COOPERATION AND COMPETITION IN INDO-

PACIFIC

Introduction
The Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region (interchangeable terms) is increasingly becoming a focus
of attention for competing interests of the US and China to gain strategic influence. This power
quest is likely to transform the geopolitical scenario not only in the Asia-Pacific region but also in
South Asia. According to the US National Security Strategy-2017, the Indo-Pacific region is the
center of geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of the world. The US
resurgence to the Indo-Pacific region aims at curbing China’s continuous rise as an economic
giant while placing India at the center of its policy besides acknowledging it as the leading
power worthy of the US defense and security agreements. Thus, major countries of the region
including China, Russia, India, and Pakistan are in the phase of diversifying and reconfiguring
their relationships.

These changing geopolitical configurations are leading to the emergence of a new global order
having a strategic shift of the US from ‘Trans-Atlantic’ to ‘Trans-Pacific’ politics. The Indo–
Pacific region is, therefore, turned out to be a new global stage for geopolitical, economic, and
military competition among great powers characterizing this 21st century as ‘The Asian
Century’.

INDIAN OCEAN AND ITS LOCATION

The Indian Ocean is the world’s third-largest body of water and has become a growing area
of competition between China and India. The Indian Ocean covers at least one fifth of the
world’s total ocean area and is bounded by Africa and the Arabian Peninsula (known as the
western Indian Ocean), India’s coastal waters (the central Indian Ocean), and the Bay of
Bengal near Myanmar and Indonesia (the eastern Indian Ocean). It provides critical sea
trade routes that connect the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia with the broader Asian
continent to the east and Europe to the west.

Location:
South of Asia, North of Antarctica, west of Australia, and
ASIA
East of Atlantic.

AFRICA & INDIAN PACIFIC &

Atlantic AUSTRALIA
OCEAN
 ANTARICITA

South and Southeast Asia, Western Asia, Northeast, East and Southern Africa and
Australia

Pacific Ocean
The Pacific Ocean is the largest and deepest of Earth's oceanic divisions.

Location
It extends from the Antarctic region in the south to the Arctic in the north and lying between the
continents of Asia and Australia on the west and North America and South America on
the east.

IOR- (Indian Ocean Region): Seas, island, stated that connected with the Indian oceans are
known as IOR.

Extra Regional States: The states which not a part of that region geographically but play an
active role there.

CONNECTIVITY

 Indian ocean with Pacific Ocean

 Indian Ocean with Atlantic Ocean

 Indian Ocean with Mediterranean

Sea

TRADE

 70 percent of world trade from

West to East and East to West.

 More than 80% of World’s oil trade.

 83 % of Chinese oil exports pass from this India Ocean

Conflict in Indian Ocean

 Regional Conflicts:

 India Pakistan
  Civil War in Yemen

 Issue of Pirates

 Iran-Saudi Rivalry

 Global Conflict :

 US and China

Indo Pacific region:

The Indo-Pacific region signifies the importance of joining the US, India, and other major Asian
states - Japan and Australia - to curb China’s growing influence in this region, like the “Cold
War”. Competing interests of the US and China are likely to transform the strategic environs of
the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean and will have pronounced implications for South Asian.

 Definition of Indo Pacific Region according to US:

1. According to US the Indo pacific region that lies between India, Australia, Japan.
 Asian pacific: Asian states whose border coincide with Pacific Ocean are known as
Asian pacific.
2. The region combining India, Asia Pacific region is called Indo-Pacific Region.
3. The region between eastern Indian Ocean, western Pacific Ocean is Indo-Pacific
Region.
 Definition of Indo Pacific Region according to India:

The region that comprises all Indian ocean and Pacific Ocean

 Definition of Indo Pacific Region according to China:

China does not consider any region like Indo-Pacific.

 Pakistan doesn’t use the term,” Indo Pacific Region”

 Russia doesn’t use the term,” Indo Pacific Region”

Indian Policy
OBJECTIVES:
 Hegemony

 To counter China (String of Pearls)

 Natural Claim (India’s Ocean)

STEPS:
Constructing 4 ports

 Building Alliances

○ Quad (2007): A four state naval alliance involving US, India, Japan and
Australia. They hold annual naval exercises

○ LEMOA (2016): Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement. A

bilateral military logistic agreement between US and India.

