Journal of Current Issues & Research in Advertising

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Rethinking the Persuasion Knowledge Model:

Schematic Antecedents and Associative Outcomes
of Persuasion Knowledge Activation for Covert
Advertising

Nathaniel J. Evans & Dooyeon Park

To cite this article: Nathaniel J. Evans & Dooyeon Park (2015) Rethinking the Persuasion
Knowledge Model: Schematic Antecedents and Associative Outcomes of Persuasion
Knowledge Activation for Covert Advertising, Journal of Current Issues & Research in
Advertising, 36:2, 157-176, DOI: 10.1080/10641734.2015.1023873

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10641734.2015.1023873

Published online: 11 May 2015.

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 Journal of Current Issues & Research in Advertising, 36: 157–176, 2015
Copyright C American Academy of Advertising

ISSN: 1064-1734 print / 2164-7313 online

DOI: 10.1080/10641734.2015.1023873

Rethinking the Persuasion Knowledge Model: Schematic

Antecedents and Associative Outcomes of Persuasion
Knowledge Activation for Covert Advertising
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Nathaniel J. Evans
Department of Advertising and Public Relations, Grady College of Journalism and Mass
Communication, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, USA

Dooyeon Park
Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Georgia, Athens,
Georgia, USA

Whether persuasion knowledge activation occurs naturally among adults as a result of covert advertis-
ing exposure is an underexplored area that should interest practitioners, researchers, and regulators. By
using the Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM) and Schema Theory as theoretical underpinnings, this
article proposes a conceptual model that addresses two central questions. First, is persuasion knowl-
edge activated for advertising or persuasive episodes in which individuals have no a priori knowledge?
Since persuasion knowledge activation requires awareness or recognition of a persuasive or adver-
tising episode, are individuals able to recognize covert advertising episodes as advertising—that is,
ads that have the appearance of something other than advertising? Second, if individuals do activate
persuasion knowledge when exposed to covert advertising episodes, are the associated attitudinal
outcomes automatically negative? As posited by the PKM, persuasion knowledge activation gen-
erates coping mechanisms leading to increased skepticism and negative attitudes. We propose that
there are alternative outcomes to attitude formation even when persuasion knowledge is activated.
Our conceptual model offers an alternative view that may account for individuals’ understanding and
processing of covert advertising.

Friestad and Wright’s (1994) Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM) assumes that when individuals
are exposed to a persuasive message they will activate and carry out strategies designed to defend
against that persuasive message. These behaviors are referred to as coping skills, processes,
or strategies. They result from experience with and knowledge of the marketplace. The role
of persuasion knowledge in forming and holding valid topic and agent attitudes suggest that
individuals learn over time what constitutes a persuasive attempt. This persuasion knowledge is
stored and used as a tool when valid agent and topic attitudes need to be formed or revised.

Address correspondence to Dr. Nathaniel J. Evans, Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication, University
of Georgia, 120 Hooper St. Athens, GA 30602, USA. E-mail: nevans4@uga.edu
 158 N. J. EVANS AND D. PARK

The recognition of advertising is a key component to the activation of persuasion knowledge

and the associated coping skills involved. Rossiter and Percy (1997) suggest that when indi-
viduals watch traditional advertisements they have enough market knowledge and experience
to understand where relevant product information is located within commercials. While adults’
recognition of persuasive intent and subsequent persuasion knowledge activation in traditional
advertising formats have been empirically investigated (Rozendaal, Buijzen, and Valkenburg
2010; Boerman, Van Reijmersdal, and Neijens 2012), significantly less information exists as
to whether covert forms of advertising result in persuasion knowledge activation (Lorenzon and
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Russell 2012; Tutaj and Van Reijmersdal 2012). Research has examined how manipulations made
to adults’ persuasion knowledge influence attitudes toward covert advertising (Wei, Fischer, and
Main 2008). However, research has also assumed that adults, due to their age and cognitive
ability, are fully capable of persuasion knowledge activation when exposed to covert advertising
(Kinard and Hartman 2013). Recent research investigating parents’ understanding of children’s
advergames suggests that “this assumption may be just that . . . an assumption” (Evans, Carlson,
and Hoy 2013, 237). Whether persuasion knowledge activation occurs naturally among adults as
a result of covert advertising exposure is an underexplored area that should interest practitioners,
researchers, and regulators (cf. Federal Trade Commission [FTC] 2013). Furthermore, when var-
ious forms of covert advertising integrate game dynamics with advertising content, the widely
held assumption that persuasion knowledge activation inevitably results in increased skepticism
and negative attitudes (Shrum, Liu, Nespoli, and Lowrey 2012) is somewhat preemptive.
The PKM offers explanations relating to persuasion avoidance and defense but does little
to explain the process of persuasion acceptance. Second, the PKM suggests that persuasion
knowledge activation requires an explicit recognition of advertising or persuasive intent. Without
such recognition, the supposed coping processes designed to help an individual defend him- or
herself from a persuasive episode will not be activated. Third, prior research using the PKM
suggests that the “acquisition of persuasion knowledge may heighten suspicion or skepticism and
negatively influence the . . . attitude toward the tactic itself” (Nelson, Wood and Paek 2009, 223).
By using the Persuasion Knowledge Model (Friestad and Wright 1994; 1995) and Schema The-
ory (Bartlett 1932; Brewer and Nakamura 1984; Rumlehart 1984) as theoretical underpinnings,
this article proposes a conceptual model that addresses two central questions. First, is persuasion
knowledge activated for advertising or persuasive episodes in which individuals have no a priori
knowledge? Since persuasion knowledge activation requires awareness or recognition of a per-
suasive or advertising episode, are individuals able to recognize covert advertising episodes as
advertising—that is, ads that have the appearance of something other than advertising? Second,
if individuals do activate persuasion knowledge when exposed to covert advertising episodes, are
the associated attitudinal outcomes automatically negative? As proposed by the PKM, persuasion
knowledge activation generates coping mechanisms leading to increased skepticism and nega-
tive attitudes. We propose that there are alternative outcomes to attitude formation even when
persuasion knowledge is activated.

