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DOMINIK MIERZEJEWSKI,
BARTOSZ KOWALSKI
CHINA’S SELECTIVE
IDENTITIES
State, Ideology and Culture

Global Political Transitions
Series Editors
Imtiaz Hussain
Independent University of Bangladesh
Dhaka, Bangladesh
Finn Laursen
University of Southern Denmark
Odense, Denmark
Leonard Sebastian
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Singapore, Singapore
The series publishes books dealing with important political changes within
states and in relations between states. The two key questions it seeks to
answer are: to what extent are countries becoming more democratic/
liberal, and to what extent are inter-state/inter-regional relations creat-
ing/demanding new ‘governance’ arrangements? The series editors
encourage submissions which explore local issues (where the local could
be a state, society, region) having global consequences (such as regionally,
internationally, or multilaterally), or vice versa, global developments (such
as terrorism, recession, WTO/IMF rulings, any democratic snowball, like
the Third Wave, Fourth Wave, and so forth) triggering local consequences
(state responses; fringe group reactions, such as ISIS; and so forth).
More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15583
Dominik Mierzejewski • Bartosz Kowalski
China’s Selective
Identities
State, Ideology and Culture
Dominik Mierzejewski Bartosz Kowalski
Faculty of Int’l & Political Studies Faculty of Int’l & Political Studies
University of Łódź Faculty of Int’l & University of Łódź Faculty of Int’l &
Political Studies Political Studies
Łódź, Poland Łódź, Poland
ISSN 2522-8730 ISSN 2522-8749 (electronic)

Global Political Transitions
ISBN 978-981-13-0163-6 ISBN 978-981-13-0164-3 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0164-3
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018947631
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
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189721, Singapore
Acknowledgments
Writing this title would not be possible without the support and help from
many people and institutions. The book is the result of the three-year
research project financed by the Polish National Science Center on deci-
sion no. UMO-2013/09/B/HS5/02650. During the period of prepar-
ing this book, both authors traveled and discussed various parts of the
research project with Chinese, American, and European scholars. We are
particularly grateful for all the comments and insights provided by profes-
sors Wang Yizhou (Beijing University), Yan Xuetong (Qinghua University),
David Shambaugh (George Washington University), and Vladimir
Portyakov (Russian Academy of Science). We are especially indebted to
two Polish China experts: professor Jan Rowinski, and former Ambassador
to China H. E. Ksawery Burski. Both studied and worked in China as
diplomats, and witnessed the changes in China since 1950 onwards.
v
Contents
1 Introduction: Theoretical Understanding of China’s

Selective Identities 1
2 Building China’s State Identity: Interests, Institutions,

and Conflicts 31
3 Debating China as Ideology: Marxism, Materialism,

and Own Way 97
4 Beyond the Borders: Utopia, Uniqueness, and Soft-Power 157
5 Conclusions 221
Index 233
vii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Theoretical Understanding

of China’s Selective Identities
Since the nineteenth century, due to the growing interaction with external
others, China has been facing a problem of finding a place for itself in
international society. Building an individual identity for the “state” that
tends to be “all under the heaven” (tianxia) and a civilization has been
perceived as a fundamental challenge. The then Sinocentric view, a model
of auxiliary states (fuguo) and the Confucian vision of great unity (datong)
was challenged by the Western modern state apparatus (Shang Huipeng,
2009, p. 57–58). Through interaction with external others, China had the
Westphalia nation-state centric system imposed upon it by the Western
powers. At this point, the collision between two different perceptions of
the world in the nineteenth century played an important role in shaping
China’s international behavior today. After years of being economically
backward, China is rising and, like every rising power, is attempting to
substantiate its legacy by building its own identity, and through these
means, shape its power status. Along with China’s growing economy and
greatly improved material status, Chinese authorities have raised questions
of fairness, equality, and justice. On the one hand, China shows its aspira-
tions, but on the other, it tries to meet international expectations. By
building its own set of values and identity, China hopes to protect its
national interests, create a peaceful environment for further moderniza-
tion, as well as shape its identity at the same time. The Chinese identity is
perceived as socially constructed and shaped by China’s historical
© The Author(s) 2019 1

D. Mierzejewski, B. Kowalski, China’s Selective Identities, Global
Political Transitions,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0164-3_1
2 D. MIERZEJEWSKI AND B. KOWALSKI
e xperiences. For this, Chinese leaders have shaped the principles of peace-
ful coexistence and assisting the developing world. During Mao’s time,
China developed a coherent, revolutionary identity, and tried to build a
united front with the Third World. Despite being more pragmatic and
non-revolutionary oriented, policymakers in the 1980s were reminded of
China’s principles and the need for contributing to developing countries.
During the next two decades, Beijing continuously built its economic
strength and in 2005 used the moral term “harmonious world” to describe
its actions in the world. Xi Jinping introduced new dynamics with his Belt
and Road initiative and leveraged China to become a global actor that
does business in every corner of the world.
To the surprise of Chinese policymakers, China’s macroeconomic suc-
cess has elevated China to become the world’s second-largest economy.
After China became involved in international affairs as a UNand WTO
member state, the question “who is China?” has become more evident.
The “new-old” questions raised by John K. Fairbank (1966) still remain:
“Communist China? – How far Communist? How far Chinese?” A second
important issue is how to build equal status among the family of nations.
A third issue is how to evaluate the impact of China’s vast cultural heritage
and historical experiences on China’s international behavior (Fairbank,
1966, p. 574). We also follow up on the question raised by Samuel Kim:
How constant or changeable is Chinese foreign policy over time, espe-
cially in the transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, and
why? (Kim, 1984, p. 25). From the perspective of this work, the core
question of how far China, as a rising power, is different from the West
might be considered as one of the most critical issues. Other fundamental
questions are: How does China place the United States within the format
of selective identities, and what are China’s primary reasons for group-
ing political actors with different types of identity, what for, and how was
this done? And finally, how does China build its position within the power
transition theory?
Revealing the actor’s postures and variety of foreign policy approaches
might explain behaviors in international relations. For a realist, the most
important issue is power when understood as a material factor that shapes
a state’s position in international relations, whereas for an idealist, the
dominant idea of “lasting peace” plays a more significant role. Finally, for
constructivists, identity and subjective knowledge are the driving forces of
state behavior (Ruggie, 1998, p. 855–860).
INTRODUCTION: THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF CHINA’S… 3
The above research questions and puzzles are answered and discussed
from the social constructivist perspective. Constructivists of different
approaches agree on the fundamental point that “humans see the world
through perspectives, developed socially … [meaning] reality is social,
and what we see” out there “and within ourselves is developed in inter-
action with others” (Palan, 2000, p. 571–580). According to Alexander
Wendt, constructivism in an international relationship is characterized
more specifically by its “idealism.” The structures of human behaviors
are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces,
and these shared ideas construct identities and interests of purposive
actors rather than being given by nature. Hans Morgenthau who was
named the father of political realism said: “we look over his [the states-
man’s] shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we listen in on conversa-
tions with other statesmen; we read and anticipate his very thoughts”
(Ibid.).
Social constructivism argues that the ideational structure shapes the
identity of the agent, and the structure in Wendt’s constructivism is not
material but cultural, defined by the distribution of ideas. Culture is
shared knowledge, which includes shared beliefs, understandings, and
expectations formed in the process of interaction among social beings.
The essence of international politics, in the view of Wendt, is ideas rather
than material capabilities. It adopts mainstream assumptions of construc-
tivism: cooperation among states is a social process and norms have
essential constitutive effects, with culture taking priority. The primary
model of interest and identity is transformed via interactions with exter-
nal others (Qin Yaqing, Wei Ling, 2008, p. 125). Under the constructiv-
ist approach, significant policy actions taken by the People’s Republic of
China are fundamentally based on spreading efforts to promote its status
via constructing and exercising different types of identities. As a conse-
quence, the Chinese hope to have a soft-influence and be different from
other global actors. Following the constructivist approach, it is not only
material issues that play an essential role in international relations.
Rhetoric, which is understood here as a diplomatic language and argu-
mentation, is also of crucial importance in shaping the understanding of
foreign policy motivations, especially in triangular relations conducted by
China with neighbors, significant powers, and developing countries. In
some respect, we follow the argument presented by Soren Clausen (1998)
who places Chinese identity on the trinity approach of ancient civiliza-

tion, anti-imperialist resistance, and high power status. Following this
understanding, however, we argue that Chinese character should be
understood as the trinity of culture and civilization, anti-imperialist resis-
tance based on ideological assumptions of justice and equal material sta-
tus, and the state identity which is recognized through shaping borders
and efficient administration.
The assumptions mentioned above suggest that international relation-
ships should not be explained from a short-term perspective, but rather
from a broader perspective on the issue. This kind of attitude has been
rooted in historical and social approaches to global affairs. Taking China
as an example, we have attempted to explain its behavior and motivation
by analyzing three necessary parts of an actor’s international performance:
equality status, identity, and influence. The first concept, as discussed later,
is understood as a precondition for building self in the international area.
Moreover, by shaping the equal status of self, there is a possibility of mak-
ing a coalition of identities based on a fair platform. An interaction with an
external other builds identity, but this other is anticipated by the actor,
who could shape collective identity and sameness among actors. Finally,
we debate the issue of influence and relations between shaping collective-
ness and a relatively peaceful power transition in global affairs. This
approach illustrates the complexity of China’s foreign behavior and argues
that China fails to shape its own single and coherent identity in global
issues (see Fig. 1.1).
Foreign Relations ‘EII’
Equality-------------------------------------------Identity-------------------------------------Influence
feeling equal by building the self by building its position via a

interaction with others communication with power transition process
and looking for similar others and finding and keeping out of bilateral
partners through similarities and conflicts
shaping a common differences
identity platform
Fig. 1.1 Foreign relations “EII”