 COMCASA (2018): Communication compatibility and Security

Agreement. A bilateral military intelligence agreement between US and
India. Under this: 1. US and India shall share military intelligence, 2. US
allowed India to purchase Intelligence gathering technologies from US
  BECA(2020)(Proposed): Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement.
A proposed military-space cooperation

 Strengthening Navy

 1st Aircraft Carrier from UK in 1960s

 2nd from Russia in 1990s

 3rd indigenous in 2007

 Currently manufacturing 3 more

 Negotiating with US to purchase one more

 US sold India Unarmed and Armed Drones in 2017 and 2019 respectively. These
drones specialize in maritime operations.

 US sold India ATAC Helicopters in 2019. They are multirole: Rescue,

Transportation and Anti-ship and Anti-submarine Missile systems

 Nuclear Capability

 India tested SLBM in April 2016

 India Posses Nuclear Triad and Second Strike Capability from Sea

 India possesses Nuclear armed and Nuclear Powered Submarine named as

Arihant

 India is currently manufacturing four more such submarines

 India signed agreement with Russia to acquire Nuclear submarine on lease for
30 year in 2019

PAKISTAN’S RESPONSE (Defensive)

 Gawadar Port as alternative to Karachi port with Chinese help

 Strengthening Navy

 2 Naval Warships from China (2018)

 Agreement to purchase 8 submarines from China in 2017 with transfer of

Technology
  Negotiating to purchase first ever Aircraft Carrier from China

 Agreement to purchase 4 submarines from Turkey in 2017

 Nuclear Capability: Pakistan tested SLBM in January 2017

KEY PLACES IN INDIAN OCEAN

Cooperation and Competition in INDO-Pacific
Asia Pacific and Indo-Pacific:

US Policy of Indo-Pacific
 Indo-Pacific Region

o Eastern Indian Ocean to Western and Central Pacific Ocean

o Term Coined in 2007 by an Indian Researcher for marine biodiversity comprising of

entire Indian and Pacific Ocean

o Geo-strategic use is recent phenomenon

Defining Indo-Pacific Policy

o Indo-Pacific Policy of US was announced by US president Donald Trump in 2017
 o “US policy to limit the growing Chinese influence in Indo-Pacific Region with
the help of regional allies”

The term ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) started to dominate the headlines after Donald
Trump’s repeated use of the term during his first trip to Asia as US president in late 2017. In the
US National Security Strategy (NSS) issued in December 2017, the ‘Indo-Pacific’ was
mentioned eleven times while the formerly prevalent term ‘Asia–Pacific’ was barely used at all.
the Indo-Pacific region is the center of geopolitical competition between free and repressive
visions of the world.

US policy to limit the growing Chinese influence in Indo-Pacific

Region with the help of regional allies

The Indo-Pacific region signifies the importance of joining the US, India, and other major Asian
states - Japan and Australia - to curb China’s growing influence in this region because:

1. China is second largest economy of the world according to IMF report (2020)
2. By 2028, China will become a largest economy of the world
3. Global economic hegemony will shift from US to China.
4. China is increasing its power and expanding its economy through BRI.
5. Through BRI (Belt and Road Initiative), investing around one Trillian dollars (in almost
400 states) on infrastructure of Africa, middle east, central Asia, Europe, Latin America.
CPEC is one of them.

String of Pearls (Indian Term):

String of Pearls’ refers to a geopolitical theory to the network of Chinese intentions in India
Ocean Region (IOR). Precisely, it refers to the network of Chinese military and commercial
facilities developed by China in countries falling on the Indian Ocean between the Chinese
mainland and Port Sudan.

Military influence:
 China’s economy directly relates to its military. As economy increases, its military also
increases
 China has its first naval base Djubouti, inaugurated in 2017 to help Chinese anti-piracy
mission in the Gulf of Aden
  China has been developing naval city, dedicating for manufacturing naval warships
 Through ports, China is influencing and growing its economy. China has world’s second
largest defense budget.
o China’s defense budget =200 billion dollars
o America’s defense budget= 760 billion dollars

According to US department of defense 2020, annual report to Congress on

Chinese military power, China has surpassed the US in the terms of naval
fleet size.

China has the largest navy in the world with an overall battle force of
approximately 350 ships and submarines, including over 130 major surface
combatants, US navy battle of force is approximately 293 ships as of early
2020.

Political influence:
China increases its political influence by trying to develop amicable relations with other
countries worldwide by providing following services:

 Largest donor of CoVid-19 Vaccines

 Largest supplier of emergency medical aid
 Leading state in technology, economy and security

Reasons for US to Contain China

China is increasing its influence worldwide and is challenging the superpowers.