COVERT ADVERTISING

The concept of embedding advertising within other media contexts is not a new phenomenon.
Historically, advertisers have strategically placed advertisements in television programs, radio
 RETHINKING THE PERSUASION KNOWLEDGE MODEL 159

programs, and newspapers. This integration of advertising and entertainment, commonly referred
to as covert marketing, can bypass consumer skepticism, thus reducing the likelihood of persua-
sion knowledge activation (Kaikati and Kaikati 2004; Petty and Andrews 2008). In other words,
covert advertising’s purpose is to make the advertisement appear less like an advertisement and
more like the media in which it is placed (Petty and Andrews 2008; van Reijmersdal, Jansz,
Peters, and van Noort 2010). The use of covert advertising tactics suggests that advertising is
viewed as unwelcome, intrusive, or even negative in the eyes of the potential consumer. Though
not specifically situated in these negative terms, Warlaumont (1997) does suggest that individ-
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uals have certain expectations of advertising. These expectations are in part formed from one’s
ability to recognize advertising as advertising based on characteristics of design, exaggeration, or
hyperreality. For example, she states that “instead of capturing real life, advertisements . . . can
provide photographic versions of persuasive messages by using props, models, and background
materials arranged to idealize the product or message” (42). Thus, the concept of embedding an
advertisement within a medium’s context is a strategy that deters the individual from recognizing
the communication as advertising.
Tanaka (1994/1999) extends Warlaumont’s position and suggests not only that individuals
have certain preconceptions on what constitutes advertising and the recognition of advertising
but also that, because individuals are aware of the persuasive intent of advertisers, they distrust
advertisers and their ads. Tanaka (1994/1999) posits that the use of a covert advertising strategy
is to overcome the “public distrust” of advertisers by preventing the individual from recognizing
the manifest content of the advertisement.

Advergames and In-Game Advertising

While multiple forms of covert advertising can serve as a means to explore this study’s central
questions, advergames and in-game advertising are of particular interest. In the advertising
literature both exist as relatively new forms of advertising. Advergames blend gaming dynamics
with a commercial message. Advergames are “custom-made games specifically designed around a
product or service” (Interactive Advertising Bureau 2007, 6). These games are a type of branded
entertainment that feature advertising messages, logos, and trade characters in a game format
typically found online (Moore and Rideout 2007), often on an advertiser’s website (Federal
Trade Commission 2006). Advergames allow a participant virtual interaction with a product or
a specific brand (Arnold 2004) and offer a combination of entertainment and engagement that
produces strong emotional connections between the brand and the game (Dahl, Eagle, and Baez
2009). Unlike advergames, which are designed around a brand, product, or service, Lewis and
Porter (2010) state, “In-game advertising involves the placement of real-world marketing into
pre-existing console and computer games, commonly in the form of billboards, posters, and
sponsor signage in sports and racing games” (47).
According to recent research by Business Insider (Emmanuel Gobry 2012), revenue for online
gaming, which includes advergames and in-game advertising, was projected to exceed the $5
billion mark by 2015. These estimates did not include the revenue garnered through advertising
and lead generation, which placed the projected revenue for online gaming at more than $1.3
billion for the 2012 fiscal year. Revenue is not the only area that has seen growth in the gaming
 160 N. J. EVANS AND D. PARK

market. Recent estimates by IGN Entertainment (2011) suggested there were approximately
99,300,000 active gamers. Those same estimates also found that 7.3 million of these individuals
played online games. The growth in gaming as an activity, in combination with the substantial
increases in revenue generation, situates it as one of the most emergent and promising areas for
marketing and advertising in the years to come.

