A Study of Group Psychoterapy

A Study of Group Psychotherapy.
An empirical study of the whole group.
Peter Rob Gordon
Submitted in total fulfillment of the requirements

of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
July, 2001.
Department of Psychology.
The University of Melbourne.
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ABSTRACT
The view regarding social units as entities in their own right disappeared from
scientific consideration in the mid-twentieth century as much for political and
ideological reasons as scientific ones. Yet group psychotherapy rediscovered these
ideas. The problem to re-establish them scientifically is lack of empirical methodology
for investigating whole groups.
The study integrated theories of groups as psychic entities from sociology, social
psychology and group psychotherapy to form hypotheses about therapeutic groups’
functioning. Four dimensions of whole-group function were derived: Structure,
Cognitive Organisation, Affect, and Action Coherence. An observational instrument,
the “Group Function Record,” was developed, categories defined for each dimension
and a procedure established to rate minute-by-minute group function from videotaped
psychotherapy groups. Therapists’ Interventions were also recorded. The instrument
treats the group as the object of study and quality of collective functioning is rated
irrespective of members present or their roles. Reliability was established and ratings
were made of one latency and four adolescent yearlong groups.
Results substantiated an eight-phase developmental sequence derived from the
group development literature and outlined a theory of group formation. The most
challenging, but creative state was found to be when the group is whole with all
members in communication, though it is unstable and often managed by breaking into
subgroups. A linear relation existed showing that the smaller the group, the better it
functions. Groups also function best with one or two members missing, but more
absentees threaten the group’s existence. More highly organized groups are more
stable, but tend to destabilize when they become self-reflective. Homeostatic self-
correcting tendencies and a close relationship between affective and action changes
were evident. Change towards unpleasurable affect is associated with change from
cooperation to conflict and vice versa. Crises tend to be precipitated by affective
change, but correct themselves within the next minute or two. The effects of
Therapists’ Interventions towards members, the group or both were analyzed. Group
interventions initially tend to reduce functionality, followed by improvement after
several minutes; member interventions have inconsistent effects; interventions to group
and members in the same minute tend to produce immediate improved function.
The findings and their implications for therapeutic goals and technique with
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adolescents are discussed in relation to the theoretical background. Considerable merit

is found in the collective mentality theories, many of whose postulates are validated.
Indications for therapeutic technique are outlined from the findings. The method
provides a different view of group process posing new questions and suggesting simple
techniques are therapeutically potent. Further avenues of research are suggested.
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DECLARATION
This is to certify that
(i) the thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD,
(ii) due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used,
(iii) the thesis is less than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps,
bibliographies, appendices and footnotes.
Signed: ………………………………… Date:……………..

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.
Many people have assisted me to complete this project. I thank my family for
their forbearance, faith and support, my supervisors, Drs. Charles Langley, Michael
Kyrios, and Richard Bell for their interest, encouragement and assistance, Drs. Petra
Steiger and Sabar Rustomjee, as well as Nic Cecic, Niloofa Patel and Anne Forbes who
spent many hours helping develop, perfect and test the reliability of the Group Function
Record; and to Sheila Park and Gabriel Ross for generously making available tapes of
their group for the study. I am grateful to my many colleagues in the Australian
Association of Group Psychotherapists, the Royal Children’s Hospital and other child
and adolescent mental health agencies for their interest and support. I wish to
acknowledge the late Dr Patricia Leaper for the initial stimulus to make this research a
doctoral thesis.
Finally, I acknowledge the boys and girls of my groups over twenty-five years,
especially those in this study. They have been and continue to be my teachers.
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CONTENTS.
TABLES. 15
FIGURES. 23
PREFACE. 25
PART I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND. 27
1: THE STUDY OF GROUPS 28

Background. 28
Purpose of the Study. 30
Structure of the Study. 30
The nature of groups. 31
The word “group.” 32
Group in psychology. 32
Group in sociology 33
Conclusion. 34
2: GROUP AS ORGANISM 35
Origins. 35
Spencer and Darwinism. 35
Functionalism. 36
Systems Theory 37
Conclusion 37
3: GROUP AS CROWD OR HERD. 39

Early theorists. 39
Le Bon. 39
Later theories. 40
The herd. 41
Conclusion. 42
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4: GROUP AS SOCIAL MIND 44

Philosophical background. 44
British theorists. 44
American theorists. 46
Conclusion. 50
5: GROUP AS BEING. 51
The collective conscience. 51
Social solidarity. 52
Individuality and cooperation. 53
Social facts. 54
The social basis of thought. 55
Social gatherings. 57
Language and the social being. 57
Impact and evaluation. 57
Conclusion. 58
6: GROUP ENTITY IN SMALL GROUP RESEARCH 59

Reduction of the group entity. 59
Analytic definitions of group. 60
Re-emergence of group mentality. 61
Conclusion. 64
7: COLLECTIVE MIND IN GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY 65

Burrow. 65
Foulkes. 67
Other Group Analytic Writers. 70
Bion. 71
The Group-as-a-whole. 74
Conclusion. 75
8: CRITICISM OF COLLECTIVE MENTALITY 76

Organism theories. 76
8
Crowd and herd theories. 76

Group mentality theories. 77
Freud’s critique. 77
Ginsberg’s critique. 78
Critique of Durkheim. 78
Critique of McDougall. 80
Later criticism. 81
Evaluation of objections. 84
Conclusions. 87
9: INTEGRATION OF THEMES. 88
A science of groups. 88
A theory of group mentality. 89

Defining collective mentality. 89
Group Organizational States. 96

The Aggregate. 96
The Organism. 97
The Psychic Group. 100
Collective Cognition. 102
Collective Affect. 104
Collective Action. 106
The Self-Reflective Group. 108
PART II. THE GROUP FUNCTION RECORD. 110
10. GROUP PHENOMENA AS SOCIAL COMMUNICATION. 111
Group Function Record 111

The challenge of group membership. 111
Communication and social interaction. 112
Communication and social engagement. 114
9
Social communication and group status. 115

Communication and the group. 116
Communication in psychotherapy groups. 118
Group Function Record dimensions. 120
11. GFR DIMENSION 1: STRUCTURE 122

Structure and group size. 122
Structure in group dynamics. 125
Structure in psychotherapy groups. 127
Structure and the GFR. 129
Criteria for rating Structure. 129
Categories for Structure. 130
12. GFR DIMENSION 2: COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION 131

The nature of cognition. 131
Fundamental properties of cognition. 132
The group cognitive system. 133
Unorganized communication in the GFR. 136
Norms as cognitive elements. 136
Normative Organization and the GFR. 138
Rules as cognitive elements. 138
Systemic Organization and the GFR. 140
The group’s cognition of itself. 141
Representations as cognitive elements. 141
Representational Organization and the GFR. 144
Cognitive Organization in the GFR. 145
13. GFR DIMENSION 3: AFFECT 149

Affect and emotion. 149
Biological theories. 149
Cognitive theories. 151
Social and phenomenological theories. 152
Psychoanalytic theories. 153
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A synthesis of affect theories. 155

Group affect. 155
Communicational phenomena as affective states. 156
Mapping group affect. 159
14. GFR DIMENSION 4: ACTION COHERENCE. 162

Definitions of action. 162
Psychological theories of action. 163
Action in contemporary social psychology. 163
Mead’s theory of action. 164
Parsons’ Theory of Action. 166
Harbermas’ Theory of Communicative Action. 167
Criticism of the Theory of Communicative Action. 170
Communicative action and goals. 170
Conclusions. 171
Characterizing group action. 173

Definition of Action Coherence categories. 174
15. GFR DIMENSION 5: THERAPISTS INTERVENTIONS. 177

Types of interventions. 177
Therapists’ control of the group process. 180
Non-verbal interventions. 180
PART III. METHOD AND RESULTS. 181
16: HYPOTHESES. 182

1. Group Development. 182
2. Group Structure. 182
3. Group Dynamics. 184
4. Therapists’ Interventions. 186
17: METHOD. 188

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Subjects and groups. 188
Data collection. 189
Reliability studies. 190

Intra-Rater Reliability Study. 191
Inter-Rater Reliability Study. 192
Validity. 193
Description and characteristics of the data. 195

Range and variety of states. 195
Incompatible Combinations. 195
Differences in frequency of categories for different groups. 197
Defining and classifying composite group states. 198

Condensed States. 198
Functional Bands. 200
Characteristics of each group. 200
Significant differences in frequencies of states. 201
Phases of Group Development 203

Studies of group development. 203
Collation of group development phases: 205
Describing group process in Collated Phases described by Functional Bands. 205
18. RESULTS 1: GROUP DEVELOPMENT 210

1.1. Stability of GFR Dimensions. 210
1.2. Quartile Development of Condensed States. 214
1.3. Phases of Group Development. 219
1.4. Condensed States in Developmental Phases. 230
19. RESULTS: 2 STRUCTURE 232

2.1. Group Function and Structure. 232
2.2. Group Function and Group Size. 244
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2.3. Group Function and Completeness. 252
20. RESULTS 3: DYNAMICS. 257

3.1. Cognitive Organization and Group Function. 257
3.2. Effects of unstable affect and conflict on group function. 259
3.3. The relationship between changes in affect and action. 264
3.4. Crises in Group Life. 273
3.5. Crisis Sessions: 280
3.6. Stability and Quality Cycles. 282
3.7. Occurrence of Crises within Sessions. 287
21: RESULTS 4: THERAPISTS’ INTERVENTIONS. 289

4.1. Effect of Therapists Interventions on GFR Dimensions. 291
Characteristics of Interventions. 298
4.2. Effect of Limits. 299
4.3. Effect of Locomotion. 300
4.4. Year Differences. 302
4.5. Differentiating Therapists Interventions, Limits and Locomotion. 302
4.5.1. Therapists Interventions with Limits. 303
4.5.2. Locomotion distinguished from Therapists Interventions and Limits. 304
PART IV. DISCUSSION. 307
22. DISCUSSION 1: THE GROUP FUNCTION RECORD. 310

Structure. 310
Cognitive Organization. 313
Affect. 315
Action Coherence. 317
Therapists Interventions, Limits and Locomotion. 318
The value of the GFR. 319
23. DISCUSSION 2. HYPOTHESES. 320

1. Group Development. 320
2. Group Structure. 321
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3. Group Dynamics. 325

4. Therapists Interventions. 331
24. DISCUSSION 3: GROUP DEVELOPMENT 334

1. Convening. 334
2. Engagement. 335
3: Positioning. 336
4. Consolidation. 338
5. Idealization. 339
6. Disenchantment. 340
7. Working. 341
8. Separation. 341
Overview. 342
25. DISCUSSION 4: THEORY. 345

The Group Organism. 345
The Crowd. 347
The Social Mind. 349
Society as a Being. 354
Group Psychotherapy. 359
Integration of Themes. 360
Conclusion. 361
26. DISCUSSION 5: CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH. 362

Theory. 362
The GFR. 363
Group Development. 366
Hypotheses. 367
Conclusion. 368
REFERENCES. 369
APPENDIX 1. 415
Changing Definitions of the word “group.” 415
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The Groups. 415
THE VALIDITY OF THE GFR. 420

Particular problems of the GFR. 421
Instrumental Validity of the GFR. 422
Methodological Validity of the study. 427
Functional Validity of the GFR. 429
APPENDIX 2: GROUP FUNCTION RECORD - RATERS INSTRUCTIONS. 431
GROUP FUNCTION RECORD - RATERS’ INSTRUCTIONS 432
GFR EXAMPLES 445
GROUP FUNCTION RECORD OUTLINE 449
GROUP FUNCTION RECORD – RATING SHEET. 450
APPENDIX 3: GROUP FUNCTION RECORD RESULTS. 452
Distribution of GFR Categories. 452

Group Development. 463
Tables for Structure Hypotheses. 468
Tables for Dynamic Hypotheses. 471
Graphs of Stability and Quality. 474
Tables for therapists Interventions, Limits and Locomotion. 481

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TABLES.
Table 11.1. Possible relationships in different sized groups (adapted from Napier
and Gershenfeld, 1989, p. 39). 124
Table 12.1. Analysis and comparison of cognitive organization categories. 148
Table 13.1. Definitions of Affect categories with examples. 161
Table 14.1. Action Coherence categories. 176
Table 17.1. Principal components analysis of three ratings of three sessions,
showing factor loadings for each rating and total fit for all three ratings. 192
Table 17.2. Principal components analysis of a random sample of ten sessions by
three raters, showing communality for each rater and total fit for all three
raters. 193
Table 17.3. Category frequencies of all group dimensions. 194
Table 17.4. Frequency, percentages and ranks of the first 80% of group states. 196
Table 17.5. Frequencies of unlikely combinations of categories. 196
Table 17.6. Percentage of categories for each year, mean of adolescent groups
and all groups. 197
Table 17.7. Division of GFR dimensions into positive and negative qualities. 198
Table 17.8. Classification of GFR categories into 9 Condensed States. 199
Table 17.9. Division of 9 Condensed States into Functional Bands. 200
Table 17.10. Percentage of time spent in Condensed states for each group. 200
Table 17.11. Key word descriptions for group developmental phases from the
literature. 205
Table 17.12. Alignment of group development phases in various authors with
phase names. 207
Table 17.13. Proportions of Functional Bands associated with phases of group
development. 209
Table 18.1. Number of sessions in quartiles for each group. 215
Table 18.2. Percentage of Condensed States by quartiles for 1988. 215
Table 18.3. Percentage of Condensed States by quartile for 1990. 216
Table 18.7. Length of phases, mean period and percentage of the year spent in
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each phase for each group. 229

Table 18.8. Percentage of Condensed States in each Developmental Phase for all
Groups; arrows show the flow of percentage between states. 231
Table 19.1. Percentage of Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action Coherence
categories in Structure ratings for all groups. 233
Table 19.2. Frequency of Affect categories in preceding and designated minutes
associated with Structure Change for all groups. 234
Table 19.3. Percentage of Action Coherence Categories in preceding and
designated minutes associated with Structure Change for all groups. 235
Table 19.4. Proportion of change in Group Action characteristics for all groups
after five minutes. 239
Table 19.5. Percentage of Structure categories in each quartile for all groups. 240
Table 19.6. Percentage of Structure categories for year quartiles for each group. 241
Table 19.7. The percentage of Cognitive Organization categories in each
Structure #2 category by quartiles for all groups. 241
Table 19.8. Proportions of Action Coherence categories in each Structure #2
category in year quartiles for all groups. 242
Table 19.9. Percentages of Action Coherence categories in each Structure #2
category in year quartiles for all groups. 243
Table 19.10. The proportion of Structure #2 categories for different sized groups. 245
Table 19.11. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories in Structure#2 for
all groups and different sized groups. 246
Table 19.12. Percentage of Affect #2 categories in Structure #2 for all groups and
for different sized groups. 247
Table 19.13. Percentage of Action Coherence categories in Structure#2 for all
groups and for different sized groups. 248
Table 19.14. Stability of Condensed States for different sized groups. 249
Table 19.15. The percentage of Condensed States by group size for all groups. 250
Table 19.16. Total percentage of changes between Group Action states in different
sized groups after 5 minutes (excluding percentage of stable minutes). 251
Table 19.17. Percentage of Condensed States in groups with different numbers of
absentees. 253
Table 19.18. Percentage of Action Coherence in Structure #2 categories showing
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the influence of group size and absentees. 254

Table 19.19. Absentees’ effect on Stability of Condensed States for all groups. 255
Table 19.20. Effect of absentees on percentage of stable minutes for Structure,
Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action Coherence. 255
Table 20.1. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories associated with
Affect categories for all groups. 257
Table 20.2. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories associated with
Action Coherence categories for all groups. 258
Table 20.3. Percentage of stable minutes in each Affect category for all GFR
Dimensions. 260
Table 20.4. Percentage of change in Group Dimensions associated with Action
Coherence categories for the minute of observation and the following minute. 261
Table 20.5. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Affect#2 categories
over three minutes. 262
Table 20.6. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Action Coherence
categories over three minutes. 263
Table 20.7. Action rating at Affect Change, 10 minutes before and 5 minutes after
for all groups. 265
Table 20.8. Mean percentage of cooperation and conflict minutes of the 10
minutes before, minute of negative Affect change and 5 minutes after. 266
Table 20.9. Mean percentage of cooperation and conflict minutes of the 10
minutes before, minute of positive Affect change and 5 minutes after. 267
Table 20.10. Proportions of cooperative/conflictual action ratings (Cooperation
Quotient) for Affect changes in associated minutes. 270
Quotient) for negative Affect changes in associated minutes for each group. 270
Table 20.12. Proportions of positive/negative Ratings for negative Structure
Changes in associated minutes for the other GFR Dimensions. 272
Table 20.13. Proportions of positive/negative Ratings for negative Cognitive
Organization Changes in associated minutes for the other GFR Dimensions. 273
Table 20.14. Proportions of positive/negative Ratings for negative Action
Coherence Changes in associated minutes for the other GFR Dimensions. 273
Table 20.15. Number of Sessions for each group in which destructive crisis
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events occur, compared by quartiles. 274

Table 20.16. Percentage of Structure #2 categories for 5 and 1 minutes before and
in Distress crises for all groups. 275
Table 20.17. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories for 5 and 1 minutes
before and in Distress crises for all groups. 275
Table 20.18. Percentage of Affect categories in 5 and 1 minutes before and in
Distress crises for all groups. 276
Table 20.19. Percentage of Action Coherence categories in 5 and 1 minutes
before and in Distress crises for all groups. 276
Table 20.20. Percentage of Structure #2 categories for 5 and 1 minutes before and
in Contracord crises for all groups. 277
Table 20.21. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories in 5 and 1 minutes
before and in Contracord crises for all groups. 277
Contracord crises for all groups. 277
Table 20.23. Percentage of Action Coherence categories in 5 and 1 minutes
before and in Contracord crises for all groups. 278
Table 20.24. Group size for crisis sessions. 278
Table 20.25. Absentees for crisis sessions. 279
Table 20.26. The frequency and percentage of Condensed States in the five
minutes leading to crisis events. 280
Table 20.27. Percentage of sessions forming troughs, peaks and intermediate
sessions in stability cycles for all groups. 282
Table 20.28. Percentage of GFR Dimension categories for peaks, troughs and
preceding sessions for stability cycles in all groups. 283
Table 20.29. Percentage of sessions forming troughs, peaks and intermediate
sessions in quality cycles for all groups. 285
Table 20.30. Percentage of GFR Dimension Categories for peaks, troughs and
preceding sessions for session quality cycles in all groups. 286
Table 20.31. Percentage of Affect and Action Coherence categories for session
quartiles for all groups. 288
Table 21.1. Percentage of Therapists’ Intervention, Limits, and Locomotion for
each group. 289
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Table 21.2. Quartile percentages for Therapists’ Intervention, Limits, and

locomotion for each year. 290
Table 21.3. Percentage of Structure categories for all groups from one minute
before “LAGS(STRUCTUR,1)” to three minutes after Therapists’ Interventions
“LEADS(STRUCTUR,1-3).” 292
Table 21.4. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories for all groups from
one minute before, “LAGS(COGNORG,1)” to three minutes after Therapists’
Interventions, “LEADS(COGNORG,1-3).” 293
Table 21.5. Percentage of Affect categories for all groups from one minute
before, “LAGS(AFFECT,1)” to three minutes after Therapists’ Interventions, 295
“LEADS(AFFECT,1-3).” 295
Table 21.6. Percentage of Action Coherence categories for all groups from one
minute before, “LAGS(ACTION,1)” to five minutes after Therapists’
Interventions, “LEADS(ACTION,1-5).” 297
Table 21.7. Characteristics of Therapists Interventions and their effects of GFR
Dimensions. 301
Table 21.8. Percentage of coincidence of Limits and Locomotion for all groups. 302
Table 21.9. Percentage of coincidence of Therapists Interventions with Limits
and Locomotion for all groups. 303
Table 17A.1. Frequencies for all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1988. 452
Table 17A.2. Frequencies of all GFR Categories for Latency Group 1990. 453
Table 17A.3. Frequencies of all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1992. 454
Table 17A.6. Percentages of all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1988. 457
Table 17A.7. Percentages for all GFR Categories for Latency Group 1990. 458
Table 17A.8. Percentages for all Group Dimensions for Adolescent Group 1992. 459
Table 17A.9. Percentages for all Group Dimensions for Adolescent Group 1993. 460
Table 17A.10. Percentages for all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1996. 461
Table 17A.11. Frequencies and percentages of Group States for all Groups
(shown as category values in the order Structure, Cognitive Organization,
Affect, Action Coherence). 463
Table 18A.1. Stability of Group Dimensions as percentage of Sessions for 1988. 464
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Table 18A.4. Stability of Group Dimensions as percentage of Session for 1993. 467
Table 18A.5. Stability of Group Dimensions as percentage of Session for 1996. 467
Table 18A.6. Means of percentage of stable minutes for Group Dimensions for
each group. 468
Table 19A.1. Percentage of Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action
Coherence in Structure categories for all groups in each year quartile. 469
Table 19A.2. Percentage of Condensed States for different absentees for all
groups for year quartiles. 470
Table 20A.1. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Affect and Action
Coherence categories over three minutes for 1988. 471
Table 20A.6. Frequencies of Action change three minutes before to three minutes
after negative Affect change for all Adolescent Groups, controlling for
overlapping minutes. 473
Table 20A.7. Frequencies of Action change three minutes before to three minutes
after negative Affect change for the 1990 Latency Group, controlling for
overlapping minutes. 474
Table 20A.8. Frequency and Percentage of Condensed States in minute preceding
destructive crisis. 479
Table 21A.1. Percentage of Structure categories associated with Limits and No
Limits for all Groups for the minute in which the Limit is applied, the
preceding minute, “LAGS(STRUCTUR,1)” and the succeeding three minutes,
“LEADS(STRUCTUR,1-3).” 481
Table 21A.2. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories associated with
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Limits and No Limits for all Groups for the minute in which the Limit is
applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(COGNOG,1)” and the succeeding three
minutes, “LEADS(COGNOG,1-3).” 482
Table 21A.3. Percentage of Affect associated with Limits and No Limits for all
Groups for the minute in which the Limit is applied, the preceding minute,
“LAGS(AFFECT,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(AFFECT,1-3).” 483
Table 21A.4. Percentage of Action Coherence associated with Limits and No
Limits for all Groups for the minute in which the Limit is applied, the
preceding minute, “LAGS(ACTION,1)” and the succeeding three minutes,
“LEADS(ACTION,1-3).” 484
Table 21A.5. Percentage of Structure Categories associated with Locomotion and
No Locomotion by therapists for all Groups for the minute in which the
Locomotion occurs, the preceding minute, “LAGS(STRUCTUR,1)” and the
succeeding three minutes “LEADS(STRUCTUR,1-3).” 485
Table 21A.6. Percentage of Cognitive Organization Categories associated with
Locomotion and no Locomotion by therapists for all groups for the minute in
which the Locomotion occurs, the preceding minute, “LAGS(COGNORG,1)” and
the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(COGNORG,1-3).” 486
Table 21A.7. Percentage of Affect Categories associated with Locomotion and no
Locomotion by therapists for all groups for the minute in which the
Locomotion occurs, the preceding minute, “LAGS(AFFECT,1)” and the
succeeding three minutes “LEADS(AFFECT,1-3).” 487
Table 21A.8. Percentage of Action Coherence Categories associated with
Locomotion and no Locomotion by therapists for all groups for the minute in
which the Locomotion occurs, the preceding minute, “LAGS(ACTION,1)” and
the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(ACTION,1-3).” 488
Table 21A.9. Percentage of Condensed States associated with Therapists
Interventions in the minute of intervention and the following three minutes in
the 1988 group for the minute in which the Intervention is applied, the
preceding minute, “LAGS(COND9,1)” and the succeeding three minutes,
“LEADS(COND9,1-3).” 489
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“LEADS(COND9,1-3).” 491
“LEADS(COND9,1-3).” 492
“LEADS(COND9,1-3).” 493
preceding minute, “LAGS(COND9,1)” and the succeeding three minutes
“LEADS(COND9,1-3).” 495
Table 21A.14. Effect of Therapists Interventions accompanied by Limits
compared with those without Limits for all GFR Dimensions from the minute
of intervention to the three minutes after. 497
Table 21A.15. Percentage of difference in GFR categories with Therapists
Interventions accompanied by Limits compared with Therapists Interventions
accompanied by No Limit. Categories not shown had no differences. 498
Table 21A.16. Effect of Therapists Interventions accompanied by Locomotion
compared with Therapists Interventions accompanied by No Limits and No
Locomotion for all GFR Dimensions from the minute of intervention to the
three minutes after. 499
Interventions accompanied by Locomotion compared with Therapists
Interventions accompanied by No Limits and No Locomotion. Categories not
shown had no differences. 500
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FIGURES.
Figure 13.1. Qualitative and quantitative dimensions mapping six group affective
states. 160
Figure 18.1. Percentage of unchanged minutes for GFR Dimensions in 1988. 210
Figure 18.6. Mean of percentage of stable minutes for GFR Dimensions for each
group. 214
Figure 18.7. Percentage of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable Functional Bands
for sessions in 1988 showing developmental phases. 220
Figure 18.10. Percentage of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable Functional
Bands for sessions in 1993 showing developmental phases. 226
Bands for sessions in 1996 showing developmental phases. 227
Figure 18.12. Generic Graph of phases showing hypothetical percentages of
Functional Bands. 230
Figure 19.1. Change between Group Action states over a five-minute period for
all groups as a percentage of all minutes and as a proportion of all changes. 237
Figure 19.2. Net percentage change between Group Action states over a five-
minute period for all groups. 238
Figure 20.1. Frequencies of cooperation and conflict for 10 minutes before,
during and 5 minutes after Affect change for all groups. 269
Figure 20.2. Proportion of cooperative/conflictual action ratings (Cooperation
Quotient) for 10 minutes prior to 5 minutes after negative Affect change for
each group. 271
Figure 20.3. Graph of percentage of stable Condensed States and percentage of
24
Constructive Condensed States for each session of 1988. 281

Figure 20A.1. Mean of Condensed states for each session for 1988, crisis
sessions: 7, 8, 11, 13, 21, 27 and 31. 475
sessions: 5, 11, 19, 21, 28, 29 and 30. 475
sessions: 7, 11, 12, 14, 19, 22, 30, 31, 35 and 37. 476
sessions: 5, 7, 8, 11, 17, 25, 29 and 30. 476
Figure 20A.5. Percentage of stable Condensed states for each session for 1988,
crisis sessions: 7, 8, 11, 13, 21, 27 and 31. 477
crisis sessions: 5, 11, 19, 21, 28, 29 and 30. 477
crisis sessions: 7, 11, 12, 14, 19, 22, 30, 31, 35 and 37. 478
crisis sessions: 5, 7, 8, 11, 17, 25, 29 and 30. 478
Figure 20A.9. Graph of percentage of stable Condensed states and percentage of
Constructive Condensed states for each session of 1990. 479
25
PREFACE.
My training at the Royal Children’s Hospital, Melbourne emphasized the group
as the important therapeutic factor. Under the guidance of Drs. Bill Blomfield, George
Christie and members of the Group Psychotherapy Training Program, phenomenology,
anthropology, developmental psychology and psychoanalysis provided a body of theory
to inform group phenomena. It indicated that formation of functional groups should
help seriously disturbed children and adolescents unable to engage in individual
treatment because of inadequate verbal skills, inability to express psychic states or
anxiety about revealing themselves. They had usually never belonged to stable,
supportive peer groups.
In 1976 I began to conduct groups for adolescents and in 1979 groups for
younger children. The phenomena of these groups were often confusing, alarming and
chaotic. Some interventions were powerful, but others ineffectual. When the groups
seemed at their worst, members would demonstrate surprising gains, sometimes only
evident outside the group setting. Gradually over ten years, a reliable technique
developed for successful group therapy, but its relationship to the existing theories was
unclear. The group was regarded as an evolving entity; therapeutic goals were its
preservation as a place where members could belong and enjoy themselves and
maintaining the group until this was achieved. The technique came to rely on observing
several dimensions of group function as the basis for its management, which were
couched less in terms of the psychological content of events, but more in terms of the
group’s structure and function. Psychological interpretations consistently tended to
disrupt the groups. These constructs from clinical experience did not correspond
closely to what the literature described. The “group-as-a-whole” perspective in
psychoanalytically oriented group theory (Bion, 1961; Foulkes, 1974) often lacked
applicability to these groups. Formulations in the literature were often couched in
metaphors deriving from the family (Friedemann, 1974; Elliott, 1994) or intrapsychic
structures (Coleman and Bexton, 1975; Hinshelwood, 1987). However, these seemed to
be secondary to groups, which preceded the evolution of nuclear families or
individuality (Freud, 1921; Mead, 1962). It seemed important to seek theory regarding
groups as primary instead of secondary psychosocial entities formed by interacting
individuals (Allport, 1924).
The study was conceived firstly, to find and integrate theoretical sources giving
26
primacy to the group; secondly, to provide conceptual clarity and theoretical support for
whole-group constructs forming the basis of the technique; thirdly to develop a
methodology for accurately recording group function as it occurred, to examine the
phenomenology of groups independently of therapists’ impressionistic memories and
test hypotheses about group function. These aims are explored in the first three parts of
the thesis. The last two parts discuss the results in relation to the theoretical material
and provide references and appendices.
27
PART I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND.
In Part I, the theoretical background to the group as an entity is explored. In

Chapter 1, the concept of “group” and its development in psychology and sociology is
analyzed. Chapters 2-5 review historical theories taking different approaches to
conceptualizing groups holistically. The concepts are traced from their origins up to their
contemporary expression. In Chapters 6 and 7, use of group entity concepts in
contemporary social psychology and group psychotherapy is reviewed. Critical arguments
against these views are analyzed in Chapter 8 and in Chapter 9 the theoretical material is
integrated to form a conceptual framework for the study.
28
1: THE STUDY OF GROUPS
Background.
This study establishes a method for studying groups as entities in their own right.
Using adolescent and children’s psychotherapy groups, it develops a theory of the group
as a psychic entity, defines dimensions of its functioning and identifies basic
phenomena. It is hypothesised some findings may apply to group life generally. The
study postulates that groups can be observed as social units whose activity is distinct
from (though not independent of) their members’ interactions. Group and members
represent distinct and separate levels of analysis requiring different observational
methodologies (Agazarian and Peters, 1981; Whitaker, 1989).
Abundant theory analyzes individual psychology in groups (Napier and
Gershenfeld, 1989; Forsyth, 1990), therapeutic effects of groups on members
(Kellerman, 1979; Rutan and Stone, 1984; Yalom, 1985; Hinshelwood, 1987; Malekoff,
1997) and individual therapy within the group (Wolf, Kutash and Nattland, 1993).
However, there is less theory about the group itself (although see Kissen, 1976;
Agazarian and Peters, 1981; Whittaker, 1989; Neri, 1998; Dalal, 1988; Ettin, 1999).
Several authors suggest theoretical advances are required before important problems in
the science of groups can be resolved (Bednar and Moeschl, 1981; McCollum, 1995).
Historically, groups were excluded from psychoanalytic theory when Freud (1921)
challenged theories of the group or crowd mind and accounted for group phenomena as
intrapsychic processes of identification and attachment among members (Ettin, 1999).
There followed little interest in groups and those who pursued them were discouraged or
ostracized (Galt, 1995). In social science the problematic status of groups is often resolved
by pejorative dismissal (Catlin, 1936), as anachronistic (Kretch and Crutchfield, 1948)
or unfashionable (Watkins, 1973). However, there are repeated calls to grant social
groups the status of entities worthy of study (Warriner, 1956; Steiner, 1974, 1983; Turner,
1988); although unfashionable, the collective mind remains a scientific hypothesis
(Steiner, 1986; Sandelands and St Clair, 1993).
In group psychotherapy literature, “group-as-a-whole” is often discussed in
interpersonal terms, using family metaphors (Wells, 1980) or systems theory (Agazarian
and Peters, 1981) rather than as a discrete psychosocial entity with its own characteristics.
Bion (1961), who is identified with the group-as-a-whole approach (Rutan and Stone,
29
1984), ultimately conceives groups in terms of members’ primitive psychic mechanisms

and shared emotional “basic assumptions” (Dalal, 1998), or as a group in the mind of
members (Hoggett, 1998). Foulkes (1964, 1990) fluctuates between a radical,
undeveloped theory of the group entity and a conservative, elaborated theory of the group
in terms of interpersonal and intrapsychic mechanisms (Dalal, 1998). There is limited
development of a theory of the whole group beyond seeing it as the context or “matrix” in
which the therapy occurs, rather than the object of treatment in itself, even though the
theoretical implications of these ideas question some of the most fundamental assumptions
of traditional psychoanalytic theory (Dalal, 1998).
Definition of dimensions of group function relevant to outcomes is lacking.
Studies of therapeutic factors concentrate on learning, insight, self-disclosure, catharsis,
family reenactment and altruism (Bloch and Crouch, 1985; Yalom, 1995; Malekoff, 1997).
Cohesiveness is the only group factor identified. There is no consensus of how to observe
group situations as the therapeutic agent (Burrow, 1927b; Bion, 1961; Foulkes, 1964,
1977) or patterns of small group behavior (Davis, 1977; Beck and Lewis, 2000). North
American group psychotherapy has tended to view the group as where therapeutic
individual experiences occur and members’ personal content is interpreted (Slavson, 1937,
1943, 1979; Durkin, 1964; Schiffer, 1971, 1984; Rutan and Stone, 1984). The British
tradition has seen the group as matrix for unique social experiences (Foulkes, 1948, 1964;
Abse, 1974; Dalal, 1998), or collective mentality as antithetic to therapeutic goals (Bion,
1961).
There appears to be no attempt to reconsider the viewpoints rejected by Freud in
spite of the principle spokesmen often using similar terms to McDougall (1920) such as
“group mind” or “group mentality” (Bion, 1961; Foulkes, 1964, 1977). What is more
surprising is the neglect in the psychodynamic group psychotherapy literature of the body
of theory in other disciplines that develop these hypotheses with scientific integrity
(Gazda, 1977a; Rosenbaum and Berger, 1975; Brown and Zinkin, 1994; Yalom, 1995;
Ettin, 1999); and with few exceptions (Allport, 1954; Turner, 1988) the same is true of
social psychology of groups. It is as though having been rejected, the concept of the group
as psychic entity in psychotherapy had to be rediscovered in isolation from all that had
already been achieved in other fields.
The theoretical part of this study sets out to re-examine the rejected sources and
discover to what extent they offer a theory of the group for group psychotherapy and
30
formulate propositions about group function.
Purpose of the Study.

The impetus for the study came from conducting groups with low functioning
children and adolescents with varied emotional and social problems unable to benefit from
individual therapy, but who responded to group treatment designed to assist them to form a
group where they belonged with the other members, enjoyed themselves and could solve
the problems of maintaining it. Successful technique for this work did not emphasize
intra-personal psychodynamics, but focused on group events and the holistic state of the
group (Gordon, 1989b; Malekoff, 1997; Tijhuis, 1998, 2000). The technique differed from
other forms of adolescent group work directed at intra-psychic issues (Rachman, 1989;
MacLennan and Dies, 1992) or personal skill development (Hazel, Sherman, Schumaker
and Sheldon, 1985; Holmes, Heshel and Gordon, 1991).
This theory forms the basis for a record of group process and an investigation of
what happens in groups from one minute to the next and one session to the next without
recourse to therapists’ memory. Such a record allows hypotheses about the process of
therapeutic groups to be tested and important phenomena described. The technical
implications of these findings provide recommendations for effective group psychotherapy
with these patients. The thesis aims to renovate a venerable tradition in social theory,
establish a methodology for systematic research of group entities and refine clinical
technique.
Structure of the Study.

The study is structured into five parts.
Part 1: Theoretical traditions viewing groups as entities are reviewed and analyzed. Key
concepts from this body of theory are integrated to form hypotheses of groups as
psychic entities and their functioning, as the basis for a therapeutic theory.
Part 2: Observable properties of groups are considered and four dimensions of holistic
group function developed. Conceptual definitions and criteria for their observation
are established and an observational instrument for systematic observation and
recording of group function (The Group Function Record) is developed.
Part 3: The observational instrument is employed to record videotaped weekly sessions of
five yearlong groups of children and adolescents. These data are used to test
31
hypotheses about developmental phases, structural influences, dynamic processes

and effects of therapists’ interventions.
Part 4: The results and their implications for therapeutic technique are discussed in
relation to the instrument and the theory. Concepts developed in non-therapeutic
disciplines are examined for their relevance and adequacy to understand typical
therapeutic group phenomena. Implications for further research are outlined.
Part 5: This contains references and appendices describing the groups, discussion of
validity, raters’ instructions for the rating system and additional results.
To introduce historical theories of the group-as-a-whole, the meaning of the word

“group” and the concept’s use in contemporary psychological theory are investigated.
The nature of groups.

The debate about groups (Allport, 1954) has been between the realists’ position
that nation, race, class, family are entities in their own right, represented by McDougall
(1920), who propounded a group mind, and nominalists arguing groups are names
referring to the individuals comprising them, represented by Floyd Allport (1921). Current
epistemology (Harre and Secord, 1972; Gadamer, 1975; Gauld and Shotter, 1977;
Giddens, 1982; Davidson, 1985; Gergen, Hepburn and Fischer, 1986; Ettin, 1999) sets this
dichotomy aside. Asking whether groups are “real” tries to place them in the categories of
“reality” or “fiction,” resulting in polemics defending different axioms without resolution.
The question can be reformulated phenomenologically by asking: What sort of reality can
be given to groups? Although lacking the criterion of falsifiability (Popper, 1972), such
scientific investigation begins by defining the horizon (Gadamer, 1975) within which
knowledge is gained, developing a method suiting the investigation, and acknowledging
observations exist in an interpretive field.
The word “entity” means “the existence as distinct from the qualities or relations,
of anything” (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). In this sense, groups are not simply
qualities or relations of their members, they exist as “social entities.” To perceive an entity
is to take a point of view towards it, like seeing a forest instead of trees. The view that
groups are not observable to the senses (Ginsberg, 1921; Agazarian, 1993) also means
neither flocks, forests nor molecules are observable (Steiner, 1983). Science does not
progress by systematic accretion of facts of objective inquiry (Kuhn, 1962) and the lack of
32
recent investigation into the nature of groups is related to non-scientific factors such as
fashion, funding and politics (Steiner, 1974, 1983; Sandelands and St Clair, 1993).
However, the concept group needs to be accessible to scientific scrutiny if a dimension of
group-specific processes is to be studied. To begin with, the meaning of the word itself
must be reviewed.
The word “group.”

Group is a recent concept (Anzieu, 1985). There is no ancient Greek word
corresponding to the contemporary idea (Hatzidaki, 1991; Liddell and Scott, 1896). In
Latin, undifferentiated masses of crowd, flock, ball, globe, sphere and mass were used for
groups (Simpson, 1963). The English word derived from French and Teutonic words for
knot, cluster or heap, was used first for people in 1748. It means: “an assemblage of
persons, animals or material things, standing near together so as to form a collective unity;
a knot (of people), a cluster (of things) … a number of persons or things regarded as
forming a unity on account of any kind of mutual or common relation, or classed together
on account of a certain degree of similarity” (Oxford English Dictionary). The transition
from unorganized collection to collective unit formed by shared characteristics occurred in
the 1960’s as evident in changing dictionary definitions (see Appendix 1). Since group has
so recently acquired its present meaning, it is important to show how it has been taken up
by the disciplines to be surveyed in the following sections.
Group in psychology.
In psychology, group means a social unit of individuals with common qualities, in
communication, influencing each other through interaction, with a feeling of group
membership, varying from a loose mass to a compact unit (English and English, 1958;
Chaplin, 1968; Drever, 1956, 1974). Groups are “two or more persons interacting with
one another, who share a set of common goals, and norms which direct their activities, and
who develop a set of roles and a network of affective relations;” they are distinguished
from crowds where reciprocal influence is not possible; 90% of groups have less than six
members (Harre and Lamb, 1983, p. 259). This notion of group as a small, structured unit
with a set of self-created relations among members was acquired by psychology in the
1950’s.
The first social psychology texts used “group” for large, undifferentiated units
33
(Ross, 1908; Ellwood, 1912; Klineberg, 1940; Maus, 1962), then for classes, associations
or society (McDougall, 1912). “Group mind” referred to nations (McDougall, 1920; Levy-
Bruhl, 1928). Many early social psychology texts make no mention of the word (Trotter,
1916; Tansley, 1920; Dewey, 1922), including the founder of group psychotherapy in the
United States (Pratt, 1917; Rosenbaum and Berger, 1975; Ettin, 199). In the following
decades, groups indicate the individual’s immediate psychological environment (Bartlett,
1932) and become “sociological wholes … [whose unity] can be defined operationally in
the same way as a unity of any other dynamic whole, namely, by the interdependence of its
parts” (Lewin, 1948, p. 73). Group came to indicate the range of human social units whose
members had a direct psychological relationship (Klineberg, 1940; Ross, 1946; Sherif,
1948; Krech and Crutchfield, 1948). Experimental work established groups in social
psychology and it became a prominent topic from the 1950’s (Newcombe, 1950; Asch,
1952; Thouless, 1958; Brown, 1965; Watson, 1966).
Group in sociology
In nineteenth century sociology, group meant classification (Darwin, 1958; Spencer,
1876; Giddings, 1896) or large undifferentiated units such as societies, nations, classes,
clans, professions, tribes or communities (Spencer, 1876; Bosanquet, 1899; Giddings,
1896; Durkheim, 1893, 1895, 1912). Gumplowicz (1899) recognized society as a large
group composed of smaller groups and studied relations between constituent groups rather
than whole societies (Maus, 1962). The group concept lacked the internal integrity central
to its modern definition (Fairbanks, 1901; Dealey and Ward, 1905; Ross, 1905; Small,
1905; Simmel, 1908, 1955; Wolff, 1950). It was “a convenient sociological designation
for any number of people, larger or smaller, between whom such relations are discovered
that they must be thought of together” (Small, 1905, p 459; Olmsted, 1959, pp 20-21).
Cooley (1909) called intimate, cooperative associations where individualities fuse into a
whole “primary groups;” small, large and temporary groups were distinguished (Hayes,
1915). Specific social groups were studied in the 1920’s and 1930’s (Thrasher, 1927;
Maus, 1956); studies of small groups began after that (Homans, 1951; Mills, 1967). Large
and small social groups then became fundamental to sociology (Broom and Selznick,
1955; Johnson, 1961; Bottomore, 1962; Nisbet, 1970).
34
Conclusion.
The concept of group has changed its early meaning and is no longer tied to
specific social forms. Although describing diverse social structures with common
properties, it usually indicates small units with structural and dynamic properties regarded
as relatively invariant across a wide range of cultures and situations. The “small group” is
a discovery of the mid-twentieth century, whose phenomena are thought to underlie social
life (Lewin, 1948; Mills, 1967; Turner, 1988) but the assumptions underlying the concept
are not explicit in social or psychological theory. A scientific theory of groups needs to
establish how the small group can form the basis of the psychical functioning of
individuals and groups. However before attempting this, the historical understanding of
groups needs to be reviewed.
Consistent with what has been found in the history of the word, historical
investigations of groups began with whole societies (Durkheim, 1964). While far removed
from small psychotherapy groups, these well-elaborated hypotheses about the nature of
collective social entities make important contributions to conceptualizing small groups as
functional units. In the following chapters, four different views of groups are described
which, while not discrete schools, share common assumptions. Firstly, society is an
organism, consisting of differentiated, specialized structures with ordered interchange and
self-maintaining integrity. Secondly, collective action by crowds forms a primitive
collective mind, fusing participants’ instinctive and affective drives, to submerge
individuality and higher functions. Thirdly, common culture and shared psychological
characteristics constitute a general, collective or group mind, incorporating language,
tradition, technology and values, extending and enriching individual existence. Fourthly,
societies and groups are beings in their own right.
These complementary conceptualizations of groups address respectively, the
organic corpus of society, undifferentiated unconscious drive states, differentiated
conscious content of the social entity and its existential identity. The view of groups in
contemporary social psychology and psychodynamic group psychotherapy completes the
review as the basis for a theoretical integration.
35
2: GROUP AS ORGANISM
The first tradition investigating large groups and societies emphasized the
intricate interconnections between their parts and conceived them to be organisms, best
understood by their total functioning. This metaphor predisposed the investigation of
whole-group characteristics analogous to anatomy and physiology. It culminated in
identifying important self-maintaining processes for enduring social units.
Origins.
Society has been compared to a living organism since ancient times by Plato, St.
Paul and others (Mackenzie, 1963). Comte (1830) called society an organism whose
institutions and relations were not created by individuals, but imposed by the group,
defined by language, customs and values (Maus, 1965, Turner, 1978; Turner, Beeghley
and Powers, 1989). Structural aspects of society were studied as interacting organs, called
social statics (Comte, 1830). Families as fundamental units formed individuals, integrating
them into the state through morality and submission to authority (Maus, 1965). Social
dynamics described social development in progressive stages like individual minds,
ultimately arriving at science and “positive” knowledge (Comte, 1830; Mazlish, 1967).
Comte emphasized the state’s role in individual life, regarding everything human above
physiology as derived from society as the “Supreme Being” of a positivist religion.
Individuals are abstractions: “Society is no more decomposable into individuals than a
geometric surface is into lines, or a line into points” (quoted in Nisbet, 1973, p. 59).
Comte established social groups as entities with life processes.
Spencer and Darwinism.

