
dispute-boards-international-disputes/
6 FIDIC je osnovan 1913. godine u Francuskoj. Sedište mu je u Ženevi i danas okuplja 94
101
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
građevinarstvu/. Odbori za rešavanje sporova su postali sastavni deo brojnih FIDIC tipskih ugovo-
ra, pa se DAB klauzule mogu naći u ’Narandžastoj knjizi’ iz 1995. g (Orange Book), ’Crvenoj knjizi’
iz 1996. g (Red Book) ili ’Žutoj knjizi’ iz 1997. g. (Yellow Book). Više: Carroll S. Dorgan, “The ICC’s
New Dispute Board Rules”, The Intern. Construction Law Review, 2005. 143, 144.
7 DRBF je osnovan 1996. godine kao tehnička klirinška ustanova sa ciljem da promoviše
upotrebu DRB i unapređuje izvršenje DRB/DAB odluka.
102
M. Petrović: Odbor za razmatranje/rešavanje sporova: još jedna alternativa ...
103
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
biti i ostati nepristrasni i nezavisni u odnosu na stranke. Istu odredbu sadrži i čl. 8. CIArb Dispute
Board Rules, 2015.
12 V. npr., čl. 7(2) CIArb Dispute Board Rules.
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M. Petrović: Odbor za razmatranje/rešavanje sporova: još jedna alternativa ...
vom slučaju odbor donosi preporuke ili mišljenja, a u drugom slučaju donosi od-
luku. Preporuke su neobavezujuće, pa stranka koja je nezadovoljna njenom sadr-
žinom nije obavezna da je izvrši. Za razliku od preporuke, odluka je obavezujuća
za stranke i ako je obe stranke prihvate trebalo bi odmah i da je izvrše. Međutim,
kako se radi o postupku koji je generalno dobrovoljan, i u ovom slučaju je mogu-
će da jedna od stranaka odbije da prihvati odluku, ali onda to mora učiniti na for-
malan način, propisan pravilima kojima se uređuje postupak. Očigledno da obe
vrste odluka stranke mogu prihvatiti ili ne prihvatiti. Ukoliko ih prihvate, stran-
ke bi trebalo odmah da ispune obaveze utvrđene preporukom ili odlukom, a uko-
liko ih ne prihvate i spor ostane nerešen, one ga uvek mogu rešiti pred arbitražom
ukoliko su je ugovorili, ili u redovnoj sudskoj proceduri (u praksi ređi slučaj).
Odbori za razmatranje/rešavanje sporova su uspešni iz više razloga. Naj-
pre, oni delaju zato što stranke same žele da treća neutralna osoba (e) donosi od-
luku ili preporuku o tome kako da reše spor. Moglo bi se pomisliti ’zar to nije
isto što čini medijator ili arbitar?’ Međutim, to svakako nije. Odbor je mnogo
više uključen u ceo proces i to uglavnom od samog početka projekta, prateći nje-
govo izvršenje do samog kraja, pa je očekivano da su članovi odbora uključe-
ni i da razumeju inpute i autpute projekta. Oni obilaze gradilišta, prate izvršenje
obaveza iz ugovora i što je izuzetno važno, oni razumeju odnos između stranaka.
Njihov fokus je na upravljanju konfliktom od njegove najranije faze, a taj sistem
uključuje mehanizam prevencije i mehanizam kontrole spora i to kroz unapre-
đenje saradnje između stranaka kao poslovnih partnera. Drugim rečima, najpre
neformalnim, a onda i formalnim pristupom, članovi odbora rešavaju sporove u
njihovoj najranijoj mogućoj fazi. To je očit benefit budući da se time minimizi-
raju advokatski troškovi, umanjuje moguća šteta zbog gubitka produktivnog vre-
mena i loših odnosa među strankama,13 štiti profit, kao što se štite odnosi, ali i
reputacija stranaka koja treba da obezbedi i sačuva njihovu kompetitivnu po-
slovnu prednost.
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REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
kuju stalni (Standing Dispute Board) i Ad hoc odbori, dok se u drugom slučaju ra-
zlikuju odbori za razmatranje sporova (Dispute Review Board – DRB) i odbori za
rešavanje sporova (Dispute Adjudication Board – DAB).
Stalni odbori za rešavanje sporova se formiraju na samom početku “živo-
ta” osnovnog ugovora i traju tokom čitave njegove implementacije. Pravilo je da
su članovi odbora upoznati sa projektom, sa svim odredbama osnovnog ugovo-
ra čiju realizaciju prate i da su upoznati sa ugovornim stranama zbog čega se, na
neki način, smatraju članovima projektnog tima za koje se veruje da će biti sa-
vesni i nepristrasni, te da će njihovi saveti, mišljenja i preporuke biti rado pri-
hvaćeni od svih ugovornih strana.14 Njihova obaveza je da periodično posećuju
gradilišta, primaju izveštaje i druge dokumente i da budu u toku sa izvršavanjem
ugovornih obaveza. Na ovaj način odbori su dostupni ugovornim stranama kad
god je potrebno da im pruže savete i daju mišljenja o stvarima koje mogu prerasti
u spor, a ukoliko on nastane i stranke ga upute odboru, on će bez odlaganja pri-
stupiti njegovom rešavanju. Za svoj rad članovi odbora su plaćeni na mesečnom
nivou tokom implementacije ugovora što obuhvata troškove obilaska gradilišta,
troškove sastanaka sa strankama i saveta i mišljenja koja im se pružaju, što realno
nije mali novčani iznos, naročito ako se radi o dugoročnim projektima.15
AD hoc odbori se formiraju tek posle nastanka spora i traju dok ne donesu
odluku kojom rešavaju spor, osim ako se stranke o tome nisu drugačije sporazu-
mele. Jedina uloga ovog odbora je da reši spor koji su mu stranke poverile budu-
ći da njegovi članovi nisu na ’’licu mesta’’ kako bi mogli da pruže savete i daju pre-
poruke kojima bi se spor prevazišao. Procedura izbora i imenovanja članova ad
hoc odbora sigurno zahteva određeno vreme, pa čak i kada se imenovanje okon-
ča, članovima je potrebno vreme da se upoznaju sa projektom, ugovorom i okol-
nostima zbog kojih je došlo do spora. Sve ovo upućuje na to da se brzo rešenje
spora ipak ne može očekivati.
Određene prednosti stalnih odbora su očigledne. Normalno je očekivati da
će se stranke lakše dogovoriti oko izbora članova odbora na samom početku pro-
jekta, nego kada nastane spor. Druga, možda i glavna prednost ove vrste odbora
je u tome što su članovi upoznati sa projektom, odnosno ugovorom, što prate nje-
govu realizaciju i u stanju su da brže donesu odluku o spornim pitanjima. S druge
strane, međutim, stalni odbori su mnogo skuplji od ad hoc odbora, ali strankama
koje ta činjenica brine treba predočiti troškove arbitraže ili suda, pa i ad hoc od-
14 Ibidem.
15 C. S. Dorgan, op. cit., 145.
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M. Petrović: Odbor za razmatranje/rešavanje sporova: još jedna alternativa ...
bora, kako bi ih uporedile i donele konačnu odluku o načinu na koji žele da reše
eventualne sporove.16 U ovom kontekstu svakako treba napomenuti da ima i mi-
šljenja da odbori ne treba da budu stalni jer ad hoc odbori mogu da ponude eko-
nomsko rešenje za one projekte koji nisu ‘jako veliki’.17
Odbori za razmatranje sporova (Dispute Review Board – DRB) u jednom ne-
formalnom postupanju pomažu strankama da izbegnu konflikte i sporove tako
što im daju mišljenja o svim pitanjima koja bi mogla da eskaliraju u spor, a ukoli-
ko spor ipak nastane, na nešto formalniji način, dostavljaju im preporuku o nači-
nu na koji bi se taj spor rešio.18 Stranke se dakle, u svakom momentu mogu obra-
titi odboru za stvari koje mogu ili su već postale predmet nesporazuma, a koje
proizilaze iz ugovora ili su u vezi sa njim. Odbor o tome iznosi mišljenje ili do-
nosi preporuku koju stranke do određenog vremena treba da razmotre. One je
mogu prihvatiti i dobrovoljno postupiti u skladu s njom, ali je mogu i odbiti bu-
dući da ih ona ne obavezuje. Smatra se da su stranke prihvatile preporuku uko-
liko su to učinile izričito, pismenim putem ili ukoliko nijedna od njih u predvi-
đenom roku nije izrazila nezadovoljstvo njenim sadržajem ili nije izričito odbila
rešenja koja su preporukom predložena. U ovom slučaju preporuka će postati ko-
načna i za stranke obavezujuća.19 Nadalje, to znači da stranke bez odlaganja treba
da se ponašaju u skladu sa preporukom. Suprotno, ako se jedna ili obe strane ne
slažu sa rešenjem predloženim preporukom, potrebno je da se u određenom roku
pismenim putem izjasne o tome navodeći razloge neprihvatanja preporuke. Bu-
dući da spor među stranama u toj situaciji ostaje, on će biti rešen od strane arbi-
traže, ako među strankama o tome postoji sporazum, ili ako to nije slučaj, biće re-
šen od strane nadležnog suda.
Odbori za rešavanje sporova (Dispute Adjudication Boards – DAB) su nasta-
li iz odbora za razmatranje sporova, pa njihovo delovanje ima iste ciljeve – pre-
venciju mogućih i rešavanje nastalih sporova od strane nepristrasnih, nezavisnih
i stručnih lica koja su upoznata sa ugovorom. Ključna razlika između ovog i pret-
hodnog tipa odbora je u tome što DAB donosi odluku o sporu koja je obavezujuća
za stranke od momenta kada je prime, bez obzira na to da li su one zadovoljne re-
16 Ibidem
17
Mahnken, Volker, “Why International Dispute Settlement Institutions Should Offer Ad
Hoc Dispute Board Rules”, ICLR, 2006. 433.
18 V. čl. 4(1) ICC Dispute Board Rules (2015); čl. 3(2) CIArb Dispute Board Rules (2014).
19 V. čl. 4(3) ICC Dispute Board Rules (2015); čl. 3(4) CIArb Dispute Board Rules.
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REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
šenjem sadržanim u njoj, ili ne,20 osim ako i dok ne bude izmenjena od strane sa-
mih stranaka, arbitraže ili suda.21
Ključna pitanja koja se nužno nameću pri pomenu odluke su kako tumači-
ti njenu obaveznost, kako se ona izvršava i da li je ona konačna. U pogledu obave-
znosti, relevantna pravila koja uređuju odbore su jasna i izričita - odluka obave-
zuje stranke i one su dužne da je izvrše bez odlaganja. Ovo nije sporno ukoliko su
stranke saglasne sa sadržinom odluke. U toj situaciji odluka za njih ostaje obave-
zujuća, ali što je jako važno, postaje i konačna, što znači da bi stranke trebalo od-
mah da je izvrše.22 Pravilima o odborima je uglavnom predviđeno da od momen-
ta kada odluka postane konačna, stranke nemaju prava da je osporavaju, osim
ako merodavno pravo za ugovor to zabranjuje. Međutim, ako jedna od stranaka
ne izvrši odluku (iako je prihvatila) ili se u roku predviđenom pravilima23 izričito
izjasni da ne prihvata odluku, druga strana, u cilju rešenja spora, može pokrenuti
postupak pred arbitražom ili pred nadležnim sudom.24 Iz ovoga sledi da DAB od-
luka obavezuje stranke samo do pokretanja arbitražnog ili sudskog postupka. Me-
đutim, to nije jedini trenutak dokle odluka obavezuje stranke. Naime, one mogu
odluku odbora da iskoriste kao osnov za neposredno pregovaranje o konačnom
rešenju datog spora što znači da odluku odbora mogu da izmene i to sporazu-
mom u vidu poravnanja tako da ih odluka odbora od momenta njegovog zaklju-
čenja više ne obavezuje.25 Takođe, odluka odbora obavezuje stranke samo ako je
odbor donese u jasno određenom roku koji je propisan procesnim pravilima koja
se u datom slučaju primenjuju.26 Ovo dalje ukazuje da DAB odluka nije automat-
20 V. čl. 5(2) ICC DB Rules; čl. 4(3) CIArb Dispute Board Rules.
21 V. čl. 5(4) ICC DB Rules; V. čl. 4(3) CIArb Dispute Board Rules; čl. 20(4) FIDIC Red
Book.
22 V. čl. 5(3) ICC DB Rules; prema čl. 20.4. Opštih uslova FIDIC građevinskih ugovora, ’ako
je DAB doneo odluku o sporu na čiji sadržaj stranke nisu u roku od 28 dana od dana prijema od-
luke istakle svoje nezadovoljstvo, onda odluka postaje konačna i obavezujuća za stranke’.
23 Taj rok može biti 30 dana (čl. 5(5) ICC DB Rules; 21 dan (čl. 3(4) CIArb Dispute Board
Rules).
24 V. čl. 5(4) ICC DB Rules; čl. 4(5) CIArb Dispute Board Rules (2014). Čl. 20.6. Opštih uslo-
va FIDIC građevinskih ugovora sadrži arbitražnu klauzulu budući da izričito predviđa da ’osim ako
stranke nisu mirnim putem rešile spor, svaki spor o kome je DAB doneo odluku koja nije postala
konačna, biće konačno rešen od strane arbitraže’.
Gerald McEniry, “It’s Time for More DRBs in Canada”, The Revay Report, Vol. 29. No. 2.
25
June 2010, 4.
26
Pod uslovom da se stranke i odbor nisu sporazumeli da se rok za donošenje odluke
produži, on je prema čl. 22(1) ICC DB Rules 90 dana od dana kada je zahtev za rešenje spora odbor
primio ili 84 dana koliko propisuje čl. 15(2) CIArb Dispute Board Rules.
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M. Petrović: Odbor za razmatranje/rešavanje sporova: još jedna alternativa ...
ski konačna, već da može, ali ne mora biti konačna. Razlog je u činjenici da po-
stupak koji sprovodi odbor nije adjudikativan pa i odluka nema efekat pravosnaž-
nosti i izvršnosti koje imaju sudske i arbitražne odluke, a posledica je da se ona ne
može prinudno izvršiti. Odluka odbora ima dakle, samo materijalnopravno dej-
stvo i njeno izvršenje zavisi isključivo i samo od volje stranaka.
Kombinovani ili hibridni odbori (Combined Dispute Boards – CDBs) su tvo-
revina ICC budući da su njenim Pravilima (ICC Dispute Board Rules) uvedeni u
ADR metode. Prema ovom pristupu, u jednom neformalnom postupku CDB po-
maže strankama da izbegnu nesporazume, ali isto tako, na njihov zahtev, pomaže
im da nesporazum reše tako što donosi mišljenje o spornom pitanju, a može do-
neti i preporuku, kao i odluku.27 Ukoliko jedna ugovorna strana zahteva od odbo-
ra da donese odluku o datom sporu, odbor će je doneti ako se druga strana tome
ne protivi. U suprotnom, odbor treba da razmotri i odluči da li će doneti pre-
poruku ili odluku s obzirom da imaju različita dejstva. U tom procesu, između
ostalog, odbor uzima u obzir: da li bi odluka zbog urgentnosti slučaja, ili drugog
razloga, omogućila izvršenje ugovora ili sprečila gubitak ili štetu koju bi stranke
pretrpele; da li bi sprečila raskid ugovora ili, da li je odluka neophodna kao do-
kaz.28 U svakom slučaju, ova vrsta odbora predstavlja miks postupaka za koji bi se
na prvi pogled moglo reći da na neki način predstavlja trapav pristup u pokušaju
da se kompletiraju benefiti DRB i DAB postupaka. Međutim, čak i da je tako, po-
stupak koji sprovodi CDB se može pokazati kao koristan za one stranke koje nisu
sigurne ili nisu odlučile da li im je potreban DRB ili DAB.