Finding Equality and Reciprocity in International

Relations
Discussing the importance of equality in social life has a long tradition.
Political scientists have presented various views of equality: for some, it
means the balance of ideas, others see it as equal material status. Equality
is also defined as the correspondence between a group of different objects,
persons, processes, or circumstances that have the same qualities in at least
one but not all respects. However, the core question remains: equal in
what respect? (Rae, 1981, p. 132). Equality consists of a triangular rela-
tion between two or more objects or persons, and one or more qualities.
In other words, two objects are equal in absolute respect if, in that regard,
they fall under the same general terminus. In international relations, at the
beginning of the twentieth century, the concept of equality among nations
was rooted in the justice in international law. Lassa Oppenheim (1905)
described it through the importance of the law of nations: “Since the law
of nations is based on the common consent of states as sovereign com-
munities, the member states of the family of nations are equal to each
other as subjects of international law […] as members of the community
of nations these are equals whatever differences between them may other-
wise exist” (Hicks, 1908, p. 530–561).
The early discussion on global equality tried to shape the common
points of reference for finding and exercising balance. Edwin Dickinson’s
book, The Equality of States in International Law (1920), is perceived as
the most influential work dedicated to justice in international relations.
First, there is equality before the law which prescribes that states should be
equal under the international law. From this perspective, international
laws should be regarded as general rules for all subjects to whom the rules
apply and that all parties remain equal before the law. The second legal
idea of equality prescribes the equality of rights for all participants.
According to this concept, there can be no exclusive rights for some actors
or groups of actors, but equal voting power and representation are embod-
ied into the sovereignty concept (Hjorht, 2011, p. 2585).
Equality is often treated as an element of sovereignty or as a principle
that is derived from sovereignty. China always refers to sovereignty but
advocates it not only for itself but also for a group of countries. In this
sense China follows the understanding presented by Pieter Kooijmans
(1964) Equality should not be viewed as a characteristic of a state, but rather
as something that results from some property that the units that enjoy equality have
in common, that is, a standard descriptive property (cited after Higgins, 2012).
Taking into consideration the theoretical assumptions of building equal
status, the most crucial issue is to establish the relations based on the reci-
procity principle. Gouldner emphasized that reciprocity implies condi-
tional action: reciprocal behavior returns ill for ill as well as good for good:
“people should meet smiles with smiles and lies with treachery”—as
quoted by R. Keohane (1986). Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane
(1986) argued that heading toward equality “seems to be the most effec-
tive strategy for maintaining cooperation among egoists.” Reciprocity is
also often invoked as an appropriate standard of behavior which can pro-
duce cooperation among actors in international society. From a broader
perspective, the discussion on global reciprocity encourages discussion
about global values and standards. Universal norms and rights enforced
through internal or external sanctions are morally justified only if they can
be reciprocally justified (Keohane, 1986, p. 1–12).
In the 1980s, during the Cold War period, the question of reciprocity
was raised by the advocates of liberal free trade. In the United States, the
discussion was derived from the trade imbalance with Japan. As declared,
reciprocity means “moving toward a balance with Japan rather than a big
surplus in their account trading with us” (Keohane, 1986, p. 14). More to
the point for social scientists, reciprocal obligations hold societies together.
Participants typically view diffuse reciprocity as an ongoing series of
sequential actions which entail mutual concessions within the context of
shared commitments and values (Ibid.).
Furthermore, the concept of reciprocity is defined as any stimulus by
one actor that “may be expected to bring about a proportionate response
in kind from the other” (Richardson et al., 1981, p. 130). Although the
above-quoted definitions answer the core question of understanding,
the problem of reciprocity’s measurement remains unanswered. Going
through the literature, we acknowledge difficulties in measuring equal-
ity, and we recognize the needs to be specified in each particular case.
In international relations, the reciprocal approaches have been mea-
sured with the equivalence of benefits (Temkin, 1993, p. 8). But accord-
ing to Koehane, in international relations, as in the social world, precise
measurement is often both impossible and inadequate: “Reciprocity
refers to exchanges of roughly equivalent values in which the actions of
each party are contingent on the prior actions of the others in such a
way that good is returned for good, and bad for bad. These exchanges
are often, but not necessarily, mutually beneficial; they may be based on
self-interest as well as on shared concepts of rights and obligations, and
the value of what is exchanged may or may not be comparable” (Ibid.).
Most authors measure it by military spending analysis. These studies
attempt to determine whether power in global politics increased or
decreased its military spending in response to the trends shaped by the
adversary. The next approach of studies of the powers’ reciprocity
focuses on patterns of events rather than on military spending. These
studies analyze the causal links among countries’ cooperative or hostile
behaviors toward each other (Goldstein, Freeman, 1991, p. 19–20).
From this perspective, China is understood as the ideology, state, and
culture, and has grouped its partners according to similarities in iden-
tity, and by these means, builds a common platform for cooperation.
Through this imagined equal status, both sides of “China+” build the
reciprocal platform. The second meaning of reciprocity is an experience
in a particular and specific crisis. In fact, it might be driven by the short-
term ebb and flow of actions and reactions. The action taken to counter
the other side’s measures should be taken with a reciprocal approach
and illustrate the level of interaction. Based on this view, China groups
its neighboring countries by conflicting them with itself and by experi-
encing a territorial crisis which allows both sides to exercise reciprocity
of equal states (Ibid.).
Going further, reciprocity is recognized as a norm that establishes an
underlying level of expected behavior which serves to determine the pat-
tern of foreign policy interactions among players in international relations.
In the eyes of Schelling, there are different types of reciprocity: structural
and induced. This model assumes an ideal world where the parties’ incen-
tives are perfectly aligned. Such reciprocity exists in a world where the
players are in a purely common interest scenario. The second approach is
“induced reciprocity” and successfully binds each player’s strategy to that
of its opponent. Here, reciprocity creates symmetric constraints for the
players’ strategy. When a player chooses to cooperate, it knows and is sure
that the other player will also collaborate. It means there is no incentive
left for unilateral actions, or for that matter any other type of defensive
strategy.
Regarding the Chinese understanding of equality, the majority of
assumptions and considerations are placed within the Confucian school
that was highly focused on secular and material issues. The core concern
for those who administer and manage society and state should be the
unequal distribution of wealth. In traditional Chinese understanding, the

Confucian concept of jun fulun (均富论) is mainly based on fiscal equality,
Mozi on “mutual brotherhood” (jian xiangai 兼相爱), and Menzi on
equal distribution and mutual help. If wealth is equally distributed there
will be no poverty, and where harmony is in place, there will be no imbal-
ance in peace. Confucianism opposed the huge gap between the poor and
the rich which has become a modern tradition in the ideal of “great har-
mony under the heaven.” In this perspective, the material well-being and
equal redistribution of wealth were considered most important in manag-
ing society. Apart from its material dimensions, the potential idea of equal-
ity and reciprocity embodied in friendship and the principle of Confucian
ethics of the Three Bonds and the Five Relations is explored and also
explained in a modern way (Gao Ruiquan, 2010).
After the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established, Chairman
Mao tried to narrow the gap between rich and poor and, by applying con-
ventional socialist means of production, started to build socialism in
China. After 30 years of Mao’s reign, the experiment collapsed, and Deng
Xiaoping changed the egalitarian model into a model based on a contract
responsibility system. Deng believed that material power should be built
first, and only then could the country redistribute the wealth according to
social needs. In other words, 30 percent of the Chinese population will
become wealthy, and would then contribute to the rest of society. This
approach was based on Ward’s (1978) understanding, who claimed that
among the nations of the world: “Inequality tends to decrease as the level
of development increases. As there are no societies (…) which have both a
low level of inequality and a low level of development, neither is there any
with a high level of inequality and a high level of development.” In other
words, in the long-term development brings equality (Dye, Ziegler, 1988,
p. 45–50).
The third generation of Chinese leaders further promoted the material
approach. Jiang Zemin advocated the “distribution according to work”
approach. Based on the social needs and growing disparities inside Chinese
society, Hu Jintao (2005), for the first time in the period of communist
rule in China, equated socialism with social justice of a harmonious soci-
ety. In his opinion, without social justice, there was no harmonious social-
ist society. This concept was further promoted by Xi Jinping (2013) for
whom international justice and equality are “majestic goals” that people
from all over the world fight for. The concept of equality embodied in
mutual trust, inclusiveness, cooperation, and justice became the primary
system of values in China’s foreign policy. In the context mentioned