Spencer (1820-1903) introduced Darwinism into sociology. He saw societies as
organisms evolving towards more perfect forms by adapting to environments (Spencer,
1860, 1876). The permanence of societies’ component relations, their individuality, the
specialized functions fulfilled through division of labor and their growth and decay make
them organisms (Spencer, 1876). They begin as small, unstructured aggregations, increase
in mass and complexity acquiring interdependence. Each part depends on the whole,
whose life is independent and more prolonged than that of its components. However,
societies are different entities from individuals. Societies do not show organisms’
36
characteristics of living tissue being continuous, having definite form, organs in fixed
position and specialized tissue endowed with feeling. In society, these are functions of
communication (Spencer, 1860). Consciousness is situated in a small part of the
individual, but diffused throughout society, which lacks a sensorium. Societies exist for
their members, but organisms’ cells exist for their host (Spencer, 1876). Societies are
“hyperorganisms” (Maus, 1965) of the natural world, living their own lives (Allport,
1954).
Spencer’s inquiry was determined by his notion of organism and he did not
question its appropriateness (Rex, 1961). Others developed the idea (Von Lilienfeld, 1873;
Schäffle, 1875-8; Espinas, 1877; Worms, 1896). Although regarded with caution (Maus,
1965), the organism theory was axiomatic at the turn of the century (McKenzie, 1890;
Small, 1905; Ross, 1905; Jordan, 1927). Darwinism presupposed societies and cultures
evolved (Spengler, 1926; Toynbee, 1947; Childe, 1963). The terms ‘structure’ and
‘function’ in sociology implied a conception of society as an organism (Rex, 1961), and
were understood by their contribution to the whole.
Functionalism.
Analytical methodology and empirical research led to functionalism and its more
integrated notion of organism (Martindale, 1964). Functionalist anthropology used
organism as an analogy for social life (Radcliff-Brown, 1935, 1940, 1952); social
institutions were explained by their group-maintenance functions (Maus, 1965). Society
was conceived as an “integrated living whole” rather than Spencer’s aggregation of
organs. The social organism was not the structure; it had structure with continuity
surviving loss of members; its social life was the functioning and maintenance of its
structure (Radcliff-Brown, 1952). However, functionalism was better suited to pre-
literate societies than general sociology (Demerath and Peterson, 1967).
To emphasize social organisms’ integrity Merton (1949) introduced Cannon’s
(1932) functional principles from biology. The structure of society included the relations
between parts; social activities and cultural items had functions for the whole social
system, which all members fulfilled, and all were necessary. This “logic of procedure”
established functional requirements for organisms’ survival and was adapted to a sociology
using Freud’s distinction between latent and manifest functions. Functionalism defined
group structures and processes by their combined role in the life and maintenance of the
37
whole group; they could not be understood in isolation.
Systems Theory
Functionalism was overtaken by general systems theory, which studied open
systems across many disciplines (Von Bertalanffy, 1955, 1975). System properties
suggested common forms in different fields. Systems are “complexes of elements standing
in interaction,” unifying disparate examples; they indicate relationships between biological
organisms and “epiorganisms” such as societies: “Characteristic of organization, that of a
living organism or a society, are notions like those of wholeness, growth, differentiation,
hierarchical order, dominance, control, competition” (Von Bertalanffy, 1955, p. 127).
Systems theory incorporates teleology and directedness. Living organisms, individual
behaviour and human society cannot be conceived of without including adaptiveness,
purposiveness and goal seeking.
Systems theory avoided the organismic approach’s pitfall of emphasizing
characteristics peculiar to the organism rather than those inherent in generalized systems
(Gouldner, 1959). It provided a paradigm for social sciences. Societies as systems were
conceptualized in terms of part/whole relationships, gradients, integration, feedback,
defenses against disintegration, ontology of activity and interface of subsystems.
Biological and social systems are extended in space and integrate their parts across
boundaries. The parts that developed from earlier states, represent organisms’ past; they
have a relatively stable present state and a future of functional potentialities (Grinker,
1956). The self-creating property of “autopoiesis” connects organisms and social groups
as life forms (Maturana and Varela, 1971) introducing creative uncertainty into their
development. “Human societies are biological systems” and “any social institution is an
autopoietic system” (Beer, 1980, p. 70). Systems theory de-emphasized literal
correspondence between organism and society, but described essential organic
characteristics for social groups. However, system oversimplifies the issue, neglecting
incompatibilities between social and biological organisms (Rex, 1961) and ignores the
complexity and variety of organisms (Merton, 1949).
Conclusion
The organism hypothesis began with naïve analogies, but showed the varied
phenomena of societies can be described as mutually interconnected and governed by their
38
relation to the whole. It provided a conception of social entities not reducible to their
constituent members and described self-sustaining functions, which support their life and
purpose. In functionalism and systems theory, the organism perspective initiated by
Comte and Spencer matured rather than was superseded. Social organisms form when
members develop ordered, systemic communication joining them into a whole, whose
functions have similar integrity and purpose to bodily functions constituting the substrate
for psychic life in individuals.
39
3: GROUP AS CROWD OR HERD.
The social organism hypothesis analysed structures and processes of large social
groups as functional units. However, an explicit notion of collective mentality was
developed in the study of the psychological characteristics of crowds and large groups.
The social problems they posed for nineteenth century society emphasised their psychic
unity and they were conceived as beings having primitive minds, an idea that can be
traced to the present.
Early theorists.
Sighele (1891) proposed that crowds formed a temporary mind, operating by laws
different from those of individual minds. The price of collective unanimity was the
antithesis of self-consciousness and loss of rational thinking, making crowds intellectually
inferior, irresponsible, destructive and criminal (McLelland, 1989). They formed
according to the law for all intelligent life that “representation of an emotional state brings
the beginnings of the same emotional state in those who observe it” (Espinas, 1877, quoted
in McLelland, 1989, p. 166). Mental processes need not be rational, deductive or abstract;
collective thinking occurs outside the brain, through individuals’ susceptibility to others’
mental representations and suggestions, enabling many to act as one. Crowds can be
creative and better than individuals, producing culture, language and revitalizing old social
structures; the state is the institutionalized crowd (Sighele, 1901).
Tarde (1903) saw crowd members as weak, primitive, irresponsible; the essential
social tie was imitation by suggestibility, since “social man is a veritable somnambulist”
(p. 76) and society is a set of suggestions causing mutual imitation. The common mental
content in crowds is ignited by a “spark of passion,” forming “a single animal, a wild beast
without a name” (Tarde, quoted in McLelland, 1989, p. 184). Crowds are criminal or
heroic, imitating whatever suggestions are given them. They are credulous, excitable or
docile to commands, influenced by images, exaggeration and appeal to emotions.
Le Bon.
Le Bon’s (1896, 1913) influential crowd theory viewed social organisms to be as
complicated as all beings, and visible social phenomena result from unconscious
processes. In crowds, conscious personality vanishes, a collective mind or “provisional
40
being” is formed like a chemical compound; members think, feel and act differently than
when individuals. Each sub-group “represents a single being” (1913, p. 113).
Suggestibility and credulity allow ideas to circulate regardless of validity; opinions become
truths, making crowds dictatorial and conservative. Crowds think in images;
hallucinations replace facts. It is difficult to implant ideas in the crowd mind, but once
done, they exert an irresistible power on members, only weakening slowly; society’s ideas
form its content, but passing infatuations and images influence it. Contradictory ideas
coexist without criticism or logical relations. It reasons by association, analogy
succession, and generalization; images take precedence over logic.
The sentiment of invincibility deriving from number dominates this being, which
shows the impulsiveness, absence of reason and exaggerated of sentiments by contagion
typical of “beings belonging to inferior forms of evolution” (p. 40). It can be heroic,
generous, cowardly or cruel, allowing nothing to come between desire and its realization.
It revolts against feeble authority, but is servile before strong ones. Images become
motives for action; conviction is like religious sentiment involving worship, fear,
submission, inability to discuss dogmas, but desire to spread them. Anyone not accepting
them is an enemy, creating intolerance and fanaticism.
Words evoke images lacking precise meaning and take on magical power.
Illusions are not diminished by facts, since crowds do not want truth. Opinions are grafted
on fixed beliefs, deriving from unalterable psychological elements of the race analogous to
anatomical formations of living beings. Leadership provides organisation, direction,
energy and the will to achieve goals. The leader’s prestige paralyses critical faculties.
Crowds are dominated by this “ancestral soul” (Le Bon, 1913). Le Bon concludes that
individual egoism weakens the race and loss of old ideals causes the racial genius to
disappear, resulting in barbarism.
Later theories.
Mussolini thought Le Bon’s work “excellent” and Hitler used his crowd
terminology and manipulation techniques (Nye, 1975; van Ginneken, 1992). Y Gasset
(1930) treats the crowd as an entity opposed to European culture with an analysis
reminiscent of Le Bon, but more complex and balanced. The thesis that group experience
is at a lower consciousness than individuality is found in Jung (1950) with
acknowledgement to Le Bon. The crowd mind was applied to collective phenomena until
41
the 1960’s; social psychology texts usually contained a chapter on the crowd or “mob
mind” with a synopsis of Le Bon (Kretch and Crutchfield, 1948; Newcombe, 1950;
Watson, 1966; Evans, 1969). The crowd as a psychic entity lost scientific credibility,
except for social philosophers (Smelser, 1963; Lang and Lang, 1965; Shibutani, 1970).
However, it persists.
Canetti (1960) follows its historical relationship to power and culture, regarding it
as a psychic entity. People surrendering to a crowd are absorbed into a circle of common
touch; fear disappears and it takes on its own life. “As soon as it exists at all, it wants to
consist of more people: the urge to grow is the first and supreme attribute of the crowd”
(p. 17). Once people feel equal in a moment of discharge, the crowd is created and
becomes a psychic entity associated with relief when the individual transcends their own
person. Hierarchical organisation is lost, freeing the crowd to violence. A command is a
“sting” in the members, as a tendency to obey and be vulnerable to influence. Crowds
can be rhythmic or stagnating, slow or quick, and classified by the predominant emotion
of the “single creature.” When it dissolves, small groups or “crowd crystals” remain
around which it may reassemble. Social institutions are “domesticated” crowds. Canetti
marks the transition from scientific theory to a literary, philosophical treatment of the
crowd entity, which does justice to the human experience of the mass as a “social animal
torn loose of its chains” (Muscovici, 1987) that can be predicted, analysed, but never
reduced to a rational formula of individuals in interaction (Reicher, 1988). It is a
precursor to contemporary research (Turner, 1988). However, its inherent conservative
political assumptions and critical attitude to social entities had less relevance outside the
tense social situation of late nineteenth century Europe.
The herd.
Trotter (1916) applied biological theory to mass psychology, postulating a herd
instinct to explain the rejection of reason and experience in favour of prejudice and
dogma in society. Human psychology is always of associated members, since solitary
individuals are unknown. Social phenomena have an instinctive quality and herd
impulses enter the individual’s mind with the value of instincts. To introspection, they
seem axiomatic, “an a priori synthesis of the most perfect sort needing no proof but its
own evidence” (p. 20). The drive to associate in groups is similar to other primary drives
sustaining life. The gregarious instinct enables other instincts to be denied, modified or
42
combined and the unit’s homogeneity compensates for loss of individual characteristics in
members enabling them to act as one. Gregarious behaviour is “a normal instinct,” the
source of opinions, credulity, beliefs, altruism, enthusiasm and power, since “the only
medium in which man’s mind can function satisfactorily is the herd” (p. 42). The
individual is more sensitive to the “voice of the herd” than other influences and feels an
unanalysable sense of comfort in the presence of other members and discomfort in their
absence. Herd approval or disapproval arise like conscience and acquire the same
discomfort as physical separation.
The herd forms “a gregarious mind” amalgamated by “intercommunication,”
binding individuals and coordinating the unit into “a single creature,” a material, social,
and psychological entity, which acquires the properties of a complex organism, subject
to evolutionary development of which members partake. Gregarious units form
collective mental entities. Individuals communicate with a common stock producing a
communal mind with a quasi-independent existence, “the deep, still spirit of the hive that
whispers in us all” (p. 205). It depends on “herd accessibility” or the sensitiveness of
individuals to the presence of fellow members. The individual, dependent on tradition,
is guided by influences outside the ego. It cannot live apart from the herd, is liable to
loneliness; its loss means loss of self. Much individual personality is invested in the
herd; deeper layers of individual minds are formed by it, tending toward homogeneity.
“Socialised gregariousness is the goal of man's development. A transcendental union
with his fellows is the destiny of the human individual, and it is the attainment of this
towards which the constantly growing altruism of man is directed” (p. 167).
The herd mind hypothesis goes beyond the crowd mind, attributing a more lasting
role to social life, which pervades individuals with a power equal to other drives. The
psychic organism of large social groups constructs, sustains and organises individual
minds. It validates participation in the formation of “gregarious” groups having the
power to reach the most fundamental structures of the individual psyche with the power
of instincts. Trotter's theory supplied a social dimension to popular accounts of
psychodynamic theories (Tansley, 1921, Peirce, 1922). However, it polarised individual
and group, casting the latter in an essentially antisocial light.
Conclusion.
The crowd and herd hypotheses propose that under certain communicational
43
conditions, members of large groups amalgamate psychically to constitute a primitive

psychic entity (“animal” or “creature”). It dissolves higher constructive functions in
individuals, developing an unpredictable, regressed mental life organized as a non-rational
mind, where thought, emotion and action unify with little organisation. Action is
impulsive, disregarding consequences and the group is subject to the influence of anyone
who exploits it. In herd theory, the collective psyche provides individuals with an
instinctive substrate, enabling them to acquire cultural and ethical values, support
collective action, but with the conservative character of instinctive life. These ideas
describe how the loss of structured communication overwhelms rational faculties assumed
to lie within individuals, immersing them in the impulsive drive life of the social entity
whose organic functions are elaborated in the organism tradition. Individuality and
rationality are sustained by social communication structures.
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4: GROUP AS SOCIAL MIND
In contrast to the view that organized large groups are organisms and under
particular communication conditions form an instinctive primitive mentality, a third
viewpoint considered the significance of organised cultural structures. It addressed
specific mental or psychological characteristics of societies, which were seen to embody a
mentality recognized as an entity in its own right, distinct from the individuals
constituting it, but making possible and sustaining their mentality. Emerging from
philosophy, these ideas were elaborated in sociology to become a psychological
hypothesis of the inseparability of group and individuals.
Philosophical background.
The notion of mind existing beyond the individual has a long philosophical
heritage. Plato regarded the world as “wholes,” as living beings (Hamilton and Cairns,
1972). Plotinus said “every whole is at the same time a certain being” (Taylor, 1994a, p.
42) and intelligent beings participate in a world intellect (Taylor, 1994b). Hobbes (1651)
called the state a “Great Man.” Hegel’s philosophy centred on “Geist,” meaning the
highest form of mind, spirit, or moral consciousness (Murat-Sanders, 1900) as the
Absolute, self-complete, universal “ethical substance,” created by coordinated action
(Hegel, 1807). Spirit is a being, “actual and alive;” it is consciousness itself reflected in
the minds of its members; its substance is a nation. Individuals are formed in the natural
ethical community of the family, which is “immediate or natural mind” and incorporated
into the universal family of the state (Hegel, 1807). Society is an “actual mind” that
knows and thinks itself, existing immediately in customs, mediately through the self-
conscious knowledge and members’ actions. It is intelligent substance expressed as
particular aspects in members, losing its ethical character when individual interests rend
its continuity. It is a self-knowing, self-actualising subjectivity, maintaining and guiding
its members’ individuality into its own collective life (Hegel, 1821, 1830).
British theorists.
Lewes (1879) conceived of a “General Mind” formed from the mental
accumulations of individual mental processes integrated as tradition, arts, religion, and
science by means of language (Giddings, 1896). An original philosopher, scientist and
45
champion of Hegel in Victorian England (Walker, 1910), he maintained mental life

originates in the “Social Organism” and the social medium permeates mind. Individuals
are units of collective life. The general mind evolves through language from common
experiences, becoming an impersonal influence on individuals, matching Nature with
Society as two orders whose laws must be obeyed. It is indicated by terms like common
sense, collective consciousness, reason and spirit of the age. It transcends the
limitations of individual minds and exists beyond individual experience or
introspection; like language, it is simultaneously individual and social. Personal
perceptions, appetites, sensations and volitions are transformed into sentiments,
conceptions and ideas by impersonal social influences in collective life and connect people
to constitute much of their system of thought. Like language, thought belongs to the
community calling it into existence. “There are minds, and besides the individual minds
there is the Human Mind” (Lewes, 1879, p. 162).
Customs and laws restrain everyone; the community “is the medium of the
individual mind, as a sea, a river, or a pond is the medium of a fish” (p. 165) and there is a
“Social Mechanism analogous to that individual Mechanism which is modified by
Experience” and accumulates as Civilisation. The “mental furniture” of prejudice,
fashion and opinion derives from the community. “Conceptions once assimilated by the
General Mind become ‘necessities of thought’ ... forces which coerce the individual” (p.
169). Self-evident truths derive from collective experience. The general mind is not
independent of its constituent individuals.
Lewes was a “thoroughgoing empiricist” (Kaminsky, 1967), with “more
philosophical insight than Spencer, but he had not the latter's architectonic genius”
(Sorley, 1965, p. 275). The social mind was elaborated by a group of social theorists
influenced by Hegel including Green (1888), Bosanquet (1899) and Barker (1915)
gaining popularity in sociological texts around the turn of the century.
McDougall was the last exponent of social mind theory. He saw society as an
evolving organism with “a mental life, which is not the mere sum of the mental lives of its
units” (1920, p. 7). It is a collective or group mind, where mind is “an organised system
of mental or purposive forces” (p. 9). Collective actions in a highly organised society
“are conditioned by an organisation which can only be described in terms of mind, and
yet is not comprised within the mind of any individual” (p. 9). A social system consists of
“mental stuff” and mental forces. Individuals comprising it come to consciousness as
46
members, influenced “at every moment in every thought and feeling and action in ways
which they can neither fully understand nor escape from” (p. 11). The common substance
of uniting ideas means a group of minds becomes a group-mind, but cannot exist apart
from the minds of the group members. For group minds to form, groups require
continuity, an idea of their composition and functions, interaction with other groups,
culture, organisation, differentiation and specialisation in highly organised and successful
social structures. The group’s unifying ideals and demands appear in members’ minds
with irresistible force. The bond of identification incorporating a member occurs when
the “self-regarding sentiment” extends to the group “more or less completely, so that he is
moved to work for its welfare, … by the same motives which prompt him to desire and to
work for his own” (p. 79). The national will depends on the idea of the whole nation
being present to the consciousness of individuals or it becomes a horde. National self-
consciousness is a common idea “diffused through the minds of the people” and gives it a
self so it is not “a mere agglomeration of individuals” (p. 163). Regardless of its quality,
it enhances mental homogeneity and difference from other groups, acquiring strong
sentiments and motives capable of overriding individual concerns.
McDougall’s discussion is Anglophile, analogical, descriptive and lacks
conceptual rigor. He denies the psychic unit has different qualities from the combination
of individual mental forces and his definition of mind as “an organised system of forces”
is vague, emphasizing culture and tradition. However, his personal influence and prestige
made his theory paradigmatic for critics (Ginsberg, 1921; Allport, 1954; Turner, 1988).
American theorists.
The idea of a superordinate mind supporting individual minds was common in
early American sociology (Giddings, 1896; Small, 1905; Dealey and Ward, 1905; Gillette,
1916). Each tribe or nation was considered to have a unique “social mind” and a
common, general “human mind.” The social mind is created by individual minds in
organized interaction. It is not a separate, transcendental entity, but the “organic
agreement” scattered among individual minds. It is the spontaneous, creative synthesis of
individual minds, which are also its product. It consists of repetition of individual minds
associating, reproducing and accumulating common mental content by rational discussion
and cultural exchanges founded on feelings of association. The conscious, cognitive,
social mind deliberates as rationally as the individual mind in contrast to the
47
unconscious, passionate crowd mind. Simultaneous thoughts in minds communicating

in language create “social self-consciousness” (Gillette, 1916) when perceptions of the
group are diffused throughout the group and “the community feels and perceives its
unity” (Giddings, 1896, p. 140). The social mind is coercive and evaluative, providing
unity and stability to group life. Although “groups are only relationships of individuals”
(Small, 1905, p. 496) they create individuals as independent entities. There is no social
mind without agreement and cooperation; as individuals think and feel alike, respect for
the “public mind” keeps most members good; in collective action it acts through
cooperating groups.
Cooley (1909), influenced by organismic ideas (Timasheff, 1966), said life must
be seen as “one human whole.” Social and individual are not two kinds of mind; “all
mind acts together in a vital whole from which the individual is never really separate”
(p. 1). The social mind’s influence is outside awareness; social consciousness develops
inseparably from self-consciousness, because people think of themselves with reference
to social groups and of groups with reference to themselves as a “complex personal or
social whole” (p. 5). Individuals’ membership of groups is as apparent and verifiable as
the uniqueness of their individual experience and they are aware of groups as
immediately and authentically as of themselves. Most reflective consciousness is social
since “self and society are twin-born,” known equally intimately. “A separate and
independent ego is an illusion” (p. 5). Self-consciousness emerges from social
consciousness or awareness of others at two years of age as two phases of the same
experience, inseparable from significant others; public consciousness organized by
shared ideas reacting upon each other is a “group state of mind” aware of itself, though
incomplete and forms a third phase.
Cooley said individuals live in cooperation with others in “primary groups,” where
fusion of individualities creates the self as “the common life and purpose of the group,” a
“we” involving sympathy and identification, differentiation, assertion, passion,
competition and love. “Human nature is not something existing separately in the
individual, but a group-nature or primary phase of society … of the social mind” (p. 31,
italics in original). Human nature is a trait of primary groups, created by their
“comparatively stable and universal” structures, maintained in family, playground and
neighborhood. It decays in isolation. The communal life of family and local groups are
immediate facts rather than combinations of something else. Though Cooley’s view of
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primary groups transmitting cultural values has been disputed (Bottomore, 1962), it
became central in sociology (Timasheff, 1966; Broom and Selznick, 1968; Nisbet, 1970).
In George Mead’s (1962, 1964) posthumous works (Morris, 1962) mind and
thought as “phases of a more general, an Absolute, mind” (1936, p. 344) are worked out
more systematically. Individuals are creations of the social organism (Mead, 1962).
Social process exists prior to mind, thinking, consciousness or self, which arise through
communication within the whole. Collective mental content is logically prior to
individual content; social action supports communication as a “conversation of
gestures” developing the “significant symbol” as “that part of the act which serves as a
gesture to call out the other part of the process, the response of the other, in the
experience of the [person] that makes the gesture” (p. 268). Gestures and symbols
become the system of language. Mind results when the “empirical matrix of social
interactions” takes on a reflexive character and “enters into or becomes present in the
experience of the individuals involved in it. … Language as made up of significant
symbols is what we mean by mind” (1962 p, 190n). Action in the social organism
supersedes the body/mind split as reference point for all psychosocial ideas and is the
context for understanding mind, consciousness, thought and self.
“The field of mind must be coextensive with, and include all the components of,
the field of the social process of experience and behavior…. If mind is socially
constituted, then the field or locus of any given individual mind must extend as far
as the social activity or apparatus of social relations which constitutes it extends;
and hence that field cannot be bounded by the skin of the individual organism to
which it belongs" (p. 223n).
Mind can only come into existence in a social environment; organized social
relations and interactions create a universe of discourse presupposed by its nature.
Mead’s “entirely social theory or interpretation of mind … must be clearly distinguished
from the partially (but only partially) social view of mind” as a hereditary biological
attribute of the individual, social only in its expression. The theory that social process is
produced by minds is in direct opposition to his view “that mind presupposes, and is a
product of, the social process” (1962, p. 223-4). Individuals initially experience
themselves as objects through social relations and by means of experiential transactions
with others in an organized social environment.
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Thinking is internalised vocalisation arising from the system of symbolic

gestures and language. “The laws of thought are abstractions of social intercourse”
(Mead, 1962 p. 90). The locus of thinking is in the whole conduct of the individual, not
restricted to neurological processes. “Getting an idea,” says Mead, “is a process of
social intercourse;” experience “is not to be located inside the head, but as related to the
whole act” (p. 106-7). Meaning is a consequence of social process; symbolization
creates objects for the social world, since, language not only symbolises what already
exists; “it makes possible the existence or the appearance of that situation or object, for
it is part of the mechanism whereby that situation or object is created” (p. 78). The
conversation of gestures and symbolic capacity are social process taken over into the
conduct of the individual; mind arises through communication, not communication from
minds.
Meaning develops within the field of language when individuals take others’
perspectives and form a “universe of discourse” in a group participating in a collective
social process. It is not primarily mental consciousness, since it only exists when
“significant symbols are evolved in the process of human social experience” (p. 80);
“implicit in the structure of the social act,” it confirms the primacy of social process for the
development of minds, self-consciousness and selves. Self-consciousness is not a
substance, but a function organised around the experience of self, taken over from action
towards others. The essence of self “is cognitive, and like thinking is social” (p. 173). Self
does not first exist then enter into relations with others; it is “an eddy in the social current
and so still a part of the current … a process in which the individual is continually adjusting
himself in advance to the situation to which he belongs” (p. 182). The self’s content is
individual, and may be selfish, but its structure is inherently unselfish always belonging
to groups; self refers beyond itself to the social relationships constituted by language.
“So far as he is a self, he must be an organic part of the life of the community, and his
contribution has to be something that is social.” (p. 324).
Other representative Americans are Boodin (1913), Dewey (1922), Judd (1926),
Alverdes, (1927) and more recently Warriner, (1956), Manis and Meltzer (1972), Steiner
(1986) and Sandelands and St. Clair (1993). However, the hypothesis failed to influence
psychology in the grip of behaviorism (Allport, 1954) and sociology becoming concerned
with quantitative research (Martindale, 1964). Perhaps this can be understood as a result
of their failure to operationalize or relate social mind to individualistic theories with
50
sufficient precision.
Conclusion.
Social mind theories provide a coherent hypothesis about the primacy of group
life and its inherent mentality as a collective system interpenetrating and sustaining
personal minds. Self, thought, sentiment and action are all defined as effects of
participation in organized symbolic communication, where group membership is the
essential means of gaining access to the creative functions of the social mind and human
psychology. The small (primary) group is the medium in which the larger social
processes are rendered effective in creating individuals. Group life is the condition for
the development of mind and self, as healthy group life is for healthy psychology. The
social mind complements organism and crowd hypotheses providing a more detailed
analysis of the context for rational social life and action.
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5: GROUP AS BEING.
Durkheim (1858-1917), one of the founders of sociology (Lukes, 1975),

developed different ideas to the sociological consensus (Gane, 1988). Rejecting animal
analogies, he described society as “a being sui generis” meaning of its own genus. His
theory of large groups integrates previous views of organic processes with collective
psychic functions that engulfed individuals in primitive group states. He postulated
social origins for thought, sentiment and action; he showed how the social being is held
together with a psychic life and development within which individuals are formed as
personalities, acquire mind and realize themselves.
The collective conscience.

Durkheim said shared psychic ideas, sentiments and actions are “collective
representations” in a communicating group. They exist in their own right with a life of
their own and are not products of individual consciounesses. They are the means by
which “the group conceives itself in its relations with the objects which affect it”
(Lukes, 1975, p. 6). Social life “is constituted wholly of collective ‘representations’”
(Durkheim, 1966, p. xli) constituting a “collective conscience.” Durkheim’s
“conscience” condenses moral conscience, consciousness, conscientiousness, (Elwall,
1897) as the organ of sentiments and representations. It resembles “unconscious” in
psychoanalysis more than the rational organ implied by “consciousness” (Simpson,
1933). Individualistic critics obscure this distinction (Catlin, 1936; Nisbet, 1973).
Though lacking a specific organ, it permeates society connecting successive generations
as a distinct reality, not dependent on the particular conditions of individuals. It is
realized in individuals, who have two consciences, one common to the group, which “is
not ourself, but society living and acting within us,” the other “personal and distinct,
that which makes us an individual” (Durkheim, 1964, pp. 129-130). They have “one
and the same organic substratum” (p. 106) and link individuals directly with society by
communicating to individual action just as ideas are communicated to words. The
collective conscience demands of the individual: “make yourself usefully fulfill a
determinate function” (p. 42). Only the “collective personality” of society has the
continuity and power to bind members beyond ephemeral relations, settle conflicts and
assign limits (Durkheim, 1893). Rules are essential to constitute social units and confer
52
freedom; without them “anomie” (normlessness) results. “Common life is attractive as

well as coercive;” individuals seek it passionately, coming together “for the pleasure of
communing, to make one out of many … to lead the same moral life together” (p. 15).
It is “a source of life sui generis,” its warmth animates and makes members human;
“destroying their egotisms” (p. 26).
Social solidarity.
Durkheim (1964) describes two types of solidarity binding society together at
different stages. “Mechanical solidarity” is created by sympathy, when images of
similarity unite and reinforce each other into collective representations, while contrary
representations weaken each other. Members are attached to each other and to the
group without intermediary as material objects are connected with each other. “Organic
solidarity” results from the division of labor. Members are linked by recognition of
differences and preserve their distinctness by symbolic relationships forming boundaries
like the relationship of organs, expressed in regulative and restitutive rules governing
their relations. Repetition of different human endeavours and the extension and
growing complication of the social organism constitute organic solidarity. Social
structure begins with mechanical solidarity and collective conscience based on
similarities creating homogeneous societies or hordes (Freud, 1921); but it is inevitably
replaced by organic solidarity as individual consciences grow more than the collective
conscience; division of labor recognizes and values individual and group differences
integrating them into larger organic units.
Individuality and group membership are centripetal and centrifugal social forces,
which cannot flourish simultaneously. Individuals have to be different, but mechanical
solidarity exerts pressure towards collective identity making “the individual conscience
… a simple dependent upon the collective type … as the possessed object follows those of
its owner” (p. 130). Individuals are absorbed into a collective personality. In organic
solidarity, individuals attain a personal sphere of action as an organ in the whole, organized
according to their function. The collective conscience leaves the individual conscience
open so functions may be established that it cannot regulate. “The more this region is
extended, the stronger is the cohesion which results from this solidarity” (p. 131).
Individual conscience is strongest when the collective conscience envelops it; and the
collective conscience’s power depends on its vitality compared to the individual
53
conscience. Physical uniqueness socializes the individual, who identifies with those
similar while remaining dependent on the common society.
Individuality and cooperation.

Individuality is not “congenital with humanity” (Durkheim, 1964, p. 195), but
arises from cooperation in division of labor. Cooperation develops among individuals
working for the organism as they become stronger and take personal initiative. In
return, society has duties toward them. Increasing concentration and density of social
interaction and communication “tighten the society” and lead to division of labor,
variation, specialization, rules and resolution of conflict. Cooperating individuals do
not form societies; societies bring individuality into existence; individuals are not self-
sufficient monads, but organs with functions in the social organism for which
“cooperation becomes not only possible but necessary” (p. 280). For social units to be
differentiated, they must first be grouped by their resemblances, which are mingled in
the “same individual collective conscience” for differentiation to begin. Complex
organisms form by repetition of “simple similar organisms which are differentiated only
if once associated. In short, association and cooperation are two distinct facts” (p. 278).
Rules determine relations of the separate groups including moral rules binding members
to one another. Consequently, “every society is a moral society” (p. 228).
As society becomes an organism, collective sentiments are replaced by culture,
which no individuals control; it becomes a reality sui generis. Psychic life is initially
collective and identical for all, but with increased social complexity, individual
diversities multiply and separate from social images, becoming collective
representations. Psychic facts are the prolongation of social facts into individual
consciousness; “if we do not accept this we will mistake the cause for the effect” (p.
349). They are products of and explained by group life. “Society does not find the
bases on which it rests fully laid out in consciences; it puts them there itself” (p. 350).
“The only power which can serve to moderate individual egotism is the power of the
group; the only power which can serve to moderate the egotism of groups is that of
some other group which embraces them” (p. 405).
54
Social facts.
Durkheim’s (1966) methodology distinguishes psychology from social life, which
is constituted wholly of representations” (p. xli). The study of society must recognize
thoughts, actions and feelings as facts not traceable to individuals. Social facts are
common in the mind of each member, not felt as owned by individuals. They are
strengthened by repetition and only expressed fully in the whole community. For
example, legal and moral standards, religious faiths, financial systems, social practices
and currents, language, rates of marriage, birth or suicide are states of the “collective
mind” (Durkheim, 1966, p. 8); but the French word “l’ame” is broader than mind,
meaning soul, spirit, ghost; mind; feeling; essence; conscience; heart; core (Elwell 1897).
Mind as the source of human experience and action has collective existence.
Group phenomena are collective because they are imposed on all members, not
because they are general. A collective fact “is to be found in each part because it exists in
the whole, rather than in the whole because it exists in the parts” (p. 9). Social facts are
not defined by their metaphysical status as ideas, since they cannot be known by mental
activity, but must be discovered by observation like material things. The study of social
facts rests not only on their collective origin or expression throughout society, but also on
the coercion they exercise over individuals; their presence is shown by sanctions against
individuals who violate them. Social facts are not derived from individual psychology
and cannot be changed by efforts of will; “they are like moulds in which our actions are
inevitably shaped” (p. 29).
Society is not the sum of its individuals, but a system formed by association
having a reality with its own characteristics. “Individual minds, forming groups by
mingling and fusing, give birth to a being. Psychological if you will, but constituting a
psychic individuality of a new sort” (p. 103). Society does not have a separate personal
existence, but “thinks, feels, and acts quite differently from the way in which its members
would were they isolated” (p. 104).
The laws of individual mentality do not govern group mentality; understanding
individuals does not help understand groups. The laws of group mentality can only be
studied by accepting that “we are absolutely ignorant of their nature, and that their
characteristic properties, like the unknown causes on which they depend, cannot be
discovered by even the most careful introspection” (p. xliii). When studied thus, they
55
show “qualities of consistency and regularity that are symptomatic of their objectivity” (p.
28). They exist in collective consciousness that consists of different representations to
those of individual consciousness. The causes of collective mentality states should be
sought in social facts preceding them, not among the individual consciousnesses in which
they express themselves. The origins of social processes are to be found in the internal
constitution of the group. The break in continuity between psychology and sociology is
the same as between physicochemical sciences and biology. The continuity is between
societies; other groups form groups, rather than individuals.
The social basis of thought.

Durkheim (1954) asserts the categories of thought and framework of human
intelligence are not abstract ideas, but formed from social life. They are defined groups of
ideas “between which internal relationships exist, similar to those of kindred;” they are
“social affairs and the product of collective thought” (p. 10). Empirical knowledge is
composed of individual experience deriving from the psychic nature of the individual; but
categories are collective representations showing the mental states of the group and reflect
its organization, morphology and institutions. “To make them, a multitude of minds have
associated, united and combined ideas and sentiments; for them, long generations have
accumulated their experience and their knowledge” (p. 17).
Collective thought forms two mental domains: an individual one with its foundation
in the organism and its activities, and another social being representing society, “the
highest reality in the intellectual and moral order that we can know by observation.”
Ideas are general relations and if people did not agree upon them, “all contact between
their minds would be impossible” (p. 19). A person freed from collective forms of
thought is not considered normal. The authority of reason is that of society itself and
forms of thought are “priceless instruments” or “intellectual capital” which “human
groups have laboriously forged through the centuries” (p. 19). Society’s organization is
the template for the psychological organization of members.
The moral order cannot be reduced to utilitarian motives any more than reason can
to individual experience. It is the force binding members to society. Respect for moral
authority is inspired, “when the representation expressing it in the mind is gifted with
such a force that it automatically causes or inhibits actions, without regard for any
consideration relative to their useful or injurious effects” (p. 207). It is elaborated in
56
common by all those subject to it and forms the collective features of social imperatives.
The power of this social pressure is psychical; it does not act wholly from without, but
since society cannot exist except in individual consciousnesses, it penetrates and
organizes itself within the members.
Whatever is not absorbed into the system of collective representations attracts
only individual sentiments and lacks the strength, respect and persuasiveness of what is.
Representations expressing individual experiences are different from those aroused by
collective influences. They form two sets of mental states, “just as do the two forms of
life to which they correspond” (p. 212). Social thought makes members see things in
whatever light it pleases, because it has power and efficacy individual thought cannot
have. Individual consciousnesses are closed to each other if left to themselves and only
communicate by sign systems; but by acting in unison with common signifiers,
individuals feel themselves in unison. Collective representations impose a homogeneity
“that gives the group consciousness of itself and consequently makes it exist” (p. 231).
Collective sentiments become conscious by being attached to objects and actions and
demonstrate that “social phenomena are born, not in individuals, but in the group” (p.
231).
Durkheim contrasts individual characteristics derived from the unique sensations of
the body, with impersonal content derived from society common to all members, such as
reason and cultural representations by which “we are freed from our senses and able to
think and act with concepts” (p. 272). If reason is not impartially shared, it is not
recognized. One determinism is imposed on the psyche by the body, another by society
that leaves the actor with the impression of liberty. “The only way we have of freeing
ourselves from physical forces is to oppose them with collective forces” (p. 272).
Individual experiences may be intense, but restrictive - “passion individualizes, yet it
enslaves.” Although what is essential in the personality is social, “there can be no social
life unless distinct individuals are associated,” so the personal and social have a reciprocal
relationship that defies simplistic division. The characteristics of human nature come
from society, but society only lives in individuals. Individuals get their distinct character,
intellectual and moral culture from society; if they no longer shared beliefs, traditions and
aspirations their group would die.
57
Social gatherings.
Energy, vitality and moral forces are created and maintained through individual
participation in the collective conscience. Collective events are stimulating, arousing
and make the collective conscience dominate individuality. The function of gatherings
is to enact group representations and invigorate them by the “collective effervescence”
of energies. Communal ritual maintains and regulates society’s life and shows the
efficacy of the collective conscience. The source of moral life is from “the society of our
fellow beings;” moral forces are sustained and increased by those obtained from others,
“beliefs are active only when they are partaken by many” (Durkheim, 1954, p. 425).
Authority is built on the regularity and establishment of practices.
Language and the social being.

Language is the system of the collective conscience expressing the social being’s
thought. Its concepts are collective representations belonging to the whole group; “they
correspond to the way in which this very special being, society, considers the things of its
own proper experience” (Durkheim, 1954, p. 425). Speakers have access to the whole
domain of the language in spite of not knowing more than a portion of its words.
Although society is universal for individuals, it is also an individuality with its own
physiognomy and idiosyncrasies; “it is a particular subject and consequently
particularizes whatever it thinks of,” but it gives “the germ of a new mentality”
individuals could not otherwise have attained, culminating in “a stable, impersonal and
organized thought” (p. 445). The social being’s activity provides the individual mind
with its structure, which can only be based on what it receives from the social mentality,
since, “impersonal reason is only another name for collective thought.” Thought “is
possible only through a group of individuals.” The social being’s contribution is not just
intrapsychic, “there is something social in all of us, and since social life embraces at once
both representations and practices, this impersonality naturally extends to ideas as well as
to acts” (p. 446).
Impact and evaluation.

Durkheim’s approach was criticised when it appeared (Tarde, 1895) and
throughout the century (Ginsberg, 1921; Lukes, 1975; Nisbet, 1973; Fenton, 1984;
58
Lehmann, 1993). Yet he greatly influenced twentieth century sociology (Merton, 1949;
Parsons, 1951, 1968; Giddens, 1982), stimulating research in ancient (Cornford, 1957) and
modern social processes (Mauss, 1979; Jodelet, 1989) and social psychology (Doise and
Moscovici, 1983; Farr and Moscovici, 1984; Tajfel, 1984; Fraser and Gaskell, 1990).
Postmodern thought has brought renewed interest in his ideas, especially individuality and
subjectivity as produced by social processes (Matustik, 1993). While Mead and Durkheim
prompted a “paradigm shift” in sociological thought, concepts of collective conscience
and collective representations were criticized as tending to “seduce us into personalizing
society” (Habermas, 1989, p. 50). Contemporary reviews of sociological theorists show
little consideration of the central hypothesis that once constituted, societies and groups are
beings or “hyperorganisms” with their own characteristics (Lukes 1975; Turner et al.,
1989), without which, collective representations, collective conscience, group solidarity,
rules, the social basis for individuality and psychic functions are vitiated.
Conclusion.
Durkheim integrates organism concepts, engulfing of individuality in crowds and
the collective mentality of socio-cultural functions in the hypothesis of the social being sui
generis. He offers a theory of the social origin of self, collective emotional currents,
religion, law, social institutions and cultural tradition; it suggests thought, reason,
structures of sentiment and action are produced in individuals by society, which becomes
creative for its members when sufficiently complex and integrated to constitute a being by
its communicative solidarity. These ideas will be shown to identify the therapeutic
capacities of groups. However, experimental social psychology provided a different
approach to the nature of small groups and is considered next.
59
6: GROUP ENTITY IN SMALL GROUP RESEARCH
Small group research in social psychology replaced theoretical studies of large

groups in social psychology (Swanson, Newcomb and Hartley, 1952) and sociology
(Mills, 1967) concentrating on interpersonal processes within groups and their influence
on behavior, rather than their nature. Group research proceeded without development in
metatheory (Turner, 1988; Forsyth, 1990). Three themes can be observed in the field.
Firstly, group entities are acknowledged, but redefined in reductionist terms; secondly,
analytic definitions of groups remove the holistic perspective altogether; thirdly, the
group entity with a mental life is recognized.
Reduction of the group entity.

Although rejecting group mentality, small group researchers wrestled with the
problem, but it infiltrated their work as they avoided it. Lewin (1939) said group mind
was an unnecessary “mystical Gestalt quality,” but emphasized groups’ dynamic
properties are “sociological wholes” whose unity is operationally defined by the
interdependence of their parts instead of as psychical concepts, which “takes mysticism
out of the group conception and brings the problem down to a thoroughly empirically
and testable basis” (p. 73). Cattell (1948) described “dynamic, temperamental, and
ability traits of the group” (p. 109) as “syntality,” the group’s “abstract entity” or
“personality,” measured by it’s functioning. It determines “the organism’s reactions
when the stimulus situation is defined” (Cattell, 1951, p. 16). He did not regard
personality as a “mental” structure, which would imply groups with personality also
have mind. However, dimensions of group function need to be identified that are
distinct from measurable variables.
Asch (1952) argued members of functional groups are “social individuals” and
have “a place in the social order as a child, a husband, or a worker” (p. 257). He
acknowledges the problem, but only conceptualizes the individual in the group context,
not the group itself. However, “group action is real, having laws that are often not
reducible to those of its components taken singly” (p. 263). “Internal group relations”
and “interaction” between members lead to new relations and properties, which may be
consequences of the group as much as other causes.
From the 1950’s, interest in interpersonal relations replaced the nature of groups.
60
Researchers “had little to say about what actually happened within a group;” they
“varied the size or composition of the groups and observed what happened to the group
product. Instead of observing process, scholars speculated about it” (Steiner, 1974, p.
98). Many texts make no mention of the nature of groups (for example, Cartwright and
Zander, 1958; Zaleznik and Moment, 1964; Watson, 1966; Hollander and Hunt, 1971).
However, it is returning. Weick (1979) used Allport’s (1924) notion of “collective
structure” to include “everything that is in a group;” it “is assumed to be the basic
building block for the creation of larger collectivities” and “does not overlook the fact
that groups are unique” (p. 97). This uniqueness is not found in individuals, but in
“repetitive interstructured behaviors” (p. 97). While not mystical, such language is no
less vague.
Wells’ (1980) review of group-as-a-whole mentions without defining the “group’s
life and mentality” and “élan vital of the group.” The idea that “a group life exists
distinct from the individual group members” is regarded as “helpful but often
confusing.” He rejects such ideas that “leave too many unresolved and knotty
theoretical issues which cloud rather than clarify” and offers, “an alternative heuristic
concept (projective identification motif) by which to understand the group-as-a-whole
phenomenon” (p. 169). Avoiding the group mentality controversy, he uses intrapsychic
concepts, restricting him to metaphors of group-as-mother, role-differentiation,
scapegoating and interpersonal phenomena losing the group altogether.
Self-categorisation theory defined groups as categories and treated them as
entities: “social groups are reflexive in that they can act upon and change themselves”
(Wilder, 1986, p. 295). Nevertheless, criteria for groups’ existence are reductive: self-
definition by members, common fate, self-categorisations in relation to non-group
others (Brown, 1989), perception of membership, psychological significance to
members, acquisition of norms and acceptance of membership (Tajfel, 1981; Fraser,
1986; Turner, 1988). In social constructivist thought, the group is a construction of the
investigator (Becvar, Cranfield and Becvar, 1997).
Analytic definitions of group.

Groups are defined by members’ psychological relationship (Kretch and
Crutchfield, 1948) interaction, proximity or satisfaction of needs, (Watson, 1966). The
focus of early studies was cohesiveness, standards, pressures, goals, structure and
61
leadership (Cartwright and Zander, 1958); dyads formed the basis for understanding
larger groups (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959). Bales’ Interaction Process Analysis
documented members’ exchanges and considered the group does not act, only
individuals. He advises raters to memorise members’ names so as not to “fall back on
some vague, amorphous conception of a team, a hoard (sic.), a gang, a crowd, or that
thinnest of all such abstractions, a ‘group’” (Bales, 1970, p. 64). However, Hackman
and Morris (1975) acknowledge that because of inadequate behavioural categories, lack
of analytic models, difficulty in handling inconsistencies and limitations of research
settings, “research based on the existing methodological and conceptual paradigms has
not yet succeeded in determining how group interaction process mediates between input
and output states” (p. 12). They identify the lack of a theory available to understand the
context of interaction. Coleman (1975) uses “group consciousness” unrelated to groups
to describe a developmental phase before children form a separate identity.
Later writers resort to earlier definitions such as Small’s (1905) (Barker,
Wahlers, Watson and Kibler, 1987), listing members’ characteristics or describing what
individuals require to be a group while ignoring the group itself (Alderfer, 1995). The
group is seen as “a distinct phenomenon whose characteristics are created by the shared
unconscious and conscious experiences of members as well as by the context of the
group” (Gillette and McCollom, 1995, p. 7). Group dynamics are distinct from, but
interact with individuals’ activities and larger systems; they “begin and end at the group
level” (p. 7). Although avoiding the question of the group as an entity, it becomes an
object of research.
Re-emergence of group mentality.