1. Thucydides Trap
When an emerging power threatens to displace an existing power as a regional or international
hegemon, that could lead to a war, is known as Thucydides Trap. China (emerging power) is
challenging the US (existing power) economically.

2. Clash of values
US and China have clashed of values politically, socially and economically.
Political Values:

USA China
Free and fair elections, democracy No democratic freedom
Make political parties Does not allow party creation
Multiple parties One political Party (China Communist Party)

Economic Values

USA
Classic Capitalism
State does not control economy; entire
economy is managed by private sector
State does not control business
China
State Controlled Capitalism
Although private companies exist, but state
does the business.
State controls business

Social Values

USA China
Freedom of expression, religion No freedom of religion, anti-religion, atheism
Right to technology No freedom to technology
Favors no interruption of state Restricted to state

3. India Pacific Region

USA wants to contain China with the help of regional alliances in Indo Pacific region.

Reasons for India to be Natural Ally

 India’s conflict with China
 India’s military and political power
 Shared Values (Economic, Social, Political)

Change in Biden’s Policy

China altered his policy to contain China:

To contain China with the help of global alliances.

 Biden visited Europe on 9 June,2021.

  An eight-day tour was made to Europe
 Meeting with G7, NATO and summit with Russian president, “Vladimir Putin”
 In G7 Meeting, Americans have pushed them to express concerns over China’s policy, a
counter proposal was put forward names as “B3W” to counter China’s BRI
 NATO meeting comprises of leaders of 27 states and was a security-oriented meeting.

US is trying to use NATO against China and seeking economic and security help from Europe.

Indo-Pacific Policy: An extension of Pivot Asia/Rebalance to

Asia
 US president Obama announced Pivot-Asia in 2012 based on article published in 2011.

 Main thrust of this policy was developed close strategic partnerships with Asia-Pacific
states

The Obama administration announced its ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy in 2012 that marked a
great tilt in US foreign policy’s focus from the Middle East and European theatre to Asian
countries, some of which are located in proximity to China. This strategy was regarded
as a haughty one with the overt military, economic, cultural, and diplomatic dimensions
focusing on consolidating US position in Asia. It is being materialized by means of new
US defense deployments and rigorous diplomatic activities marking at leveraging US
position through its maritime deployments in the Asia-Pacific region. This follow-up is
actually based on establishing military balance in the region that will ultimately lead to
US economic preponderance. In this regard, establishing a US base in Australia is,
nonetheless, a symbolic move that is accompanied by an increase in US military
deployments in the region.
Interestingly, unlike the Obama administration which openly denied that the US ‘pivot to
Asia’ strategy was aimed at containing China, the Trump administration has no qualms
about openly confronting China. In the 2017 US NSS, China was labelled a revisionist
state and a strategic competitor of the United States because it was seen to challenge
‘American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and
prosperity.
Pivot Asia (Rebalance to Asia)
Military Component:
 Military Security guarantee

 Deployment of Military

 Establishment of Military Bases

 Sale of Modern Weapons

 Deployment of modern weapons

 Nuclear Shield

 Missile Defense Systems

 Increased maritime presence

Economic Component of Pivot Asia: Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)

 Signed in 2015 by 12 States

 Basic objective was to Isolate China in the region

 US withdrew from TPP in 2017

 Yet to be ratified

 The TPP was a massive trade agreement signed by twelve Pacific Rim countries,
including the United States, that together comprised 40 percent of the global
economy.

 While many experts say the TPP had economic and strategic benefits, it drew
attacks from across the U.S. political spectrum. President Trump withdrew from the
deal on his first day in office. 

 The eleven other TPP countries have moved forward with a slightly modified
agreement, and have left the door open for the United States to rejoin.
Indo-Pacific Policy(2017): Extension in Pivot Asia:
Interestingly, unlike the Obama administration which openly denied that the US ‘pivot to Asia’
strategy was aimed at containing China, the Trump administration has no qualms about
openly confronting China. In the 2017 US NSS(National Security Strategic), China was labelled
a revisionist state and a strategic competitor of the United States because it was seen to
challenge ‘American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security
and prosperity

 China declared officially as Rival and threat by US president Donald Trump

 Region under the policy was expanded

 India: A central state in this policy

○ Quad (2007): A four state naval alliance involving US, India, Japan and
Australia. They hold annual naval exercises

○ LEMOA (2016): Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement. A

bilateral military logistic agreement between US and India.
 ○ COMCASA (2018): Communication compatibility and Security
Agreement. A bilateral military intelligence agreement between US and
India.