Antecedents and Outcomes of Persuasion Knowledge Activation

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The growing popularity of embedding advertising in games, as evidenced by increases in ex-

penditures, revenue, and active participation, suggests a level of public acceptance not generally
seen with traditional advertising formats. This trend indicates two possible explanations worthy
of theoretical investigation. On one hand, individuals who play advergames and games with
embedded advertising may not recognize the advertising therein. On the other hand, individuals
may very well recognize the advertising therein, thus activating persuasion knowledge. In this
case, the activation of persuasion knowledge may not necessarily lead to increased skepticism
and/or negative attitudes due to the positive feelings generated from game play.
The former explanation, according to the PKM, suggests that nonrecognition of advertising in
a covert advertising episode prevents the individual from accessing a priori persuasion knowledge
structures and the associated coping strategies designed to defend oneself against the message.
It is possible that the features of the gaming environment such as interactivity or character
control, which are not generally seen in traditional advertising episodes, guide the individual’s
interpretation of the media context as qualitatively represented by games instead of advertising.
These qualitative mental representations are referred to as schema.
The latter explanation, in contrast to the PKM, suggests that the positive experience of game
play can become associated with the advertising. This associative transfer may supersede the
increased skepticism and negative attitudes resulting from individuals’ activation of a priori
advertising persuasion knowledge. Accordingly, even if one recognizes an advertising episode
within the game environment, the superiority of the positive experience over the activation
of advertising persuasion knowledge marginalizes the assumed occurrence of skepticism and
negative attitudes. The development and activation of persuasion knowledge are discussed in
the following section. The potential associative mechanisms and their relationship to persuasion
knowledge activation are discussed later.

THE PERSUASION KNOWLEDGE MODEL: THE DEVELOPMENT

OF PERSUASION KNOWLEDGE

We assume that people who are exposed to covert advertising, such as advergames or in-game
advertising, might not access or utilize a priori persuasion knowledge. This assumption is rea-
sonable when we consider how persuasion knowledge is thought to develop. Whether individuals
access or utilize a priori persuasion knowledge as a result of covert advertising exposure requires
a review of the individual- and societal-level elements thought to affect the development and
formation of accessible persuasion knowledge structures. Our review of the literature reveals that
the elements thought to exert an influence on the development and use of persuasion knowledge
 RETHINKING THE PERSUASION KNOWLEDGE MODEL 161

can be categorized under two major headings: (1) cognitive and information processing ability
and (2) experience.

Cognitive and Information Processing Ability

We suggest that one fundamental prerequisite for persuasion knowledge development is cognitive
and information processing ability. The PKM implies that adults, due to their age and information
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processing ability, are better able to infer the selling and persuasive intent within all forms of
advertising compared to children (Friestad and Wright 1994; John 1999; Kunkle et al. 2004;
Wright, Friestad, and Boush 2005). Numerous accounts of research indicate improvements in
cognitive and information processing ability as we age, which include but are not limited to recog-
nition of strategic deception (Beal and Belgrad 1990; Peskin 1992), communication competence
(Laupa 1991), perspective in social interactions (Pillow 1991), how communications influence
behavior (Chapman, Skinner, and Baltes 1990), and advertisers’ goals (Robertson and Rossiter
1974; Ward, Wackman, and Wartella 1977; Donohue, Henke, and Donohue 1980; Macklin 1985;
Moschis 1987).
However, discrepancies exist as to whether age influences the use and activation of persuasion
knowledge (Kirmani and Campbell 2004; Carlson, Bearden, and Hardesty 2007). Additionally,
research indicates that reductions in adults’ cognitive and information processing ability can
interfere with the activation of persuasion knowledge (Campbell and Kirmani 2000; Evans and
Hoy forthcoming) and result in less skeptical attitudes (Yoon, Choi, and Song 2011). Therefore,
even if adults have a propensity for cognitive and information processing ability, the cognitive
ability that determines their capability for persuasion knowledge activation is most likely normally
distributed among the adult population (Evans and Hoy forthcoming). For that reason, it is
incorrect to assume that adults, by virtue of their superior cognitive and information processing
ability, are likely to activate persuasion knowledge when exposed to covert advertising episodes
(Evans and Hoy forthcoming). This line of research suggests that a certain proportion of adults
are able to tolerate more processing load, which may lead to a greater incidence of persuasion
knowledge activation for covert advertising.
The covert nature of advergames and in-game advertising requires more mental resources
for successful game navigation compared to traditional advertising (Panic, Cauberghe, and De
Pelsmacker 2013). Therefore, the proportion of adults who are less able to tolerate increased pro-
cessing load are perhaps also less likely to activate persuasion knowledge when exposed to covert
forms of advertising, which require the use of those same information processing capabilities.

Experience

A second prerequisite for persuasion knowledge development is the direct and indirect experiences
individuals have with advertising and persuasive episodes (Friestad and Wright 1994). The amount
of advertising or persuasive episode exposure and the variety of tactics used with such episodes
can be classified as direct experience, which is a highly salient mechanism for individuals’
development of persuasion knowledge. This direct experience aids in recognizing the use of
persuasive tactics, in understanding the situational motivations behind the tactics, in the ability to
 162 N. J. EVANS AND D. PARK

evaluate their effectiveness, and in the activation of persuasion knowledge (Friestad and Wright
1994).
Persuasion knowledge development is also shaped by indirect experiences such as the general
sociocultural discourse of persuasion and third-party observations of persuasive episodes, which
include watching people participate in sales interactions (Campbell and Kirmani 2000), viewing
sales presentations, and seeing in-store designs (Friestad and Wright 1994; 1995). Concerning the
sociocultural discourse of persuasion, Barry (1987) notes a “folk” or “common sense” model of
persuasion knowledge that has always existed and functioned the backdrop of society. This type
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of persuasion knowledge is experienced within the social discourse and activities of everyday life
and society. These various activities in everyday life not only provide people with experiences but
also foster engagement in sharing and forming their knowledge about persuasive environments.
The transmission of “folk knowledge” does not necessarily occur on the conscious level; rather,
it is shared and developed naturally by various persuasive attempts without any special efforts.

