05 Polese, Abel Horák, Slavomir - A Tale of Two Presidents - Personality Cult and Symbolic Nation-Building in Turkmenist

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A tale of two presidents: personality

cult and symbolic nation-building in
Turkmenistan
ab c
Abel Polese & Slavomir Horák
a
Institute for International Conflict Resolution and
Reconstruction, Dublin City University, Glasnevin, Dublin 9,
Ireland
b
Institute of Political Science, Tallinn University, Tallinn, Estonia
c
Institute of International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences,
Click for updates Charles University in Prague, Prague, Czech Republic
Published online: 13 May 2015.
To cite this article: Abel Polese & Slavomir Horák (2015) A tale of two presidents: personality cult
and symbolic nation-building in Turkmenistan, Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and
Ethnicity, 43:3, 457-478, DOI: 10.1080/00905992.2015.1028913
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Nationalities Papers, 2015
Vol. 43, No. 3, 457–478, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2015.1028913
A tale of two presidents: personality cult and symbolic nation-building

in Turkmenistan
Abel Polesea,b* and Slavomir Horákc
a
Institute for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction, Dublin City University,
Glasnevin, Dublin 9, Ireland; bInstitute of Political Science, Tallinn University, Tallinn, Estonia;
c
Institute of International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague,
Prague, Czech Republic
(Received 4 November 2014; accepted 1 March 2015)
This article proposes a comparison of the attitudes of the first and second presidents of
Turkmenistan to discuss possible overlap between personality cult, as it has been

initiated and developed by the two presidents after independence, and nation-building
narratives in the country. Nation-building in post-Soviet spaces has been studied
comprehensively, but this paper is distinguished by two interpretative frameworks.
First, this article is possibly the first comparison of personality cult as it has been
constructed by the two Turkmen presidents since 1991. Second, it looks at some
specific aspects of the personality cult as possible markers of a Turkmen national
identity that becomes, by force of this, de-ethnicized. We suggest that a number of
idiosyncratic aspects of the personality cult in Turkmenistan contribute to construct
an official nation-building narrative so concentrated on the figure of the president as
to minimize the ethnic features of nation-building measures that scholars have noticed
in a wide range of cases in the post-socialist region.
Keywords: Turkmenistan; nation-building; personality cult; president; Central Asia
Introduction
Enhanced by the availability of a very large region for fieldwork, and by the legacy of the
Soviet nationalities policy, the abundant scholarship on identity construction and nation-
building that characterized the 1990s has been, for a large part, inspired by studies on
the post-Soviet region (Smith 1994; Bremmer and Taras 1997; Ó Beacháin and Kevlihan
2013). A first group of scholars provided a series of elite-centered, or statist, accounts of
nation-building by putting at the center of the nation-building project party politics and
top-bottom identity policies (Kuzio 1998; Kolstø 2000). They have been gradually comple-
mented by a second group of scholars looking at the effects of specific policies on a popu-
lation or a given territory (Laitin 1998; Shulman 2002). This has led a growing number of
scholars to ask whether the way nation-building is “imagined” by the political elites, that is,
through measures adopted centrally, is understood in the same way by different segments of
the population (Ó Beacháin and Kevlihan, forthcoming; Polese 2011b, 2013). It has also
suggested the possible existence of disruptive factors, or discrepancies, between the
source and the receiver of these measures.
*Corresponding author. Email: ap@tlu.ee
© 2015 Association for the Study of Nationalities

458 A. Polese and S. Horák
Starting from this assumption, this paper looks at the intersections between personality
cult, as started and developed by the first post-independence president, Saparmurat
Niyazov (1991–2006), and continued, although with different features, by current president
Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov (2007–present), and post independence official narratives of
nation-building in the country. We suggest that a personality cult can, in certain contexts
and situations, serve as an instrument of nation-building and that the official narrative on
Turkmen national identity has become, in many respects, de-ethnicized to represent poss-
ibly one of the most, albeit understudied, practical examples of civic nation-building. In
line with Hobsbawm and Ranger’s [1983] (1992) ultra-constructivist approach, being a
real Turkmen, in Turkmenistan national narratives, depends in large part on the willingness
to accept the absolute power of the president, his quasi holiness, and a fictional version of
the history that heroicizes all of his family.
We define nation-building for this paper as the efforts to match the nation with the state
(Connor 1994) and, subsequently, civic nation-building, as first named by Kuzio (2000), as
a way to use these efforts to propose the existence of a civic nation, bonded by acceptance
of values and principles other than history, language, and ethnic belonging (Smith 1991).
This means also to expand the boundaries of the nation using identity markers that are
“intangible” and “inclusive” (Polese 2008, 2009). Nation-building, per se, is a potentially
immense topic so that we feel we need to further define the object of our study. We will
refer to a “nation-building project” as the ensemble of policies and measures adopted by
the political elites who attempt to bring the nation from point A to point B, where point
B is total overlap between nation and state boundaries. By virtue of this, we can use
tools and instruments of nation-building to indicate a certain measure, or set of measures,
that are supposed to impact the national identity of a given population. Following on
Billig’s (1995) idea of banal nationalism, we suggest that there is a wide range of
nation-building tools that, despite not being visible and beyond the control of the
country elites, may be crucial to national identity formation. Our main focus is the role
of new tools and strategies, invented and performed by both state and non-state actors,
something that hitherto the existing literature has not comprehensively been engaged in
(Morris 2005, 2009; Isaacs and Polese 2015)
In this paper, we look at technologies and sociopolitical evolutions as generating fresh
challenges and opportunities for those groups and individuals involved in identity construc-
tion. We call upon the theory of unintended consequences (Merton 1936) to suggest that
certain political measures, or expressions of citizens’ participation in the social life of a
state, may also directly or indirectly impact the narratives of nation-building of a given
society, a phenomenon that one of the authors described as “spontaneous nation-building”
some years ago (Polese 2009) to highlight two things. First is that nation-building is also
conceived, performed, and engaged with by people or organizations of people; for instance,
the construction of national identity through the perpetuation of national songs, popular art,
singing, and dancing despite the possible lack of support from state authorities and insti-
tutions (De Juriew 2000; Ventsel 2012a, 2012b). Second, just as nation-building measures
might not have the desired effects and impact on a given population, there might be some
measures that, conceived of at the central level, were not intended to primarily influence
identity construction – this is the case of elections, opposition movements, and mega
events (Militz 2015; Ó Beacháin and Kevlihan, forthcoming) – but nevertheless end up
strongly affecting identity in a country.
The Turkmen case is extremely interesting since, as we will show, some of the official
narratives constructed by the first and then the second president may be seen as functional to
the construction of a national identity that includes the majority of the population. This is,
Nationalities Papers 459
possibly, a distinctive feature of Turkmenistan in a region where personality cult by proxy