Postupci koje sprovode svi navedeni tipovi odbora ukazuju na to da se ovaj
ADR metod koristi uobičajeno kao inicijalni ili srednji korak u sveukupnom me-
hanizmu rešavanja sporova, ali da može biti i završni korak ukoliko stranke pri-
hvate odluku odbora i izvrše je. Ako odbor ne uspe da reši spor predmet se uo-
bičajeno prosleđuje arbitraži,29 a ako ona nije ugovorena, stranke mogu zaštitu
prava tražiti u redovnoj sudskoj proceduri.
Ono što između ostalog, povezuje rad svih odbora jeste činjenica da se nji-
hove preporuke i odluke generalno mogu koristiti u kasnijem arbitražnom ili
sudskom postupku.30 Ta činjenica može da ohrabri nezadovoljnu stranu da pri-
hvati odluke odbora bez obzira što su one neobavezujuće ili nisu konačne.31 Ovo
27 V. čl. 6(1) ICC DB Rules.
28 V. čl. 6(3) ICC DB Rules.
29 U svojim brojnim ugovorima FIDIC na primer, predviđa nadležnost ICC arbitraže kada
stranke nisu voljne da prihvate odluku odbora.
30 V. čl. 27. ICC DB Rules; čl. 3(6) i čl. 4(6) CIArb Dispute Board Rules.
31 C. S. Dorgan, op. cit., 145.
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REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
tim pre što preporuke i odluke odbora u ovim postupcima mogu imati ogroman
uticaj na arbitre ili sud koji će ih verovatno prihvatiti, s obzirom da dolaze od ek-
sperata za tu vrstu pitanja i s obzirom da su te eksperte same stranke izabrale.
Između neobavezujućih preporuka i obavezujućih odluka razlike očigled-
no postoje. Međutim, one nisu od velikog značaja u praksi s obzirom da ih stran-
ke u velikoj meri prihvataju. Naime, nepristrasnost i nezavisnost članova odbora,
kombinovana sa njihovim znanjem i iskustvom, daju njihovim odlukama razu-
mljivo ubedljivu snagu. Na to ukazuju podaci DRBF prema kojima je u periodu
između 1985-2005. godine broj projekata u kojima su angažovani odbori stalno
rastao da bi samo u 2005. godini on iznosio preko 1300 projekata čija je ukupna
vrednost bila preko 100 milijardi dolara. Stopa uspešnosti odbora iznosila je 98%
što predstavlja postotak sporova koji su okončani bez obraćanja stranaka arbitra-
ži ili sudu radi rešenja spora.32
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M. Petrović: Odbor za razmatranje/rešavanje sporova: još jedna alternativa ...
htev bilo koje strane (ali uz saglasnost druge strane) pored neformalne pomoći
donese i odluku o spornoj stvaru.33 Ukoliko svi napori da se nesporazum izbegne
ostanu bezuspešni i on preraste u spor, svaka strana ga uz formalni zahtev može
uputiti odboru koji onda u jednoj formalnijoj proceduri donosi preporuku ili
odluku (zavisno da li je u pitanju DRB ili DAB). Strana koja inicira ovaj postupak
je dužna da podnese pisanu izjavu o spornoj stvari sa dokazima koji je potkre-
pljuju i to kako odboru, tako i drugoj strani. Vodeći računa o tome da se izbegnu
nepotrebno odugovlačenje postupka, kao i troškovi, odbor treba da izabere onu
proceduru koja odgovara vrednosti, prirodi i složenosti spora.34 Uglavnom se za-
kazuje ročište na ili blizu gradilišta i održava se relativno neformalno. Svedoci,
eksperti i drugi resursi koji odboru mogu da pruže informacije koje su od pomoći
za donošenje odluke, mogu takođe prisustvovati ročištu. U roku koji je predviđen
procesnim pravilima odbor je dužan da donese obrazloženu preporuku, odnosno
odluku, zavisno od toga da li je u pitanju DRB ili DAB.
Budući da se suočavaju sa ozbiljnim i složenim zadacima, od članova odbo-
ra se zahteva da poseduju određene kvalifikacije ukoliko žele da ih stranke ime-
nuju za ovu vrstu posla. Tako, oni moraju posedovati neophodna stručna znan-
ja iz oblasti za koju se ugovor i eventualni spor vezuju, moraju imati znanja iz
ugovornog prava, s obzirom da će morati tumačiti ugovor i dokumenta koja ga
prate i moraće pratiti njegovo izvršenje, ali isto tako, moraju posedovati određene
veštine koje će im omogućiti da kroz jedan proaktivni odnos pomognu stranka-
ma da se suoče sa problemom, da pokušaju da ga reše pre nego što on eskali-
ra u spor, a ukoliko on nastane, da su kvalifikovani za njegovo rešavanje.35 Uz to,
članovi odbora moraju imati određeno iskustvo u svim navedenim oblastima36
i što je imperativ svih ADR metoda, moraju biti nepristrasni i nezavisni kako u
odnosu na stranke, tako i u odnosu na predmet spora i celokupni projekat. Na-
dalje, oni moraju biti dostupni za vreme trajanja projekta i sposobni da se od-
mah suoče sa svakim problemom ili nesporazumom kako ne bi prerastao u spor.
Takođe, članovi odbora moraju dobro govoriti jezik na kome se obavlja komuni-
kacija kako i na tom polju ne bi nastali nesporazumi. Imajući u vidu da je za ve-
33 V. čl. 16. ICC DB Rules.
34 V. čl. 14(4) CIArb Dispute Board Rules.
35 V. čl. 7(1) CIArb Dispute Board Rules.
36 Lica koja ispunjavaju uslove i mogu biti izabrana za rad u DRB/DAB se uglavnom nalaze
na listama koje preporučuju institucije koje se bave ovim poslovima (na primer DRBF, FIDIC itd.)
Srbija ima svoju nacionalnu PRO listu stručnjaka (eksperti tehničkih disciplina, advokati, adjudika-
tori) koju je objavilo Udruženje ACES koje kao stalna članica FIDIC koja zastupa interese FIDIC u
Republici Srbiji.
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REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
ZAKLJUČAK
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M. Petrović: Odbor za razmatranje/rešavanje sporova: još jedna alternativa ...
Summary
Dispute board is a relatively new, internationally recognised ADR method, a regular feature
of international construction and infrastructure contracts. It is composed of three independent and
impartial persons selected by the contracting parties. It’s basic function is not only to resolve dis-
putes among the parties, but also, if at all possible, to prevent them from happening. So, the board
members help the parties avoid or overcome any disagreements or disputes that arise during the
implementation of the contract. They also serve to ensure that, where differences between parties
escalate into disputes, issues are resolved equitably and as expeditiously and cost-effectively as pos-
sible, so that relationships are enhanced (rather than harmed) for the future. The DBprocess is de-
signed to be fast, cheap and well suited for construction disputes. The parties carefully pick their
own panel based on integrity, knowledge of the work, and experience in dispute settlement. Dispute
boards are certainly not new but experience over the last twenty years has proven them to be high-
ly successful, relatively inexpensive and the only proactive form of ADR which promotes the avoid-
ance of disputes.
Key words: dispute board, dispute, recommendation, decision
Literatura
Chern C., Chern on Dispute Boards, 3th edition, Informal Law, New York, 2015.
Dorgan S. C., “The ICC’s New Dispute Board Rules”, The Intern. Construction Law Re-
view, 2005.
Goodrich M., Dispute Adjudication Boards: Are they the future of dispute resolution?, do-
stupno na: https://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/dispute-adjudication-boar-
ds-are-they-future-dispute-resolution.
Gould N., Enforcing a Dispute Board’s Decisions: Issues and Considerations, dostupno na:
www.fenwickelliott.co.uk.
Gould N., Lockwood C., (Introduction) Dispute Board Rules Chartered Institute of Arbitra-
tors (Introduction), Practice and Standard Committee, August 2014, Chartered Insti-
tute of Arbitrators, dostupno na: https://www.fenwickelliott.com/sites/default/files/dbr.
pdf
Hunt R., Dispute Resolution Boards, dostupno na: www.roberthuntbarrister.com/Dispute.
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McEniry G., “It’s Time for More DRBs in Canada”, The Revay Report, Vol. 29. No. 2. June
2010.
Rayment S., The use of Dispute Boards for International Disputes, February 19, 2018, do-
stupno na: www.systech-int.com/use-dispute-boards-international-disputes/.
Rudić-Dimić Lj., FIDIC ugovori kao najviši standardi u građevinarstvu, dostupno na:
https://www.legeartis.rs/fidic-ugovori-kao-najviši-standardi-u-građevinarstvu/.
Volker M., “Why International Dispute Settlement Institutions Should Offer Ad Hoc Dis-
pute Board Rules”, ICLR, 2006.
114
TREĆA SEKCIJA
PRAVO EU
UDK 347(4-672EU)
DOI: 10.5937/RKSPP2002117J
TATJANA JOSIPOVIĆ
Prof. dr. sc. Tatjana Josipović, redovna profesorica na Pravnom fakultetu Sveučilišta u Zagrebu,
e-mail: tatjana.josipovic@pravo.hr.
117
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
UVOD
118
T. Josipović: Zaštita temeljnih prava u privatnom pravu Europske unije
nih odnosa. Koncept zaštite temeljnih prava u pravu Unije značajno utječe i na
uređenje određenih privatnopravnih odnosa, a posebno na ostvarivanje privat-
ne autonomije i slobode ugovaranja u privatnopravnim odnosima.7 Tradicionalni
koncept privatne autonomije i slobode ugovaranja razvijen u nacionalnim privat-
nopravnim porecima prilagođen je u privatnom pravu Unije naglašenim zahtje-
vima u pravu Unije za efikasnom zaštitom temeljnih prava u privatnopravnim
odnosima. U nekim se slučajevima u pravu Unije zbog zaštite temeljnih prava
privatna autonomija i sloboda ugovaranja ostvaruju u ograničenom opsegu kako
bi se osiguralo ostvarivanje socijalnih prava (čl. 3/3/reč.2. UEU), razvoj socijal-
nog tržišnog gospodarstva (čl. 3/2/rel.1. UEU), socijalna pravda u privatnoprav-
nim odnosima. U nekim slučajevima se uređuju posebni pravni instrumenti za
zaštitu pojedinaca čija su temeljna prava povrijeđena u određenim privatnoprav-
nim odnosima. Glavni razlog za takav pristup uređenju i zaštiti temeljnih pra-
va u privatnopravnim odnosima jeste važnost zaštite temeljnih prava za ostva-
rivanje ciljeva Unije. Zaštita temeljnih prava u kontekstu uspostave unutarnjeg
tržišta predstavlja ustavnopravni okvir za uspostavu i funkcioniranje unutarnjeg
tržišta.8 S obzirom na to da je uređenje unutarnjeg tržišta u pravu Unije determi-
nirano i različitim javnim interesima Unije, a ne samo privatnopravnim intere-
sima sudionika na unutarnjem tržištu, europski standardi zaštite temeljnih pra-
va svojevrsni su korektiv za uređenje pravnih odnosa na unutarnjem tržištu. U
tom smislu zaštita temeljenih prava u pravu Unije determinira i uređenje poje-
dinih privatnopravnih odnosa kako sekundarnim pravnim aktima Unije9 tako
i u nacionalnom privatnom pravu. Sekundarni akti Unije koji uređuju pojedine
privatnopravne odnose moraju biti u skladu sa zahtjevima zaštite temeljnih pra-
va Unije.10 Sekundarni akti Unije moraju se tumačiti sukladno primarnom pravu
7 V. Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, “Introduction”, Constitutionalization of European Private
handbook on EU Law and Human Rights, (ur. Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Nicholas Hatzis), Chelten-
ham, 2017, 365.
9 Npr. na području radnog prava, prava zaštite osobnih podataka, antidiskriminacijskog
ne odnose sudska kontrola u pogledu usklađenosti sa zahtjevima zaštite temeljnih prava moguća
je temeljem više odredbi UFEU. Npr. čl. 263. UFEU propisuje da Sud EU ispituje zakonitost akata
Unije, a u okviru toga i usklađenost s temeljnim pravima. Temeljem čl. 263. UEU moguće je ospo-
ravati valjanost akta Unije zbog toga što nadležne institucije i tijela Unije prilikom njihovog dono-
šenja ili provedbe nisu uvažavala temeljna prava Unije npr. uređenjem neosnovanog i/ili nepropor-
cionalnog ograničenja temeljnog prava. Povreda temeljnog prava iz općeg načela prava Unije ili iz
odredbe Povelje u smislu čl. 263/2 UFEU smatra se, naime, povredom pravnog pravila koji se odno-
119
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
si na primjenu Ugovora. Čl. 267/1/b UFEU propisuje nadležnost Suda da odlučuje o prethodnim pi-
tanjima koja se tiču valjanosti i tumačenja akata Unije. Temeljem čl. 267/1/b UFEU moguće je u po-
stupku povodom prethodnog pitanja postaviti pitanje valjanosti akta Unije zbog povrede temeljnog
prava priznatog pravom Unije.
11 V. Koen Lenaerts, José Gutiérrez-Fons, “To say what the law on the EU: methods of inter-
pretation and the European Court of Justice”, The Columbia Journal of European Law, No. 2, Vol. 20,
2014, 20; Bernhard Wegener, “Kom.Art. 19. EUV”, EUV/AEUV, Kommentar, (ur. Christian Calliess,
Matthias Ruffert), München, 2016, 313–314; Stefan Leible, Ronny Domröse, “Interpretation in con-
formity with primary law”, European Legal Methodology, (ur. Karl Riesenhuber), Cambridge, 2017,
176; Thomas Oppermann, Claus Dieter Classen, Martin Nettesheim, Europarecht, München, 2014,
142; Robert Schütze, “Direct effects and indirect effects of Union law”, Oxford Principles of European
Union Law, (ur: R. Schütze, Takis Tridimas), Vol. 1, Oxford, 2018, 292–293; Jörg Gundel, “Kom. Art.
288 AEUV”, Frankfurter Kommentar EUV•GRC•AEUV, (ur: Matthias Pechstein, Carsten Nowak,
Ulrich Häde), Band, IV, Tübingen, 2017, 869.
12 V. H.W. Micklitz, op. cit., 21.
13 V. S. Leible, R. Domröse, op. cit., 194. Takva obveza za nacionalne sudove proizlazi iz čl.
4/3 UEU o načelu lojalne suradnje kojim je propisano da države članice poduzimaju sve odgovara-
juće mjere kako bi osigurale ispunjavanje obveza koje za njih proizlaze iz Ugovora ili akata institu-
cija Unije. Obveza tumačenja nacionalnog prava sukladno temeljnim pravima Unije vrijedi za na-
cionalnih mjere kojima je provedeno usklađivanje s pravom Unije (npr. nacionalni propis kojim
je transponirana direktiva), ali i za druge nacionalne propise koji se primjenjuju na privatnoprav-
ne odnose koji spadaju u područje primjene prava Unije. V. Takis Tridimas, The General Princi-
ples of EU Law, Oxford, 2006, 29; Koen Lenaerts, José Gutiérrez-Fons, The constitutional allocati-
on of powers and general principles of EU Law, CMLR, 2010, 1636, 1638; Anthony Arnull, “What is
a General Principle of EU Law?”, Prohibition of abuse of law, (ur. Rita de la Féria, Stefan Vogenauer),
Oxford, 2011, 12.
14 V. K. Lenaerts, J.A. Gutiérrez-Fons, op. cit., 1663; T. Tridimas, op. cit., 339,341.
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ni imaju odredbe primarnog prava Unije. S druge strane, zaštita temeljnih pra-
va provodi se i na temelju brojnih sekundarnih akata Unije (direktiva i uredbi).
