29th Annual

HANDS-ON
RELAY SCHOOL
March 12 - 16, 2012

BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION

Brent Carper, PE
P r o te c t i o n & I n te g r a t i o n E n g i n e e r
b r e n t . c @ r e l aya p p l i c a t i o n . c o m
 OUTLINE

 Protection System Failures and Breaker Failures

 BF Protection versus BF Relaying
 BF Relay Schemes and Logic
 Special BF Situations
 BF Setting Calculation Exercise
 Impacts from Changing Technology
 Testing and Maintenance of BF Schemes

P r i m a r y Re f e r e n c e :
C 37. 1 1 9 - 2 0 0 5 I E E E G u i d e f o r B r e a ke r Fa i l u r e P r o te c t i o n o f Pow e r C i r c u i t B r e a ke r s
 PROTECTION FAILURE

Protection System Failures Breaker Failures

 Relay failure  Fails to trip
 Settings failure  Trips too slow
 Control system failure  Fails to interrupt fault current
 CT/PT failure  Fails to interrupt load current
 Batter y system failure  Flashover when open
 Catastrophic control house failure  Fails to close
(fire)  Auxiliar y contact problems
 Catastrophic failure
Breaker Failure Protection
versus
Breaker Failure Relaying
 BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
BY COORDINATION

T A B
 BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
BY COORDINATION

T A B
 BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
BY COORDINATION

T A B
 BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
BY COORDINATION

T A B
 BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
BY COORDINATION

T A B

Advantages: Disadvantages:
 S i m p l e – N o ex t r a e q u i p m e n t  S l ow
 Simple – No risk of misoperation  M ay n o t b e p o s s i b l e f o r t h e b a c ku p
 U l t i m a te p r o te c t i o n . C ov e r s A L L r e l ay i n g a t [ A ] to s e e a l l f a u l t s
f a i l u r e s , n o t j u s t B r e a ke r Fa i l u r e
( f a i l u r e o f b r e a ke r, r e l ay, s e t t i n g s ,
c o n t r o l s a n d w i r i n g , b a t te r y, e t c . )

Conclusions:
 C o m m o n p r a c t i c e f o r D i s t r i b u t i o n , b u t t y p i c a l l y n o t s u f f i c i e n t f o r Tr a n s m i s s i o n .
 T h e r e i s “ B r e a ke r Fa i l P r o te c t i o n ” eve n t h o u g h t h e r e i s n o t “ B r e a ke r Fa i l Re l ay i n g ” .
 B r e a ke r f a i l u r e p r o te c t i o n i s b u i l t - i n to g o o d p r o te c t i o n p r a c t i c e s .
 BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
BY COORDINATION

T A B

T M 3

5
 BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
BY COORDINATION

T A B

T M 3

[ A ] c a n p r o b a b l y b a c k u p [ B ] a n d s e e a m i n i m u m f a u l t a l l t h e way a t t h e e n d o f t h e l i n e .
[ M ] m ay n o t b e a b l e to f u l l y b a c k u p t h e f e e d e r b r e a ke r s f o r a n e n d o f l i n e f a u l t .

Example: Assume 200A load per feeder section, and 800A minimum fault current at the end of line.
[A] has 400A max load and needs to pickup on an 800A fault.
[M] has 1000A max load, so it cannot be set to pickup on an 800A fault.
 IEEE EXAMPLE

B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load
 IEEE EXAMPLE
PROPER CLEARING
B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load
 IEEE EXAMPLE
PROPER CLEARING
B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load
 IEEE EXAMPLE

B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load
 IEEE EXAMPLE
BREAKER FAILURE
B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load
 IEEE EXAMPLE
BREAKER FAILURE
B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load
 IEEE EXAMPLE
REMOTE BACKUP
B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load
 IEEE EXAMPLE
REMOTE BACKUP
B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load

Advantages: Disadvantages:
 C o m p l e te l y i n d e p e n d e n t o f  S l ow – s y s te m i n s t a b i l i t y
Substation B.  S l ow – vo l t a g e d i p s
 Wide area outage
 M ay n o t b e p o s s i b l e f o r t h e b a c ku p
r e l ay to s e e a l l f a u l t s
 IEEE EXAMPLE