(Adams 2010), from Ataturk in Turkey to Timur in Uzbekistan, is far more common. We
cannot hold our argument true for all cases at all times, for one thing if the personality
cult is based on certain ethnic features that fork the population into several segments, it
can enhance a certain ethnic group but will not benefit all citizens. However, for the
Turkmen case, we will show that the eccentric project aimed at constructing a cult of person-
ality (based, though, on the celebration of a role, rather than of a person) might also impact
the sense of national identity of the citizens of Turkmenistan. We refer here to Kaldor’s
(2004) definition of spectacular nationalism, as used by Adams (2010): that is, to define a
number of events, instructions that are one-way political communication imposing official
discourses and attempting a mobilization of the people through an illusion of participation.
Indeed, for Adams “politics is conducted on the symbolic level, promoting the state’s dom-
ination over the shared meaning of concepts such as heritage and progress” (2010, 5).
In addition to the usual ones of post-Soviet spaces, studies with a focus on Turkmeni-
stan create at least three additional challenges for scholars. First, given its limited accessi-
bility, scholarship has remained short of empirical studies on Turkmenistan, given the fact
that only short stays in the country are allowed.1 In addition, the study of Turkmenistan is
problematic due to the criticisms of the country’s poor record on human and political rights
that it often triggers. While presenting our work at conferences and public events, we have
sometimes been criticized for not recalling the country’s poor record in this regard. We
need to be precise here that this is intentional. We have tried not to engage with any assess-
ments on the country’s standards, but we limit our analysis to the correlation between the
personality cult and the process of building a nation. Finally, study of the country chal-
lenges us with an additional ethical dilemma when we are asked to provide more details
about our methodological approach. Also in this case, the fact that we provide limited
details is intentional. The relatively small population of the country and the way elite
power relations are constructed mean that key people might be easily identifiable. This,
as well as the fact that any historical or political event post-nineteenth century is rarely,
if ever, debated or even mentioned in official discourses, means that our informants who
have shared information about modern Turkmenistan are potentially at risk. We are avail-
able to discuss our methodology in any non-public setting, but for now we shall just
mention that this article is based on material collected in the course of several years of
research in and on the country. It has not been possible to spend more than a few weeks
in the field, but visits began in the late 1990s and have continued regularly to the
present day. In the course of each visit interviews with civil servants and ordinary citizens
have been carried out. The authors have also done a review of the majority of Turkmeni-
stan-focused books printed in the country to see how the elites see themselves. These have
been complemented by conversations with experts and members of the country’s elites. A
review of books on Turkmenistan printed in the country has also provided a chance to see
how the elites see themselves and conversations with experts have completed the picture.
The next section provides an overview of the main debates we are engaging with, while
the following ones illustrate the attempts of the Turkmen elites, and presidents in primis, to
create a narrative identifying the president with the state and the Turkmen nation. The
empirical section has two intermingled foci that we have deemed most important to under-
stand the country’s state- and nation-building evolution. The first is the way the current
period is supposed to be reflected in national historiography and where it falls in the histori-
cal context of the country. The second focus is the analysis of selected aspects of the per-
sonality cult and deification, including the way they were conceived and implemented by
the first and second presidents.
From personality cult to nation-building

Studies of post-USSR nation-building have centered around three main approaches: state
and institution building, identity construction policies, and identity testing. A first group
of scholars have been concerned with state consolidation through party politics and enhance-
ment of institutions. Some have looked at the relationship between state and institutions as
the fundamentals for identity construction (Brubaker 1996; Kuzio 1998; Robinson 2000;
Sakwa 2004; Withmore 2005). Others, in contrast, have focused on the role of elites and pol-
itical parties in generating synergies impacting nation-building projects. Some have explored
the correlation between power and national construction (Akbarzadeh 1999; Cummings
2002; Isaacs 2011, 2015; Peyrouse 2012b; Ó Beacháin, Sheridan, and Stan 2012; Isaacs
and Withmore 2013), the way this power is used and reinforced by symbols (Cummings
2002, 2009, 2013; Denison 2009; Ó Beacháin 2011; Matveeva 2009), and, more recently,
the role of neo-patrimonialism in a number of interesting cases in Central Asia (Kunysz
2012; Laruelle 2012a; Isaacs 2014). Another recent tendency has been to explore the com-
petition between formal, informal, and even insurgent actors (Kevlihan 2007, 2013a, 2013b;
Polese and Kevlihan 2015) that have affected the way political structures and policies in the
region have taken shape (Isaacs 2010; Dagiev 2014). All these approaches have in common
a preoccupation with the nation-building project at the institutional and elite level and the
way this is done by official laws and recommendations that, in turn, feed an official state
narrative on national identity and nation-building.
A question that the aforementioned works have left open is the variety and depth of
actors in nation-building or, said a different way, who are the main actors – beyond the
state and the elites – in the nation-building project? This deficiency has inspired a
second strand that, instead of looking at top politics, has been constructing particular
case studies on nation-building projects based on a specific policy or set of policies
(Kolstø 2000; Laruelle 2012b) that have been stretched in various directions. Scholars
have investigated the relationship between nation-building and the construction of an offi-
cial state culture (Kuru 2002; Marat 2009; Adams 2010; Dogan 2006), the use of various
tools such as the cinema industry (Isaacs, forthcoming), collective memory (Edgar 2004),
the use – and interpretation – of history (Wolczuk 2000; Kuzio 2006), and the relationship
between citizenship access, language policies, and participation (Arel 1995; Barrington
1995; Laitin 1998; Ó Beacháin and Kevlihan 2013). The aforementioned foci have been
integrated by the study of nontraditional tools in nation-building such as analysis of
foreign policies (Cummings 2002; Anceschi 2008, 2010), land reforms (Hierman and Nek-
bakhtsoev 2014), and the use of symbols to promote a new national identity (Kolstø 2000;
Cummings 2009; Menga, forthcoming).
A third approach has focused on the way a policy, or set of policies, adopted to influence a
national identity, has been transmitted to the lower levels of a society. Studies of implementing
agencies, and of human agency, carrying out instructions from above have been compared with
the way people receive and accept these instructions, allowing for an analysis of the attitudes of
linguistic minorities to language instructions (Fournier 2002; Polese and Wylegala 2008a,
2008b; Kulyk 2011). A sub-strand emerging from this focus has explored the use of
symbols by both the elites and the people (Ó Beacháin and Coene 2014), as well as the way
education policies have been put forward and renegotiated at the local level through an exten-
sive use of agency (Janmaat 2000; Rodgers 2007; Richardson 2008; Polese 2010, 2014a,
2014b). Mostly informed by anthropological studies, they have engaged with grass-roots
actors and their willingness to question a view denying the existence of disruptive factors
between conception and implementation of nation-building measures. They have also
pointed at the fact that some of the most successful nation-building measures, or tools, have not
been conceived to affect national identity. These could be events, facts, and news not piloted by
the elites to which people attach a symbolic meaning that “makes” them instruments of nation-
building (Polese 2010; Kruusvall, Berry, and Vetik 2009). In contrast to Connor’s argument
that “nation-building is the effort to match the nation with the state” (1994), they have been
proposing a less elite-centered view by highlighting the role people may play. The elites are
certainly in charge of constructing an official narrative. However, the people themselves
decide whether to feel part, or not, of the national community. This, in our view, may mean
that there are a number of ways to conceive, endorse, or engage with, a nation-building
project. Indeed, Kolstø (2014) and Polese (2009, 2011b) have each, respectively, identified
three and four distinct understandings of nation-building in the current literature (Table 1).
For this article we shall define nation-building as the work of elites to propose a series of
identity markers that people can accept – consciously or unconsciously – when choosing an
identity and the elites’ capacity to listen to the people and take up some of the markers that
are proposed at the local level (Polese 2009, 2011a). Elites, however, might be promoting
national symbols without knowing it or with an intention that is not mirrored in the results.
Given the abundance of charismatic, eccentric, or megalomaniac political leaders, per-
sonality cults have emerged as an intriguing and popular focus, prompting scholars to
approach it from a variety of angles (Smith 1998; Wedeen 1999; Schrift 2001; Leese
2014). Both Mao and Stalin have attracted a large amount of studies on the way a person-
ality cult can be constructed (Althusser 1976; Tucker 1979; Plamper 2012), perpetuated
(Leese 2007), and even “consumed” (Schrift 2001) well beyond the leader’s life
(Plamper 2003), sanctioning the emergence of what has been described as personality
cult by proxy (Adams 2010). Indeed, there seems to be an awareness of and connections
between the personality cult by proxy used in Turkey after the 1930s, and thus the construc-
tion of historical memory and identity based on the figure of Ataturk (Glyptis 2008), and the
way Central Asian republics have constructed their new national identity (Lipovsky 1996),
possibly also inspired by the Soviet experience with Lenin (Barmé 1996).
Post-Soviet Central Asia has turned out to be a favorable place to encounter personality
cults of varying intensities (Horák 2005; Adams and Rustemova 2009; Isaacs 2010), with
Turkmenistan being possibly the most interesting case (Kiepenheuer-Drechsler 2006;
Pomfret 2006). These studies have informed a vast literature attempting to theorize the
role of a personality cult, first historically (Gill 1980; Narkiewicz 1986) and then in the
context of emerging theories in political science. They have contributed, to a fair extent,
Table 1. Four waves/definitions of nation-building.