Breadth Versus Depth of Experience

Individuals’ direct and indirect experience with persuasion can be further conceptualized as
possessing breadth and depth. On one hand, we suggest that the depth of experience can be defined
as the quantifiable amount of or exposure to persuasive tactics, third-party observations, or folk
knowledge for a specific advertising format. On the other hand, we suggest that the breadth of
experience can be defined as the recognition of differences in advertising and marketing executions
that exist across a variety of advertising formats. We further posit that breadth of experience leads
to an understanding that each advertising format possesses its own unique structural elements,
which include a wide variety of advertising executions. In other words, while depth of experience
accounts for a persuasive understanding of advertising within a specific format or medium
(i.e., television advertising), breadth of experience accounts for a persuasive understanding of
advertising across all formats or media (i.e., advergames vs television advertising).
Hypothetically, then, if an individual were exposed to every television commercial ever made,
the individual would possess a very high depth of experience for TV advertising. However, that
depth of experience may not effectively inform or activate persuasion knowledge for a covert
advertising episode in a non-TV format. Conversely, if an individual is exposed to one example
of advertising across all formats that possibly exist, the individual would possess a very high
breadth of experience. Because the breadth of experience informs recognition of all structural
elements that could feasible qualify a communication as advertising, we suggest that breadth of
experience may more effectively activate persuasion knowledge for a covert advertising episode
regardless of format.
While we do concede that persuasion knowledge activation is most likely to occur when high
depth and breadth of experience are present, we suggest that breadth alone may suffice when
presented with a new covert advertising episode where individuals have little to no experience.
Research that supports this assertion finds that individuals who are given information that de-
scribes the features and purpose of various forms of covert advertising have a better persuasive
understanding of that advertising compared to those who are given no information (Wei et al.
2008; Nelson et al. 2009). In other words, the activation of persuasion knowledge for covert
advertising in these cases is less a result of general marketplace experience, cognitive ability, or
age, but rather a result of one’s recognition that media previously not considered the domain of
 RETHINKING THE PERSUASION KNOWLEDGE MODEL 163

advertising can in fact qualify as such when one is provided the information leading them to that
conclusion—a phenomenon referred to as the change of meaning principle (Friestad and Wright
1994; Nelson et al. 2009).
Therefore, we suggest that the recognition of structural elements that comprise and qualify
communications as advertising, whether covert or not, is guided by our interpretation of the relative
advertising information provided. While research suggests that one’s activation of persuasion
knowledge for a covert advertising episode is contingent on cognitive ability and experience,
we argue that the processes that account for information interpretation, which are referred to as
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mental schema, can account for the process of persuasion knowledge activation as well.

SCHEMA THEORY

In the seminal work on schema theory, Bartlett (1932) defined a schema as “an active organization
of past reactions, or of past experiences, which must always be supposed to operating in any well-
adapted organic response” (201). In an attempt to explain what was meant by “active organization”
Brewer and Nakamura (1984) stated that schema “are higher order cognitive structures. . . . They
serve a crucial role in providing an account of how old knowledge interacts with new knowledge
in perception, language, thought, and memory” (120). In simpler terms, Rumlehart (1984) said
that “schema is a data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in memory” (163).
Schema function as guides to help us interpret situations whether novel or not. Schema allow
for the activation of behavioral scripts in situations that call for them. For example, we have a
schema for restaurant behavior. We know that we find the hostess, tell him or her how many
people are in our party, proceeded to a table, order drinks first, then food, pay the bill, and leave
a tip. These scripts are enacted upon activation of the proper “restaurant schema.” But before we
are able to activate the proper “restaurant schema” we must locate the identifying characteristics
of the situation or stimuli that are best explained by a particular schema.

Locating Variable Constraints

Rumlehart (1984) states that variable constraints are the knowledge we have about the typical
values of the variables in a situation or stimuli and how each of these variable values are
interrelated (see Figure 1). In the case of the “restaurant schema” we know that there must be
variables such as food, cooks, servers, hostesses, patrons, and so on. Each of these variables has
values. For example, we know that the food is inanimate and cannot interact with others, whereas
the cook can interact but does not interact with patrons because they are not in the kitchen. We also
understand that within a “restaurant schema” both the food and the cook are interrelated because
the cook creates the food. The identification of the variable constraints and their interrelationships
can help us recognize the important aspects of the situation or stimuli and then link those with
variables in the appropriate schema (Rumlehart 1984). Second, as with the example of the unseen
cook producing the food, variable constraints can help us “make inferences about unobserved
aspects of a situation” (165). So even though we do not see the cook making the food, we infer,
for variables we have not seen or variables whose values we have not seen, that the food did in
fact in all likelihood come from a cook that we have not seen yet.
 164 N. J. EVANS AND D. PARK
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FIGURE 1 Covert advertising instantiation process: Noninitiation of advertising schema.

