Two player conflicting interest Bayesian Games
A.V.S.KAMESHWARI, SHOURYA SHARMA and S. BALAKRISHNAN
Department of Physics, School of Advanced Sciences, VIT University, Vellore.
Tamil Nadu, India.
Email: avs.kameshwari2018@vitstudent.ac.in , shouryasharma2018@vitstudent.ac.in ,sbalakrishnan@vit.ac.in.
Abstract— Game theory is the study of decision
making of competing agents in some conflict situations.
Motivation of introducing quantum mechanics into game
theory is to find a solution resolving the dilemmas in the
game which cannot be achieved in classical game theory.
The weird aspect predicted by quantum mechanics is
entanglement. The celebrated Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) paradox argued using entanglement that quantum
mechanics is an incomplete theory. However, John Bell
showed that EPR argument is incorrect and hence
quantum mechanics is a complete theory to describe the
nature. Further, Bell’s inequalities emphasize that
entanglement is a fundamentally new resource. In this
work we are going to investigate the outcome of Bayesian
games when the underlying probability set is obtained
from generalized EPR experiment. Nash equilibrium
describes the optimal solutions of the game and it will
exist only when bell’s inequalities are violated. The
objective of this work is to use a different approach to
the quantum game using cereceda inequalities.
Keywords: Quantum Game theory, Bayesian Games,
EPR experiment, cereceda inequalities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Classical Game theory helps us to understand the
situation in which some decision makers connect with each
other. It helps us to analyse a competitive situation. It
contains the essence of the particular situation. Classical
game theory is a well-developed branch of mathematics and
has wide applications starting from economics, biology,
sociology and so on [1]. It talks about set of strategy called
Nash Equilibrium in which the players get maximum payoff
and unilateral deviation of any player will reduce the payoff
[1]. It is factorizable and it includes classical bit i.e. either 0
or 1 and no intermediate states.
Quantum Game Theory is an extension of classical game
theory as it includes the superposition of strategies to be used
on initial states. It is a probabilistic approach which doesn’t
refer to the formalism of quantum mechanics using state
vectors, unitary transformation and quantum measurements
[1]. It involves qubit i.e. not only 0 and 1 but also includes
the intermediate states. The quantum game reduces itself to
the classical game when the considered probability set
becomes factorable [1].
II. PRELIMINARIES
Bayesian Game
A Bayesian game is a game of incomplete information in
which the rules of the game are not fully known to all
players. In this one player is unaware of the other player’s
strategies and payoffs, they are known as games of
incomplete information.[3]
Battle of sexes
It is a type of Bayesian Game which describes the situation
of two people e.g. Alice and Bob who wish to go out together
and two concerts are available: one with music of Bach and
the other Stravinsky. The condition here is they are happy
when they are together but if they go to different concerts,
each of them is equally unhappy listening to the music of
either composer. The situation is represented by the matrix.
Where Bach and Stravinsky are represented by B and S
respectively. This is represented by the following matrix.
Bob
B S
B (2,1) (0,0)
Alice S (0,0) (1,2)
In this game the probability with which Alice expects Bob to
join with her is γ and the probability with which Bob would
not join her is 1-γ. Moreover, Bob expects Alice to join with
him with probability ω and with probability 1-ω she will
avoid him. The relation between ω and γ is to be determined
in the below work.
III. VARIANT OF BATTLE OF SEXES
In the game of Battle of Sexes (BoS) [3] the variant is the
one in which Alice is unsure whether Bob prefers to join her
or prefers to avoid her, whereas Bob knows Alice’s
preferences.
In case of incomplete information neither player knows
whether the other wants to meet or not [3]. As before Alice
assumes that Bob will prefer to join her with probability γ
and will prefer to avoid her with a probability 1-γ. Bob on the
other hand expects with probability ω that Alice will prefer to
join him and with probability (1- ω) that she will avoid him
[4].
The action of two types of Bob as well as two types of Alice  1  3
is represented by the pairs (B,B), (B,S), (S,B), (S,S) Where  B 2  0; ,1  2
 2  2
the first entry is for the Bob of type 1 and second entry is for
(8)
Bob of type 2.[1]
Table 1 Classically on comparing all the types of players we get a
(B,B) (B,S) (S,B) (S,S) relation between ω and there exists point of intersection for
A1 , A2 ; B1 , B2 and A1 , B1 but no intersection for A2,
(B,B) ( 2,0 ) , ( 2 γ , 2−2 γ ) ,( 2−2 γ , 2 γ ) ,( 0,2 ) , B2. Thus there exists no relation between type 2 Alice and
type 2 Bob.
(1,0) (1,2) (0,0) (0,2)
IV. QUANTUM PROBABILITIES IN GENERALIZED
EPR EXPERIMENT
(B,S) ( 2,1 ) , (2 γ , γ ) , ( 2−2 γ ,1−γ( 0,0
), ),
EPR experiment is standard setting which involves a large
(ω ,1−ω) (ω ,2 ω) (2−2ω ,1−ω) (2−2ω ,2 ω)no of runs. Here the observers are spatially separated and
(S,B) ( 0,0 ) , ( 1−γ , 2−2 γ( γ) ,,2 γ ) , ( 1,2 ) , cannot communicate with each other. Here we consider the
(2 ω , 2−2 ω)set of non factorisable quantum probabilities obtained from
(1−ω , ω) ¿ (2 ω , ω) generalized EPR experiment.
Two halves of an EPR originate from the same source
(S,S) travelling in opposite direction. One half is received by
( 0,1 ) , ( 1−γ , γ ) , ( γ ,1−γ ) , ( 1,0 ) , observer 1 and the other half by observer 2. The outcome of
(0,1) (0,0) (2,1) (2,0) quantum measurement is either +1 or -1 [1].
The 16 probabilities are represented by the following matrix.