Years Geographical focus Ideological approach
1960s New states of Asia and Modernity will erase ethnic boundaries and
Africa civic values will avoid conflicts
End of the 1970s, Western Europe and USA Desire to create even access to resources and
beginning of the economic welfare that leads to the
1980s conception of a nation-state
1990s Former USSR and Balkans Ethnic boundaries are dangerous.
Engagement with civic values will allow
consolidation of a political community
After 2001 Post-conflict countries (such If a state is unable to take care of itself,
as Afghanistan or Iraq) foreign powers must have a primary role in
promoting democracy
Source: Polese (2011a).
to the conceptualization of sultanistic regimes (Linz and Stepan 1996; Chehabi and Linz
1998) and more general studies on dictatorships (Apor et al. 2004).
This is not to say that a personality cult has never been considered a way to enhance
national identity. For example, Vladimir Putin’s cult has clearly been contributing to the
construction of a new national identity (Cassiday and Johnson 2013). However, the theor-
etical relationship between personality cult and nation-building has so far remained under-
studied and Turkmenistan, despite being an outstanding case, has not been given the
attention it might deserve. The next section will provide an overview of personality cult
measures adopted by either president so to compare attitudes and allow, in the following
section, the establishment of a link between personality cult and nation-building. The
goal is to provide a comprehensive comparison of the approach adopted by the two presi-
dents and find a direct correlation between personality cult and nation-building that has
been underexplored so far.
Personality cult features and competition