B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load
 IEEE EXAMPLE
BREAKER FAILURE RELAYING
B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load
 IEEE EXAMPLE
BREAKER FAILURE RELAYING
B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load
 IEEE EXAMPLE
BREAKER FAILURE RELAYING
B C

A 3 4

A 1 2 5 6 C

Load Load
7 8

Load

BFR on breaker [3] detects breaker failure condition

 B F R t r i p s a L o c ko u t r e l ay
 L o c ko u t r e l ay ( 8 6 ) t r i p s b r e a ke r s [ 2 ] , [ 5 ] , a n d [ 7 ]
 L o c ko u t r e l ay b l o c k s c l o s e o f [ 2 ] , [ 5 ] , a n d [ 7 ]

What else?
 Tr a n s f e r Tr i p to b r e a ke r [ 4 ]
 Cancel reclose of [4]
BREAKER FAILURE RELAYING

01
21
87B
Z1
21
Z2
21
Z2
67
G 86B
67
G

50 BFI
62 trip all
bkrs on bus

DTT/RC to
86BF
remote bkrs

trip all
adjacent bkrs
BREAKER FAILURE RELAYING

21 21
87B
P B

BFI
BFI 50 BFI
86B
62

86BF
BREAKER FAILURE RELAYING

1 2 3

87B 87B

BF BF
1 2
21
B

21
P
BF
3
21
B

21
P
 BREAKER FAILURE LOGIC

1. Basic Breaker Failure Scheme

2. 50BF Torque Control
3. Breaker Re-Trip Logic
4. BFI Control Timer
5. BFI Seal-In
6. Minimal Current Scheme
7. Timer Bypass Scheme
8. Dual Timer Scheme
9. Special Schemes
 BASIC BREAKER FAILURE SCHEME

 Four Par ts to a Breaker Failure Scheme:

 Fault Detector (50) or other Failure Detectors
 Initiator Circuit (BFI)
 Logic and Timers (62)
 Output Circuit (BFT)
50BF TORQUE CONTROL
BREAKER RE-TRIP LOGIC
BFI CONTROL TIMER
BFI SEAL-IN
MINIMAL CURRENT SCHEME
 TIMER BYPASS SCHEME

Note: This logic is for illustrative purposes only. Not intended as a complete scheme. The timer bypass scheme should
be supervised by a fault detector, which may not be compatible with torque controlled 50BF.
EXAMPLE BE1-50BF LOGIC
 DUAL TIMER SCHEMES

 Use fast BF timer for multi-phase faults (L-L, L-L-G, 3P)

 Use slower BF timer for single-phase faults (SLG)

 Multi-phase faults have larger impact on system stability, and may

require fast breaker failure times.
 Single-phase faults are more common.

 Dual timer allows fast BFT for the multi-phase fault, but keeps the
security of a slower BFT for the most common fault scenario.
 SPECIAL SCHEMES

 Voltage dif ferential

 Frame leakage detection
 Breaker dif ferential
 IPO breakers
 Redundant breakers
 BF SETTINGS

 Logic
 Fault or Load Current Detector Pickup
 Other Breaker Failure Detectors
 Set Timers
 CALCULATING BF SCHEME TIMERS

MAX CRITICAL CLEARING TIME
CRITICAL CLEARING TIME
CALCULATED BY STUDY

BY COMPANY POLICY
PROPER OPERATION
FAULT CLEARED
FAULT

NORMAL CLEARING TIME

PROTECTIVE RELAY BREAKER 50FD

OPERATE TIME OPERATE TIME RESET MARGIN

BFI BF TIMER 50FD BFR 86BF LOCAL BACKUP BREAKER

INPUT SETTING P/U OUTPUT OPERATE OPERATE TIME
P/U RELAY TIME
TIME TT REMOTE END BACKUP BREAKER
CHANNEL OPERATE TIME
TIME

CONTROL TIMER
SETTING
 CALCULATING BF SCHEME TIMERS

MAX CRITICAL CLEARING TIME
CRITICAL CLEARING TIME
CALCULATED BY STUDY

BY COMPANY POLICY
PROPER OPERATION
FAULT CLEARED
FAULT

NORMAL CLEARING TIME

PROTECTIVE RELAY BREAKER 50FD

OPERATE TIME OPERATE TIME RESET MARGIN

BFI BF TIMER 50FD BFR 86BF LOCAL BACKUP BREAKER

INPUT SETTING P/U OUTPUT OPERATE OPERATE TIME
P/U RELAY TIME
TIME TT REMOTE END BACKUP BREAKER
CHANNEL OPERATE TIME
TIME

CONTROL TIMER
SETTING
EXERCISE
 IMPACT OF CHANGING TECHNOLOGY

 Digital Relay BF Protection: Faster, Better, Cheaper, More

 Solved transient stability problems previously unsolvable
 Better protection against wide-area and cascading outages
 Protect against all breaker failure modes, not just one or two
 Can be more secure if designed well