above, Chinese leaders follow the understanding of equality as a result of
economic development, and not a type of political system. This belief is
rooted in the material understanding of equality in development.
To conclude, we assume that as regards Chinese relations with the
external world, the first concept of equality is revealed in China’s narrative
on unequal treaties and finding a way to be equal among the family of
nations. As rightly pointed out by Beijing-based scholar Zhang Baijia in
his book Change yourself, and go to the World, the policy of Sun Yat-sen,
Mao Zedong, and Jiang Jieshi was rooted in their perception of the inter-
national system as unfair and unequal. The memory of the “Chinese and
dogs are not allowed” sign plays a significant role in shaping China’s for-
eign policy and in fact, has become the major motivation for China’s
actions in foreign policy. The major goal for the Chinese leadership was to
fight oppressors, and to join the rest of Asia in a struggle against “white
imperialist domination.” Moreover, Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, and even
Jiang Jieshi never urged the Chinese to accept the leadership of Western
or Japanese states, however friendly they might be. Although China
decided to join and become open to the world in 1978 and has since then
tried to build a relationship on a regular basis, the major perception of
injustice remains unchanged. Zhou Zunnan (1988) argues that the most
important issue for China has been to be respected and supported as a
member of international society. He said, “Due to promoting the inde-
pendent policy of peace and not supporting a superpower, China has won
respect from the international audience” (Zhou Zunnan, 1988, p. 53).
This brought the issue of identity to the Chinese leadership’s attention
and was understood as a need for identity building, maintenance, and
preservation (Zhang Quanyi, 2010, p. 217).
Discussing Self and Identity Issues

In international relations, as in the social world, an identity of self should
be defined as unity and self-evidence of an actor. The identity is usually
constructed and shaped in light of experiences indifference and by interac-
tion with the other. According to Jurgen Straub (2002), the process of
forming the identity, similar to the reciprocity concept, is inevitably con-
nected with the specific experience of crisis. On a certain level of develop-
ment, states experience domestic destabilization and foreign conflicts and
call into question the orientation that will give directions to the actions
taken by the actor (Straub, 2002, p. 60–61). On the one hand, during a
crisis, loyalty toward the state-nation and cultural system was formed, but
on the other unity and integrity were tested (Dai Xiaodong, 2006, p. 5–6).
Moreover, the inherent parts of identity include personal characteristics
such as the ability to bind anxiety, to perform efficiently in the face of tur-
moil, and self-esteem; independence of external pressure; autonomy and
self-directedness; and changes in self-esteem and conformity. The concept
of identity in sociological theories of the subject includes the idea of lim-
ited independence. In fact, the self is limited, provisional, and fragile, and
is recognized in the process of interaction with others (Straub, 2002).
The basic theories in international relationships differentiate two types
of identity: Wendtian Liberal Convergent Identity and Smittian Realist
Discrete Identity. The first type of identity involves the possibility of build-
ing a collective identity, the second places emphasis on the differentiation
between “you” and “me,” and a definition of the enemy. In line with the
first type of identity, the primary issue is about building a common plat-
form of understanding toward constructing the universal character of
China’s global behavior as the benevolent, idealistic power, while in the
second forming the enemy and the quest for being accepted are essential
(Dong Qingling, 2010, p. 69). The behavior of an international actor
should be understood via three significant perspectives: the active and
constructive participant of the international system; the actor who has no
impact on global affairs and is part of the status quo; and finally the actor
who hopes to challenge the system because it perceives itself as a non-
member of a community. Moreover, as mentioned by Qin Yaqing (2010),
the active identity is divided into three social identity subgroups: identity
forced and dominated by another as China was during the Opium War
regime and as a forced ally with the Soviet Union; the second type referred
to maintaining the identity’s stability and interests, where the actor remains
passive as in the 1980s and early 1990s when China concentrated on its
economic development; and finally when it actively participates in the
international community based on its identity and cultural heritage like
China has from the beginning of the twenty-first century (Qin Yaqing,
2010, p. 349–351). More specifically, the construction of identity, as
quoted by Chinese scholars, as in Darwinism and Marxian philosophy,
depends on an actor’s economic strength and material power. Along with
growing material power, the identity changes its face with an enhance-
ment in the level of interaction and participation in global affairs. The
creation of one’s own identity inevitably results in a quest for universal
values and builds a more comprehensive international system. This

approach is structure oriented and just like Wilsonism and Kantian should
be perceived as idealistic (Dong Qingling, 2008, p. 12).
Being a member of the international community, China faces a dilemma
of shaping its behavior. In the past, as suggested by Bennett (1976), China
had three types of cultural norms that developed its behavior: traditional,
modern, and revolutionary. However, Kenneth Lieberthal (1982) identi-
fied three approaches in Chinese foreign policy: nativist, selective modern-
izer, and technology promoter. Finally, Peter Van Ness (1970) founded a
foreign policy position and national development strategy nexus which is
embodied in the following three routes: command economy, autarky, and
market socialism (Chih-yu Shih, 1988, p. 606–607). Qin Yaqing makes
China’s identity conditional on China’s different types of activities and the
level of interaction with the outside world. He illustrates this thesis by say-
ing that during Mao’s time, China’s actions were revolutionary and that is
why China possessed the “revolutionary identity.” Contrary to this, Deng
Xiaoping “hid China’s intentions,” and the Middle Kingdom was a self-
oriented actor. Taking responsibility and being a member of major inter-
national bodies like the United Nations, World Trade Organization, World
Bank, and so on, China has changed its identity into a concept-oriented
identity. It means China has expressed its hope to contribute to the world
in the non-material sphere (Qin Yaqing, 2009, p. 99–101). As “China’s
international identity has as a serious problem. Our credibility as a devel-
oping country is ridiculous! Who are our friends? North Korea, Iran,
Myanmar, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Venezuela! We have a big problem. We do
not have a priority identity. We have no main identity in the world so we
cannot prioritize. Who are we?” Once China knows is single identity
Chinese authorities can define China’s national interests. Contrary to this
statement, Wang Guangya, the former China UN ambassador, “China still
considers their [developing countries] position and our concern is closer
to the G77” recognizing China’s global identity as very complicated and
not fixed (Shambaugh, 2013, p. 215).
The non-material sphere is transmitted through the language used in
declarations, statements, and discourse, and by action and international
activity (Sun Jisheng, 2007, p. 63–74). In transferring the social definition
of identity into international relations, the actor’s character is associated
with a collection of discursive practices, including language with vocabu-
lary, written or verbal, and characteristic behaviors such as gestures, a spe-
cific reaction to others, and conducting policy in terms of its own cultural
pattern (Hopf, 2002, p. 1–2). The statesmen’s particular uses of language