 RETHINKING THE PERSUASION KNOWLEDGE MODEL 165

In the case of advertising, we often look at the observable variables and their values to
make inferences about which schematic representation accounts for what we see. For example,
in the case of advergames or in-game advertising we may look at the variables of format,
pace, interactivity, flow, and control. We then look at how these variables and their values are
interrelated. Before we can active or instantiate a particular schema that fits with an interpretation
of these particular variables, values, and interrelations, we must first process the situation or
stimuli, either holistically or bit by bit.
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Concept and Data Processing

Rumlehart (1984) suggests that we process stimuli or situations according to two distinct patterns:
conceptual processing and data-driven processing (see Figure 1).

Conceptual Processing

According to conceptual processing, upon exposure to a stimulus or situation we partially

activate a promising schema that has the possibility of guiding our successful interpretation of the
stimuli or situation. Following the partial schema activation, other subschematic operations are
activated that also help us to interpret the variables and their values, whether seen or not, in the
situation or stimulus. For example, suppose we are playing an advergame and we attempt to make
sense of this stimulus by partially activating an advertising schema. We see that the game contains
advertising and then activate other subschemas that help us interpret the stimulus. Perhaps after
activating the various subschemas we realize that the variable values and characteristics found in
other advertising subschema do not fit well with the current stimulus. We then activate another
promising schema (say, a video game schema) and replace the previously activated advertising
schema because it did not help us interpret the stimulus fully. Following the partial activation
of the gaming schema, other gaming subschema will then be activated and perhaps will better
help us interpret the advergame compared to prior advertising subschema. Thus, our conceptually
driven processing starts large and winnows down, while a data-driven form of processing starts
small and gets larger.

Data-driven Processing

According to data-driven processing, instead of activating a promising schema we activate

promising subschema (Rumlehart 1984). As with the same example used earlier, imagine we are
playing an advergame. With data-driven processing we may recognize that we control a character
in an environment. We may also recognize that we accrue points for doing the “correct” action
in this environment. Both of these realizations may activate respective subschemas for video
game characters and competition. These subschemas then activate a promising schema for video
gaming instead of advertising. Thus, we then come to interpret the stimulus as a video game and
not an advertisement.
It is important to note that these are very simplified examples of the internal processes that
take place when exposed to an advergame or in-game ad. In fact, Rumlehart (1984) suggests that
the schema interpretation process can occur in either way, both ways, and simultaneously. Thus,
 166 N. J. EVANS AND D. PARK

the ultimate interpretation is a process of both conceptual and data-driven processing that lead
one to instantiate a “best fit” schema.

Advertising Schema Noninstantiation

Proposition 1: In the absence of a priori covert advertising knowledge, advertising schema instantiation
for covert advertising episodes will not initially occur.
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Following the location of the variable constraints, their values, and their interrelations, one per-
forms a combination of conceptual and data-driven processing and decides on the best schematic
representation of the situation or stimulus. This is known as schema instantiation (see Figure 1).
Rumlehart (1984) describes this as happening “whenever a particular configuration of values
are bound to a particular configuration of variables at a particular moment in time” (165). Thus
far, a central question of this article has been whether persuasion knowledge is activated for
covert advertising episodes in which individuals have no a priori knowledge. Does an individual
instantiate an advertising schema when exposed to a covert advertising episode?
As suggested by Proposition 1 (P1), we will assume that when an individual is exposed to
a covert advertising episode the individual does not instantiate an advertising schema. Given
that covert forms of advertising are designed to prevent the individual from recognizing the
manifest content of the advertisement (Tanaka 1994/1999; Petty and Andrews 2008), individuals’
processing of variable constraints may lead to a nonadvertising schematic instantiation.

A “Best-Fit” Schema Search and Instantiation

Proposition 2: When advertising schema is not initially instantiated for covert episodes, individuals
will conduct a schema search and instantiate a best-fit schema.

According to P1, one first rejects their advertising schema as the best possible interpretation of
the advergame or in-game advertisement and then embarks on a schema search as suggested
by P2 (see Figure 1) so that there may be an eventual schema instantiation. Levin, Petros, and
Petrella (1982) suggest that the elements present in traditional advertising are not present within
covert forms such as advergames and in-game advertising. In fact, these traditional elements or
tactics, as Friestad and Wright (1994) refer to them, are abandoned in favor of more involving and
interactive tactics. Therefore, it follows that if an individual is exposed to a covert advertisement
that appears to be a game (i.e., an advergame or an in-game advertisement), and that individual
believes that game to be a game and not an advertisement, then the individual will most likely
process it as a game and not an advertisement (Warlaumont 1997). Crook (2004) suggests that
when exposed to advertising stimuli, people rely on certain cues. These cues in the case of TV
advertisements (i.e., separation of commercial content from the program content) aid the person in
instantiating the correct advertising schema (Crook 2004). As is the case with covert advertising,
advergames and in-game ads do not typically contain explicit cues that identify the true nature of
the communication as advertising (Henry and Story 2009). Therefore, in terms of schema search
and selection, Axelrod (1973) suggests that more “highly accessible” schema are checked first
 RETHINKING THE PERSUASION KNOWLEDGE MODEL 167

to see if they fit with the information at hand (1250). Recent research that supports this premise
found that a less integrated form of online advertising (banner ads) resulted in more persuasion
knowledge activation compared to a more covert form of online product placement (Tutaj and
Van Reijmersdal 2012). Arguably, the banner ad resulted in a “highly accessible” banner-ad
schema,while the covert product placement did not result in an accessible advertising schema.
As the fit between the variables, their values, their interrelationships, and the information
are better explained or better “fit” with an already accessible schema, the likelihood of that
particular schema activation increases (Axelrod 1973; Rumlehart 1984). If an individual plays
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an advergame, and upon searching for an accessible schema the individual discovers a priori
knowledge that fits the information at hand, and best explains that information as a game, then
that schema will in all likelihood be activated.