Nadležna tijela Unije donijela su čitav niz direktiva radi suzbijanja diskriminacije
usklađivanjem pravnih poredaka država članica ili radi zaštite određenih temelj-
nih prava u različitim pravnim područjima. O zaštiti temeljnih prava mora se, ta-
kođer, voditi računa i prilikom donošenja svih drugih sekundarnih pravnih akata
Unije kojima se uređuju privatnopravni odnosi.18 Naposljetku, na obvezu efika-
sne zaštite temeljnih prava u privatnopravnim odnosima ukazuje i praksa Suda
Europske unije. Iz prakse Suda EU proizlaze važna pravila o načinu i opsegu za-
štite temeljnih prava u privatnopravnim odnosima, posebno u slučajevima kad
države članice nisu pravilno ili pravovremeno transponirale direktive kojima se,
između ostalog, osigurava i zaštita temeljnih prava u privatnopravnim odnosima.
U takvim slučajevima Sud EU priznaje odredbama Povelje ili općim načelima o
temeljnim pravima tzv. horizontalne izravne učinke na koje se mogu pozvati po-
jedinci prilikom zaštite svojih subjektivnih prava u privatnopravnim odnosima.
U tekstu se razmatraju i komentiraju instrumenti zaštite temeljnih prava
Unije u privatnopravnim odnosima koji spadaju u područje primjene prava Uni-
je. Posebna se pozornost posvećuje utjecaju zaštite temeljnih prava Unije na pri-
vatnu autonomiju i slobodu ugovaranja u privatnopravnim odnosima ovisno o
tome da li se temeljna prava štite temeljem nacionalnog prava usklađenog s pra-
vom Unije ili temeljem izravnih učinaka Povelje ili općih načela. Cilj je analize
utvrditi kojom se metodom u privatnopravnim odnosima može uspostaviti op-
timalna ravnoteža između zaštite temeljnih prava Unije i načela privatne autono-
mije i slobode ugovaranja uređenog nacionalnim pravom država članica.
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124
T. Josipović: Zaštita temeljnih prava u privatnom pravu Europske unije
jedi i za privatne poslodavce odnosno privatne osobe koje se bave pružanjem ta-
kvih usluga odnosno prodajom robe. Za te je osobe, u području primjene zabrane
diskriminacije, ograničena sloboda ugovaranja. Za njih vrijedi obveza uvažavanja
subjektivnog prava drugih pojedinaca na nediskriminatorno postupanje prilikom
sklapanja ugovora u privatnopravnim odnosima na koje se odnose te direktive ili
uredbe. Drugim riječima, u području primjene zabrane diskriminacije uređenog
pojedinim sekundarnim aktom Unije ne bi bilo dopušteno odbiti sklapanje ugo-
vora isključivo zbog spola, rasnog ili etničkog porijekla i dr. drugog pojedinca26
niti bi bila dopuštena bilo kakva izravna ili neizravna diskriminacija u ugovornim
odnosima, već bi postojala obveza sklapanja ugovora ako su za to ispunjene sve
druge pretpostavke određene zakonom. Takvo se ograničenje slobode ugovaranja
i privatne autonomije opravdava potrebom za efikasnim ostvarivanjem politika
Unije i funkcioniranjem unutarnje tržišta na kojem bi korisnicima usluga, zapo-
slenicima, potrošačima trebalo osigurati slobodu izbora i pristupa uslugama, robi
i zapošljavanju, 27 te odgovarajuća zaštita njihovih temeljnih prava.
Međutim, privatna autonomija i sloboda ugovaranja u svim su navedenim
slučajevima ograničene na način kojim se osigurava odgovarajuća ravnoteža iz-
među zaštite temeljnih prava i slobode ugovaranja u pravu Unije. Prije svega, ob-
veza nediskriminatornog postupanja nije obveza koja obvezuje sve pojedince u
svim privatnopravnim odnosima uređenim pravom Unije.28 Obveza nediskri-
mintaornog postupanja u privatnopravnim odnosima uređena je samo za odre-
đene privatnopravne odnose u kojima se smatralo da je potrebno izravno zašti-
ti temeljna prava pojedinaca zabranom diskriminatornog postupanja i u kojima je
sukladno primarnom pravu Unije bilo potrebno konkretizirati opću zabranu dis-
kriminacije.29 U tom je smislu zabrana diskriminacije uređena prvenstveno u pri-
vatnopravnim odnosima u kojima i inače postoji izraženija potreba za zaštitom
socijalnih prava i interesa pojedinaca kao što su zapošljavanje, stanovanje, pristup
univerzalnim uslugama i sl. No, niti u tim područjima zabrana diskriminacije u
privatnopravnim odnosima nije apsolutna. U sekundarnim pravnim aktima koji
26 V. S. Leible, op. cit., 29.
27 V. Nobert Reich, “The Impact of the Non-Discrimination Principle on Private Auto-
nomy”, The Involvement of EU Law in Private Law Relationships, (ur. Dorota Leczykiewicz, S. We-
atherill), Oxford, 2013, 269–270.
28 V. npr. presudu od 15. listopada 2009., Audiolux SA, C-101/08, ECLI:EU:C:2009:626C101/08.
V. više Jürgen Basedow, “General Principles of European Private Law and Interest Analysis – Some
Reflections in the Light of Mangold and Audiolux”, European Review of Public Law, Vol. 3–4, 2016,
336–338.
29 V. N. Reich, op. cit., 74.
125
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karcima i ženama u pristupu i nabavi robe, odnosno pružanju usluga kojom je propisano da ta Di-
rektiva ne zabranjuje razlike u postupanju, ako se dostava robe i pružanje usluga isključivo ili pr-
venstveno osobama jednog spola opravdava zakonitim ciljem, a sredstva za postizanje tog cilja su
prikladna i potrebna. V. N. Reich, op. cit., 63.
31 V. Moritz Zoppel, Europäische Diskrimierungsverbote und Privatrecht, Tübingen, 2015,
169, 198; Nobert Reich, “Effective Private Law Remedies in Discimination Cases”, Non-Discrimina-
tion in European Private Law, (ur. R. Schulze), Tübingen, 2011, 59.
32 Naknada štete se ostvaruje temeljem odredbi mjerodavnog nacionalnog prava. Pritom
pravo Unije uređuje obvezu naknade potpune štete. V. npr. čl. 18. Direktive 2006/54/EZ o proved-
bi načela jednakih mogućnosti i jednakog postupanja prema muškarcima i ženama u pitanjima za-
pošljavanja i rada. V. K. Riesenhuber, op. cit., 103, 110; N. Reich, op. cit., 69. Kako bi se osigurala efi-
kasna zaštita od diskriminacije obveza odgovornosti za štetu zbog povrede zabrane diskriminacije,
kad je ta odgovornost uređena kao građanskopravna odgovornosti, trebala bi se urediti kao objek-
tivna odgovornost za štetu bez obzira na krivnju. Vi. u tom smislu presudu od 22. travnja 1997.,
Draehmpaehl, C-180/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:208, t. 21,22 ; V. M. Zoppel, op. cit., 153.
126
T. Josipović: Zaštita temeljnih prava u privatnom pravu Europske unije
postupanja prema muškarcima i ženama u pitanjima zapošljavanja i rada. V. K. Riesenhuber, op. cit.,
109; S. Leible, op. cit., 46; M. Zoppel, op. cit., 135.
34 V. npr. presudu od 10. travnja 1984., van Colson i Kamann, C-14/83, ECLI:EU:C:1984:153
u kojoj je Sud tumačio da u slučaju kad je država članica izabrala naknadu štete kao sankciju za po-
vredu zabrane diskriminacije temeljem spola, visina te štete mora biti primjerena pretrpljenoj šte-
ti tj. mora biti potpuna. Slijedom toga šteta ne može obuhvaćati samo troškove u vezi s prijavom na
radno mjesto, jer i sankcija u obliku naknade štete mora biti djelotvorna i mora imati odvraćujući
učinak.
35 V. npr. čl.5,6 Uredbe (EZ) br. 261/2004 o utvrđivanju općih pravila odštete i pomoći put-
nicima u slučaju uskraćenog ukrcaja i otkazivanja ili dužeg kašnjenja leta, Sl.l. L 46, 17.2.2004, s. 1–8
o pravima putnika prema zračnom prijevozniku u slučaju otkazivanja leta ili kašnjenja leta.
36 V. čl. 14. Direktive 2008/48/EZ o ugovorima o potrošačkim kreditima, Sl.l. L 133,
22.5.2008, s. 66–92.
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REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
ne učinke. Za slobodu kretanja robe v. npr. presudu od 5. veljače 1963., Van Gend en Loos
, C-26/62, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1; za slobodu kretanja radnika v. presudu od 14. srpnja 1976.,
Donà, C-13/76, ECLI:EU:C:1976:115; za poslovni nastan presudu od 21. lipnja 1974., Reyners,
C-2/74, ECLI:EU:C:1974:68; za usluge presudu od 3. prosinca 1974.,van Binsbergen, C-33/74,
ECLI:EU:C:1974:131; za promet kapitala presudu od 14. prosinca 1995., Sanz de Lera i dr, spojeni
predmeti C-163/94, C-165/94 i C-250/94, ECLI:EU:C:1995:451.
128
T. Josipović: Zaštita temeljnih prava u privatnom pravu Europske unije
129
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
2016, 21; Thorsten Kingreen, “Kom. Art. 51. GRCh”, EUV/AEUV, Kommentar, (ur. C. Calliess, M.
Ruffert), München, 2016, 2952; Tamara Ćapeta, Siniša Rodin, Osnove prava Europske unije, Zagreb,
2018, 17–18; A. Dashwood, M. Dougan, B.J. Rodger, D. Wyatt, op. cit., 254; Michael Dougan, “In
defence of Mangold?”, A constitutional order of states? (ur. Catherine Barnard, M. Dougan, Elea-
nor Spaventa), Oxford, 2011, 225; Eleanor Spaventa, “The Horizontal Application of Fundamental
Rights ad General Principles of Union law”, A constitutional order of states? (ur. C. Barnard, M. Do-
ugan, E. Spaventa), Oxford, 2011, 201,203; Christoph Busch, Hans Schulte-Nölke, EU Compendium
– Fundamental Rights and Private Law, München, 2011, 4; Jürgen Kühling, “Fundamental Rights”,
Principles of European Constitutional Law, (ur. Armin von Bogdandy, Jürgen Bast), München, 2011,
496; T. Oppermann, C.D. Classen, M. Nettesheim, op. cit., 117; Eckhard Pache, “Kom. Art. 6. UEU”,
Frankfurter Kommentar EUV•GRC•AEUV, (ur. M. Pechstein, C. Nowak, U. Häde), Band, I, Tübin-
gen, 2017, 284.
45 V. A. Arnull, op. cit., 13; A. Dashwood, M. Dougan, B.J. Rodger, D. Wyatt, op. cit., 254; P.
Craig, G. de Búrca: op. cit., 194.
46 U literaturi o tome imaju li odredbe Povelje horizontalne izravne učinke postoje različita
stajališta. S jedne se strane, naglašava da iz odredbe čl. 51/1 Povelje jasno proizlazi da Povelja obve-
zuje tijela i institucije Unije i država članica. V. T. Kingreen, op. cit., 2761; Dirk Ehlers, Europäische
130
T. Josipović: Zaštita temeljnih prava u privatnom pravu Europske unije
Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten, Berlin, 2009, 469–470; Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty, Law, Poli-
tics and Treaty Reform, Oxford, 2010, 207; E. Pache, “Kom. Art. 51. GRCh”, Frankfurter Kommen-
tar EUV•GRC•AEUV, (ur. M. Pechstein, C. Nowak, U. Häde), Band, I, Tübingen, 2017, 1678–1679.;
A. Hatje, “Kom. Art. 51. GRCh”, EU-Kommentar, (ur. J. Schwarze), Baden-Baden, 2019, 3537. S dru-
ge strane se, međutim, upozorava i na to da čl. 51. Povelje ne isključuje izričito izravne učinke u od-
nosu na privatnopravne subjekte odnosno da nije izričito isključeno da odredbe o temeljnim pra-
vima obvezuju i privatnopravne subjekte. V. E. Pache, op. cit., 1678; Sebastian Lohsse, R. Schulze,
“EU-Grundrechte im Privatrecht – Entwicklung, Interaktion und Perspektiven”, EU-Grundrechte
und Privatrecht, (ur. B. Heiderhoff, S. Lohsse, R. Schulze), Baden-Baden, 2016, 16–17; M. Zoppel,
op. cit., 109. Posebno se, pritom, naglašava važnost horizontalnih izravnih učinaka Povelje za osigu-
ranje socijalne pravde u privatnopravnim odnosima i zaštitu slabije ugovorne strane što je od važ-
nosti za određene ugovorne odnose (npr. ugovor o radu). V. Saša Sever, “Horizontal effect and the
Charter”, CYELP, Vol. 10, 2014, 41–42, 64; Eleni Frantziou, “The Horizontal Effect of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU: Rediscovering the Reasons for Horizontality”, European Law Jour-
nal, Vol. 21, 2015, 676.
47 V. E. Spaventa, op. cit., 202; C. Busch, H. Schulte-Nölke, op. cit., 5; T. Tridimas, op. cit., 47;
Filippo Fontanelli, “General Principles of the EU and a Glimpse of Solidarity in the Aftermath of
Mangold and Kücükdeveci”, European Law Journal, 2011, 233. V. npr. presuda od 24. ožujka 1994.,
Bostock, C-2/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:116 u kojoj je Sud tumačio da u kontekstu ugovornih obveza
proizašlih iz ugovora o zakupu farme opće načelo zaštite vlasništva, načelo zabrane diskriminacije i
načelo neosnovanog bogaćenja nemaju horizontalne izravne učinke.
48 V. npr. presudu od 6. studenoga 2018., Bauer, spojeni predmeti C-569/16 i C-570/16,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:871, t. 88; mišljenje nezavisnog odvjetnika Yvesa Bota od 29. svibnja 2018., spojeni
predmeti C-569 i C-570/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:337, t. 77.
49 V. E. Pache, op. cit. u fusnoti 46, 1679.
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T. Josipović: Zaštita temeljnih prava u privatnom pravu Europske unije
Povelje u vezi s temeljnim pravom na nediskriminatorno postupanje Sud je proširio koncept hori-
zontalnih izravnih učinaka koji je tumačio u pogledu načela o jednakim plaćama muškaraca i žena
za jednak rad ili za rad jednake vrijednosti (čl. 157. UFEU) kojeg je Sud prvi put tumačio u presudi
od 8. travnja 1976., Defrenne, C-43/75, ECLI:EU:C:1976:56���������������������������������������
C-43/75. V. i sudsku praksu Suda nave-
denu u Gert Brüggemeier, ”Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi, Giovanni Comandé”, Fundamental Rights and
Private law in the European Union, Vol. I, Cambrige, 2010, Annex A-Table of cases.
53 Na njihovu se važnost upozorava u brojnim odredbama primarnog prava Unije i na ko-
jem se temelji antidiskriminacijska politika Unije. V. npr. čl. 2. UEU, čl. 8., 18, 19, 157. UFEU, čl. 21,
23 Povelje.
54 V. npr. Direktivu 2000/43/EZ o provedbi načela jednakog postupanja prema osobama bez
obzira na njihovo rasno ili etničko podrijetlo; Direktivu 2000/78/EZ o uspostavi općeg okvira za
jednako postupanje pri zapošljavanju i obavljanju zanimanja; Direktivu 2006/54/EZ o provedbi na-
133
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čela jednakih mogućnosti i jednakog postupanja prema muškarcima i ženama u pitanjima zapošlja-
vanja i rad; Direktivu 2006/54/EZ o provedbi načela jednakih mogućnosti i jednakog postupanja
prema muškarcima i ženama u pitanjima zapošljavanja i rada; Direktivu 2010/41/EU o primjeni na-
čela jednakog postupanja prema muškarcima i ženama koji su samozaposleni
55 Tada dolazi do izražaja načelo nadređenosti (načelo prvenstva) prava Unije po kojem u
slučaju kolizije između odredbe prava Unije i odredbe nacionalnog prava, kad se radi o pravnom od-
nosu koji spada u područje primjene prava Unije, prednost u primjeni ima odredba prava Unije. V.