situate their states nationally, and, especially in a stratified world, accord-
ing to their system of values. The usage of language, one or another,
locates them in international affairs. Discourse can be defined as interre-
lated texts, conversations, and practices associated with a particular object.
In this study, we adopt the standard meaning of discourse analysis depend-
ing on the context within which the text is produced and published
(Philips, Hardy, 2002, p. 34–38). According to another definition, iden-
tity is conjoined with language and is understood as the linguistic con-
struction of membership in one or more social groups or categories. More
to the point, according to Peter Burke, language is one of the most impor-
tant signs of identity. Speaking or using the same language and same
notions is a simple and effective way of indicating solidarity. On the other
hand, speaking a different language is an equally valid way of distinguish-
ing oneself from other individuals or groups (Palan, 2000, p. 577–581).
In the Chinese context, the role of rhetoric was somewhat passive and was
perceived as a tool to restore public order. Barton Watson discusses the
issue in the following words: “public address and discussions of rhetoric in
China before the third century BCE are almost totally concerned with
efforts to restore order to society, to induce rulers to act wisely, justly, and
compassionately toward the people, to encourage the public to respond
with loyalty to the regime, and to perpetuate ancient traditions in ritual
and social relationships” (cited in Mierzejewski, 2013, p. 7).
Moreover, the importance of discourse was presented by Barbara
Biesecker. She notes “the power of persuasive discourse” is “to constitute
audiences out of individuals, to transform singularities into collectivities,
to fashion a ‘we’ out of a plurality of ‘I’s,’ and to move them to collective
action.” For Pierre Bourdieu, power is manifested through a structured
discourse—an active phenomenon that rests upon accumulated capital
(status) and mediating the body (Ibid.). The language here has the indi-
vidualized potential to shape the meaning for an individual, and rhetoric
contains the capacity to advocate and shape the identity. McGee is right to
argue that “Virtually nothing about rhetoric is innocent of this power.
Pick any rhetorical principle, and we’ll put it on the table, and I’ll show
you how it’s connected with power” (Rufo, 2003). This conceptualization
of the role of language in shaping identity bridges the gap between passive
materiality and active discourses of power, allowing for a complete under-
standing in the particular case of China’s three types of identification.
According to scholars Janice Bailly Mattern and Ludwik Wittgenstein,
language itself is the power that has shaped the international system, and
the system is a material product of non-material factors. Argumentation
and communication are not merely elements of international order but in
fact are the source of global society (Guzzini, Leander, 2006). Without
language nothing is possible. Furthermore, domination in the sphere of
language has provided a basis for the construction of a truth regime (Sun
Jisheng, 2007, p. 65). Following this understanding, language might play
a role in shaping bilateral and multilateral relations, placing pressure or
building peaceful and harmonious relationships. On the other hand, as
mentioned by Ivere Neumann, we assume that language makes points of
reference and contextualizes reality (Stenseth, 1998, p. 29–30).
Although Chinese identity was shaped by its interaction with Manchu
since the seventeenth century, the significant factors that created China’s
status are contained in the Middle Kingdom’s understanding of its past
both from the nineteenth century and regarding itself as a victim of the
West like other colonial countries, as well as by building relationships with
developing countries. The influential factors shaping China’s international
identity are: history—the mentality of a significant power but also the
complex of a victim and the memory of being defeated; state-oriented fac-
tors: material power and ideological independence; international-oriented
elements: international systems, global processes, and the psychological
profile of the leadership (Zhou Pinyun, 2006, p. 396–402). The growing
interaction with outside actors has provoked China to formulate its system
with its values, drawing the border between “I” and “he” and finally
strengthening the uniqueness of the actor. The identity was formed in the
process of movement and interaction. As mentioned by Pan Wei (2010)
due to the contacts with others, the Ming and Qing Dynasties identified
themselves as different from foreigners. The next step was taken after the
Opium Wars. Although the late Qing dynasty took the pro-nation state
reforms, in 1905 China officially established the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and turned away from its tributary system. After being forced to
join the Westphalia system, China experienced the first crisis and dilemma:
why had the Middle Kingdom been defeated by “barbarians”? The unequal
treaties and “one hundred years of humiliation” created a basis for shaping
China’s identity. According to Kang Youwei, the biggest challenge for
China’s tributary system was not even caused by the Western powers but
by the Japanese victory in 1895. The subordinate defeated the superior.
China’s next identity crisis was when it was part of the coalition with the
Soviet Union in the early 1950s. Mao’s China needed to shape its own
identity contrary to that of “big brother” which finally led to Mao Zedong
presenting a new form of utopian government during the Cultural
Revolution (Xu Zhouyun, 2010). The Chinese felt and were perceived as
the “other” in the state-oriented system. However, breaking with mistrust
and suspicion became the dominant theme of China’s identity as a positive
power. This was the consequence of China’s post-Mao identity and the
country’s strategy of step-by-step development. The next crisis in the era
of reform arrived after the Tian’anmen 1989 isolation, with the US and
European embargo becoming the catalyst for the breakthrough concern-
ing China realizing its differences. At that time Deng Xiaoping announced
taoguang yanghui—a low profile concept as the leading principle of
China’s foreign behavior. After being in the shadow of the West, the
Chinese leadership tried to shape China’s new identity in two different
ways: using military tools and economic interdependence. The first unsuc-
cessful attempt of venturing out into the world after 1989 was the Taiwan
Crisis in the mid-1990s. The use of military forces signaled China’s readi-
ness to become a member of the international order. However, the failure
of re-joining the world via military means proved that the idea of peaceful
coexistence via trade should have been exercised through Chinese diplo-
macy (Yan Xuetong, 2014). As mentioned by Men Honghua (2007),
because of the Asian crisis and the passive stance that China adopted as it
came out of the shadow of isolation, it failed to respond to the American
military domination manifested for example by the bombing of China’s
Embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo War (Liu Mang, 2007, p. 147).
The needs of being different from others pushed China into portraying
and repeating the peaceful image of its international behavior. Its level of
interaction with the world and its embracing of globalization have gener-
ated some challenges and obstacles for China’s idealistic vision of the
world. After Washington was engaged in the war against terrorism, China
was named as a responsible stakeholder by Robert Zoellick in 2005. As a
brief observation states, although China compromises on some issues, it
mostly sticks to its principles. The problem should be explained by the
social approach framework. Apart from language and rhetorical strategies,
China shapes its behavior based on principles rooted in the 1950s’ narra-
tive of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, namely: mutual respect
for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-
aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equal-
ity, and cooperation for mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence (Zhou
Enlai, 1954).
The above-mentioned definition allows us to conclude that identity is

made of a set of values and principles. Principles have become a coherent
part of a global actor’s behavior. Usually, principles are ideality-oriented
and reveal wishes, desires, and plans. States, as with human beings in
social science, check on their activities, status, and qualities and compare
perceptions against reference values. If the opinion of behavior differs
from what they intended to do, the outcome typically manifests itself in
a change in behavior. Principles are an underlying platform for action in
international society. They are aspects of practice for which we have
names in the diplomatic language such as benevolence, honesty, respon-
sibility, thrift, and experience. Principles specify qualities that can be
manifest in acts of many types. These specific activities are driven by fac-
tors behind an actor’s international behavior and play the dominant role
in the perception of this actor in the eyes of external others (Carver,
2009, p. 27–30).
Despite being idealistic, identity plays a vital role in shaping our world
and affects actors by making them interdependent. Since identity has not
been formed in a clear-cut manner, the influence of an actor on the inter-
national stage is perceived as chaotic and casts doubt on its intentions. The
question remains how the PRC would like to achieve its status via its inter-
action with others and whether and what kind of identity or identities the
country needs to go through during the peaceful transition of power. As
mentioned by Su Changhe (2010), China earns its position in global
affairs by building a coherent identity. The absence of this cohesive iden-
tity would cause global public opinion to doubt China’s intentions.
Moreover, coherence will make China more active in global affairs, which
to a certain extent would challenge Confucian passiveness. As mentioned
by Yu Xintian (2010), the PRC’s identity was, paradoxically, coherent dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution. By linking China’s identity with fighting
against revisionism, revolution, and anarchism, Mao has tried to build its
international status. Since 1978 China should have created its coherent
identity by taking peace, development, cooperation, and human rights as
the banner of global citizenship. The Communist government should
have departed from its communist rhetoric, values based on Marxism, and
communist nomenclature. Only by referring to cultural values will China
be able to build coherent universal values of all human beings (Yu Xintian,
2010, p. 175–176).
The primary argument here is that Chinese identities are culturally
constructed in the sense that China has failed to build its identity as one
single self-entity but has grouped other players into one basket with
China. This situation is visible in each particular case of being a state, a
civilization, and an ideology. In the first case, China’s state identity is
shaped by two processes: first by Chinese foreign investment and the
need for protecting its people, and second by experiencing territorial
disputes with neighbors, especially with Japan. The second type of iden-
tity was based on the group of developing countries where the Middle
Kingdom is placed among equals which shared a similar historical back-
ground and experiences. Here the core ideas of justice and equality have
been transmitted. By being together with developing countries, the PRC
allows itself to find equal partners in international relations. The third
chosen cultural identity allowed China to play the role of an equal part-
ner in its relations with Europe and the United States. From the per-
spective discussed earlier, China feels comfortable with being among the
developed countries and can enjoy its status. Moreover, the understand-
ing of the selective identities of “three in one” (san weiyiti 三位一体)
means that China is not eager to play a dominant role by itself but rather
within a group of countries. This approach reflects both China’s inclu-
sive approach and its very cautious strategic tactics. On the one hand,
this method is rooted in the Chinese culture of inclusiveness that is
focused not only one country but also on inviting countries with similar
historical experiences, cultural heritage, and need to build statehood as
well as identities. However, this approach is also a product of China’s
interaction with different types of actors. By conducting relations with
developing and developed countries as well as its neighbors, China
shapes its identities. The process of communication is, in fact, a method
of establishing relations and also a means of mutually influencing and
reshaping each other’s identity and interests. Any identity is path-depen-
dent and subject to the flux of historical events and processes. Since the
era of reforms in 1978, China has changed not only in behavior but also
in identity, both of which are interrelated and correlated. China has
struggled over the threshold of becoming a member of international
society and has evolved in the last three decades from a revisionist power
to one that was detached before finally becoming a status quo power.
The identity shift, the institutional selection, and norm acceptance have
all been peaceful. The triangular identity presents itself as a core, domi-
nant approach that allows China to raise peacefully (Zhu Liqun, 2010,
p. 38–40).
Shaping Collective Identities and Power Transition