Schema Instantiation Through Learning

Proposition 3: When a best-fit schema search results in no acceptable schema fit for a covert episode,
schema instantiation can occur through accretion, tuning, and restructuring.

On the other hand, what happens when the schema search reveals little to no schema fit? What if
the individual that plays the advergame or is exposed to the in-game ad has no a priori knowledge
of the variable constraints or their values? Rumlehart (1984) suggests that individuals have the
ability to change, update, and form schema according to three different learning modes: accretion,
tuning, and restructuring (see Figure 1).

Accretion

Accretion suggests that increases in exposure to the advergame or in-game ad environment help
the individual develop memory traces that act as schema. It is important to note that according to
accretion learning no new schema will form (Rumlehart and Norman 1978). Thus, as an individual
garners enough experience or knowledge, they will have access to a memory-based schema based
on experiential a priori knowledge, and whether it be one that represents advertising, gaming, or
something else, it will be instantiated.

Tuning

Second, the process of tuning takes existing schema that cannot account for information at
hand, modifying it or changing it (Rumlehart and Norman 1978). This refinement process is based
on experience as well. Therefore, as one develops more knowledge about advergames, based on
experience, one will be more likely to have tuned schema that help to interpret advergames as
games, advertising, or something else.

Restructuring

Lastly, restructuring is the creation of new schema. Rumlehart and Norman (1978) suggest
that new schema can be patterned on existing schema or can be induced from experience. In terms
 168 N. J. EVANS AND D. PARK

of the former, schematic variables can be replaced or substituted. For example, a variable that
explains the presence of advertising in games can be substituted in an existing gaming schema
for some other variable that failed to help one interpret advergames. The resulting schema may
be one that is neither game based nor advertising based but rather one that is a combination of the
two. The latter restructuring type, induced from experience, suggests continued exposure to and
experience with certain “spatio-temporal” configurations of schema will induce a new schema
(Rumlehart 1984, 183). Advergames may develop their own schema because only during certain
times (i.e., when I get on my computer and go to a particular website) is the individual exposed
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to this particular stimulus. Over time this exposure will result in the interpretation and schematic
representation of advergames as advergames and not advertising or games per se.

Summary of Antecedents of Nonadvertising Schema Instantiation

In summary, according to Figure 1, when an individual is exposed to a covert advertising episode

it may be the individual does not initially instantiate an advertising schema (P1). This noninstanti-
ation of advertising schema could be a result of inadequate a priori covert advertising knowledge.
Following this proposed outcome, exposure to a covert advertising episode prompts the search for
and instantiation of other nonadvertising schema (P2). The nonadvertising schema instantiation
could be based on direct a priori knowledge (i.e., video-game knowledge) or could be based on
schemata and learning (P3).
However, we must consider the possibility that exposure to covert advertising content will
instantiate an advertising schema. According to Friestad and Wright’s (1994) Persuasion Knowl-
edge Model, the instantiation of advertising schema denotes the activation and use of a priori
advertising persuasion knowledge. Furthermore, according to PKM, once advertising persuasion
knowledge is activated one is motivated to defend oneself from such persuasive attempts and
act accordingly through the use of coping skills. We argue, through the use of associative con-
ditioning, that the instantiation of advertising schema and the activation of a priori advertising
persuasion knowledge do not necessarily result in increased skepticism and negative attitudes.

ADVERTISING SCHEMA INSTANTIATION

The other possible route is that following exposure to a covert advertising episode, one will process
the variables, their values, and their interrelationships and then instantiate an advertising schema.
As suggested by Friestad and Wright (1994), the instantiation of an advertising schema implies
awareness or recognition of an advertising episode or tactic. Advertising awareness implies the
activation of a priori advertising persuasion knowledge, which, in turn, triggers persuasion coping
skills. As research suggests, the activation of persuasion knowledge typically results in negative
evaluations of the ad (Shrum et al. 2012) and can result in increased skepticism and negative
attitudes as well (Friestad and Wright 1994; Wei et al. 2008; Nelson et al. 2009).
As Figure 2 proposes, upon the instantiation of an advertising schema for a covert episode the
activation of persuasion knowledge should theoretically result in the use of coping skills, increased
skepticism, and negative attitudes (Nelson et al. 2009; Tutaj and van Reijmersdal 2012). Therefore,
the recognition of such covert formats as advertising, while structurally different from traditional
 RETHINKING THE PERSUASION KNOWLEDGE MODEL 169
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FIGURE 2 Instantiation of advertising schema for covert advertising: Deprioritizing persuasion knowledge and coping
skill activation through associative learning.