As Denison puts it, “the Ataturk personality cult embodies a set of values beyond the perso-
nage of Ataturk, whereas in Turkmenistan it has been indissoluble from Niyazov’s own pre-
dilections and idiosyncrasies materialising the organic, primordial, mystical connection
between land and people” (2009, 1176). After his appointment as head of state, president
Niyazov (also called “Serdar” – the Leader) started a modern version of “l’Etat c’est moi,”
endorsing a team of ideologues to produce the image of a highly idealized and divine
leader. Turkmenbashi (he received this honorary title in 1993) was more and more intoxicated
by the sycophantism of his surroundings and requested devotion to him at any occasion
(Kuliyev 2006, 20–21). Soon enough, all the country’s cities were filled with monuments,
busts, and billboards representing the president, who was widely celebrated in mass media.
Turkmen citizens were also required to pray an Oath of Fidelity to Turkmenistan, and person-
ally to the President, every day.2 Official sources depicted the very fact of the appointment of
Turkmenbashi to the position of First Secretary of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic
Communist Party as an appearance of the grace of God for the Turkmen people (“Serdar,”
2006) on whose command he had come to fulfill a sacred mission on Earth.3
Historians in Turkmenistan were charged with the task of matching and embedding, to
the maximum possible extent, the personal history of the president and his family with the
history of the Turkmen nation in a relationship of mutual dependency. They had to find real
or symbolic connections between President Niyazov and legendary Turkmen heroes such as
Oghuz Khan (the grandfather of all Turkmen), Sultan Sanjar (one of the khans who spread
Turkmen culture over the Asian and European continents), or the poet Magtymkuly. This
process culminated in an overemphasis on President Niyazov, celebrated as the most impor-
tant person in Turkmenistan’s history. When Ruhnama, “The Holy Book of all Turkmen,”
was published in 2001, national ideologues proclaimed Turkmenbashi “the Prophet of the
Turkmen Nation” (Ballyev and Odeyev 2001).
Despite not having presented himself as a God (at least until his death), on his journeys
around the country the president regularly demonstrated his “divine abilities” in many
ways, such as displaying his ability to predict the weather or foresee major events in the
country.4 The introduction of the Holy Book Ruhnama may be regarded as the culmination
point of Turkmenbashi personality cult. Not only was the book included as a mandatory
subject of adoration in state institutions, but it also became compulsory reading for any
kind of learning process – including driving license tests and a range of school or university
studies (Horák 2005). The main monument to Ruhnama, Ruhy mesjidi in Gypdjak (the birth
and then burial place of Turkmenbashi) turned out to be one of the most eccentric
expressions of the so-called Golden Age period: a 91-meter minaret, the highest of this
kind in Central Asia, with Ruhnama citations on the walls of the mosque and minarets,
something that goes against standard customs in most of the Muslim world.
A further campaign promoting the ancestors of the president was launched at the end of
the 1990s. National historians attempted to demonstrate connections between president
Niyazov’s ancestors and personalities from Alexander the Great to Prophet Muhammad.
The connection of Turkmenbashi’s family with the Geod Depe Battle in 1881 (considered
as the greatest defeat of the Turkmen nation) was made the object of scientific research
already in the 1990s and overemphasized in Turkmenbashi’s biography, which soon
became a mandatory school subject (Horák 2014). According to the book, one of Turkmen-
bashi’s presumed ancestors, Tangrykuly Batyr, had been killed in the Geod Depe Battle
(Detstvo i iunost’ Velikogo Serdara 2004, 142). By the time he left this world, the president’s
genealogical tree, up to seven generations, became a main element of his personality cult and
a must-know for all Turkmens. Reverence to ancestors used to be a traditional part of the
moral code for Turkmens, and Turkmenbashi used this tradition for his own ideological
image. The alleged mother and father of the President were given a dual role: they represented
both the quintessence of Turkmen-ness, the archetype of the Turkmen family of their time,
and a moral example to follow (Detstvo i iunost’ Velikogo Serdara 2004, 137). In addition,
the president’s mother, Gurbansoltan Eje, was also made into a symbol of motherhood, hard
work, and justice, to the point that a number of schools and organizations, the most important
of them being the Union of Turkmenistan Women, were named after her. The president’s
father became a symbol of the Turkmen patriot and national hero, having been killed in
World War II. His celebration included renaming of the city of Kerki (now Atamyrat, in
the east of the country) and calling the Organization of War Veterans after him. The burial
places of the alleged remains of his mother and father were “found” in Turkmenistan and
in the Northern Caucasus and their remains were moved to the Gypjak memorial complex,
which was then transformed into a pilgrimage site and a venue for official visits. After his
death, Turkmenbashi’s body was also buried in the complex.
This trend was continued by the second Turkmen president, who quickly became the
new object of sanctification, in addition to the symbol of the Great Renaissance and
Might and Happiness Period. His cult started to gradually replace that of Turkmenbashi,
although the two cults coexisted side by side in the first years (until about 2008). Although
the new president was not very keen to completely phase out his predecessor, the name of
the first leader appeared less and less frequently in the official mass media, though
occasional ceremonies such as official visits or sadaqas (commemorative feasts) still
took place in Gypjak. A large number of Niyazov’s statues and busts were kept, but
often moved to a less visible location, for instance the tripod (the Arch of Neutrality) in
2011 and the Monument of the Earthquake in 2014. The official reason provided was
that Niyazov’s Arch was being placed at the center of the new town in the southern outskirts
of the city. However, the newly established park was filled with dozens of small summer-
houses for Sunday picnics. The place remains popular for wedding ceremonies, although
new couples usually do not come here to commemorate the first president.5
The first signs of the ideological reset were observed as early as June 2007, when por-
traits and posters of President Berdimuhamedov replaced Niyazov’s all over the country on
the occasion of the president’s 50th birthday. By then a short biography of the new presi-
dent was published and the president was awarded with the specially established order of
“Watan” (Fatherland). He kept the official holiday President Niyazov had associated
with his birthday, but disconnected it from him by calling it The Flag Day (Baýdak
günü). President Berdimuhamedov became glorified in many articles, songs, and poems
and named in most cases as “The Founder,” “The Creator,” or “The Inspiration” for the
Great Renaissance. National songs celebrated the leader, with titles such as “mehriban”
(akin), “adyl jurtbashy” (fair head of state), or “howandar” (benefactor) (Babaev 2009).
The most honorable title that he received is “Milli Lider” (National Leader), and not
only was it shown in most national media, but it was also used as the title of the major
book about the president. His most popular title “Arkadag” (The Protector) was introduced
in 2010 (“Zelenyi flag otchizny,” 2010) and it quickly and widely spread to become the
main object of poems, songs, billboards, posters, TV news, and other propagandist litera-
ture all around the country already in 2011.
Crowds of people have been educated to shout the title “arkadaga shohrat” at various
occasions on the streets during the president’s participation at official events and opera
spectacles. President Berdimuhamedov took care of his own cult through extensive appear-
ances in mass media and authorship (at least officially) of several books illustrating his
qualities. These books, since the short biography was published in 2007, were gradually
incorporated into the school curricula to gradually replace Turkmenbashi’s Ruhnama
(Jurdekow 2010). The most outstanding volume is the series about medical plants in
Turkmenistan, the fifth volume of which was published in 2013. The president’s love for
Akhal-Teke horses was also reflected in the books he “authored” on the topic, which
were quickly translated into several foreign languages (Russian, English, and French) by
foreign companies hoping to win the president’s favor.6
Ruhnama became one of the major subjects of transformation between the first and second
presidents once Berdimuhamedov was elected into office. Conversely from what Niyazov
would have expected (if alive), the new president gave his oath on the Koran and the
Ruhnama only on the occasion of his first election. After his second election in 2012,
however, Berdimuhamedov held his hand on the Constitution only, thus sealing a change
in ideology in the country. As early as 2007 the Ruhnama lost its mandatory role in the
media and increasingly fewer mentions of the Ruhnama’s author were made. The book con-
tinued to be an integral part of entrance exams for university until 2014, although it was
removed earlier from school curricula as a special subject (“Entrance exams,” 2012; Esli li
u Berdymukhamedova al’ternativa Rukhname? 2014). There are rumors that a new Holy
Book, written by the current president, will soon replace the Ruhnama in the collective imagin-
ation of the country and in all its practical matters. The historical concept of the Ruhnama,
however, has remained valid and will probably serve as a basis for further historical education.
As of 2014, however, President Berdimuhamedov had not (yet) reached Niyazov’s level
with regard to monuments dedicated to himself. The only large monument of the second
president was the stone portrait in the Altyn Asyr park opposite one of the most famous Turk-
menbashi golden sculptures in Central Ashgabat. It was transformed from the previous
colonnade dedicated to Turkmenbashi into the celebration of the Might and Happiness
period. The situation seemed to change in the summer of 2014, when Berdimuhammedov’s
first sculpture was constructed in Ashgabat (“The First Monument to Turkmenistan’s second
President,” 2014; “Prezident Turkmenistana oznakomilsia,” 2014), but only the next years
will tell us what his plans are for the future.
Respect toward elders and forefathers who influence their descendants (the president in
this case) is proper in Turkmen customs, and it inspired another element of the construction of
the personality cults centered around the ideological choices of President Berdimuhamedov,
his father, and grandfather, all of whom are extensively studied by a large community of
Turkmen historians. The distinctions and glory of Berdimuhamedov’s family are mainly
located in periods prior to “The Great Renaissance” and the “Might and Happiness.” The
president’s father, Berdimuhammet Annaýew, is portrayed as a great teacher and patriot and
has had a museum and a school named after him in his native village Yzgant in the Western
Akhal region. They have been accompanied by the publication of a new biography (Mugal-
lym, esger, ilhalar ynsan 2009). Rooted in the president’s love for Akhal-Teke horses, his
grandfather’s brother, Aba Annaev, was depicted as a famous horse breeder after important
information about him was “discovered” in the National Archive (“Skakun – kryl’ia Voz-
rozhdeniia,” 2010). Two monuments in Ashgabat and Yzgant were erected to the president’s
father, who also became the object of a book written by the president himself (“V Ashkha-
badskom vuze ustanovliena statuia ottsa prezidenta,” 2010; Berdimuhamedov 2011). It is
useful to note that while these examples of the cult of Berdimuhamedov’s family show
some continuity with the political culture set up by the previous president, they are only a
small portion of what Turkmenbashi did for himself and his family.
The creation of the personality cult in Turkmenistan is the combination of several
elements. The personal character of the first president, who fell in love with the adoration
of others, can be seen as the igniting factor. However, Niyazov would probably not have
been able to reach such an extent without the background of Soviet political culture, based
on hierarchy, devotion, and sycophantism within the party starting from the central level
down to the local party cells (see, for instance, Brooks 2000). This was already visible in
Soviet Central Asia, for instance, with the cult of Sharof Rashidov in Uzbekistan or Dinmu-
khamed Kunaev in Kazakhstan.7 Convinced that a good image at the upper level is crucial to
secure a power position, he stretched this to an unprecedented level. He also adopted ideolo-
gization practices of the past (in particular the Brezhnev era in which he politically grew up),
during which he learned to use articles, books, and other tools to enhance a political image –
the Soviet leader as well as local First Secretaries (Gill 1980). During perestroika in the late
Soviet system, voices providing alternative views and analysis of the situation were weakly
visible in Turkmenistan and were quickly silenced in the country after the USSR’s dissol-
ution. This context provided Niyazov with a space for uncontrolled actions and the appoint-
ment of people keen to express their unlimited and absolute devotion that he used, in his
words, as protection against centrifugal tendencies in the various Turkmenistan regions
(Kadyrov 2003, 160–169).
The transformation of the cult from the first to the second Turkmenistani president
follows similar dynamics of transformation from the Soviet to post-Soviet system. Gurban-
guly Berdimuhamedov’s career developed in the environment of a strong personality cult
within post-Soviet Turkmenistan’s political culture. Growing up in this atmosphere, he took
over the ideological path created by his predecessor, slightly adapting the content of the cult
for his own purposes, as shown in Tables 2 and 3.
Turkmenistan: the place where personality cult and nation-building meet