 Under this: 1. US and India shall share military intelligence, 2. US

allowed India to purchase Intelligence gathering technologies from
US

○ BECA (Proposed): Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement. A

proposed military-space cooperation

○ US sold India Unarmed and Armed Drones in 2017 and 2019

respectively. These drones specialize in maritime operations.

○ US sold India ATAC Helicopters in 2019. They are multirole: Rescue,

Transportation and Anti-ship and Anti-submarine Missile systems

○ US is negotiating to sell an Aircraft Carrier to India

 US withdrew from TPP

 Name of US Pacific Command changed to Indo-Pacific Command

Chinese Island Disputes
China’s Response to Indo-Pacific/Pivot Asia Policy
China, a global economic giant, has shown its outreach to the world in a massive way through
its BRI projects that President Xi Jinping unveiled in 2013.35 China’s BRI is an aspiring strategy
purpose to connect Asia, Africa, and Europe through land and maritime networks comprising six
corridors with the sole purpose of augmenting regional integration with an increased trade and
businesses resulting in rising economic growth. Its six corridors involve over 100 countries and
global organizations, encompassing 116 projects worth about $1 trillion. It will benefit two-third
of the world’s population, one-third of world’s GDP, and one-fourth goods and services of the
world.

China, a global economic giant, has shown its outreach to the world in a massive way through
its BRI projects that President Xi Jinping unveiled in 2013.35 China’s BRI is an aspiring strategy
purpose to connect Asia, Africa, and Europe through land and maritime networks comprising six
corridors with the sole purpose of augmenting regional integration with an increased trade and
businesses resulting in rising economic growth. Its six corridors involve over 100 countries and
global organizations, encompassing 116 projects worth about $1 trillion. It will benefit two-third
of the world’s population, one-third of world’s GDP, and one-fourth goods and services of the
world.

BRI is a skillful move that seeks dominance in the heartland and sea that is likely to wean
Europe away from the US and transforming and connecting regions via BRI with the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as its lynchpin.44 CPEC is to grant China direct access to
the Indian Ocean. Through Gwadar seaport, China will accrue greater dividends via connectivity
with the Suez Canal. Thus, there is rivalry in IOR by means of ‘String of Pearls Policy’ by China
in competition with ‘Necklace of Diamonds Policy’ by India; hence, a battle for seaports are
ensuing in IOR with India having 9 ports and China with 13

 Belt and Road Initiative especially CPEC

 Strengthening Navy

 Regional Comprehensive Partnership (RCEP): A free trade agreement by China with 14

other states (China, ASEAN states (10), Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South
Korea (India decided not to join in November 2019)

BRI:
CPEC:
RCEP:

Conclusion
The Sino-US strategic convergence and competition via the Pivot to Asia and BRI respectively
in the Indo-Pacific region have heightened tensions by paving the ground for yet another cold-
war scenario embedded in containment mentality. The US-China economic inter-dependence
renders unlikely war between them. However, volatility and intensification in world politics and
complexities and instabilities are to impact the overall security of the Indo-Pacific and South
Asian regions.

"Indo-Pacific", originally a geographic concept that spans two regions of the Indian Ocean and
the Pacific Ocean, is not a new concept in itself. 10 years ago, Gurpreet s. Khurana, who used the
word" Indo-Pacific Strategy" for the first time, was a marine strategist and executive director of
the New Delhi National Marine Foundation. Recently, he wrote in the Washington Post that the
new term has changed the new strategic mind map since China’s “reform and opening up” in the
1980s. “Asia Pacific” has shaped the image of a community of interests linking the United States
and East Asia. The " Indo-Pacific " used by Trump means that India, the United States, and other
major Asian democracies, especially Japan and Australia, will join in curbing China in the new
framework of growing "Cold War" influence.

In recent years, the Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad concept have been introduced and
advocated by various countries at various points in time. Shinzo Abe held talks with Indian
Prime Minister Modi and promoted the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" several times. On the one hand,
he praised India's "Eastward Action" policy. On the other hand, he expressed the need to
strengthen cooperation with India. The Trump’s visit to Japan formally called the “Indo-Pacific
Strategy,” reflecting the US-Japan interest in this strategy.

Chinese scholars believe that the geopolitical changes brought about by China's rise are the main
reason Washington is devoting efforts to boost Indo-Pacific alliances, and the Indo-Pacific
strategy is intended to hedge against China’s foreign and security policy behaviour. On the other
hand, many scholars also argue that Trump's Indo-Pacific strategy is an update of Obama's
“rebalance.” Xue Li, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, believes that the
new strategy is needed because of the strategic culture and the need for balance of power in the
United States.