Even in the most anti-collective period, Campbell (1958) maintained groups
exist in their own right and encouraged behavioural scientists to read Spencer. While
not as solid or stable as physical objects, groups as entities could be defined by criteria
adapted from Wertheimer’s principles of perceptual organisation of “entitativity” by
proximity, similarity, common fate, pregnance (good organizational integrity) and
boundaries. They make possible “a science of social groups per se” and “in the end this
is an empirical matter not to be decided on a priori grounds” (p. 24).
The limits of group dynamics became evident during the 1970’s when, “lack of a
nourishing theory” of the group as a whole system (Steiner, 1974, p. 101) meant there
62
was abundant theory about individuals and large social systems, but not the group itself.
Studies of the whole group and its processes,
“were frighteningly difficult to conduct, required lots of subject time, and were
often too big to be undertaken by one or two persons. Time from inception to
conclusion promised to be long, and there was no guarantee that all those efforts
would ever bear fruit. It was easier and less risky to deal with a fragment of the
process. … No graduate student in his right mind would have elected to
undertake a thesis that might have kept him busy until his own children were
graduate students, especially when there were lots of easier projects that could be
completed in a few months” (p. 102).
There were no new ideas since the classic studies of the 1950’s (Steiner, 1983).
At the end of his life, Allport acknowledged his criticisms of group entities equally
applied to individuals or atoms. He concluded wholeness was a product of
interdependence of parts. Social psychology failed to clarify continuity or reciprocity of
action in groups. It observed parts, but was “loath to construct unobservable wholes
from observed parts,” while believing in larger wholes not registering on the observer’s
direct experience (Steiner, 1983, p. 277); it assumed “social behavior is produced by
individuals, not groups” (p. 280). Observation of units larger than dyads was rare.
Study of individuals in social situations should be “combined and coordinated with the
almost nonexistent social psychology of collective behavior” (p. 285).
However, no theorists of group mentality maintained groups existed apart from
individuals; they were constituted by part of the individual psyche governed by the
group. If the individual is observable, the group entity must be; a framework was
required to differentiate observable collective and individual phenomena.
By the 1980’s, a field of study was defined between the extremes of “super-
individuals with their own minds” and “cumulative characteristics of group members”
(Back, 1981, p. 321). Common fate and resistance to intrusion make groups’ unity “just
as ‘real’ as that of any other object” and is “the source of power above and beyond the
power of individuals composing it. In this sense the group has an individuality, a
separate meaning for its members” (p. 338). Steiner (1986) contrasted the demise of
Durkheim’s perspective with the tendency for contemporary theorists to regard
individualistic explanations as incomplete. An unassailable point of Allport’s (1924)
individualism is that what is observable “is the individual and his actions. Groups do
63
not ordinarily constitute a strong Gestalt; they rarely register in our direct experience as
entities or things” (p. 256). This sets the limits of differentiating an observational field
rather than implying anything about what is observed. Social psychology’s emphasis on
cognitivism (Eiser, 1992) with its individualistic assumptions failed to provide a
“supportive intellectual environment for the study of groups” (Steiner, 1986, p. 285). A
science of groups requires dialectic between individuals within group settings and
groups’ effect on them.
Systems theory treats groups as living organisms (Barker et al., 1987), assuming
they are composed of “elements that function together and engage in exchange
relationships with their environments … parts that hang together, that work together,
and are interdependent even though specialized in their function” (Sampson and
Marthas, 1990, p. 95). The organism metaphor implies “the whole has properties that
no element necessarily has. And these properties or characteristics of the whole affect
the behavior of each of the elements of the system” (p. 97).
Collective mentality theory is re-emerging. Sandelands and Stablein (1987)
propose the “organisation mind – the idea that organizations are mental entities capable
of thought” (p. 135). Organizations consist of behaviors not individuals and roles
participate in the social system rather than individuals. Criteria for minds “must not be
confused with individual minds” and “the concept of mind admits varying degrees of
complexity.” Scientific analysis of mind requires criteria to be “observable or predict
observables; this clearly marks the question of the existence of organization mind as one
to be decided empirically, not by formal argument” (pp. 149-150). Without evidence,
they suggest “the question remains to be settled”. Based on “reasonable criteria for the
existence of a non-reified and non-anthropomorphic mind” it is possible to develop a
“true study of organizational behavior, not just the behavior of organization members”
(p. 157).
Sandelands and St Clair (1993) propose an empirical approach to studying
group entities. In ordinary language, groups are treated as either single entities, or
“multiples” (collections) of individuals. Groups are defined as multiples of individuals
and this “bias towards the individual has limited the development of the theory of
groups” (p. 425). Both points of view must be researched. Individualistic research
promotes reductionism, avoids reification, but lacks “an orienting view of the group
entity,” like studying anatomy and physiology without knowing the animal. To
64
understand groups, “it is not enough to know about people, or even to know about their
interactions and networks of communication and sentiments. It is necessary to know
also how these things relate to the nature and conduct of the group entity” (p. 431).
Evidence for group entities is gained from reports by members experiencing them as
entities, from multiples with qualitatively different dynamics from entities and cultural
recognition of entities. A group entity is “a form of life” directly perceived, a “process”
rather than a “thing” (p. 447) known to participants directly by feeling. Groups are
social facts invisible to the senses, but social science “lacks a genuine concept of group
entity” (p. 452). Until this is rectified, “there can be no theory of groups unless there
are entities to theorize about” (p. 452).
Conclusion.
The nature of groups is being questioned again after a period in which research
stagnated. The group as a psychic entity had barely been abolished before it re-
appeared in social psychology albeit as a minority view. A methodology is required to
integrate group and members. Even reductionist writers refer to groups as entities and
their indexes list group characteristics as though describing properties of things like:
“action patterns, beliefs, functions, identifications, ideology, morale, rigidity, structure,
tensions” (Krech and Crutchfield, 1948, p. 632). An implicit entity exists in the science
of groups, with consensually agreed attributes and a psychic character, but ill defined as
a system, group-as-a-whole, or collective structures. The limitation is the lack of
formulation of a theory for research without individualistic bias. This is the task of the
present study and will be approached in Chapter 9. Before doing so, the conception of
the group mentality within group psychotherapy will be reviewed.
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7: COLLECTIVE MIND IN GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY
Educational principles were initially applied in groups of medical patients (Pratt,

1917, 1953, Marsh, 1935), children, adolescents and other patient groups, emphasizing
individuals (Slavson, 1948; Rosenbaum and Berger, 1975). The group as entity was not
recognized. Small group process was adapted for therapeutic purposes in encounter and
T-group movements emphasizing interpersonal interactions (Mowrer, 1964). Three
theorists recognized the group as an entity. Trigant Burrow (1875-1950) was the first to
practice group psychotherapy (Berne, 1963); his work inspired Foulkes to develop
Group Analysis during the 1940’s (Foulkes, 1948); at the same time, Bion initiated what
became the Tavistock model (Colman and Bexton, 1975; Colman and Geller, 1985).
Collective mentality was central to their therapeutic techniques, though the body of
social theory reviewed above is not acknowledged. They conceptualize the meaning of
psychological disorders as phenomena of collective mentality and are examined for
their contribution to a comprehensive theory of the group entity.
Burrow.
Burrow trained in psychoanalysis, but questioned its axioms (Galt, 1995). He
developed “group analysis” with patients, students and colleagues in which the group was
the therapist. He saw body-mind-society as “one tissue” (Galt, 1995); social groups are
integral wholes whose individuals form an “instinctive racial unity” binding members into
“an organic principle of consciousness” expressed biologically, socially and
psychologically (Burrow, 1927a; 1953, p. 176). He called the socio-biological entity a
“phyloorganism” (phylo- means large group) affiliated with racial or national group
characteristics (Burrow, 1953). The “common, organic consciousness” is the “matrix” of
mental life. Normal consciousness unites individuals in “social polity” to form a
“collective social mind” that provides “active images” and “gestures of self-reflective
actuality” as real as the “passive sensory images of the individual mind” (p. 88). Its
images restrict individual self-expression and it preserves itself against separation by
creating unities. Individual and social unconscious are incorporated in the organic unity
of social consciousness and interchanges between them cause individuals’ oscillating
moods. The “secret illusion” of separateness underlying responses to collective mentality
is an “affective fallacy.”
66
Burrow saw organic consciousness as a societal continuum, manifesting in the

continuity between individual personality and the “societal organism” (p. 151).
Disrupting the continuity dissociates individuals from it. “One’s individual organism is
a replica of the social organism, the dissociation of the social mind is identical with the
dissociation of the individual mind” (p. 151). Thought is represented as a whole in
organic life. Affects are residues of collective biology woven into a “collective
personality of the social consensus” and are as neurotic and restrictive as they are
enhancing of members. The individual unconscious is split from the collective by the
images of good/bad, hope/fear and praise/blame surrounding children from birth.
Unconscious adaptation is followed by conscious, self-reflective adaptation to the
“organic continuity of consciousness that unites the individuals of the species into a
confluent whole” (p. 61). It is sustained by collusion between members of the
phyloorganism as a self-perpetuating, self-protective system constituting a “social
unconscious.” The resistance towards it is as tenacious as resistance within individuals.
Individuals begin as “corpuscles in a homogeneous tissue” as undifferentiated
from the social context as from their maternal organism (p. 115). The personality is
formed from an “inclusive societal consciousness” rather than “circumscribed
individual consciousness” (p. 109). Normative values and others’ demands interpret
this social continuity creating “a fallacy of a self over against other selves” (p. 119).
The pure individual as “a separate and dissociated part” only becomes a “conscious,
unified whole” by accepting “an integral, confluent part in the common, societal
personality” (p. 126). The self is an element in “the consolidated unity of this common
societal entity” (p. 127).
The separate, autonomous self is not the problem; its failure to develop an
“encompassing organismic point of view” separates it from the societal and disruption
in the biological continuity between them manifests in “functional” illnesses. Neurotic
conflict is between part and whole embodied in what is organically inseparable.
Unconsciously asserted self-will opposes integration into the “confluent life of the
organism as a whole” (p. 129) forming “lesions” in the psychosocial continuity. Just as
physical pain results from organic lesions or separation of elements in the body,
neurotic pain is due to lesions separating the individual from the organic whole of the
societal aggregate. Normality is “merely unconsciousness on a co-operative basis”
(Burrow, 1927, p. 27) or “the neurosis of the race” (Syz, 1960 p. 175).
67
Individuals disrupt the social organism; taking them out of context destroys it, “as
truly as we destroy the integrity of the organism composing a flower when we isolate its
petal or leaf in order to examine it apart from its structural continuity with the whole”
(Burrow, 1927, p. 165). Treating individuals ignores the societal organism of which they
are part; without it, they cannot maintain a coherent life. When individuals threaten the
integrity of the encompassing social aggregate, they struggle in unconscious collusion
with the disruptive process they embody. Neurotic phenomena are not located within
individuals even though neurotics, through self-interest, promote their impairment by
acting against the social aggregate. “But the separateness of the part is its own
destruction, concomitantly the confluence of the whole is its own conservation” (pp 152-
3). Individual neurosis reflects neurosis within the social mind as a societal lesion, since
it is produced by and creates separation from the surrounding social continuum.
Therapists cannot cure neurosis when they are part of the pathological mentality.
“The individual’s ‘symptoms’ may only be corrected through the analysis of the social
processes constituting latently the individual’s collective medium” (p. 236). Burrow’s
group analysis is the group’s analysis of members. “Group” here is a “phyletic principle
of observation” applied equally to individual and aggregate (Burrow, 1953, p. 237); it
means the social constellation “throughout the community at large, the immediate group
being a constituent of this larger unit” (Burrow, 1928, quoted in Pertegato, 1999, p. 11).
Burrow’s method developed into weekly hour sessions for about ten people.
When he published papers in psychoanalytic journals, he was expelled from the American
Psychoanalytic Society in 1933 (Galt, 1995). He continued to publish, corresponding
widely with scientists in many fields (Burrow, 1953). Neglect of his work is consistent
with antagonism to the collective perspective in the mid-century. It was subject to
censorship by individual psychoanalysis and group analysis in spite of “widespread
ransacking of ideas” from him seldom with credit by Carl Rogers, neo-Freudians and
Foulkes (Pertegato, 1998). However, he formulates the problem of neurosis from a socio-
centric point of view and shows it as a disruption between the individual and the
collective mentality.
Foulkes.
Inspired by Burrow’s papers, Foulkes (1948) began group analysis. His
inconsistent and fragmentary theorizing does not do justice to his originality (Foulkes,
68
1948, 1965, Dalal, 1995). The group as an entity in its own right and intermediary
between individuals with historical and cultural processes was central to his therapy.
Social nature is “an irreducible basic fact.” The group or community is primary and the
individual “helplessly compressed into a mere particle of social groups and masses”
(Foulkes and Anthony, 1965, p. 24). The existence of individuals requires explanation
rather than that of groups. Individuals develop as much from community as family.
Individuality implies a social instinct integrating individuals into groups. Mental
processes in groups are a “concerted whole,” not a summary of individual processes.
The group-as-a-whole is “a psychological entity,” (Foulkes, 1964, p. 70), a unified
structure, a “psyche group” (pp. 75-76) with structures similar to individuals. Foulkes
postulated a group mind on the same basis as an individual mind. “The ‘Group as a
Whole’ is not a phrase, it is a living organism … it has moods and reactions, a spirit, an
atmosphere, a climate” (Foulkes, 1948, p. 140), which must be observed and treated.
Groups form both self and neurosis. Neurosis is attributed to social situations rather
than individuals (Foulkes, 1964). “Mental sickness is a disturbance of integration
within the community at its very roots – disturbance of communication” (p. 24). Health
is inconceivable without “being a respected and effective member of the group” (p. 27).
Group analysis treats the social network of disturbance through the member’s
transference to other members as part of the social world (Foulkes, 1964).
Dalal (1998) discerns two distinct discourses in Foulkes’ writing. A
“conservative” discourse retreats from the individual as abstraction of the social entity
into intrapsychic accounts of group events. The need to belong to groups is seen as a
residue of primitive states of the social instinct. The social unconscious consists of
automatic, routinized behaviours. A “radical” discourse asserts the “interconnected
nature of existence itself” (Dalal, 1998, p. 35). Culture is neither inside nor outside, it
permeates the individual. The social entity thrusts into the individual’s biological roots as
“the very structure of the psyche itself, … the container as well as the contained” (pp. 48-
49). Personal psychic processes start outside in the social world and are then internalised
as inner psychological events. The person is a function of communicational networks in
social environments. Communication is the instrument for holding communities together,
mind itself derives from the need to communicate and language creates mind in
individuals. Mind is “reframed as an interpersonal phenomenon” (p. 55) and “mind that
69
is usually called intrapsychic is a property of the group” (Foulkes, 1974, pp 278). Some
of Foulkes’ radical concepts are examined.
The Group Matrix: The group-as-a-whole forms a “psychological medium” for
communications and interactions called “a common matrix inside which all other
relationships develop” and “common ground of operational relationships” (Foulkes,
1964 p. 110). Participation in groups reawakens an irresistible need to re-establish
deeply rooted modes of group behaviour. Groups take hold of isolated individuals and
evoke ancient tribal feeling that “permeates them to the very core and all their
subsequent interactions are inescapably embedded in this common matrix” (p. 235).
Individuals emerge from the common matrix where group and individuals coalesce.
Members are in “in a state of interaction, in a common field, in interpenetration and
communication. They speak now through one mouth, now through another” (p. 259).
“Active group currents” are “personified” in members. Processes in the matrix are
“transpersonal” (Foulkes and Anthony, 1965, p. 26) or “suprapersonal” (Foulkes, 1964,
p. 70), not restricted to intra-psychic, individual effects. Group events are composed of
all members, whether directly involved or not, like the “figure” of participants against
the “ground” of the group (p. 110) and manifest in communication. Individual defenses
are displayed within the matrix as communicational phenomena, but are no less intra-
psychic because of this. Communication occurs with consciousness and translates
individual unconscious material into common symbols and group expressions.
“This work in communication is the operational basis of all therapy in the
group” (Foulkes and Anthony, 1965, p. 28). The therapist focuses on the matrix as the
“total interactional field” where unconscious reactions manifest and are translated into
conscious representations within group communication (Foulkes, 1964). The group
“conductor” observes all communication, promoting all events to “the rank of
communication.” Every event has meaning within the total communicational matrix
(Foulkes and Anthony, 1965) as ideas or phantasies “in the group’s mind” (p. 257). The
conductor must balance destructive and constructive energies in the matrix.
Interpersonal relationships and events do not occur in, but between individuals and exist
through interaction. The matrix, like the network in the brain, constitutes a complex
unit defining the meaning, intensity and location in time and space of communications.
It is the operational basis of the group’s mental processes, like the lines of force of a
magnetic field passing through members as nodal points “suspended in it” (Foulkes and
70
Anthony 1965, p. 259; Foulkes, 1964, p. 70).

Group consciousness: Consciousness in the group is what can be communicated
and represented by being spoken of (Foulkes, 1964, pp. 116-7). Anything that can be
voiced, but is not is preconscious; what cannot be spoken is unconscious for the group,
even if consciously represented in each member individually. Group productions are
similar to individual free associations and are meaningful in the “total group matrix.”
The social unconscious: Individuals are as compelled and modeled by these
forces as by their personal unconscious and defend as strongly against their recognition
without being aware of it. There is a “social or interpersonal unconscious” of such
social relationships not open to conscious reflection (Foulkes, 1964, p. 52). The
collective unconscious is the reservoir of members’ pooled ideas and may be suddenly
discharged as the “condenser phenomenon” (Foulkes and Anthony, 1965, p. 151).
Other Group Analytic Writers.

Van der Kleij (1982), who calls the matrix the “common ground” between
conductor and members, and identifies four “levels.”
1. The current physical and social situation, which Foulkes calls the “allosphere.”
2. The “transference level” of members’ interactions expresses past object
relationships in the social network.
3. Members’ projected “bodily and mental images” include unintegrated, part-
object relationships defensively displaced onto each other.
4. The “foundation matrix” contains primordial images of Jung’s collective
unconscious and histories of groups from which members come (Foulkes,
1964).
The second and third levels constitute the “personal” or “dynamic” matrix,
analogous to the transitional object since it “belongs to nobody and yet to everybody”
(Powell, 1994, p. 15). Its mental processes penetrate, transgress, link members and form
group events. It de-centres the discrete subject within the body (van der Kelij, 1982),
making members like “words of a sentence, none of which can express their meaning –
except as objects – unless belonging to each other” (p. 224). The fourth level is the
common ground of culture or race, normally felt as “innermost self, the intrapsychic as
against the external world” (van der Kleij, 1982, p. 221). It exists as collective images
that can be put into language and are “already shared” (p. 221). It links the group to the
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macrocosm (Powell, 1994) and individuals with a common non-differentiated collective

entity (Kaës, 1987; Le Roy, 1994).
The matrix’s boundary conditions, rules and common understandings unite
members and provide the transformative medium of communication and language. When
past and present co-exist and situations become “transparent,” the medium becomes
“communion;” this enables members to change rather than the conductor’s interpretations
(van der Kelij, 1984). The matrix holds historical elements, nourishes emotional and
cognitive aspects and is regarded as either “a group-work creation” (Ahlin 1985) or
already present (van der Kleij, 1985; Powell, 1994). The intrapsychic “is not only
shareable, but is in fact already shared” (van der Kleij, 1985, p. 220) and the matrix
makes society internal, penetrating the “innermost being of the individual” (Pines, 1994,
p. 49). Matrix and mind have been considered “synonymous” (Powell, 1994) and
separation from the matrix is separation from essential aspects of mind. Foulkes is often
explicit about the existence of group mind and his view of groups as living organisms has
not been integrated with psychoanalytic theory (Powell, 1994), but the individual as node
in a communication network is close to Freud’s (1895) metapsychological account of the
ego as network of neurones constantly invested with energy (Powell, 1994).
Foulkes rediscovered many ideas already reviewed in earlier collective mentality
theorists, but adapted to the small psychotherapeutic group context, they account for
psychological disturbance and guide therapeutic technique.
Bion.
Bion treated the group-as-a-whole and made no interventions to members (Bion,
1961; Ettin, 1999). His theory of the group psychic entity relies on well-established
Kelinian individual psychoanalytic concepts without which, he doubts “the possibility of
any advance in the study of group phenomena” (Bion, 1961, p. 8; Dalal, 1998). The
failure to develop these ideas may account for their “deification” of him (Pines, 1987).
Bion’s groups were experiential rather than psychotherapeutic (Bion, 1961). His concept
of the group entity emerged out of its unified response to his refusal to accept the role of
leader and made it a subject against him. “Group transference” is “what the group really
wants” (Bion, 1961, p. 33). The group expresses by it “saying nothing,” ignoring or
excluding him (p. 34), having a mood, insisting on its view (p. 35), having a desire about
what it does and interpreting or being disturbed by his statements (p. 36). Members talk
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to the group as a subject itself (p. 41). The group attitude coalesces into a common mode
of functioning opposed to what the group is intended to achieve, though the members
remain committed to it. The essential role of group membership in individuality is shown
by the fact that anyone in contact with reality consciously or unconsciously estimates
groups’ attitude towards themselves. The “efflorescence or decay of the social life of the
group” depends upon this assessment, which is as important as the individual’s “sense of
touch” (p. 43). Bion develops several concepts.
Group Mentality: Members contribute anonymously to a “group mentality,”
preventing issues being confronted and avoiding personal responsibility. It ensures
consistency of contributions contrasted with the diversity of individual thought. Group
mentality is the unanimous expression of the group’s will. Members unconsciously
contribute to it and it causes aversive reactions whenever they think or behave at variance
with it. It is the machinery of “intercommunication” designed to govern group life by
assumptions. Individuals cannot keep pace with group process since a “matrix of
thought” lays within the confines of the group mentality “not within the confines of the
individual” (p. 19). It is both refuge and obstacle, providing unity, but restricting what
can be said. It is the means of attaining goals and source of frustration as members
contribute to and oppose it (p. 53). The source of this frustration is failure to take
individual responsibility for contributions. Some members overtly express group
mentality, others tacitly.
Basic Assumptions: Three group mentality states embody different assumptions
that members behave as though they share: firstly, any contact between a pair of members
has a sexual purpose; secondly, only fight or flight preserve the group, which must
survive even at the expense of the members; thirdly, the group is dependent, meeting to
obtain security from an individual, who is to protect it as an “immature organism.” Basic
assumptions are phenomenological descriptions of group emotional structures or
“emotional atmospheres” (p. 83). They unify the group like “religious” beliefs, forming a
common identity like the “herd,” but creating conflict between personal functioning and
group membership. Members submerged in the basic assumption group, achieve a “sense
of vitality” and their “inalienable inheritance as a group animal” is stimulated (p, 19).
The interface between individual and group involves changes in awareness; assumptions
are tacit, members seem to behave as if they are conscious of them as individuals, but
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unconscious of them as group members. The group has no consciousness and is not
articulate; “it is left to the individual to be both” (p. 94).
Significant emotions for group members are determined by the assumptions.
Individuals avoid this by splitting from the group and their own “essential ‘groupishness’”
(p. 95), but then they have difficulty thinking for themselves. Members’ personal
contributions and symptoms derive from “being at one with the other members of the
emotionally reinforced group” (p. 95). Participation in basic assumptions is unavoidable,
ensuring emotions are shared. Their occurrence and transitions between them are
unpredictable. They alternate as products of group states rather than conflicting with each
other. Conflict occurs at transitions to the work group.
Basic assumptions are “group diseases” or modes of dysfunction affecting the
group rather than individuals. The “spontaneous instinctive co-operation in the basic
assumptions” is called “valency” to distinguish it from co-operation which he associates
with conscious or unconscious activity in the work group. Therapeutic groups oscillate
between assumption states and instability spreads to other groups outside them until there
is enough “inert material” of outsiders not sharing the emotional situation to form a new,
larger group that ceases to vibrate. The “violent and disagreeable mass oscillation” then
ceases (p. 125). If this is not achieved, oscillations create sub-groups that engage in
“platitudinous, dogmatic, and painless” communication, become dependent or exclude
newcomers. Basic assumptions recognise neither time nor development, but tensions
provide vitality to participants.
Proto-mental Phenomena: Bion postulates prototypic group mentalities where
physical and psychological are undifferentiated as “proto-mental” phenomena expressing
themselves only through the group, not individuals. Phenomena exist in the proto-mental
sphere long before they are demonstrable. It is a “matrix” where basic assumption
emotions “reinforce, pervade, and dominate the group’s mental life” physically and
mentally (p. 132). When an assumption manifests, the others remain in the proto-mental
system, converting into different states according to circumstances. In the proto-mental
sphere, members meeting together “has no significance whatsoever in the production of
group phenomena” (p. 132); meeting is only needed to receive interpretations from the
therapist. In the proto-mental sphere, they are already united, their responses being
created from a common base. Groups allow aspects of individual psychology to be
studied that are alien to non-group situations.
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The Work Group: The work group is an inherently group state achieved by
organization and structure giving stability and resistance to basic assumptions. Basic
assumption groups need neither structure nor organization since the unity is in the
common emotion. Members believe the group is distinct from the aggregate of members
who regress to achieve commonality. Symbolic verbal communication is a function of
work groups, whereas the ‘language’ of basic-assumption groups is debased and used as a
mode of action instead of thought. “The ‘language’ of the basic-assumption group lacks
the precision and scope that is conferred by a capacity for the formation and use of
symbols: this aid to development is therefore missing, and stimuli that would ordinarily
promote development have no effect” (pp. 185-186). Bion derives group mentality from
an undifferentiated, proto-mental level. It is as much a product of individuals as their own
psychic functioning; the group situation brings it into expression. He suggests an
instinctive basis for this valency or attachment to groups, but avoids saying what group
mentality or proto-mental states are, or relating them to the individual mind.
Bion’s work has been influential in the “Tavistock” approach (Rice, 1965; Rioch,
1970; Colman and Bexton, 1975; Colman and Geller, 1985) and seminal to many group
therapists (Gazda, 1977a; Rosenbaum, 1978; Rutan and Stone, 1984). His vagueness and
criticism of McDougall, Le Bon and Trotter led followers to deny the group entity.
“Although Bion thinks and speaks of instincts, he does not postulate a herd instinct or a
group mind” (Rioch, 1970, p. 22). Yet, Bion clearly invests the group with a mental life
and existence of its own. Others confirm that he sees groups as organisms and group
mentality as inherently collective (Lipgar, 1998). Bion’s mentality is composed of what
is rejected by members; what joins them is regressive and destructive, but this may be a
function of his method (Pines, 1987; Brown, 1996).
The Group-as-a-whole.
Other therapists postulate holistic phenomena, such as “common group tension”
(Ezriel, 1950a, 1950b) or “group focal conflict” (Whitaker and Lieberman, 1964). The
group-as-a-whole has been central to psychotherapy using group dynamics (Whitaker and
Leibermann, 1964; Whitaker, 1989) and systems theory (Agazarian and Peters, 1981).
Groups are not thought to have moods since “a group is not an organism capable of
feeling. Yet … there are times when particular moods or atmospheres develop in a group
which are undeniably detectable and in some sense belong to the group as a whole”
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(Whitaker, 1989, p. 33). Agazarian and Peters (1981) regard the group-as-a-whole is an
object of thought, a conceptual tool deduced from observations and its phenomena as
“invisible” since they cannot be seen. For Agazarian (1993), “systems do not really exist
in the real world, like people do. They exist only as ideas in your head. Each system
comes into existence only when you think and it disappears again when you don’t” (pp. 4-
5). The term “group-as-a-whole” is often used to demarcate the Tavistock approach’s
exclusive focus on the group, which has been found of limited therapeutic use (Kibel and
Stein, 1981). It is also seen as a holistic expression of group phenomena, variously
regarded as gestalt, universal, group-in-the-mind, metaphor, construct or superordinate
structure (Ettin, 1999), allowing knowledge of the group to be gained while avoiding
definition of its ontological status beyond saying it is neither fantasy nor reality (Durkin,
1989).
Conclusion.
The organism is central to both Burrow and Foulkes’ thought, linking
individuals to groups by an “instinctive” bond. Individual, self and mind are secondary
products of the continuity of social mentality; they emerge through communication in
the social organism. Psychological disturbance is a consequence of discontinuity
between individual and group. Communication is the common matrix for bridging the
gap between discrete selves. Many of the social mentality theorists’ ideas are re-
invented to serve therapeutic theory. However, Bion does not recognize the Work
Group as engaged in collective mentality, which are regressed, de-individualizing basic
assumption states, similar to phenomena described by crowd theorists. Like them, he
attributes their union to identification processes. His collective phenomena are counter-
therapeutic, although he implies much more with his concepts of proto-mental
phenomena.
The ideas common to these disciplines have been regarded as curiosities in
social science. The critique needs to be examined and they must be integrated into a
common body of theory for the empirical task at hand. These are the subjects of the
next two chapters.
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8: CRITICISM OF COLLECTIVE MENTALITY
Theories of the group entity faded from the social sciences in the second quarter
of the twentieth century. By mid-century small-group research in social psychology
replaced it as the dominant paradigm except in the relatively discrete field of group
psychotherapy. The reasons will be shown to be as much ideological as scientific. In
considering their contribution to group psychotherapy, it is essential to review the
critique.
Organism theories.
Spencer’s organism theory was criticized as descriptive and analogical, rather
than analytical (McDougall, 1920) and suffered from ideological axioms that all
knowledge be systematized in evolution theory (Timasheff, 1966). However, organism
theory successively transformed with changing paradigms. Systems theory, its current
form, is accepted in orthodox social science, though somewhat disguised.
Crowd and herd theories.

Although mentioned in most social psychology texts, the crowd mind was not
subjected to empirical research. Allport (1924) dismissed collective mind as lacking
demonstrable, material basis and declared there was no group psychology, only
psychology of individuals in groups. His prestige and experimental work relocated inquiry
around problems suitable for behaviorist investigation (Turner, 1988). The general critique
of instinct theory also undermined it (Murphy, 1964) and the assumption that large groups
debased their members was also attacked (Mannheim, 1940, 1943). Crowds were taken
as the exemplars of group mind theories in later literature (Newcomb, 1950;
Wrightsman, 1972), but their specific functions and social mind theories were ignored.
Scientific criticism was supported by ideological rejection. Although Trotter
was democratic and liberal, crowd theorists were elitist and conservative (Nye, 1975)
and became contaminated with fascist and Marxist ideologies, which asserted the
precedence of nation, race or class over individuals. Mussolini proclaimed, “All for the
State; nothing outside the State; nothing against the State” (Y Gasset, 1930, p. 72).
Mass psychology was one of Nazism’s most important weapons (Reich, 1942;
Mannheim, 1943; Meerloo, 1944; van Ginneken, 1992). After World War II, crowd
77
phenomena were explained by suggestion, imitation, social facilitation and dissociation

of consciousness (Young, 1946; Ogburn and Nimkoff, 1947) and replaced by small
group psychology (Sherif, 1948; Lewin, 1948; Asch, 1952). Study of crowd
psychology made way for classification, prediction and etiology in sociology (Turner
and Killian, 1957; Lang and Lang, 1961; Smelser, 1963; Evans, 1969; Shibutani, 1970).
Group mentality theories.

Cycles of individualism and collectivism have alternated in social thought since
Plato (Nisbet, 1973). Emphasis on individuality (Jordan, 1927; O’Neill, 1973; Heller,
Sosna and Wellbery, 1986) made collective mind theories seem fanciful and politically
dangerous (Ginsberg, 1927) and encouraged ethnocentric polemics idealizing Anglo-
Saxons, vilifying Germany and criticizing other European nations’ inferiority (McCabe,
1915) that science could only oppose. The unity of a system of social forces was seen
not to correspond to the mind’s unity and group behavior was determined by influences
on individual minds (McIver, 1917). Sociological research moved to “unit ideas” such
as community, authority, status, stratification and alienation (Nesbit, 1973; Collins,
1985). Collective mentality became “old fashioned” (Allport, 1954). Objections often
amounted to paradigm differences and alternative approaches often describing social
concepts in terms similar to group minds (Asch, 1952; Allport, 1964). However,
science itself does not progress by scientific method (Kuhn, 1962) and the political
debate was between ideologies valuing individuality versus those subordinating it.
Freud’s critique.
Freud (1921) explained crowds’ uncontrolled, “primitive” characteristics as
unconscious impulses freed from repression by the conditions in large groups rather
than creating mental entities. Group organisation equipped with the individual’s
attributes preserved the characteristics extinguished by membership. Members
identified with each other through common love for the leader, creating suggestibility
and contagion. Loss of the leader-follower relation produces panic and breakdown of
the group. Individual psychology explained group mind and herd and left no room for
collective mentality. Psychoanalytic theory continues to be individualistic and
considers group dynamics in terms of identification, projection and projective
identification (Rice, 1965; Menzies-Lyth, 1970; Colman and Bexton, 1975; Colman and
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Geller, 1985; Hinshelwood, 1987; Jaques, 1990). However, psychoanalytic group

therapists proposed collective mentality theories similar to those discredited.
Ginsberg’s critique.
Ginsberg (1921, 1932, 1954) attacked collective mentality for thirty years. He
claimed the rationality, integration and unity of collective entities and individual
personality are exaggerated and “no coherent and self-consistent account has been
offered of the way in which the unity of social groupings is to be conceived” (1921, p.
47). Social institutions are not the result of a mind and do not embody rational
purposes; they embody conflicts, their unity often suppressing vital demands of most
members. They appear to be “‘trial and error’ experiments, groping attempts at finding
solutions for the problems and dis-harmonies of life” (p. 44). It is false to oppose
individual to society; the intrinsic social relations said to constitute individuals have no
existence outside social groupings. Individuals retain something “unique and
incommunicable,” yet their development is development of sociality. Although
relations holding members of society together are mental, social mind hypotheses are
“exceedingly dangerous,” giving society a “fictitious unity which it does not posses;” it
belittles individuality and minorities, opposing the good of society to that of individuals.
Social mind theories idealize society with higher and lower qualities than individuals.
Regarding the social mind as more enlightened and rational than individuals encourages
submission and conservatism. Personification of the whole means something can be
good for it, but not its members, allowing autocracy or aristocracy to masquerade as
democracy. Someone has to speak for the social mind no matter how infallible it may
be.
Ginsberg (1921) distinguished two types of theory. Durkheim’s maintained “a
collective consciousness in which the mental processes of individuals are fused and
compounded” (p. 51) forming the self from collective mental processes that gains
continuity and unity from society. McDougall’s proposed a “general will” formed by
the essentially social character of mental content and the self, owing its nature to
relations with others.
Critique of Durkheim.
Ginsberg attacked Durkheim’s concept of collective representations. Since there
79
is no continuity of substratum in society like that of individuals’ brains, the fusion of

individual representations into collective representations is meaningless. He concluded,
“it is doubtful, therefore, whether the conception of interaction between minds has any
validity;” individuals’ influence on each other can only be through indirect symbolic
communication. “Perhaps such terms as fusion or interaction have really no meaning at
all when applied to minds” (p. 58). He cannot imagine how elementary processes
constitute representations. Yet Durkheim’s (1964) view that richness of communication
and collective effervescence in groups provide continuity is compatible with
contemporary cognitive theory, which understands higher order mental representations
as forming out of the complexity of associated cognitive elements (Von Eckardt, 1993;
Cummins, 1995). Ginsberg did not address common ideas operating on individuals as a
non-personal constraint and adopted a skeptical, empiricist method presupposing the
individual’s primacy, which does not touch the import of Durkheim’s argument.
Ginsberg considered consistent application of Durkheim’s theory would result in
“complete disappearance of the individual and his absorption into the social mind” (p.
58). Durkheim’s distinction of personal and collective content in individual minds leads
to a position that “there can be no such thing as individual presentations, and therefore
no individual minds” (p. 58). While content is universal, process can only be
individual. Durkheim’s view is called the result of a “hypostatization” (a common
pejorative term in discussions of collective mentality, meaning “to make into or treat as
a substance,” Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990) of the contents of the social system at
the expense of mental process. However, Durkheim (1964) took great pains to avoid
this simplicity by balancing centripetal and centrifugal forces on individual and group.
Ginsberg objected to categories of thought being socially derived by declaring
they are already inherent in ideas of society and it is uncertain which is primary. His
view was that since the social character of general ideas was as “functional principles,
as ways in which the mind organizes its experience, there is no difficulty in conceiving
of them as essentially part of the structure of the individual mind” (p. 59). The
difference in the behaviour of individuals in or out of groups is due to special conditions
such as organisation and deliberation. He proved his point by an appeal: “surely the
phenomena referred to do not need a super-individual mind to explain them” (p. 59).
He criticized the group mind’s superiority. There is no way of finding out what such a
being might think and the “tissue of mental forces operative in society” exhibits “little
80
unity of purpose or clear perception of ends such as we find in the best or greatest
individual minds” (p. 60). Popular idealism does not compare with the “clear-eyed
vision and steadfast devotion” in great personalities. Such phraseology reveals his
ideological partiality for the individual as reference point.
Critique of McDougall.
Ginsberg objected to McDougall’s (1920) view of mind as “an organised system
of mental or purposive forces.” A system of minds is not a mind itself, as a house built
of bricks is not a brick. He found two simultaneous group mind concepts in
McDougall. The first is “esprit de corps,” each member having a similar idea of and
strong emotional attachment to the whole group. Ginsberg said it is “out of harmony
with the facts” for nations and does not allow for complex, conflicting and discordant
views. The second concept is of group interests, ideas and values not attributable to
individual minds. He regarded this as a “dangerous” idea, confusing unity of content
and process. Groups rarely arrive at superior decisions to individuals; superior public
decisions show collective deliberation rather than collective mind. Complex group
structures lack the unity and concreteness of individual minds, which possess a core of
being not exhausted in groups. Intellectual or moral institutions are nothing in
themselves; they must be reinterpreted by each generation. The idea that society has a
mental life greater than the sum of its units is purely verbal since units cannot exist apart
from social relations. “The idea that we can get a ‘mere sum’ of isolated individuals
and contrast them with a concrete social entity is a gratuitous assumption” (p. 64).
Psychological phenomena of social wholes are “unities of mind” (p. 66), but he rejected
group mind or organism explanations as confusing content with process. “The problem
of the relation of the individual to the social wholes to which he belongs is more
complex than the theory of the social mind allows for” (p. 68). He reasoned that since it
is counter-intuitively for him, the theory cannot be valid. Finding assertions
“gratuitous” is irrelevant to their validity and declaring the hypothesis too complex is
unscientific.
Ginsberg (1954) tackled the nominalist fallacy that “to assign characteristics to
groups is by no means the same as to consider them as entities which exist
independently of the individuals which compose them” (p. 152). Applying will, mind,
purpose or other individualistic concepts to society implies a “new kind of whole which
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stands outside individuals or in which they are merged.” The complexity of multiple
intersecting, changing social structures and groups of which individuals are
simultaneously members allow no analogy to physical organisms. “Minds in relation to
each other do not constitute a mind in the sense in which each individual has a mind.
They are “relational complexes” of a peculiar kind, with characteristics of their own” (p.
158).
He gave opinion with exhortation, but cited no evidence against the view. A
mixture of assertion and value judgment obscures the possibility of sui generis entities.
Political misuse of ideas is no argument against their validity, any more than misuse of
technology is an argument against its existence. However, he was a champion of
individual rights and a major influence in the scientific rebuttal of prejudice and
pseudoscience common in the first half of the twentieth century (Ginsberg, 1956, 1960,
1961).
Later criticism.
Earlier criticisms were repeated in the middle of the century. Moore (1969)
equated the “group mind fallacy” with the “reductionist fallacy” overlooking that
although the latter is a methodological problem the former is a theoretical one. Krech
and Crutchfield (1948) typify the mixture of arguments from fashion and authority:
“Today the term group-mind is in disfavor, but the concept still plays an
important role in the thinking of … many social philosophers, and even some
social scientists. Despite its burial at the hands of F. H. Allport and others, the
group-mind concept still seems to lead a ghostly life in the thinking of many
social psychologists for the simple reason that in doing away with the group-
mind, the social psychologist seems to have been left with only the individual as
his unit of analysis, and so no social psychologist can get along without some
larger unit than the individual. Thus we find the use of such terms as group
gestalten¸ dynamic social fields, etc. – all modern terms, but frequently misused”
(p. 20).
Uncritical promulgation of such attitudes led to the idea being dismissed in passing:
“Historically, there have been social theories that developed the concept of an emerging
group mind, but these have largely fallen into disrepute” (Lana, 1976 p. 118). Parsons
(1968) called the group mind, “merely a metaphysical assumption; its employment is
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scientifically unsound” (p. 357). Although Durkheim never reified social being as
group mind, Parsons claimed it is implied by giving reality to society’s mentality and is
due to the theory’s incompleteness (p. 363).
Other criticisms misinterpreted and reified collective mentality. The group mind
was “once used to refer to an extra-natural mind, or psyche, of a group of people” and
was “the view that groups, societies, and peoples think, feel and act as entities in
themselves, quite apart from the thinking, feeling, and acting of the individuals making
up the group” (Zadrozny, 1959, p. 141). Asch (1952) repeated this error, accusing
group mind theorists of the “anthropomorphic fallacy,” introducing,
“a profound cleavage between group forces and the individual and to fix the
relations between them in a particular manner. The group swallows the
individuals who become mere recipients of group forces…. The upshot of the
group-centered view is that men are the agents of outside conditions - that their
aims, their ways of thinking and feeling, and their very character are dictated to
them by forces over which they have no control” (p. 254).
Durkheim’s qualifier sui generis was ignored; no group mentality proponents suggest it
exists apart from the members.
Political connotations were ever-present. Klineberg (1940) says group mind
theory encourages a “romantic and mystical concept of the nation” exploited in “recent
fascist literature” (p. 330). Crowd theories were cited, ignoring more rigorous social
mind theories (Newcomb, 1950). Asch (1952) said the relationship of group to
individual,
“has a direct bearing on political questions of the relation of the state to the
individual. … The group-centred view, when carried to its conclusion, becomes
the basis for the proposition that the society – or its representative, the state – has a
will and a personality, that its interests are supreme, and that the individual exists
for the state. This proposition was in fact an explicit part of the legal doctrines of
the Nazi and fascist regimes” (p. 259).
He supported this emotional argument with fascist quotations:
“‘Not the individual, only the community has rights; there is no Magna Carta. The
individual has only duties, the violation of which constitutes a crime. The plans for
the criminal law foresee the breaking down of the primacy of the individual, and
establishment of the superiority of the community.’ (Nationalsozialistische
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Leitsätze für ein neues deutsches Strafrecht, 1935, p. 6.) ‘Fascism conceives of the
state as an absolute, in comparison with which all individuals or groups are
relative, only to be conceived in their relation to the state.’ (B. Mussolini, The
Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism, International Conciliation, 1935, p. 13.)”
(Asch, 1952, p. 259, note).
He accused Durkheim of hypostasizing group mentality “into an autonomous entity,
working through individuals but not determined by them” (p. 255), although Durkheim
(1954, 1964) said neither individual nor society can be autonomous; society operates
from within individuals as though expressing their own desires.
Group mentality appears in sociological and psychological dictionaries till the
early 1960’s (Zadrozny, 1959; English and English, 1962) then disappeared (Chaplin,
1968; Mitchell, 1969; Harré and Lamb, 1984). It was no longer discussed from the
1960’s (Johnson, 1961; Brown, 1965; Watson, 1966; Nisbet, 1970; Bottomore, 1971;
Wrightsman, 1971) indicating uncritical acceptance of consensus judgment. Brodbeck,
(1973) refered to “the scientifically disreputable past of social science – its closet
cluttered with ‘group minds’ and other suspect entities” (p. 110) as reason to condition
the consciousness, “or better” the unconscious of social scientists with “Methodological
Individualism.” Watkins (1973) glibly dismissed it: “is the behaviour of a number of
individuals ever regulated by some super-individual mental entity? … In general,
‘group-minds’ are very rightly out of fashion” (p. 153-153). Refuting a caricature of the
carefully considered theories of Durkheim, Cooley, Mead and Trotter they only
reiterated fashion without reading the authors.
Gellner (1973) mentioned the “holistic subject” in historical explanation it as
“equivalent to a ‘group mind’ theory,” adding “I take it no one is advocating this
seriously” (p. 251). Later, he said, “of course, societies not being endowed with group
minds, the question doesn’t arise for ‘the totality’” (p. 259). The idea was dismissed
rather than refuted. Even Durkheim’s admirers were reluctant to accept the group
being, saying he did not mean it and expressed himself badly (Goldstein, 1973). It was
dismissed as, “some mystical concept of a ‘group mind’” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 128) and
became a historical curiosity displaced by interpersonal processes between members.
The nature of groups themselves is ignored between the early 1960’s and the late 1980’s
(Steiner, 1974, 1983; Turner, 1988).
84
Evaluation of objections.
Objections to collective mentality can be condensed into four types and evaluated for
their relevance to empirical investigations.
1. Epistemological Objection: Groups cannot be perceived and are observers’

constructs since they do not exist. Only individuals can be observed and group
properties are emergent, nominalist reifications.
At the end of his life, Allport conceded this argument applied equally to atoms
and other phenomena (Steiner, 1986). The perceptual “invisibility” of groups is naïve. A
tree is not perceived as a whole yet is an entity because of the perceptual field’s structure.
Although not objects like physical persons, groups are perceptible. Perception and
cognition are constructive activities (Berger and Luckman, 1973; Rose and Kuhlwein,
1996) and in some respects, all entities are constructs (Maturana, 1988). Individuals
themselves are constructs of varied states.
The idea that group entities are emergent is simplistic, since individuals are
already elements of pre-existing groups, which are re-organised in new groups. Groups
are no more “emergent” than individuals are; both always co-existed. Groups did not
emerge from nothing any more than individuals born from other individuals are emergent;
the members forming groups always already belonged to other groups. Groups’ do not
exist because they are named, but because they are consensually validated structures of
the perceptual world.
Reification is the fallacy where abstract relationships or properties are regarded
as having independent existence (Bullock and Stalleybrass, 1986). Group entities were
never claimed as independent of their constituent individuals, but equally real. They are
constructions of interacting individuals. Groups are reified when defined as relationships
between members, but not if described as observable phenomena.
2. Functional Objection: Groups are not like people; fictitious unity is attributed
to them devaluing individuals. Although consisting of the same stuff as
individual minds, group minds lack properties of personal minds and should not
be called mind. They lack the intelligence and wisdom attributed to them and
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are subject to error and evil. Groups exhibit trial and error rather than guidance
by a mind.
Group beings do not have the same mentality as their constituent individuals;
they are sui generis (Durkheim, 1964), but this does not refute their existence. Group
entities co-exist with individuals, but have different functions from individual minds and
perhaps should not be called “mind” with its individualistic associations. They are not
formed by the same stuff as individual minds, or not all the same stuff.
A portion of individuals’ minds constitutes group mentality and there is no
assumption it should function like an individual’s mind. A relation of analogy between
individual and group is denied by all theorists.
Groups being subject to stupidity, error and evil only demonstrates that they are
as fallible as individuals, but the error and evil of individuals may also be accounted for
by groups. Collective dynamics have been used to explain communal violence and
genocide (Turner, 1985, 1987).
3. Collective Subject Objection: Collective representations and collective

consciousness formed by symbolic communication cannot constitute a being
that thinks and acts. If group mentality only speaks through individuals, it gives
power to those who speak for it.
This objection assumes a collective subject is proposed that can speak, desire or
act. However, no proponents assert analogical attribution of individualistic subjectivity to
groups, which leads to untenable notions. Durkheim (1954) speaks of collective
conscience in which members are embedded, resembling Burrow’s (1927b) collective
consciousness, Foulkes’ (1948) matrix and Bion’s (1961) proto-mental dimension. Only
Hegel (1807) possibly describes a collective person. The collective subject is sui generis,
different from individuals, its character and expression to be determined by observation.
Regarding it as a collective person misinterprets all versions of the idea. Durkheim never
confuses collective conscience with the being of society; collective functions are activities
of the social being. Individual subjects arise within groups under circumstances not
applicable to groups themselves.
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Collective consciousness only arises with organised communication forming

common propositions and values that define common cognitive objects, affects and action
patterns for members. This is similar to theories of individual consciousness. In
psychoanalysis, individual consciousness occurs when word presentations are added to
thing presentations (Freud, 1919), making it a product of language and communication.
Mead (1962) regarded consciousness as produced by a “universe of discourse.”
Contemporary cognitive theory sees consciousness arising from complex parallel
processing, inseparable from linguistic representation (Gregory, 1987; Johnson-Laird,
1988). Consciousness arising out of communication is no longer controversial, but
collective consciousness refers to members’ shared content. Consciousness mediated by
collective representations unites individuals to respond as members of the collective entity
rather than as individuals. Attributing it to a collective subject misunderstands and reifies
the concept as a separate entity, which no theorist supports. Political misuse of the idea
has no bearing on scientific investigation; on the contrary, its power potential may assist
in managing criminal and destructive groups.
4. Structural Objection: A social mind would consist of multiple intersecting

minds with bewildering complexity, making members part of many “minds”
simultaneously; but groups also do not possess the complexity of personal
minds and differ structurally from biological individuals.
The complexity of the brain, neural representations and cognitive processes

(Rummelhart and McLelland, 1989; Macdonald and Macdonald, 1995; Port and van
Gelder, 1995; Kelso, 1995) make this objection less significant than when it was made.
Individual minds have a complexity, which is only now becoming understood. Social
Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1988; Hogg, 1988) shows individuals map
themselves within complex interconnecting social identifications. Tribal social structures
are complex without constituting a problem for members (Durkheim, 1964; Levi-Strauss,
1969) and aboriginal people’s relationships and identity extend throughout the community
(Elkin, 1979). Collective entities are organised differently to individuals; collective
mentality is not a duplicate of individual mentality and may be more complex in some
aspects and less complex in others. It is an empirical task to describe these differences.
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Conclusions.
Although critics raise important theoretical problems, many arguments distort
key elements making the group mentality hypothesis untenable and they refute their
own versions. Critiques conform to fashionable deductive, empiricist methodologies
and the weight of argument is from authority, ideology and directed at political rather
than scientific implications. Objections identify it with individual human subjects,
invalidating its uniqueness and ignoring the qualifications collective mentality theorists
make to avoid this. With the breakdown of behaviorism and advent of
phenomenological and hermeneutic methodologies it is becoming respected as a
contribution to the unsolved problems of social science (Warriner, 1956; Steiner, 1983,
1986; Tuner, 1988; Sandelands and Stablein, 1987).
While not an empirical hypothesis, it structures the perceptual field as a way of
observing groups rather than being falsifiable. Falsifiability is a criterion of positivist
empirical science (Popper, 1972), but not so crucial to humanistic or hermeneutic science
(Schotter, 1975; Gauld and Shotter, 1977; Davidson, 1985). Group mentality is a meta-
psychological proposition defining the field of observation. Its existence is an
epistemological or metaphysical issue and not the subject of this study. Scientific
investigation requires a methodology for observing and interpreting phenomena defined
as social or group mentality. The scientific question is whether the hypothesis facilitates
systematic study of group phenomena, reveals regularities and informs therapeutic
technique (Gregory, 1996). Its scientific merits must rest on a coherent theory and a body
of reliable observations.
The criticisms can be interpreted as responses to ambiguities of the concepts.
The following chapter integrates the ideas reviewed into a comprehensive notion of
collective mentality as the foundation for specific concepts of group psychic life to be
operationalised and studied empirically.
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9: INTEGRATION OF THEMES.
A science of groups.
A science of groups considers them objects in their own right, constituted by
interacting members, who are studied in another discipline (Social Psychology); each
requires appropriate methodology. This study presents a methodology for studying group
psychical entities. The influence of society is mediated by peer groups (Cooley, 1909;
Durkheim, 1966; Cotterell, 1996; Harris, 1998) and group psychotherapy provides
opportunities to observe collective psychic functions and how collective mentality is
constituted in interpersonal interaction.
Many objections to collective mentality can be avoided by defining a clearer
relationship between concepts of group and individual. Although it requires theoretical
discussion beyond the scope of this study, axioms can be postulated to accommodate the
criticisms and set the study’s boundaries. These propositions are intended as heuristics to
define the field of study of group entities.
1. Group entities are not like persons, who are defined by their body, capacity to
act and use of language; groups cannot act or speak as subjects. Their
characteristics have to be determined by observation not analogy (Durkheim,
1966).
2. Group entities must exist with organic organization, continuity and a life cycle
before developing mentality (McDougall, 1920; Durkheim, 1964).
3. The group entity’s manifestation and materiality is communication in the widest
sense; its mentality is communication, organization and content (McDougall,
1920; Burrow, 1927b; Mead, 1962; Foulkes, 1964).
4. The group entity is coexistent and co-temporal with its members (Durkheim,
1954). Groups existed from the beginning and individuals emerged within them
(Freud, 1921; Harré, 1993); group mentality is not derived from individual
minds, but a different order preceding and co-existing with them (Durkheim,
1966; Mead, 1962).
5. The group entity cannot exist apart from its members, who serve individual and
group mentality at the same time (Durkheim, 1954). It does not only exist when
members are physically gathered (Bion, 1961).
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6. Groups and individuals are complementary; individuals do not develop outside

membership of groups; groups cannot exist without members. Lack of
appropriate group involvement deforms personality; lack of appropriate
members deforms groups (Cooley, 1909; Burrow, 1927B; Mead, 1962; Foulkes,
1964; Harris, 1998). Their relationship is between symbiosis and parasitism
(Blomfield, 1982).
7. Distinguishable domains of individual and group mentality exist within the
person (Durkheim, 1954). The same content may have one status for the
individual and another for the group (Bion, 1961; Foulkes, 1948, 1990).
8. Group entities have lives of their own, which are not necessarily consistent with
members’ welfare (Bion, 1961; Durkheim, 1964).
9. Group entities to which individuals belong, provide a creative tension of
supports and constraints on personal existence (Durkheim, 1954, 1964).
10. Group entities are vulnerable to the same vicissitudes, accidents, failures and
errors as individuals. They are no wiser or more capable than individuals, but
differently organized (Burrow, 1927b; Bion, 1961; Durkheim, 1966).
With these axioms, findings on group entities are summarised and integrated into a
theoretical framework.
A theory of group mentality.

A theory of group mentality is proposed that enables whole group phenomena to
be systematically observed and their therapeutic effects investigated. The theory first
establishes what types of mentality are collective as distinct from individual, then
describes group conditions enabling this to exist and defines group dimensions of
cognition, affect and action. In the following chapters, these phenomena are theoretically
defined and criteria for their observation in psychotherapy groups are described.
Defining collective mentality.