Observer 2
The entries in the brackets are the expected payoffs of Bob of
type 1 and 2 and Alice of type 1 and 2. For the two pairs of  1  2  5  6 
payoff entries, the first pair is for Alice’s two types and  
second pair is for Bob’s two types. Observer 1   3  4  7  8 
  9 10 13 14 
The mixed strategy payoffs for Alice’s and Bob’s two types  
are found to be as follows  11 12 15 16 
 A1 ( p; p ', q ')   (3 pp ' 3 pq ' p ' q ') (3 pq ' p  q ' 1) (1) The probability set ϑ={ε 2 , ε 3 , ε 6 , ε 7 , ε 10 , ε 11 , ε 13 , ε 16 } is
expressed in terms of
 A 2 ( q; p ', q ')   (3qq ' 3qp ' q ' p ') (q ' 2q  3qq ') (2) μ={ε 1 , ε 4 , ε 5 , ε 8 , ε 9 , ε 12 , ε 14 , ε 15 }.
The eight dependent variables are written in terms of
 B1 ( p '; p, q )   (3 pp ' 3qp ' 2 p  2q) (3qp ' 2 p ' 2q  2) (3) independent variables as follows. [1]

 B 2 (q '; p, q )   (3qq ' 3 pq ' 2q  2 p)  (q ' 2q  3qq ')
(4)
Here π A 1 represents payoff of Alice of type 1, π A 2
represents payoff of Alice of type 2, π B 1 represents payoff
of Bob of type 1 and π B 2 represents payoff of Bob of type 2.
The pure strategies B and S are given by the numbers p, q,
p’ and q’ ϵ [0, 1] for Alice of type 1, Alice of type 2, Bob of
type 1 and Bob of type 2 respectively. It is observed that
{(1/2, 1), (2/3, 0)} is a mixed strategy Bayesian Game Nash
Equilibrium at which players’ payoff are obtained as
 2  (1  1   4   5   8   9  12  14  15 ) / 2
 3  (1  1   4   5   8   9  12  14  15 ) / 2
 6  (1  1   4   5   8   9  12  14  15 ) / 2
 7  (1  1   4   5   8   9  12  14  15 ) / 2
10  (1  1   4   5   8   9  12  14  15 ) / 2
11  (1  1   4   5   8   9  12  14  15 ) / 2
13  (1  1   4   5   8   9  12  14  15 ) / 2
16  (1  1   4   5   8   9  12  14  15 ) / 2