formats, should arguably be schematically represented as advertising. This “update” in one’s

advertising knowledge could be integrated with one’s existing advertising schema and could then
be useful when the individual encounters future covert advertising episodes with similar variable
constraints, values, and interrelationships. In other words, upon schematic integration, covert
advertising episodes that maintain similar structural formats should be recognized as advertising,
thus resulting in the activation of coping skills, increased skepticism, and negative attitudes.
 170 N. J. EVANS AND D. PARK

However, research indicates inconsistencies in attitudinal outcomes toward covert ads or as-
sociated brands even when persuasion knowledge is assumed to be active (Terlutter and Capella
2013). Such inconsistencies in attitudinal outcomes have been explicated by variations in brand
familiarity (Cauberghe and De Pelsmacker 2010), general attitudes toward placements in games
(Bambauer 2006), the attitude toward the game played (Lewis and Porter 2010), game flow
(Waiguny, Nelson, and Terlutter 2012), game outcome (Steffen, Mau, and Schramm-Klein 2013),
game repetition (Cauberghe and De Pelsmacker 2010), game involvement (van Reijmersdal,
Rozendaal, and Buijzen 2012), congruency (Wise, Bolls, Kim, Venkataraman, and Meyer 2008),
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and placement prominence (Redondo 2012). Therefore, even if we assume that persuasion knowl-
edge is activated for a covert advertising episode, the associated skepticism and negative affect
toward the covert ad are presumed as an outcome by the PKM. Regardless of one’s persuasion
knowledge, one might still like the ad in question (Terlutter and Capella 2013). While we do not
dismiss the occurrence of negative attitudes and skepticism resulting from persuasion knowledge
activation, we suggest that the various interactive features of covert ads (i.e., repetition, con-
gruency, placement, etc.) are more salient for attitudinal formation even when one maintains a
understanding that such ads are of a persuasive nature.

Deprioritizing Negative Attitudes and Skepticism Toward Covert Advertising

Friestad and Wright (1994) position coping skills as a defense mechanism designed to protect
oneself from advertisers’ attempts to change attitudes or behavior. Regardless of the advertising
method used, PKM assumes that coping skills are always activated upon recognition of advertising
attempts. We assume that while coping skills are activated upon the recognition of advertising
and activation of persuasion knowledge for a covert episode, they and the associated skepticism
and negative attitudes are not the sole influences on attitudinal outcomes. When we reexamine
Tanaka’s (1994/1999) position on covert advertising; she states that it is “a case of communication
where the intention of the speaker is to alter the cognitive environment of the hearer, i.e., to make
a set of assumptions more manifest to her, without making this intention mutually manifest” (41).
In other words, a covert or embedded form of advertising communications says nothing of the
product but rather attempts to make it either more attractive or less recognizable by placing it
in an environment that is inconsistent or at odds with one’s advertising schema. Furthermore,
the environment in which the ad is placed may be one that elicits positive feelings or a sense of
enjoyment (i.e., games). For example, a recent study by Campbell, Mohr, and Verlegh (2013)
suggests that the positive brand attitudes resulting from exposure to a covert placement are no
different even when persuasion knowledge is activated through the use of a disclosure during the
covert ad. They found that the presence of a disclosure after, and only after, the covert ad resulted
in less positive brand attitudes (Campbell et al. 2013). This suggests that positive experience
garnered during exposure to the covert ad was more salient in guiding attitudinal outcomes
compared to the disclosure, which according to past research activates persuasion knowledge,
increases skepticism, and lowers attitudes.
Advergames and in-game advertising make little reference to salient product features or
performance compared to traditional placements. In fact, “the main aim [of in-game ads] is to
entertain the player” (Terlutter and Capella 2013, 95). While the main aim of advergames is to
drive traffic on the brand website, advergames are nonetheless “easy and fun to play, and offer
 RETHINKING THE PERSUASION KNOWLEDGE MODEL 171

quick rewards” (Terlutter and Capella 2013, 96). It is atypical that either of these formats discloses
the advertising within (Moore and Rideout 2007; Henry and Story 2009). What clearly separates
these covert forms of advertising from more traditional formats is the general lack of product or
performance claims. The absence of substantive claims within covert ads has resulted in Federal
Trade Commission’s (FTC) reluctance to regulate them as it would a traditional ad (Commercial
Alert 2005). Furthermore, without an attempt to directly incite purchasing behavior through the
use of claims, the supposed need to defend oneself is perhaps seen as less of a priority. When the
need to defend oneself from an advertisement or persuasive message is less intense, the negative
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attitudes and skepticism that result from coping skill activation are perhaps less intense as well.
As evidenced by recent research on attitude formation and persuasion knowledge activation
of covert advertising environments, we propose an alternative explanation for attitude formation
following persuasion knowledge activation. Following one’s activation of advertising persuasion
knowledge of a covert ad, it is possible that any positive experiences garnered from such expo-
sure will become associated with the advertising in question and will deprioritize the negative
attitudinal outcomes resulting from such activation of persuasion knowledge. This route is seen
in Figure 2, and the proposed process is associative learning.