 Most utilities moving away from Stand- Alone BF Relays

 Some utilities (not many) are reversing the trend and going back to stand alone
Breaker Failure Relays
 Reduce misoperations “unscheduled maintenance tests”
 Use longer maintenance cycles for BF protection systems
IMPACT OF CHANGING TECHNOLOGY

21 21
87B
P B

BFI
BFI 50 BFI
86B
62

86BF
IMPACT OF CHANGING TECHNOLOGY

21 21
87B
P B

BFI
BFI BFI
BF 86B

86BF
IMPACT OF CHANGING TECHNOLOGY

21 21
87B
P B
BFI

BFI
BFI
BF BF 86B

86BF
IMPACT OF CHANGING TECHNOLOGY

21 21
87B
P B

I
BF

BFI
BF BF 86B

86BF
IMPACT OF CHANGING TECHNOLOGY

21 21 BFI
BF 87B
P B
BFI

BFI
BF BF 86B

86BF
IMPACT OF CHANGING TECHNOLOGY

1 2 3

87B 87B

BF BF
1 2
21
B

21
P
BF
3
21
B

21
P
IMPACT OF CHANGING TECHNOLOGY

1 2 3

BF BF
87B 87B
1 3

BF 21 BF
1 B 2

BF 21 BF
1 P 2

BF 21 BF
2 B 3

BF 21 BF
2 P 3
 IMPACT OF CHANGING TECHNOLOGY

 Digital Relay Timing and Logic

 Precise timing eliminates relay misoperations due to calibration drift
 Precise timing and logic allows reducing “design margins”

 Digital Relay I/O

 Sensitive BFI inputs (transients, DC grounds)
 Solid state relay outputs (sneak circuits)

 Digital Relay Protective Elements

 Used to be limited to a 50FD
 Now we can use 50L and other sensitive detectors that may pick up a lot
 Solution: Consider using other elements to help add Security, not just Sensitivity
(negative sequence, voltage elements, synch check and frequency elements, etc.)
 IMPACT OF CHANGING TECHNOLOGY

 Challenges from Complexity

 Elaborate/exotic BF logic
 Wide variety of BF schemes, even in the same model of relay at the same utility
 May have more than one BF scheme in a single relay
 May have more than one BF scheme for single breaker
 Solution: Engineering Standardization
 Solution: Documentation (written setting descriptions, logic diagrams, and test plans)

 Challenges with Integrated BF

 May not be able to disable all BFI’s
 May not be able to disable all BFT’s
 Trend is to completely eliminate all hardwired BFT and lockout relays (IEC 61850)
 Solution: Design with test switch to relay input that disables the BFI and/or BFT.
Especially important for BFTT or 61850.
 TESTING AND MAINTENANCE
OF BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
Challenges with BF Protection
 D i f f i c u l t to te s t i n te n t i o n a l l y
 E a s y to te s t u n i n te n t i o n a l l y
 TESTING AND MAINTENANCE
OF BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
There is a dif ference between testing the BF Relay
and testing the BF Relaying System

 M a ny u t i l i t i e s p e r f o r m m a i n te n a n c e te s t i n g o f t h e B F Re l ay, b u t a r e n o t te s t i n g t h e
e n t i r e B r e a ke r Fa i l u r e P r o te c t i o n S y s te m .
 G o o d m a i n te n a n c e p r a c t i c e s ( a n d N E R C c o m p l i a n c e r e q u i r e m e n t s ) a r e to te s t t h e
P r o te c t i o n S y s te m :
 Maintenance program for the BF Relay
 Maintenance program for CT’s/PT’s
 Maintenance program for the Battery and DC system
 Maintenance of the BFR Protection System must include:
 Rolling lockout relays and tripping breakers
 Best practice: simultaneous functional test (clear the bus)