Elise Muir, “Of ages in – and edges of – EU law”, The Canadian Modern Language Review, 2011, 52.
56 Presuda od 22. studenog 2005, Mangold, C-144/04, ECLI:EU:C:2005:709.
134
T. Josipović: Zaštita temeljnih prava u privatnom pravu Europske unije
ju temeljem dobi koja nije u skladu s pravom Unije tj. s čl. 6. Direktive 2000/78/
EZ o razlozima kojima se može opravdati diskriminacija. Međutim, u predme-
tu Mangold, tužitelj se nije mogao pozvati na izravne učinke Direktive 2000/78/
EZ i to iz dva razloga. U vrijeme sklapanja ugovora o radu još uvijek nije bio iste-
kao rok za transponiranje Direktive, a izravni učinci odredbi direktive eventual-
no mogu nastupiti tek nakon što istekne rok za transponiranje. Drugi razlog bio
je još važniji. S obzirom na to da se radilo o privatnopravnom odnosu, odredbe
direktive nikad ne mogu imati horizontalne izravne učinke. Slijedom toga je Sud
tumačio da se u tom sporu radi zapravo o povredi načela zabrane diskriminaci-
je na temelju dobi koje se smatra općim načelom prava Unije. Provedba tog na-
čela samo se konkretizira u Direktivi 2000/78/EZ, jer to načelo proizlazi iz među-
narodnih ugovora i ustavnopravnih tradicija zajedničkih državama članicama i
zbog toga se smatra općim načelom prava Unije.57 Opće načelo o zabrani diskri-
minacije temeljem dobi isključuje primjenu odredbu nacionalnog prava kojom se
u pogledu uvjeta za sklapanje ugovora o radu na određeno vrijeme diskriminira-
ju zaposlenici stariji od 52 godine. Stoga je Sud EU naglasio da je nacionalni sud
dužan osigurati efikasnu primjenu općeg načela zabrane diskriminacije temeljem
dobi i to na način da ne primijeni odredbu nacionalnog prava koja je suprotna toj
zabrani diskriminacije. Tako je Sud EU u biti tumačio da se opće načelo koje ure-
đuje temeljno pravo na nediskriminatorno postupanje temeljem dobi primjenjuje
u privatnopravnom odnosu tj. na ugovor o radu sklopljen između privatnoprav-
nih subjekata odnosno da opće načelo zabrane diskriminacije ima horizontalne
izravne učinke. U konačnici je to značilo da se privatni poslodavac, kad sklapa
ugovore o radu s osobama starijim od 52 godine, ne može pozvati na posebne
odredbe nacionalnog zakonodavstva koje uređuju iznimke od pravila o sklapanju
ugovora o radu na određeno vrijeme.
Isti je stav Sud EU zauzeo i u predmetu C-555/07 Kücükdeveci58 u kojem se
također radilo o diskriminaciji temeljem dobi, ali prilikom otkaza ugovora o radu
sklopljenog između zaposlenika i privatnog poslodavca. Njemački Građanski za-
konik uređivao je različite otkazne rokove za ugovor o radu ovisno o tome koli-
ko je trajao ugovor o radu pri čemu je izričito bilo određeno da se u otkazni rok
ne uračunava vrijeme zaposlenja koje je proteklo do 25 godine života zaposleni-
ka. Tužiteljica je osporila valjanost otkaza ugovora o radu zbog toga što joj traja-
nje zaposlenja nisu bile uračunate i godine rada prije njezine 25 godine smatraju-
57 O kritici takvog stajališta Suda EU V. M. Dougan, op. cit., 221; F. Fontanelli, op. cit., 228;
Lüder Gerken, Volker Rieble, Günther H. Roth, Torsten Stein, R. Streinz, “Mangold” als ausbrechen-
der Rechtsakt, München, 2011, 21; J. Basedow, op. cit., 340.
58 Presuda od 19. siječnja 2010., Kücükdeveci, C-555/07, ECLI:EU:C:2010:21.
135
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njezine jasnoće i preciznosti nije moguće tumačiti na način sukladan Direktivi 2000/78/EZ.
60 Presuda od 19. travnja 2016., Dansk Industri (DI), C-441/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:278.
136
T. Josipović: Zaštita temeljnih prava u privatnom pravu Europske unije
137
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
138
T. Josipović: Zaštita temeljnih prava u privatnom pravu Europske unije
čl. 4/2 Direktive 2000/78/EZ o uspostavi općeg okvira za jednako postupanje pri
zapošljavanju i obavljanju zanimanja. Tom je odredbom Direktive bilo dopušte-
no državama članicama da zadrže nacionalne odredbe koje dopuštaju kod pro-
fesionalnih djelatnosti crkvama i drugim privatnim organizacijama, čiji se su-
stav vrijednosti temelji na vjeri, različito postupanje zbog vjere, ali samo ako vjera
predstavlja stvarni, legitimni i opravdani uvjet za obavljanje zanimanja. U tom se
predmetu vodio spor između osobe koja se prijavila na natječaj za posao i poslo-
davca koji je u uvjetima za natječaj izričito naveo kao uvjet za zaposlenje pripad-
nost evangeličkoj crkvi ili crkvi koja je članica zajednice kršćanskih crkava u Nje-
mačkoj te poistovjećivanje s đakonskim poslanjem. Na radno mjesto je izabrana
osoba koja se deklarirala kao kršćanin koji pripada regionalnoj evangeličkoj cr-
kvi u Berlinu. Tužiteljica, koja se prijavila na natječaj i deklarirala da ne pripada
niti jednoj vjeroispovijesti, smatrala je da je odbijanjem njezine prijave za zapo-
slenje diskriminirana na temelju vjere te je zahtijevala da joj se temeljem njemač-
kog Općeg zakona o jednakom postupanju isplati uzrokovana šteta, uključujući i
neimovinsku štetu. Tuženi poslodavac osporavao je tužbeni zahtjev smatrajući da
je različito postupanje na temelju vjere bilo opravdano te se pozivao na odredbe
njemačkog zakona kojim je bila transponirana Direktiva 2000/78/EZ. Sud EU je
prvo tumačio čl. 4/2 Direktive u vezi s čl. 47. Povelje o djelotvornom pravnom li-
jeku. Sud EU je smatrao da je tvrdnja crkve o postojanju legitimnog i opravdanog
uvjeta vjere za obavljanje zanimanja načelno dopuštena, ali da mora biti predmet
djelotvornog sudskog nadzora, te da mora biti u skladu s načelom proporcional-
nosti. Nadalje, Sud EU je tumačio da je zabrana diskriminacije na temelju vje-
re opće načelo prava Unije koje je utvrđeno u čl. 21. Povelje te da s obzirom na
svoj sadržaj ta odredba Povelje ima sve uvjete za izravne učinke. Isto je tako Sud
EU tumačio i da čl. 47. Povelje ispunjava pretpostavke za izravne učinke. Slijedom
toga je ako nacionalni sud u sporu između pojedinaca, kad ne može osigurati za-
štitu odgovarajućim tumačenjem nacionalnog prava, dužan osigurati pravnu za-
štitu pojedincu u slučaju diskriminacije temeljem vjeroispovjesti neprimjenjiva-
njem nacionalne odredbe protivne pravu Unije i to temeljem izravnih učinaka čl.
21. i 47. Povelje. To pravilo vrijedi i u sporovima između pojedinaca tj. u sporo-
vima u privatnopravnim odnosima. Ukratko, Sud EU je opet priznao horizontal-
ne izravne učinke temeljnom pravu iz čl. 21. Povelje (zabrana diskriminacije te-
meljem vjeroispovijesti) i temeljnom pravu iz čl. 47. Povelje (pravo na djelotvorni
pravni lijek) temeljem kojim za privatnog poslodavca nastaje obveza nediskrimi-
natornog postupanja temeljem vjeroispovijesti odnosno obveza obrazlaganja ra-
139
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
ćeg okvira za jednako postupanje i zapošljavanju i obavljanju zanimanja i čl. 21. Povelje o zabrani
diskriminacije na temelju vjere. Radilo se otkazu ugovora o radu liječniku, katoličke vjeroispovije-
sti, od stranke poslodavca – društva s ograničenom odgovornošću čiji se sustav vrijednosti temelji
na vjeri ili uvjerenju, a čiji se cilj ispuniti zadaće Caritasa, osobito upravljanjem bolničkom ustano-
vom. Razlog otkaza o ugovora o radu bila je okolnost da se zaposlenik, čiji je brak bio sklopljen ka-
toličkim obredom, razveo, a potom je s novom partnericom sklopio građanski brak, a prvi brak nije
bio crkveno poništen. Tužitelj je osporavao da razlog za otkaz nije valjan, jer je diskriminatoran te-
meljem vjere, dok je poslodavac otkaz opravdavao pozivom na odredbu njemačkog zakona kojim je
transponiran čl. 4/4 Direktive 2000/78/EZ o opravdanim razlozima za različito postupanje temeljem
vjere. Sud je, kao i u predmetu Egenberger, tumačio čl. 4/2 Direktive 2000/78/EZ na način da ra-
zlog za različito postupanje temeljem vjere mora biti stvaran, legitiman i opravdan s obzirom na su-
stav vrijednosti predmetne crkve, da mora biti proporcionalan te da mora biti osigurana djelotvorna
sudska kontrola odluke o različitom postupanju. Ako se nacionalna odredba ne može tumačiti su-
kladno čl. 4/2 Direktive 2000/78/EZ, nacionalni sud je u sporu koji se vodi između privatnopravnih
subjekata dužan izuzeti nacionalnu odredbu protivnu pravu Unije i pružiti zaštitu temeljem učinaka
koji proizlaze iz čl. 21. Povelje. Sud je, dakle, opet priznao horizontalne izravne učinke temeljenog
prava na nediskriminatorno postupanje temeljem vjeroispovijesti iz čl. 21. Povelje.
65 Presuda od 22. siječnja 2019., Cresco Investigation, C-193/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:43.
140
T. Josipović: Zaštita temeljnih prava u privatnom pravu Europske unije
Private Law”, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, Bd. 75, H. 2, 2011,
246; Gregor Thüsing, Sally Horler, “Case C-555/07, Seda Kücükdeveci”, The Canadian Modern Lan-
guage Review, 2010, 1170; V. K. Lenaerts, J.A. Gutiérrez-Fons, op. cit., 1669.
67 Iz te bi pretpostavke proizlazilo da u vrlo malo slučajeva postoji mogućnost da se proši-
re horizontalni izravni učinci temeljnih prava Unije i na druga područja. To bi, npr. eventualno bilo
moguće u području zaštite osobnih podataka jer čl. 16. UFEU slično kao i čl. 19. UFEU predstavlja
osnovu za donošenje mjera za zaštitu osobnih podataka, a čl. 16/1. UFEU izričito propisuje da svaka
osoba ima pravo na zaštitu svojih osobnih podataka. To je ujedno i jedno od temeljenih prava ure-
đenih Poveljom čl. 8. V. E. Muir, op. cit., 61. Takvo tumačenje potvrđuje okolnost da je 2016. godi-
ne donesena posebna Uredba (EU) 2016/679 o zaštiti pojedinaca u vezi s obradom osobnih poda-
taka i o slobodnom kretanju takvih podataka (Opća uredba o zaštiti podataka), Sl.l. L 119, 4.5.2016,
s. 1–88 kojom se, između ostalog, uređuje zaštita i u različitim privatnopravnim odnosima temeljnog
141
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
prava na zaštitu osobnih podataka. Tada temeljno pravo na zaštitu osobnih podataka ima horizontal-
ne izravne učinke temeljem izravno primjenjivih odredbi Uredbe.
68 V. u tom smislu presudu Presuda od 23. rujna 2008., Bartsch, C-427/06,
ECLI:EU:C:2008:517 u kojoj je Sud prethodno razmatrao da li postoji veza između diskriminator-
nog nacionalnog propisa i prava Unije, jer je to osnovna pretpostavka za razmatranje usklađenosti
nacionalnog propisa s pravom Unije, te eventualne opravdanosti i proporcionalnosti iznimki od za-
brane diskriminacije.
69 Slično i E. Muir, op. cit., 60.
70 Ako odredba Povelje ne ispunjava pretpostavke za izravne učinke, zaštita pojedinca može
se ostvariti samo pravnim sredstvima kojima se od države članice zahtijeva naknada štete zbog pro-
pust u usklađivanju nacionalnog prava s pravom Unije. V. presudu od 15. siječnja 2014., Association
de médiation sociale, C‑176/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2, t. 50.
142
T. Josipović: Zaštita temeljnih prava u privatnom pravu Europske unije
143
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
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T. Josipović: Zaštita temeljnih prava u privatnom pravu Europske unije
ZAKLJUČAK
145
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
der Grundrechte für das europäische und nationale Privatrecht”, Zeitschrift für europäisches Priva-
trecht, No. 2, 2014, 255, 277–278.
73 ČL. 51. Povelje obvezuje tijela i institucije Unije i država članica da u području primjene
Ugovora (čl. 4/3 UEU) obuhvaća i obvezu da se u svim nacionalnim mjerama koje spadaju u pod-
ručje primjene prava Unije poštuju temeljne vrijednosti na kojima se temelji Unija (čl. 2 UEU) uk-
ljučujući i temeljna prava.
146
T. Josipović: Zaštita temeljnih prava u privatnom pravu Europske unije
prava sukladno primarnom pravu Unije (čl. 4/3. UEU) na odgovarajući način vrijede i za tumače-
nje Povelje. To bi značilo da su nacionalni sudovi obvezni i u sporovima između privatnopravnih
subjekata za koje je mjerodavno pravo Unije privatnopravne odredbe nacionalnog prava tumači-
ti na način sukladan odredbama Povelje kako bi se u spornom privatnopravnom odnosu uvažava-
la i temeljna prava stranaka. Ta će obveza postojati za one norme privatnog prva koje su mjerodav-
ne za rješavanje privatnopravnog spora koji spada u područje primjene prava Unije.V. H.D. Jarass,
op. cit., Kom. Art. 51. Rn. 34.; Christoph Busch, “Europäischer Grundrechtsschutz im Privatrecht
nach Lisabon: Die EU-Grundrechtcharta als neuer Prüfunsmassstab für Umsetzugsgesetze”, Deutsc-
he Richterzeitung, No. 2, 2010, 65.
77 V. C. Herrestahl, op. cit., 270–272; S. Lohsse, R. Schulze, op. cit., 25–26.
V. H.D. Jarass, op. cit., Kom. Art. 51. Rn. 5.; C. Calliess, “Kom. Art. 1 GRCh”, EUV/AEUV,
78
Kommentar, (ur. C. Calliess, M. Ruffert), München, 2016, 2761; C. Herrestahl, op. cit., 247–249, 251.
79 V. H.D. Jarass, op. cit., Kom. Art. 51. Rn. 33–35.; S. Lohsse, R. Schulze, op. cit., 22–23.
147
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Summary
The paper considers and comments on the instruments of protection of the fundamental
rights of the Union in private law relationships that are in the scope of applicable EU law. Spe-
cial attention is paid to the influence of fundamental rights of the Union on private autonomy and
the freedom of contract in private law relationships depending on whether fundamental rights are
protected by national law harmonized with EU law, or by horizontal effects of the Charter of gen-
eral principles. The goal of the paper is to determine the method in private law relationships that
can attain the optimal balance between the protection of fundamental rights of the Union and the
principle of private autonomy and the freedom of contract regulated by national law of a member
state. The author favors the protection of fundamental rights in private law relationships by apply-
ing adequate measures that create indirect horizontal effects of the provisions of EU law on funda-
mental rights. These concern national measures that can also secure adequate protection of funda-
mental rights via interpretation and application of national law in line with EU law in private law
relationships.