Quandaries
In the case of China, as argued before, the pre-requisite condition for
building its international character and developing its position in interna-
tional relations is to create equal status within the global society. As our
argument states, China failed to establish its fair status based on bilateral
relations and prefers to group partners into three different types of iden-
tity cycles. By grouping other actors, China can exercise its power within
this group of equal partners. This allows China to go through the process
of power transition in a relatively peaceful way. From this perspective at
least two approaches should be discussed, firstly the collective identity and
secondly the power and power transition theory.
In this regard, Alberto Mellucci’s (1996) understanding describes col-
lective identity as an interactive and shared definition produced by several
interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientation of their
actions as well as the field of opportunities and constraints in which their
efforts take place. Within this framework, the actor has tried to formulate
a cognitive framework concerning goals, means, and environment of
action; conduct active relations among participants; and build emotional
recognition between individuals. In fact, the idea of collective identity is
grounded in a variety of traditional sociological concepts, starting from
Durkheim’s “collective conscious” to Marx’s “class consciousness.” It
“addresses the ‘we-ness’ of a group, stressing the similarities or shared
attributes around which group members coalesce” (Cerulo, 1996, p. 386).
In organizational research, collective identity has predominantly been
explained as members’ beliefs about the central, enduring, and distinctive
attributes of their organization (Hardy, Lawrance, 2005, p. 58–77). The
collective identity is based on the same processes as the above-discussed
discourse-self nexus. The collective identity is produced via the creation of
texts, and on the relationship of collective identity as a discursive object to
patterns of action. Following this perspective, the collective identity is not
naturally generated but socially constructed: it is the intentional or non-
intentional consequence of interactions which in turn are socially pat-
terned and structured. In fact, as with the individual self, the collective self
produces and constructs boundaries between “we-ness” and “other-ness”
(Eisenstadt, Giesen, 1995, p. 72–102).
Elaborated more fully, we define the collective identity of a social move-
ment as the participants’ shared sense of a movement as a collective actor
and as a dynamic force for change that they identify with and are inspired
to support through their actions. The collective identity develops within
an imagined world or, to use another term, a figured world (Holland et al.
1998). The definition of collectiveness is based on two primary dimen-
sions: belonging and action. Standard definitions of collective identity in
anthropology and other social sciences emphasize identity concerning dif-
ference. This approach assumes that people who are considered culturally,
racially, ethnically, nationally, or in some other way are distinctive in that
they have a basis for solidarity and individual belonging. In international
relations, similar to the process of building collective self through the
nation-state paradigm, we acknowledge that collective identity is placed as
an important pillar of the current international scene. This process is par-
ticularly visible in big power politics. On the one hand, building coalitions
is based on material premises, but on the other is supported by values,
understanding, and finally as identity platforms. By grouping countries
together, either by their own decision or by third parties, new alliances or
blocs form through the collective identity assigned to them, even if some-
times this assignment is based on inaccurate binary groupings. Regardless
of the accuracy of these groupings, the very act of grouping these countries
affects how the international system views them and thus treats them. This,
in turn, causes the countries to identify with each other regarding their
common position internationally. Following A. Wendt (1999), understand-
ing the corporate/collective identity of the state generates four basic inter-
ests or features: “physical security, including its differentiation from other
actors, ontological security or predictability in relationships to the world,
which creates a desire for stable social identities, recognition as an actor by
others, above and beyond survival through brute force, development, in
the sense of meeting the human aspiration for a better life, for which states
are repositories at the collective level” (Wendt, 1999, p. 384–396).
The first step in the process of building collective identity is the increas-
ing interdependence among entities that interact with each other. This can
take on at least two forms. One discussed by Buzan (1983) and Ruggie
(1983) is an increase in the “dynamic density and substance” of interac-
tions due to, for example, trade and capital flows. This provides the emer-
gence of a “common other,” whether personified in an external aggressor
or a more abstract threat like nuclear war or ecological collapse (Lasswell,
1972, p. 24). While one generates “dilemmas of common interests” and
the other “dilemmas of common hostility” (Stein, 1983), both increase
the objective vulnerability and sensitivity of actors to each other (Keohane,
Nye, 1987). The first approach might be illustrated by investments of

transnational companies or sovereign wealth funds as in the case of China
and which characterizes China-Africa relations. The second is visible in the
history of the NATO-Warsaw Pact during the Cold War period, and in the
current balance of military power in the South China Sea.
Going further into more systemic processes, the collective identity for-
mation is encouraged by the transnational convergence of domestic val-
ues. This can take place in various issue areas, but two of the most salient
are cultural and political, for example, the American model of liberal
democracy and the Chinese model of development. To put in a nutshell,
the societal convergence can result from rising interdependence, in which
case, its effects will be hard to separate from the latter.
As it has been argued, the most critical aspect of China’s building of its
peaceful influence, transition, and exercise of power in the international
arena is building a coalition of collective identities. When discussing
power, we understand the ability of a state to impose on or persuade
another state to comply with its will. Power is achieved through the com-
bination of a state’s population, this population’s economic productivity,
and the ability of its government to mobilize these aspects efficiently and
efficiently. John Kenneth Galbraith in Anatomy of power distinguishes
three types of power: first, “deserve power” (condign power), by using
threats and punishment to ensure the other side’s obedience in its ability
to act; second, the “compensation of power” (compensatory power), by
using rewards and prizes to obey self-ability to act; third, “about as power,”
by shaping the beliefs and preferences of other’s influence on the ability to
act. In the context of the identity-influence nexus, power is the ability of
one actor: “to induce forces on the other, toward or against movement or
change in a given direction, within a given behavior region, at a given
time.” Two conditions are necessary for the actor to have power over the
other: first, the other must have needs or goals which it feels can be satis-
fied or attained with the help of another’s resources but not without such
assistance, second, the other must perceive the actor as having resources
which might be made available to it. Power and authority are similar con-
cepts in the case of dealing with the ability of one social entity to influence
or affect the behavior of another (Wolfe, 1959, p. 99–101).
In the process of rising and attaining position, the core question is: how
to conduct a prosperous and relatively peaceful means of persuasion, and
what kind of argument is used? From this perspective, China exercises its
different types of identity in order to build its position and escape from
global conflict during the process of power transition. The above-discussed

power concept is bonded with the power transition theory. The primary
argument of the power transition theory posits that war is likely when a
challenger approaches power parity with the dominant actor. A. F.
K. Organski, in War and Change in World Politics (1958), argued that
bipolar systems are unstable because rising powers tend to be dissatisfied
with the systems organized by the dominant forces or hegemon. In this
context, the balance-of-power system fails to provide stability and becomes
the system that builds conflict and confrontations. In developing their
model of power transition, Organski and Kugler (1980) used GNP to
indicate the strength of a nation and found support for their thesis
among major powers that they considered contenders for hegemony in
global affairs. This implies that the realist theory of the balance-of-
power approach predicts that the international system will be peaceful
if no nation is allowed to acquire predominant strength. Breaking this
consensus, it is argued, could lead to a global war, by a rising hegemon
that challenges the position of existing power. According to the power
transition theory, “The dominant nation and the challenges are very
likely to wage war on one another whenever the challenger overtakes in
power the dominant nation” (Organski, Kugler, 1980). Following this
argument, Organski argues that the aggressor will come from a small
group of strong but dissatisfied countries; and it is the weaker, rather
than the stronger power that is most likely to be the aggressor. But all
presented analyses are based on the experiences from the same cultural
cycles. In other words, the examples of rising and declining power
within the power transition theory are only based on Western exam-
ples. The second important challenge is that in the original concept,
Organski did not include the effects of alliances and believed that the
dominant power would pre-empt in anticipation of any attempt to
overtake it. This perspective supports the argument that while rising
China has no single identity, it does have at least three types of identi-
ties as a rising power. From the above-mentioned understanding, the
PRC will not be perceived as a single power that challenges the inter-
national system but rather as part of those group of entities shaped by
China. On the one hand, creating three types of identity allowed China
to escape from being labeled a dominant power that maintains domi-
nance by establishing its own system, and on the other allows to be a
leader within three different international societies. By applying
the three fold identity, China can maintain the status quo peacefully,
rather than enforce its will on partners. To a certain extent, China fol-
lows this understanding based on power transition, when a dominant
power leads by creating satisfaction rather than fear, cooperation rather
than conflict, and the sharing of resources rather than fights over
resource allocation. The core problem for China in constructing its ris-
ing status is how to escape from the Western logic of rising powers? As
history teaches us, dominant powers consider preventive wars as the
most important means of eliminating the threats and challenges posed
by rising powers. On the other hand, the hegemon can respond by
reducing commitments, forming new alliances, rapprochements, and
appeasing challengers.
Following the constructivist approach rather the realist perspective, we
embed the power transition within the international society concept.
From the constructivist perspective, China became a member of global
society that is defined by Watson as a group of states or political communi-
ties which form a system by dialog and shared principles and institutions
for the conduct of their relations (Zhang Yongjin, 1991, p. 3–16).
Following Watson’s understanding, international society is a particular
form of human association that is thought to include and somehow orga-
nizes the relations among different political communities. Hedley Bull
once wrote that an international society exists when “a group of states,
conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society
in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set
of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of
community” (Watson, 1987, p. 149). By articulating the research agenda
based on China’s three selected identities, we argue that China builds
three different types of international society. It goes against globalization
understood as unification and Americanization and presents a kind of
alternative to existing world orders. This approach is rather based on
China’s cultural narrative of unity in diversity, a world for all human
beings, or a more utopian understanding of “great unity” (datong).
Within this framework, China builds and exercises its social influence.
The concept of social impact is recognized as the process by which indi-
viduals make real changes to their feelings and behaviors as a result of
interaction with others who are perceived to be similar. In this concept,
the social power concept is described as an individual’s potentiality for
influencing one or more other persons toward acting or changing in a
given direction. According to this definition, social power is the ability to
exert interpersonal influence (Levinger, 1959, p. 83).
Following the steps taken by China in building its social influence,