The eccentric approaches of the previous section may certainly be regarded as an indicator
of the level of megalomania that both Turkmen presidents could attain. They are, however,
in our view an essential element of Turkmen nation-building and, in many respects, may be
seen falling under the category of “spontaneous nation-building,” defined as a measure not
conceived with the primary aim of impacting national identity of a population but that, for
any reason, ends up becoming an essential feature of that population’s national identity
(Polese 2009). Starting from this definition, this section will look at the intersections
between personality cult and nation-building that may have, in our view, a primary role
in identity construction.
Table 2. Personality cult compared (selected aspects).

Niyazov Berdimuhamedov
New periods Golden Age Great Renaissance
Might and Happiness
Public Official events Any possibility
appearance
Presentation Books, statues, billboards, Books, billboards, films
films, monuments
The Holy Book – Ruhnama
Titles Turkmenbashi (Head of Arkadag
Turkmens)
Beyik (the Great)
Serdar (the Leader)
Prophet
Birthday Baydak günü – the national Unofficial holiday, widely celebrated
celebrations holiday
Policies Permanent neutrality Endless neutrality
Books The Holy Book – Ruhnama Key speeches and interviews (Döwlet Adam
üçindir)
Biographies
Akhal-Teke Horses Biographies and autobiographies
Economic transformation The Medicine, health and health style of life
(Medical Plants)
Akhal-Teke Horses
Others Calendar, street, and city Slow dismantling of the previous names, albeit
names, oath not replaced by the new leader’s name
Currency The president’s portrait was on Re-evaluation of the currency phased out most
all banknotes banknotes. Nyazov was kept only on the
highest ones, which are rarely used
Family and The seven ancestors (including Cult of father and grandfather (the example for
ancestors Gök Depe Battle heroes) teachers, symbol of wisdom)
Cult of Father (symbol of
army, bravery)
Cult of Mother (symbol of
love, peace, and justice)
Table 3. Perspectives on the personality cult in Turkmenistan.