All theorists affirm collective mentality is fundamentally different from
individual mentality and it remains scientifically unusable unless distinguished. The
first question is whether the term “mind” is appropriate to designate collective
mentality.
The concept mind: Mind means memory (bear in mind); intention, desire, wish;
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seat of consciousness, thoughts, volitions, feelings; incorporeal subject (Shorter Oxford

Dictionary, 1990). As the seat of consciousness representing the subject, mind is an
individual concept indicating bodily and sensory content of psychic life.
Philosophically, mind is an “abstract version” of individual functions such as thinking,
perceiving or feeling, rather than something in its own right, (Morton, 1995). It is
associated with sensation and consciousness (Scruton, 1996); it involves mental
changes, but if it is only the collection of changes, it leaves out “precisely what ties
them together into the mind” (Shaffer, 1967, p 337). Using mind for collective psychic
functions raises linguistic problems since it evokes individual, sensory activities.
The alternative term “psyche” is no less individualistic. In Greek philosophy,
psyche means breath, soul or spirit (Matthews, 1995) and indicates living entity,
conscious self or principle of individuality (Kerferd, 1967a). To avoid the
individualistic bias of mind, individual and collective mentality must be contrasted and
an alternative term suggested.
The individual mind: The body and its functions, definitive in time and space
determine the individual’s mental content. The body individualizes; its functions,
sensory experiences, pleasure, voluntary movement and conscious representation belong
only to one person. Most of what is defined as mind derives from sensory and bodily
content such as sensation, consciousness, memory, thought, affect and volition, which is
subjected to mental operations. This can be called the “somatosensory mind” including
sensory experience, states of arousal and motor activity.
To analyse the boundary between individual and collective mentality,
somatosensory content must be distinguished from what is not sensory. Mental
functions not dependent on sensory or bodily content include rational structures and
processes that go beyond the specifics of an experience and relate it to forms common
to members of a culture. They derive from social experiences provided through
communication and language (Durkheim, 1954; Mead, 1962; Toulmin, 1972).
Concepts and rational operations are collective because they cannot be reduced to
specific sensory instances, presuppose a common culture and are the same for all who
have them. Other functions include collective representations, sentiments and ritualized
action patterns (Durkheim, 1954).
Collective Mentality: Collective mentality is therefore the framework of
concepts, categories, ideas, logical and rational operations, relationships, rules,
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assumptions and values constituting the system within which specific sensory mental
content is given meaning common to members of a cultural group. Individual sensory
experience is given meaning by shared products of thought and knowledge. Collective
mentality denotes a framework that gives collective meaning to individual experience; it
is indicated by all that remains constant in a given human mental activity when the
specific somatosensory content changes.
For example, if a person’s conversation about their job is compared with another
conversation about their family, common features organize the different sensory content
showing their mental structures. Comparing this person’s conversation with another’s
in the same culture shows common cultural structures organizing their sensory contents.
Comparison with someone from a different culture shows other, more fundamental
structures. Such comparisons can be taken by substituting different somatosensory
content to reveal the commonalities of structure and function underlying them.
Eventually, any human beings have in common certain fundamentals of rational
consciousness that are the core of human mentality.
An alternative to Mind. Since mind or mentality has a strong individualistic,
bodily meaning, another word may help define collective mentality more clearly
without individualistic connotations. In Greek philosophy, “nous” denoted mental
operations not dependent on the senses. It referred to the rational, intellectual, knowing
part of the mind (English and English, 1958), principles beyond the manifest
phenomenal world (Jones, 1995) related to eternal truths, implying a universal, cosmic
or world mind (Rhode, 1987). It was cosmic reason and rationality (Kerferd, 1967b, p
525). It indicated thinking, ordering, planning, and universal order; it expressed the
consciousness of organisms’ life through the inherent connectedness of their organs. It
is intellectual activity analogous to perception for ideas and consciousness (Gadamer,
1998). It denotes mental functions not dependant on sensory content, whose principles
and processes are the same for all people. It may be used to define collective mentality.
Collective mentality can more correctly be called collective nous.
The ideas, principles and operations constituting nous only exist collectively.
No person embodies more than a fragment of the interconnected system. Traditionally,
philosophy and psychology privilege individual awareness by acknowledging only what
individuals express. Another point of view can focus on the system of functions defined
by nous. Logic, reason and other forms of thought exist for everyone who understands
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them to form a self-sustaining cultural system. Individuals join such a world of thought
in the same sense they join a language community. Nous exists as the medium of a
specific set of conditions of individual minds, including communication, being subject
to collective and individual interactions and being part of a social entity and cultural
milieu.
The collectivizing function of nous: The body divides people from each other.
Nous functions link people in communicational-mental-social structures through
language. To have a place in social life or in nous, sensory content must be converted
into words or other semiotic forms and rendered as linguistic products. Sensory
experience is formed in the rational structures and operations of these communications.
Mental representations form when conceptual forms structure sensory data, when word
presentations are attached to thing presentations (Freud, 1919). Individuals’ memory
images are unique, but take on cultural significance when communicated to others.
Instead of the images themselves, their verbal representations are transmitted through
social communication and subjected to organizing structures and processes independent
of sensory content. This is the functioning of nous.
Images become active in nous when freed from their specific somatosensory
forms and take communicable form (Durkheim’s, 1964, collective representations).
The sensory images are re-created by other communicating individuals, each giving
them personal colouring within the common forms. Communication and its structures
exist through individuals’ participation in organized, rational thought and expression
with common values of truth and consistency. It is co-extensive with cultural forms,
inseparable from social and communicational forms that make social organization and
ordered mental processes possible.
Nous exists in its own right since no individual sustains it; each comes into and
leaves forms existing independently of them as individuals, though they may leave their
marks on it. This is also characteristic of groups to which they belong. People are born
into social forms that pre-exist and succeed them. The individual mind’s point of
contact with nous is wherever communication occurs within any rational structure.
Initially, this is in small social groups (Cooley’s, 1904, primary groups). For large
groups, mass media, culture and ritual are the institutionalized forms for exchanges that
are spontaneous in small groups. Individuals who cannot become part of such groups
are deprived of contributing to or being structured and supported by nous.
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Personal and collective nous: Using the criterion of somatosensory content, two
domains of nous can be defined to differentiate personal and collective mental content.
When somatosensory experiences are represented mentally, they can be represented in
language, communicated and subjected to logical or moral principles. The resulting
manifest mental content consisting of personalized concepts, values and actions
constitutes personal nous. A person may think rationally about their life, make
decisions and evaluate their experiences using nous functions in their personal mind.
They may be unaware how this is structured by the organization of culture, gender,
history, moral attitudes and prejudices of their society that reflect collective nous
working through personal nous and somatosensory content. To take its place within a
wider system of meanings and values incorporating membership of society, this
personalized organization must be subject to the meanings and values of the culture that
constitute collective nous. While personal nous forms and organizes representations
within the personal mind, collective nous links them to collective representations
values, meanings and functions common to society members.
There is no clear boundary between the two, but rather a series of gradations
from collective to personal. Within collective nous, various domains can be
distinguished, like other social structures. Part is common to humanity, then large-scale
cultures such as occidental and oriental, national, class, family and eventually peer
group structures. Each provides essential elements in the organic complexity of the
whole nous organism. There are also different degrees of organization of nous. The
crowd mind, Burrow’s collective neurosis and Bion’s basic assumption group mentality
are all organized around shared sentiments, emotions and attitudes. They show only
limited logical operations, subject to cultural norms. The systemic functions are limited
to simple conjunction and disjunction of normative values. The emotive content
debases the logical system of nous.
In orderly discussion reaching a consensus, cooperative problem solving and
decisions, the personal nous activity of each member becomes an element in a common
rational structure with respect for reason, ethics, culture, history, language and forms of
action. These operations of collective nous support and organize sensory-personal
content. They lack specific content, but comprise shared structures and operations
allowing communication to have effects. This is shown in language. The choice of
words and construction of sentences and topics discussed are personal and specific, but
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rules, structures and idioms expressing them are common to all speakers and logical
operations are common to educated people. They are the same whatever the topic or
sensory content. If members fail to become part of the collective nous system, no
comprehensive order exists and no collective thought or action can take place.
Alternatively, protagonists may belong to contending groups and give collective
organization to their views and actions along “party lines.” Since language is only
sustained as a collective function, nous’ structure and functions are linguistic (in the
widest sense of the term as distinct from speech, Whorf, 1995); speech is produced by
individuals and is personal, but language with its rules is collective.
Group mentality theorists have not satisfactorily answered the question of where
collective nous is located. Placing it in a transcendent domain departs from empirical
science. However, it is similar to asking where language, culture or social structures are
located. They undoubtedly exist – but where? They are not confined to functions in
individual minds, but suspended between all those involved in them. Theoretical
developments in the categories of thought may be required to answer this. No adequate
language exists to discuss entities not identified with coherent physical objects. It is not
helpful to say that because this question cannot be answered the theory should be
abandoned. It can only be answered by more intense consideration of relevant
phenomena and ideas.
The individual and the group: For groups to become organisms and develop
psychic functions that support nous, individuals need to be integrated and fulfill their
own needs as well as the group’s. Since the medium of group nous is communication,
this means being “membered” into the communication process. The quality of
membership determines the quality of the group psychic life. Only in primitive social
organisms, capable of primitive functions does authority of a leader determine the
structure. The greatest cultural achievements are in societies with a high degree of
individuality and a strong collective life integrated by active communication and
differentiation. Personal initiative is expressed and takes on social value within the
collective organizing context of nous.
Collective mentality theorists describe the individual’s mind as sustained in the
matrix of nous. The quality of individuals’ membering into the group and ability to
serve functions in the collective organs of thought, affect and action determine the
quality of their individual psychic life. According to axiom 4 above, individual and
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group mentalities are co-existent, co-temporal and complementary. The personal

psychic development of people unable to member themselves into the communicational
life suffers by failing to participate in the nous functions. They lack the capacity to
enter organic communicational structures necessary for the group to develop psychic
capacities. Participation in a group’s organic integrity and functioning to meet the
needs of its existence constitutes an important therapy for members.
Psychopathology and individuals’ relationship to nous. Nous provides the form
for sensory experience. Individuals with a relationship to society feel bound by its
constraints. If a contradiction is pointed out or something is shown to be untrue, they
feel bound to take account of this, not because someone has pointed it out, but because
it is felt as a contradiction in the self. Individuals value their relation to nous as though
it is part of the self. The forms of language create a structure imposed on individual
content that demands it be modified. The individual has to account for the contradiction
or untruth in their thought, emotion or action. Psychological defence mechanisms
confirm the valuing of nous since their aim is to appear to uphold it. The anti-social
individual swamps the nous with somatic affects and disrupts the communicational
organism, subjecting it to personal content. When nous is encountered, it is respected
enough to manipulate and impose its restrictions on others to advantage by denying or
exploiting logic, truth, morality and rights. Subjugation of nous to somatosensory
interests is also illustrated by lack or remorse of criminals; they are pure individuals,
unincorporated into domains of collective nous that unite people into social, moral or
cultural structures.
Therapeutic potential of group life. Individuals’ integration into groups that
develop a collective psychic capacity subjects them to nous and provides developmental
opportunities. They are subject to collective representations and affects within an
organized structure and participate in collective action and routines that establish
cognitive categories and logical relations. Membering into the communicational fabric
of groups assists in developing communication capacities and encourages participation
in nous functions. They can exercise these capacities in a developing group culture.
Participation in a group that becomes a psychic organism is a therapeutic modality in
itself and works with fundamental structures and functions necessary for a person to
become a socially effective being. This is different from the focus on the internal
psychic life working with the personal mental content. The two are complementary.
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Group Organizational States.

A number of organizational states of groups need to be distinguished for their
capacity to sustain nous. These are described below. Group mentality theorists’
contribution is summarized, and interpreted in terms of the nous theory as an expression
of collective mentality. Finally, the sequence of organizational states of
psychotherapeutic groups that progressively make this possible is described. A series of
states is postulated by which groups come into being as organisms and attain the
organization required to sustain collective functions of nous.
The Aggregate.
The initial group state is an aggregate, a number of people brought together by
circumstances external to the group itself. It exists before interactions have occurred;
membership is extrinsic, motivated by factors outside the group. Members are bound
by the idea of the group rather than to each other. This has been called the “group to
join” (Long, 1992), “series group” (Sartre, 1991) collection, aggregate or multiple
(Sandelands and St. Clair, 1993). The prototype is a bus stop queue of people united by
interest in the bus who interact as individuals. It can be called the Nominal Group
(abbreviated as “Gn”), because being named forms the group. Its members are bound by
their identification as members of the named group. In psychotherapy groups, members
identify with each other’s wish for treatment. The reality of social forms whose
members know nothing of each other except they are members of a group was
established experimentally by the “minimal group paradigm” (Tajfel, 1981; Hogg and
Abrams, 1988).
This is not enough to form intrinsic bonds or constitute group action. Although
associated, members exhibit their own tendencies within the group context. Gn is a
collection of individuals who relate to each other, but are not a functional unit or entity.
Although a preliminary stage, groups also revert to Gn when members lose their
common identity. It ceases to function as a unit and becomes a collection of
individuals. Since it lacks entitativity (Campbell, 1958), the Nominal group cannot
support collective mentality and consists of the interpersonal interactions. Transition
from Nominal Group to entity is the initial task.
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The Organism.
A social entity forms when members communicate, develop common experience
and a shared culture of thoughts, emotions, actions, history and traditions. This
organizes their activity to constitute a group life no longer a summation of interactions.
Members experience the group as a social entity or organism to which they belong,
distinct from (though not independent of) them as individuals; their relationship to it
may conflict with individual relationships. It is indicated when members speak on
behalf of the group and place demands on each other for it rather than for themselves,
such as when encouraging members to attend meetings or remain in the group. The
group is felt as part of them (Sandelands and St. Clair, 1993) and evokes loyalty and
commitment (Campbell, 1958). This condition corresponds to the “group to form”
(Long, 1992) or “fused group” (Sartre, 1991). Members’ interactions create a social
organism and experience of belonging, not dependent on anything outside the group.
Members identify with common characteristics evoked by the group life. Membership
is “intrinsic,” related to the mutual bonds, in contrast to the Nominal Group’s
“extrinsic” bond, though both may co-exist. It can be called the Organic Group (“Go”)
and responds to events impacting upon it, re-creating itself (Maturana and Verula, 1980)
as an entity with its own life, a unit of the social world, a psychosocial organism
(Durkheim, 1966). Group processes (Cartwight and Zander, 1958; Forsyth, 1983)
involve members in interactions determined by individual factors and stereotypic forms
common to other groups. It preserves itself against threats, develops structures and
regulates its states. It corresponds to an informal recreational group. Go can manage
the problems of its existence and undertake collective action in responding to demands
from outside the group.
The social organism. Early sociologists identified large social units as hyper- or
epiorganisms with specialized functions, growing and decaying in complexity (Comte,
1830; Von Lilienfeld, 1873; Spencer, 1876; Espinas, 1877; McKenzie, 1890; Small, 1905;
Ross, 1905). They lack continuous living mass, sensorium, specialized feeling organs
and motor apparatus. Communication coordinates their functions. The functionalists
(Radcliff-Brown, 1935; Merton, 1949) showed societies were integrated living organisms
whose structures have functional significance for the whole rather than parts. The
organism’s life is the function of its structure. Systems Theory (Gouldner, 1959;
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Grinker, 1956; Maturana and Varela, 1971; von Bertalanffy, 1975; Beer, 1980) applied
characteristics of living systems such as wholeness, growth, differentiation, hierarchical
order, control, adaptiveness, purposiveness and goal seeking to groups. Communication
processes such as feedback, integration, gradients, selective boundaries, defences
against disintegration and autopoiesis are evident in social units.
Durkheim (1954, 1964) described societies as organisms either held together by
images and sentiments of similarity leading to agglutination and loss of differences
(mechanical solidarity), or by valuing complementary differences, forming collective
representations and leading to division of labor (organic solidarity). Mechanical
solidarity becomes organic solidarity as collective representations express differences
and sub-systems form like organs. Organic solidarity follows from communication
between members as the essential condition of culture, solidarity and coherence.
Groups require regulation that dominates members in return for cohesion and limited
freedom. The individual’s value is in becoming an organ rather than an absolute
monad. Trotter (1916) likened the collective entity to an animal with an instinctive
character. Burrow (1927b) called groups “phyloorganisms” held together by an
instinctive “inner organic bond,” as much biological as social or psychological;
Foulkes’ (1948) group-as-a-whole is a living organism also with an instinctive basis.
Both emphasize organized communication as the essential condition for constituting the
group.
Conclusion: When communicational interactions attain sufficient organization
and richness, members become interconnected in processes that maintain temporal
continuity and ensure every event affects all other events in the group’s life. Feedback
and homeostatic features develop like those of biological organisms such as maintenance
of activity against entropy and within limits (Goldstein, 1995). Social organisms adjust
internal and external states and preserve themselves, even at the expense of structures or
functions. Events are only understood by reference to the whole of the group’s ongoing
life. Groups become organisms when they are self-maintaining and coherently respond to
circumstances consistent with their purpose. Organized communication between
members is the condition for this organic character.
Organism and nous: What is inherent in organisms is inherent in nous. Every
element must have implications for every other element, just as every organ in a body
relates to other organs. This is denoted by “integrity,” which means, “having no part or
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element wanting; unbroken state; material wholeness, completeness, entirety,” from the
Latin integer meaning “whole, entire” (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). It is not just
that group members need to be in communication; organic integrity is illustrated by the
fact that it is inadequate for only most ideas of a discussion to be subject to the laws of
logic or most of a person’s actions to be subject to moral principles. All must be equally
affected by insertion into the system of operations; otherwise, they lack logic, meaning,
value and morality and threaten the integrity of the whole. Nous’ systemic nature is
shown by the need for consistency in its functions, which is taken for granted just as the
completeness of operation of the rules of language is accepted. Ungrammatical utterances
are given meaning in relation to these rules if possible, or else ignored.
The coherence of communication is its “organic quality.” Organic integrity is
shown when members cannot be ignored and are communicatively inter-dependent. In
this circumstance, what can be called the “Watzlawick Principle” comes into force.
Watzlawick, Bavelas and Jackson (1967) said,
“behavior has no opposite … there is no such thing as nonbehavior … one cannot not
behave. Now if it is accepted that all behavior in an interactional situation has
message value, i.e., is communication, it follows that no matter how one may try, one
cannot not communicate” (pp. 48-49).”
In the communicational organism, lack of participation or silence is a communication just
as talk. Integrity is demonstrated by participants existing for each other in a
communicative medium demanding interaction. They are bound by communicational
reciprocity; isolated personal decisions are not possible since other members provide the
context for what is decided. Connectedness or “solidarity” (Durkheim, 1964) is implied
by this situation; each member is vital to the others. Solidarity means “the fact or quality,
on the part of communities, of being perfectly united or at one in some respect” (Shorter
Oxford Dictionary, 1990). It comes into effect when communication is established in a
group. What members communicate has effects not completely determinable by them,
but is constrained by a range of possible meanings within the social code. The
possibilities are endowed with significance by the social organism.
This “communicational organism” comes into being whenever the Watzlawick
Principle is present as a criterion of organicity. Communication develops an organic
integrity and supports nous functions of rational organization with logical, moral and
emotional significance. The content of communication (and hence of members’ minds) is
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organized and integrated by the collective forms of nous. The communication process has
similar structural characteristics, irrespective of the personal, sensory content, whose
place in the communicational organism is defined by the collective nous system. The
Watzlawick Principle governs the necessity to communicate, but not the content.
Members may hope for one sort of communication rather that another, but the organism
preserves integrity provided any communication occurs. Nous organizes the content
within a collective communicational organism once all members are drawn into its
integrity. An illustrative example follows.
An intelligent, withdrawn adolescent girl has been in a group for six months,
rarely speaking except to complain about how hard she had to work for her last
prize. She distains the boisterous play of non-academic members. Eventually, she
can contain herself no longer and after warning the group, the following week she
criticises their immature behaviour and lack of interest in their problems. They
are all embarrassed, attempt to justify themselves to her, but are resentful. Her
intervention stimulates sporadic problem talk over the next few sessions. She
remains in the group and begins to join in some of their fun.
Members are bound together and cannot ignore communicational inadequacies. The girl
can neither ignore the others nor leave the group without comment and the boys can
neither ignore her nor simply reject her. They are bound in communicational solidarity
that demands they interact towards a common culture.
The Psychic Group.

To become effective, the group must be more than an organism, it must organize
itself to achieve psychic functions, perform tasks and solve problems posed by its
developing states. This comes about through the coordinated social process and is called
the Sociable Group (Gs).
Depending on their organization, social organisms manifest holistic psychic
functions. Le Bon (1896) said a primitive, holistic, collective psychic organism forms in
crowds by suggestion from members’ common characteristics. Trotter (1916) asserted a
gregarious instinct binds nations together by “intercommunication” making it seem wrong
to question collective psychic content, which enters members’ minds with the
persuasiveness of instinct. For Lewes (1879), society is the medium permeating the
individual mind; the product of feeling, it organizes the faculties as a general mind.
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Communication and language integrate experience into culture; generalities are

condensed out of differences and actions, desires and opinions gain a common stamp, but
impersonal direction. McDougall (1920) said mind is an organized system of purposive
forces in groups and forms in groups when communication provides continuity, an idea of
the group, culture, organization and interaction with other groups. Cooley (1909) said
mind is a whole expressed through language, institutions and culture as social mind;
individuals are never separate from it. Mead (1962) said the empirical matrix of social
institutions, language and social process creates mind, which functions in communication
through the conversation of gestures within the social group.
For Durkheim (1954), social phenomena are born in the group not in individuals.
When members are united in a whole communicating group, psychic functions emerge
from collective representations of shared ideas, sentiments and action. As common
property, they are no longer like products of individual consciousness, but form a
collective organ of sentiments and representations – a “conscience.” Individual minds
fuse and express the social being’s thinking through language and communication.
Individuals have a group conscience alongside their personal one; thoughts, sentiments
and action have an inherent social existence from which individual content derives.
Burrow (1953) said group unity created “an organic principle of consciousness” as
the matrix for individual mental life. The communicational continuity between individual
and group provides a “functional solidarity” within which images and gestures form a
“collective social mind” as real as individual minds. Personality is not based on
circumscribed individual consciousness, but inclusive societal consciousness. Foulkes’
(1971) group processes are suprapersonal, not restricted to intrapsychic events; group
communication forms a common matrix within which relationships develop, psychic
functions occur and the group’s mind is constituted. Individuals are nodal points in this
communication network and mind is a property of the communicational matrix. Bion
(1961) said collective attitudes intended to evade tensions coalesce and constitute a group
mentality formed by “intercommunication” to which members contribute anonymously.
It has uniformity, restricts members, provides functional unity and is both means and
obstacle to attaining goals. Group mentality does not require continuity and influences
members between sessions. It is neither conscious nor articulate, and reflects a “debased”
language as a mode of action instead of symbolic communication; symbolic
communication is characteristic of the work group.
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Conclusion: Once social organisms form, the collective communication life is

organized by common representations to form a mental system incorporating images,
ideas and sentiments. If poorly organized, it is unconscious, emotive, primitive, governed
by suggestion, impulse and defensiveness. If well organized, it forms culture becoming
the creative matrix of individual mentality. Shared communication becomes common
property that members experience from within to develop collective consciousness.
Personal psychic functioning takes meaning from its place within the group.
Three functions of collective mentality can be defined for Gs, indicating its
capacity to perform psychological processes. The subject of these functions is a group
entity, not individuals’ psychological functions transposed to a collective unit. Groups’
psychical characteristics are different from those of individuals and forms of cognition,
affect and action need to be defined as group functions.
Collective Cognition.
The capacity to form representations, create information and perform operations
on or “process” it is analogous to individual cognition. Performing cognitive operations
requires members to coordinate their ideas and interactions around common topics
subject to the logical operations that allow problems to be solved.
Groups are capable of cognitive functioning. Sighele (1891) said as people think
with the whole nervous system, so the whole group thinks. Tarde (1903) emphasised the
uniting function of common ideas. Le Bon (1896) described crowds’ thinking as a
function of their organization, characterised by contradictions, fantasy, lack of critical
evaluation or reality; ideas are dominated by their emotional value and become persistent
sentiments linked by association. Trotter (1916) said rationality counteracts
gregariousness, but the herd’s thoughts become dogma, little affected by reason. Mead
(1962) maintained thinking derives from social intercourse and lives in social acts, not the
head. Meaning is a social process created through the conversation of gestures.
Durkheim (1954, 1964) said social communication is the basis for collective
thought. Categories of thought form from social and religious rituals. Collective
representations result from cooperation within social structures, creating shared categories
for sensory and psychical content that encounter and reinforce or counteract each other in
the collective conscience. Regulation and organization by laws is necessary for thought.
Burrow (1927b) said thought is represented as a whole in organic life. For Foulkes
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(1948), the group’s mind has the same structure as the individual’s since it is formed from
communication. Ideas must be capable of communication to be conscious; what cannot
be communicated is unconscious. Defence mechanisms occur in group communication as
in individual minds. Bion (1961) said organization allows groups to think and resist basic
assumptions. In the work group, language becomes a mode of thought.
Conclusion: As communication is organized by structural differentiation, rules
and rituals, the circulation of psychic representations and other functions constitute
cognitive processes that are not the property of individuals, but exist in the whole
organism. In holistic, unorganized crowds they are primitive, emotive judgemental,
incapable of learning. Ordered group life enables members to differentiate into subgroups
and develop logical processes internalised as the framework for individuals’ thought.
Cognition and nous: In the organism, organized communicational processes allow
ideas to undergo operations that go beyond those sustaining the communication organism
itself. Cognitive functions of the collective nous consist of operations of thought,
including the interpretive framework for perceptual functions. The communicational
organism must become organized to make logical operations possible, make decisions,
reach agreements and initiate activity. Operations require norms or rules to organize the
communicational organism. Norms impose regularity on the content; rules ensure
operations are performed on it. The communicational field is permeated with collective,
socio-linguistic and cultural structures. Cognition becomes collective the more it is
subject to higher order, abstract principles that organize all members. The following
example illustrates this.
A group of inarticulate boys discuss the plight of a member’s acquaintance, who is
systematically victimised at a railway station after school. They elaborate a fantasy
of him being pushed under a train. Their hilarity is followed by vivid descriptions
of the imagined mutilation and a series of exclamations of how much pain and
horror this would involve. This leads to anecdotes about their own conflicts with
peers, which are responded to with mutual advice and support.
Here, the group submits the sensory content of a fantasized case to common elaboration
in a series of verbal representations of images and hypothetical actions. The
consequences are represented in language and allow identification with the victim.
Members’ experience is then substituted into the cognitive structure created, allowing
them to think together about their own situations and consider solutions. The cognitive
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sequence is sustained as a spontaneous group process and is a function of a collective

cognitive structure (nous), specific for their membership and experience of this group.
The Watzlawick Principle can be modified: “Once the communicational organism forms,
it is impossible not to communicate and impossible for members’ communication not to
take on some form of organization.”
Collective Affect.
The group’s ability register qualitative states, adapt to events and register their
impact on its welfare is analogous to individual affect. For continued existence, it must
regulate arousal or energy within a compatible range. In Gs, this energy motivates
advantageous states reducing tension, creating comfort or creates disadvantageous states
increasing tension and discomfort. Energy states are regulated and controlled in Gs for
the performance of other group functions.
Groups have an affective life. Le Bon (1896) said in crowds, members’ affective
states spread by contagion, undermining individual thought and functions; they are
intolerant, conservative and exaggerated by imitation without modification. Images carry
emotional power within groups. Trotter (1916) said being part of a larger group being
gave comfort and difference is felt as wrong. The instinctive bond to the group manifests
in members’ affect. Durkheim (1954) shows members gain pleasure in associating.
Collective sentiments sweep through members and are replaced by differentiated states.
Collective events are arousing and affects associated with collective representations
influence individuals from outside with psychical force felt from within. Collective
sentiments are socially organized affects attached to objects and actions. Sentiments fuse
through the collective effervescence of communication. The collective part of the “soul”
dominates the individual, liberating energy and moral force. Burrow (1927b) saw affects
as residues of collective biology. For Bion (1961), basic assumptions are responses to
shared emotional states; being submerged within group mentality gives members vitality.
Conclusion: The group’s affective life follows from the vitality, arousal and
pleasure of being together. Communication and collective representations carry aversive
or rewarding energy, transmit emotions, motivate members and fuse ideas. Collective
affects are socially organized, seem to come from within individuals and exert power like
conscience, though they may be disruptive or contribute to culture and support
individuals.
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Affect and nous. The energy of communication is also collective. Personal arousal
becomes collective energy when affect is communicated. The somatosensory mind
includes physiological expressions of emotions with their hedonic qualities. Arousal
occurs at the interface between the experiences of body and mind; it is given meaning as
emotion when communicated into a social context (Harré, 1988). The energy state and its
significance are altered and meaning is found within group states. Emotion can be
directly transmitted from one person to another as “contagion,” because affective signals
take cultural, collective forms; or it may be converted into social energy through
communication within collective-rational forms. If members communicate their anger in
critical argument that is understood by and convinces others, it evokes similar affective
responses in them. The collective rational structure and cultural context determine the
communication’s affective significance and validate the original communicator’s affect as
common.
Nous manifests in communicated aspects of affect. The affect’s content derives
from individual sensory experience and somatic arousal. Emotions have social forms
that are also semiotic (collective linguistic) forms. What someone is happy or sad about
is personal, but the emotion’s form, expression and responses to it are collective
representations within a communication process. When someone describes an
emotional experience, the linguistic medium allows the recipient of the communication
to reconstruct the emotion, evoking a shared state with its own energetic properties. Not
only is the emotional form collective, but the energy also becomes collective affect as a
consequence of communication. The important affective life is not restricted to bodily
manifestations, but is shared between people with collective significance if
communicated.
Psychic energy can be defined as psychic vigor, being capable of having psychic
effects or exerting psychic force; it has affective character and aversive or rewarding
qualities for the communicational organism. Individual activity alters the energy of the
group state quantitatively and qualitatively because of the solidarity of the
communicational organism. The Watzlawick Principle can be expanded: “Once the
communicational organism is formed, it is impossible not to communicate and
impossible for the energy of members’ communication not to affect each other.” This is
illustrated in the following example:
Three adolescent girls were talking while waiting to disembark from a plane
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returning from an overseas school trip. One laughingly recounted an incident

from the trip. The others smiled; they exchanged other anecdotes, each escalating
the humor. They looked at each other laughing, associating to other memories
until all three were doubled over laughing with flushed faces and tears in their
eyes. There was a pause when they were in a common affective state of rapport
for a moment; the laughter gradually subsided and they left the plane talking
quietly and smiling in a mood of contentment.
The affect begins as a state of arousal in one girl and as it is communicated to
others, escalates because of the reciprocity of the anecdotes; the accompanying energy
escalates the pleasure, which is collective, not confined to any individual. The humor
was built by each communication complementing the preceding story within the
organization of their shared culture and values. Without the nous function organizing
their communication, there would have been three disparate states lacking integrity. A
communication process permeated by the organizing functions of collective nous
sustained the collective affective state.
Collective Action.
Groups’ capacity to integrate impulses and act in a coordinated manner as a unit is
analogous to individual action. In order for Gs to act, members’ activity is coordinated
and individual actions reconciled. The group acts as a unit in relation to demands and
needs or it cannot ensure its development. Collective action requires resolution of
differences, decisions coordinated and energy regulated. Its essence is cooperativeness
of members’ actions within a common purpose or goal.
Groups are capable of collective action. Le Bon (1896) said crowds’ shared ideas
and sentiments transform into acts. Increased size and lack of structure lead to
impulsivity and irascibility. Crowds’ action is unified by leaders, who appeal to emotion
by suggestion. For Durkheim (1964), the individual’s value is as an active organ in the
whole. Undifferentiated, whole groups impose action on their members, reducing
freedom; differentiated groups integrated by organic solidarity engage in collective action
toward common goals by cooperative communication. Thought results from cooperative
action forming collective representations enabling the group being to represent itself in
ritualistic actions. Acting in unison makes members feel in unison. Burrow (1953) saw
neurosis as conflict between the individual and the surrounding social mind. The pain of
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neurosis is the group encroaching on the individual; neurotics seek destructive

separateness by acting against the social. Bion (1961) said conflict between members
occurs at the point of contact between the individual and the group. In basic assumption
groups, language is a mode of action rather than thought.
Conclusion: Organic processes need to be regulated to the purposes of the whole,
or disorganization threatens self-maintenance. For group organisms, members’ action is
integrated by cooperation or coercion. Cooperativeness enables collective goals to shape
action, while coercion means collective action is organized under a leader or subgroup
that subjugates members in return for unanimity; individuals participate as functional
units in organized action. Members’ action expresses group action when referred to the
whole organism. The individual feels pain in conflict with the group and pleasure in
concord.
Action and nous: The somatosensory mind provides volitional, motoric actions
as well as sensations and images. Individual action lacks value unless inserted into the
social context that creates the opportunity for and motivates action. It is determined by
the way it corresponds to others’ goals and group goals. The integrity and reciprocity of
the communicational organism means personal action is also social. Group action, on
the other hand, concerns somatosensory content organized to meet collective goals and
individuals acting within a system whose goal is only identifiable for the group.
Members cooperate in common action. Individual actions are organized into collective
forms to serve shared goals and achieve things individuals could not. Cooperation
presupposes rational communication, common culture and values organized
independently of individual sensory experiences. The greater the cooperation is, the
more collective the action. While cooperation brings about group action, aggression
may not be equivalent to individual action, since it may express a group situation, but
jeopardizes the integrity of group solidarity. There is mutuality to conflict or tension
within a communicational organism and rules order the conflict. Aggression and
coercion may represent assertion of an individual’s impulses over others, disrupting or
destroying the collective rational form; but inter-group aggression or organized conflict
within a group may express collective rules (Bion, 1961). Another addendum can be
made to the Watzlawick Principle: “Once the communicational organism is formed, it
is impossible not to communicate, and impossible for members’ actions not to be
structured by the logic of the organism.”
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A group of boys is anxious about being together. Everyone seems paralyzed. The
therapist sustains sporadic talk. One boy restlessly moves around the room, then
begins making paper planes. Following facilitatory comments by the therapist,
others join in. There is no communication between them except observing each
other as they do this. After a time, they throw them around the room and
comment on each other’s achievements, verbalizing intentions. “I’m gunna make
a bigger one.” “Mine’s gunna have a twist in it.” Then they express interest in
each other. “Hey look at that one!” “That’s a beauty!” Finally, the boy who
started the activity throws his plane at the half open window saying “I bet I can
get it out first.” The others join in the competition and take turns throwing and
retrieving their planes. When one boy finally gets his out the window, there is a
collective roar of jubilation; the organism has formed. The game becomes a
regular feature of the group life.
Initially, there is no communicational organism to support group action. One boy
acts individually in response to the group tension; others join the action. By his
personal action, he has intervened in the structure of group action and created a
possibility of which others take advantage. When they share common activity, the
integrity of the group communicational organism results in increasing mutuality of
action, so their individual activity builds a group action culture, converting individual
goals into group goals. An encompassing framework of meaning, intention and value is
provided in which individual actions can be inserted. Finally, the group plays a game
whose meaning depends on it being common. However, it only has this character
because of the group action within organizing functions of nous.
The Self-Reflective Group.

When groups regulate and coordinate their activity, they can apply their functions
to representing their own states and working out problems. This is a specialised condition
of Gs. The group entity forms collective representations of itself, its members, states and
events. Representations are subjected to a system of operations by the group enabling
problem-solving, decision-making or planning. The minimal requirements are shared
representations or symbols of things and events in the group’s life, representations of the
group and members, and a system of operations to relate them. This state is called the
Functional Group (Gf) and is the ideal state for a psychotherapeutic group to resolve
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members’ emotional problems.

In the following section, these dimensions of group function are analysed and a
theoretical basis developed to define categories for observing them.
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PART II. THE GROUP FUNCTION RECORD.
Part II, describes the observational instrument upon which the study is based. In Chapter
10, the function of social communication as the concrete observable element in social
phenomena is explored. In Chapters 11-14, the four group process dimensions of structure,
cognitive organization, affect and action coherence applied to collective entities are derived
from relevant theoretical background with categories for each dimension. In Chapter 15,
observational categories for therapists’ interventions are developed. Together, they
constitute the Group Function Record.
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10. GROUP PHENOMENA AS SOCIAL COMMUNICATION.
Group Function Record

Four dimensions of the group entity have been identified: groups are integrated
organic units, capable of cognition, affective phenomena and action. Chapters 11-15
provide the theoretical basis for a set of observable categories for each dimension
constituting the “Group Function Record” (GFR) enabling trained observers to rate
group function by assigning numeric ratings to describe each minute of group process
from videotaped sessions. The resultant record enables patterns and relationships
between dimensions to be evaluated. The GFR does not differentiate which members
occupy a role in a structure or interaction. Members are regarded as agencies of the
group’s nature (Gordon, 1989); their activity is taken collectively as a description of the
group. Observational categories enable whole-group phenomena to be studied in
contrast to interpersonal interactions, and stages by which groups acquire functions are
observed and defined.
The challenge of group membership.

In groups of adolescents with social and emotional difficulties, the Organic
Group (Go) repeatedly forms and collapses into the Nominal Group (Gn) as members
come into conflict and stop associating or expel members. The GFR observes the
formation of organism (Go) and Sociable Group (Gs) by rating the group’s functional
capacity. Transitions from Gn to Go represent members’ attempts to be part of a social
structure. Gs only comes into being when Go is sufficiently organized to attain the
functions. When Gs becomes self-reflective, it achieves the Functional Group (Gf).
The GFR structures observations to define and record group process functions.
It shows the formation of Go or when this is incomplete, the presence of the Gn or sub-
units of Go. The observed quality of collective cognitive, affective and action functions
are described as Gs or Gf whenever attained. It also records therapists’ interventions to
the group, individuals or both, when limits are set and their movement around the room
(locomotion).
Membership in functional representational groups is a criterion of psychological
health; it integrates individuality into social structures and acquires culture (Cotterell
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1996). External circumstances lead a person to become a member of Gn; social

pressures create membership of Go and organization for Gs. However participation in
Gf requires members to commit themselves to a system that never fully meets individual
needs, but gives collective significance to membership if they reveal themselves and
their experience of the group. Loss of individual autonomy is compensated by group
identity through achieving Gf. Participation in Gf is the condition for individuals to
contribute to society and benefit from self-representational community life (Durkheim,
1964; Mead, 1962; Harbermas, 1984). A framework to define social phenomena for
observation has to recognize the complex social reality. To do this, the essence of
interpersonal and social interaction must be analyzed.
Communication and social interaction.

Group life is inconceivable without communication (McDougall, 1920; Mead,
1962). The condition for a higher order entity and the presence of nous is members
being in communication. Communication in all its variety provides the material for
social encounter and group observations. Interpersonal communication can be defined
individualistically considering members’ contributions as part of deterministic linear
sequences. This view of communication does not reflect social communicational
phenomena as the complex, multilevel and multi-determined fabric of social interaction.
In natural social situations, communication cannot be controlled by any member and
develops its own sequences and rhythms; events from the immediate and distant past
interact with cultural structures and personal factors to create a psychosocial field in
which participants are immersed.
Communication has traditionally been conceived as autonomous senders
transmitting messages to receivers (Schramm, 1977; De Vito, 1985; Beebe and
Masterson, 1989). Exclusive focus on transmitting messages takes communication out
of context, history and social conditions supporting it (Sigman, 1987). It oversimplifies
the situation, obscuring organic phenomena pointing to the group entity. However,
Social Communication Theory conceives communication as the medium for sociality
itself (Corner and Hawthorn, 1980; Sigman, 1987). Communicational episodes are
embedded in a complex, multi-modal context. The group’s history frames the structure
of communication episodes largely determined by past and present social factors outside
the control of individual participants. Communication becomes “depersonalized” in the
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sense of Social Identity Theory; it is a product of the social situation itself, not restricted
to the individual (Turner, 1987; Hogg and Abrams, 1988) rather than the psychiatric
meaning of feelings of unreality about the self (Freedman, Kaplan and Sadock, 1977).
Communication as a depersonalized, collective construction is a social process
enmeshing members who determine and are determined by it. Only in a hypothetical
sense can members be outside the communicational situation, just as no one can be
outside language or have another basis to grasp the meaning of their situation.
In Social Communication Theory, any message manifests the group’s whole
context and history. Its meanings and effects may be different from the sender’s
intentions and is viewed in terms of its effects on the whole social setting as much as on
the intended receiver. Irrespective of content, messages signal involvement of sender
and desire towards the receiver; their circulation creates group identity and involvement.
Messages are multi-leveled, have syntactic meaning, affective significance, embody
cultural characteristics and are part of historical events whose importance is not known
until accomplished in the future. They are relevant or irrelevant to preceding messages,
can duplicate or add information, be incomprehensible yet convey a host of
significations. Messages make participants known to each other in ways that have
nothing to do with their content. The message in Social Communication Theory is a
mode of social relationship. A communicational act takes its significance from its total
context within the social system; the act itself is part of a historical sequence of explicit
connotations and implicit insinuations influencing past or future communications pro-
and retroactively. It is the means for participants to become known and encounter each
other and their social environment.
Communication is the medium of social interaction and the purpose and means
of interaction. “Communication” derives from the Latin “communare” meaning “to
share” (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). Social communication is the means by which
people share themselves, forming communal life. It occurs through mutually
recognized acts of encounter engaging participants with each other, irrespective of
whether their meaning is understood (Mead, 1962; Joas, 1996). Individuals in an
aggregate become members of an organic unit (Go) by sharing communication and
constitute it as a functioning social entity (Gs) when collective nous manifests.
Information transmitted in communicational acts is as much the medium for social
contact as its end; properties of the communication process other than content are
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significant for nous achieving Gf.
Communication and social engagement.

The act of communication involves contact and exchange between participants
and holds them in interaction while it occurs. A social structure comes into existence
consisting of participants and the multilevel historical and cultural contexts that confer
order on their encounter. Communication has structural properties, even if only
momentary (Sanders and Cushman, 1984). The presence of communicational structures
defines events as social and in turn, social forms are defined by their communicational
structures. A community is a group of people in communication with each other, even if
not continuously, who have an ongoing expectation or readiness to communicate. Social
communication has a preparatory or readiness property even when messages are not being
transmitted. Communication is not restricted to continuous sequences, but is recognized
by communicators having membership of a common communicational context redefined
in multiple ways from time to time. Communication is more than sending and receiving
messages; it is the material, observable expression of relationships. “Communication is a
name for the overall system of relations people develop between each other and with the
community and habitat in which they live” (Harre and Lamb, 1983, p. 104).
In communication, what is shared is not just a message, but information broadly
conceived in Bateson’s (1972) definition as “any difference which makes a difference”
(Sigman, 1987). Communication shares the differences within a community resulting in
common understanding and allows them to function in a coordinated manner
(Harbermas, 1984, 1989). Information in this sense is mediated as much by qualities
and mode of transmission as content. A message can be silence, withholding or “not
communicating” just as readily as communicating something.
Parties to communication must attend to each other (even if separated in space or
time). Their mutual involvement is distinguished from their attitudes, content or
consequences of the communication; initially it indicates openness to the sharing that is
fundamental to communication. The parties’ involvement embraces them in a
depersonalised unit, as shown when members of a social situation feel they encounter a
collective otherness (“the group”) different from the personal otherness of the individuals
involved (Sandelands and St. Clair, 1993). The social involvement itself is as significant
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as the content in changing participants or recognising differences, since it creates a

relation for each to the mutual otherness of the social unit.
Involvement in communication and the formation of the embracing context that
constitutes a social form can be called an “engagement.” To emphasise the centrality of
communication in the engagement constituting social interaction, the unit formed can be
called a “communion” and its members “communicants.” Social communication forms
communions rather than transfers messages. As long as the contact is maintained,
communication brings a social organism into existence even if not organized into
syntactic messages. In this state, the Watzlawick Principle applies, that it is impossible
for the communicants not to communicate as long as the communion exists (Watzlawick,
et al., 1967).
Social Interaction. Although there is a long tradition recognizing social
interaction as the primary social phenomenon (Zaleznik and Moment, 1964; Argyle,
1974; Rosenburg and Turner, 1981), the centrality of communication makes interaction
a consequence rather than cause of communication. Interaction is a derivative of social
communication and is meaningless if its communicational aspect is ignored. Interaction
only has social meaning if it has significance for participants. If communication is
documented, interaction is described. Communication is cause and product of
interaction as well as the medium in which it takes place. The impossibility of not
communicating means there can be no interaction without communication.
Social communication and group status.

These concepts are applied to group states as they form an organic entity.
Communicational engagement creates a communion as a social form (Go) and consists
of participation in a communication process which includes:
• Giving and receiving messages;
• Monitoring for messages;
• Readiness to give and receive messages;
• Observation of others’ communicational activities;
• Participation in the communal context supporting the communication.
Social communication is a reciprocal process including mutual attention and
acknowledgment between communicants. It is not systematically determined by the
preceding situation, as assumed in Markov chain analysis (Doreian, 1970), but is
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rhythmic and historical. Events from any point in the group’s past may determine
communication in a specific moment. It embodies any or all levels of personal and
social experiences. To communicate is not so much to send or receive messages, as to
join the ongoing, complex texture of communicational sociality.
Communication and the group.

Social communication is the fabric of group life and of sociality itself,
transforming the aggregate, Gn into an organic entity, Go. In the aggregate state (Gn),
communication is individualized, sporadic and episodic. The group does not develop a
life of its own. As it becomes continuous and consistent, Gn becomes Go. As a social
form, Go is defined by all members embedded in the integrated communicational
activity serving the purposes of group life. When the communicational life of Go
becomes ordered and performs group functions rather than individual acts, Gs comes
into existence and the group is an entity sui generis in the social world and can manifest
collective nous. Social communication is the medium ordered as nous so it can function
cognitively, respond affectively and act in response to environmental and internal
demands. When communication consists of representations of itself or its members, it
becomes Gf.
Transitions between states are described by their communicational
characteristics. Fluctuations can be recorded as changes in communication
characteristics. Observation of groups’ communication establishes their status and
records of successive group states describe whole-group processes. Common processes
are not merely the summation of individual activity; their meaning is only
understandable when considered in relation to the functioning group entity.
Communication in such groups forms a common culture. Statements, anecdotes, events
and names are carried from one session to another regardless of who originated them.
Games, episodes, effects of conflicts and losses become common group property,
accessible for any member regardless of their role in the events; new members are
incorporated into these structures and take on the values as though they had participated
in them. The role of particular members in these communicational events is referred to,
but any member may bring them into the situation.
What is communicated from one member to another is also received by other
communicants expressing the common structure. Simple, dyadic communication of
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sender transmitting messages to receiver no longer accounts for group processes,

because all other communicants are also engaged in whatever happens; it also has a
significance for them, though it may be different to that intended in the message. For
instance, a member may tell another a joke as a message of companionship between
sender and receiver, but for members listening, it may be a message that they are
excluded and considered of lower status. Simple interchanges between members may
assert in-group/out-group boundaries, make status claims and establish prestige
hierarchies.
All communications within the communion have significance for all members,
irrespective of their role in the overt interchange. The common psychological life is
shared in communication. All members are incorporated in multiple roles in a
communion, which differ for each member as long as they remain in contact.
Communication and interaction are not dependent on any one set of determinants, since
the group consists of members with a communicational history extending into their
common past and incorporating present events. Communication is not the property of
sender or receiver in the communion; it is a multidimensional state of the whole group
involving sender, receiver, active observer and incidental bystander.
The boundary between acts of interpersonal communication and subjective
psychological experience is blurred, since personal experience flows from and is
organized by communicational phenomena. Inter-personal and intra-psychic events are
inextricably joined within the communicational field. It is impossible to distinguish a
simplistic boundary between internal personal experiences and external social events,
since no communication can be located only between particular members. This
describes collective mentality as nous. The meaning of communications may be created
by communicators’ past actions, even if they are unaware of the relevance of this to
observers. For example, a member who has teased others previously, may be
interpreted as teasing and criticizing even when not intending to. Participants’ different
meaning contexts have to be recognized, not the boundaries of inter-personal
interaction. The meaning context is a property of the communicational structure where
external-interpersonal and internal-intrapsychic domains are merged. If the
communicational field replaces the body as unique reference point for interpersonal
phenomena, communicational events are facts of the group’s life, regardless of which
particular members render them observable.
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The causal stimuli of the complex fabric of communication are incompletely

definable and not restricted to sender and receiver. Each communication is expressed
by a member, but has as much or more significance for members outside the dyad.
Group observation is not restricted to individuals’ behavioural expressions, but observes
the group’s communicational phenomena. Facts of the communicational field are
recognized by their effects on the communion. Durkheim’s (1966) social facts are
communications, forming a domain distinct from those of individual psychology. They
have a different substratum, evolve in a different milieu and depend on different
conditions; they are “mental” since they consist of thinking or behaving, but different
from individual consciousness, being “‘representations’ of another type” (1966, p.
xlix). The communion is a social fact in the observational field. Each member is
constrained and affected by group and members, subject to and acting within the group.
They are affected by whatever occurs while they are part of it, as indicated by the
Watzlawick Principle. Communication cannot be ignored in the communion. Group
experience exists as facts of members’ history. The communicational field is likewise a
fact, since it reveals the existence of the group organism. Communion membership may
be the most powerful effect of group life irrespective of content or outcome of activities
since it gives access to collective nous. Participation has irresistible effects on
participants as a consequence of their “common fate” (Campbell, 1958).
Communication in psychotherapy groups.