As such, changes in the geopolitical environment in the Asia-Pacific region are the fundamental
causes motivating the creation of the Indo-Pacific strategy. Against the backdrop of the relative
weakening of the United States’ dominant position and the increasing shift of geopolitical and
economic gravity to the Indo-Pacific, the aim is to reshape alliances and partnerships to respond
to China’s rise.

An Analysis of Intentions and Interests of Countries under the "Indo-Pacific Strategy"

The United States

The United States is the leader of the " Indo-Pacific Strategy“. At present, the United States has
put forward the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" which reflects the attention of the United States to the
Indian Ocean region. Through its economic rise in recent years  India has has  become a leader
among emerging economies. On the other hand, after the retreat of Obama's "Asia-Pacific
rebalancing" strategy, the Asia-Pacific power structure involved corresponding adjustments.
Allies in the Asia-Pacific region have been skeptical of Trump's foreign policies. This time, The
objective why Trump returned to the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" is very clear——The "Indo-Pacific
Strategy" is the expansion and revision of the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy." The purpose is
to contain China's rise and safeguard U.S.l eadership in the region.

Japan

Japan, as an important ally of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, plays an important
role in the conception and promotion of the India Pacific. Apart from its own insecurities as an
island nation, the reason that Japan is so clearly united with India and the United States is
Japan’s vigilance against and concers about China’s rising economic and military capabilities.

India

India has always been a country with great national ambitions and is one of the most important
advocates of the concept of " Indo-Pacific Strategy“. India can take this opportunity to promote
the justification and rationalization of its interests in Southeast Asia; expand its presence in East
Asia, strengthen its political, economic and military cooperation with the United States and its
allies, and comprehensively increase India’s influence in international affairs.
Australia

Australia was one of the earliest countries to introduce the concept of “India”. In the 1960s,
Australia discussed the exertion of its influence in the “India” region to avoid its own difficulties
in the Cold War. Today, Australia actively welcomes the “Indo-Pacific” strategy promoted by
the United States and emphasizes its important position in the United States’ “Indo-Pacific”
strategy, not only because Australia wants to enhance US-Australia trade relations, but also it
wants to improve its presence and scope of interest in Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asian Countries

We must pay attention to the responses of Southeast Asian countries to the "Indo-Pacific
Strategy." To link the “Indian Ocean” with “Pacific Ocean”, Southeast Asia becomes a key area
that cannot be bypassed. Indonesia and Singapore are also supporters of the "Indo-Pacific
Strategy" concept. Due to the location advantages of Indonesia and Singapore themselves, the
concept of “Indo-Pacific” will have the opportunity to enhance its strategic position. Small and
medium-sized countries are caught between China and the United States. On the one hand, they
are afraid of the regional order changes brought about by the rise of China. On the other hand,
they do not want to lose their share of the dividends brought about by China's economic
development.

The Space and Prospect of Realizing an Indo-Pacific Strategy

First, America's isolationist tendencies and policies in Asia are hampering the development of
the new framework.

If the United States wants to build an "indo-pacific" system, whether it has enough strength and
resources to shoulder this responsibility is also worth considering. The costs and responsibilities
that are required to maintain the “India” system in military security, economic cooperation, etc.,
must be shared among its allies in Asia Pacific and India. This in itself poses a challenge to India
and India.

Moreover, the "Indo-Pacific" strategy has made South Korea and Southeast Asian countries
allies at a loss, emphasizing the "pillar of four countries" and ignoring the status and role of
South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Singapore and other countries in the framework.

All in all, the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" is still only an idea now. Its starting point is to establish a
hedge against China’s economic and military rise and to reconstruct the regional order. The
future effectiveness of the Indo-Pacific strategy is uncertain, not least as  the United States,
Japan, India and Australia have yet to improve coordinating and joint adoption of policies and
strategies.

Iran has been a traditional energy supplier to India, at the moment it's third largest, and the
recent Chabahar port development project represents India's intent to project itself as a
constructive maritime power around the Strait of Hormuz and in the Arabian Sea. That
project itself is partly a response to China's development of the Gwadar port in neighboring
Pakistan as part of its mega "Maritime Silk Road" initiative, and partly to offer an alternate
trading route for land-locked Afghanistan. On the other hand, US-Iran relations can best be
described as a quagmire. After the Obama administration and its European partners meticulously
negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 to curb the Iranian nuclear
program, President Trump withdrew from the arrangement and reinstated strict sanctions on Iran
in May 2018.