The first set of symbols used to build a personality cult that can be seen as a nation-
building instrument is linked to the creation of a new memory, focused on a president-cen-
tered account of current and past history. It fuses selective aspects of pre-Soviet and Soviet
conceptions of power and order in Turkmen tribal governance and Soviet practice (Denison
2009, 1174). Ruhnama, the Holy Book of President Niyazov published in 2001 (Volume I)
and 2005 (Volume II), has served to highlight independence and neutrality as well as the
role of the president in the process of state- and nation-building in Turkmenistan. The
text of the Ruhnama, which included Turkmenbashi’s personal biography, was intended
to underline the historical role of the president in Turkmenistan. Ruhnama also supported
Turkmen nationalism and legitimized the place of the Turkmen nation in world history. The
book has thus maintained its position as the chief and only correct historiographic work in
contemporary Turkmenistan.
This may be seen as closely related to the interpretation, reconstruction, and invention,
of history and traditions that, after Hobsbawm and Ranger [1983] (1992), an increasing
number of scholars have been addressing. The Ruhnama extensively references the
oldest ancestor of the Turkmen – Oghuz Khan, whose entry is dated to the third millennium
BCE (Turkmenbashi 2005, 80). This mythological ruler has become the patron of the new
Turkmenistan nation and is also considered to be the first in a line of Turkmen prophets,
culminating in the first Turkmen president. According to the Ruhnama, the Turkmen
founded approximately 70 dynasties, passed through Central Asia and the Near East,
which included practically all dynasties of Turkic origin so as to demonstrate the signifi-
cance of the Turkmen people in history. In contrast, the period of Russian and, later,
Soviet expansion is characterized by a certain sense of martyrdom:
In the epic, Görogly says to the vizier Balybegiň Sultan: Sultan, if you wish to destroy the
Turkmen, think about this: knock him off his horse like those who did it before. His
enemies in the past thought of this. At the end of the last century, they knocked the
Turkmen out of his saddle. (Turkmenbashi 2005, 158)
Russian culture was labeled as alien or even outright as an enemy culture. The martyrdom
of the Turkmen nation culminated in the battle for Geoktepe which, in 1881, saw the break-
down of resistance by the Akhal-Teke tribes. This was depicted as a pivotal event for the
governing elite of post-Soviet Turkmenistan (Turkmenbashi 2002, 270–273), a thing
that, however, indirectly elevated the Teke tribe from which both presidents were drawn.
The historiography of the Geoktepe battle confirms the ethnic exclusiveness of the Turk-
mens on their territory and idealized their sense of independence and freedom (Horák
2014).
Schools and education policies were directly affected by this approach. The newly adopted
version of Turkmen history quickly replaced the pro-Soviet version taught until the 1990s.
Post-Soviet independent and neutral Turkmenistan was portrayed as the culmination of all
Turkmen dynasties, which led to the prophesied Golden Age under the guarantee of the
first Turkmen president, something also contained in the prophecy of Prophet Gorogly:
The nation that travels a straight road is happy. The happiness of the nation is the basis of the
brave preservation of the country and the territory. Today, the happiness of your nation is in
your hands. Saparmurat, show the way of the golden life to the Turkmen nation. This will
be your task; this will be your way (Turkmenbashi 2002, 148)
The Golden Age of Turkmenistan became one of the principal slogans during Niyazov’s
independence period. This went well beyond school policies and the books written by
the president, or resting on a president-dictated ideological path; it became the only edu-
cational resource at the disposal of pupils.
The Ruhnama grew to become one of the three key pillars of President Niyazov’s ideol-
ogy, the other two being independence and neutrality. According to this official narrative,
gradually integrated into all educational programs throughout the 1990s, after indepen-
dence it was possible to achieve the “dream of the Turkmen nation for ages of freeing
itself from colonial might” (Turkmenbashi 2002, 70–82) and Niyazov was to take credit
for this. Like in other former USSR republics, the main goal was to blame the USSR for
any possible economic shortfall, while maintaining that an independent and sovereign
state would be capable not only of sustaining the previous social benefits, but also of
even increasing them, thanks to its external gas rents.
The limits of civic nation-building may be seen as resting in the limited availability of
symbols and historical narratives to tap in building the official narrative of the state
(Polese 2008). President Niyazov’s personality cult may be seen as a way to come out of
this dilemma since he was keen to construct a state narrative ex nihilo. It is true that he
was inspired by many personalities before him, with Ataturk in primis. However, through
his pursuit of the “art of the impossible” (Denison 2009) he was able to separate state ideology
from a particular ethnic discourse and claim that he was representing the whole Turkmen
nation, depicted in official state narratives as one single nation. This contrasted with ethno-
graphic descriptions of the country that see the Turkmen as composed of five main tribes and
power structures centered on kinship (Kadyrov 2003). This potential danger of sub-ethnic
diversity in the country was matched by, inter alia, disputes between Turkmen and some min-
orities, such as the Uzbek and Turkmen farmers near Charjou already in 1988, and showed to
Niyazov the risk of family–clan hostility (Denison 2009, 1172). This possibly led Turkmen-
bashi to construct a narrative which claimed that Turkmens (meaning all the major tribes
living on the territory of Turkmenistan) are one nation with a strong historical heritage.
Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov took up the tradition of the glorification of his own
period, which was called “The Great/New Renaissance”8 (“Pod znakom Velikogo Voz-
rozhdeniia i vseokhvatnykh reform,” 2008). Despite being initially presented as a continu-
ity of Niyazov’s Golden Age of Turkmen, the discourse quickly disassociated both periods.
The former one was presented as an ideological framework within which the Great Renais-
sance would develop (“O Konstitutsii Turkmenistana epokhi velikogo vozrozhdeniia,”
2008). The New/Great Renaissance is defined as:
… a policy of spectacular, all-embracing reforms initiated by our highly valued President of
Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, in order to strengthen and expand the economic
power of our homeland, increase the standard of living of the Turkmen people and develop all
areas of the life of the state and society without exception. This means an emphasis on progress-
ive thinking, professionalism and an innovative approach to everything touching on the inter-
ests of the people … The President of Turkmenistan is leading the way to a cardinal
transformation, receiving the warm support of his citizens and positive feedback from all
over the world. (“Politika Novogo vozrozhdeniia i Velikikh preobrazovanii,” 2007, 1)
These quotes portray President Berdimuhamedov as the central figure in the “Great Renais-
sance,” both domestically in terms of support from his own citizens, and before the inter-
national community. Indeed, in contrast to his predecessor, he adopted the habit of mingling
with other world leaders relatively frequently, something in line with the Great Renaissance
concept: openness to the world at large, designed to attract new investments and visitors to
the country.
Along with a gradual and partial lowering of the Ruhnama’s importance from official
discourse, the second president introduced a new set of values and symbols that the
Turkmen state should be based on. The first can be seen in the national constitution,
adopted in September 2008 and considered one of the major embodiments of the Great