While communications must affect members, they may be inaccurate. What is
transmitted may not be what is received and bystanders may interpret something else.
Nevertheless, communication constrains members within a total communicational field
determined not by members, but by the total content of past and present group
phenomena. Communication is a “social fact” to which members are subject,
constituting them as “organs” of a social organism. In a communion, communication
constitutes a common field of psychological activity, explicit and implicit messages and
contexts are cross-referenced in a multidimensional fabric of changing meanings, which
is described as collective nous. Each member is inserted into this field in their own
unique way, determining and being determined, constraining and being constrained.
This communication organism constitutes a sociable system (Gs). Once a group
functions in a given manner (such as forming pairs, scapegoating members, avoiding
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certain topics, remaining silent, depending on a leader) norms develop, often persisting
for the life of the group, giving it a personality (“syntality,” Cattell, 1951). Consistency
and continuity in functioning indicate the systemic nature of the communicational
organism and the presence of nous, observable as characteristics of the group's
communication. The nous system may not be reducible only to communicational
phenomena, however it is expressed in the communicational field and is where the
group’s psychic integrity as an entity is observed. For groups to constitute themselves
as sociable entities supporting nous, the communicational field must be organized to
perform functions essential for their maintenance as living organisms, such as:
• Define membership and maintain boundaries with the environment;
• Form collective representations of members and group;
• Form collective representations of the group’s purpose and nature, common
values, attitudes and expectations;
• Represent and communicate with the external world;
• Define and regulate affective states;
• Provide feedback on the basis of the rewarding or aversive nature of events;
• Organize for cooperation and group action.
The communicational system is the medium for collective nous functions
equivalent to the individual’s psychological apparatus. As for any organism, functions
may fail, its integrity be breached and result in malfunction, loss, mutilation of organs
or death. Failure to acquire these functions leads to anti-therapeutic group cultures, loss
of members or dissolution. Such groups are unviable organisms of the genus and
deprive their members of crucial development and social education obtainable from
belonging to viable groups (Mead, 1962). Adolescents lacking access to membership of
viable groups are seriously disadvantaged (Collett, 1996).
A therapeutic aim is for the group’s communication process to constitute a
viable organism manifesting collective nous functions. If the qualities of this process
are observed and degrees of its adequacy defined, therapeutic techniques that assist (or
inhibit) the process can be examined. Members’ ability to participate in a sociable
communicational system indicates therapeutic progress. In a communion, collective
functions derive from and contribute to members’ psychic functions through
communication. The group can be observed as a functioning entity and its fluctuations
judged in terms of how well they allow the communicational system’s ability to fulfill
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the requirements of group life. The minimal characteristics for a psychic entity with
nous functions can be defined as three sets of communicational characteristics:
1. To gain knowledge and perform cognitive functions (cognition);
2. To differentiate psychic energy into affective states and regulate them (affect);
3. To act as individuals and as a group (action).
If the system of communication phenomena is observed as the concrete
expression of the group's psychical character, the task is to define processes of
cognition, affect and action as properties of the communion rather than aggregations of
members’ interactions. However, the phenomenal field of communication is complex
and several aspects need to be differentiated. Analyses of groups’ communication
processes have concentrated on defining interpersonal interactions rather than properties
of the whole group (Hackman and Jones, 1965; Bales, 1970; Shaw, 1978; Beck and
Lewis, 2000). The Group Function Record treats the group as the unit of observation
and the totality of communicational phenomena is analyzed.
Group Function Record dimensions.

The GFR defines five dimensions of communication phenomena to record
changes in groups’ functional status. First, Structure records the presence of
communication between members constituting a communion, marking the
establishment of the Organic Group (Go) out of Gn. A communion may include all or
only some members. Gs then exists as the whole or parts of the group (sub-units are one
or more Go units within Gn). Structure indicates the presence of communication and
hence the pervasiveness of a social unit.
Once Structure shows Go exists, three other dimensions of social communication
indicate attainment of the Sociable Group (Gs). Observations are made of Cognitive
Organization, Affect and Action Coherence characteristics of communicational
phenomena. The psychical functions are characteristics of the communicational life of
a communion described by the category of Structure. Each dimension specifies
different aspects of the same phenomena of the communicational field; the GFR
assesses these characteristics in each minute.
The final dimension describes Therapists’ Interventions in each minute. Since
they constantly intervene to alter the group, a comprehensive description of group
function must include their activity. The GFR documents the life of the group and quality
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of the communication process rather than its content; therefore, therapists’ verbal
interventions are categorised in terms of the object they are directed to in the communion
rather than their content. Records are also made of Limits set and therapists’ Locomotion
round the room.
These five dimensions describe group communicational structure, minimal
requirements for group cognitive capacity, affect, action and therapists’ interventions.
They do not record completed functions, but the appearance, interference and loss of
conditions for them. In following chapters, essential attributes of each dimension and
associated psychological processes are discussed. Their group-communicative aspect
allows differentiation of communicational structure, cognitive functions, affective states
and actions within the communicational field of the communion, rather than locating
them within individual members.
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11. GFR DIMENSION 1: STRUCTURE
The entity observed is the structure of the communicating unit. The GFR follows
aggregates of individuals changing into social units, including the whole group or
subgroups. The development of communions out of Gn is a function of the organisation
of the relationships between members (McDougall, 1920; Ettin, 1999) and corresponds
to the group’s communication structure. “Structure” means “mutual relation of the
constituent parts of a whole as determining its peculiar nature or character” and
“organised body or combination of dependent parts or elements” (Shorter Oxford
Dictionary, 1990). In psychology, structure is: “any enduring arrangement, grouping,
pattern, or articulation of parts to form a whole,” contrasted to function or process, it
“usually implies stability of the component parts” (English and English, 1962). Group
structure is “a nonrandom configuration or arrangement of elemental parts into an
organized whole; some sense of innate, evolving or patterned construction is implied”
(Ettin, 1999, p. 212). For the GFR, structure reflects members’ communicative relation.
Gs is a unit consisting of all members as parts of the whole, but the definition of group
lacks clarity. Quantitative criteria of distance between members or time spent in
association have been used (Martin and Bateson, 1996); however, they lack flexibility
for the present purpose.
Structure and group size.

Numerical size imposes structural properties on groups (Simmel, 1950).
Designating a number to indicate group size does not refer to separate individual
elements, but “their synthesis” which is “a new concept emerging from the synthesis of
these elements” (p. 107). The individual is not an isolate and “involves the somehow
imagined, but then rejected, existence of society.” Isolation is “society’s effect at a
distance – whether as lingering-on of past relations, as anticipation of future contacts, as
nostalgia, or as intentional turning away from society” (p. 119); it is more intense in the
presence of others than alone.
Members of a dyad preserve contact with each other; mutual dependency is more
likely, since loss of either destroys it. Dyads are not groups, which can exist even if
particular members are missing. They are more vulnerable than groups, since losing one
individual destroys them. Immediacy of interaction and absence of other factors makes
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dyads liable to become trivial; but they are intimate and inclined to form around what
only the two share (Simmel, 1950; Northen, 1988).
Each member of a triad can be an intermediary for the others, uniting or separating
them (Simmel, 1950). It is more difficult to maintain since the third person disrupts the
collusion that allows dyads to ignore differences in favour of commonalities (Northen,
1988). The independent factor introduces an inherently social element. Group culture
and collective identity develop in groups more than dyads. The character of the group
alters when it is large enough to form subgroups and members cannot readily remain in
contact with all others.
Large groups must divide into subgroups and add or subtract components to move
from simplistic mechanical solidarity towards more flexible organic solidarity (Durkheim,
1964) . Forming subgroups is therefore inherent to maintaining larger groups. A
structurally secure number for forming subgroups of large social or political groups is
between five and seven members (Simmel, 1950). Consequently, the average
membership of most groups is between 2.4 (James, 1953; Forsyth, 1990) and five
members (Harrè and Lamb, 1983). Groups gravitate towards dyads (Hare, 1976; Forsyth,
1990). The power of groups to create conformity rapidly increases from two to four
members. A majority of three to one is enough to induce conformity, forming a ceiling
effect with more members (Brown, 1989; Forsyth, 1990). Increasing group size
encourages de-individuation, increased aggressiveness, lowered personal responsibility or
empathy with target individuals and heightened emotionalism or arousal (Durkheim,
1964; Main, 1985; Forsyth, 1990). The power of groups to distort judgements increases
with size, but negative emotions and aggressive interactions are more likely to occur if the
dispute is between subgroups (Asch, 1953). As size increases, quality of performance,
productivity, disagreement, giving directions, opportunity for self expression and tension
release increase, though participation and tension are reduced; antagonism is greater in
odd-numbered groups (Thomas and Fink, 1966; Brown, 1989; Forsyth, 1990).
The structural effect is indicated by possible relationships with increasing size, as
shown in Table 11.1. If a three person group is taken as the defining group situation
(defining a dyad as not a group), the challenge of group situations can be estimated using
its six relationships as a “factor of increase” in the larger groups as shown in the third
column. The factor increases massively in six person groups, which are more likely to
reduce stress by forming subgroups. The factor of increase in complexity constitutes a
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measure of difficulty or “social demand quotient” indicating size is an important

structural factor to be considered in observing group function.
Group Number of Factor of

Size Relationships Increase
2 1
3 6 X 1
4 25 X 4
5 90 X 15
6 301 X 50
7 966 X 161
Table 11.1. Possible relationships in different sized groups (adapted from Napier and
Gershenfeld, 1989, p. 39).
The larger the group, the more demanding it is for social cognition, affective
control and coordination of action. Size is a major factor for groups to solve problems
and maintain stability; the capacity to manage interactions limits viable size or causes
qualitatively different processes (Krech and Crutchfield, 1948; Mann, 1990). Though
dyads give greatest opportunities for intimacy, they create more tension since there is no
one else to relate to in a dispute (Hoffman, 1978; Northen, 1988). Triads are more likely
to exclude one person and undermine self exteem; communication is likely to be
smoother in odd numbered groups, while satisfaction and opportunity for participation
reduce above a threshold of five members. Dependency increases, while emotional
attachement, initiative and motivation reduce in larger groups (Napier and Gershenfeld,
1989).
Five people is optimal for some types of problem solving (Napier and
Gershenfeld, 1989). Assertive members have a disproportionate effect in larger groups,
since most members are more likely to allow others to lead; the larger the group, the more
inhibited some people are and the less likely to voice dissent (Hoffman, 1978). Small
groups are more attractive than larger ones, where there are reduced intimacy, sense of
personal significance or personal identification and greater heterogeneity of interests
(Napier and Gershenfeld, 1989). Members participate less in larger groups and there may
be more “social loafing” with a few dominating the interaction (Hoffman, 1978).
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Structure in group dynamics.

Structure is the “framework within which the elementary [group] processes …
take place” (Brown, 1989, p. 51) or the “underlying pattern of stable relationships
among group members” (Forsyth, 1990, p. 110). Lasting group interactions develop
structural properties (Sherif, 1948). Stability and differentiation create relatively
homogeneous “distinguishable parts” (Cartwright and Zander, 1953, p. 416). Structure
develops as the first crisis for group life, but whereas group identity is a personal
experience, structure is a property observable as recurrent actions accepted by members
(Zaleznik and Moment, 1964). It involves ordered arrangements, definition and
regulation of behaviour, patterned constancy and stability independent of members
coming and going, (Sampson and Marthas, 1990). It describes the arrangement of parts,
constraints and pattern of roles and relationships ordering interactions; it provides
stability by its independence of the specific individuals in positions. Structural
properties emerge and stabilize over time (Brown, 1989). Bales (1980) developed a
system of mapping group structure based on dimensions of activity (task/socio-
emotional), status (dominant/submissive) and attraction (friendly/unfriendly) (Forsyth,
1990). However, he recorded individual interactions, not the group as an object.
In group dynamics, structure emphasizes stability and continuity of group
functions in relation to operational factors. The GFR defines the communicational unit
as the object and differentiates the aggregate of members (Gn) not in communication
from those forming a communicating unit (Go). Other structural properties are
reviewed.
Roles: Members’ roles tend to differentiate out of groups and form a hierarchy
of influence as soon as they stabilize (Forsyth, 1990). Roles are used for examining
members’ actions toward each other since they can be considered “structured
behavioural acts” (Krech and Crutchfield, 1948; Zaleznik and Moment, 1964). Bales
(1970) observed members’ roles in communicative action to analyse structural
properties of groups and distinguish between those related to tasks and those with socio-
emotional significance (Brown, 1989). Roles emerge from interactions as products of
communication, yet prescribe members’ actions and relationships within the group and
constitute a pattern. Therefore, roles only occur once Go forms.
Status, Power and Authority: Other structural influences are status and authority
(Zaleznik and Moment, 1964). The emergence of personal prestige and power is
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spontaneous, recognized by group members and sustained by interactions (Sampson and

Marthas, 1990). Those in higher status positions tend to be nominated as leaders,
regardless of suitability (Brown, 1989). Assertive members are most likely to lead
unstructured groups, but structure reduces this effect (Hoffman, 1978). Power relations
create a pattern of relationships and communications. Status and power are only
expressed and recognized by being communicated and are derivatives of
communication in Go.
Interaction: Interaction is considered in terms of quantity, direction and content.
The more interaction there is, the greater the influence; more interaction is directed
toward higher status members (Zaleznik and Moment, 1964). Most groups form
subgroups of two or more members who interact with each other more than with
remaining members (Hoffman, 1978). Structure organizes the group’s life, whereas
interaction is its content and derives from communication (Forsyth, 1990).
Attraction: Attractiveness is an important cause of status differentiation and
subgroup formation; attraction relations in groups are a stabilizing factor (Forsyth,
1990). Attraction among members has been regarded as directly observable, (Zaleznik
and Moment, 1964), but depends on an individual perspective. Research on attraction
as a structuring influence on groups uses sociometric or other questionnaires (Jones,
Bell and Aronson, 1972), but does not reveal a communicational entity.
Communication structure: Communication structure is an important structural
dimension (Cartwright and Zander, 1953, Barker, Wahlers, Watson and Kibler, 1987;
Forsyth, 1990; Sampson and Marthas, 1990). Structure is restriction of communication.
In peer groups, affiliation and authority restrict communication (Brown, 1989), favoring
communication within and between cliques; members sustain such structures even to
their own disadvantage (Whyte, 1973). Patterns of communication maintain structural
organisations (Sampson and Marthas, 1990) and affect groups’ performance.
Centralized hierarchical structures are better for solving simple problems. Planning,
solving complex problems and members’ morale are better with decentralized structure.
Satisfaction is related to richness of communicational opportunities; members central to
communication structures are more likely to become leaders (Barker, Wahlers, Watson
and Kibler, 1987; Brown, 1989). Communication structure is annulled by superimposed
organizational structures (Shaw 1978b). Communication structure refers to constraints
on members in relation to specific performance criteria of communication already
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occurring. However, these approaches do not record the development of

communication and the extent it incorporates the whole group.
Subgrouping: Subgrouping and patterns of interpersonal sentiment are also
structural influences (Zaleznik and Moment, 1964). Roles differentiate in-group and
out-groups, which include or exclude members (Krech and Crutchfield, 1948; Sherif,
1948). Subgroups reduce conformity pressures and facilitate tolerance of differences,
but may increase intra-group conflict (Durkheim, 1964; Cartwright and Lippitt, 1976)
and are a common response to absence of leaders (Kissen, 1976a). Forming subgroups
is an important structuring phenomenon, but criteria used to define boundaries between
them are unclear. They are an intermediate stage in the formation of whole-group
entities and need to be recorded and defined by communicational boundaries since the
essential observational basis for the entity is communication.
Structure in psychotherapy groups.

Structure is relatively neglected in group psychotherapy. While the major concern
of psychoanalytic theories is with dynamic content and members’ intrapsychic structures
(Foulkes and Anthony, 1973; Rutan and Stone, 1984; Hinshelwood, 1987; Halperin,
1989; Etting, 1999), a number of concepts refer to group structure. The “group matrix”
(Foukes, 1964; Powell, 1994), “basic assumptions” (Bion, 1961) and “structure” as
arrangements and plans for conducting groups (Whitaker, 1989; Ettin, 1999) are
structural, but are not defined and treated as contextual factors for dynamics and
technique.
Development of Structure: Learning or experiential groups begin with little
organisation and structure attaches to circumstantial events, often in finding a leader.
Lack of structure is associated with reduced control, impulsive actions and suspicion of
new members (Rice, 1965). Developing a stable structure is a criterion for group
formation; when it has occurred, the group is referred to as a “working group” rather than
a “group formation” (Agazarian and Peters, 1981). This concept is closer to the transition
between Gn and Go although observable phenomena indicating structure are not specified.
Prior Assumptions: Groups are also structured by members’ assumptions before
joining (Gazda 1977a). Structures form around prescribed roles (Northen, 1988),
planning and preparation (Rutan and Stone, 1984; Whitaker, 1989; Malekoff, 1997).
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These essential structural elements are located in members’ pre-group contacts with
therapists in Gn, outside the group entity.
Relationships: Established relationships, interaction and attraction patterns are
structural elements (Agazarian and Peters, 1981). They are interpersonal events, which
presuppose social communication and are formed after Go is constituted.
Intrapsychic Structures: Group structure has been compared to individual psychic
structure (Kellerman, 1979), although it is also disputed as misleading and unhelpful
(Agazarian and Peters, 1981). This is not relevant to the structure of the collective entity
and is not specified in the GFR.
Communication: Communicational patterns define group structure and determine
group character (Agazarian and Peters, 1981). However, they are conceptualised in
individualistic terms, and do not define observable structure of group entities.
Spatial and temporal boundaries: Structure has been conceptualised as spatial and
psychological boundaries between group, leader, environment, group size and physical
proximity of members (Berne, 1963; Agazarian and Peters, 1981; Malekoff, 1997).
Organisation of arrangements to suit members has been called “the logistics of caring”
(Malekoff, 1997, p. 68). This structural property defines the presence of the members in
the same place and time. Without this, social communication is not active and Go cannot
come into being. All members need to be present to be included in the structure.
Subgrouping: Forming subgroups restricts involvement, allows acting-out,
avoids therapeutic challenges and undermines therapeutic goals (Kellerman, 1979;
Yalom, 1995). They help members explore issues not confronted in the whole group,
allow them to identify commonalities, enlarge affective expression and manage needs
for control (Northen, 1988; Yalom, 1995). Subgroups enhance group cohesiveness and
express personal choices, although not always consciously or constructively (Northen,
1988). They indicate the group’s inability to confront tasks and threaten its integrity
(Bion, 1961), although they are generally accommodated and integrated (Northen,
1988). It is more difficult for groups to make decisions when they polarize into
subgroups (MacLennan and Dies, 1992). In documenting the emergence of a group
organism, subgroups represent transitional states between Gn and Gs and must be
defined and recorded as expressions of social communication.
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Structure and the GFR.

The GFR observes group structure as communication structure or the presence
of a communion as Go. When reciprocal social communication links members of Gn,
the group becomes Gs, enabling other dimensions to be observed. If all members are
included, Go corresponds to Gn. If all members are not in communication, Go does not
correspond to Gn. It is usual in groups, especially of adolescents, for sub-groups to
form. One or more Go structures are then formed as portions of Gn.
If the Nominal Group (Gn) consists of five members, when they interact as a trio
and pair, Go is fragmented; or a trio may form as Go, while two members remain
isolated. Such states are transitional between Gn and a comprehensive Go including all
members. Combinations of individuals, sub-groups and whole-group fluctuate. The
quality of the process in the structural units is rated to determine how functional the
group is, or to what extent Go becomes Gs. Structure is the first dimension of group
function to be observed by the GFR and records the communicating units,
(communions) formed and disbanded from time to time. Criteria for rating formations
of Go are given below.
Criteria for rating Structure.

Changes in Structure are recorded when members join or leave communicating
units. Members are rated as part of a group or sub-group (Go) when in communication
with each other. The existence of communions is rated.
Communication: Two or more members are in communication when at least two
communication criteria are met. They discount unintentional contact without
communicational significance. Social communication involves not only sending or
receiving messages, but joining the stream of communicational activity, which is not
necessarily a defined, causal sequence, but may be a fabric of multi-determined
interactions, not confined to a single time reference. Whenever two or more of the
following criteria are met, communication is deemed to be occurring:
1. Proximity: A member is so close that it comprises an intentional selection of
others in preference to random placement within the room.
2. Looking: The member looks at or keeps another in view or eye contact.
3. Listening: A member obviously listens to or maintains auditory monitoring of
one or more others.
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4. Talking: A member talks to, or engages in other form of verbal

communication with one or more others.
5. Gesturing: A member exhibits body language or non-verbal communication by
providing some form of movement or positioning perceived or intended as
meaningful by others.
6. Engaged: A member is engaged in a common activity or shared enterprise,
such as parallel play or continuing to perform a common task.
Categories for Structure.

Four possible ratings indicate the group’s structure.
• Whole Group (W): All members are in communication.
• Subgroups (S): All members are in communication with other members, but
comprise groups smaller than the whole group.
• Subgroups and Individuals (SI): One or more subgroups exist and one or more
members are not in communication with anyone else in the group.
• Individuals (I): No member is in communication with any other (Gn).
Detailed rating rules and criteria are provided in the Raters’ Manual in Appendix 2.
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12. GFR DIMENSION 2: COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION
Collective cognition is a central function of collective mentality or nous. To

document its emergence, an empirically viable concept of whole-group cognition must
be developed from reviewing and adapting individual cognition to group entities.
The nature of cognition.

Cognition is the application of “intelligence and its computational processes”
(Simon and Kaplan, 1989, p. 2). Intelligence is a stable characteristic, but cognition is
“the action or faculty of knowing, perceiving, conceiving, as opposed to emotion and
volition: a perception sensation, notion, or intuition” (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1990)
and denotes the domain of mental activity lying between perception and sensations on
the one hand and actions on the other (Honderich, 1995). It is, “the way human beings
perceive and learn, how they reason and think, even how they remember and imagine;
and how their ‘minds’ work in the ordinary day-to-day activities” (George, 1962, p. 11),
including, “all processes by which the sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated,
stored, recovered, and used” (Niesser, 1987, p. 4). It is also regarded as knowledge
(Glass and Holyoak, 1986), coming to know, states of knowing, wanting and decisions
“insofar as they are guided by knowledge” (Macnamara and Reyes, 1994, p. 3). Many
texts do not define cognition, but discuss perception, attention, meaning, memory,
problem solving, reasoning, mental representation and language (Anderson, 1985;
Eysenk and Keane, 1990; Stillings, Weiser, Chase, Feinstein, Garfield and Rissland,
1995). Cognitive science is often defined in information processing terms (Eysenk and
Keane, 1990; Carroll, 1993; Stillings et al., 1995), which excludes non-computational
processes (Lakoff, 1987; Leiser and Gillerion, 1990; Gibbs, 1994).
Cognition is obtaining knowledge of objects (Brentano, 1874/1995; Macnamara
and Reyes, 1994), perceiving an environment, preserving representations and forming
propositions relating them (Posner, 1989). Non-informational aspects such as context,
motivation, emotion and metaphor are also essential ingredients (Hoffman and Palermo,
1991). It is knowledge of something definite (Follesdal, 1994), of self (Guidano and
Liotti, 1983) and enables organisms to organize experience as active, self-regulating
participants in an environment (Zivin, 1979).
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Groups lack a unified sensory system for object knowledge, so cognition needs
to extend beyond personal phenomena as in Maturana’s (1970) comprehensive account:
“Living systems are cognitive systems and living … is a process of cognition.
This statement is valid for all organisms, with and without a nervous system. If
a living system enters into a cognitive interaction, its internal state is changed in
a manner relevant to its maintenance and enters into a new interaction without
losing its identity… Although the nervous system expands the domain of
interactions of the organism by bringing into this domain interactions with pure
relations, the function of the nervous system is subservient to the necessary
circularity of the living organization” (Maturana, 1970, p. 8).
Essential characteristics of cognition need to be described and circumstances defined
when cognitive capacity is achieved. The GFR records the emergence of cognitive
capacity out of confusion by progressive organization.
Fundamental properties of cognition.

Piaget’s genetic epistemology provides a starting point for defining organization.
Although it has been criticised for not making meaningful contact with specialized
cognitive theories (Halford, 1978; Scandura, 1978), a rapprochement is occurring
(Leiser and Gillieron, 1990). Genetic epistemology describes the genesis of epistemic
function. Piaget analyses structures of cognition rather than computational processes by
which it is conducted. Operational structures and the “overall coherence” of behaviour
are emphasized rather than data structures (Leiser and Gillieron, 1990, p. 4).
Cognitive content, function and structure are differentiated (Flavell, 1964). Ideas,
memories or representations for performing cognitive processes are the content. Function
is the system of intelligent processes common to all cognitive beings. “Every act of
intelligence presupposes some kind of intellectual structure, some sort of organization
within which it proceeds” (Flavell, 1964, p. 46). It confers wholeness on the system,
defining boundaries, allowing transformations of content. The cognitive system is self-
regulating and self-maintaining (Piaget, 1973). Cognitive acts are distinguished from the
infrastructure organizing the cognizing system. Cognitive structures interpose between
function and content as “organized properties of intelligence, organizations created
through functioning and inferable from behavioral contents whose nature they
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determine;” or “mediators interposed between the invariant functions” and “variegated

behavioral contents” (Flavell, 1964, p. 17).
Figurative processes of perception, imitation and imagery do not transform
objects, but form representations. They are distinguished from operations, which
transform elementary, concrete sensorimotor and internalised actions into increasingly
abstract relations and meaning structures by linguistic and logico-mathematical processes
(Fraisse and Piaget, 1969; Piaget and Inhelder, 1973). There is no simple relationship
between operations and structures; “operational structures” organize the whole context of
the processing (Leiser and Gillieron, 1990).
Distinctions between content, function and structure are evident in the
organization of language, which consists of elements such as phonemes, words, sentences
organized into structures through grammar and syntax. Common rules and their
organization make the act of communication possible and provide the first manifestation
of collective mentality as the structures of nous (see Chapter 9). The organization of the
individual’s cognitive system makes memory, perception, attention, learning, thinking
and problem solving possible. An initial state of the “intellectual organization” is
postulated to account for language and cognitive structures developing (Chomsky, 1976).
Perceptions, mental images, words, ideas, intellectual skills, memories, statements and
complex meaning structures are subject to sequential operations, re-combining or
transforming them to constitute cognition. A state of organization makes cognition
possible. When organization of the cognitive system is damaged, as in intoxication,
dementia or psychosis, content and operations may be intact, but productions are not
valid. In a group’s cognitive capacity, the role of the mediating organizational structure is
fundamental to cognitive function.
The group cognitive system.

Groups engage in cognitive processes as defined by Maturana and Piagetian
structuralism and as a function of collective mentality or nous (discussed in Chapter 9).
Elements such as words, gestures, reports, actions, emotions, activities, memories and
traditions are subject to operations when members communicate, reach conclusions and
transformations affecting each member. Verbal cognitive processes, non-verbal
functions, behavioural mannerisms or rituals may be incorporated into and transform
group life. Operations organize group culture, becoming operational structures as in the
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following example.
A group member reported a news item of an adolescent killed riding on top of a
train that went under a bridge. Other members asked for clarification and
confirmation; information was contributed about the line where the accident
happened and the likelihood the victim was unaware of the bridge. There were
horrified, mirthful and empathic comments about the victim and speculations
about his experience. Then jokes elaborated the theme and a consensus emerged
that he was “an idiot.” The unstated implication was they would not do it.
Other memories of train-related experiences were shared, including how to open
doors when trains are moving. A member humorously reported how an
acquaintance was pushed out of a moving train, sustaining a broken arm.
Another member expressed horror at this action, saying it was stupid, “he could
have been killed!” The reporter was scornful and abused him. The conversation
degenerated into trading insults and eventually an exchange of blows. A period
of confused activity followed without common theme or shared activity
(Adolescent Group, 1993).
Cognitive elements include news reports, memories, facts, opinions, attitudes,
speculations, jokes and value judgments related in coherent sequences allowing the
accident to be evaluated against adolescent values, eventually arriving at a consensus
judgment. The group provides the framework for a collective cognitive process
affecting everyone. Each member participates in cognitive operations transforming the
elements. Associating to other risk-taking activities facilitates further evaluative
operations. A difference of attitude between two members generates hostile affect,
organization is lost and operations interrupted. The group’s organization cannot
integrate the contradiction and fails to regulate the affect. It disorganizes, preventing
further collective cognitive activity.
Group cognition and the GFR. The group’s capacity for cognition depends on
achieving an organization within which operations can be performed that are collective,
not the function of individuals. The organization needed is a state of the communicational
field; collective cognition is a function of the organization of group communication
processes (Lewes, 1879; Cooley, 1909; McDougall, 1920; Durkheim, 1954). The
dimension for rating groups’ cognitive capacity is defined by the GFR as “Cognitive
Organization” rather than specific cognitive content or operations.
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Cognitive activity depends on relevant ideas following each other in logical order
and relations of meaning predominating over non-logical relations such as similarity or
affective value. Higher order cognition is expressed in language and linguistic structures.
The two central requirements are maintaining the topic or theme, (preserving a norm) and
functioning within logical operations (abiding by the operation’s rules). These features
can be defined for group communication. Verbal productions, non-verbal gestures or
other actions must preserve a commonly accepted theme to constitute normative
organization. Then they need to form sequences allowing common relations, operations
and meaning expressed through a set of explicit or implicit rules. Finally, they must
embody representations of the group and members if cognition is to be applied to the
group itself.
The Dimension of Cognitive Organization. The formation of Go means the
group can reconcile and integrate members’ communicational contributions to attain a
collective function. Cognitive function underpins the group acting as a unit, even if
tacitly (Polanyi, 1962). Making decisions and reconciling differences indicates
structuring of communicational content to produce shared conclusions. The decision to
play cards involves proposing an idea, communicating it, ensuring it is understood,
gaining agreement, finding cards, arranging seating, agreeing on rules, assigning roles
and depends on organization of communications between members. Norms and rules
are only achieved with a shared framework for tasks.
The conversation about the boy riding a train consists of information and
opinion that become common property of all members. The judgment that he was “an
idiot” is an operation conferring value on the information. Although pronounced by one
member, it becomes a shared value. It is predisposed to recur by association in later
conversations and becomes an operational structure of the group’s communicational
life, where impulsive, risk-taking behaviour is considered “idiotic.” This occurs
because of all members participate in communications organized to provide sequential
description, evaluation of reports and incorporate the member’s value judgment. This is
collective cognition and characteristic of nous, since no individual performs the
function, but each contributes in communication to what becomes a common result.
Group cognitive development is observable in different degrees of organization.
The first is an unorganized state, without consistency or sequencing. The second
organizational level allows acquisition of common ideas, symbols and elements with
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simple concrete operations expressed as norms such as agreement, disagreement,

comparison and association. At the third level, rules govern how elements are related;
complex operations such as analysis, deduction, conclusions, evaluations, judgment and
opinion can be performed. At the fourth level representations of the group, members
and their lives are formed; self-reference and self-regulating functions can occur. These
states are described in more detail.
Unorganized communication in the GFR.

There is no capacity to engage in collective cognition when members contribute
their own communications without reference to each other’s contributions and their
actions are not coordinated by shared goals or purposes. There are only heterogeneous
elements without common order evident in periods of confusion, breakdown or
transition between more organized activities, or in sporadic conversation where
comments are made without building on previous contributions, each communication
being sufficient to itself. Unorganized Cognitive Organization describes states without
communication between members described in the Nominal Group (Gn) or the group as
an unorganized organism (Go).
Norms as cognitive elements.

When groups emerge from unorganized states, norms enable some cognitive
organization of communication. Norms are standards or “shared definitions of desirable
behavior” (Harré and Lamb, 1983) regulating interaction (Wilke and Van Knippenberg,
1989). They promote conformity, are endorsed by members and control action (Fraser,
1986); they describe regularities in behaviour and promote coordination of
communication (Forsyth, 1983). Norms are described as simple rules for group conduct
(Thibaut and Kelly, 1959; Harre and Lamb, 1983; Forsyth, 1983; Brown, 1989) or for
linking behaviors to consequences (Sanders and Cushman, 1984). Norms define what
all members accept (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959), though participants may only notice their
violation (Forsyth, 1983). Members’ attitudes converge towards an average that
becomes a norm (Wilke and Van Knippengerg, 1989). They give communication a
degree of organization and define acceptable knowledge for the group (Asch, 1952).
They “are the basis for mutual expectations amongst group members” (Brown, 1989, p.
42), frames of reference (Sherif, Sherif and Nebergall, 1965; Cancian, 1975) and depict
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“a shared social reality” (Sampson and Marthas, 1990, p. 73; Baron, Kerr and Miller,
1992).
Groups accomplish goals, sustain themselves and define their relationship to
their surroundings with common attitudes, behavioural sanctions and organizing
features of group life highly resistant to change (Wilke and Van Knippenberg, 1989).
Any collective cognitive activity requires members to agree on topic, activity,
procedures, values and regulation of interaction. With normative organization,
members can maintain common topics and related attitudes in a conversation without
logical or operational outcome. Norms maintain themes, common values and meaning
contexts as the organizational framework for cognition and a framework with action
implications; cognitive norms create a collective content and style not restricted to the
summation of individual contributions. Norms are idiosyncratic (Brown, 1989); they
represent a particular cognitive environment and identity of cognitive style and conduct.
They are the first indications within cognitive organization of whole-group functioning
and the emergence of Gs. Norm systems confer collective structures on cognitive
organization such as:
• All members participate in activities;
• When some members start an activity others continue it;
• If someone talks others listen;
• If a topic is introduced other contributions are relevant;
• If communications are not understood members ask for clarification;
• If a member has a complaint, it is expressed.
Norms of communicational reciprocity underpin complex group processes. However,
they may interfere with cognitive activity. Adolescent norms are often contravened by
expressing attachment, care or admiration (Malekoff, 1997); they disrupt serious
conversation after a short time; boisterous games may constitute a narrow range of
normative activities, restricting cognitive achievement. Groups need suitable norms to
promote collective cognition as the most elementary organization permitting nous to
manifest.
Cognitive norms ensure common content and non-systemic organization in an
otherwise unorganized communicational field; they do not form a rule-based system,
but operate idiosyncratically, without reference to other norms or rules. Norms provide
shared order rather than transformations of cognitive elements. Since they lack logical
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relationships to each other, they may be inconsistent, contradictory or incompatible

(Homans, 1951). Peer group norms may discourage members from talking about
problems, but personal experience norms may urge discussion of common problems.
They do not constitute a logical system.
Normative Organization and the GFR.

In the GFR, Normative Cognitive Organization is present when norms organize
the group’s communication into common themes, shared activity, similar, parallel
activity or other common elements, but abstract cognitive operations are not performed.
Cognition requires norms to ensure common content, but commonality is possible
without logical operations. In a conversation about cars, if contributions are related
only by the theme of cars no operations are performed. Personal recollections or
fantasies about cars may be given as a series of associations not organized to draw
conclusions or form a logical argument. Normative organization describes members
flying paper planes or having shots at a target without rules to define procedure, scores
or winner; operations are absent.
The category following Normative Organization describes rules permitting
logical operations. However, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by rules before
describing it.
Rules as cognitive elements.

In the GFR, “rule” defines a feature of cognitive function qualitatively distinct
from norms. Rules govern cognitive operations, denoting a higher state of organization
of the common content established by norms. Rules may define classes and social
practices; they regulate behaviour, indicating permitted, prescribed or proscribed actions
(Collett, 1977; Harré and Lamb, 1983). A rule is: “A principle regulating the procedure
or method necessary to be observed in the pursuit or study of some art or science”
(Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). There are constitutive, generative and regulatory
rules. They confer unity on the perceptual field; orderliness in succession of events is
created by the sequence following a rule; concepts are rules in rationality (Kant, 1976).
Rules operate in individuals, but evolve socially (Wittgenstein, 1953; Collett, 1977;
Bloor, 1983; Arnold and Frandsen, 1984) and “are social inventions, by and for persons
who are oriented to the same conditions. Their power rests on their real or presumed
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relevance” (Asch, 1953, p. 351). “Rules necessarily imply social or inter-individual

relation. ... Rules are a regulation imposed by the group and their violation carries a
sanction” (Piaget, 1972, pp. 112-3). Social exchange leads to the formation of rules
(Bochner, 1984). They indicate how individual cognitive structures are formed and
sustained by group membership (Luria, 1976; Vygotsky quoted in Collett, 1977).
Social life rests on rules (Simmell, 1950), which restrict individuals, but confer a shared
code (Arnold and Frandsen, 1984) and make social action comprehensible to others
(Sanders and Cushman, 1984).
Rules in cognition constitute implicit or explicit propositions specifying mental or
behavioural activity. A rule is part of a systemic or symbolic structure reciprocally
related to other rules as parts of a system. A rule unrelated to other rules is a norm. Rules
indicate an underlying organization or “deep structure” such as guides manifest behaviour
in speech production (Chomsky, 1965). Several levels of rules govern complex language;
basal rules create abstract phrase structures while transformational rules arrange elements
into surface structures (Chomsky, 1980). Meaning is not possible without rules (Bochner,
1984); semantic meaning is created by grammatical rules relating symbols to each other
and their referents (Cronkhite, 1984). Rules forming individuals’ language preserve
continuity with rules governing interpersonal communication, which is only possible
when similar rules apply to the form and content of messages (Sanders and Cushman,
1984). They are essential to language, communication and social structures, but also exist
for other group behaviour such as conversation (Noftsinger, 1976; Harré, 1977; Bruner,
1977; Duncan and Fiske, 1977) and violence is a paradigm for rulefulness in apparently
disorganized social interaction (Reicher, 1988; Cotterell, 1996). Fighting is rule-
governed; the rules are unconscious, but obeyed like those of language (Fox, 1977).
The rules of “the turn system” in conversation consist of “transition-readiness
states” determining sequence, coordination signals, “moves” to be undertaken, units to
punctuate interactions and rules to operate these elements forming a complex system
providing the activity’s social structure and meaningfulness (Duncan and Fiske, 1977).
Unless speakers finish their statements, their interlocutors do not know what they intend
to say and discussions lack logical development. In a card game, rules determine
actions and sequence of play catering for all eventualities and designate winners. In a
dispute, logic determines who wins and loses, even if members do not abide by the
outcome.
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Contrasting Norms and Rules. Rules are systemic and refer to social relations,
whereas norms only relate to specific situations. Rules are more abstract and general
than norms, requiring categories and concepts for their application; they are
conventional, but “not merely so” (Asch, 1953, p. 352). They define, generate and
regulate meanings necessary for organized communication and action, giving a
framework for individuals to participate in collective processes. The distinction
between norms and rules parallels that between conventions sustaining structures in a
concrete, static way and principles preserving organization and permitting operations
and transformations in cognitive structures. Rules of human conduct in situations
evolve, but ensure action occurs “within frames of reference delimiting the goals that
can be attained and the means of pursuing and attaining them” (Sanders and Cushman,
1984, p. 231).
Rules support each other systemically. Social situations are determined by
systems of rules having neither inconsistent nor contradictory logical relations. Rules
cannot act alone, whereas norms may. A rule standing alone is arbitrary or idiosyncratic
to the group and is a norm or convention (Searle, 1970). Rules constitute a system with
the elements they govern, such as lexical elements in language, moves in a game and
actions in social life. The rule system enables “socio-rational” transformations of
cognitive elements into meaningful structures (Chomsky, 1957; Fraisse and Piaget,
1969; Piaget and Inhelder, 1973). Rules do not indicate commonly held ideas, themes
or understandings, but common principles determining how ideas relate to form
collective cognitive products characteristic of nous. They are equally effective whether
implicit or explicit (Fox, 1977; Harré, 1984).
Systemic Organization and the GFR.

Rule-based communication and action indicate a change in organization from
the conventionality of norms and is called Systemic Organization. Normative
Organization enables the group to undertake simple activities and functions, share
information and experiences, cooperate in shared tasks or common activities. Systemic
Organization enables members to coordinate activities with implicit rules such as
conversations, discussions and arguments, or undertake activities with explicit rule
systems such as debates, problem solving or games. In Systemic Organization, each
participant has a role and transformations of cognitive elements are contributed to the
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common communicational field so the group generates cognitive products or sustains

collective cognitive activity.
The group’s cognition of itself.

To function as self-sustaining organisms, groups must develop self-
representations and evaluate their own welfare. Norms and rules do not specify the
content of the communications they organize; but cognitive elements organized into
higher-level reflexive structures form collective representations. To function as Gs, a
group must manage the problems of its existence, plan and undertake self-maintenance,
regulate, recognize and understand itself. It needs to know its membership, where and
when it meets, its purpose, functions and history. The group makes itself the cognitive
content of communication when members talk about each other’s lives, their problems,
time and place of meeting, past events or former members. Cognition of the group itself
is related to content rather than form of cognitive activity, so another Cognitive
Organization category is introduced for self-referenced, systemic operations.
Systemically organized communicational states referred to the group, members, their
lives, the group’s history or future are called Representational Organization. To clarify
this term, it is necessary to discuss representations.
Representations as cognitive elements.

For Kant, representation indicated the form in which a transcendental “thing-in-
itself” was present to understanding (Toulmin, 1972). Subsequent accounts emphasize
representations as elements upon which meaning develops in cognitive systems. They
are a mental substitute for raw data of cognitive processes (Cummins, 1995). Cognitive
psychology interprets them as internal states in a private world, identified with
neurological states (Posner, 1991), structures of the cognitive apparatus (Hinton,
McClelland and Rumelhart, 1989) or mental content (Mounoud and Vinter, 1982). They
are the material basis for knowledge as images, words or other models of the world
(Johnson-Laird, 1991). Psychoanalytic concepts define representation as “iconic or
symbolically encoded meanings that are capable of conscious awareness or
communicative expression” (Horowitz, 1988, p. 17).
Piaget regarded representations as developing from the evocation of absent
objects, allowing the subject to organize experience to perform cognitive functions and
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enable mental experience to succeed actual experimentation (Piaget, 1963; Bronckart

and Venouras-Spycher, 1979). Sensorimotor action is internalized as imitation or
representation (Meltzoff, 1982). Representations are not copies; they have meaning as
“signifiers” related to actualities or “signifieds,” evoking absent objects and forming
new combinations. They confer unity on behaviour and are “capable of entering
language to be transformed, with the aid of the social group, into reflective intelligence”
(Piaget, 1963, p. 356). In social life, representations evoke what is outside the
perceptual field and transform sensorimotor into conceptual functioning. Collective
representations are shared signs, language, myths, rituals and culture (Durkheim, 1966).
Language enables representations to form a “support system of usable ‘signifiers’ at the
disposal of the individual” (Piaget, 1972 p. 273). Action requires preliminary
representation (Mounoud and Vinter, 1982).
To develop a collective cognitive capacity, groups depend on common
representations. Durkheim considered “everything which is social consists of
representations and therefore is the product of representation” (quoted in Lukes, 1975,
p. 234). Social institutions form collective representations, as common content shared
throughout the social organisms allowing them to become self-conscious (Durkheim,
1954; Deutscher, 1984). Social (collective) representations are necessary for a
collective thought life (Farr and Moscovici, 1984; Moscovici, 1984). Collective
representations form in interactions between member and group (Leyens and Codol,
1993); once created, they “lead a life of their own, circulate, merge, attract and repel
each other, and give birth to new representations” (Moscovici, 1984, p. 13; Durkheim,
1966).
Collective representations conventionalize and model group objects and
processes by providing common signifiers of them. They also restrict and proscribe
activity, imposing themselves on members, forming a cognitive environment in which
social thought and history create group culture. They regulate and integrate psychic or
social tensions, forming boundaries, make the unfamiliar familiar, organize information,
control individual behaviour and “canalise the flow of emotions and of fluctuating
interpersonal relationships” (Moscovici, 1984, p. 60).
Group action is only possible with shared, conscious representations formed in a
social context with norms, rules and values which are all social representations of a
lower order (Farr and Mocovici, 1984; Von Cranach and Valach, 1984). While psychic
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representations are internal mediating functions between subject and environment

(Mounoud and Vinter, 1982), social representations are part of a circularity formed by
observation, continuing through communication, becoming the context for the
observation and providing the structure with its meaning. The social eventually takes
precedence over the psychic in cognitive functions, since social and public processes
were gradually interiorized as psychic processes (Durkheim, 1954; Mead, 1962). “It is
as though our psychology contained our sociology in a condensed from” (Moscovici,
1984 p. 65).
Giving primacy to the collective use of representations displaces the private,
mental concept (Toulmin, 1972). The personal, inner representation is encapsulated in
the German “Vorstellung” related to the mental image or sensory representation placed
before the self. It symbolizes something in an individual’s mind. An alternative
German word, “Darstellung” denotes public representation, such as exhibiting an idea in
public (Toulmin, 1972). Representation in this sense is collective, existing in the
relation between public entities. Language represents experience publicly in open
demonstration (Wittgenstein, quoted in Toulmin, 1972). Meaning as the collective use
of words and representations poses the problem of “how the personal thoughts and
concepts of an individual concept-user are related to the communal or collective uses of
concepts” (Toulmin, 1972, p. 197). If collective representations are seen as behavioural
accompaniments to inner thoughts, which alone have rational significance, ideas and
personal representations are detached from their expression as collective or social
representations. Representations are thus located in the social-communicational domain
and not exclusively intra-psychic. Public expression of representations is not derived
from privileged personal reality, but the primary social reality from which personal
constructs are internalized (Moscovici, 1984). Communicated representations develop
group culture and identity; they define boundaries and relationships to other groups.
Social representations create collective thought and a “support system of usable
signifiers” (Piaget, 1972, p. 273) enabling members to derive their own cognitive life.
A member’s private mental image of an event does not effect group history until it
is communicated to others, evoking reciprocated images, creating shared symbolic
reference. Words, gestures or symbols become collective representations as group
cognitive elements, but affect members as external to themselves (Durkheim, 1954;
Moscovici, 1988). Two types of social representations can be distinguished. One type is
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formed of anything within language in the communicational field; everything beyond

sensation is represented in symbolic elements or signifiers by a social environment of
language and communication. Being in a group gives members representations of
themselves, their lives and experiences through the richness of communicational
opportunities. Another type of representation formed within the communicational process
is of the group, members, history, states, processes and relations with entities outside
itself. They are collective as members contribute to and are incorporated into collective
thought processes developing a collective self-awareness from systemic cognitive
organization of group communication (Moscovici, 1984).
Representations of the group make it an object of cognition and subject to
regulating processes. Group representations are “psychic organizers” of group life
(Kaës, 1984, p. 374). Groups are founded on collective representations of purpose as
the identification defining membership. This “emblematic representation” has a similar
function to leadership and “guarantees the possibility of communication and exchange.
It is a nucleus of identification for members distinguishing the group from the non-
group” (Kaës, 1984, p. 375).
Representational Organization and the GFR.

In the GFR, representations are formed by communications about members,
their lives, experiences, families, friends, problems, therapists, the group and where it is
conducted. Communications about such content forms social representations,
promoting collective cognition and group self-awareness. Social representations must
be connected and systemically organized, understood and incorporated into a common
discourse to become shared social constructs. If enacted, they must be recognized or
participated in by all and relate to current communication becoming “signifiers” of the
group.
Whenever members talk about or convey figurative representations about
themselves in a rule-based system, they function in a higher cognitive state than Systemic
Organization characterised by systemic communication of representations of members or
group called Representational Organization. It does not indicate communication of fully
formed social representations, but processes exist that enable them to form (Moscovici,
1984). Regardless of cognitive complexity or whether fully formed, representations are
assumed to be coalescing provided communication includes the requisite information.
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Whenever these subjects are expressed in systemic organization, representations are

forming, although not necessarily complete or stable.
In Representational Organization, members recognize each other as participants
in a communion. It is different to consciousness of membership, since it is possible to
be in a communion without having representations of it. However, being conscious
involves representing the group, one’s relation to it and the other members. When
consciousness and shared understanding develop, individuals consider each other as
members having similar interest in the group (Asch, 1952). Members and group
become discrete cognitive objects collectively and individually. Shared figurative
forms and language specific to the group support common ideas and images with the
“subtle interplay of presuppositions and semantic potentialities” constituting
intersubjectivity as a common awareness and group culture (Rommetveit, 1984, p. 336).
In the Nominal Group, Gn is defined externally and members lack
representations of their involvement. Communication joins members forming the social
organism, as the Organic Group, Go. When representations of common interest form,
but group or social representations are not in evidence, the group is Social (Gs). When a
common culture creates group representations and members’ communications about
themselves and each other form social representations, Representational Organization
forms the Functional Group (Gf).
Cognitive Organization in the GFR.