China’s Response
U.S. American President Donald Trump announced – during his first Asia tour in November
2017 – that it was now time to think about the Indo-Pacific strategy. This has de facto put an end
to Washington's previous Asia-Pacific strategy adopted by Trump's predecessor in 2011: the U.S.
"pivot to Asia". This shift increases the chances of recreating what has been known as the so-
called 'Quad', that is, an alliance which comprises the US, India, Japan, and Australia.

China, which is deeply involved in the region, especially through the BRI (Belt and Road
Initiative) is now thinking about how to respond at the strategic level, even if it is probably still
too early to draw conclusions about what China's Indo-Pacific strategy will encompass.
However, there are already visible elements, which enable us to understand how the Chinese
Indo-Pacific strategy might look like.

First of all, China's ports expansion policies deserve a critical analysis. Intertwined with the
BRI, China has already consolidated its presence in the ports of Djibouti in the Horn of Africa,
Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, in the Maldives, and in Tanzania.

The strategic reason for China's ports expansion policies throughout the region is twofold. First,
China needs to protect its supply routes – that is, the sea lines of communications (SLOC) –
destined for its own economic development. To be able to achieve this objective, for years now
China has been engaged in a naval military growth aimed at both the construction of a navy
capable of performing military as well as humanitarian operations outside China's coastal areas
and at the protection of its trade interests, especially in light of growing regional tensions with
the United States and India. The necessity to move now into the military realm is a "reverse of
the Mahanist idea of commercial ships following the warships." [1]

It is clear that, for Beijing, the protection of trade routes is motivated above all by the need
to meet the goals of its economic growth. For instance, 80% of the oil Beijing imports passes
through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca before it reaches the South China Sea.
For China, therefore, the Indo-Pacific routes are vital corridors (生命线– shengming xian) for its
energy survival. It is essential, then, to be able to defend them against possible adversaries. For
example, a naval blockade in the Strait of Malacca, in Southeast Asia, which would halt the
supply of crude oil for China, would have an immediate negative impact on the Middle
Kingdom's domestic stability. This concern had already been expressed in 2003 by the then
Chinese President Hu Jintao who referred to the "Malacca Dilemma" (马六甲困局–maliujia
kunjun) when talking about the so-called chokepoints of Southeast Asia.
This geopolitical commitment underlines China's historical geographical vulnerability: long
maritime and land borders to protect against adversaries. For instance, Beijing’s economic
decade-long rise has paved the way for the establishment of the so-called first and second "island
chains", which are conceived as means to contain China's territorial and military expansion in the
region. Therefore, one of the major drivers of China's ports expansion policies concerns
Beijing's desire to minimize its maritime vulnerability and to shorten its supply routes; in
other words, finding a way to diminish the so-called "tyranny of distance." [2] In so doing, China
is trying to establish its presence (both military and otherwise) in various ports along the Indian
Ocean in order to protect its maritime corridors. The way Beijing is expanding its presence
abroad also highlights another important feature of China's ports expansion approach, the so-
called dual-use strategy, namely the use of ports for both civilian and military purposes.

The second reason behind China’s ports expansion concerns Beijing's desire to extend its own
influence throughout the region both to fulfill its hard and soft power objectives. For example,
it was recently announced that the Middle Kingdom might be willing to establish a military post
in Vanuatu, a tiny republic located outside the Indo-Pacific region. Since this outpost lies outside
China's historical areas of geopolitical interest, it is clear that such a move responds more to
Beijing's overall objective to extend its presence throughout the region than to its own intimate
necessity to protect the sea lines of communication. In fact, such a Chinese base outside the
Indo-Pacific would create favorable conditions for checking on Australia's maritime moves and
policies, especially in light of Canberra's involvement in what may be the revival of the above-
mentioned Quad, i.e. the four-party alliance between Japan, India, and the United States. At the
same time, this action would further enhance Beijing's ability to monitor US actions in Guam.