Renaissance ideology and symbol of the new democratic development (“Vo imia sviash-
chennoi nezavisimosti,” 2008). The text incorporates one of the key slogans of the new
period – “Government for the people” (döwlet – adam uçindir) – so as to become the guar-
antor of civil peace and national reconciliation.
Convinced that the constitution was the beginning of a new era, President Berdimuha-
medov initially claimed the Golden Age to be a “transition period from the Soviet order to
democracy” (“O Konstitutsii Turkmenistana epokhi velikogo vozrozhdeniia,” 2008).
However, despite the attempt to differentiate the concept of the “Great Renaissance”
from the former ideology of Turkmenbashi, some key topics such as the celebration of inde-
pendence or neutrality remained. Berdimuhamedov did not try to portray himself as the
founder of independent Turkmenistan; his marketing strategy rotated around being credited,
and praised, for most of the main achievements of the postindependence period. The bill-
board dedicated to the 20th anniversary of independent Turkmenistan (celebrated in 2011)
mentioned the president’s successful reforms in health care, foreign policy, education,
architecture, the energy sector, and others, incidentally “forgetting” to mention president
Niyazov anywhere. In addition, whilst Niyazov invested a great deal of effort in the creation
of the idea of a common Turkmen people to replace tribal differences, this has been partially
phased out under Berdimuhamedov. This can possibly mirror the diminished risk of ethnic
clashes that was more possible under the first president, but this might also mean a new
ideological direction, with the current president supporting Akhal-Teke sub-nationalism
and Akhal-Teke tribal domination over the rest of the Turkmens and national minorities.
It is still too early to identify a new direction, but this aspect is definitely worth keeping
under observation in the near future.
The move from the “Period of Great Renaissance” to the “Period of Might and Happi-
ness” – vaguely defined as Progress, Innovation leading to Might and Happiness (“Our
Tasks Remain the Same,” 2012), may be seen as moving the official narrative from
some attempts of ideological commitment to somehow empty slogans. The common
point, however, is that all the concepts (Golden Age, Great Renaissance, and Might and
Happiness) have mostly served to cement the personal (i.e. presidential) component of
the narrative, helping the gradual establishment of a new personality cult, different in
some principles and aspects, but patterned on similar forms. For one thing, adoration
elements established by Niyazov, such as composition of songs, creation of an image as
Leader of the Nation, devotion to the president’s family, architecture, and monuments cel-
ebrating the leader, have remained milestones of the personality cult. In this atmosphere of
sycophantism we can expect further deification of the president that, whilst being a further
element detaching the country from reality, may still well serve the goal of creating brand
new cultural and political references that are difficult to reject because they are not linked to
any concepts or past ideologies. In 2014 the first statues of the president were erected and
rumors about a “Holy Book for the New Renaissance” have already appeared in some
media (Gutlyýew 2011; Ýazgulyýew 2011).
Already under Niyazov foreign policy became a major identity marker. Baky Bitar-
aplyk (The Endless Neutrality) concept was based upon neutrality recognized by the
United Nations General Assembly on 12 December 1995 (see Anceschi 2008, 2010).
It quickly became one of the pillars of Niyazov’s foreign policy, not attempting any
integration with the rest of Central Asia while allegedly granting Turkmenistan the
status of a peacekeeper in the world (Šír 2005). Internationally, it allowed the export
of Turkmen raw materials virtually everywhere, while domestically it gave Niyazov
the merit of having invented another key concept for modern Turkmenistan (Musaev
2002, 243–248). Neutrality is also mentioned in a number of official discourses by
the second president. The major national newspaper, Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan (Neutral
Turkmenistan), is both a mirror of this tendency and a way to reassert the foreign policy
of the country that claims to be a friend of all other countries in the world. Turkmeni-
stan is also proposing itself as a development-aid giver, more than receiver, with foreign
aid being sent to developing countries while international aid is being gradually
rejected.
Not all attempts to build a personality cult were so successful or gained much popu-
larity. For one thing, the renaming of the days of the week after President’s Niyazov’s
family members did not lead to a radical change in people’s perception and the names
were quickly forgotten after the president’s death.9 Ashgabat has now become the
number one city in the world for the number of marble buildings. Authorities have
been trying to give the buildings to people for some years already but have faced con-
trasting results. While locals will confirm that they are affordable, comfortable, and con-
venient, the random visitor will notice that a large amount of them are empty and they
are not as comfortable as they are supposed to be.10 This has been accompanied by
destruction of an increasing number of old houses and massive construction of large
buildings and sport complexes that celebrate the greatness of both Turkmenistan and
the president.11
The president’s passions and health issues have gradually become idiosyncratic to the
country and, in turn, may be seen as a constituent marker of a Turkmen national identity.
This has been accompanied by the paternalistic approach of both presidents, offering to
the country what they thought it most needed while disregarding what could be the real
needs of the population and setting unrealistic objectives to be met. The first thing the
casual visitor will notice in the new areas of Ashgabat is the surprisingly high number
of (state-owned) shops specializing in the needs of diabetic people. Diabetes is certainly
present in Turkmenistan, as in the rest of the world, but what the visitor learns almost
immediately is that President Berdimuhamedov is himself a diabetic. Looking after
people ill with diabetes has, therefore, become a major priority in the country in a
sort of overlap, or incarnation, between the president, the state, and his people. This
may be seen as a further specialization of a national value that President Niyazov had
already emphasized – health. A healthy nation has become one of the national objectives
serving, as in other cases, two main goals. One is to propose the president as the healer
of the nation, continuing an allegedly long tradition of miraculous healers that are cele-
brated in national historiography and through international conferences. The other is to
show the modernity of Turkmenistan and its world-level standards. The construction
of the healthy path – a road through the hills outside of Ashgabat that is supposed to
help people keep fit and healthy, has also been complemented by the construction of
new and modern hospitals and the purchase of state-of-the-art medical equipment. Presi-
dent Berdimuhamedov has continued this tradition by having himself photographed while
performing surgery in the newly built clinic.12
The anti-tobacco campaign is another example. Smoking is only allowed in restaurants
and private places, having been banned from the street and, starting from 2012, taxes on
cigarettes were exponentially increased as part of a plan to have tobacco banned and its use
made punishable on the same level as narcotics by 2016. Another example is the preva-
lence of photographs of President Berdimuhamedov performing various sports and
taking part in horse riding at least once a year. Closely linked to a healthy lifestyle, and
possibly in continuation of a Soviet ideology, sport and the love of sport have been
erected to the level of a national symbol. Large investments have been made in sport com-
plexes and stadiums, and Turkmenistan will be hosting the Asian games in 2016, making
Table 4. Links between nation-building and personality cult.