Associative Learning

Proposition 4: The occurrence of associative transfer during a covert advertising episode can depri-
oritize skepticism or negative attitudes that result from persuasion knowledge activation.

Associative learning is the process by which attitudes are transferred from one stimulus to
another. In the classical conditioning paradigm, numerous instances of research have provided
evidence for the association of previously unconditioned stimuli (US) (i.e., anything naturally
producing a response) to conditioned stimuli (CS) (i.e., things that do not naturally produce
responses). For example, when the US–CS associative process is applied to advertising, research
efforts have focused on cognition or beliefs toward the brand (Kim, Allen, and Kardes 1996),
affect toward the ad and/or brand (Gresham and Shimp 1985; Mitchell 1986), attention to the
brand (Janiszewski and Warlop 1993), purchase intent (Gorn 1982; Allen and Madden 1985),
brand gender perceptions (Till and Priluck 2001), celebrity endorsers (Till, Stanley, and Priluck
2008), and effectiveness of product placements (Schemer, Matthes, Wirth, and Textor 2008).
Within these examples, a multitude of unconditioned stimuli have been used in order to induce
conditioned responses. These include but are not limited to music (Gorn 1982), pictures (Kim,
Lim and Bhargava 1998; Priluck and Till 1998), humor (Allen and Madden 1985), and celebrities
(Till, Stanley, and Priluck 2008).
We propose that a similar type of associative transfer also takes place when individuals are
exposed to covert advertising content. Though it is possible that individuals access a priori
advertising persuasion knowledge and then activate coping skills when exposed to covert ad
content, it is also possible that the unconditioned stimuli (i.e., playing an advergame or a video
game with an in-game ad) would produce unconditioned responses that may override the need
for increased skepticism and negative attitudes resulting from persuasion knowledge activation.
Furthermore, since the very concept of covert advertising incurs the pairing or embedding of
advertising within the context of another media form, it is quite possible that the unconditioned
 172 N. J. EVANS AND D. PARK

response to the content (i.e., the game) would transfer to the conditioned stimulus (i.e., the
advertisement in the game).

Nonevaluative and Evaluative Associations

Two possible outcomes may occur according to the associative learning process. The first of
these is evaluative association, whereby the US and CS are simultaneously presented and the
individual’s evaluation of the media context (i.e., the advergame or video game with in-game ad)
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is thereby transferred to the advertisement. Once this occurs, the game (US) and the embedded ad
(CS) are assigned evaluative labels and are thus encoded and reinforced as part of the individual’s
advertising schema. The other possible outcome of the associative process is referred to as
nonevaluative association. As in evaluative association, the US and CS are paired. Instead of the
unconditioned response to the US being transferred to the CS, the valanced characteristics of
the game context, such as particular attributes of the game, usage situations, and time of use,
are important. The CS (the advertisement in the game) then becomes associated with important
valenced characteristics of the media context, which, in turn, act as US.

Conceptual Model and Implications

Our conceptual model implies that individuals must constantly update their mental schema in
light of ever evolving advertising techniques (see Figure 3). The continuing use of immersive and
interactive advertising techniques that blur the line between advertising and entertainment should
lead researchers to question the assumption that persuasion knowledge is activated among adult
populations regardless of the advertising format (Evans et al. 2013). Additionally, even if adults
maintain a persuasive understanding of covert advertising, which include advergames and in-game
advertising, the traditional paradigm that suggests persuasion knowledge activation automatically
leads to negative and skeptical attitudinal outcomes is not without discrepant findings.
While the PKM explains the processes underlying persuasion avoidance and tolerance, there
is a dearth of research, to this researcher’s knowledge, that accounts for processes underlying
persuasion acceptance within the context of advertising. Given the rapid changes in the media
landscape over the past decade, it appears imprudent to assume that individuals only wish to avoid
advertising. Is it not possible that, given such clutter and advertising saturation into entertainment
media, individuals wish to be persuaded? Furthermore, is it unreasonable to posit that enjoyment,
when associated with various forms of covert advertising, can lead to persuasion?
Our answer is no. We believe that this conceptual framework is the first of its kind to confront
and reconceptualize some of the central assumptions regarding persuasion knowledge forma-
tion and activation for covert advertising formats. Second, considering the continued growth
in interactive and immersive advertising techniques, we believe that this conceptual framework
makes several points that lead us to question the theoretical applicability of the PKM to covert
advertising formats. Specifically, whether the PKM in its current state can accurately explain and
account for individuals’ understanding and processing of covert advertisements is a question that
should interest researchers, practitioners, and regulators alike. We believe that our conceptual
model offers an alternative view that may account for individuals’ understanding and processing
of covert advertising.
 RETHINKING THE PERSUASION KNOWLEDGE MODEL 173
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FIGURE 3 Schematic antecedents and associative outcomes of covert advertising persuasion knowledge: Instantiation
and noninstantiation processes of advertising schema.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The corresponding author acknowledges and thanks Dr. Eric Haley (University of Tennessee) for
his guidance and feedback on earlier versions of this article.
 174 N. J. EVANS AND D. PARK

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