The second element, a direct result of the first, concerns China’s new maritime strategy, which
also encompasses the Indo-Pacific. The most valid explanation is offered by the 2015 China's
Military Strategy White Paper. It illustrates Beijing's plan to develop a blue-water navy fleet,
able to carry out operations for offshore protection (远海护卫 – yuanhai huwei). The
document has also labeled the offshore protection as "frontier defense", that is, the protection of
the new Chinese frontiers abroad directly related to Beijing's own national and security interests.
This stands in contrast to Chinese classic defense operations, carried out near the coast (近海防
御 –jinhai fangyu), for which China's coastal fleet (green-water navy) would have been already
sufficient. The creation of a blue-water navy is crucial according to the new national
defense document, since it highlights the importance of moving from one maritime theater of
operation (the Pacific Ocean) to two (the Pacific and the Indian).

Moreover, this strategic shift also entails the so-called "1.5 war" doctrine, which calls for the
development of Chinese naval capabilities able to fight one major war while being able to
contain a second military conflict. In other words, China is trying to find a way to be able to fight
in the East or South China Sea against, for instance, the US, while also facing the possibility of
an Indian attack on its land frontier or vice versa.

The creation of a high seas fleet would facilitate the expansion of the Chinese military presence
at the regional and global levels and would help Beijing to counter India and the United States'
encirclement policies. Taking New Delhi into Beijing's strategic calculation, China is creating, in
the Indian Ocean (Sri Lanka, Maldives, Pakistan and Bangladesh), what has been defined as the
strategy of the "pearl chain" (珍珠链 – zhenzhulian), not be mistaken as the so-called "string of
pearls" which simply envisages the creation of logistical support points in the Indian Ocean. The
pearl chain, instead, entails the policy to connect the main strategic ports of the Indian
Ocean – even through the physical control of the strategic islands –in order to form a combat-
oriented containment line of India. New Delhi, under the Modi presidency, has launched an
intense program of military modernization. The Indian navy is expanding into what the
government perceives as its area of influence. The fruits of India's new assertiveness already
manifested themselves in 2017, first by sending its own military unit to the Strait of Malacca,
with the aim of monitoring the commercial flow of the area, and then through the military
standoff with China on the Doklam plateau, located between Bhutan, India and China – clear
indications of Indian preparedness to deter the above-mentioned Chinese maritime
expansionism.

As a result, Beijing's crucial aspects of its developing Indo-Pacific strategy - ports expansion and
blue-water navy – are two assets to be closely monitored for the future strategic interaction
within the region. The ports, in fact, are considered strategic support points (战略支点–zhanlue
zhidian), in order to both protect the maritime routes for the transportation of the necessary
resources for Beijing's economy and to extend the Chinese influence at regional and global
levels. Chinese influence that could also be the result of a more assertive foreign policy, which
tries to find a way to deter other countries from what Beijing perceives as "encirclement policies"
against it.

Malacca Dilemma
Fueling China’s exponential industrial expansion is its heavy reliance on energy, particularly oil. China
became the world’s largest oil importer in 2017, surpassing the US. Approximately 70% of the country’s
oil requirements were satisfied through imports in 2018 with the U.S. Department of Commerce
expecting this to grow to about 80% by 2040.This dependence on foreign oil to run the country’s giant
economic machine created what is known as “The Malacca Dilemma,” coined in 2003 by then-president
Hu Jintao.

“Malacca Dilemma is a word coined in 2003, by the then Chinese President Hu Jintao. It is a term that
represents the potential factors that could hinder China’s economic development through choking oil
imports. China is the world’s largest importer of oil, accounting for 80 percent of the total oil used by
the country, mainly secured from the USA.”

The strategic location strait of Malacca Falls between Sumatra Islands and Malay Peninsula and
has Singapore to its east. This narrow stretch of water could be easily blocked by the rival
nations of China, affecting the big China machine, in lieu of the fact that around 80 percent of its
exports pass through this strait.

Singapore inevitably plays an important role as it is an ally of the USA and India and could
possibly be influenced by them. It has been feared by China that this could possibly materialize
somewhere in the near future as the politics are dynamic in nature. If it happens, it could slow
down the big China machine, something that China is not ready to accept amidst its “China
Dream”.
In the search of alternate routes, most of them like Sunda Strait, Lombok and Makassar Straits
have been proven dissatisfactory as the former is shallow and the latter ones are longer routes
that could incur huge financial burden with shipping costs estimated around $220 billion per
year.

Most of China’s imports derive from the Middle East and Angola. Currently, eighty percent of
China’s oil has to pass through the Strait of Malacca, a narrow stretch of water between the
Indonesian island of Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula. With Singapore, a major US ally that
frequently participates in US naval drills, located at the mouth of the strait’s eastern opening, the
Strait of Malacca becomes a natural strategic chokepoint. In the event of a conflict, the Malacca
Strait could easily be blocked by a rival nation, cutting off China from crucial energy resources.
The closest alternative is the Sunda Strait whose narrowness and shallowness make it unsuitable
as a passageway for large, modern ships. Other alternatives such as the Lombok and Makassar
Straits are much longer routes that would incur additional shipping costs estimated to be from
around $84 to $220 billion per year, according to RSIS.