1 2  The payoff equations of Alice of type 1, 2 and Bob of type 1

 A1  ; , 0   2  1
2 3  (5) and 2 in the game with EPR probabilities are written as
 2  follow where the payoffs are expressed in terms of the
 A 2  1; , 0   2  2 elements from the set μ.
3 
(6)
2 1  3  A1   (21   4  2 5   8 )  2 5   8
 B1  ; ,1   1 
3 2  2  A 2   (210  11  214  15 )  214  15
 B1   (1  2 4   9  2 12 )   9  212
(7)
 B 2   (2 6   7  214  15 )  214  15
Here p, q, p’and q’can be expressed in terms of the
probabilities ε j as follows. [1]
1 1
p= (ε 1 + ε 2+ ε 5 +ε 6 ) , q= ( ε 9 +ε 10+ ε 13+ ε 14)
2 2
1 1
p' = ( ε 1 +ε 3 + ε 9 +ε 11 ), q ' = (ε 5+ ε 7 +ε 13+ ε 15)
2 2
Previously by using EPR experiment the interdependence of
different types of players were found. In this case a different
approach is used to find out the relationship between Alice
of two types and Bob of two types. The cereceda
inequalities were reduced to eight using EPR experiment
and in this approach we aim to further reduce the cereceda
inequalities.

Using the above four equations of p, q, p’, q’ and the payoff When a game starts each player receives a random binary
equations of Alice and Bob of two types we get the input B and S. Each player knows his/her own input but is
following equations unaware of other player’s output. The output of Alice is
 A1  B1 a i ∈{0,1 } to denote Alice’s output and b i ∈{0,1 } denote
2  2 Bob’s output. Each entry is a tuple of two values. [8]
p p '
The payoffs of Alice of two types and Bob of two types are
joined in the following tabular form
 A 2  B 2
 4  2(2  1)
q q ' Table 2:-
Using these payoff equations following graphs are plotted.
a1 a2 b1 b2 πa πb πa+ πb
0 0 0 0 2ω ϒ 2 ω+ϒ
0 0 0 1 2 ω(2 ϒ −1)−2(
−ϒ +2 ϒ −1) 2 ω(2 ϒ −1)−3 ϒ + 4
0 0 1 0 2
0
2[ω+ γ (1−2 ω)] 2[ω+ γ 2 (1−2 ω)]
0 0 1 1 2 ϒ (1−ϒ2(1−ϒ
)(2 ω−1)+2(1−ω)
) 2(1−ϒ )[ϒ (2 ω−1)+
0 1 0 0 ω+ 1 ω (ω ϒ −1)+1 ω 2 ϒ +2
0 1 0 1 ϒ (1+ω) ω (−3 ϒ +2)+ϒ ϒ (2+ω( 1+ 2ω)−2
2
) ω(ϒ −1
0 1 1 0 2
ϒ +2 ω+1
ω (ω−2 γ(3+1)−ϒ ϒ −1) 2
ω (1+ ω−ϒ2ϒ +)+ϒ 1 ω(3−
0 1 1 1 2 ω ϒ (1−ϒ2 ω(1−ϒ
) ω)2 ω(ϒ +1−2 γ 2 −2 ω2
Fig1 Graph between Alice of type 1, 2 and γ 1 0 0 0 0 (2−ϒ )ω2 +ϒ(2−ϒ ) ω2 +ϒ
1 0 0 1 (ϒ −2)( ω)2−1)
ω (1+ϒ )+2(1−ϒ (1+ϒ )ω+ω 2(ϒ −2)−
1 0 1 0 γ 2 (2−ω)(1+ϒ )ω2 γ 2 (2−ω)+(1+ϒ )ω 2
1 0 1 1 ω ϒ (1−ϒ(2)+ϒ2ϒ ωω2
(ϒ −1)−ω+2
−1)2 ϒ (1−ϒ
−2(ϒ −1)+4 ω)−4(ϒ
1 1 0 0 1−ω (1−ϒ )ω −ω+1 2
2(1−ω)+ω2 (1−ϒ )
1 1 0 1 ω (1−2 ϒ(2−3ϒ
)+ϒ )ω+2 ω 2(ϒ −1)+ϒ
(3−5ϒ ) ω+2 ω 2(ϒ −
1 1 1 0 ω (ϒ −1)+ϒ(1−ϒ 2
ϒ −1)+1
(ω)ω +ω( 4(3ϒ ϒ−ω ϒ + γ 2−2+ω
−1)+1−ϒ
1 1 1 1 ω [ϒ (ϒ −1)+
2 ω+2 1]ω 2(ϒ (ω
−1) ϒ +2 ω 2)(ϒ −1)+3