the Chinese government uses this approach to shape its interdepen-
dence in international relations. Interdependence advocates, for exam-
ple, argue that a hegemonic actor is required for peace because it can
unilaterally impose rules that secure stability. In this perception, the
most significant point of reference is the current hegemonic power—the
United States. From this perspective, China has been building a multi-
polar world through multilateral platforms. Multilateralism is under-
stood as the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three
or more states. Ye Zicheng, the Beijing-based scholar (1998), defined
multipolarization (duojihua 多极化) as hua—process, and changes. In
this regard, the Chinese have placed multipolarity as a process of adjust-
ment of China’s position in the changing global order, contrary to a
unipolar world led by the United States and as an essential focal point in
the worldwide balancing of powers. Contrary to multipolarity, Qin
Yaqing (2001) defined multilateralism (duobian zhuyi 多边主义) as sta-
ble, with a solidly principled institutional system with nation-states as
the core element. But the discussion on a multipolar world started in
January 1986 when Huan Xiang claimed that because the Cold War
conflict had become relatively static, the superpowers were losing their
ability to control their camps and therefore political multipolarity was
increasing. The undertaken analysis proved the thesis that the US expe-
riences in Vietnam and the Soviet Union’s in Afganistan demonstrated
that both superpowers’ power was limited. The collapse of the Soviet
Union was the event that allowed the People’s Republic of China not to
follow a single power policy but rather group partners and bind them
together with China. In their analysis, the Chinese leadership usually
perceived multipolarity through the lenses of five powers the United
States, Russia, China, Japan, and Europe. The balance between the five
powers and the adjustments of each respective power’s policy toward
each other should be understood as the only way to stability. Stability is
defined as the probability that the system retains all of its characteristics
and that no single nation becomes dominant, and that the majority
of its members continue to survive with the avoidance of large-scale
war. From a particular actor’s standpoint, stability is related to the
perspective of securing its sovereignty, political independence, and territo-
rial integrity. The asymmetrical approach followed by realism and neo-realism
assumes that a more powerful country can usually impose their power and
will on a less powerful country (Guzzini 2012). As Kenneth Waltz argued,
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por bonparoli pri ĝia amiko; ĝia malantaŭa voĉo por elparoli
malpurajn vortojn kaj kalumnion. Se la vina enhavo de mia
botelo povos resanigi ĝin, mi ĝian febron kuracos. Nun, amen![6]
Mi tuj verŝos iom en vian alian buŝon.
Trinkulo.
Stefano! . . .
Stefano.
Ĉu via alia buŝo vokis al mi? . . . Di’ kompatu! kompatu! . . . Tio ĉi
estas ne monstro sed diablo! Mi tuj forlasos ĝin; mi ne posedas
longan kuleron![7]
Trinkulo.
Stefano! (se vi vere estas Stefano!) Tuŝu min kaj parolu al mi, ĉar mi
estas Trinkulo—(ne timu!)—via bona amiko Trinkulo!
Stefano.
Se vi estas Trinkulo, elvenu! . . . Mi detiros vin per la malpli longaj
kruroj; se iaj el ili apartenas al Trinkulo, tiuj ĉi estas ili. Vi ja
estas Trinkulo mem. Kiel okazis tio, ke vi fariĝis dorso al tiu ĉi
monstro?
Trinkulo.
Mi pensis ke ĝi estis mortigita per fulmofajro. Sed, ĉu vi mem ne ĵus
dronis, Stefano? Mi nun esperas, ke vi ne dronis. Ĉu la
fulmotondro estas pasinta?—Mi min kaŝis sub la kitelego de l’
monstro pro timo de la fulmotondro. Ho; ĉu vi tamen estas viva,
Stefano? Ho, Stefano! du Neapolanoj savitaj!
Stefano.
Ne tro puŝu min, mi petas; mia stomako ne tre firme agas.
Kalibano.
Belaĵoj, tiuj ĉi! Ĉu ne spiritoj? . . .
Mi genufleksu al vi, dio brava,
Pro la likvoro inda je ĉielo!
Stefano.
Kiel vi foriris? Kiel vi venis tien ĉi? Ĵuru, per tiu ĉi botelo, kiel vi tien ĉi
venis! Per tiu ĉi botelo (kiun mi faris el arboŝelo, per miaj propraj
manoj, post kiam mi estis trafinta la bordon) mi mem fornaĝis
sur barelo da kanarivino, kiun la maristoj elĵetis al la maro.
Kalibano.
Mi tuj ĵuros, per tiu botelo, ke mi fariĝos via fidela subulo, ĉar ne
terdevena estas la likvoro.
Stefano.
(Al Trinkulo) Tien ĉi! ĵuru do kiel vi foriĝis.
Trinkulo.
Karulo, mi naĝis al la bordo, kiel anaso. Mi povas naĝi kiel anaso;
tion mi ĵuras!
Stefano.
Nu! kisu la libron![8] Kvankam vi povas kiel anaso naĝi, vi tamen
havas la mienon de ansero.
Trinkulo.
(Trinkinte) Ho, Stefano! Ĉu pli da tio ĉi estas?
Stefano.
Tutan barelon mi havas, maljunulo. Mia kelo sidas en ŝtonego ĉe l’
marbordo, kie mia vino estas kaŝita. Nun, monstro, kiel
kuraciĝas la febro?
Kalibano.
Ĉu ne falis vi de la Ĉielo?
Stefano.
De la luno, mi certigas. Mi iam estis lunloĝanto, dum kelka tempo.
Kalibano.
Mastrino montris vin, la hundon, l’ arbetaĵon;
Mi vidis vin en ĝi, kaj vin mi nun adoras!
Stefano.
Bonege! tion ĵuru! kisu la libron.[9] Mi tuj replenigos ĝin per nova
enhavo! ĵuru!
Trinkulo.
Per la sunlumo! tio ĉi estas naivega monstro! Ĉu mi ĵus timiĝis pro
ĝi? Malsprita monstro! La lunloĝanto! ha! ha! Kia kredema
monstro! Bone vi suĉis, monstro, vere.
Kalibano.
Mi ĉiun fruktan colon sur l’ insulo montros:
Piedon vian kisu mi! Di’ estu mia.
Trinkulo.
Per la taglumo! Perfidega kaj drinkema monstro! Kiam ĝia dio
dormos, ĝi de li ŝtelos la botelon.
Kalibano.
Mi tuj kisos vian piedon; tuj via subulo mi mem ĵuros.
Stefano.
Venu do; genufleksu kaj ĵuru!
Trinkulo.
Mi mortiĝos per rido je tia azenidkapa monstro. Kia malestimebla
monstro! Mi preskaŭ volus ĝin bati . . .
Stefano.
(Al Kalibano) Venu! kisu.[10]
Trinkulo.
. . . nur ke la mizera monstro estas ebria. Abomena monstro!
Kalibano.
Mi fontojn montros, mi eltrovis berojn,
Por vi fiŝkaptos, kaj alportos lignon.
Ho! peston al tirana mastro mia!
Mi ne lin servos plu, sed vin mi sekvos,
Ho, mirigulo!
Trinkulo.
Monstro ridindega! ĝi faras mirindaĵon el malnobla drinkulo!
Kalibano.
Vin mi kondukos kie la pomarboj
Fruktege kreskas—Per ungegoj miaj
Elfosos trufojn, garolneston montros,
Kaj vin instruos por sciuron trafi,
Mi vin trovigos la avelarbaron,
Kaj foje sur ŝtonego mevojn kaptos . . .
Ĉu vi nun volas veni?
Stefano.
Ho, mi petas,
Antaŭen tuj, kaj plu ne vorton diru.
Trinkulo, ĉar la reĝo kune kun niaj aliaj kunmarveturantoj ĉiuj dronis,
ni tie ĉi heredos. (Al Kalibano) Portu mian botelon. Post ne
longe, kunfrato Trinkulo, ni ĝin replenigos.
Kalibano.
(Kantas ebriule) Adiaŭ, mastro, mastro, adiaŭ.
Trinkulo.
Monstro blekeganta! Drinkema monstro!
Kalibano.
(Laŭte kantas).
Mi por fiŝo ne plu faros digon,
Nek alportos lignon,
Nek ĝin eĉ ekfajros,
Nek pletegon gratos,
Nek teleron lavos!
Ban! ban! ban! Ka-Kalibano, kantu:
Novan mastron amu,
Ne tiranon timu!
(Ekkriante) Libereco! he! ho! Libereco! libereco! he! ho! libereco!
Stefano.
Ho, brava monstro, nun, antaŭen marŝu!
(Ili foriras).
Akto III.
Sceno 1.—Antaŭ la ĉambreto de Prospero.
(Venas Ferdinando portanta ŝtipon).
Ferdinando.
Labora ludo havas ĉarmon agan;
Humila tasko rekompencon celas.
Mizera estus mia nuna stato,
Se la mastrino, kiun mi obeas,
Al koro mia ne redonus vivon;
Ŝi, dolĉulino, penon plezurigas.
Dekoble por mi estas ŝi pli bona
Ol ŝia patro maldolĉema ŝajnas:
Li min devigas, per kruela povo,
Alporti milojn da ŝtipegoj tie
Kaj altan mason per ĉi tiuj fari.
La karulino—kiam ŝi min vidas
Sub peza ŝarĝo pene laciĝantan
Plorege diras: Humilega tasko
“Faranton havis noblan pli, neniam.”
Forgesas mi: sed tiuj dolĉaj pensoj
Laboron ĉarmas kaj l’ animon mian
Pli okupadas, ol fortuzo korpon.
(Venas Mirando, kun Prospero malproksime).
Mirando.
Ho ve! mi petas, tiel ne penadu!
Ke Dio volu per la fulmofajro
Bruligi ŝtipojn ĉiujn kolektotajn!
Demetu tion; tie ĉi ripozu.
La ŝtipoj ploros kiam ili brulos,
Ĉar ili vin lacigis. Mia patro
Atente legas nun; mi petas, sidu:
Ne trudos li vin dum de nun tri horoj.
Ferdinando.
Mastrino kara! eĉ la sun’ subiros
Hodiaŭ, antaŭ ol mi povos fari
La taskon devigitan.
Mirando.
Se vi volas
Sidiĝi tie, mi la ŝtipojn portos.
Demetu tion kaj al mi tuj donu:
En mason ĝin mi lokos.
Ferdinando.
Ne, karega!
Preferus mi muskolojn miajn kraki,
Aŭ spinon rompi ol vin vidi tiel
Humile penadantan, dum mi sidus
Mallaboreme.
Mirando.
Al mi bone decus;
Ja, kiel al vi tiel:—pli facile . . .
Ĉar estus en l’ afero mia volo,
Sed ne la via.
Prospero (flanken).
Ina kreitaĵo!
Vin ankaŭ trafis nun, l’ aminfektado!
Mirando.
Vi ŝajnas laca.
Ferdinando.
Ne! mastrino nobla,
Por mi la nokto ŝajnas la mateno
Se staras vi proksime. Mi petegas—
Precipe ke preĝante mi ĝin povu
Esprimi—diru al mi vian nomon!
Mirando.
Mirando. (Flanken) Patro mia, mi forgesis:
Kaŝitan tion ĉi vi volus gardi.
Ferdinando.
Mirando! plej el ĉiuj admirinda!
Plej kara el plej karaj tra la mondo!
Multegajn sinjorinojn mi ekvidis:
Tre ofte eĉ belsona ina voĉo
Sklavigis tro atentan mian aŭdon;
Pro multaj ecoj mi virinojn ŝatis;
Neniam tamen trovis mi animon
Perfektan tiel, ke malbono ia
Ĉarmegan virton en ŝi ne malhelpis,
Aŭ ĝin surstrekis. Sed vi, ho! vi sole
Perfekta staras; senegalulino,
Vi el plej bona kreitaĵ’ devenas.
Mirando.
Neniun el la mia seks’ vidante,
Vizaĝon inan nun mi ne memoras
Krom mia, kiam vidas en spegulo.
El viroj, kiujn mi jam povus nomi,
Nur vi, amiko, kaj la patro kara
De mi konataj estas: eksterulojn
Neniam mi ekvidis por kompari
Al iu la alian—Modesteco
La plej ŝatita, for de mi, juvelo!—
Mi kunvivanton, krom vi, ne dezirus,
Nenian formon mi imagi povas
Ol via pli amindan. Iom vage
Mi babiladas, kaj la patran leĝon
Per tio mi forgesas.
Ferdinando.
Karulino!
Reĝido mi naskiĝis; Dio gardu,
Sed, mi nun eble eĉ jam Reĝo estas!
Mi do sklavecon tian ne elportus
Pli dolĉe ol la lipo tabanpikon . . .
Mirando! la animon mian aŭdu!
Tuj kiam vin mi vidis, mia koro
Eksaltis por vin servi, ĉe vi loĝas . . .
Kaj mi, la sklavo ĝia, pro vi, sole,
Ŝtipegojn portas nun.
Mirando.
Ĉu vi min amas?
Ferdinando.
Ĉielo! tero! estu atestantoj
Al mia diro, se ĝi estas vera:
Se ne sincera, en mi mem nuliĝu
Plej karaj la esperoj! Jes, Mirando,
Mi, super ĉiuj limoj de parolo
Vin amas, ŝatas, kaj honoras.
Mirando (plorante).
Tamen,
Je tio tiel bona mi ekploras.
Prospero (flanken).
Renkonto taŭga de du noblaj koroj!
Sur tion, kio inter ili venos,
Ĉielo, pluvu benon!
Ferdinando.
Kial plori?
Mirando.
Ĉar mi ne estas inda, . . . ne maltimas
Donaci kion mi oferi volus . . .
Eĉ malpli preni mian koran vivon!
Sensence tamen veron kaŝi estus:
Ju pli kaŝita, des pli ĝi montriĝas.
For de mi do, kaŝema honto, iru;
Instruu min, vi, sankta senkulpeco!
Edzino via estos mi bonvole,
Kun mi edziĝi kiam vi deziros,
Aŭ mortos mi nur via servistino.
Min kunegalan povus vi rifuzi,
Sed vin mi servos, laŭ aŭ kontraŭ volo.
Ferdinando.
Mastrino mia estus: mi vin servu!
Mirando.
Ĉu kiel edzo mia?
Ferdinando.
Jes! pli kore
Ol sklavo iam liberecon volis!
Jen mian manon!
Mirando.
Kaj vi, mian prenu
Kun koro en ĝi . . . Ĝis ne longa tempo,
Adiaŭ, nun!
Ferdinando.
Miloble mil adiaŭ!
(Ferdinando kaj Mirando foriras).
Prospero.
Min tio ne ĝojigas kiel ilin
Per amo ĵus kaptitajn—Sed pli ĝoja
Ĝi igas min ol ĉio ajn en vivo—
Nun mia libro devas min konsili:
Ankoraŭ mi por fari multon havas
Eĉ antaŭ vespermanĝo.
(Foriras).
Sceno 2.—En alia parto de l’ insulo.