Interdependence between Strong interdependence Weak interdependence
personality cult and nation-
building elements
Language Niyazov praised himself for
phasing out the Cyrillic
alphabet, but has been unable
to go as far as to reinstate the
old alphabet
Schools Widespread images of the
president
Wide use of president authored
books or books that declare
having taken inspiration from
the president’s teachings
Media and representation The president is omnipresent

(directly or indirectly) and
overrepresented
When the president is not shown,
references to the president and
his ideologies are used
Religion Islam has been “rediscovered” as
religion and the president is
present in some prayers but
links with the religion are weak
Architecture and symbols The president is to be praised for
(museums, statues) such a clean and modern city,
there is a high number of
museums and statues that can
be linked (directly or
indirectly) to the president
History and historiography The president’s (both) figure is
rebuilt and history is
reinterpreted in a way that sees
the president, and his
ancestors, at the very heart of
Turkmen history
Culture (design of), books Book production is largely
centered around the president
as author, object of study, or
initiator of the processes
studied in the book
Political system and Ultra-presidential, not only state
institutions but also institution building is
centered around the president’s
figure
sport a national value, a source of national pride, and a way to show off Turkmenistan on
the world stage. The construction of sport complexes may also be associated with attempts
to create a nexus between architecture and national identity, as other scholars have noticed
elsewhere in the region (Fauve 2015, forthcoming).
Language is another contested territory of nation-building. In addition to phasing out
Russian as a state language, President Niyazov phased out the Cyrillic alphabet replacing
it with the Latin one. This could be seen as a compromise between ideology and
pragmatism. Ancient Turkmen was written using the Arabic alphabet, but that would be too
difficult to reintroduce. This reflects the choice made by Ataturk for Turkey at the beginning
of the twentieth century and marks an attempt to break from the (Soviet) past without
raising too many problems for the population (Table 4).
Conclusion: Quo Vadis Turkmenistan?

Neither personality cult nor nation-building is anything new in history. The novelty of the
approach proposed in this article lays in the possibility of exploring the personality cult as
a tool contributing to a nation-building project. In particular, this paper has explored the
way nation-building in Turkmenistan is perpetuated not only through traditional instruments
such as language, schools, or the construction of the past, but, and more importantly, through
the de-ethnicization of these elements. In contrast to an association of national symbols with
the past, a tribe, or an ethnic group, the production of Turkmen symbols is mostly associated
with the present and they are constructed around the figure of the president.
By avoiding discussion on, and confrontation with, some centuries of national history
and referring to a Turkmen nation already consolidated well before the arrival of modern
nation-states, the Turkmen national discourse projects a sense of civicness that is
somehow unique. In addition, by associating national identity with a presidential figure
who does not excessively display his tribal ethnic origins, we can see an attempt to
match president, people, and state that has sometimes been called “civic nation-building”
(Kuzio 2000).
There are, of course, limits to this discourse, to our approach, and to the nation-building
strategy so far adopted. Excessive symbolism has not always been matched by real
improvements in the country. In addition, there is, so far, no evidence that the existence
of expensive buildings, machines, or even planes is matched by a sufficient number of
trained personnel capable of using them properly. A further limitation is the situation of
non-Turkmen or at least non-Turkmen speakers, since the country has shown so far a
poor record of integration policies for the minorities traditionally inhabiting these territories
or even for the Russians settled in the country.
As most scholars from the region are probably aware, there is much more to be explored
in Turkmenistan, and this paper is only a first step in the study of a place that has been
understudied so far. By analyzing the patterns of personality cult, we have been trying to
give an idea of how this may be used to build a possibly unprecedented de-ethnicized
nation-building narrative that might be regarded as one of the most successful models of
civic nation-building observed in practice so far.
Acknowledgements
The authors want to express their gratitude to Rico Isaacs, Filippo Menga, and Donnacha Ó
Beacháin and the anonymous reviewers who provided invaluable comments to improve this
article.
Funding
This work was supported by the Charles University in Prague [grant number P17-
PRVOUK]; and by the European Commission Research Executive Agency, projects Trans-
for [grant number 295232-2011] and PSDEV [grant number 318961-2012].
Notes
1. Only a few works are based on relatively extensive and regular visits in the country, see Horák
(2005), Horák and Šír (2009), Ó Beacháin (2010) and Peyrouse (2012a).
2. The text of the oath was as follows:
Turkmenistan,/ My beloved motherland/My beloved homeland!/You are always with me/In
my thoughts and in my heart./For the slightest evil against you/Let my hand be lost./For the
slightest slander about you/Let my tongue be lost./At the moment of my betrayal/To my
motherland/To her sacred banner,/To Saparmurat Turkmenbashi the Great,/Let my breath
stop! (Ruhnama, 2)
3. President Turkmenbashi tried to call wind and rain during the dry season in 1992 directly at the
Cabinet of Ministers meeting. Interview by the author S. H. with former Minister of Foreign
Affairs Avdy Kuliyev, October 1999.
4. Interview, S. H., with Avdy Kuliyev, October 1999.
5. Interview by the author, S. H., in Ashgabat, April 2013.
6. This was a habit started under President Niyazov and continued by his successor
Berdimuhamedov.
7. See Cassiday and Johnson (2010) for a similar study on Putin’s Russia.
8. Or more fully, “The Epoque of the Great Renaissance, of Great Deeds, the Modernization of
Turkmenistan and All-Embracing Reforms,” sometimes accompanied by “Total Renewal of
Society.”
9. Personal communication, A. P., with a civil servant.
10. Personal communication, A. P., with a civil servant.
11. Such as the collection of gifts that the president was given by other head of states that are dis-
played as a section in the national museum.
12. http://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/_eng/?id=3797.
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On: 18 May 2015, At: 03:15

Nationalities Papers: The Journal of

A tale of two presidents: personality

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2015.1028913

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A tale of two presidents: personality cult and symbolic nation-building

Turkmenistan to discuss possible overlap between personality cult, as it has been

Keywords: Turkmenistan; nation-building; personality cult; president; Central Asia

*Corresponding author. Email: ap@tlu.ee

© 2015 Association for the Study of Nationalities

possibly, a distinctive feature of Turkmenistan in a region where personality cult by proxy

From personality cult to nation-building

Table 1. Four waves/deﬁnitions of nation-building.

Personality cult features and competition

Turkmenistan: the place where personality cult and nation-building meet

Table 2. Personality cult compared (selected aspects).

Table 3. Perspectives on the personality cult in Turkmenistan.

Table 4. Links between nation-building and personality cult.

Media and representation The president is omnipresent

Conclusion: Quo Vadis Turkmenistan?

De Juriew, Dominique. 2000. Mythes politiques et identitaires en Ukraine post-sovietique. Paris:

Kiepenheuer-Drechsler, Barbara. 2006. “Trapped in Permanent Neutrality: Looking Behind the

Šír, Jan. 2005. “O nekotorykh aspektakh ‘pozitivnogo neitraliteta’ postsovetskogo Turkmenistana.”

“Skakun – kryl’ia Vozrozhdeniia.” 2010. Ashkhabat: Turkmenskaia gosudarstvennaia izdatel’skaia

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