The hierarchy of Cognitive Organization begins as unstructured and confused; it is
ordered by norms governing behaviour, but not allowing decisions, plans or group
representations. The group’s activity needs to be governed systemically, beginning with
norms and common propositions, developing logical operations such as decision-making,
compromise, conversations, games and planned activities. Finally, operations on
representations of group and members are attained with talk about themselves. Cognitive
Organization observes the formal cognitive characteristics of group communication that
reveal norms, rules, operations and collective representations as the basis for shared
cognition. The four categories of organization of group communication enable group
functioning to be located on an ascending order of complexity and functional integrity,
summarized below. The complete rating instructions and criteria are in the Rater’s
Manual in Appendix 2.
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Unorganized: Members’ communication lacks common themes, shared topics or

system. Individual cognition occurs, but is unorganized for the group because common
propositions or operations are lacking. Behaviorally, it consists of disorganized
behaviour, “milling” or “time out behaviour” (Cotterell, 1996), chatter or aimless talk
with sporadic, disconnected comments, confusion following conflict or transitional
states when forming or breaking up without organized communication.
Normative Organization: The second category describes simple relations of
routine and habit with content organized by similarity of theme. The communicational
field has shared topics without rule-based operations. It describes relations based on
common acceptance and established custom rather than logical rules. Verbal
communications include anecdotes, reports, descriptions, which may be shared or
elaborated without logical development or operations; members swap stories or jokes
without analysis or discussion. Behavioural engagement includes shared activities or
games without systemic rules, such as throwing games, play fights, simple competitive
activity, building a cubby house, setting up or tidying the room. Communicational
norms or guidelines do not constitute an articulated system, but cover specific
situations; there may be prescriptive rules such as telling others what to do or behaving
in an authoritarian manner without interrelated rules. It includes incomplete, inadequate
or unsuccessful systems whose rules are rejected, failing, breaking down or violated.
Issues are not followed through; elements of the system may be present, but it wholly or
partially fails, such as a game or discussion failing from inadequate rules, dissension or
cheating.
Systemic Organization: The third category is where communication is organized
by rules, such as logic, morality, games or social conventions of conversation, etiquette
or custom. The rules are interconnecting principles existing as abstract ideas instanced
in various concrete situations. Rules systemically predetermine, create and maintain
relations between communicational contributions, enabling cognitive operations to be
performed by the group. Wide variation in sophistication of operations is possible
maintaining the system, however the condition is that rules interrelate to each other. It
is present in card games, conversations about why a team won, games of chess or
“tiggy,” debates about politics or deciding what to do. Group activity needs to be
effectively organized by the system and may consist of conversations, games or motor
activities. The group is successfully governed by rules. Systemic organization does not
147
indicate the activity’s content or sophistication, but the group’s capacity to develop
regulatory processes by applying rules.
Representational Organization: The fourth category describes systemic functioning
that includes social representations of the group and members. These may not be fully
developed, but are implicit in the content of systemically organized communications.
There is a system of organized terms and relations effectively governing or organizing
communication and behaviour, representing the group or members, their lives, other people
or events of personal significance or their problems. It includes figurative representations
such as acting, or drawing. All members of the group or communion share in the content
of their communicational field. If someone talks about themselves or the group, but others
are not listening, the systemic character of communication fails and it is not
Representational Organization.
Table 10.1 compares the four characteristics of Cognitive Organization of the
communicational field in each of the four categories and provides examples of
conversation and activity for each category.
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Definitions UNORGANIZED NORMATIVE SYSTEMATIC REPRESENTATIONAL

ORGANIZATION ORGANIZATION ORGANIZATION
TERMS Any common elements No common terms, in- Common themes, terms Common terms elaborate Common terms refer to self,
allowing ideas, topics, consistent themes or and topics shared and common ideas or experiences, group, family, member's life or
themes to be shared or topics; individual promote communication. creation of group culture; other psychologically relevant
common actions to be topics. ideas, values, memories. topic.
undertaken
MEMBERS’ Communicative acts, Basic ideas Guided and bound by Themes elaborated by logical Contributions elaborate systemic
CONTRIB- utterances, actions, undeveloped; individual themes, descriptions, argument or structure, have representations and themes in an
UTIONS responses contributed and inconsistent narratives, reports; ideas purpose and relevance to ordered, logical systematic way.
by members to the declarations, comments, lack development; a sequence; bound by rules and
communication process anecdotes. member dominates group. logical operations.
RELATIONS Relations of No consistent relations Similarity, comparison, Logical, sequential, Logical and associative relations
BETWEEN contributions in of communicational agree/disagree, question/ developmental order and preserve the topic, and advance
MEMBERS’ communication; contributions, norms, answer, norms; rules are relevance; rules are consistent the purpose of communication.
CONTRIB- operations undertaken prescriptions of conduct in-complete, inconsistent, and guide process, but may be The group elaborates the theme.
UTIONS by the group or rules of actions. ineffective, lack of logic. implicit.
SYSTEM Overall goals, purpose, Lack of systematic Overall purpose, meaning, Goal oriented, elaboration of Goal oriented to develop
meaning or purpose, goal- connectedness present, but theme together to gain understanding or sharing of
directedness of directedness, or ineffective; group information, solve problems, experience, personal problem
communication meaning; information functions for itself, not undertake actions, plan, solving, about self, life or group.
processes. not processed. performing tasks. prepare or carry out projects.
Examples Sporadic talk, not res- General conversation; Rule-based games, cards, Talking about self, group,
ponded to; mucking chatter; motor games, ball gross motor games, family, life, school in a manner
around; aimless, disorg- throwing, war games, discussion, problem solving, that increases psychological
anized activity; collapse tiggy; cheating; games not informing, debate, logical awareness and problem solving.
of organized activities; working; collapse of rules; argument, advice or sharing Caring for each other or helping.
transition states: start or a member dominates; experiences; more than one
end of session, between question/answer; agree/dis- member active.
activities, break-down agree; listening to
or end of game. therapist; argument, abuse.
Table 12.1. Analysis and comparison of cognitive organization categories.
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13. GFR DIMENSION 3: AFFECT
Collective mentality theorists describe an affective life in social organisms.

Membership provides affective stimuli of comfort (Trotter, 1916) or joy (Durkheim,
1954), whereas isolation or conflict causes pain (Burrow, 1927b). Communication of
personal emotions establishes common affective states in members and collective affect
in the organism (Le Bon, 1896; Durkheim, 1954). Describing collective affect
presupposes a description of individuals’ affect and applying this validly to groups.
Collective entities must have something in common with individual psychology, but
transferring individualistic concepts obscures their uniqueness. Individual affect is
reviewed to develop a concept of group affect.
Affect and emotion.

Dictionaries refer definitions of affect to emotion and emotion to affect (English
and English, 1962; Chaplin, 1968; Harré and Lamb, 1983; Gregory, 1987). The two
terms are often equated (Brenner, 1980; Livesey, 1986; Jones, 1995). Rather than
defining them, essential attributes are often listed, including: temporary response
pattern, physiological changes, overt expression, endogenous perception of changes,
personal interpretation or appraisal (Lewis and Rosenbuam, 1978; Lazarus, Kanner and
Folkman, 1980; Mandler, 1984; Denzin, 1984) adaptive function (Weinreich, 1980) and
changes in “action readiness” (Frijda, 1993). Emotion has received less attention in
contemporary psychology that motivation, perception and cognition (Lazarus et. al.,
1980; McCarthy, 1989). It is defined as inherently social, individualistic, “social
convention” (Averill, 1980a), “collective representations” (McCarthy, 1989) or “social
representations” (Farr and Moscovici, 1984). Affect tends to refer to motivation and
arousal to distinguish it from emotions or feelings, although the literature lacks clear
differentiation.
Biological theories.
Affect is a product of neurological arousal, activating patterned brain activity
(Schore, 1994) associated with “subjective” or feeling aspects (Livesey, 1986). It
evolved as cognitive control by reward or punishment of action registered by
“immediate, inbuilt percepts of sensations and danger signals” (Livesey, 1986, p. 250).
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Affects amplify basic drives (Tomkins, 1962; Livesey, 1986) and have four functions
(Young, 1961):
• Energizing behaviour;
• Sustaining or terminating involvement in activity;
• Regulating action according to aversion or pleasure;
• Organizing future action by learning.
Primary affects are sensations of need, reward or punishment; secondary affects
generate expectancies from cognitive interactions, creating emotions. Affects register
internal states as the result of actions providing organisms with motivational
information. Drives generate distress signals at the “site of the consummatory act”
rather than the tissues, ensuring the organism acts to redress the problem; signals are
amplified as affects to ensure motivation in “drive-affect assemblies” (Tomkins, 1962,
p. 88). Affect is an innate biological motivating mechanism (Izard, 1979), more urgent
than drives (Tomkins, 1979) involving awareness of bodily-visceral responses. Basic
affects of interest or excitement, enjoyment or joy, surprise or startle, distress or
anguish, fear or terror, shame or humiliation, contempt, disgust, anger or rage are
distinguishable (Tomkins, 1980) across cultures (Ekman, 1992). Rhythms of discharge,
refractory period when energy is recouped and readiness for further discharge regulate
affect (Freud, 1920, 1924, 1938; Tomkins, 1962). Affective quality is governed by
differences in increase, maintenance and decrease of the density of stimulation;
increasing density produces startle, fear and interest; decrease creates joy; maintenance
or lack of relief causes anger and distress (Tomkins, 1980, p. 144).
Qualities of arousal organize different emotions (Grastyan, 1974; Plutchic and
Kellerman, 1980, 1990). Two dimensions have been empirically derived: an “arousal
continuum” of emotional energy of the system ranging from low to high (Mandler,
1984; Plutchik and Kellerman, 1989; Stein and Oatley, 1992) and a “hedonic
continuum” of states from positive, pleasurable to negative, unpleasurable conditions
(Young, 1961; Tellergen, 1988; Clark and Watson, 1991). A third dimension of
dominance-submission or engagement-withdrawal has been proposed (Russell and
Mehrabian, 1977; Watson and Tellergen, 1985; Russell, 1989) integrated in a
circumplex model (Plutchik, 1962; Kellerman, 1979; Watson and Tellergen, 1985;
Russell, 1989). These dimensions are found in Freud’s account of affect as consisting
of quantitative aspects of “particular motor innervations or discharges,” hedonic aspects
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of “direct feelings of pleasure and unpleasure” and the dominance-engagement factor as

“perceptions of the motor actions that have occurred” of feeling (Freud, 1917, p. 395).
Emotions, while not clearly distinguished from affects, mediate appraisal of
action outcomes. Little cognition is needed to arouse affects, whereas emotions are
generated by expectancies from learning and experience (Livesey, 1986). Cognitive or
social constructs, action plans, goals, expectancies and social signaling generate
emotion. It “acts in a communicative setting enabling animals to read each other’s
emotional expressions” (Livesey, 1986 p. 237). Emotions result from interruption of
current states or conflict between competing states (Mandler, 1980). However,
“fundamental emotions” are “motivators and organizers of behavior, not merely
responses to an appraisal process” motivated and directed by emotion (Izard and
Bleuler, 1980, p. 168). Basic emotions evolved as “action dispositions” meeting
survival needs (Stein and Oatley, 1992) related to drive characteristics (Tomkins, 1962;
Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 1980a, 1980b).
Emotions have positive or negative hedonic qualities considered as approach-
withdrawal (Davidson, 1992), attraction-repulsion, active-passive, pleasure-unpleasure
(Dahl, 1991) hedonic-agonic (Chance, 1980), excitement-calmness or tension-relaxation
(Nathanson, 1996a). Emotions are a function of the whole body (James, 1890; Cannon
1932; Schachter and Singer, 1962; Papanicolaou, 1989) with functional significance for
organic needs (Young, 1961; Thayer, 1989). The quantitative dimension describes the
intensity of autonomic activity while quality is characterised by cognitive aspects.
However, physiological theories of emotion have been criticised as too little related to
human experience (Averill, 1980a).
Biological theories and the GFR. Once groups have achieved organism status as
Go, the communication system is activated; social organisms develop integrity
analogous to biological organisms and are subject to energy characteristics like
biological aspects of affect; activity is sustained or terminates and rewarding or aversive
with rhythms of discharge, refractory period and accumulation.
Cognitive theories.
Affect provides the energy source for cognition (Green, 1977; Decarie, 1978)
since “no stimulus can evoke a psychological response unless it first triggers an affect”
(Nathanson, 1996a, p. 3). Emotions have logic and cognitive meaning (Calhoun and
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Solomon, 1984); their laws, reducible to “laws of empirical psychic life” (Scheler, 1916,
p. 220) are always directed towards something, therefore an extension of cognition
(Brentano, 1898). Cognitive theory describes emotions as a holistic and abbreviated
mode of perception, information processing, evaluation or interpretation of actual or
expected outcomes of interactions with the environment (de Sousa, 1991; Frijda, 1993).
Emotions are “cognitive appraisals, action impulses, and patterned somatic reactions”
(Lazarus et al., 1980, p. 198). They prompt action plans, lack propositional content,
syntactic structure, informational value, but function as signals for goals and coordinate
group behaviour (Johnson-Laird and Oatley, 1992). Emotions are related to social
norms, values and modes of interaction; they express “non-instrumental” behaviour as
“action tendencies” (Frijda, 1993).
Cognitive theories and the GFR. Emotions as primary appraisals imply a
cognitive capacity only possible in Gs. Group emotions can be conceptualised as
elementary collective cognitions lacking propositional content or syntactic structure that
organize groups and provide energy to collective mentality. Emotional states
redistribute resources, manage priorities and presuppose a degree of integrity of
communication evident as nous in Gs.
Social and phenomenological theories.

Social theorists criticize the “reifying tendencies” of biological and cognitive
theories (Averill, 1980a; Harré, 1988b; McCarthy, 1989). Emotions “can be fully
understood only on a social level of analysis” (Averill, 1980a, p. 309). All aspects of
emotion are influenced by socio-cultural factors; they are socially constructed
responses, “transitory social roles” or improvisations based on interpretations; they are
cognitive structures incorporating social norms like grammar (Averill, 1980a). Their
appraisals are personal meanings bestowed on spontaneous activity; they are passive
states that happen to the subject (Averill, 1980a; Harré, 1988b).
Emotions place the person in a world of social interaction; they are sensations in
the lived body felt in relation to others, “lodged in social acts” and embodied mental states
(Denzin, 1984, p. 50). They are social acts, felt by the self and referred to others with a
communicational structure. “Emotionality is a circular process that begins and ends with
the transactions and actions of the self in the social situation” (p. 58). The affect system
mediates all social relatedness; “affect is biology, while emotion is biography”
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(Nathanson, 1996a, p. 13). Emotions are affects associated with socially constructed
experience. Basic emotions are reifications, since emotional terms indicate culturally
specific social norms (Wierzbicka, 1992). They cannot be identified with specific
behaviours within the social process (Averill, 1980b) and have been called articulations of
intentions, “vocabularies used to define situations” (Perinbanayagam, 1989, p. 77).
Emotions’ arousing intensity is a function of their perceived value in a social context
(Swanson, 1989).
Symbolic Interactionism denies there are unsocialised emotions. Emotional
stimuli arise from individuals, act upon others, yield responses and are inherently
socially positive or negative. They are “emergents” within acts in the social world like
mind, and actions in the world like spoken words, as much “outside” the body as
“inside;” yet they develop in social relations constituted by group process (Mead, 1962;
McCarthy, 1989; Coulter, 1988). Their stability and impersonality comes from their
universality as collective representations (McCarthy, 1989). Affect is socially
constructed into distinct emotions. Emotions are “intentional” and involve a “local
moral order” (Harré, 1988b, p. 8). Affect qualities have been disputed by
constructivism (Armon-Jones, 1988), but they are complex and socially structured along
a variety of dimensions (Plutchic and Kellerman, 1980, 1989, 1990).
Social and phenomenological theories and the GFR. Emotions emerge from the
forces constituting the collective organisation of the social entity. Their linguistic
structure locates them in the communicational field as elements of collective mentality
and they mediate attachments consolidating the social entity. Emotions are expressed in
communicational phenomena and their arousing function underpins social value. They
belong as much to the group as within its members. As collective phenomena of social
communication, they are applicable to groups, and identified by the GFR.
Psychoanalytic theories.
Freud described affect as the quality of psychic energy capable of transformation
into pleasure or unpleasure, depending on its distribution in the psychic apparatus.
Affect is memory plus energy produced by endogenous excitation (Freud, 1895). It
regulates the energy of the apparatus by discharge (Freud, 1900). Psychic energy
occurs in two conditions. It is “bound” by being invested in psychic functions and
maintains activity level in a controlled state. Thought is activated by energy bound to
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representations; steady release of energy provides the motive for thought, while sudden
discharge is restricted by its investment in the functions. It can also be “free” or
unbound from specific representations and seek “uninhibited discharge,” no longer
harnessed and expressing itself in affect (Freud, 1895).
Affect qualities result from “tension” within the psychological apparatus (Freud,
1895). Pleasurable hedonic quality occurs with decrease in tension and unpleasure with
increase. Tension refers to the distribution rather than either quantity or the bound/free
state of energy, where some parts of the system (or representations) have a relatively
higher investment of energy compared to others. Pleasure is reduced tension through
free distribution of energy throughout the system. Unpleasure is increased tension, with
energy unevenly constrained in some areas, while released from others. Drives manifest
in consciousness as affects; ideas allow drive impulses to develop into affect (Freud,
1915). Affects are internal perceptions arising in consciousness independently of
sensory perceptions and memories (Freud, 1923). Affect quality is not directly related
to excitation; it is a signal related to meaning and quantity related to energy as a force
(Freud, 1938). Affective life fluctuates rhythmically in strength and pleasurable quality
(Freud, 1920, 1924, 1938)
In psychoanalysis, affects are synonymous with emotion (Brenner, 1980; Jones,
1995). Emotions are the experience of non-symbolic information processing that is the
central control mechanism for human behavior (Jones, 1995), a dimension of ideas
rather than a separate phenomenon. The dominant affect is anxiety (Stein, 1991).
Psychoanalytic accounts emphasise its relationship to language as fundamentally
representational, carrying meaning when adapted to discourse, but also disrupting
meaning structures creating pleasure or pain (Plutchik and Kellerman, 1980, 1990;
Green, 1977).
There are two thresholds of quantitative intensity. Above the first, affect reaches
consciousness, enlivens and enlarges the field of perception being “invested” in psychic
functions. Above the second, it is disruptive, experienced as unpleasurable, loosed from
ideas and discharged. The thresholds activate chains of association crucial to energising
communication as well as determining content. Affect has the function of “punctuating
the signifier” (Green, 1977).
Psychoanalytic theories and the GFR. Affective processes of energy within a
system of representations are applicable to collective representations (communications)
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in a social entity. Bound and free energy, rhythm and tension as uneven distribution
within the system can be applied to the communicational field observed by the GFR.
The more highly collective mentality is developed, the more organized affective energy
is likely to be and its qualities differentiated. In Gs and Gf it is likely to be a significant
motivating and qualitative feature of collective mentality.
A synthesis of affect theories.

General statements about affects can be applied to social organisms.
1. Affect refers to energizing functions of organisms and amplifies drives.

Below one threshold, the organism has low energy; above it energy is bound
to representations and invested in activating psychic functions; above a
second threshold, arousal disruptively discharges energy from
representations and investments. The quantitative aspect manifests the
organism’s collective psychic (nous) energy state.
2. Affects have an aversive or rewarding qualitative dimension, structured by
social meaning and the impact on the organisms’ well being. Unpleasure is
the accumulation of different relative levels of energy in various sub-
systems creating tension; pleasure is equable distribution of the energy
throughout the system. Quality is the increase, maintenance or reduction in
density of arousal and a function of collective representations and meaning.
3. Affect has rhythmic sequences of tension accumulation, discharge,
refractory period and accumulation.
4. Affect emerges within acts as an abbreviated, holistic mode of interpreting
action; it motivates and coordinates action and is essential for learning.
5. Affect is inherently social and no more located “inside” organisms than are
spoken words. It has a grammar of structured social roles and collective
representations.
Group affect.
Group affect is the tension and distribution of energy throughout the social
system. It has three states: low inactive energy, medium activating energy and high,
unstable discharging energy. Affect regulates group states. Action evokes affect as
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impulsive tension discharge or sustained arousal organizing action tendencies. It is not

“inside” the members, but in the organized social communicative domain as a
characteristic of collective mentality (nous). The formation of Go entails affect as the
collective activity of the communicational process. Group affect is not members’
emotional states, but the state of the whole social system.
Since communicational phenomena are the material basis of the collective
entity, affect is represented in communicational phenomena. Energy is located
biologically in individuals, but transmitted via communication creating collective group
activation. Individual affect becomes collective affect when communicated. If a
member is hostile to others, all are affected. All members may not feel the same, but
anger expressed in the communicational process affects the group. Only expressed or
communicated affective states produce group affective states. In the GFR, affect is not
inferred from members’ emotional state and interpersonal interactions (Kellerman,
1979; MacKenzie, 1990; Karterud, 2000), but rated by observing the activity level and
hedonic quality directly observable in non-cognitive, non-action aspects of
communicational phenomena.
Communicational phenomena as affective states.
Attributing specific emotions to groups treats them as persons by analogy.
However, collective affective states can be described by reference to quantitative and
qualitative properties of energy within the communicational process. Two dimensions
of quantity or activity level of energy and hedonic quality are defined in the
communicational process.
1. Quantitative Phenomena of arousal or energy indicate the affective state within
the communion, though not necessarily the whole group. It may refer to the energy of
one or more members, but not all. The criterion is that it is expressed in communication
to others. There are three conditions.
1.1. High, Unstable Energy. When energy exceeds the scope of current
communication, it becomes “unbound” from the activities it energizes, falls
outside homeostatic mechanisms, cannot be integrated and current
communicational activity is disrupted or terminated. Energy is then not a
qualitative feature of the communication content, but expressed in new modes of
communication or discharged. Communication cannot consistently be
maintained for transmission of meaning. The affective state itself is
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communicated, rather than a message; the signifier is “punctuated” (Green,

1977). Non-syntactical communicational phenomena occur and overflow into
proxemic and paralinguistic events such as interpersonal distance, sounds, and
gestures. Members move impulsively, physically interact and generate
discharge phenomena such as physical blows, cries, laughter or tears. The
communicational organism is integrated by communication of the affect itself.
Affect is unable to represent other representations, but is communication by the
group to itself about itself.
1.2. Medium Stable Energy. When energy in the communicational process is within
a stable range it remains bound, serving the functions expressed in
communication. Variations remain integrated so functions activated by the
energy adjust to change without disruption. Social and biological processes are
rhythmic; affect’s stability is homeostatically preserved within a range of
variability and becomes unstable when this is violated. Stable communication
processes do not demand change; engagement is maintained by members in
stable communication, even if its quality or coherence of content fluctuates.
Continuity of communication and content are needed and may or may not
involve syntactic communication.
1.3. Low, Inert Energy. In the low energy condition communication is stable, but
inert. Little is communicated, though the communion remains passively intact.
Communication may subside while members remain in contact. They may be
passive, listening, observing or ready for communication rather than giving
messages. Little overt affective energy is observable; the communicational
process may fail for lack of energy. The state is stable and terminating.
2. Qualitative Phenomena. This dimension concerns qualities of positive and
negative hedonic states as pleasure/unpleasure, reward/aversiveness or positive/negative
as reasonable observers would identify them. Qualities need to be defined for the
communicational domain. Psychodynamics of overt or latent emotional content, such
as embarrassed laughter representing overt pleasure and covert unpleasure, refer to
individual states and lose the whole-group perspective so are ignored. The social
entity’s affects are expressions within the communicational process. Operational
definitions like approach or avoidance are inadequate since people may avoid pleasure
and approach unpleasurable experiences. Hedonic quality is pleasure or unpleasure in
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the group organism and expresses the disposition or tension of energy throughout Go.
Tension is independent of quantity of energy or whether it is bound or discharged. In
high tension, energy does not circulate freely, but is dammed up to some extent in
members or subgroups. It is defined as the degree members participate in the
communicational organism and their contributions are accepted and circulate. It is
complemented by overt communications of pleasure or unpleasure. When
communication brings Go into existence, increasing tension threatens or damages its
integrity; relaxation and free expression in communication enhance integrity so the
whole can more fully express itself, whatever the quantity of energy.
2.1. Unpleasure - Negative Hedonic Quality (high or increasing communicational
tension) is constrained communication that may be socially construed as fear,
anger, disgust or distress. Others observe the communication from one angry
member to the recipient of the anger, who may or may not respond. There is a
constraint in angry or unhappy members not engaging in the monitoring and
mutuality of pleasurable states. With anxiety, communication is restricted,
members disengaged from common themes while others do not take account of
them, creating tension. Unpleasure occurs in Go when tension is expressed in
conflict, misunderstanding or disagreement impairing communication. In
unpleasure Go suffers reduced wholeness. Tension is impairment of free flow of
communication; the process itself is disrupted or the meaning (message) is
impaired by rejection, denial or abuse. Unpleasure takes precedence over
pleasure; when both are present in communication mixed quality is regarded as
unpleasure.
2.2. Pleasure - Positive Hedonic Quality (low or decreasing communicational
tension) is reduced tension. Communication flows freely and its functions are
performed, transferring from one member to another or creating an exchange
network connecting them. For Go pleasure results in enhanced collectivity
through successful communication; it is low tension and free flow of
communication without impediments. Members talk freely, contribute as they
wish, when one talks, all listen or laugh together. Pleasure does not imply the
system is in equilibrium, which is quantitative, it means the system reduces
tension by free flow of energy.
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Mapping group affect.

In Figure 13.1, affect states are mapped on a two dimensional graph. Arousal or
activity level is shown on the vertical axis ranging from high unstable activity at the top,
medium stable activity in the middle, to low inert activity level at the bottom. The
horizontal dimension represents the hedonic continuum, ranging from aversive,
unpleasurable on the left to rewarding, pleasurable on the right.
Six general affective states are described. At the top, states of high activity are
shown. On the left, negative or unpleasurable side of the hedonic continuum, a state of
high aversive affect leads to energy discharge, called “Distress,” common to any
aversive affect reaching sufficient intensity to become unstable and discharge including
anger, grief, fear, pain, disgust or horror. There is high tension and high energy in
verbal or non-verbal communication. It manifests as unpleasurable messages in both
symbolic and non-symbolic content of communication. If pleasure is also evident,
Distress is rated as long as one unpleasurable discharge occurs in the interval.
On the right side, “Joy” denotes a high intensity, positive or rewarding state. It
refers to any pleasurable emotion of intensity leading to discharge including joy, mirth,
pleasure or affection. It is high, unstable pleasurable energy and causes discharge of
pleasurable affect in low tension. It is observed in communication by non-symbolic
elements expressing the discharge in laughter, shouts of mirth or joy, gestures and
actions such as a slap on the back.
Intermediate activity states are in the center. On the left side of the hedonic
continuum are emotional states expressing aversive affect without discharge or
termination. They are stable states with bound energy or sustained activity, including
unhappiness, annoyance, frustration, disappointment and apprehension called
“Discontent.” Tension evident in communication expressed as unpleasurable affects,
preventing free flow of communication defines Discontent even if overt unpleasurable
affects are not evident. Discontent is rated if there is evidence of pleasure and free flow
of some aspects of communication mixed with unpleasure. The presence of tension is
enough to rate negative affect even if pleasurable affects are also present. On the
positive hedonic side of the graph are found medium bound or stable pleasurable states
called “Interest, with low tension that sustain activity, including interest, enjoyment,
curiosity and satisfaction. It is likely to occur in stable states when communication
flows freely to fulfill requirements of the current activity. There are no discharge
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phenomena.
High
DISTRESS JOY
Intensity or
activation
continuum.
DISCONTENT INTEREST
Hedonic continuum.
Negative, Positive,
Aversive, Rewarding,
Unpleasure Pleasure.
BOREDOM Low CONTENTMENT
Figure 13.1. Qualitative and quantitative dimensions mapping six group affective
states.
At the lower end of the activity dimension are two inactive states. On the
aversive hedonic side, the affect is called “Boredom,” referring to boredom, sullenness,
apathy, depression and lethargy. It is low, stable inert energy level with tension,
expressing stability through inertia and unpleasurable or mixed affects. Members may
not be in active exchange but passively participating in a communion. On the positive
hedonic side, “Contentment” refers to placid states of low activity with positive hedonic
quality. It is expressed by inert energy level and low tension. It is a state of ease with
no evidence of tension; members are in a state of communion, but not necessarily active
communicational exchange. This is likely following discharge of pleasure or in
transition states between other, more aroused activities.
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The categories, definitions and examples are summarized in Table 13.1.

Detailed rules and criteria for rating Affect are given in the Rater’s Manual in Appendix
2.
PLEASURE UNPLEASURE
Definitions Rewarding hedonic quality, Aversive hedonic quality,

increased togetherness, increased interpersonal tension,
shared emotional states, separateness, unshared emotional
decreased interpersonal states; anger, unhappiness,
tension, happiness, displeasure: cries, facial
enjoyment, pleasure: grimaces, gestures;
gestures, smiles, pleasant
voice modulations.
UNSTABLE Emotional energy fluct- JOY: Pleasurable, unstable DISTRESS: Unpleasurable,
HIGH uates, involving discharge, energy, exultation, happi- unstable energy, unhappiness,
ENERGY reduction and increase; ness, excitement, glad-ness, anger, grief, sadness, excitement,
unable to be maintained in mirth, delight, enjoyment intensity, fluctuations in energy
communication, interrupts expressed intensely, fluc- and disruption in syntactical
syntactical messages; tuations in energy, disrupts communication by paralinguistic
paralinguistic communication with non- phenomena.
communication. syntactical contributions.
Examples Jokes, laughter, boisterous, Anger, tears, shouting, abuse,
excited talk and play cries of pain, rage, frustration,
exclamations of pleasure, blows, jeering, teasing, mocking
gestures, back slapping. laughter.
STABLE Emotional energy remains INTEREST: Pleasurable DISCONTENT: Unpleasurable
MEDIUM stable for more than half energy, maintained, stable, energy, maintained, stable,
ENERGY the minute without motivates continuing motivates continuing or
discharge or marked involvement or increased increasing engagement though
fluctuation; maintains engagement in syntactic with tension, frustration or
current state of the communication or current dissatisfaction. Communication
communication process. activities. maintained or increased.
Examples Pleasant conversation, Complaints, arguments,
modulated interaction in disagreements with tension and
talk, game, other activity, aversive emotion; teasing,
interest shown by attention, criticism, talk about worries and
questions to ensure contact. unhappy experiences with
Talk of interests, satisfaction empathic responses.
of curiosity
INERT Energy low, emotion not CONTENTMENT: BOREDOM: Unpleasurable,
LOW overtly expressed, lack of Pleasurable states with little inactive states, little overt
ENERGY arousal, minimal commun- expressed emotion, main- communication; communion is
ication, lack of syntactic taining communion, without maintained, without significant
messages, contact is significant overt exchange. energy or overt exchange.
maintained.
Examples Quiet, unemotional states, Boredom, frustration, paralysis
group in contact, not inability to tackle problems or
actively exchanging communicate about issues, sad
following a satisfying moods, anger, disappointment
experience.
Table 13.1. Definitions of Affect categories with examples.
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14. GFR DIMENSION 4: ACTION COHERENCE.
Collective action is an essential characteristic of group functionality and

requirement for members’ solidarity (Durkheim, 1964). However, action is even less
considered than affect in social psychology, having been replaced by analysis of the
“causes” or “units” of behaviour (Miller, Galanter and Pribram, 1960; Rosenblith and
Allinsmith, 1966), although it was retained in Gestalt Psychology (Koffka, 1950).
Empirical psychology views action as the expression of internal states rather than a
category in its own right. It is absent from indexes of social psychology texts over fifty
years (Sherif, 1948; Asch, 1952; Wrightsman, 1972; Rosenberg and Turner, 1981;
Napier and Gershenfeld, 1987; Hewstone, et al., 1988; Forsyth, 1990; Gillette and
McCollom, 1995). Cooperation, conflict, performance, decision-making and collective
behaviour are discussed instead.
“Behavior” concerns the determining effect of situations as the objective basis
for observation. Its reductionist assumptions proved arid and it was superseded by
cognitivism, which include action referring to behaviour and its mental concomitants
(Apter, 1982). However, concepts of human action as studied in sociology, philosophy
and phenomenological social psychology are reviewed to develop a concept of
collective action.
Definitions of action.
Action is “human conduct devised by the actor in advance … ‘act’ shall designate
the outcome of this ongoing process” (Schutz, 1953, p. 304), or “action, an objective
performance of consciousness, is at the same time the precondition for the construction of
the social world,” (Schutz and Luckmann, 1983, p. 5). Actions are social when others
appear in their purpose (Schutz and Luckmann, 1983). Social action is expressed in the
goals of social relations, which originate in the reciprocity and continuity of social action.
Action theory is “the study of human goal-directed behavior and its social basis” (Harré
and Lamb, 1984, p. 5). Action is socially steered and controlled consciously goal
directed, planned, motivated, deliberate behaviour, accompanied by emotions (Harré and
Lamb, 1984). Execution and modification of plans in the light of results of goal-directed
action have been studied (Miller, Galanter and Pribram, 1960; Clark and Crossland,
1986). Action expresses the image of the act, cognitive act, hierarchy of instructions and
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evaluation of results. It is “behavior over which an agent has exercised discretion, so that
it is goal-directed and specific to immediate situations” (Sanders and Cushman, 1984, p.
246). Social action is performed by actors understanding and adjusting to each others’
rules with reliable interpretations. Empirical investigations concern linguistic,
anthropological and experimental interaction (von Cranach and Harré, 1982); action is
integrated by communication into social contexts (Sanders and Cushman, 1984).
Psychological theories of action.

Systemic approaches investigating coordination of social action and perception
postulate “action systems” consisting of components dealing “semi-autonomously with a
limited aspect of the problem” (Turvey, 1977, p. 221). Actors’ intentions organize each
hierarchical level to evolve acts, analogous to the neurobiology of physical action
(Weimer, 1977). Yet, natural events require methodologies not reducing phenomena to
abstract elements (Jenkins, 1977). Hermaneutic psychology regards human behaviour as
action or “text-analogues” open to interpretation with a similar stucture to language
(Shotter, 1975; Gauld and Shotter, 1977; Clarke and Crossland, 1985). Actions involve
bodily movements guided by actors, who have criteria of success or failure and its
observation involves interpreting intentions.
Action in contemporary social psychology.

Harré and Secord (1972) proposed a methodology of intentional agents. Social
meaning is acquired by performing acts defined by social convention. Roles are
determined by expected actions; actors’ accounts of actions reveal their meanings and are
organized into cooperative or competitive act-structures, routines, games, ceremonial
rituals or entertainments (Harré and Secord, 1972). Action is a means towards an
identified end (Harré, 1982), distinguished from behaviour by occurring in social
situations that are a “spatio-temporal unity” (von Cranach, 1982, p. 38) and provide
meaning. Goal-directed action is the framework for empirical (von Cranach and Harré,
1982a) and theoretical studies (von Cranach and Valach, 1984).
Action contributes to the fabric of social life, has social origins and social
consequences. It is behaviour guided by partly social cognitions; society guides and
controls members’ actions through their cognitions and social structures. It is regulated
by social conventions and rules, proceeds from decisions of an ordered series of
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individual cognitions in which knowledge and value are criteria. However, “group
psychology is concerned with group goals and group actions; but until now these
collective actions have not been investigated in detail” (von Cranach and Valach, 1984, p.
297).
A goal is an “imagined state aspired to as the outcome of the action;” since
cognition is assumed to direct behaviour, “action theory is therefore cognitive theory”
(von Cranach 1982, p. 40). Goal-directed action is fundamentally social and “the
behaviour of a human actor which is consciously and purposefully aimed towards a goal,”
but has been considered as “above all individual” (Von Cranach and Valach, 1984, p.
285), placing goals outside the observable field. It studies individuals in social interaction
(von Cranach and Harré, 1982).
However, individuals’ actions are essentially actions with others and their
“intended public performance” is defined by the body and social situation; effectiveness is
determined by skill and knowledge, which are not only individual, but distributed
throughout groups. “Group action” integrates body and social situation. In social events,
individual actors’ intentions are transformed by others’ understanding in the medium of
language (Harré, 1993).
Psychological theories of action and the GFR. If individuals’ actions derive
meaning in social environments, groups must provide their context. Goals cannot be
observed if regarded as personal cognitions, but if individual action is only complete
when integrated into group action, the communicating or linguistic structure of the act
locates goals beyond the privacy of the individual mind, making them available for
observation.
Mead’s theory of action.

Action theory was central to Mead’s “social behaviorism” (Mead, 1962). The
object of action is “in the life-process of the group, not in those of the separate
individuals” (p. 7n). Individual acts involve larger social acts only understood with
reference to the group, which in turn is understood in terms of the “social whole of
complex group activity, into which we analyze (as elements) the behavior of each of the
separate individuals composing it” (pp. 6-7). Individual conduct is “the organized
conduct of the social group;” rather than accounting for group conduct by individuals,
“the whole (society) is prior to the part (individuals), not the part to the whole; and the
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part is explained in terms of the whole, not the whole in terms of the part” (p. 7). The act
is “the fundamental datum of both social and individual psychology” (p. 8).
Cooperation is possible even if individuals neither understand nor accurately
interpret each other’s communications. A group member’s gesture “calls out the proper
response” in others or provokes responses without common meaning (pp. 55-56),
consequently, social action is a dimension of psychic activity, analysable without
reduction to cognition. A collective act may be constructed by individuals with differing
(even incompatible) motives, understanding or goals. “The unit of existence is the act,
not the moment” and unfolds successive phases, synchronising social, personal and
historical dimensions (Mead, 1972).
Action becomes a social object with a significance independent of the goal. A
game of cards with a goal of winning may cause a fight that changes the group’s social
structure, though the game is successfully completed. It is part of a sequence of actions
for the group and cannot be considered as a single goal-directed event. A theory of action
in groups must acknowledge the act’s significance for the group’s history rather than
actors’ intentions. Group boundaries are defind by action, “the boundaries of social
things and of the individual as a social being are determined by contacts in social
conduct” consisting of members’ actions and their group consequences (Mead, 1972, p.
362).
Action and selves: Mind and self are products of (social) action. Identification of
self with specific acts isolates and renders it definite. Action “has a social pattern only
from the standpoint of the group … not from the standpoint of the physiological
organism” (Mead, 1972, p. 446). Participants in co-operative activity show by socially
established gestures what others are to do. Others’ actions form a “generalised other” that
becomes the representative of the self viewed from outside and the means of acquiring
values and morality. Acting towards oneself (even in imagination) permits individuals to
allign with others in cooperative ventures. Social objects and consensual meanings result
from cooperative actions rather than causing them (Denzin, 1972). To form selves, actors
adjust to others’ roles, as in games, where all understand the common goal by
participating in a common action pattern. Participation in activity with common goals is
the condition for forming selves (Melzer, 1972).
Action and cooperation. Cooperation as the condition for human action requires
attaching common meaning to gestures, imagining corresponding intentions and
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achieving consensus. In common action, cooperation precipitates ideas in individuals

rather than deriving them from common ideas. Action as a phenomenon of
communication and self-communication allows construction of cooperative actions;
consequently, groups’ functionality is specified by the degree they cooperatively integrate
actions (Blumer, 1972b). When shared meanings and definitions do not allign,
coordination fails and collective action becomes contentious or anatagonistic. Individuals’
actions adjusted to others’ are not behavioral responses, but interpretations of intentions.
Intra-psychic events are covert stages of action (Swanson, 1972). Social action
imaginatively incorporates others’ conduct; psychological functions are integrated in the
“complete span of action” comprising initial impulse, actor’s constuctive organization and
terminal objective (Meltzer, 1972). Interpretation of others’ progressively constructed
gestures as actions unfold in a shared social context is essential for forming and regulating
stable definitions of group situations. Objects do not pre-exist around individuals, they
are constructed by on-going activity. The act is the unit of study; its meaning is formed
by the relation of its phases and is not a “psychical addition” to it (Troyer, 1972). Human
society and its life consist of acting people and their actions; culture consists of
conventionalised understanding, acts and artifacts as premises of common modes of
action for members (Shibutani, 1972).
Mead and the GFR. Mead shows action is not dependent on prior cognitions, but
observable in communication. Group culture and cognition are consequences of acts. A
common reality is formed through action independent of individual’s intentions. Mind,
self, body, value, sense of others and psychosocial boundaries are formed in action, whose
essential condition is coordination by cooperation. For the GFR, cooperation is a central
characteristic of social action.
Parsons’ Theory of Action.

Weber first used social action as a theoretical construct (Mitchell, 1968),
distinguishing rational, expedient, affective and traditionalist forms of action; bureaucracy
converted community action into rationally ordered social action (Gerth and Mills, 1967).
Parsons’ theory of action included the act, intelligent actor, goal, context changed by the
act, and relationship between the elements as the unit of observation. An act is a process
subject to error or failure in relation to norms and choices. Actors act within a social
milieu and system of norms, rules and values that are imposed from society and
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constraining actors from within as moral obligations to preserve society (Durkheim, 1954;
Parsons and Shils, 1962; Parsons, 1968). The key ideas of society manifest in collective
actions repeated within temporal structures having meaning for the whole society rather
than individuals. This “ritual attitude” (Parsons, 1968, Vol. II, p. 712) strengthens
solidarity, since each member contributes similarities (mechanical solidarity) or
complementary differences (organic solidarity) to common action. Common affective
experiences are provided by supporting common purposes that enact the social being’s
values. The social organism sustains itself by action. Action elements are not
“phenomena” in the space-time framework, they constitute their own human, purposive
structure for empirical observations (Parsons, 1968, Vol. II, p. 733). Theory of action
divides science into natural sciences and sciences of action for which space-time is
irrelevant, but include means-end schemata and “the indispensability of the subject” (p.
764). Parsons’ work established social action as central to cultural studies and continues
to stimulate discussion, but has been criticised as “fatally flawed” by being too reliant on
rationality, altruism and self-expression (Joas, 1996, p. 24).
Theory of Action and the GFR. Action is the observable matter of groups
existing in the “field of action” structured by the social organism, sustained by
cooperation. Actions reflect the organizing effects of the collective consciousness in
members, are not phenomena in space time, but created by goals, social significance and
unanticipated social effects. Observation of action in the GFR needs to take account of
goals in addition to cooperation.
Harbermas’ Theory of Communicative Action.

For Habermas (1984, 1989) action is the fundamental category for analyzing
social life. He criticised the “philosophy of consciousness” polarizing subject-object,
reason-sensation, mind-body and self-other, giving insufficient recognition to language.
Action is part of pre-existing structures of social interaction, not equated with
communication, though language is the medium for understanding, coordination and
consensus. Communicative action involves understanding all that ensures actors
coordinate. In Durkheim and Mead’s paradigm, individuation is socialization. Personal
motivations, intentions, desires, feelings and repertoires of behaviour are not private,
but formed through language and culture. What is available in society is encountered
through action. Rationality is a pattern of social action mediated through cultural
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processes rather than private cognitive representations. Identity is recognition of self

under conditions of “a communicatively shared intersubjectivity.”
Communicative action and rationality. In social action, individuals know and
act by joining the common fund of implicit knowledges. Rationality is “less to do with
the possession of knowledge than with how speaking and acting subjects acquire and
use knowledge” (Habermas, 1984, p. 8). Goal-directed actions are only possible with
the “central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus-bringing force of
argumentative speech” (p. 10). Communicative action coordinates cooperative action
that creates group solidarity, forms personal identity and constructs internal behavioural
controls. The objective world is established by being regarded the same by a
community of speaking, acting people. The act of communication develops common
experience. Explicit knowledge implies background knowledge uniting communicants
while consciously and unconsciously coordinating their activity. Actions regulated by
norms, self-representations and evaluations form a communication practice that sustains
a consensus of common values. Communicants embrace norms of action as the
background for evaluating actions; “intuitive” awareness of norms of action makes
actions “rational.”
Subjectivity arises from privileged access to phenomena that cannot be attributed
to the shared world; but the shared world also provides the system of ideas evaluating
phenomena as true or false and actions as cooperative or oppositional to the consensus.
The normative reality must be autonomous in relation to individuals to have this
evaluative function. If separation into internal and external worlds is not achieved, there
is no clear demarcation between actions, intentions and feelings. Intentions and motives
are as inseperable from actions and consequences as feelings and emotions are from the
their expression. Meaning in everday life derives from action against the background of
common interpretations, implicit beliefs, assumptions, values and cultural practices that
are the medium for communicative action. It is not a subjective construction, but a
collective formation, an extension of “objective mind” (Kögler, 1995). Communicative
action is the interaction of subjects capable of speech who strive for understanding about
situations and their plans, to coordinate actions by agreement and common interpretations
(Habermas, 1984).
The linguistic medium links communicative action, Social Communication
Theory and collective mentality. But communicative practice is “a diffuse, fragile,
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continuously revised and only momentarily successful communication in which

participants rely on problematic and unclarified presuppositions and feel their way from
one occasional commonality to the next” (Habermas, 1984, p. 100-101). Actors have
individual goals ranging from cooperation to conflict. Communicative action is
“coordinated through speech acts and does not coincide with them” (Habermas, 1984, p.
101). It does not infer actors’ intentions, but observes the structure of their expressions in
relation to discernable goals.
Society is not a “reification of consciousness,” but the result of communicative
action and self regulating systems. Objective behaviour is contrasted with objectified
action symbolically expressed in a cultural context, recognising actors’ goals.
Communicative action achieves understanding among actors, coordinates goal-directed
activities and develops common social reality (Harbermas, 1989). Meaning is
“objectively there as a relation between certain phases of the social act,” not a psychical
addition to it nor “an ‘idea’ as traditionally conceived” (Mead 1962, quoted Habermas,
1989, p. 8).
Communicative action regulates the energies of social solidarity by
communicative acts communicating collective consciousness as a normative consensus
established in community rituals, which confer collective identity and define members as
of the same social group. Communicative actions regularized into rituals and normative
action patterns create a collective identity expressed in the sense of belonging. The
condition for this identity is coordination of goals into cooperative action that socializes
and regulates energies. Stability in society is maintained by socially integrated actions
forming a self-sustaining system. Communicative action emerges in two stages: first a
medium of communication specific to the situation develops enabling expressive gestures
to be translated into common symbols; second common behavioural norms develop that
regulate behaviour. Then communicative action directly restructures group action
(Harbermas, 1989).
Communicative action and the GFR. Communicative action develops an implicit
fund of social knowledge that interprets, coordinates and integrates individual action.
Coordination of action enables members to achieve understanding, cooperate and form
personal and collective idenity. Communicative understanding is an effect of action, not a
cause. Communicative action and the fund of knowledge is Gs. For the GFR, the group-
forming effects of action are in the field of communicative phenomena.
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Criticism of the Theory of Communicative Action.

Habermas has been criticised for lacking a coherent theory of society,
inadequately accounting for irrational and conflictual social life and neglecting
individuals’ richness (Honneth and Joas, 1991; Schnädelbach, 1991). However, he
established communication as a “space” for complimentary experiences of “I” and “we.”
Communications exist simultaneously for individual and group, constituting a “common
referential space” that is neither inner nor outer and devlops common meaning. “We”
predates “I,” since language is founded in discourse towards others, only later forming
individual consciousness. Consensus in communicative action allows participants to
recapture the “we” that repairs incompatible individual goals. In conflict, “overarching
common ‘we’-perspectives” of the discourse must exist, since “we always share other
norms which are not yet contested and a common background knowledge” (Taylor, 1991,
p. 28). Conflicts are resolved by rational speech identifying other commonalities (p. 30).
Harbermas’ theory is really of communicative rationality. However, language is
also a medium for self-representation, and this contributes nothing to norms and
rationality; as the sole framework for the investigation of communicative action
rationality inadequately accounts for emotional and non-rational action (Joas, 1996).
Habermas agrees “language is the constitutive organ not only of thought, but also of both
social practice and experience, of the formation of ego and group identities” (1991, p.
221). Social pathologies are manifestiations of systematically distorted communication;
social repression or other pathologies “take root unobtrusively in the pores of processes of
reaching understanding” and damage intersubjective forms (p. 226; Burrow, 1927b).
Communicative action and goals.

Action is socially structured like cognition and affect. Collective goals and
value structures are integral to it. The group is an action matrix as much as a thought
matrix. The view that action emanates from independent individuals oriented toward
personal goals is inadequate. Pre-existing norms and a common implicit knowledge
fund are resources for action decisions. Action theory includes normative reference
points, values, energy or “effort,” with the same status as energy in physics and
dynamics in the psychoanalytic sense (Joas, 1996, p. 17). Rational or normatively
oriented action is teleological, has explicit goals and end-purposes, assumes actors have
control over their body and are autonomous individuals.
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However, Wundt’s “law of the heterogeneity of purposes” that all actions

produce more consequences than entailed in their motives and that consequences never
coincide with motives, complicates matters. Actors constantly evaluate actions in
progress and contract or extend them. A comprehensive action theory must consider
creative, non-rational action where actors are not causative agents of sequences, ends
and means, goals and methods. The effects of action are uncertain as in play, where
goals are precise, but develop and change in response to the unfolding situation. They
become means when superseded by new goals. This applies to work considered in
relation to a broader “ends in view” that does not specify the goals by which it will be
attained (Joas, 1996).
Action theory places cognition in reciprocal relation between actor, goal,
developing means by which it is attained and alteration in the light of experience. The
alternative to a cognitive, teleological action theory is “to conceive perception and
cognition as not preceding action, but rather as a phase of action by which action is
directed and redirected in its situational contexts” (Joas, 1996, p. 158). Action emerges
from the preceding situation, which is the pre-existing relationships between humans
and objects, implicitly understood by the protagonists as the context of their action. It is
continuously revised, reorganized and redefined in response to changes in the situation.
Actors’ pre-conceived plans and goals do not account for what is observed and the
results cannot adequately be traced to intentions.
Goals are emergent characteristics, interpreting action as the social situation
unfolding in response to actors’ activity; each carries its own tacit contexts reaching
beyond the situation. Goals are not internal cognitive representations of intended
actions within the personal mind of the subjects; they are implicit or explicit intentional
structures in social situations that organize action and self-reflective control over them.
They are organizing structures of action, evident in the communicational phenomena
and observable elements of action. Since social action is manifested through
communicational phenomena, goals are observable organizing structures of the
communicational field.
Conclusions.
Action theory provides a concept of group action. Action is inherently social
and results from the selection and organization of environmental features. It is only
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understood in a social context and ‘reality’ is formed by common actions. Sense of self
and other and boundaries between individuals and groups are defined through action.
Cooperation based on a consensus of common meanings integrates other psychosocial
functions into action; social meaning results from action. Acts are constructed from
ongoing action by communication and group action fits individual acts together in
shared meanings and common purposes. Action is a central dimension of group
mentality and coordinates nous functions.
Action theory is a comprehensive theory of society. Social organisms sustain
themselves through action. Acts are units of observation and include actors, rationality,
goals, context, relationships and process in time. Norms and rules of the social milieu
sustain action and constrain actors. Ritualistic action creates social, cognitive and
affective structures through collective representations. Communicative action is
fundamental to social life. Based on language rather than consciousness, it is socially
coordinated within pre-existing structures of interaction that underpin values and
purpose; language is the medium for understanding and coordinating it. Individuality,
motives, intentions, desires and behavioural repertoires are not private ‘internal’ events,
but formed by language and culture through action. Rationality, expressed collectively
in nous, is a pattern of social action mediated by culture, not a set of cognitive rules.
Ego identity is self-recognition in intersubjectively shared communication.
Communicative action regulates social life, facilitating coordination,
cooperation and group solidarity through norms and the common fund of implicit
knowledge. Socially integrated action preserves the stability of society and
communicative practice creates a common world. Communicative action forms
boundaries between internal and external worlds, individual and group, actions,
intentions and feelings. Goals are a phase of action, directing it in the situational
context; they express social relationships and are observable characteristics of action,
rather than actors’ internal states. Communication creates coordinated cooperation and
common goals observable as structures of action. It is a dimension of psychosocial life,
expressed and observed in communicational phenomena of group life and the condition
for collective mentality (Small, 1905; Durkheim, 1964). Social communicative action
integrates individual intentions within a body of shared knowledge, norms and values to
regulate and stabilize group life and manifest nous.
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Characterizing group action.