(Venas Kalibano portante botelon, Stefano kaj Trinkulo).
Stefano.
Ne parolu tiel: kiam la barelo estos senenhava, ni trinkos akvon, sed
nenian guton antaŭe; tial, staru kaj maltime marŝu.
Servantmonstro, drinku al mi!
Trinkulo.
“Servantmonstro!” kia insula petoleco! Oni diras, ke nur kvin loĝantoj
estas sur l’ insulo; ni estas tri el ili: se la du aliaj estas tiel
cerbigitaj kiel ni, la ŝtato ŝanceliĝos.
Stefano.
Drinku, servantmonstro, kiam mi ordenas: viaj okuloj preskaŭ ŝajnas
kiel se ili sidus en via kapo!
Trinkulo.
Nu, kie ili do estus, alie? Brava monstro estus ĝi, vere, se ĝi havus
okulojn en ĝia vosto.
Stefano.
Mia monstro dronigis sian langon en kanarivino. Miavice, la maro ne
povas min dronigi. Per tiu ĉi lumo! mi naĝis, antaŭ ol mi atingis
la bordon, tridek-kvin mejlojn, kun intertempoj . . . Vi estos mia
leŭtenanto, monstro, aŭ mia gardstaranto.
Trinkulo.
Via leŭtenanto, se vi volas; sed, certe, ĝi ne estas staranto.
Stefano.
Ni ne kuros, Monsieur Monstro.
Trinkulo.
Certe, kaj ankaŭ vi ne iros, sed enŝlimiĝos aŭ, kiel hundoj,
ternestiĝos en kelka angulo.
Stefano.
Unuafoje en via vivo, parolu, malspritulo, se vi estas bona monstro.
Kalibano.
La ŝuon leku mi de Via Moŝto:
Lin[11] mi ne servos; li ne estas brava.
Trinkulo.
Vi mensogas, malklerega monstro; mi nun estas taŭga por policano.
Kiel! vi, diboĉama fiŝo! Ĉu estis iam ia timemulo, kiu drinkis tiom
da vino, kiom mi hodiaŭ? Ĉu monstran mensogon diras vi, kiu
nur estas duonfiŝo kaj duonmonstro?
Kalibano.
Jen! kiel li mokas min! Ĉu vi permesas tion, landsinjoro?
Trinkulo.
“Landsinjoro!” ĝi diras; ke monstro povas esti tiel malsprita!
Kalibano.
Jen! jen! ankoraŭ! mordu lin morte, mi petas!
Stefano.
Trinkulo, detenu vian langon. Se vi fariĝos ribelanto, la proksima
arbo . . . La honesta monstro estas mia subulo, kaj ĝin neniu
insultu!
Kalibano.
Dankon al nobla mia mastro! Ĉu vi bonvolus min aŭdi denove, pri la
peto kiun mi jam faris?
Stefano.
Certe, mi volas. Genufleksu, kaj ĝin rediru. Mi staros kune kun
Trinkulo.
(Venas Arielo, nevidebla).
Kalibano.
Kiel mi antaŭe diris al vi, mi estas la subulo de tirano, sorĉisto, kiu
magie ŝtelis de mi la insulon.
Arielo.
Vi mensogas.
Kalibano (al Trinkulo).
Simia mokemulo, vi mensogas!
Ke mia mastro volu vin mortigi!
Mi ne mensogas.
Stefano.
Trinkulo, se vi ankoraŭ tedos al ĝi, dum ĝia rakonto per tiu ĉi mia
pugno! mi elrompos kelke da viaj dentoj!
Trinkulo.
Kion do? mi nenion diris.
Stefano.
Sufiĉe! silentu. (Al Kalibano) Daŭrigu!
Kalibano.
Mi diras, ke magie tiun ĉi insulon
Li de mi ŝtelis: se la Via Moŝto
Min volas venĝi, vi la povon havas . . .
Sed ne ĉi tiu timegulo.[12]
Stefano.
Certe.
Kalibano.
Vi estos insulestro: mi vin servos.
Stefano.
Nu! kiel tio fariĝos? Ĉu vi al la individuo povas min konduki?
Kalibano.
Jes, jes, sinjoro mia, lin dormantan
Liveros mi al vi, kiam vi povos
En lian kapon najlon martelumi.
Arielo.
Vi mensogas; vi ne povas.
Kalibano (al Trinkulo).
Skorbute makulkolorita besto!
Lin, mastro, multe batu, mi petegas!
Kaj de li prenu dian la botelon,
Por ke li poste nur marakvon trinku;
Ĉar la fontetojn al li mi ne montros.
Stefano.
Trinkulo, ne ludu kun danĝero plie: se unu vorto via ankoraŭ
interrompos la monstron, per tiu ĉi mia mano! mi tuj forpelos
malseverecon kaj gadon faros el vi.
Trinkulo.
Kial? Kion mi faris? Mi faris nenion. Mi pli malproksime tuj staros.
Stefano.
Ĉu vi ne ĵus diris, ke ĝi mensogas?
Arielo.
Vi mensogas!
Stefano (batas Trinkulo).
Ĉu mi ankaŭ mensogas? Prenu tion! Se vi tion amas, diru ree, ke mi
mensogas.
Trinkulo.
Mi tion neniam diris. Vi estas frenezulo kaj ankaŭ surdulo.—Peston
al via botelo! Tion vindrinkado povas kaŭzi!—Epidemion al via
monstro, kaj la diablo forprenu viajn fingrojn!
Kalibano.
Ha! ha! ha!
Stefano.
Nun, daŭrigu vian rakonton. (Al Trinkulo) Mi petas, staru for de ni.
Kalibano.
Sufiĉe vi lin batu; post ne longe,
Mi, ankaŭ, tuj lin batos.
Stefano (al Trinkulo).
Nu, for staru.
(Al Kalibano) Daŭrigu.
Kalibano.
Kiel mi antaŭe diris,
Kutime li[13] en posttagmezo dormas:
De li preninte librojn, tuj vi povos
Lin sencerbigi; aŭ, per dika ŝtipo,
Premegi la kranion; aŭ elŝuti
Intestojn liajn, per borega vundo;
Aŭ, per tranĉilo, gorĝon lian tranĉi.
Memoru, tamen, ŝteli liajn librojn;
Sen tiuj kiel mi li malspritiĝos,
Kaj ne spiritojn povos li komandi:
Prosper’ de ĉiuj estas malamata
Simile de mi. Brulu do la librojn.
Li ankaŭ belajn havas bonajn ilojn,
Per kiuj domon povas li ornami:
Filinon tiel belan li posedas
Ke ŝin li nomas “senegalulino.”
Nur du virinojn jam ĝis nun mi vidis,
Ŝin, kaj patrinon mian Sikorakso.
Sed Sikorakson ŝi superas kiel
Bonego malbonegon.
Stefano.
Belulino!
Kalibano.
Jes, landsinjoro, taŭga kunulino
Por Via Moŝto, kaj idaron noblan
Ŝi naskos, kiam vi kun ŝi edziĝos.
Stefano.
Monstro, tiun ĉi viron mi mortigos. Lia filino, kune kun mi, estos Reĝo
kaj Reĝino (Di’ savu nin!) Kaj Trinkulo kaj vi mem estos vicreĝoj.
—Ĉu vi amas la konspiron, Trinkulo?
Trinkulo.
Bonege!
Stefano.
Donu al mi vian manon; mi bedaŭras, ke mi vin batis, sed, dum vi
vivos, ĉiam posedu sobran langon en via buŝo.
Kalibano.
Post duonhoro dormos la tirano:
Ĉu vi detruos lin?
Stefano.
Jes, per honoro!
Arielo.
Mi tion diros tuj al mastro mia.
Kalibano.
Vi min gajigas, min plezur’ plenigas:
Ni ronde kantu, kaj petole dancu!
Stefano.
Kiel vi volos, monstro. Mi akceptas vian proponon. Venu, Trinkulo, ni
kantu!
(Kantas) Moku, kaj pelu, remoku, repelu;
Liberaj ni!
Kalibano.
Tio ne estas la ario.
(Arielo ludas la arion per tambureto kaj ŝalmo).
Stefano.
Kio estas tio?
Trinkulo.
Tio estas la ario de mia rondkanteto, ludata per la pentraĵo de Neniu.
Stefano.
Se vi estas viro, aperu en via simileco; se vi diablo estas, faru kion vi
volos.
Trinkulo.
Pardonu Di’ pekojn miajn!
Stefano.
Mortante, viro ĉiujn ŝuldojn pagas:
Mi vin maltimas . . . (Min pardonu Dio!)
Kalibano.
Ĉu timas vi?
Stefano.
Ne, monstro, mi ne timas.
Kalibano.
Ne timu: plena je bruadoj strangaj
L’ insulo estas; sonoj dolĉariaj,
Ĉarmegaj, kiuj ne malbonon faras.
Ho, foje, ventaj, kordaj muzikiloj
Milope ludas; dolĉaj voĉoj kantas, . . .
Dormantan min tuj vekas, . . . redormigas, . . .
Grandegaj sonĝoj malfermante nubojn,
Belecon montras pretiĝante fali
Sur min, . . . sed elreviĝo tuj revenas . . .
Kaj mi bedaŭre krias por resonĝi.
Stefano.
Tio fariĝos noblega reĝlando por mi, en kiu mi havos muzikon
senpage.
Kalibano.
Kiam Prospero estos nuligita.
Stefano.
Tio estos post ne longe; mi memoras vian diron.
Trinkulo.
Nun la sono foriĝas: ni sekvu ĝin, kaj poste la aferon ni faru.
Stefano.
Konduku nin, monstro; ni sekvos.—Tiun ĉi tamburetiston mi tre
dezirus vidi—Li laŭte ludas, ĉu ne?
Trinkulo.
Ĉu vi venas, Stefano? Mi tuj sekvos.
(Ili foriras).
Sceno 3.—En alia parto de l’ insulo.