Key words: fundamental rights, horizontal direct effect, indirect horizontal effects, prohibi-
tion of discrimination, EU private law
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ples of EU Law, CMLR, 2010.
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Perspektiven”, EU-Grundrechte und Privatrecht, (ur. B. Heiderhoff, S. Lohsse, R.
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Pechstein, C. Nowak, U. Häde), Band, I, Tübingen, 2017.
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Weatherill), Oxford, 2013.
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Ruffert M., “Kom. Art. 1. AEUV”, EUV/AEUV, Kommentar, (ur. C. Calliess, M. Ruffert),
München, 2016.
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tors, and Factors of Influence”, Varieties of European Economic Law and Regulation,
Heidelberg, (ur. Kai Prunhagen, Peter Rott), 2014.
Sever S., “Horizontal effect and the Charter”, CYELP, Vol. 10, 2014.
Spaventa E., “The Horizontal Application of Fundamental Rights ad General Principles of
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Tizzano A., “The Role of the ECJ in the Protection of Fundamental Rights”, Continuity
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Tridimas T., The General Principles of EU Law, Oxford, 2006.
Weatherill S., “The internal market and EU Fundamental rights”, Research handbook on
EU Law and Human Rights, (ur. Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Nicholas Hatzis), Chelten-
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Zoppel M., Europäische Diskrimierungsverbote und Privatrecht, Tübingen, 2015.
153
UDK 340.137
DOI: 10.5937/RKSPP2002155B
Jedna od osnovnih vrednosti svakog pravnog poretka je pravna sigurnost, čija konso-
lidacija u zakonicima predstavlja njen najviši izraz. Ovu vrednost je, međutim, u današnje
vreme u velikoj meri, ali nenamerno, dovela u pitanje Evropska unija, posebno putem niza
mehanizama čiji je cilj da obezbede standardizaciju prava u Državama članicama. Princip
nadređenosti evropskih propisa nacionalnim propisima, princip neprimene nacionalnih pra-
va koja nisu kompatibilna s evropskim pravom (uključujući i pravo sadržano u direktivama
koje još uvek nisu sprovedene ili koje su pogrešno sprovedene), princip usklađene interpreta-
cije nacionalnog prava u odnosu na evropsko pravo, a posebno obavezujuća i obavezna sna-
ga presuda Suda pravde, čak i kada ove presude nude “originalnu” interpretaciju, koja nije
izričito predviđena u evropskom zakonodavstvu, predstavljaju konsolidovane principe koji
su se afirmisali i na nivou nacionalnih sudova. Sve ovo je dovelo do radikalne promene siste-
ma izvora prava i njihove hijerarhije u svim pravnim porecima Država članica, čija su žrtva
građanin i preduzetnik, a naročito pravnik i sudija koji moraju da se snalaze i neprekidno
tragaju za korektnim zakonom koji treba primeniti na konkretni slučaj.
Ključne reči: pravna sigurnost, Evropska unija, nadređenost, Sud pravde, neprimena
nacionalnog prava
Prof. dr Gian Antonio Benacchio, redovni profesor Pravnog fakulteta Univerziteta u Trentu,
Italija, e-mail: g.benacchio@unitn.it.
155
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
PREDGOVOR
liana, 2018, 5, 1216 i dalje; prvi broj časopisa Persona e Mercato iz 2018. godine u celini je posvećen
reformi Građanskog zakonika i sadrži priloge kao što su na primer: Giuseppe Vettori, “L’ordonnance
sulla riforma del contratto in Francia” (3–8), Emanuela Navarretta, “La causa e la rèforme du Code
civil francese” (31–37), Giulia Terlizzi, “Erosione e scomparsa della clausola dei “buoni costumi”
come limite all’autonomia contrattuale” (135–144); “La riforma del Code civil: una prospettiva ita-
lo-francese”, (ed. D. Valentino), Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli, 2018.
2 V. Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Schuldrechts, koji je stupio na snagu 1. januara 2002. go-
dine. Reinhard Zimmermann, “Il BGB e l’evoluzione del diritto civile”, Contratto e impresa : Europa,
2004, 625 i dalje, kao i ostali zanimljivi članci sadržani u istom broju časopisa.
156
Gian Antonio Benacchio: Evropsko pravo, nacionalno pravo i pravna (nes)sigurnost
mom v. i Paolo Grossi, “Codici: qualche conclusione tra un millennio e l’altro”, Codici. Una rifles-
sione di fine millennio, (ed. P. Cappellini, B. Sordi) zbornik studija sa seminara u Firenci, 26–28.
oktobar 2000, Giuffrè, Milano, 2001, 580 i dalje, Rodolfo Sacco, “Codificazione, ricodificazione, de-
codificazione”, Digesto, discipline privatistiche - Sez. Civ., Torino, 2010, aggiornamento, V, 319 i dalje.
4 New Civil Codes in Hungary and Romania, (ed. A. Menyhárd, E. Veress), Springer, Cham,
2017.
5
David Elischer, Ondrej Frinta, Monika Pauknerová, “Recodification of Private Law in the
Czech Republic”, The Scope and Structure of Civil Codes, (ed. J.C. Rivera), Springer, Dordrecht, 2013.
6 Denise Marino, Il nuovo codice civile rumeno fra tradizione e innovazione, EUT, Edizioni
Università Trieste, Trieste, 2020.
7 Salvatore Patti, “Ricodificazione”, Rivista di diritto civile, br. 2, 2018, 435 i dalje. Rečenica
navedena u tekstu sadrži napomene sa citatima Paolo Grossi, Mitologie giuridiche della modernità,
Giuffrè, Milano, 2007 i citatima Stefan Zweig, Il mondo di ieri, Garzanti, Milano, 2014.
157
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161
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162
Gian Antonio Benacchio: Evropsko pravo, nacionalno pravo i pravna (nes)sigurnost
odluku da čak i privatna firma, kao što je na primer firma koja upravlja autoputevima Brennero, ima
obavezu da direktno primeni Direktive 93/89 i 99/62 u ugovorima s klijentima i to u meri u kojoj je
država poverila ovom privatniku zadatak da naplati putarinu i u meri u kojoj Država direktno ili in-
direktno kontroliše ovog privatnika (Sud pravde, 5. februar 2004.g., C-157/2002).
163
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odredbe koja, u zavisnosti od toga šta je odabralo odgovorno lice, može biti u
skladu sa nacionalnim zakonom ali i suprotna evropskom pravu i obratno. Baš
zbog ovog kompleksnog preplitanja faktora koje treba uzeti u obzir, čini se da je
pravna sigurnost nužno oslabljena. Stoga bi bilo poželjno da pravna nauka i sam
zakonodavac pokušaju da reše bar neke od ovih konceptualnih problematičnih
čvorova koji proizlaze iz mogućnosti direktne primene nesprovedenih direktiva.
Ovo pitanje se, nadalje, tiče i krajnjih subjekata na koje ova pravila treba
primeniti tj. privatnih lica, firmi i drugih pravnih subjekata, koji ne moraju biti
upoznati sa propisima koji se primenjuju na njihove sporove, a ti propisi mogu
biti nacionalni propisi koji su na snazi ili propisi sadržani u direktivi koja je če-
sto nepoznata jer se ne sprovodi, a za koju nije sigurno da se može direktno pri-
meniti.
Od kada je potvrđen direktni učinak nesprovedenih direktiva, Sud u Luk-
semburgu uvek je bio čvrsto uveren da ovaj učinak ima efekta samo u vertikal-
nim odnosima (država-građanin), a ne i u horizontalnim (privatni subjekt-pri-
vatni subjekt), čak i po cenu nejednakog tretiranja građana, u zavisnosti od toga
da li su oni u pravnom odnosu sa državom ili drugim javnim organom ili s nekim
drugim privatnim licem.19 Sud je opravdao takav pristup, tvrdeći da bi proširiva-
nje direktnog učinka na horizontalne odnose značilo priznavanje prava Evropskoj
zajednici da koristi direktive kako bi definisala propise iz kojih bi odmah nastale
obaveze građana, dok “to pravo Evropskoj zajednici pripada samo kada joj je dode-
ljeno pravo da usvoji propise”.20
Još veći nivo nesigurnosti u vezi s utvrđivanjem propisa koji se mogu pri-
meniti, proizlazi iz presuda u kojima je Sud pravde, premda nije direktno po-
tvrdio princip vodoravnog učinka direktiva, predložio interpretacije nacional-
nog prava po kojima nesprovedene direktive Evropske zajednice imaju indirektni
učinak i u odnosima između privatnih lica. U tu svrhu tipični su prvi slučajevi
19 Sud je potpuno svestan da bi ovaj princip mogao dovesti do nejednakog tretiranja rad-
nika, u zavisnosti od toga da li imaju državni posao ili rade kod privatnika: dok bi u prvom slučaju
radnici mogli iskoristiti prilike koje nudi neprenesena direktiva, radnicima zaposlenim kod privat-
nika ne bi se ni na koji način mogla priznati prava koja proizlaze iz direktive. Ipak, sudije odgovara-
ju na ovaj prigovor, koji je izrazila sama britanska vlada, navodeći da se ta razlika u tretiranju rad-
nika “lako mogla izbeći da je dotična država članica pravilno prenela direktivu u svoje nacionalno
pravo” (presuda Marshall, cit.).
20 Sud pravde, 14. jul 1994.g., C-91/92, Faccini Dori v. Soc. Recreb.
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Gian Antonio Benacchio: Evropsko pravo, nacionalno pravo i pravna (nes)sigurnost
Sud pravde, 13. novembar 1990.g., C-106/89, Marleasing S.A. v. Comercial Internacional
21
de Alimentacion.
22 Sud pravde, 28. mart 1996.g., C‑129/94, Ruiz Bernáldez.
23 Sud pravde, 30. april 1998, C-215/97, Barbara Bellone v. Yokohama S.p.A. U istom smislu
pogledati i Sud pravde, 13. jul 2000.g., C-456/98, Centrosteel Srl c. Adipol GmbH.
24 Sud pravde, 27. jun 2000.g., sporova od C-240/98 do C-244/98, Océano Grupo Editorial i
165
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166
Gian Antonio Benacchio: Evropsko pravo, nacionalno pravo i pravna (nes)sigurnost
kone, a pre svega usaglašavaju nacionalne pravne propise, tako da imaju veći uči-
nak u odnosu na neku direktivu ili pravilnik, s obzirom da presuda, u formulisa-
nju ili ponavljanju pravila, izražava jedinu dozvoljenu interpretaciju koju zahteva i
od nacionalnih sudova.
Međutim, funkcionalnost evropskih presuda ističe granice ovog načina for-
mulisanja pravila. Specifikacija putem pravnih propisa instituta i pojmova koji se
odlikuju primenom propisa po slobodnom nahođenju svakako je korisna i vred-
na poštovanja, ali treba primetiti da postoji značajan nedostatak sistematičnosti i
pravne sigurnosti, koji je rezultat naglašene autonomije koju sudovi imaju po pi-
tanju procenjivanja.27
Sud pravde često koristi ovo osnovno sredstvo “pravne standardizacije”
tamo gde direktive, bilo zbog pravnih ili političkih razloga, bilo zbog nesposob-
nosti evropskog zakonodavca, nisu htele ili nisu znale na koji način da stignu. Na
taj način se potvrđuju propisi koji nisu izričito navedeni u direktivama za usklađi-
vanje zakonskih propisa.
Drugim rečima, zahvaljujući interpretaciji, Sud pravde formuliše propise
koji važe i za države i za privatna lica, a koji se direktno mogu primeniti, iako ih
nije usvojio nacionalni zakonodavac, pa su ovi propisi često u više ili manje oči-
glednom kontrastu s nacionalnim “izraženim” propisima. Pometnja koja se stvara
u nacionalnim pravnim porecima je evidentna, a s njom i nesigurnost koja nasta-
je i kod sudije i kod građana.
Neki primeri u području privatnog prava i u području javnog prava mogu
pomoći da se razume koliko su ozbiljne posledice ove neusklađenosti.
167
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169
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Gian Antonio Benacchio: Evropsko pravo, nacionalno pravo i pravna (nes)sigurnost
vanje, u čl. 13 direktive, na prava koja oštećena strana može da koristi na osnovu ugovorne ili vanu-
govorne odgovornosti, u smislu što ono “not preclude the application of other systems of contractual
or non-contractual liability based on other grounds, such as fault or a warranty in respect of latent de-
fects” (uporediti § 31).
39 “Article 13 of Directive 85/374 … must be interpreted as meaning that the rights conferred
under the legislation of a Member State on the victims of damage caused by a defective product under
a general system of liability having the same basis as that put in place by the Directive may be limited
or restricted as a result of the Directive’s transposition into the domestic law of that State” (uporediti iz-
reku presude Gonzales Sanchez, cit.).
40 Sud pravde, 10. januar 2006., Skov v. Bilka.
41 Uporediti § 33 Sud pravde, Skov v. Bilka, cit.
Sud pravde, 26. septembar 2019. godine, C-63/18, Vitali Spa v. Autostrade Spa. Na ovu
42
temu videti i Michele Cozzio, Edoardo Tozzo, “Subcontracting Limitation as Expressed by Italian
171
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
Legislation of Public Contracts Does Not Comply with European Law”, u European Procurement &
Public Private Partnership Law Review, 2020, 2, 174-178.
172
Gian Antonio Benacchio: Evropsko pravo, nacionalno pravo i pravna (nes)sigurnost
ZAKLJUČAK
Kratko navedeni primeri predstavljaju samo minimalni deo onoga što nude
postojeći slučajevi. Iz njih, međutim, proizlazi nesporna činjenica u odnosu izme-
đu prava Evropske unije i nacionalnog prava, odnosno sposobnost odluka Suda
pravde da standardizuje pravo država članica. Presude, koje su obavezujuće za
sve jurisdikcije svih država članica, ne samo da mnogo više standardizuju propise
nego što to čini zakonodavstvo Zajednice, koje se čak i direktno može primeni-
ti kao pravilnik EU, s obzirom da i ovaj pravilnik može biti predmet različitih tu-
mačenja i primena od strane nacionalnih organa vlasti, već su u stanju da odred-
be sadržane u direktivama odmah učine efikasnim i obavezujućim za privatna
lica, a ove direktive, po svojoj definiciji, ne bi trebale da obavežu građane, već
samo države.
Istovremeno, ovaj fenomen podstiče sve veću nesigurnost u utvrđivanju
propisa koji se konkretno mogu primeniti na sporove, posebno “horizontalnih
propisa”, odnosno propisa koji uređuju odnose između privatnih lica.
Kao što je istaknuto u uvodu, predmetna nesigurnost poprima sistemski
karakter. S tim u vezi, trebalo bi razmisliti o neskladu koji dovodi u međusob-
ni sukob neke principe evropskog prava, poput principa o procesnoj autonomi-
ji država članica, s intervencijama Suda pravde, koje su se često oslanjale na cilj
efektivne primene evropskog prava da bi formulisale (ili protumačile) nacionalna
prava koja se odnose na službeno utvrđivanje pitanja nevaljanosti ugovornih kla-
uzula, propisa itd. Ako se, u cilju postupnog usklađivanja i konsolidacije standar-
da za zaštitu Unije, intervencija Suda pravde može opravdati i ako je ona poželj-
173
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Gian Antonio Benacchio: Evropsko pravo, nacionalno pravo i pravna (nes)sigurnost
Summary
One of the fundamental values of any legal system is the principle of certainty of law, whose
highest expression is its encoding in the various bodies of law. However, today this value is strong-
ly, albeit inadvertently, called into question by the European Union – in particular, by a set of prin-
ciples, and related mechanisms, designed to ensure uniformity of law across the EU Member States.