The degree to which the group is capable of acting as an entity has to be
documented to show movement from Gn to Gf. Characteristics of members’ actions as
they influence the development of communions need to be recorded. Dimensions
important to the study of action include meaning (Harré and Secord, 1972),
interpretation in the social context (Habermas, 1984, 1989), acts performed (Harré,
1993), goals and cooperation (Parsons, 1968; Harbermas, 1989). They resolve into two
observable features of the communicational field: cooperation between protagonists and
whether goals are common or individual. Once a communion is formed and the group
has achieved Gs, action is coordinated through communication with all members
cooperating in shared goals, regulating their contributions to compliment each other. In
this state, the group nurtures mind, self, identity, cognition and rationality, self-
regulation, morality and culture.
Group action describes how well the group undertakes collective action, defined
as: action each member is agreed upon (even if tacitly), undertaken collectively with a
common goal. Participating, supporting or vicariously observing it implicates all
members. The primary collective action is communication, which constitutes the group
and provides conditions for higher order action oriented to non-communicational goals
dependent on it as a medium. In a group, the first act is to talk or acknowledge each
other by non-verbal communication. The result may be group actions to play cards,
skittles or “hang out.” They cannot occur without members participating and only have
meaning if all participate. Communication as action is the means by which an
individual’s intention is collectively embraced and initiates common acts. The extent to
which the group acts or individuals act has to be defined. The quality to be recorded is
the degree to which members act in a coordinated, cooperative way or in an
uncoordinated, uncooperative way. The degree to which the action hangs together is a
quality of “action coherence.”
Action Coherence is a dimension of group function, which records the degree to
which action is coordinated and integrated. “Coherence” means “action or fact of sticking
together; cohesion, logical connection; congruity; consistency, harmonious connection of
the several parts of a discourse or system, so that the whole hangs together;” the verb
“cohere” means to cleave or stick together, unite or remain united in action (Shorter
Oxford Dictionary, 1990). Action Coherence describes the social integrity of the
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communion as a quality of communication. It records the extent members reciprocate

communication and cooperate to produce common action.
Action Coherence describes the extent members stick together as a unit and
involves two conditions: first, cohesion or the closeness of bonds; second, ordered,
systematic relations. The dimension of cooperation-opposition embodies both of these
characteristics. High coherence involves unanimity among members creating closeness,
while low coherence involves opposition and less closeness. Action Coherence
describes how unified the communion is and how strongly members function as an
acting unit. Although this is the group’s task, it does not suggest they remain in high
coherence for a long time. They fluctuate as they deal with internal tensions, but need
to unify and undertake group action if group life is not to collapse.
Definition of Action Coherence categories.

Action Coherence describes whether group action is the manifestation of a
collective will in which the group acts as one (even if in different or complimentary
roles), or a set of individual and disparate acts which take place in the group
environment. Structure defines the formation of the group or sub-group based on
participation in a communicational field. Once the unit is a communion, the coherence
of its action can be considered. Categories describe degrees of coherence in observed
communicational phenomena and the group action it reveals. Four categories of group
action are described. The names of these categories provide a vocabulary to
differentiate qualities of action coherence.
Concord from Latin, “of one mind,” means, agreement, state of peace and amity,
harmony (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). All members of the communion act as
one, even if in different roles, to form the collective action. Members are in agreement
and mutually aware of their participation in collective action. They are in a state of
unanimity in pursuit of a common goal, expressed as a common activity or concurrent
activities in which each plays a cooperative role. It is observed within the communicative
process as agreement, common purpose, common or coordinated action.
Accord from the French, “to bring heart to heart,” means to cause to agree, attune
to, reconcile (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). In this condition, members cooperate
in different, but compatible goals. They cooperate, but not in a unified common activity.
Common action may be incompletely or ineffectively achieved. It is rated by observing
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the communication process for evidence of common purpose, not fully understood or
realized or with different, though compatible purposes. Several actions may occur
concurrently, such as a game and a conversation involving players and non-players
unrelated to the game. Common action for a unified goal may occur with differences of
opinion, misunderstandings or confusion when members are not in agreement, but
without overt conflict, such as cooperative differences of opinion about a game’s rules.
Communication may not fulfill its function, in spite of members trying. In a game, they
may participate reluctantly, hesitantly or watch without joining. In conversation they
talk over each other, misunderstand, or disagree about a common topic, while
maintaining a cooperative attitude.
Discord means absence of concord or harmony, dissension, disagreement,
diversity, dissonance, confused noise (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). This is
expressed in the communicational field when members demonstrate diverse,
incompatible goals and engage in uncooperative activities disrupting each other or the
common goal. They communicate uncooperatively or without common purpose;
communication fails to be achieved or fulfill its function. Members do not try to
understand or listen to each other; communications are disagreed with or not received;
there is dissension about suggested common purposes that cannot be undertaken as
shared action. While difference of opinion is present in Accord, it becomes dispute in
Discord, which records failure to undertake group action. It may occur through
difference, disorganization or failure to manage the task. Members may refuse to
participate, disagree or repudiate the common purpose or action. Conversation lacks
agreed or consistent topic and there is disagreement without resolution. It may describe
diversity, dissension or failure to coordinate individual purposes to a common goal
through communication. Active opposition or overt conflict between members is
lacking. It describes confused and disorganized action, but not intended to damage each
other.
Contracord is coined to describe an additional category. It derives from Latin
“contra,” meaning “against;” as a prefix it means against, in opposition to, opposite, in
the opposite direction (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). Contracord therefore means -
“against or opposed to the heart or mind,” intended as a general term to cover conflict,
disunity, hostility or antagonism. Common action is not achieved because of members’
active opposition to a common purpose. Members have incompatible goals and adopt an
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oppositional attitude to group, therapist or other members. They compete, act in rivalry
and oppose common action. They counteract a common action and try to impose their
purpose or action on others. It is the least unified condition of the group, involving
coercion, hostility or aggression. Opposition and hostility are expressed in the
communicational field, which becomes a medium for disunity. There is antagonism of
members against each other, whereas in Discord, there is loss of unity or failure to
achieve common purpose. The antagonism in Contracord may be hostile, aggressive, or
coercive, against the wishes of other parties to the communicative acts. Hostility is
harming another, antagonism intends to counteract or go against their action. Members
may passively resist or disrupt another's activity without actively attempting to harm the
other. Contracord is antagonistic communication.
These criteria are summarized in Table 14.1, which compares categories goals,
quality of cohesion or cooperation and example activities. Full details of rating criteria
and rules are given in the GFR Rater’s Manual in Appendix 2.
GOALS COOPERATION ACTIVITY
CONCORD Members share a Members cooperate fully and There is a common, shared
common goal enabling coordinate with unanimity in activity involving all
them to coordinate collective action. Cohesion members of the
with each other’s and mutual engagement are communion coordinated
action to achieve it. high. by a common goal.
ACCORD Members’ goals are Members cooperate loosely, The activities are diverse,
different but but do not coordinate well and compatible or similar, but
compatible. While not allow different involvement or not shared. They do not
shared, they do not communication. Cohesion is interfere with each other
conflict with each low with loose engagement. and coordinate, but with
other. different goals.
DISCORD The goals are different, Members are uncooperative Activities are diverse, with
but incompatible though not oppositional. incompatible goals and
though not directly They disagree, misunderstand, interfere with each other
conflicting with each fail to coordinate. Cohesion or fail to achieve
other. is low and engagement loose cooperation. Members do
not oppose each other
CONTRA- Goals are Members may be highly Activities may be diverse
CORD incompatible; members cohesive and intensely or common, but within
coerce or impose goals engaged, but in opposition or them members actively
on others or oppose antagonism to others. oppose each other with
their goals. Cohesion is variable, antagonism.
engagement high.
Table 14.1. Action Coherence categories.

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15. GFR DIMENSION 5: THERAPISTS INTERVENTIONS.
Since therapists profoundly affect groups, the GFR records their activity. They
intervene throughout the life of the group assisting members to sustain pleasurable
group experiences and help their identified problems. In addition to making
psychotherapeutic interpretations (all therapists in the study had psychodynamic
training), they conversed with patients, gave instructions, set limits and gave
information.
Types of interventions.
Interpretation, confrontation and clarification are the main forms of intervention in
psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy (König, 1991). Other therapeutic models
place stronger emphasis on education, information, advice and other involvements
(Upper and Ross, 1985). Other forms of intervention do not involve symbolic content
of the patient’s discourse (Etkin, 1995). For group psychotherapy of children and
adolescents with poorly developed verbal skills, a number of types of verbal
interventions have been discriminated (Dalal, 1995; Gordon, 1997).
1. General Interpretations are statements about events in the group providing new
meaning. Often interpretations point out significance not evident to participants
or that they do not wish to acknowledge. The overall effect of interpretations is to
change understanding, add new information or link unconnected ideas.
2. Group Interpretations are offered to the group-as-a-whole or all members. They
tend to intensify the sense of identification between members, strengthen the
group process and may stimulate interaction between isolated members.
3. Member Interpretations are to one or several individuals. They may deal with
intra-psychic issues, individual behaviour, intensify members’ sense of
individuality and increase differentiation from the rest of the group.
4. Facilitations promote interaction without interpreting, including questions about
members’ activities, drawing interactions to their attention and assisting them feel
at ease.
5. Logical Implication. Often activity has a limited perspective, not taking account
of the welfare of the whole group. Logical implication enunciates its
consequences or places logical alternatives before the group. For example, when
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a member is persecuted, it can be pointed out that if he is driven from the group,
another victim will be selected until only one person is left. Alternatives can be
placed into discussion or as interventions in a sequence of behaviour, such as
saying “instead of hitting him, you could ask him to stop.”
6. Questions. Often therapists can initiate a new train of thought or place a
conversation or activity in perspective by posing questions that engage members.
If someone is being coerced, the therapist could ask, “do you want to do what he
says?” throwing doubt on a member’s assertions and prestige or stimulating
members to develop their own views.
7. Punctuation. Repeating what is said or done helps members become conscious.
Therapists may repeat a phrase like “Oh really?” or move into the midst of a
scuffle which is becoming aggressive, interrupting the process so reflection can
occur.
8. Naming an action or behaviour for its social significance may include saying a
member is “teasing” or “bossing” another or labelling affects as anger, fear or
sadness.
9. Representation. Describing the existing state of the group, members’ disposition,
cognitive organisation, affects and action without interpretation facilitates
recognition of their function in the structure and encourages their representation in
the group. Representation consists of verbal descriptions of situations, narratives
of events or group history. Members are often unable to provide a verbal account
of what is happening since they are immersed in it. Description without
interpretation is often a powerful stimulus.
10. Limits. It is often necessary for therapists in child and adolescent groups to
remind members of the rules or re-establish boundaries. These limits are intended
to reiterate circumstances that define and maintain the therapeutic situation.
Limits serve a symbolic function of reminding members of their contract (Anzieu,
1984).
11. Locomotion. Therapists’ movement around the room is a significant intervention.
The presence of the therapist next to scuffling members restrains them.
All interventions play a part in managing the group process to sustain Go. They
are used to shape and direct the spontaneously expressed life of the group. In the
present study, it would have been valuable to examine the effect of each form of
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intervention on group function. However, in early versions of the GFR, definition of

verbal characteristics of interventions was complex and prevented consistency of
ratings. A significant research project would be required to establish such a system.
Inclusion of complex judgments increases the difficulty of gaining acceptable intra- and
inter-rater reliability. However, a crucial theoretical question concerns to whom the
intervention is directed rather than its content. Comments can be addressed to
individuals, subgroups, the whole group or all three.
Followers of Bion (1961) consider the group the object of treatment and therapists
should exclusively make group interpretations (Talamo, Borgogno and Merciai, 1988).
At the other extreme are those who believe group psychotherapy is the treatment of
individuals in a group context and interventions should be directed to individuals
(Slavson, 1979; Wolf, Kutash and Nattland, 1993). Between, are those advocating both
group and individual interventions (Foulkes, 197; Abse, 1974) and subgroup interventions
(König, 1991). In child and adolescent psychotherapy, it is essential to clarify whether
group, individual or both should be interpreted and what interventions are effective.
Although the form of intervention is difficult to define, the objects to which they are
addressed can be defined from the object of the sentence or physical intervention.
Therapists can talk to the whole group, individual members or both the group and
particular members (König, 1991). This distinction evaluates the effect of interventions
directed at group or members and assists reliability of ratings.
Four types of intervention are defined in the GFR. Therapists may direct
interventions to the whole group (“Group”), to one or more, but not all individuals
(“Member”) or to both individuals and the whole group (“Group and Member”) in the
rating period. A category of “No Intervention” is included to record when therapists do
not intervene. They are described below.
Group Intervention: The group is addressed or all members are addressed
individually. The group is addressed if general comments are made without referring to
anyone in particular, or if a member is talked about in the third person (“Bill is feeling
angry”), since this is a comment to the group about the member.
Member Intervention: One or more, but not all members are explicitly identified in
the comment or by non-verbal cues.
Group and Member Intervention: Both the above interventions are made within the
minute. This is rated if an intervention includes both group and references to individual
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members.
No Intervention: Therapists do not speak during the minute.
Therapists’ control of the group process.

Limits. Psychotherapy usually involves accepting the patient’s behaviour and not
exercising judgment or evaluation. Providing any sort of direction or limit is expressly
excluded from some group approaches (Schiffer, 1971, 1984). In other cases, firm
consequences are advocated to maintain a safe therapeutic environment (Slavson, 1979;
Malekoff, 1997). The turbulent nature of group therapy with adolescents requires
therapists to depart from a purely verbal psychotherapeutic relationship to the group.
Instructions, reprimands, reminders of rules, threats to terminate sessions or the group and
occasionally physical restraint may be required (Gordon, 1989; Malekoff, 1997). These
interventions have implications for outcomes and managing the groups. Observing their
impact requires them to be recorded. Whenever therapists use speech or action to set
limits to the activity of the members, reinforce rules or issue prohibitions a “Limit” is
rated. “No Limit” is rated whenever no limit is set.
Non-verbal interventions.
Locomotions. It is also important to record therapists’ non-verbal interventions.
In child and adolescent group psychotherapy, aggressive or destructive events may lead
to injury or damage. In such instances, therapists intervene physically by moving
around the room to be close to disruptive members or use restraint. The effect of these
interventions needs to be examined. Therapists may also move around the room for
other purposes, although these actions are harder to evaluate. “Locomotion” is rated
whenever therapists moved from their chair during the minute; “No Locomotion” is
rated when there is no change.
Details of rating criteria and rules are given in the GFR Rater’s Manual in
Appendix 2.
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PART III. METHOD AND RESULTS.
In Part III, the study’s empirical section is described. In Chapter 16, a set of
hypotheses is described defining questions the study aims to investigate. Chapter 17
describes the method, reliability studies and characteristics of the data. In Chapters 18
to 21 the results of the data analysis for hypotheses related to group development,
structure, dynamics and therapists interventions are given.
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16: HYPOTHESES.
The GFR records changes in whole group function dimensions and explores four
areas: developmental process, structural conditions, dynamics or relationships between
dimensions, and the effects of therapists’ interventions. The hypotheses are described
below.
1. Group Development.
Developmental phases in psychotherapy groups are important to understand various
stages of treatment, planning, deciding about new members and managing groups.
Literature of group development is reviewed in Chapter 17. Group development is
examined in several ways using GFR ratings.
1.1. Development of Stability. Stability is an indicator of group progress. It is
hypothesised stability indicates the degree groups regulate their processes. The first
hypothesis examines change in stability over the group’s life.
H1.1. Stability of sessions will change systematically over the group’s life and
will be defined as part of a developmental sequence.
1.2. Development of Functional Quality. Development is also indicated by
change in the quality of GFR states over the course of the year. Development over the
treatment is expected to change from lower to higher functioning and include greater
conflict in the middle period.
H1.2. A developmental sequence will show lower quality early in the year,
increase in conflict and dysfunction in the middle and increased high
quality function at the end of the year.
1.3. Developmental Phases. Group development postulates identifiable phases
expressing developmental tasks. This hypothesis examines whether phases are
discernable in the data.
H1.3. Definable phases of group development will be discernible throughout the
group’s life.
2. Group Structure.
Three sets of structural hypotheses concern wholeness, size and completeness.
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2.1. Effect of Subgroups. Research discussed in Chapter 11 suggests for groups

above three members, formation of subgroups is important. Subgroups are associated
with constructively maintaining stability (Cartwright and Lippitt, 1976; Northen, 1988;
Yalom, 1995) and destructively avoiding problems (Krech and Crutchfield, 1948;
Sherif, 1948; Kellerman, 1979; Yalom, 1995; MacLennan and Dies, 1992). The first
structural investigation examines the significance of subgroups for therapeutic goals.
The GFR dimension of Structure differentiates whole group, subgroups and individuals.
It is predicted that functional status on other GFR dimensions will change according to
structural category.
H2.1. The group’s functioning will alter according to its Structure.
The functional quality of the group is expected to differ according to whether it is in
whole or subgroup structures:
H2.1.1. The distribution of GFR categories for Whole will differ from
Subgroup Structures.
It is also hypothesised that if functional quality differs according to structure, transition
from one structure to another will be associated with change in other dimensions of
group function. The complexity and greater relationships in whole structure and the
dynamics of using subgroups to avoid conflict suggest change from whole to subgroups
improves functioning.
H2.1.2: Movement from Whole to Subgroup Structures will be
associated with reduced unpleasure and conflict categories;
movement in the opposite direction will be associated with
increased unpleasure and conflict categories.
The aim of therapy is to assist members to manage group life more effectively.
Towards the end of the year, groups are expected to manage more constructive
functioning in whole structure. It is hypothesised the effect of structural categories will
change depending on the stage of the year.
H2.1.3: In early stages of group life, more therapeutically desirable
states will occur in Subgroup Structure; in the later stages, they
will occur in Whole Structure.
2.2. Effect of Size. As discussed in Chapter 11, size significantly alters group
function. In psychotherapy groups, size cannot be decided from clinical considerations
alone. It is often decided by availability of suitable members and who attends. It is
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important to demonstrate whether it significantly influences group functioning.

H2.2. Group functioning will alter according to Size.
This suggests the distribution of GFR categories will differ according to group size.
H2.2.1. Different sized groups will show different distributions of GFR
categories.
Smaller, less complex groups are likely to be more stable and show less fluctuation.
H2.2.2. The smaller the group, the lower will be the amount of change in
categories from one minute to the next.
Smaller groups should show higher quality functioning indicated by greater frequency
of higher functional categories than larger groups.
H2.2.3. Sessions of smaller size will function at higher quality compared
to other sessions.
The tendency for groups to resolve conflict by moving from whole to subgroups is
likely to be greater in larger groups than smaller.
H2.2.4. The tendency to move from Whole to Subgroups to resolve
conflict will be more likely in larger groups.
2.3. Effect of Completeness. Adolescent groups are often incomplete because
of absenteeism. Groups with a large nominal membership may be small in some
sessions because of absentees. Groups can avoid dealing with problems by attributing
them to absent members and creating an alliance against them. If this is so, groups
should function better when members are absent, because they are smaller and problems
can be projected onto absent members.
H2.3. Groups’ functional quality will alter according to their Completeness.
Both quality and stability of group functioning in terms of GFR categories can be
examined in two subsidiary hypotheses.
H2.3.1. The more incomplete the group, the higher will be its functional
quality in GFR categories.
H2.3.2. The more incomplete the group, the more stable it will be as
shown by the amount of change in GFR categories in consecutive
minutes.
3. Group Dynamics.
The theoretical development of GFR categories was based on three relatively
185
independent dimensions of group function in addition to Structure. Although some

combinations are likely to be more common than others, a few are contradictory and
should not occur. They are discussed in Chapter 17. However, combinations of
categories in Cognitive Organisation, Affect and Action Coherence, express changing
group states and identify crucial aspects of group function. Relationships between these
dimensions are examined.
3.1. Cognitive Organisation: Since the group is more likely to exhibit control,
self-regulation and self-representation in higher Cognitive Organisation categories, they
should reflect higher pleasure affect states and cooperative action states.
H3.1. Low quality Cognitive Organisation categories (Unorganised,
Normative) will be more likely to be associated with Dysfunctional
categories of Affect (Discontent, Distress, Boredom) and Action
Coherence (Discord, Contracord). Conversely, high quality categories of
Cognitive Organisation (Systemic, Representational) will be more likely
to be associated with higher functional categories for Affect (Joy,
Interest) and Action Coherence (Concord, Accord).
3.2. Affect and Action Coherence: The fluctuations of high energy, unstable
states exceed the group’s capacity to bind and are expected to reduce organisation and
cooperation. Similarly, conflictual Action Coherence categories are likely to cause
disorganisation.
H3.2. High, unstable Affect (Joy, Distress) and conflictual Action Coherence
categories (Contracord, Discord) will be associated with instability and
change on the other dimensions in the same or succeeding minutes.
3.3. Effect of Affect on Action Coherence: Unpleasurable emotion is often
associated with conflict. The GFR makes it possible to examine the relationship
between them. Since adolescent groups often have high pleasurable energy (Slavson,
1977; Malekoff, 1997), conflict can be sudden, destructive and short-lived, yet have a
lasting effect on group culture. It is important to identify impending conflict.
Adolescents are often reluctant to reveal unpleasurable affects in groups and tolerate
conflict or hostility for some time before expressing unpleasurable affect. It is likely
changes towards unpleasurable affect may be preceded by changes toward conflictual
action.
H3.3. Changes from positive to negative Affect will be preceded by changes
186
from positive to negative Action in the preceding 1-3 minutes.

3.4. Crises: Adolescent groups often experience crises of hostility, distress or
conflict. They threaten the group’s survival, increase absenteeism and are stressful to
therapists and agencies conducting groups (Malekoff, 1977). They are identifiable by
GFR categories of Distress and Contracord and can be examined to identify patterns and
predictors.
H3.4.1. The group’s function will alter before and after the appearance of
specific crisis categories or combinations.
This is further refined to examine specific states associated with crisis categories in
Affect and Action Coherence.
H3.4.2. Distress and Contracord will have identifiable precursors in the
preceding 2-5 minutes, which will predict their occurrence.
It is important for therapists to know whether crises occur at different stages of sessions.
More conflict is expected in the middle of sessions than at the beginning or end since
there is a “warm up” at the start and towards the end members often disengage. The
occurrence of crisis categories is examined at different stages of the session.
H3.4.3. Crisis points, particularly Distress and Contracord will be more
likely to occur in the middle quartiles of sessions than the first or
last quartiles.
4. Therapists’ Interventions.
Therapists are expected to effect group process therapeutically. The objects of
Therapists’ Interventions are discriminated. The theory of the group entity suggests
Group Interventions are most likely to lead to improved functioning.
H4.1. Group Interventions will lead to higher GFR categories in the succeeding
minutes.
Limits should be followed by reduced conflict and unpleasure in the following minutes if
they are effective.
H4.2. Limits will be associated with decreased destructive categories in the
same or the succeeding 1-3 minutes.
If therapists use Locomotion as an additional means of managing the group, it should
also reduce dysfunctional categories in following minutes.
H4.3. Locomotion by the therapists will be associated with decreased
187
destructive categories in the same or the succeeding 1-3 minutes.

Effects of therapists’ interventions should be independent of Limits or Locomotion.
H4.4. Therapists’ Interventions, Limits and Locomotion will be independent in
their effects.
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17: METHOD.
Subjects and groups.
Four adolescent groups (aged thirteen to seventeen) and a latency group (aged
nine to eleven) conducted in the Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service of the Royal
Children’s Hospital, Melbourne were analysed for the study. Four adolescent groups in
1988, 1992, 1993 and 1996 and a latency group in 1990 were videoed and rated. The
groups, members and outcomes of their treatment are briefly described in Appendix 1.
The groups were similar in that members were referred because they were not responding
to individual psychotherapy and lacked peer relations; attendance was inconsistent. All
groups had membership changes, reflecting the circumstances of such psychotherapy
groups.
The investigator conducted the 1988 group alone and had a co-therapist in the
other adolescent groups; two colleagues conducted the latency group. They were all
conducted as part of the clinical service. There was no policy for the groups to have all
boys, but girls were not referred for group psychotherapy during this period. Referrals
were from the Mental Health Service and other hospital units. Each boy was assessed by
the therapists before entry; some were also treated individually by group therapists, others
were referred by their treating clinician. Conditions for joining the groups were that
members acknowledged a problem, wanted help with it and were willing to try the group.
The groups were conducted weekly during school terms. Members were seen with
parents periodically to review progress. Parents were encouraged to contact therapists
whenever they had concerns.
Rules: Agreement with the following group rules was gained at assessment:
1. Sessions are confidential.
2. No one will be hurt, including feelings hurt by verbal abuse.
3. The room will not be damaged.
4. Members remain in the room for the session.
5. Any mess that can be cleaned up at the end of the session is permitted.
6. The members will not spend time together outside the group.
The rules were explained as enabling them to gain what they want from the group;
infringements were pointed out and consequences for the group explained (Anzieu, 1984).
Sessions. The adolescent groups were held in a meeting room at 4 or 5 pm; the
latency group was conducted at 10 am. They lasted an hour. The video was activated as
189
they entered. However owing to a various human and technical factors, some sessions
were not recorded. The sessions were unstructured, except for the beginning when
therapists facilitated introductions. Members were encouraged to talk about themselves
and enjoy being together. The therapists had psychodynamic training and orientation, but
did not emphasise intrapsychic issues, since most members were referred from
unsuccessful individual treatment using these techniques. The room had toys and games
in the cupboards. Cards, puzzles, paper, coloured pens and stationary were provided.
Although talking was encouraged, they often played games.
Therapeutic technique. Maintenance of the group by encouraging communication
and managing conflict was the first goal. The next goal was for all members to be
included in enjoyable, meaningful communication, express themselves freely and belong
(Gordon, 1983, 1989b; Tijhuis, 1998). They were encouraged to talk about their lives,
families and problems. Therapists facilitated rewarding interaction, since the boys had
little experience of healthy peer groups. Interventions were made to manage tensions or
antisocial activity. Therapists moved around the room to maintain control of boisterous
activity, but did not intervene in enjoyable, controlled activity.
Data collection.
All patients were told about the video recordings and the purposes for which they
would be used and parents signed a release in accordance with University of Melbourne
and Royal Children’s Hospital ethics protocols. Sessions were recorded by a camera
mounted in the room on VHS video. On several occasions, members asked to watch the
recordings and were permitted. They grew bored after a few minutes and returned to the
group. On several occasions, they became self-conscious and briefly covered the camera
lens although apart from this, it did not seem to alter the quality or content of the sessions.
The procedure for rating sessions is specified in the GFR Rater’s Manual in
Appendix 2. The rater watches the session for the first half of the minute and then makes
ratings for Cognitive Organisation and Action Coherence during the second half-minute
and for Structure and Affect in the last quarter using the GFR Rating Sheet shown in
Appendix 2. Rating sheets were converted into data files substituting numbers for
categories, adding year, minute, attendance, absentees and year for each minute. They
were collated and loaded into SPSS (Norusis, 1993) for analysis.
190
Reliability studies.
Intra-rater reliability is required to show that definitions and criteria enable
consistent observations of the same session to be made; inter-rater reliability is required
to show other trained raters can make consistent observations of the same sessions using
the GFR. Statistical techniques for establishing reliability often rely on correlating
repeated ratings of the same material to measure agreement. The GFR furnishes
categorical data for which parametric techniques such as analysis of variance cannot
establish reliability. The data are repeated observations of the same subjects and not
independent, precluding non-parametric techniques (Siegel and Castellan, 1988).
Techniques for estimating rater reliability for categorical data often compare
each rater with the other raters and the average of all raters (Hall, 1974; Koslowsky and
Bailit, 1975; Cicchetti, 1976; Fliess, 1981, Beck and Lewis, 2000). However, the GFR
records variability of the group as a unitary field of observation with discriminable
dimensions representing functions of a collective entity and reliability can be defined as
the accuracy with which raters agree with the actual hypothetical variability of the
dimension, rather than each other or their average (Overall and Magee, 1992). Ratings
are compared with a “common factor” underlying raters’ performance. Reliability is the
extent to which all raters agree with the hypothesised common factor that is the group
function dimension. The common factor is estimated in the same way factors are
identified by factor analysis, where the “communality” between raters (proportion of
variance accounted for by the presence of a factor common to the sets of data) is
estimated by squaring the value of the factor loading. Individual performances are
compared with this yielding two measures of reliability:
(a) The score indicating each rater’s agreement with the common factor
hypothesised as the actual dimension (factor loading) is squared, giving a
measure of communality;
(b) The score representing percentage of variance common to all raters (total fit).
Because the ratings are of categories, ordinary principal components (requiring
interval data) cannot be used. Instead, scores are obtained using a nonlinear Principal
Components Analysis (PRINCALS in SPSS). PRINCALS enables optimal scaling
transformation of the data so the principal components can be estimated using an
alternating least squares technique to reveal the major dimensions of variation within a set
of variables (Van de Geer, 1993). The variables are each rater’s ratings of GFR
191
dimensions. Each dimension is compared for each rater and factor loading and its total fit
computed. The factor loading is the amount that each rater’s ratings of a dimension
contribute to the overall variability of the data set. Total fit is the proportion of the
variance of the combined data pool for the dimension common to all raters, or the
proportion of agreement. These figures are presented as a proportion of the data set.
Intra-Rater Reliability Study.

After the rating system was developed, training was undertaken with sessions
from similar groups of years not used in the study. When repeated ratings of sample
sessions achieved acceptable consistency, the formal Intra-Rater Reliability study was
undertaken by the investigator.
Method. Intra-rater reliability needs to sample the full range of categories with
frequent changes to test the accuracy of rating changes as well as categories. For these
reasons, random sampling was not used; instead, three sessions exhibiting frequent
changes of rating, high variability and the full range of categories were selected. These
sessions were rated consecutively three times by the investigator over a six-week period
to minimise memory of previous ratings. Rating sheets were encoded and analysed using
PRINCALS.
Reliability Criterion. There are no firm criteria for what constitutes acceptable
reliability (Shaughnessy and Zechmeister, 1997). The size of the score depends on what
it measures. In this case, communality scores indicate the proportion of ratings
corresponding to a hypothetical ideal rating of the dimension. Given approximately 55
ratings per session (minutes in an hour therapy session), a reliability of 0.7 means 16
ratings differ from the ideal; 0.8 means 11 ratings differ. Reliability in clinical studies is
often accepted from 0.6 upwards, while above 0.8 is common for studies involving
observers (Shaughnessy and Zechmeister, 1997); instruments designed to measure
process in group psychotherapy accept reliability measures of between 0.54 and 0.95
(Beck and Lewis, 2000). Consequently, 0.8 was considered acceptable for the reliability
studies.
Results. Factor loadings and total fit for each set of ratings are shown in Table
17.1 for each GFR dimension. One Affect rating, two Limits ratings and all Locomotion
ratings are below the criterion for communality scores. However, all are above 0.7. All
figures for Total Fit exceed the reliability criterion.
192
GFR 1st Rating 2nd Rating 3rd Rating Total Fit,

Dimension Communality Communality Communality all 3 ratings.
Structure .92 .92 .96 .96
Cognitive Organisation .92 .88 .96 .96
Affect .85 .85 .77 .90
Action Coherence .85 .85 .85 .92
Therapists Interventions .81 .81 .85 .91
Limits .77 .92 .77 .89
Locomotion .72 .72 .72 .85
Table 17.1. Principal components analysis of three ratings of three sessions, showing
factor loadings for each rating and total fit for all three ratings.
Affect is the most inconsistent group dimension, which may reflect it having a
quarter minute rating time, while the others have a half-minute (see Rater’s Manual,
Appendix 2). Ratings of Therapists’ Interventions are least reliable by Communality
indicating definition of categories requires further development. However, it would be a
substantial project in itself to develop such a system and current definitions achieve
acceptable reliability. Limits are ambiguous when therapists make comments that include
other interventions. Locomotion presents difficulties of definition when therapists make
small movements or move across the minute boundary and it is understandable that its
reliability would be lower; while not meeting the criterion, they are acceptable.
Conclusion. The GFR can be reliably applied on successive occasions by the
same rater.
Inter-Rater Reliability Study.

A GFR Rater’s Manual, other resource documents (see Appendix 2) and training
video were prepared illustrating each category with criterial specimens of group process,
written descriptions and rating criteria.
Rater Training. Two experienced adolescent group psychotherapist raters were
recruited. With the investigator and then independently, they rated all categories in
representative stable and unstable sessions not included in the research sample. When
they had gained competence, conjoint sessions were held with all raters and discrepancies
discussed. When 80% agreement with the investigator’s ratings for the training sample
was reached, the reliability study was undertaken.
193
Method. Ten of the 119 sessions from the research groups were randomly
selected. Three substitutions were made to replace sessions of two members or short
duration ensuring a robust sample. Raters rated them over several months independently
of each other or the investigator. Rating sheets were coded and analysed using
PRINCALS.
Results. Communality and total fit for each of rater are shown in Table 17.2 for
each GFR dimension. As in the Intra-Rater Reliability study, Affect has the lowest
reliability of all group function dimensions. Limits is the only dimension to fall below the
criterion of 0.8 for total fit. It may be more difficult to rate reliably since interpretation is
ambiguous or rater’s instructions may need further refining. Lower total fit and higher
communality may indicate that although each rater had a similar proportion of ratings,
they did not always agree. Raters 1 and 2 were similar whereas Rater 3 had a higher
score.
1st Rater 2nd Rater 3rd Rater Total Fit, all

GFR Dimensions Communality Communality Communality 3 raters.
Structure .92 .88 .90 .90
Cognitive Organisation .88 .85 .85 .86
Affect .85 .81 .77 .81
Action Coherence .90 .83 .87 .86
Therapists Interventions .90 .90 .81 .87
Limits .72 .71 .81 .74
Locomotion .90 .87 .87 .87
Table 17.2. Principal components analysis of a random sample of ten sessions by three
raters, showing communality for each rater and total fit for all three raters.
This discrepancy would manifest as a reduction in the total fit even though Rater
Three’s score was higher and therefore closer to the hypothetical dimension. The
conclusion may be that Rater 3 was slightly out of step with the other two in definition of
Limits. The accuracy of this method may be reflected by the fact that Rater 1 is the
investigator and has higher communality than the other raters, suggesting his ratings
reflect the underlying group dimensions more closely than the trainees.
Conclusion: Acceptable inter-rater reliability is obtained for the GFR.
Validity.
The validity of the GFR is discussed in Appendix 1.
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AFFECT
0
Contentm 3 5
ent 1 Joy 2 Interest Discontent 4 Distress Boredom
Count Count Count Count Count Count
STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 10 44 286 33 1 1
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 8 31 177 55
2 Discord 3 33 55 1
3 Contracord 4 5 3
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 19 166 681 22 1
COHER. 1 Accord 1 41 249 15
2 Discord 22 52 42 2 1
3 Contracord 6 4 3 8
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 10 82 1
COHER. 1 Accord 3 131 467 46 4 25
2 Discord 53 68 90 8
3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord 4 1 1
COHER. 1 Accord 90 192 19 1 13
2 Discord 127 71 105 14 1
1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 2 2
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 51 6 61 3
2 Discord 2 3
3 Contracord 1 1
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 1 2
COHER. 1 Accord 14 67 5
2 Discord 1 11 5
3 Contracord 1 2 1
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 12 23
COHER. 2 Discord 4 4 5 2
3 Contracord 1 5 3
2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 1 7 40 9
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 9 51 38
2 Discord 6 3 15
3 Contracord 1 2 1
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 58 28 267 7 1 1
2 Discord 4 36 19 1
COHER. 1 Accord 2 72 398 30 1 12
2 Discord 4 31 41 1
3 Contracord 9 5 1
3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord 1 1
COHER. 1 Accord 44 169 14 3 6
2 Discord 36 57 58 11 2
3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 97 20 3 14
ORGANISn COHER. 2 Discord 1 4 8
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 67 11 46
COHER. 2 Discord 8 10 6
Table 17.3. Category frequencies of all group dimensions.

195
Description and characteristics of the data.

The characteristics of the data yielded by the Group Function Record are
summarized.
Range and variety of states.

Table 17.3 shows frequencies of categories of four group dimensions for each
possible state in the whole data set. Of 384 possible states, 180 (46.9%) ocurred,
indicating the GFR is sensitive to a wide range of group conditions. Many states have
low frequencies, the greatest being 10.7%. The frequencies of states for each group are
shown in Appendix 3 as Tables 17A.1 – 17A.5 and percentages in Tables 17A.6 –
17A.10. There is considerable variation across groups, but the range is similar.
Each state was represented by a four-figure number identifying the category of
each GFR dimension. The frequency, rank and percentage of these states are shown
Table 17.4. Sixty percent of states occur less than 3% of the time. Eleven states (6% of
possible combinations) account for 50.4% of ratings, 33 states (18%) account for 75.7%
of ratings and 41 states for 80.5% of ratings. Percentages less than 0.1% are recorded as
“0.0%.” This 80% samples all categories except Boredom in Affect and Contracord in
Action Coherence. These categories first occur at the 51st and 52nd ranks and occur 0.4%
of the time.
Percentages for all states are given in Table 17A.11 in Appendix 3. Fifty seven
percent of all states only occur between 1 and 5 times in the whole sample. This suggests
the GFR is too sensitive and categories were combined later in the analysis.
Incompatible Combinations.
A number of combinations are contradictory: Individual Structure associated
with high-level categories of Cognitive Organisation and Action Coherence;
Contentment Affect associated with Discord and Contracord in Action Coherence.
These combinations were not found. Table 17.5 sets out the frequencies of unlikely,
though not incompatible combinations. These are Boredom with Contracord,
Discontent or Distress with Concord. They may occur because the different time
interval for rating Structure and Affect compared with Cognitive Organisation and
Action Coherence. Dimensions rated at different times within the minute may produce
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implausible combinations. Boredom only occurs once with Contracord; Discontent or

Distress does not occur with Concord.
State No. State Frequency. % Rank Cumulative %

1 0120 681 10.7% 1.0 10.7%
2 0221 467 7.4% 2.0 18.1%
3 2221 398 6.3% 3.0 24.4%
4 0020 286 4.5% 4.0 28.9%
5 2120 267 4.2% 5.0 33.1%
6 0121 249 3.9% 6.0 37.0%
7 0321 192 3.0% 7.0 40.0%
8 0021 177 2.8% 8.0 42.8%
9 2321 169 2.7% 9.0 45.5%
10 0110 166 2.6% 10.0 48.1%
11 2121 148 2.3% 11.0 50.4%
12 0211 131 2.1% 12.0 52.2%
13 0312 127 2.0% 13.0 54.0%
14 0332 105 1.7% 14.0 55.7%
15 3221 97 1.5% 15.0 57.2%
16 0232 90 1.4% 16.5 58.6%
17 0311 90 1.4% 16.5 60.0%
18 0220 82 1.3% 18.0 61.3%
19 2211 72 1.1% 19.0 62.4%
20 0322 71 1.1% 20.0 63.5%
21 0222 68 1.1% 21.0 64.6%
22 1221 67 1.1% 22.5 65.7%
23 3321 67 1.1% 22.5 66.8%
24 1120 61 1.0% 24.0 67.8%
25 2100 58 .9% 25.5 68.7%
27 2322 57 .9% 27.0 70.5%
28 0031 55 .9% 28.5 71.4%
29 0032 55 .9% 28.5 72.3%
30 0212 53 .8% 30.0 73.1%
31 0122 52 .8% 31.0 73.9%
32 1100 51 .8% 32.5 74.7%
33 2021 51 .8% 32.5 79.5%
34 0231 46 .7% 34.5 76.2%
35 3351 46 .7% 34.5 76.9%
36 0010 44 .7% 36.5 77.6%
37 2311 44 .7% 36.5 78.3%
38 0132 42 .7% 38.5 79.0%
39 1121 42 .7% 38.5 79.7%
40 0111 41 .6% 40.5 80.3%
Table 17.4. Frequency, percentages and ranks of the first 80% of group states.
GFR Dimension Categories Categories

Affect Contentment, Boredom Discontent, Distress
Action Coherence Contracord. Concord
Frequency 1 0
Table 17.5. Frequencies of unlikely combinations of categories.

197
Conclusion: Contradictory states were not recorded and the low frequency of
improbable combinations indicates the GFR has internal validity.
1988 1992 1993 1996 Mean 1990 Total Total

Adols. Frequ %
STRUCTURE
Whole 73.0% 46.9% 70.9% 76.1% 66.7% 40.9% 3821 60.3%
Subgroups 1.3% 5.4% 1.3% 2.0% 2.5% 18.0% 374 5.9%
Subgp+Individs 20.3% 40.6% 23.2% 17.3% 25.4% 40.1% 1850 29.2%
Individuals 5.4% 7.1% 4.6% 4.7% 5.5% 1.0% 295 4.7%
COGNITIVE ORGANISATION
Representational 26.3% 11.2% 13.5% 10.0% 15.3% 7.7% 956 15.1%
Systemic 43.5% 8.3% 8.3% 62.9% 30.8% 43.8% 2115 33.4%
Normative 16.4% 54.2% 41.1% 18.1% 32.5% 23.8% 1911 30.1%
Unorganised 13.8% 26.2% 37.0% 8.9% 21.5% 24.7% 1358 21.4%
AFFECT
Contentment 0.2% 0.0% 5.2% 2.9% 2.1% 6.2% 157 2.5%
Joy 15.9% 18.6% 25.5% 13.0% 18.3% 10.7% 1032 16.3%
Interest 63.0% 60.5% 49.8% 74.6% 62.1% 68.9% 4024 63.5%
Discontent 16.6% 14.6% 13.5% 8.2% 13.2% 11.8% 866 13.7%
Distress 1.4% 2.5% 3.4% 0.4% 1.9% 2.1% 124 2.0%
Boredom 2.9% 3.7% 2.7% 0.9% 2.6% 0.0% 137 2.2%
ACTION COHERENCE
Concord 50.9% 9.15% 11.3% 46.4% 29.4% 27.4% 1936 30.5%
Accord 32.4% 69.85 56.9% 43.0% 50.5% 43.3% 3037 47.9%
Discord 14.4% 18.6% 26.9% 9.8% 17.4% 22.3% 1147 18.1%
Contracord 2.3% 2.4% 4.8% 0.7% 2.6% 7.0% 220 3.5%
THERAPISTS INTERVENTIONS
Group 10.4% 8.45% 7.0% 7.1% 8.2% 9.8% 567 8.9%
Member 38.9% 59.0% 48.6% 59.7% 51.6% 39.4% 3016 47.6%
Group & Member 13.9% 14.1% 31.1% 13.0% 18.0% 18.3% 1079 17.0%
No Intervention 36.9% 18.5% 13.3% 20.2% 22.2% 32.5% 1678 26.5%
LIMITS
No Limit 89.0% 80.4% 69.4% 94.9% 83.4% 75.1% 5213 82.2%
Limit 11.0% 19.6% 30.6% 5.1% 16.6% 24.9% 1127 17.8%
LOCOMOTIONS
No Locomotion 90.9% 82.6% 61.9% 98.5% 83.5% 58.1% 5018 79.1%
Locomotion 9.1% 17.4% 38.1% 1.5% 16.5% 41.9% 1322 20.8%
Table 17.6. Percentage of categories for each year, mean of adolescent groups and all
groups.
Differences in frequency of categories for different groups.

Table 17.6 compares percentages of categories rated for each dimension in each
year and the percentage and frequency for the whole data set. The total number of
minutes rated is 6,341 in 199 sessions. There is a pattern of similarities and differences
between the groups. The pattern of Structure states is similar for 1988, 1993 and 1996,
whereas 1992 and 1990 are different. Cognitive Organisation is similar for 1992 and
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1993, and to a lesser extent for 1988 and 1996. For Affect, 1988 and 1992 are similar
and to a lesser extent so are 1990 and 1996; 1993 is different. For Action Coherence
1992 and 1993 are similar while 1988, 1990 and 1996 are different. Therapists
Interventions is similar in 1992, 1993 and 1996, while 1988 is similar to 1990. The
GFR differentiates groups according to their GFR characteristics, though there is no
consistent pattern. These are explored further in the results sections.
Defining and classifying composite group states.

To identify patterns and test hypotheses, categories were combined according to
how closely they approached the therapeutic goal of a sustained, cohesive group
cooperating in well-organised pleasurable activity. Categories of each Group Dimension
were coded from 0 to 3, (0 to 5 for Affect) and divided into “positive” categories 0-1 (0-2
for Affect) supporting therapeutic goals and “negative” categories 2-3 (3-5 for Affect) as
shown in Table 17.7.
Group Dimension Quality Categories Codes Name

Structure +ve Whole, Subgroups 0, 1 Whole
Structure -ve Subgroup+Individuals, Individuals 2, 3 Sub/Ind
Cognitive Organisation +ve Representational, Systemic 0, 1 Organised
Cognitive Organisation -ve Normative, Unorganised 2, 3 Disorganised
Affect +ve Contentment, Joy, Interest 0, 1, 2 Happy
Affect -ve Discontent, Distress, Boredom 3, 4, 5 Unhappy
Action Coherence +ve Concord, Accord 0, 1 Cooperative
Action Coherence -ve Discord, Contracord 2, 3 Uncooperative
Table 17.7. Division of GFR dimensions into positive and negative qualities.
Condensed States.
To reduce the proportion of low frequency ratings, individual states were grouped
by combining states with some common categories until the total percentage was
significant. When the frequency was too low to usefully differentiate states, positive and
negative categories in Cognitive Organisation, Affect or Action Coherence were included
in the same state. Groupings were made for 25 “Comprehensive States” and 9
“Condensed States.” The Comprehensive States yielded no clearer findings than
Condensed States so only the latter are presented.
Condensed States were ranked in order of the degree to which they approach the
ideal of group function with Whole Structure, Representational Cognitive Organisation,
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pleasurable Affect and cooperative Action Coherence as the optimal state and
Individual Structure with any combination of the other three Dimensions as the least
beneficial. Structure is the most important indicator of functionality, because unless all
members are involved, the value of the process is reduced. The next most valued
dimension is Action Coherence indicating cooperation or conflict. Cognitive
Organisation is valued next, describing collective cognition. Finally, Pleasurable Affect
states are more constructive than Unpleasurable states. Rankings consider these
aspects.
Condensed State Structure Cognitive Affect Action Frequency Total %

Code and Name categories Organisation categories Coherence
categories categories
0 Functional 0 0 0,1,2 0,1 556 8.8%
1 Limited Functional 1,2 0 0,1,2 0,1 296 4.7%
2 Sociable 0 1,2,3 0,1,2 0,1 2137 33.7%
3 Limited Sociable 1,2 1,2,3 0,1,2 0,1 1346 21.2%
4 Unhappy Cooperation 0,1,2 0,1,2,3 3,4,5 0,1 380 6.0%
5 Happy Conflict 0,1,2 0,1,2,3 0,1,2 2,3 749 11.8%
6 Productive Turmoil 0,1 0,1 3,4,5 2,3 121 1.9%
7 Dysfunctional 0,1,2 2,3 3,4,5 2,3 460 7.3%
8 Nominal 3 0,1,2,3 0,1,2,3,4,5 0,1,2,3 295 4.7%
Table 17.8. Classification of GFR categories into 9 Condensed States.
The ratings comprising Condensed States are shown in Table 17.8 with names,
category codes, frequencies and percentages. They are used to analyse many aspects of
the group process. The most valued state “Functional” shown in the table is Whole
Structure, Representational cognition, pleasure and Concord. Next, “Limited
Functional” is the same state with less than Whole Structure. When the Cognitive
Organisation is less than Representational, Affect pleasurable and Action Coherence
cooperative, it is called “Sociable;” the same state in less than Whole Structure is called
“Limited Sociable.” Then come states with combinations of negative categories. The
most valued of these is “Unhappy Cooperation” including any Structure above
Individuals any Cognitive Organisation, unhappy Affect, but cooperative Action
Coherence. “Happy Conflict” is the same except for happy Affect and conflict in
Action Coherence; then “Productive Turmoil” has Whole Structure, positive Cognitive
Organisation, unpleasure and conflict. “Dysfunctional” consists of any Structure above
Individuals with negative categories for all other Dimensions. Finally, “Nominal” is
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Individual Structure and any category of the other Dimensions.
Functional Bands.
Condensed States were further condensed into three “Functional Bands.” These
are: first, Functional and Limited Functional combined into “Functional States;”
Sociable and Limited Sociable into “Sociable States;” and all other states into
“Unsociable States.” They are shown in Table 17.9.
Condensed States Functional Band

0 Functional Functional States
1 Limited Functional
2 Sociable Sociable States
3 Limited Sociable
4 Unhappy Cooperation
5 Happy Conflict
6 Productive Turmoil Unsociable States
7 Dysfunctional
8 Nominal
Table 17.9. Division of 9 Condensed States into Functional Bands.
Characteristics of each group.