(Venas Alonzo, Sebastiano, Antonio, Gonzalo, Adriano,
Francisko, kaj aliaj).
Gonzalo.
Per Dipatrin’, ne povas mi plu marŝi,
Doloras tro maljunaj miaj ostoj:
Ne labirinto iam pli lacigis,
Ol niaj iroj kaj deiroj. Reĝo,
Per via pacienco, mi tuj restos.
Alonzo.
Sinjor’ maljuna, mi ne vin kulpigas,
Ĉar ankaŭ min atakas nun laciĝo,
Kaj senspritige super mi pezegas . . .
Sidiĝu, restu. Tie ĉi mi devas
Forlasi la esperon tiel flatan
Revidi filon mian. Ne, li dronis . . .
Kaj vane ni vagadis por lin trovi,
Dum maro mokas nian teriradon.
Ho ve! li mortis.
Antonio (flanken, al Sebastiano).
Mi tre ĝojas
Ke li plu ne esperas. Ne forlasu,
Pro malprospero, tiun entreprenon,
Pri kiu ni interligiĝis.
Sebastiano (flanken, al Antonio).
Bone:
Okazon proksimegan ni ekprenos.

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1 Introduction: Theoretical Understanding of China’s

2 Building China’s State Identity: Interests, Institutions,

3 Debating China as Ideology: Marxism, Materialism,

4 Beyond the Borders: Utopia, Uniqueness, and Soft-Power 157

Introduction: Theoretical Understanding

© The Author(s) 2019 1

who places Chinese identity on the trinity approach of ancient civiliza-

Foreign Relations ‘EII’

feeling equal by building the self by building its position via a

Fig. 1.1 Foreign relations “EII”

Finding Equality and Reciprocity in International

unequal distribution of wealth. In traditional Chinese understanding, the

system of values in China’s foreign policy. In the context mentioned

Discussing Self and Identity Issues

values and builds a more comprehensive international system. This

pattern (Hopf, 2002, p. 1–2). The statesmen’s particular uses of language

The above-mentioned definition allows us to conclude that identity is

Shaping Collective Identities and Power Transition

Nye, 1987). The first approach might be illustrated by investments of

global conflict during the process of power transition. The above-­discussed

Following the steps taken by China in building its social influence,

Sceno 2.—En alia parto de l’ insulo.

Sceno 3.—En alia parto de l’ insulo.

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1 Introduction: Theoretical Understanding of China’s

2 Building China’s State Identity: Interests, Institutions,

3 Debating China as Ideology: Marxism, Materialism,

4 Beyond the Borders: Utopia, Uniqueness, and Soft-Power 157

global conflict during the process of power transition. The above-discussed