These include the principle of primacy of EU law over the laws of its Member States, the principle
of the disapplication of national laws that are incompatible with EU law (including the provisions of
directives that have not yet been implemented, or that have implemented in a manner deemed in-
correct), the principle of interpretation of national law in conformity with EU law and, above all,
the conclusive and binding effect of the judgments of the EU Court of Justice even when they pro-
vide a ‘unique’ or unusual interpretation, not expressly provided for in EU law. These principles are
now well-established benchmarks in supreme and national courts as well, to the extent that there
has been a radical shift in the system and hierarchy of sources of law in each legal system of the EU
Member States, at the expense of citizens, businesspeople and legal practitioners, who all find it
hard to identify the exact rule to apply to specific cases.
Key words: certainity of law, European Union, primacy of EU law, Court of Justice, disappli-
cation of national law
175
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Literatura
176
Gian Antonio Benacchio: Evropsko pravo, nacionalno pravo i pravna (nes)sigurnost
Sandulli M.A., “Riflessioni sulla responsabilità civile degli organi giurisdizionali”, L’Europa
del diritto: i Giudici e gli ordinamenti, (ed. P.G. Portaluri), Università del Salento, Na-
poli, 2012.
Terlizzi G., “Erosione e scomparsa della clausola dei ’buoni costumi’ come limite
all’autonomia contrattuale”, Persona e Mercato, 2018.
Vettori G., “L’ordonnance sulla riforma del contratto in Francia”, Persona e Mercato, 2018.
Zimmermann R., “Il BGB e l’evoluzione del diritto civile”, Contratto e impresa: Europa,
2004.
Zweig S., Il mondo di ieri, Garzanti, Milano, 2014.
177
ČETVRTA SEKCIJA
SLAVKO ĐORĐEVIĆ
181
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
ugovora o razmeni nepokretnosti od kojih se jedna nalazi u Srbiji a druga u stranoj državi, s
obzirom da u ovom slučaju koliziona norma iz čl. 21 ZRSZ upućuje na dva merodavna pra-
va – kako na domaće tako i na strano pravo.
Ključne reči: javni beležnik, međunarodna nadležnost, strani lex rei sitae, javnobelež-
nička forma ugovora, utvrđivanje ekvivalentnosti formi
POSTAVLJANJE PROBLEMA
182
S. Đorđević: Postupanje javnog beležnika prilikom zaključenja ugovora ...
no fizičko ili pravno lice, javni beležnik mora da utvrdi postojanje uzajamnosti (reciprociteta) u po-
gledu sticanja svojine na nepokretnosti između Srbije i strane države čije državljanstvo ima fizičko
lice odnosno kojoj pripada pravno lice u pitanju, s obzirom da strana fizička i pravna lica mogu ste-
ći svojinu na nepokretnosti u Srbiji samo pod uslovom uzajamnosti (vidi čl. 82a i čl. 82v Zakona o
osnovama svojinskopravnih odnosa, Službeni list SFRJ, br. 6/80 i 36/90, Službeni list SRJ, br. 29/96 i
Službeni glasnik RS, br. 115/2005 – dr. Zakon). Javni beležnik može od ministarstva pravde zatražiti
objašnjenje o postojanju uzajamnosti, a isto mogu učiniti i same stranke (Čl. 82v st. 3 Zakona o os-
novama svojinskopravnih odnosa).
8 Prema čl. 1 st. 4 Zakona o poljoprivrednom zemljištu (Službeni glasnik RS, br. 62/2006,
65/2008 – dr. zakon, 41/2009, 112/2015, 80/2017 i 95/2018 – dr. zakon), strano fizičko ili pravno lice
ne može biti vlasnik poljoprivrednog zemljišta koje se nalazi u Republici Srbiji, osim ako je reč o
državljaninu države članice Evropske unije koji može, na osnovu pravnog posla, steći poljoprivred-
no zemljište u privatnoj svojini pod (veoma strogim) uslovima koji su predviđeni odredbama čl. 72đ
pomenutog zakona. Javni beležnik je dužan da vodi računa o ovim odredbama odnosno da o njima
pouči ugovornike i odbije zaključenje ugovora ako se u ulozi sticaoca poljoprivrednog zemljišta na-
lazi strano fizičko ili pravno lice odnosno ako se u ulozi sticaoca nalazi državljanin države članice
183
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
EU a, pri tom, nisu ispunjeni propisani uslovi za sticanje poljoprivrednog zemljišta u privatnom
vlasništvu.
9 O tumačenju i primeni ovih čl. 9 i 13 ZRSZ, v. M. Dika, G. Knežević, S. Stojanović, op.
cit., 41–42, 49–50; Slavko Đorđević, Zlatan Meškić, Međunarodno privatno pravo I, opšti deo, Prav-
ni fakultet Univerziteta u Kragujevcu, Kragujevac, 2016, 116–126; Maja Stanivuković, Mirko Živko-
vić, Međunarodno privatno pravo, opšti deo, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2010, 302 i dalje; Tibor Vara-
di, Bernadet Bordaš, Gašo Knežević, Vladimir Pavić, Međunarodno privatno pravo, Pravni fakultet
Univerziteta u Beogradu, Beograd, 2012, 114–115.
184
S. Đorđević: Postupanje javnog beležnika prilikom zaključenja ugovora ...
ležnosti domaćih sudova za stvarnopravne sporove u pogledu nepokretnosti koje se nalaze u ino-
stranstvu, v. Slavko Đorđević, “Isključiva nadležnost stranog suda i sprečavanje pozitivnog sukoba
međunarodne nadležnosti”, Pravni život, br. 12, Beograd, 2009, 686–688.
11 Ibidem.
12 Službeni glasnik RS, br. 93/2014, 121/2014 i 6/2015.
185
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186
S. Đorđević: Postupanje javnog beležnika prilikom zaključenja ugovora ...
nomerno rasporede među njima na teritoriji Republike Srbije.16 Pri tom, treba
pomenuti da čl. 26 st. 2 Zakona o parničnom postupku17 pruža mogućnost da se
pravila o mesnoj nadležnosti “uzdignu” na nivo pravila o međunarodnoj nadlež-
nosti, s tim što to važi samo za nadležnost sudova,18 pri čemu se ova mogućnost
ne može (prema stanovištu jednog dela domaće literature19 koje podržavamo)
primeniti na pravila o isključivoj mesnoj nadležnosti, s obzirom da čl. 47 ZRSZ
zahteva da isključiva međunarodna nadležnost domaćih sudova mora biti izriči-
to određena zakonom (tj. do nje se ne može doći posrednim putem, tj. primenom
pravila o isključivoj mesnoj nadležnosti sudova). Otuda, odredba čl. 26 st. 2 ZPP
se ne može primeniti na nadležnost javnih beležnika jer se njihova delatnost ja-
sno i nedvosmisleno razlikuje od sudske delatnosti, a i kada bi se mogla primeni-
ti, njena primena ne bi važila za pravila o isključivoj mesnoj nadležnosti iz čl. 4 st.
2 i 4 ZPN. Ova konstatacija nas vraća na već izneti zaključak da su javni beležni-
ci, kao predstavnici službe od javnog poverenja, uvek međunarodno nadležni da
obavljaju svoju izvornu delatnost, izuzev ako za neke poslove njihova nadležnost
nije izričito isključena.
Najzad, imajući u vidu da domaći javni beležnici jesu međunarodno nad-
ležni da sačinjavaju ugovore koji imaju za predmet sticanje stvarnih prava na ne-
pokretnosti koje se nalaze u inostranstvu, postavlja se pitanje kako utvrditi koji je
javni beležnik na teritoriji Srbije mesno nadležan za sačinjavanje takvih ugovora.
Kako u domaćem pravu nema posebnog propisa o mesnoj nadležnosti javnih be-
ležnika za ove ugovore, za njihovo zaključenje mogao bi biti mesno nadležan bilo
koji javni beležnik u Srbiji.20
187
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S. Đorđević: Postupanje javnog beležnika prilikom zaključenja ugovora ...
189
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ve u skladu sa propisima stranog prava, jer su ona za njega strana procesna pra-
vila). Pri tom, treba istaći da je, uprkos razlikama koje postoje između našeg pra-
va i prava stranih država, gotovo uvek moguće utvrditi da li strani pravni propisi
za konkretni ugovor zahtevaju neku od formi koja odgovara (tj. koja je ekvivalen-
tna) formi koju poznaje naše pravo (javnobeležnički zapis, javno potvrđena ispra-
va, pisana forma sa overenim potpisima ugovornika). Ako to, ipak, nije moguće,
domaći javni beležnik će primeniti pravila o formi koje za taj ugovor predviđa do-
maće pravo. Prema tome, možemo zaključiti da se javni beležnik mora pridržava-
ti pravila o formi domaćeg prava koji se, dakle, kao lex fori procesnopravni pro-
pisi primenjuju na formu ugovora, s tim da istovremeno, na gore opisani način,
mora uzeti u obzir pravila o formi koju predviđa strano pravo (na koje upućuje čl.
21 ZRSZ), jer od toga zavisi pravilna primena domaćih pravila o formi.
Pretpostavimo, na primer,27 da zajmodavac i zajmoprimac žele da sačine
ugovor o hipoteci kojim zajmoprimac ustanovaljava u korist zajmodavca pravo
hipoteke na nepokretnosti koja se nalazi u Bjeljini u Republici Srpskoj (BIH), te
odlaze kod domaćeg javnog beležnika da ovom ugovoru da odgovarajuću formu.
S obzirom da je u ovom slučaju za ugovor o hipoteci merodavno, shodno čl. 21
ZRSZ (u vezi sa čl. 10 ZRSZ28), pravo Republike Srpske, javni beležnik će ispita-
ti kakvu formu za ugovor o hipoteci predviđa pravo Republike Srpske.29 Prema čl.
68 st. 1 tač. 4 Zakona o notarima Republike Srpske,30 svi ugovori o sticanju i pre-
nosu stvarnih prava na nepokretnosti (uključujući i ugovor o hipoteci) zaključu-
ju se u formi notarski obrađene isprave čiji je postupak sastavljanja detaljno ure-
đen odredbama čl. 70–86 ovog zakona. Iz ovih odredaba se može zaključiti da je
“notarski obrađena isprava” koju predviđa pravo Republike Srpske ekvivalentna
formi “javnobeležničkog zapisa” koju predviđa pravo Republike Srbije, tako da će
srpski javni beležnik ovaj ugovor o hipoteci sačiniti u formi javnobeležničkog za-
pisa po pravilima Zakona o javnom beležništvu Republike Srbije (ZJB). Najzad,
27 S. Đorđević, op. cit., 23.
28 O tumačenju i primeni čl. 10 ZRZS (koji rešava problem upućivanja na nejedinstveni
pravni poredak kakav je u BiH), v. S. Đorđević, Z. Meškić, op. cit., 55 i dalje; M. Dika, G. Knežević,
S. Stojanović, op. cit., 42 i dalje.
29 Prethodno će utvrditi da pravo Republike Srpske ne zabranjuje da se pred javnim beležni-
kom Republike Srbije zaključi ugovor o hipoteci koji se odnosi na nepokretnost koja se nalazi na te-
ritoriji Republike Srpske.
Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, br. 86/2004, 2/2005, 74/2005, 76/2005 – ispr., 91/2006,
30
37/2007, 74/2007 – odluka US, 50/2010, 78/2011, 20/2014, 68/2017, 113/2018 – odluka US i
82/2019.
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Na kraju, važno je istaći da javni beležnik, nakon što odredi kakva forma je,
u skladu sa merodavnim stranim pravom, potrebna za ugovor i na nju primeni
odgovarajuća pravila domaćeg prava, utvrđuje smisao ugovora i njegove pravne
posledice u skladu sa pravom strane države u kojoj se nalazi nepokretnost koja je
predmet ugovora (s obzirom da je ono merodavno za sadržinu ugovora) i o tome
poučava stranke.
Ako se pred javnim beležnikom pojavi ugovor o razmeni (trampi) dve ne-
pokretnosti od kojih se jedna nalazi u Srbiji a druga u stranoj državi, situacija se u
određenoj meri usložnjava, jer koliziona norma iz čl. 21 ZRSZ upućuje na prime-
nu dva merodavna prava – domaće pravo i pravo te strane države.33 U tom slučaju
domaći javni beležnik treba da postupi na sledeći način.34
Kao i kod ugovora koji za predmet ima samo jednu nepokretnost koja se
nalazi u stranoj državi, javni beležnik treba, najpre, da ispita da li pravo strane dr-
žave u kojoj se nalazi nepokretnost koja je predmet ugovora o razmeni dozvo-
ljava da se ugovori koji se odnose na nepokretnosti na njenoj teritoriji zaključu-
ju pred srpskim javnim beležnikom. Takođe, javni beležnik treba da ispita da li
je prema stranom pravu i/ili prema domaćem pravu (koje je takođe merodavno)
ovaj ugovor zabranjen odnosno nedopušten iz nekog drugog razloga. Ako utvrdi
da zaključenje ugovora o razmeni nije dopušteno bilo prema stranom bilo prema
domaćem pravu, domaći javni beležnik će odbiti da sačini javnobeležnički zapis
odnosno solemnizuje privatnu ispravu o takvom ugovoru.
Kada je reč o formi ugovora o razmeni, domaći javni beležnik treba primar-
no da postupa u skladu sa domaćim pravom, tj. da zaključi ugovor u formi koju
predviđa domaće pravo jer je dužan da obezbedi da ugovor proizvede dejstva u
domaćem pravnom poretku. Ako pravo strane države, koje je merodavno u po-
gledu nepokretnosti koja se nalazi u toj državi, zahteva strožu formu od one koju
33 Ovde je reč o tzv. cepanju ugovora koje vodi primeni dva pravna poretka na ugovor o raz-
192
S. Đorđević: Postupanje javnog beležnika prilikom zaključenja ugovora ...
predviđa domaće pravo, domaći javni beležnik treba to da prihvati i ugovor za-
ključi u toj strožoj formi (naravno, u skladu sa pravilima domaćeg prava), jer na
taj način obezbeđuje da ugovor bude punovažan i proizvode dejstva u oba mero-
davna pravna poretka (stranom i domaćem). Zaključenje ugovora u strožoj formi
od one koju predviđa domaće pravo nije zabranjeno. Ako, primera radi, domaće
pravo za konkretni ugovor predviđa solemnizaciju privatne isprave a strano pravo
javnobeležnički zapis, domaći javni beležnik može da sačini ugovor u obliku jav-
nobeležničkog zapisa i on će biti punovažan prema našem pravu iako ono zahteva
“blažu” formu. Pri tom, sve što je rečeno o utvrđivanju ekvivalentnosti formi do-
maćeg i stranog prava odnosno o primeni metode transpozicije, važi i ovde.
Najzad, kada je reč o poučavanju ugovornika o smislu ugovora o razmeni i
njegovim pravnim posledicama, javni beležnik će ova pitanja ceniti kako prema
domaćem pravu koje je merodavno u pogledu nepokretnosti koja se nalazi u Sr-
biji, tako i prema stranom pravu koje je merodavno u pogledu nepokretnosti koja
se nalazi u stranoj državi.
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S. Đorđević: Postupanje javnog beležnika prilikom zaključenja ugovora ...
Summary
This paper deals with certain issues of private international law that Serbian notaries public
must resolve when performing notarial duties in the process of the conclusion of a contract whose
subject matter is the acquisition of rights in rem in immovable property located abroad. The au-
thor first deals with the question of whether Serbian notaries public have international jurisdiction
to perform notarial duties with regard to these contracts. After that and bearing in mind that the
governing law for these contracts is, pursuant to Art. 21 of Serbian Private International Law Act
(SPILA), the law of the foreign state in which the immovable property is located, the author tries
to clarify whether the notary public applies the rules of this applicable foreign law on the form of
the contract or must comply with lex fori (domestic) rules on the form (which are, from the point
of view of Serbian notaries public, of procedural nature). Finally, the author explains how, from the
point of view of private international law, the notary public should proceed when concluding the
contracts on exchange of two immovables, one of which is located in Serbia and the other in a for-
eign country, given that in such case the conflict-of-law rule of Art. 21 SPILA refers to two applica-
ble laws – Serbian (domestic) law and foreign law.