As such, the Chinese government has taken a number of steps to reduce the country’s over-
reliance on the Strait of Malacca. These include the Kazakhstan-China Pipeline which connects
the country to the oil-rich Caspian region and the Myanmar-Yunnan Pipelines which siphons oil
and gas from the Bay of Bengal to the Kunming region of China, avoiding the Malacca Strait for
Burmese oil imports.
The most effective way to avoid the Malacca Strait altogether would be to build a canal across
the Kra isthmus of southern Thailand, providing an alternative shipping route. In an ideal
scenario for China, Beijing would retain control over the area in return for building the canal,
much like how the U.S. Panama Canal Zone operated before full control was handed over to
Panama in 1999.

However, Thailand would be hard-pressed to accept such a deal. The country is not as weak
economically or politically as Panama was during the 19th century and so would be much less
willing to grant China the right to use and control strategically important territory .

Should China not be able to secure control over the area, the canal would be vulnerable to hostile
entities and leave China stranded in essentially the situation it stands in today. Shipments would
have to be unloaded and reloaded at both ends and the canal would itself become another
strategic chokepoint. Also important is the estimated cost of the project, an estimated whopping
$25 billion, and the logistical nightmare it entails.

Alternate route to China via Gwadar in Pakistan. 

In light of this fact, perhaps the most interesting and viable alternative is the Gwagdar-Xinjiang
Pipeline. As part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Chinese government invested in a
series of transportation and energy infrastructure development projects in Pakistan valued at $62
billion. The economic corridor would provide China access to Pakistan’s Gwadar port in the
Arabian Sea. Nicknamed the “Crown Jewel” of China’s string of pearls, a network of Chinese
naval facilities in the Indian Ocean, Gwadar is a deep-sea port in close proximity to both the
Middle East and the Strait of Hormuz.

Gwadar, deep-sea port in southern Pakistan, is

envisaged to be the crux of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

The most important advantage of the Gwadar-Xinjiang pipeline is that it enables China to bypass
the Malacca Strait altogether. Middle Eastern shipping tankers could simply dock in Gwadar
where the oil would be extracted and further transported to China through a series of pipelines.
The Iran-Pakistan Pipeline could also be linked to Gwadar and potentially provide an additional
avenue of energy imports to the Chinese industrial machine and increase the security of its
energy supply. Although this option is comparatively more expensive than others, it notably
maintains China’s connection to Middle Eastern oil supplies in an efficient and comparatively
secure manner, should a crisis arise in the Strait of Malacca.

However, despite Beijing’s aggressive attempts at diversification, it will continue to remain

dependent on the Malacca Strait in the short-term. The Kazakhstan-China and Myanmar-Yunnan
provide only 400,000 and 420,000 barrels a day respectively, compared to the 6.5 million China-
bound barrels that pass through the strait daily. As such, China is attempting to significantly
expand its naval power projection capabilities to defend its access to energy.

One strategy is the development of the famous String of Pearls, a series of Chinese naval bases in
the Indian Ocean. The string not only serves to protect China’s sea lines of communication that
are crucial for seaborne trade but also provides an additional avenue of deployment points for the
Chinese Navy. A modernized People’s Liberation Army Navy coupled with a ring of staging
points across the Indian Ocean could provide China some semblance of security, but because of
the US Navy’s heavy presence near Singapore, the Strait of Malacca would remain significantly
vulnerable to a China-focused blockade.

As China’s shortfall in domestic production and energy consumption continues to grow, a viable
new route will need to be established in the long-term. Deng’s reforms created lasting impact on
the world’s most populous nation and propelled China to become a major player in the
international stage. Yet they also created a supreme dependence on energy and the country lacks
the natural resources to fulfill its needs domestically. The Gwadar-Xinjiang Pipeline is the
only feasible project currently underway that provides an alternative to the Malacca Strait
altogether and it seems that China is hedging on its success. However, Gwadar port is still under
construction – with estimates ranging from 2025 to 2030 for completion – and so, until then,
Beijing will try its best to acquire influence over the Malacca Strait at any costs. Expect more
Chinese meddling in the Malay peninsula.