π A 1=ωγ ( 2 P11 11 12 12 2 11 11 12
00 +2 P 01−2 P00 −P11 ) +ω γ ( P11 −2 P 01 ) + ω( P11 +

Fig 2 Graph between bob of type 1, 2 and ω π A 2=γ ( P21 22 22 22 22 21 2 21

10 −2 P01 −P10 ) + ωγ ( 2 P01 + P 10 −P 10 ) + 2 γ ( P01 −ω P

From Fig 1 and 2.

The payoff of Alice of type 1 and Alice of type 2 becomes
π A =ωγ [ 2 P11 11 11 12 12
equal at γ= 0.5 i.e. it is a phase transition point above which 00 + ( 2−2 γ ) P01 +γ P 11 ] +ω ( 1−γ ) ( 2 P00 + P11 ) + ( 1−ω
Alice of type 2 dominates over Alice of type 1 and below
which Alice of type 1 dominates over Alice of type 2.
Similarly at ω=0 payoff of Bob of type 1 and Bob of type 2
π B 1=ωγ ( P 11 11 12 12 2 11 11 12 12
becomes equal but for any value of ω other than 0 Bob of 00 + P10 −2 P01 −2 P11 ) + ω γ ( 2 P11 −P10 −P10 +2 P11
type 1 always dominates over Bob of type 2.
π B 2 =ωγ ( 2 P22
It is seen that there exists relation between type 1 and type 2 21 21 22 22 22 2 11 22
11 −P10 −P00 −P 10 +2 P01 + P 10 ) + ω γ ( P 10 −2 P 11 ) +
players of both Alice and Bob respectively. There is no
relationship between the two type players of Alice and Bob.

V. DIFFERENT APPROACH π B =ωγ [ 1 P11 11 11 12 12

00 + ( 1−ω ) P10 +2 ω P 11 ] + ω ( 1−γ ) [ 2 P01 +ω P10 + ( 2−
V. ANALYSIS
Using a different approach it is observed that the payoff of
Alice of type 1 becomes zero when ω=0 while the payoff of
Alice of type 2 becomes zero when ω=1 but it is not zero
when ω=0. Bob of type 1 becomes zero when ω=0 but Bob
of type 2 do not become zero in any of the cases.

VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The results of EPR experiment shows us that there exists
relation between type 1 and type 2 players of both Alice and
Bob respectively. There is no relationship between the two
type players of Alice and Bob. Using a different approach in
which input of the players are random binary. From table 2
the output of π A (1000) is zero which shows the dominant
nature of Bob. Similarly π B (0010) is zero which shows
the dominant nature of Alice.
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