Key words: notary public, international jurisdiction, foreign lex rei sitae, notarial form of the
contract, determining the equivalence of the forms
Literatura
195
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
Hein J. von, Einl. IPR, Internationales Privatrecht I, MükoBGB, C.H. Beck, München,
2015.
Köhler A., Artikel 4 Rome I-VO, BeckOKG, Rom I-VO, Beck-online, München, 2016.
Looschelders D., Die Anpassung im internationalen Privatrecht, Heidelberg, 1995.
Pitanja i odgovori (pitanje br. 12), Stručni savet Javnobeležničke komore Srbije, 03. fe-
bruar 2016. godine.
Poznić B., “Osvrt na neke procesnopravne odredbe ZRSZ”, Pravni život, br. 6–7, Beograd,
1983.
Spellenberg U., Art. 11, MükoBGB – EGBGB, C. H. Beck, München, 1983.
Stanivuković M., Živković M., Međunarodno privatno pravo, opšti deo, Službeni glasnik,
Beograd, 2010.
Varadi T., Bordaš B., Knežević G., Pavić V., Međunarodno privatno pravo, Pravni fakultet
Univerziteta u Beogradu, Beograd, 2012.
196
UDK 34:929 Stojković S.
DOI: 10.5937/RKSPP2002197S
MAJA STANIVUKOVIĆ
SANJA ĐAJIĆ
Prof. dr Maja Stanivuković, redovni profesor Pravnog fakulteta Univerziteta u Novom Sadu,
e-mail: maja@stanivukovic.rs.
Prof. dr Sanja Đajić, redovni profesor Pravnog fakulteta Univerziteta u Novom Sadu, e-mail:
sdjajic@pf.uns.ac.rs. Autorke se zahvaljuju na pomoći u sastavljanju biografije i pribavljanju foto-
grafija: Arhivu Jugoslavije, Biblioteci Matice srpske, Slobodanu Markoviću, advokatu iz Beograda,
†Mikici Đuriću, bivšem direktoru pravnog odeljenja Energoprojekta, Ratomiru Veljkoviću, prija-
telju porodice Stojković, dr Urošu Stankoviću, asistentu sa doktoratom Pravnog fakulteta u Novom
Sadu, doktorandu Vladislavu Đaniću, Mili Stojković iz Njujorka, unuci i Milenku Kristijanu Rolfu
Stojkoviću, iz Knivste, u Švedskoj, unuku profesora Stojkovića.
197
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
UVOD
KRATKA BIOGRAFIJA
198
M. Stanivuković, S. Đajić: Hommage jednom zastupniku pred međunarodnim sudovima
199
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
200
M. Stanivuković, S. Đajić: Hommage jednom zastupniku pred međunarodnim sudovima
šen 1945. prilikom pokušaja prelaska italijanske granice sa porodicom, bez put-
nih isprava. Zadržan je i osuđen od jednog suda u Istri na pet godina strogog za-
tvora.15 Ostalo nam je nepoznato kako je uspeo da dobije otpust iz zatvora. Posle
Drugog svetskog rata bio je pravni savetnik u Privrednom savetu i Ministarstvu
finansija FNRJ i glavni pravni savetnik Narodne banke Jugoslavije. Već 1950. pu-
tovao je sa jugoslovenskom delegacijom na pregovore sa francuskom vladom u
Parizu. Država ga je 1970. godine imenovala na listu nacionalnih eksperata i spe-
cijalista za međunarodno trgovinsko pravo pri UNCITRAL-u.16 Krajem sedam-
desetih on i supruga Milica, rođ. Saković, rodom iz Kuršumlije, preselili su se u
Nju Džersi kod sina Stanka. Međutim, nedostajao im je Beograd i vratili su se po-
sle dve godine. Umro je 4. aprila u 83. godini u Beogradu i sahranjen je na Novom
Groblju 6. aprila 1983.
201
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
202
M. Stanivuković, S. Đajić: Hommage jednom zastupniku pred međunarodnim sudovima
203
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
DIPLOMATIJA
nja Energoprojekta.
28 Pitanje naših vicinalnih železnica pred Društvom naroda – pošto nije postignuta saglas-
nost u Stalnom pravnom komitetu spor će se rešiti u Savetu Društva naroda, Pravda, 13. april 1934.
29 AJ, 334-195-170, MIP KJ, personalni dosijei.
30 League of Nations 15 Official Journal (1934), pp. 1765 i 1772. V. takođe: “G. Bogoljub
Jevtić optužio je pred Savetom Društva naroda Mađarsku vladu za saučesništvo u Marseljskom
zločinu”, Vreme, naslovnica: subota 8. decembar 1934.
204
M. Stanivuković, S. Đajić: Hommage jednom zastupniku pred međunarodnim sudovima
205
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
PRAVNA NAUKA
pravne i društvene nauke, br. 1–2, tom XV (XXXII), 1927 (preštampano u Arhivu br. 3, 1997, 449–
472); Hipoteka na rečnim brodovima u slovenskim državama, glavni referat za prvi Kongres pravni-
ka slovenskih država u Bratislavi, 1933 (koautor sa Ivanom V. Subbotićem); “La Petite Entente et
l’Entente Balkanique (Mala Antanta i Balkanska Antanta)”, Études centro-européennes, 1937, 203–
224. (predavanje održano na Čehoslovačkoj letnjoj školi u Tatranskoj Lomnici u avgustu 1937) itd.
(kompletan spisak nalazi se na kraju rada).
206
M. Stanivuković, S. Đajić: Hommage jednom zastupniku pred međunarodnim sudovima
nih institucija.40 Jedno vreme bio je dopisnik uglednog holandskog pravnog časo-
pisa Bulletin de l’Institut Intermediaire International.
Ono što je vrlo uočljivo, i što ga razlikuje od njegovih kolega i savremenika,
jeste da suvereno vlada međunarodnim privatnim, međunarodnim javnim i arbi-
tražnim pravom. U većini radova prepoznaju se argumenti i izvori koji su iz ra-
zličitih međunarodnopravnih oblasti – po tome je bio, da se poslužimo La Prade-
lovim (La Pradelle) rečima u opisu profesora Pijea “‘un internationaliste complet’,
‘de ceux qui, rares, prennent également les deux aspects, public et privé, du droit
international’“ (u prevodu: potpuni internacionalista, od onih retkih poznavalaca
oba aspekta međunarodnog prava – javnog i privatnog).41
Njegova doktorska disertacija predstavlja prvi značajniji rad srpskog auto-
ra o savremenoj međunarodnoj arbitraži. Više puta je citirana u inostranstvu, ne
samo kada je objavljena nego i u novije vreme.42 U odluci Međunarodnog suda
pravde iz 1991. godine koja se odnosila na poništaj arbitražne odluke donete u
sporu između Gvineje-Bisau i Senegala, preciznije, u odvojenom mišljenju sudije
Nija, pomenut je kao “eminentan autor”, rame uz rame sa Vatelom (Vattel), Ope-
nhajmom (Oppenheim) i Kalvom (Calvo).43 Septembra 1937. godine učestvovao
je na Kongresu pravnika slovenskih država u Bratislavi, sa referatom o hipoteci na
40 “Les Tribunaux arbitraux mixtes et leur jurisprudence” (Mešoviti arbitražni sudovi i nji-
hova praksa), Annuaire de l’Association Yougoslave de Droit International, 1ère année, Belgra-
de-Paris, 1931, 255–263; Citiran u: Rudolf Blüdhorn, “Le fonctionnement et la jurisprudence des
tribunaux arbitraux mixtes créés par les Traités de Paris”, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de droit in-
ternational de la Haye, t. 41, 1932, 137–244, 241. V. takođe: Maja Stanivuković, “Marking the Cen-
tennial of International Arbitration in Serbia: Remembering the Mixed Hungaro-Yugoslav Arbitral
Tribunal established in the Treaty of Trianon”, u štampi.
41 Société française pour le droit international, Antoine Pillet (1857-1926), http://www.sfdi.
org/internationalistes/pillet/, 16.9.2020.
42 Joseph Limburg, “L’autorité de chose jugée des juridictions internationales”, Recueil des
Cours de l’Académie de droit international de la Haye, t. 30, 1929, 523–617, 526; Sir Hersch Laut-
erpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community, Oxford University Press, (First pub-
lished 1933), 2011, 207; Lassa Oppenhaim, International Law, a Treatise, 7th ed., 1952, 26; Oscar
Schachter, “The Enforcement of International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions”, American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 54, No. 1, 1960, 3; Leonard N. C. Brant, L’autorité de la chose jugée en droit
international public, Paris, 2003, 367; Charles Brower, “The Functions and Limits of Arbitration and
Judicial Settlement under Private and Public International Law”, Duke Journal of Comparative and
International Law, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2008, 271.
43
Case concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), Interna-
tional Court of Justice, Judgment (1991) 1991 International Court of Justice Report of Judgments,
Advisory Opinions & Orders 53.
207
REVIJA KOPAONIČKE ŠKOLE PRIRODNOG PRAVA br. 2/2020.
pravnika na ovom Kongresu referisali su: Živojin Perić, dr Toma Živanović, dr Čedomir Marković,
dr Metod Dolenc, dr Lavoslav Henigsberg, dr Stanko Frank, dr Gregor Krek, dr Čedomilj Mitrović,
dr Stanko Lapajne, dr Otmar Pirkmajer, dr Ivo Krbek, dr Ivo Belin, dr Vidan Blagojević, dr Milan
Bartoš i dr Pavao Rastovčan.
45 Lj. Kandić, op. cit., 110.
46 “Razmatranja o međunarodnim elementima u međunarodnom privatnom pravu”, Ju-
goslovenska revija za međunarodno pravo, br. 3, t. VI, 1959, 334–365 (sa apstraktom na francus-
kom: Considérations sur les éléments internationaux en droit international privé, Jugoslovenska
revija za međunarodno pravo, no. 3, vol. VI, 1959, 363–365; “Međunarodno privatno pravo u svet-
losti dosadašnjih iskustava”, Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno pravo, br. 3, t. VII, 1960, 462–
498; “Savremene tendencije međunarodnog privatnog prava”, Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno
pravo, br. 1, t. VIII, 1961, 20–48; “Prenos svojine, prelazak rizika i čuvanje stvari. Rokovi isporuke”,
Savetovanje o nacrtu uniformnog zakona o međunarodnoj kupoprodaji telesnih pokretnih stvari,
1961 (22 strane); “Nekoliko aktuelnih pitanja međunarodne trgovinske arbitraže”, Jugoslovens-
ka revija za međunarodno pravo, br. 3, t. IX, 1962, 321–359; “O nekim problemima u stvaranju i
izjednačenju prava međunarodnih privrednih odnosa”, Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno pravo,
br. 3, t. X, 1963, 338–367; “Materijalno pravo koje se primenjuje u arbitraži za meritorno rešavanje
sporova”, Savetovanje o spoljnotrgovinskoj arbitraži, Beograd, 1964; takođe objavljen u: Jugosloven-
ska revija za međunarodno pravo, br. 2, t. XI, 1964, 201–234; “Razvoj međunarodnog rečnog pra-
va i značaj izgradnje hidroenergetskog i plovidbenog sistema u Đerdapu za međunarodnu plo-
vidbu”, Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno pravo”, br. 1, t. XII, 1965, 1–28; “Anerkennung und
Vollstreckung ausländischer Schiedsspüche in Jugoslawien”, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und
internationales Privatrecht, 1966, 685-700. “L’importance de la construction du système hydro-élec-
trique et de navigation dans le secteur des portes de fer pour la navigation international”, Jugoslov-
enska revija za međunarodno pravo, br. 1–2, t. 15, 1968, 120–135; “Bankarski poslovi u spoljnoj
trgovini”, (predavanje sa simpozijuma Pravna problematika ekonomskih odnosa (posebno spoljne
trgovine) između Jugoslavije i SAD, 1968 (15 strana); “Primena međunarodnog prava na ugovo-
re koje zaključuju države i međunarodne privredne organizacije u vršenju ekonomsko-finansijskih
delatnosti međunarodnog karaktera”, dopuna skripte: Majhsner, Vjekoslav, Pravni aspekt novca u
domaćem i međunarodnom pravu, Ekonomski fakultet Univerziteta u Skopju, nastava trećeg stepena
iz monetarno-kreditnih problema, Skopje, 1967, štampano u: Anali Pravnog fakulteta, br. 1, t. XVII,
Beograd, 1969, 17–40.
47 Osnovi građanskog prava, Beograd, 1940; Enciklopedija prava, Beograd, 1941; Osnovi
međunarodnog prava, Beograd, 1947; Osnovi građanskog prava, Beograd, 1948; Obligacioni odno-
si sa elementom inostranosti, Beograd, 1959; Kupoprodajni ugovor u spoljnoj trgovini, Beograd, 1959;
Pravni izvori i instrumenti međunarodne trgovine, Beograd 1964.
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M. Stanivuković, S. Đajić: Hommage jednom zastupniku pred međunarodnim sudovima
ZAKLJUČAK
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Summary
This paper pays tribute to life and work of professor Dr. Slavko Stojković, a diplomat and
state agent of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. It is divided into five parts – introduction, short biogra-
phy and three fields of his work – representation in international arbitral and judicial proceedings,
where he made his principal achievements, diplomacy, and finally, legal writing, in which he also
left a mark. The part on representation briefly mentions the cases Losinger (1935) and Pajzs, Csaky,
Esterhazy (1935) before the Permanent Court of International Justice in which he acted as the state
agent of Yugoslavia, the pathological arbitration S.E.E.E. v. Yugoslavia in which he was involved in
various ways, and his role as the state agent of Yugoslavia before the German-Yugoslav and Hunga-
ro-Yugoslav Mixed Arbitral Tribunals. Reference is made to sources that cover these cases in more
detail. His diplomatic activity includes participation in the sessions of the League of Nations, and in
particular his role in advocating the adoption of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment
of Terrorism (1937), as well as his participation in negotiating with the Halyard Mission (1944) and
with the French Government (1950). Among his legal writings, the most remarkable are his doctor-
al thesis De l’autorité de la sentence arbitrale en droit international public obtained at the Sorbonne
in 1924 under the presidency of Antoine Pillet, and often cited even in modern times, his article on
Mixed Arbitral Tribunals (1931) published in French, and his article on the “Possibility of Existence
of International Arbitration Independent of National Laws” (1966) anticipating the appearance of
investment arbitration. The authors conclude that Dr. Slavko Stojković was one of the most eminent
lawyers of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the forefather of arbitration law in Yugoslavia and Serbia.
Key words: Slavco Stoykovitch, Losinger (Switzerland v. Yugoslavia), The Pajzs, Csáky, Ester-
házy Case (Hungary v. Yugoslavia), SEEE v. Yugoslavia
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ne i društvene nauke, br. 5, tom XXXIV, Beograd, 1937.
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ss, Stanford, 1929.
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bel, Cambridge, 1994.
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PRILOG
UDK 340.12
GORDANA VUKADINOVIĆ
DRAGAN MITROVIĆ
PRAVNE ISKRICE
Iz najnovije knjige G. Vukadinović i D. Mitrovića Uvod u teoriju
i filozofiju prava, (2 prošireno i dopunjeno izdanje, izd. Dosije studio,
Beograd 2020)
Autoritet
Mora da je strašno verovati u neki autoritet kao istinu umesto u istinu kao
jedini autoritet.
Pravni autoritet može samo propisati, dok pravna nauka može samo opisati
ono što je pravni autoritet propisao.
Argument
Ako je uverenje argument u religiji ili filozofiji, nije u nauci.
Vrednost
Vrednost je uverenje da je nešto dobro zato što je istinito, ispravno, korisno,
poželjno. Postoji i tamna strana: “ne-vrednost”, koja je nepoželjna ili nedopustiva.
Prof. dr Gordana Vukadinović, redovni profesor Pravnog fakulteta Univerziteta u Novom Sa-
du, u penziji, e-mail: gordvuk@gmail.com.
Prof. dr Dragan Mitrović, redovni profesor Pravnog fakulteta Univerziteta u Beogradu, u
penziji, e-mail: draganm@ius.bg.ac.rs.
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Vrlina
Vrlina (kao vrednost na delu) označava prepoznatu moralnu izvrsnost lič-
nosti. Ona je najviša tačka dosegnute vrednosti.
Tamnu stranu vrline predstavlja porok. Već iz ove razlike jasno proizilazi
da je vrlina uže i strože doživljena vrsta vrednosti, jer nije svaka vrednost vrlina.
Biti obdaren vrlinama znači biti izuzetno vredan u pozitivnom, a ne u negativnom
smislu. I zlo je vredno, ali se ne smatra poželjnom vrednošću, a još manje vrlinom.
Vlast
Umesto dekreta samodržaca kojima su nekad zarobljavali ljudska tela (duše
su već zarobile duhovne vlasti), danas to čine “armije pravnika” donošenjem bez-
brojnih propisa koje niko ne može da pročita, a kamoli da upozna i razume. Sve
to se čini tako da se svetovnim putem zarobe i ljudske duše, a ne samo ljudska
tela, jer su moći tradicionalnih duhovnih vlasti u opadanju.
Građanin
Građani ne mogu biti vlasništvo države ni pod kakvim uslovima ili izgovo-
rima, ali mogu da budu vlasnici svoje države.
Dostojanstvo
Uvek kad postoji, dostojanstvo začinjava slobodu kao milosrđe pravdu.
Ljudsko dostojanstvo se ne poklanja već osvaja.
Jedino lično ljudsko dostojanstvo ne može da se proda, ustupi niti zameni
dostojanstvom nekog drugog čoveka.
Zbilja, i dalje treba razmišljati šta će u budućnosti biti s ljudskim dostojan-
stvom i hoće li ga uopšte biti u ovom sve više dehumanizovanom svetu?
Estetika
Estetika bavi pojmovima lepog i skladnog, naročito u umetnosti kao poseb-
nom obliku ljudskog stvaralaštva, što nije slučaj sa etikom koja se bavi izučava-
njem morala, tj. pojmovima dobrog i ispravnog. Budući da sve pojave u svetu sa-
drže vrednosti – to sve one mogu na neki način i u nekoj meri da budu lepe, čak i
kad nisu dobre ili ispravne.
Estetske teorije i shvatanja su tragično uzaludni. Moguće je da ljudi pose-
duju nekakav prethodni pojam o lepom, pod uslovom da im je osećaj za estetsko
urođen (npr., kao za moral ili pravdu), ali je gotovo nemoguće načelno pouzda-
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G. Vukadinović, D. Mitrović: Pravne iskrice
no razgraničiti lepo od ružnog i stvoriti tačna estetska merila ili pouzdane estet-
ske teorije i shvatanja. Ne kaže se bez razloga da se o ukusima (kao skupu ličnih
ili srodnih estetskih /vrednosnih/ sudova do kojih um dolazi uz pomoć čula) ne
raspravlja (De gustibus non est disputandum).
Ako su lepo i skladno glavni i obuhvatni predmeti estetike, tada se može
ustvrditi kako je ono što je lepo univerzalna estetska vrednost, slično onom što je
dobro, koje je univerzalna moralna vrednost zbog svoje ispravnosti, kao što je tvr-
dio Platon u dijalogu Hipija. Nevolja je u tome što ne može načelno tačno ni una-
pred da se odredi šta je lepo, a šta dobro (npr., ono što je lepo, ne mora da bude
dobro ili ono što je dobro, ne mora da bude lepo, odn. ono što je skladno, ne
mora da bude ispravno ili ono što je ispravno ne mora da bude skladno).
Kad god se govori o lepom, posredno se govori o ružnom. Reč je o korela-
tivnim pojmovima: da nije ružnog ne bi se uopšte moglo znati šta je lepo, i obrat-
no. Lepo nije moguće izvoditi iz lepog. (Ni ružno nije moguće izvoditi iz ružnog.)
I sam svet je suštinski lep, kao vrhunsko umetničko delo, jer sadrži najvišu
moguću estetičnost posle Boga kao njegovog tvorca.
Izgleda da je težnja ka lepom urođena, a ka ružnom stečena.
Možda je pravo zbilja ars poetica, a pesnici “nepriznati zakonodavci sveta”.
Znanje
Zakon
Istinitost
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Ispravnost
Istina
Istorija
Izreka
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G. Vukadinović, D. Mitrović: Pravne iskrice
Jurisprudencija
Jurisprudencija je prvo zbir pa tek zatim sistem, dok su teorija prava i filo-
zofija prava uvek sistemi višeg i najvišeg stepena apstraktnosti.
Korisnost
Karitativni princip
Ljudima nije dato da saznaju suštinu stvari, konačnu istinu, krajnje uzroke i
svrhu sveta kako bi sa njima uskladili pravno regulisanje.
Ljudska bića lišena osećaja za moralnost pripadaju zoološkom svetu, a ne
humanoidnom. Budući da su samo biološki sazdana kao ljudska bića, danas se u
medicinskom rečniku jednostavno nazivaju − psihopate.
Možda tvrdnja da se više uči iz promašaja nego iz pogodaka važi za sve ljud-
ske poduhvate, a ne samo za pravne poduhvate.
Ljudski rod je oduvek težio ne samo ka dostizanju istinitosti i ispravnosti,
već i lepote.
Milosrđe
Milosrđe je poželjno ali nije dovoljno, jer se njime ne menjaju pravila druš-
tvenog iskorišćavanja siromašnijih od bogatijih.
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Ontologija
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G. Vukadinović, D. Mitrović: Pravne iskrice
Pravo i kultura
Svaka država raspolaže pravom. Gde nema prava, tamo je varvarstvo. A
varvarstvo je oznaka za bezvlašće i anarhiju. Ono je per definitionem negiranje
svake civilizacije i kulture, svakog prava i države. Zbog toga se kaže: pravo – to je
civilizacija!
Pravilo je da svako pravo sadrži u sebi odgovarajući civilizacijski i kultur-
ni obrazac. Ako se može smatrati da svaka civilizacija sadrži u sebi izvestan ste-
pen kulture, to još nije dovoljno da njene izvedene pojave, kakva je pojava i pra-
vo, odmah i po nekakvom automatizmu steknu to svojstvo. Pravo, dakle, može
da bude civilizovano a nekulturno sa stanovišta nekog drugog kulturnog obras-
ca. Ali, pravo ne može da bude kulturno a necivilizovano.
Nema “boljih” i “gorih” u istom kulturnom krugu. Postoje samo uspešno i
neuspešno primenjeni kulturni obrasci.
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izuzev����������������������������������������
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ako������������������������������������
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kulturi�������������������������
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zna-
čenje da se ona izjednači s civilizacijom. Unutar iste civilizacije može da postoji
više kultura, ali unutar iste kulture ne može da postoji više civilizacija.
Država i pravo ne mogu da budu necivilizovani, ali mogu da budu nekul-
turni.
Nije svaki oblik države kulturan samo zato što predstavlja civilizacijski obrazac.
Budući da pravo i umetnost pripadaju istom civilizacijskom i kulturnom
krugu, to dele iste vrednosti i sredstva izražavanja (govor, gestikulacija, odeća,
oznake, objekte itd.).
Pravo se često smatra jednim “modus operandi”, pukim sredstvom ili do-
datkom obezljuđenom i umreženom (bivšem) ljudskom biću. A to više ne može
da bude predmet estetike, jer je ona odbačena zajedno sa ljudskošću. Te pogubne
ideje se danas sve češće unose u sisteme prava najrazvijenijih zemalja s ciljem da
se njihovom zloupotrebom pravno ograniči i zatre još nešto malo preostale ljud-
ske slobode. Savremena razvijena društva slobodu napuštaju u korist sigurnosti,
a demokratiju u korist bezbednosti. Sve češće se podržavaju militaristički i poli-
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Pravna država
Pravda
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G. Vukadinović, D. Mitrović: Pravne iskrice
Pravičnost
Pravda i pravo
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Proceduralna pravda
Proceduralna pravda ne postoji dok pravda postoji, samo ona nije proce-
duralna, kao ni pravičnost, koja se može smatrati operativnim i primenjivačkim
oblikom pravde, “pravdom na delu”.
Pravo samo preko pravičnosti može da služi ostvarenju ideje pravde, a ne
preko proceduralne pravde.
Proceduralna pravda ne postoji, ali se do pravde može doći ispravnim po-
stupcima. I obratno, pravda postoji, ali ona nije proceduralna, što nije ni pravič-
nost. Procedura je jedino ispravno sredstvo prava, ali pravo nije jedino ispravno
sredstvo pravde.
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G. Vukadinović, D. Mitrović: Pravne iskrice
Pravda i moral
Prednost treba dati moralu nad pravdom, tj. dobru nad istinom, čovekolju-
blju nad činjenicama, jer je ljudsko milosrđe iznad pravde. Ono začinjava pravdu
kao što pravda začinjava pravo.
Pravo i moral
Budući da je nastanak morala suštinski povezan s nastankom modernog čo-
veka (homo sapiens), to je očigledno da su prvo morale da nastanu moralne nor-
me. One su najstarije i takoreći prvobitne u odnosu na sve druge.
Može se živeti bez prava, ali nije moguće živeti bez morala. U odnosu na
moral, sve druge vrste normi predstavljaju kasnije stvorene ljudske konvencije.
Samo je moral praroditeljski izvoran.
Moralne su sve norme koje nalažu poštenje i istinoljubivost. Budući da je
čovekovo generičko svojstvo da je moralno biće, nasuprot moralnim nakazama,
osećajem za moralnost natopljeni su svi čovekovi postupci i sve čovekove tvorevi-
ne. Nevolja je što nisu natopljeni istim sadržajem ili barem ne u istoj meri.
Najvažnija je da moral ili osećaj za moralnost predstavlja generičko čove-
kovo svojstvo. Reč je o izvornom osećaju za ljudskost koji je urođen ljudskim je-
dinkama. Sa pravom to nije slučaj. Ono je proisteklo iz nužnosti održavanja za-
jedničkog života ljudskih jedinki, njihovog saživota. Reč je o stečenom osećaju za
društvenost koji nameće civilizovanost.
Razdvajanje morala od prava je dovelo do krajnjeg relativizovanja nekad
apsolutno shvaćenih vrednosti o tome šta je dobro a šta loše, kao i do moralne i
pravne korumpiranosti. Geslo savremenog etičkog relativizma, koje danas vlada u
porodici kao i u društvu, glasi: uradi sve što ti se čini ispravnim, čak i kad to nije,
jer je sve dozvoljeno.
Pravo se nužno izopačuje kad se odvoji od morala, dok podudaranje mora-
la i prava treba da spreči da se mudrost koristi za spletke, pamet za podlost, a hra-
brost za bezobrazluk.
Svet
Ovaj svet se zbilja menja zbog uticaja podsticajnih i prihvatljivih ideja, ali
ovom svetu same ideje i zamisli nisu dovoljne.
Savremena društva su konformistička. Neizvesnost slobode su zamenila za
sigurnost udobnosti.
Srazmernost
Srazmerno je i ono što je jednako, i ono što je nejednako. Ali, nije svaka
srazmernost pravedna.
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Srazmernost je oznaka za pravdu, koja kao najviša vrednost nije samo isti-
nita već je i lepa zbog svoje istinitosti.
Sloboda
Sloboda nije samovolja jer je samovolja nedosledna i nepouzdana.
Ne kaže se tek tako da je cena ljudske slobode neprestana budnost građana.
Bez slobode čovek nije ništa više od jednog biološki sazdanog bića.
Čovek se rađa slobodan, a čim se rodi postaje neslobodan. To je neizmerno
kratak trenutak odistinske slobode, zbog čega se možda vredi roditi.
Sloboda je pre stanje svesti nego stanje stvari, jer od pamtiveka postoji samo
jedan poredak. Zove se robovlasništvo. A ono je smrtni neprijatelj ljudske slobode.
Svojina
Ono što je “Moje”, to nije “Tvoje”, ili, ono što je moje, to nije ni “Naše” ni
“Vaše”. Samo je Moje. Ipak, shvatanje svojine je vremenom preoblikovano: prvo
tako da ono što je moje bude i tvoje (npr., ortakluk), zatim da ono što je moje i
tvoje bude naše (npr., korporacija), a na kraju i da ono što je moje i naše postane
vaše (npr., potpuno podržavljenje svojine u tzv. socijalističkim porecima).
Tolerancija
Tolerancija pokazuje da još nije iščezla razumnost podržana osećajem za
pravdu i lično poštenje.
Teorija i filozofija
Veza teorije i filozofije je tanana, a nauke i filozofije relativna, jer između
njih postoji bezbroj finih preliva koje samo treba otkriti novim istraživanjima.
Čovek
Čovek nije samo racionalno već i intuitivno biće. Time se može objasniti
zašto ima toliko pogrešnih predstava o istini, pravdi i njenim vrstama.
228
S ADRŽ AJ
REČ UREDNIKA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Cristina Poncibò
A CONTRACT LAW FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Almir Gagula
Zlatan Meškić
TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT UNDER FIDIC
– THE PERSPECTIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA . . . . . . . 57
Milena Petrović
ODBOR ZA RAZMATRANJE/REŠAVANJE SPOROVA:
JOŠ JEDNA ALTERNATIVA DRŽAVNIM SUDOVIMA . . . . . . . . . . 99
III. PRAVO EU
Tatjana Josipović
ZAŠTITA TEMELJNIH PRAVA U PRIVATNOM PRAVU
EUROPSKE UNIJE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Maja Stanivuković
Sanja Đajić
HOMMAGE JEDNOM ZASTUPNIKU PRED MEĐUNARODNIM
SUDOVIMA: PROFESOR DR SLAVKO STOJKOVIĆ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
PRILOG
Gordana Vukadinović
Dragan Mitrović
PRAVNE ISKRICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
CIP - Каталогизација у публикацији
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд
34
REVIJA Kopaoničke škole prirodnog prava : časopis
za pravnu teoriju i praksu / glavni i odgovorni urednik
Jelena S. Perović Vujačić. - God. 1, br. 1 (2019)- . -
Beograd : Kopaonička škola prirodnog prava - Slobodan
Perović, 2019- (Novi Sad : Futura). - 24 cm
SADRŽAJ BROJA
Michael G. Bridge
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TRANSNATIONAL LAW
Cristina Poncibò
A CONTRACT LAW FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS
Uglješa Grušić
SUBJEKTIVNI DOMAŠAJ ARBITRAŽNOG SPORAZUMA U SRPSKOM PRAVU
Milena Petrović
ODBOR ZA RAZMATRANJE/REŠAVANJE SPOROVA:
JOŠ JEDNA ALTERNATIVA DRŽAVNIM SUDOVIMA
Tatjana Josipović
ZAŠTITA TEMELJNIH PRAVA U PRIVATNOM PRAVU EUROPSKE UNIJE
Slavko Đorđević
POSTUPANJE JAVNOG BELEŽNIKA PRILIKOM ZAKLJUČENJA UGOVORA KOJI ZA PREDMET IMA
STICANJE STVARNOG PRAVA NA NEPOKRETNOSTI KOJA SE NALAZI U INOSTRANSTVU
KOPAONIČKA ŠKOLA
PRIRODNOG PRAVA
SLOBODAN PEROVIĆ
KOPAONIKSCHOOL.ORG