Table 17.10 compares the percentages of Condensed States of each group
showing their different character; each column shows the proportion of minutes in each
Condensed State for the year for each group.
YEAR
1988 1990 1992 1993 1996
Col % Col % Col % Col % Col %
9
Condensed Functional 16.2% 3.2% 5.4% 8.6% 7.2%
States
Limited Functional 2.2% 12.4% 3.6% 1.7% 2.3%
Sociable 39.1% 21.3% 25.5% 32.6% 57.6%
Limited Sociable 12.3% 31.6% 31.0% 15.2% 13.0%
Unhappy Cooperation 9.4% 1.3% 6.9% 5.7% 4.7%
Happy Conflict 8.4% 17.6% 9.3% 19.9% 6.4%
Productive Turmoil 3.2% 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 2.7%
Dysfunctional 3.6% 10.5% 10.2% 10.7% 1.5%
Nominal 5.4% 1.0% 7.1% 4.6% 4.7%
Table 17.10. Percentage of time spent in Condensed states for each group.
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1988: The group spent 67% of its time in Functional, Sociable and Limited
Sociable states and all other states were represented above 2%, indicating it was
constructive.
1990: There are high incidences of Limited Functional, Sociable and Limited
Sociable (65.3% altogether) and Happy Conflict and Dysfunctional (28.1% together),
suggesting considerable fluctuation and correspondingly less time in Unhappy
Cooperation, Productive Turmoil and Nominal. It functioned in either a limited
constructive manner or destructively with limited capacity to support mixed states.
1992: A high incidence of Sociable and Limited Sociable (56.5% together) and
Dysfunctional (10.2%) occurred. It spent significant time in Unsociable states. The
only low incidence state was Productive Turmoil (1.1%). This group was unable to
maintain high Cognitive Organisation in unhappy Unsociable states.
1993: There is high incidence in Sociable and Limited Sociable (47.8%
together), Happy Conflict and Dysfunctional (30.6% together). The low incidence was
in Productive Turmoil. The group divided its time between limited achievements of
Sociable and the Unsociable states.
1996: There is high incidence of Sociable and Limited Sociable (70.6%) and the
only low incidence was Dysfunctional, showing achievements in social activity without
being able to represent their own functioning, but avoiding Unsociable states.
Significant differences in frequencies of states.

The amount of change considered significant for this analysis needs to be defined.
The highest percentage Condensed State for all groups is 57.6% Sociable in 1996. Over
half the states are below 10% and a third below 5% per year. For an average session
length of 55 minutes, 1% change would account for half a minute or one rating per
session. For an average year quartile of 6 sessions, it would mean 3 events. The
findings of Chapter 20 indicate threats to the group from hostility and unpleasurable
emotion generally only occur in a 1-2 minute time frame. In percentage terms, this
means changes of 0.5-1% frequencies may indicate such a crises in the session. Small
changes in percentage, especially of Contracord and Distress indicate important events
in the life of the group. Similarly, Representational may only occur in a low frequency,
yet each 0.5% indicates a minute when the group considers themselves.
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The nine Condensed States cover all combinations of categories. If equally

divided, each state would account for 11.1% of minutes. For such an analysis, 10%
significance determines the scale of changes likely to occur. Where the null hypothesis
predicts equal distribution of 11% for all Condensed States, a significant change of 1% in
one state is in fact 10% change from the null hypothesis prediction. Since the rating
system and condensation covers such a large number of possible states, relatively small
percentage changes do represent significant alterations of group functioning.
GFR Dimensions have four or six categories. Four categories would account for
25% of randomly distributed observations if equally divided; six categories would
account for 16.7%. Changes of 1% in frequency of GFR categories mean 4% changes for
any one of four categories and 6% for each of six categories according to the null
hypothesis. The observed percentage change could be multiplied by 10, 4 or 6 to be
expressed as a proportion of expected percentage of a random distribution. One percent is
confirmed a realistic criterion for significant change.
Quantitative changes also have qualitative significance. Small percentage
changes may indicate significant change in session quality. A percentage shift from
Sociable to Limited Sociable does not indicate great change for group functionality, but
change from Sociable to Happy Conflict shows a great change in atmosphere. The
group may be threatened by a short episode of disorganized conflict and break into
subgroups or a member may isolate himself for several sessions after a single
disappointment. It is common to find changes following an event are only reversed
when discussed later and resolved although the event may have represented a small
percentage of time. Small percentage changes in Unsociable or Functional States are all
that is likely to occur in group-building processes. Significant change may consist of
the qualitative implications of small percentage changes.
Condensed States are ranked in terms of the degree to which they approach the
functional condition of Gf. However, change from positive to negative categories in
each GFR Dimension signifies a change from more to less functional, whereas changes
within the positive or negative ranges signify change in degree rather than quality.
Groups also spend much of their time in states persisting over a number of minutes.
Once some changes occur, groups remain in that state for a time. The moment of
change, or disruption of a continuing state is the significant event. Although the size of
percentage changes is important, small changes are also indications of important
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qualitative events. A change of 1% is significant in the case of all Unsociable

Condensed States except for Happy Conflict, which has relatively high frequency. The
analysis examines percentage changes on the understanding they have both qualitative
and quantitative significance.
Phases of Group Development

A topic of importance in any study of group psychotherapy is whether phases of
group development exist. In order to examine whether phases occur in the groups, a
conceptual scheme of developmental phases was needed. Many schemes of group
development proposed in literature were reviewed and integrated into a hypothetical
series of phases to be investigated with the GFR.
Studies of group development.

Bennis and Shepard (1956) identified a preliminary phase of Dependence with
subphases of Dependence-flight, Counterdependence-flight, Resolution-catharsis
followed by a second phase of Interdependence with subphases of Enchantment-flight,
Disenchantment-fight and Consensual Validation. Agazarian and Peters (1981)
developed a variation consisting of six phases of Flight, Fight, Power-Authority,
Enchantment, Disenchantment and Interdependent Work. Martin and Hill (1957) gave
six phases: individual unshared behavior in an unshared structure; reactivation of
fixated interpersonal stereotypes; exploration of the interpersonal potential within the
group; awareness of interrelationships, subgrouping and power structures;
responsiveness to group dynamics and problems; the group as an effective integrative
social instrument.
Foulkes and Anthony (1965) described the natural history of therapeutic groups
as an Initial therapeutic honeymoon, followed by an Intermediate Phase of group
process as encapsulated society, then a Terminal Phase where members work through
departure. Day (1967) identified stages in the natural history of training groups of
Fantasied Familiarity, Transient Victimization, Focused Victimization, Perfect Unity
and Individualization. Although not developmental phases, Mills (1967) identifies
purposes that groups must fulfill as: Immediate Gratification, To Sustain the Group, To
Pursue a Collective Goal, Self Determination and Growth.
Sarri and Galinsky (1974) proposed seven phases including Origin; Formative;
204
Intermediate; Revision; Intermediate II; Maturation; Termination. Tuckman and

Jensen’s (1977) fivefold sequence is Forming, Storming, Norming, Performing,
Adjourning (Napier and Gershenfeld, 1989). Lacoursiere (1980) proposed five general
stages: Orientation, Dissatisfaction, Resolution, Production and Termination. Janosik
(1982) proposed an Initial Stage consisting of Inclusion and Power phases; the Middle
Stage includes Intimacy and Work Phases with Primary and Secondary Tasks, Problem-
Solving Methods, Restrictive Solutions, Collusive Defenses and Enabling Solutions; a
Final Stage includes Separation, Disengagement and Dissolution phases. Rutan and
Stone (1984) offer a three-phase model of Group Formation followed by Reactive Phase
and Mature Phase.
Northern (1988) proposed four stages of Orientation-Inclusion; Dissatisfaction
and Power Conflict; Mutuality-Work; Separation-Termination. Schambaugh (1989)
began with Negative Orientation, followed by Positive Orientation, Dissatisfaction,
Enchantment, Disenchantment, Production and Termination. MacLennan & Dies
(1992) described four stages in adolescent groups of Initial Relatedness, Testing Limits,
Working on Self and Moving On. Alderfer (1995) resolves Bennis and Shepard’s
system into four phases of Group Formation; Influence; Intimacy; Termination. Yalom
(1995) suggests three formative stages: first, Orientation, Hesitant Participation, Search
for Meaning, Dependency; second, Conflict, Dominance, Rebellion; third, Development
of Cohesiveness. Becvar, Canfield and Becvar (1997) propose Planning, Orientation,
Organisation, Process or Work, Termination. Malekoff (1997) suggests Preaffiliation,
Power and Control, Intimacy, Differentiation, Separation.
Others (Whitaker, 1985; Ahlin, 1995) maintain pre-established phases in a fixed
sequence are unlikely. Groups deal with the same issues repeatedly in increasing depth
and adequacy in cyclic approach-avoidance of issues. Linear developmental models
have been criticised as unsuited to the complexity of social phenomena (Kellerman,
1979; Ahlin, 1995). McCollum (1995) questions the comparability of studies and
points to the failure to identify the environmental demands on groups studied, leading to
a difference of focus between structure, emotional climate or relationship to the leader.
The studies can be distinguished by their approach. Some developmental
systems are oriented towards group process phenomena (Bennis & Shepard, 1956;
Foulkes & Anthony, 1965; Day, 1967; Tuckman & Jensen, 1977; Lacoursiere, 1980;
Malekoff, 1997). Others are related to the psychological content of interpersonal
205
interactions (Martin & Hill, 1957; Sarri & Galinsky, 1974; Janosik, 1982; Schambaugh,
1989; Yalom, 1995; Alderfer, 1995). Some are based on clinical groups (Agazarian and
Peters, 1981; Rutan and Stone, 1984; Foulkes and Anthony, 1965), others on
experiential or training groups (Bennis and Shepard, 1956; Sarri and Galinsky, 1974;
and Lacoursiere, 1980). Some consider children or adolescents (Northern, 1988 and
Malekoff, 1997), others adults (Mills, 1967 and Yalom, 1995).
Collation of group development phases:

Some phases of this list seem out of sequence with the consensus (Schambaugh,
1989; Janosik, 1982). Others are ambiguous, such as Martin and Hill’s (1957) “fixated
interpersonal stereotypes.” However, they can be placed within a common framework,
with each writer identifying some parts of a sequence that collectively has considerable
consistency, but is not fully described by any author. This alignment indicates
generalized phases to be tested using GFR data. Eight phases can be identified and
summarized with key terms as shown in Table 17.11.
The phases are shown in Table 17.12 with references, a summary of the phase
character and a set of tentative names describing them.
PHASE KEY WORD DESCRIPTIONS
1 Individualized behaviour, origins, orientation, group formation.
2 Forming, orienting, fantasied familiarity, dependency, flight, artificial togetherness, avoidance,

fixated interpersonal stereotypes, therapeutic honeymoon, inclusion and power.
3 Conflict, dissatisfaction, counter-dependency, testing, fight, power struggles, encapsulated
society, transient victimization, immediate gratification, storming, reactive phase.
4 Resolution, catharsis, power, focused victimization, norming, authority exploration,
establishing structure, to sustain the group, revision, primary and secondary tasks.
5 Enchantment, flight, independence, interrelationships, subgrouping, power structures, perfect
unity, to pursue a collective goal, intimacy, avoidance, functioning, problem solving.
6 Disenchantment, fight, conflict, responsive to process problems defensiveness, rebellion, self-
determination, restrictive solutions, collusive defenses.
7 Consensus, consensual validation, independent work, mature, performing, cohesion,
production, integrative-creative, instrumental, enabling solutions, individualization.
8 Termination, adjourning, disengagement, dissolution, separation
Table 17.11. Key word descriptions for group developmental phases from the literature.
Describing group process in Collated Phases described by Functional Bands.

The processes of each phase can be translated into relative proportions of
206
Functional Bands of Condensed States to allow quantitative and qualitative testing of

phases against data.
1: Convening. The group forms; members are tentative and unclear about how the
group will operate; they are formalized and constrained, following the therapists,
functioning individualistically. This would result in high percentages of
Functional states as they talk about the group, some Sociable as they search for a
basis to communicate and low Unsociable states, since they do not yet have
reason for conflict or emotional expression.
2: Engagement. Members’ interactions create increased involvement. Initially, mutual
dependency develops discouraging conflict, promoting superficial harmony to
avoid problems. There are less likely to be Functional states as they find it more
threatening to go beyond superficial discussion of themselves. A higher
percentage of Sociable states is likely as they communicate about “safe”
subjects, while Unsociable states would remain low, as there is not enough
involvement to cause conflict.
3: Positioning. Gradually, the group becomes emotionally significant; members
experience dissatisfaction with it, conflict develops; they become counter-
dependent, test limits and struggle for power. They seek influence, but are
unwilling to resolve problems. Functional states would remain low due to the
attempt to use power, but high levels of Unsociable are likely as conflict and
anxieties express themselves, interspersed with periods of Sociable, expressing
the developing common culture. Conflicts are likely to produce fluctuations and
variations to Unsociable and make the process unstable and erratic.
4: Consolidation. For the group to continue, power relations need to be resolved by
developing norms, group culture and an agreed structure enabling the group to
make decisions and establish roles. It is unlikely to be socially mature and may
be hierarchical or dysfunctional for the long term depending on how the
conflicts are resolved. However, the group stabilizes, suggesting high
percentages of Sociable and low or fluctuating Functional and Unsociable states.
207
AUTHORS PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 PHASE 4 PHASE 5 PHASE 6 PHASE 7 PHASE 8

Bennis & - Dependence: Couterdependence- Resolution- Independence: Disenchantment- Consensual -
Shepard, 1956. Dependence-Flight Flight Catharsis Enchantment-Flight Fight Validation
Agazarian & - Flight Fight Power-Authority Enchantment Disenchantment Independent -
Peters, 1981. Work
Martin & Hill, Individual - Fixated inter- Exploration of Interrelationships, Responsive to Integrative- -
1957. behavior in an personal stereotypes interpersonal subgrouping and process problems creative
unshared structure potential in group power structures instrument
Foulkes & - Initial: therapeutic Intermediate phase, - - - - Terminal phase
Anthony, 1965. honeymoon encapsulated society
Day, 1967. - Fantasied Transient Focused Perfect unity - Individualiz- -
familiarity victimization victimization ation
Mills, 1967. - - Immediate To sustain the To Pursue a Self Determination Growth -
Gratification Group Collective Goal
Sarri & Galinsky, - Origin, Formative Intermediate Revision - Intermediate II Maturation Termination
1974.
Tuckman & - Forming Storming Norming - - Performing Adjourning
Jensen, 1977.
Lacoursiere, Orientation - Dissatisfaction Resolution - - Production Termination
1980.
Janosik, 1982. - Inclusion and Power Intimacy and Work Primary and Problem Solving Restrictive Enabling Separation,
Secondary Tasks Methods Solutions, Collusive Solutions Disengagement
Defenses and Dissolution
Rutan & Stone, Group Formation - Reactive Phase - - - Mature -
1984.
Northern, 1988. Orientation- - Dissatisfaction and - - - Mutuality-Work Separation-
Inclusion Power Conflict Termination
Schambaugh, Negative Positive Orientation Dissatisfaction - Enchantment Disenchantment Production Termination
1989. Orientation
MacLennan & - Initial Relatedness Testing the Limits - - - Working on Self Moving On
Dies, 1992.
Alderfer, 1995. Group Formation - Influence - - - Intimacy Termination
Yalom, 1995. Orientation Hesitant Search for meaning Conflict Dominance Rebellion Cohesiveness -
Participation Dependency
Becvar, Canfield Orientation - - Organisation - - Process or Work Termination
& Becvar, 1997.
Malekoff, 1997. Preaffiliation - Power and Control - Intimacy - Differentiation Separation
Collated Phase Convening Engagement Positioning Consolidation Idealization Disenchantment Working Separation
Name
Table 17.12. Alignment of group development phases in various authors with phase names.
208
5: Idealization. If Consolidation is successful, the group develops limited intimacy,

encouraging idealization of the group and members, avoiding problems by
collusion with existing power structures and norms irrespective of their
appropriateness for therapeutic aims. In adolescent groups, this is expressed as
play and shared activity, promoting idealization and pseudo-mature functioning
based on unrealistic unity. This situation cannot last long since it neither
measures up to expectations nor manages the social life. However, it enables the
group to function well in areas not threatening the status quo. High levels of
Functional are likely as they communicate about themselves and the group,
medium to low levels of Sociable and low levels of Unsociable states. This
phase will be short.
6: Disenchantment. Tensions develop from idealization, since social issues are not
resolved. Disenchantment follows and conflict emerges from members’ unmet
needs. Rebellion against the existing structure and preoccupation with group
process problems are likely. This would be shown by high percentages of
conflictual Unsociable states, medium to low percentages of Functional states as
the problems are confronted and low levels of Sociable states since this method
of avoidance no longer works. Tension is also expressed by fluctuation in
percentages from one session to another. This stage will also be short and
tumultuous.
7: Working. If the group passes the crisis, more realistic expectations and sharing of
power enable it to support members and work on problems. Cohesion is more
evident and the difficulties of the group process are tackled. Conflicts continue,
but are accompanied by discussion of issues and constructive solutions. The full
range of group activity and a mixture of states will occur. There will be high
percentages of Functional and medium to high levels of Unsociable and Sociable
states as the group engages in enjoyable cooperative activity. However, states
will fluctuate in relation to each other and show cyclical variation.
8: Separation. The end of the group raises the need to disengage and prepare for losing
it. In some groups, it is a pause until the following year, but with uncertainty
about membership. Anxieties increase Unsociable states as conflicts emerge and
if the group is unable to address these issues, low percentages of Functional
states are expected, but medium to high levels of Sociable states expressing the
209
enjoyment of being together.
In Table 17.13, predicted proportions of Functional Bands for phases are summarized.
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 7 Phase 8

Functional Conven- Engage- Position- Consolid- Idealiz- Disench- Working Separation
Bands ing ment ing ation ation antment
Functional High Low Low Low Medium Low to High or Medium
or High Medium Varied to High
Sociable Low High Medium High or High Low Medium High or
to High Varied Varied
Unsociable Low Low High or Low to Low High or Medium High or
Varied Medium Varied Varied
Table 17.13. Proportions of Functional Bands associated with phases of group

development.
210
18. RESULTS 1: GROUP DEVELOPMENT
In this chapter, group development hypotheses are tested against the data.
1.1. Stability of GFR Dimensions.

Group development was first examined with GFR Dimensions.
H1.1. Stability of sessions will change systematically over the group’s life and
will be defined as part of a developmental sequence.
Stability of each Group. A measure of group stability is the percentage of

minutes in which groups remained in the same category as the previous minute in each
GFR Dimension. Figures 18.1 - 18.5 show graphs of the percentage of minutes in each
session when groups remained stable for successive minutes on each Dimension.
Categories are not discriminated. All groups except 1988 have missing sessions so the
slope of the line between points adjacent to missing sessions may be misleading. The
percentages are given in Appendix 3 as Tables 18A.1 – 18A.5.
Stability of Group Dimensions 1988

100
% in (0,0)
90
80
70
60
Struc
50 Cogn
40 Aff
30 Act
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31
SESSION
Figure 18.1. Percentage of unchanged minutes for GFR Dimensions in 1988.

211
Figure 18.1 shows waveforms with a period of between 3 and 5 sessions for
1988. Each Dimension has similar features somewhat out of phase with each other.
Stability oscillates between highs of 100% for Structure, around 90% for other
Dimensions and lows of 40-60%. The regularity and synchronisation of these
fluctuations is explored in later hypotheses.

100
% in (0,0)
90
80
70
60
Struc
50 Cogn
40 Aff
30 Act
1 5 7 9 11 16 18 21 23 25 27 29 31
SESSION
Figure 18.2 shows less regular wave fluctuations for 1990. Allowing for
missing sessions, it has a period of 2 to 5 sessions. Several stages are suggested.
Sessions 1 to 7 are characterized by differences in stability of Dimensions; sessions 8 to
18 fluctuate within a narrower range; sessions 19 to 22 suggest a crisis of instability
with a short period of synchronisation from session 23 to 25; the discrepancy increases
from session 26 to 31.
Figure 18.3 shows more sessions missing in 1992, but a wave period of between
3 and 5 (recorded) sessions. The discrepancy in stability between Dimensions varies
from small (sessions 13, 16, 23, 31 and 38) to great (sessions 12, 15, 19 and 36),
suggesting rhythmic alternation between degree of stability and synchrony between the
212
Dimensions.

100
% in (0,0)
90
80
70
60
Struc
50
Cogn
40 Aff
30 Act
3 6 8 12 14 16 18 22 25 29 31 34 36 38
SESSION

100
% in (0,0)
90
80
70
60
Struc
50
Cogn
40 Aff
30 Act
1 5 8 12 18 22 24 26 29
SESSION

213
In figure 18.4, more sessions are missing in 1993 and cautious interpretation is
needed. However, fluctuation of stability and degree of synchrony between the
Dimensions is suggested. In spite of missing sessions, the period of the waveforms is
still 3 to 5 (recorded) sessions. Sessions 1 to 5 are relatively stable, then in sessions 7 to
11 there is discrepancy between Dimensions. Sessions 11 to 17 are more synchronous,
followed by high stability in sessions 18 and 21, then unstable episodes at sessions 22
and 25 and discrepant states at the end of the year.

100
% in (0,0)
90
80
70
Struc
60
Cogn
50
Aff
40 Act
1 4 7 11 13 18 29 35
SESSION
Figure 18.5 for 1996, has even more sessions missing making it difficult to
interpreted. Similar rhythms between stability and synchrony of Dimensions are
evident. At session 1, the group is synchronous and at session 3 is unstable with high
discrepancy between Dimensions. There is cyclical alternation throughout the year
ending in a stable and synchronous session at session 35.
The fluctuation for all groups is within the same range. Points of instability
occur within the first 6 sessions. Sessions 7 to 9 show greater stability, with greater
synchrony and stability around sessions 22 to 24. There are peaks of stability in one or
more Dimensions at sessions 25 to 27, and for all groups except 1996 there is a crisis of
instability several sessions before the end of the year.
214
Stability of all Groups. Groups were compared by calculating the mean of the
percentages of stable minutes for all Dimensions for each group. They are plotted
together in Figure 18.6, with lines broken at missing sessions. Points of synchrony are
evident. Sessions 3, 10, 18, 26-28, and 30-31 are closely related for most groups.
While values differ, the slopes are at times closely related, although there is sometimes
a lag between groups. Examples are at sessions 5-6, 10-12, 17-19, 22-25 and 29-32.
These relationships are explored in later hypotheses. The means are provided in Table
18A.6 in Appendix 3.
100
90
80
M88
70
M90
M92
60
M93
Value
50 M96
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37
sessions
Figure 18.6. Mean of percentage of stable minutes for GFR Dimensions for each
group.
Summary 1.1: There is rhythmical fluctuation in stability of GFR Dimensions in

all groups, but no systematic developmental change as hypothesised.
1.2. Quartile Development of Condensed States.

Condensed States integrate the four Dimensions and are used to examine group
development hypotheses.
H1.2. A developmental sequence will show lower quality early in the year,
215
increase in conflict and dysfunction in the middle and increased function

at the end of the year.
Year quartiles are used to examine groups’ development. Table 18.1 shows the
number of sessions in each quartile for each group, which vary because of missing
sessions. Since 1992 continued for five sessions later in the year than other group, these
were included in quartile 4 to allow other quartiles to describe consistent periods as
other groups.
Quartiles: 1st 2nd 3rd 4th

1988 sessions 8 8 8 9
1990 sessions 5 5 8 7
1992 sessions 5 6 5 11
1993 sessions 5 2 6 5
1996 sessions 5 6 1 4
Table 18.1. Number of sessions in quartiles for each group.
Tables 18.2 - 18.6 show quartile percentages for Condensed States in each
group. Group development can be examined considering changes greater than 1% as
significant (see Chapter 17).
Year Quartiles for 1988

1 2 3 4
Col % Col % Col % Col %
Functional 6.7% 7.6% 27.1% 23.0%
Limited Functional 2.8% 1.5% 3.4% 1.4%
Sociable 43.7% 50.1% 34.5% 29.2%
Limited Sociable 24.5% 13.0% 3.8% 8.2%
Unhappy Cooperation 4.1% 6.1% 6.3% 19.8%
Happy Conflict 8.9% 13.7% 7.4% 4.1%
Productive Turmoil 1.7% 2.6% 5.2% 3.5%
Dysfunctional 3.5% 5.0% 1.1% 4.7%
Nominal 4.1% .4% 11.1% 6.2%
Table 18.2. Percentage of Condensed States by quartiles for 1988.
1988: Table 18.2 shows percentages of Condensed states for each quartile of
216
1988. In quartile 1, Sociable states dominate; little conflict occurs except with
pleasurable affect. There is limited Functional capacity. In quartile 2, Whole
Functional and Sociable states and all Unsociable states increase indicating greater
engagement is accompanied by increased conflict. In quartile 3, Functional increases
fourfold, but the group compensates by increased separation into individuals. In
quartile 4, Functional and Sociable decrease somewhat, Dysfunctional increases, but the
group cooperates more in spite of unpleasurable affect (Unhappy Cooperation).
Over the year, Limited Sociable and Nominal states change toward increased
whole group Sociable and boisterousness (Happy Conflict), which are then converted
into increased Functional, reduced Unsociable but increased Nominal states. Then most
Unsociable states reduce and cooperation in spite of unpleasurable affect increases
(Unhappy Cooperation). Maintaining cooperation with unpleasurable affect is essential
for sustaining groups.

1 2 3 4
Functional 3.3% 3.9% 2.1% 4.1%
Limited Functional 12.2% 7.7% 18.7% 9.1%
Sociable 10.8% 45.6% 11.4% 23.8%
Unhappy Cooperation 2.7% .7% 1.0% .6%
Happy Conflict 12.5% 6.0% 24.6% 25.4%
Productive Turmoil .5% 1.1% 1.0% 1.3%
Dysfunctional 7.0% 2.8% 14.8% 16.3%
Nominal 3.5% .3%
Table 18.3. Percentage of Condensed States by quartile for 1990.
1990: Table 18.3 shows percentages of Condensed States for 1990 quartiles. It
begins with highest percentages in subgroup and conflict states. In quartile 2, they
reduce in favor of a fourfold increase in Sociable. In quartile 3, self-reflection in
subgroups (Limited Functional) and Unsociable states increase; then in quartile 4, whole
states (Functional and Sociable) and conflict increase. The group makes only limited
progress. Limited Functional is the main early strength and the group stabilizes in
Sociable states, but while Limited Functional is reduced, conflictual states increase
fourfold. This is maintained to the end of the year though the capacity to be whole
217
increases.
1992: Table 18.4 shows percentages of Condensed States for 1992 quartiles. In
quartile 1, the group is predominantly in Limited Sociable, but unreflective. In quartile
2, whole Sociable and Unsociable states increase. In quartile 3, conflict is unchanged,
but Limited Sociable replaces whole states and Unhappy Cooperation. By quartile 4,
the group achieves a modest capacity for self-reflection, improved whole sociability,
cooperation and reduced conflict, but increased separation into individuals. The middle
quartiles show increased conflict and the group only achieves functional capacity in the
last quartile. Increased Unsociable states accompany reduced whole states.

1 2 3 4
Functional .4% 1.6% .7% 11.9%

Limited Functional 4.5% 2.8% .7% 5.1%
Sociable 12.7% 37.0% 19.5% 27.8%
Happy Conflict 8.6% 10.9% 10.1% 8.3%
Productive Turmoil .3% 3.2% 1.0%
Dysfunctional 7.5% 15.8% 15.9% 5.6%
Nominal 7.1% 1.2% 2.2% 12.5%
1993: Table 18.5 shows percentages of Condensed States for 1993 quartiles.
This group spends almost half the first quartile in Unsociable states, but has some
capacity for whole group and self-reflection (Functional). The two sessions in quartile 2
show increased Sociable states, but reduced Functional and Unsociable. By quartile 3,
Functional self-reflection increases accompanied by reduced conflict and more time in
whole states. In quartile 4, Unsociable increases similar to quartile 1, while Functional
is also reduced. The group improves whole Functionality in quartile 3, but loses it at the
end of the year. Quartile 3 is the most constructive but conflict increases in quartile 4
along with loss of whole states.
218

1 2 3 4
Functional 5.6% 2.2% 15.4% 5.9%
Limited Functional 4.8% 1.1% .4% .4%
Sociable 26.4% 32.2% 46.7% 22.5%
Happy Conflict 29.0% 22.2% 9.2% 22.5%
Productive Turmoil .9% .4% 2.5%
Dysfunctional 14.3% 2.2% 5.5% 16.5%
Nominal 2.2% 18.9% 4.4% 1.7%
1996: Table 18.6 shows percentages of Condensed States for 1996 quartiles.
Almost three quarters of quartile 1 is Sociable. In quartile 2, the group is more
Functional, with Unsociable similar to quartile 1. Only one session is in Quartile 3. In
quartile 4, Sociable accounts for three-quarters of time with reduced Unsociable;
Functional is maintained. The group achieves self-reflection; conflict increases then
reduces.

1 2 3 4
Functional .8% 8.1% 32.6% 8.3%
Limited Functional 1.2% 3.3% 2.9%
Sociable 58.0% 47.6% 58.7% 71.8%
Limited Sociable 15.6% 17.9% 5.3%
Happy Conflict 3.9% 10.1% 5.3%
Productive Turmoil 5.1% 2.3% 1.0%
Dysfunctional 2.3% 2.0%
Nominal 9.7% 2.3% 6.5% 1.5%
Summary 1.2: The proportions of Condensed States change over the year for all
groups. Although percentage changes are small, their qualitative effects on
session climate suggest important group events. A number of generalizations
can be made:
219
1.2.1. Functional states increase towards the end of the year, suggesting all
groups make therapeutic progress.
1.2.2. All groups increase their ability to unite in Sociable activity during the
year.
1.2.3. Increased Whole Sociable states are associated with increased
Unsociable states, suggesting Whole group states are more demanding
and provoke increased tension and conflict.
1.2.4. Increased Limited Sociable states are associated with decreased
Unsociable states, suggesting division of groups reduces tension and
conflict.
1.2.5. For less successful groups (1990 and 1993), when subgroup Sociable
states increase, there are increased Unsociable states, suggesting conflicts
are carried into subgroups towards the end of the year, having established
relatively stable dynamics.
1.2.6. Successful groups (1988, 1992 and 1996) manifest greatest conflict and
tension in the middle quartiles of the year. Their best functioning is in
the last quartile.
1.2.7. The less successful groups (1990 and 1993) function best in quartile 3,
but it is lost in quartile 4.
A more complex pattern of development is found than postulated by hypothesis
1.2.
1.3. Phases of Group Development.

The next question is whether discrete developmental phases can be identified.
H1.3. Definable phases of group development will be discernible throughout the

group’s life.
Using the scheme described in Chapter 17, the eight phases were described in
terms of their expected proportions of Functional Bands (see Table 17.13). The
hypothesis was tested by computing graphs of percentage of time spent in each
Functional Band per session for each group and examining whether the phases can be
identified. Allowance must be made for the “noise” of natural fluctuations in
220
therapeutic groups. Therefore criteria for the phases may only be met in a general
sense. Each group is examined below.
1988: In Figure 18.7, percentages of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable

Functional Bands are shown for each session. The x-axis shows the percentage of
minutes of each session spent in each Band.
Phase: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
YEAR: 1988
100
80
60
40 Cond9
% Func
% minutes
20
% Soc
0 % Unsoc
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
SESSION

for sessions in 1988 showing developmental phases.
1. Convening (Session 1): The group begins with relatively high Functional, lower
Sociable and medium Unsociable percentage. However, after one session
Sociable increases dramatically and the others fall, indicating the group quickly
moves beyond superficial focus on problems.
2. Engagement (Sessions. 2-8): From session 2 there are six sessions with high
Sociable except for dips at sessions 4 and 7 in response to rises in Unsociable
states, which otherwise remain low. Functional remains low fulfilling criteria
for phase 2 between sessions 2 and 9, for seven sessions. Oscillations of
Sociable peaks and troughs alternating with Unsociable suggest the group may
have repeated the dynamic of phase 2 three times before moving on. It is a
221
phase of common activities that do not confront the problems of group life.
3. Positioning (Sessions 9-11): At session 9 Unsociable rises, Sociable falls and
percentages of all states fluctuate until Sociable dramatically increases at session
12. The rise in Functional is not predicted however. This indicates instability and
conflict for three sessions, consistent with the power struggle of this phase.
4. Consolidation (Sessions 12-16): At session 12 the increase in Sociable may indicate
resolution and formation of norms. The fall in Sociable and rise in Unsociable
at session 13 is reversed in the next three sessions. Phase 4 consists of five
sessions 12 to 16.
5. Idealization (Sessions 17-19): Session 17 initiates a drop in Unsociable and rise in
both Sociable and Functional, reflecting cooperation and communication
consistent with criteria for phase 5 of idealizing the group. This lasts for three
sessions, 17 to 19.
6. Disenchantment (Sessions 20-21): The high Unsociable in session 20 is consistent
with disenchantment and the increased Sociable of session 21 represents
possible avoidance. Unsociable peaks again at session 22. Phase 6 lasts from
sessions 20 to 21.
7. Working (Sessions 22-33): The next stage has fluctuating Unsociable, Sociable and
Functional percentages as the group works productively. Towards the end of the
year, Unsociable rises and Sociable falls although Functional also rises,
suggesting conflicts are worked with for eleven sessions between 22 and 33.
8. Separation: There is no phase 8 for this group since it lingered past session 33 with
only two members and recording was suspended.
Regular, rhythmic oscillations with the changes in proportions of Functional,

Sociable and Unsociable Bands suggest the group may have repeated tasks for each
stage several times. The high Functional peak at session 23 may be a second, more
intense Idealization, followed by a second Disillusionment in Sessions 24-26 before a
productive Working phase sets in.
1990: In Figure 18.8, values of Functional Bands for 1990 are shown. This
group shows different characteristics to 1988, but has missing sessions.
222
1. Convening (Session 1): The orientation phase is shown in the initial high Sociable
and Functional with low Unsociable states in session 1.
2. Engagement (Sessions 2-5): Then Functional falls, Sociable and Unsociable rise
from sessions 2-5, fulfilling criteria for phase 2. The group avoids problems
while finding common activity, but conflict grows. This phase lasts four
sessions until session 5.
3. Positioning (Sessions 6-7): At session 6, Unsociable and Sociable stabilize then fall
while Functional remains low, indicating conflict and disorganization for two
sessions to session 7.
Phases: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
YEAR: 1990
100
80
60
40 Cond9
% Func
20
% Soc
0 % Unsoc
1 5 7 9 11 16 18 21 23 25 27 29 31
% minutes 2 6 8 10 12 17 19 22 24 26 28 30
SESSION

4. Consolidation (Sessions 8-16): From session 8, Sociable increases and remains high
for nine sessions; Functional and Unsociable remain low with some fluctuation
consistent with resolving conflict to develop norms for group functioning. It
lasts until session 16.
5. Idealization (Sessions 17-18): From session 17, Functional rises sharply and
Sociable and Unsociable fall for two sessions consistent with idealization lasting
223
two sessions, until session 18.

6. Disenchantment (Sessions 19-23): Unsociable rises sharply as Functional falls for
five sessions of high conflict and fluctuating Sociable consistent with
disenchantment of phase 6. Its length suggests the group has difficulty resolving
its developmental tasks. It lasts from sessions 19-23.
7. Working (Sessions 24-31): At session 24, there is a rise in Functional and then
Sociable, leading to productive work. This group’s productivity falls towards
the end of the phase as Unsociable rises from session 27 onwards. However,
work with the conflict is suggested by Functional and Sociable rises. This fulfils
to some extent the criteria for phase 7, which lasts for seven sessions.
8. Separation: Final sessions for the year were not recorded.
This group has a long period in Consolidation, possibly due to missing sessions,
which make interpretations tentative, although Idealization seems evident. Working
shows the same rhythms as 1988 and it may have extended further if later sessions were
recorded.
1992: Percentages of Functional Bands for 1992 are shown in Figure 18.9.
Convening is lacking, since session 3 is the first recorded. In contrast to 1988 and 1990,
it was not a new group; a number of members attended the previous year so a clearly
defined Convening Phase may not be present even with complete records.
1. Orientation: Initial sessions are missing.

2. Engagement (Sessions 3-7): Session 3 shows high Sociable and low Functional
indicating avoidance of group issues. Sociable falls towards session 8, when
Unsociable increases, indicating tensions leading to phase 3. Phase 2 lasts five
sessions.
3. Positioning (Sessions 8-12): The conflict from session 8 leads to fluctuating
Unsociable complemented by high Sociable with low Functional, expressing the
power struggles of this phase, which lasts five sessions until session 12.
4. Consolidation (Sessions 13-24): At session 13, Unsociable is medium, but rises at
session 14, then falls as issues are worked at; Sociable falls, then rises for the
next 11 sessions with a dip between sessions 17-19. This is consistent with
224
formation of norms and resolution of phase 3 conflicts. The phase is long (12
sessions), suggesting the group was fixated and had difficulty stabilizing and
achieving Idealization.
Phases: 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
YEAR: 1992
100
80
60
40 Cond9
% Func
20
% Soc
0 % Unsoc
3 6 8 12 14 16 18 22 25 29 31 34 36 38
% minutes 4 7 11 13 15 17 19 24 26 30 33 35 37
SESSION

5. Idealization (Sessions 25-26): At session 26, there is a spike in Functional, while

Sociable falls. This moment of engagement in the group process is not
sustained, since it falls in conjunction with a peak in Unsociable at session 29.
Idealization leads to the next phase though only lasting two sessions. However,
sessions 27 and 28 are missing and may have added to Idealization or
Disenchantment.
6. Disenchantment (Session 29): Idealization is replaced by high Unsociable and low
levels of other Bands at session 29. This lasts one session since Functional and
Sociable again rise in the next. However, the previous two sessions may have
been part of this phase.
7. Working (Sessions 30-35): At session 30, Functional and Sociable rise, fluctuating
with variable Unsociable, consistent with productive work, since conflict is
225
accompanied by reflection on the group and constructive activity in the same or

next session. This phase lasts six sessions.
8. Separation (Sessions 36-38): The group’s records include the last session and show a
drop in Functional, and Unsociable and rising Sociable similar to the avoidance
of phase 2, suggesting the group fails to engage the issues of separation.
However, several members were continuing the following year, so perhaps
termination was not occurring. This phase lasts two sessions.
There is ambiguity about phases 3 and 4, but this may be a reflection of missing
sessions. The long period in phase 4, Consolidation, indicates it had difficulty resolving
issues of this phase.
1993: Percentages for Functional Bands in 1993 are shown in Figure 18.10.
This group continued from 1992 with some new members and has missing sessions,
making identification of phases tentative.
1. Convening (Session 1): In session 1, there is high Functional similar to 1988, but it
drops immediately and by session 3 is replaced by high Sociable and rising
Unsociable. The orientation phase lasted for one or possibly two sessions (since
session 2 is missing).
2. Engagement (Sessions 3-4): The pattern of common activity is indicated by high
Sociable and low Functional. However, it is shorter than other groups, since the
level of conflict shown by Unsociable rises sharply. It lasts till session 5, a total
of two sessions, and may reflect resumption of processes from the previous year,
although session 4 is missing, making interpretation uncertain.
3. Positioning (Sessions 5-10): At session 5, Unsociable is high, while Functional and
Sociable are low. This is consistent with power struggles, continuing for six
sessions till session 10.
4. Consolidation (Sessions 11-20): At session 11, there are signs of more stable
functioning. Although Functional remains low, Sociable rises and Unsociable
falls until session 21. Phase 4 lasts for ten sessions, although sessions are
missing.
5. Idealization (Sessions 21-23): At session 21, Unsociable is high, but Functional
226
begins to rise, continuing till session 23, a fall in Unsociable and increase in
constructive Sociable representing a focus on the group. This phase lasts three
sessions.
Phases: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
YEAR: 1993
100
80
60
40 Cond9
% Func
20
% Soc
0 % Unsoc
1 5 8 12 18 22 24 26 29
% minutes 3 7 11 17 21 23 25 28 30
SESSION

Bands for sessions in 1993 showing developmental phases.
6. Disenchantment (Sessions 24-25): Session 24 sees a high point in Sociable, which

falls in conjunction with a rise in Unsociable indicating disenchantment, loss of
Functional and a fall in Sociable. This phase lasts two sessions.
7. Working (Sessions 26-30): At session 26, Functional rises and fluctuating productive
work begins. This group’s records do not include the end of the year, so it is
impossible to determine the course beyond four sessions. Unsociable rises,
Sociable fluctuates, however, increased Functional means some self-reflection
accompanies conflict. This phase lasts four sessions.
8. Separation: The end of the group is lacking.
Allowing for missing sessions, 1993 shows similarities with 1992 especially in
227
phases 4 and 5. More session records may have allowed a more adequate mapping.
The peak of Functional at session 23 is placed in phase 5, but it corresponds to similar
peaks at session 34 in 1992, session 24 in 1990 and session 23 in 1988, all in phase 7.
1996: The percentage of Functional Bands for 1996 is shown in Figure 18.11.
This group continued from the previous year and more records are missing than other
groups. The group does not seem to go through phase 1, although session 1 is recorded,
since all members had been together before. Six sessions are lost between sessions 18
and 25, so the session axis does not provide even spacing for the time scale through the
year. With the data available, possible phases can be examined.
Phases: 2 3 4 5 6 7
YEAR: 1996
100
80
60
40
Cond9
%Func
20
% Soc
0 % Unsoc
1 3 4 6 7 10 11 12 13 15 16 18 25 29 31 35
% minutes
SESSION

Bands for sessions in 1996 showing developmental phases.
1. Convening: Initial elevation of Functional characteristic of this phase is lacking, due

to members being together the previous year.
2. Engagement (Sessions 1-2): The record starts in session 1 with high Sociable and
low Functional and Unsociable consistent with common activity and avoidance
228
of problems. After two sessions, Unsociable rises in session 3.
3. Positioning (Sessions 3): At session 3, Unsociable rises as avoidance breaks down

and power issues emerge, but is also short-lived as expected in an experienced
group. At session 4, Unsociable drops and Sociable rises indicating the next
phase. It lasts one session.
4. Consolidation (Sessions 4-7): At session 4, there is a rise in Sociable and fall in
Unsociable indicating constructive activity, while Functional remains low
indicating little self-reflection. This lasts until Sociable falls and Functional
rises at session 8 (inferred since the record is lacking). The Consolidation phase
lasts four or five sessions.
5. Idealization (Sessions 8-10): The peak in Functional at session 10 is associated with
lower Sociable, consistent with Idealization. This lasts two to three sessions
(since records are incomplete). Perhaps this is less intense and occurs earlier
because of the continuation from the previous year.
6. Disenchantment (Sessions 11-14): Disenchantment occurs as Functional falls and
Unsociable rises, indicating emerging conflict, which continues until session 15
with low Sociable indicating group disorganization. This phase lasts four
sessions.
7. Working (Sessions 15-35): The fall in Unsociable at session 16 indicates a period of
low Unsociable, with fluctuating Sociable and Functional consistent with the
working phase. This phase is somewhat hypothetical owing to the high number
of missing sessions (14 sessions between sessions 16 and 35) and is longer than
in other groups (a total of 19 sessions), but may be valid because its experience
may have allowed it to move into Working earlier. It continues till the end of the
year and Separation is not defined since the last session is missing.
8. Separation: This is not recorded.
Although many sessions are missing and 1996 is more regular than other groups,
phases can be tentatively distinguished. Groups continuing into a subsequent year may
traverse early stages more rapidly spending more time in Working.
Summary of Developmental Phases. Table 18.7 summarizes the length, mean

229
period and percentage of the year for each phase in each group. If these results can be
generalized, similar groups may spend one session in Convening, about four in
Engagement and Positioning, but twice as much time in Consolidation. Idealization and
Disenchantment seem to require only a few sessions each, then about a third of the year
is spent in Working. When Separation occurs, it occupies a couple of sessions. The
number of groups is too small for this to be more than suggestive.
The groups vary as expected from their nature. Some groups start treatment
(1988 and 1990), others continue from the previous year (1992, 1993 and 1996). The
only one with complete continuity of personnel and therapists from the preceding year
was 1996, which may explain its rapid movement through early phases and longer
Working (although there are missing sessions which may have shown different
phenomena).
Group Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 7 Phase 8

Conven- Engage- Position- Consolid Idealiz- Disench- Working Separat-
ing ment ing -ation ation antment ion
1988 1 7 5 5 3 2 11 -
1990 1 4 2 9 2 5 7 -
1992 - 5 5 12 2 1 6 2
1993 2 2 6 10 3 2 4 -
1996 - 2 1 5 2 4 20 -
Mean 1 4 4 8 2 3 10 2
% Yr 3% 12% 12% 24% 6% 9% 30% 3%
Table 18.7. Length of phases, mean period and percentage of the year spent in each
phase for each group.
Finally, a hypothetical generic graph of developmental phases is shown in

Figure 18.12.
Summary 1.3: Eight group developmental phases were identified from an

integrated scheme from the group literature. Expected percentages of Functional Bands
were defined and identified in all groups.
230
Phases: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35
Functional Sociable Unsociable
Figure 18.12. Generic Graph of phases showing hypothetical percentages of

Functional Bands.
1.4. Condensed States in Developmental Phases.

Developmental phases should be identifiable by the proportion of Condensed
States occurring in them. Sessions were coded for their phase and frequencies and
percentages computed. Percentages are given because of the different number of
sessions in each phase. In some cases, there is only one session per phase and some
years lack one or more phases, however the comparison may be suggestive.
Percentages of Condensed States are given for all groups in Table 18.8 with arrows
showing percentage changes from one phase to another.
The highest proportions of Functional and Limited Functional are in Convening,
Idealization and Working (between 30% and 38% together). Highest proportions of
Dysfunctional are in Positioning and Disenchantment (13% and 11%), but with
moderate values for Consolidation and Working (7% to 12%). Happy Conflict has
highest values in Positioning, Idealization, Disenchantment and Working (11% to 24%).
Nominal is highest in Convening, Disenchantment and Separation (13% to 15%).
Sociable and Limited Sociable are highest in Engagement, Consolidation, and
231
Separation (over 60% together).
Developmental Phases for All Groups.

Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 8
Phase 1 Engage Positioni Consol Idealisati Disench Phase 7 Separat
Convening ment ng idation on antment Working ion
Col % Col % Col % Col % Col % Col % Col % Col %
Functional 22.7% 2.4% 2.9% 3.0% 13.0% 9.8% 15.6% 3.2%

Limited Functional 16.0% 3.3% 1.5% 4.4% 11.9% 1.6% 5.0% .6%
Sociable 15.3% 34.1% 29.2% 41.1% 24.7% 33.5% 31.7% 58.3%
Limited Sociable 24.5% 39.0% 19.0% 26.7% 22.7% 10.5% 13.8% 12.8%
Unhappy Cooperation 1.8% 3.3% 6.1% 4.7% 6.4% 5.2% 8.6% 6.4%
Happy Conflict 4.3% 8.9% 23.5% 8.5% 12.2% 16.0% 11.4% 1.3%
Productive Turmoil 1.0% 2.6% 1.8% 1.1% 3.5% 2.1% 1.3%
Dysfunctional 2.5% 4.5% 12.9% 7.3% 3.5% 10.7% 7.2% 1.3%
Nominal 12.9% 3.6% 2.2% 2.5% 4.6% 9.1% 4.4% 14.7%
Table 18.8. Percentage of Condensed States in each Developmental Phase for all
Groups; arrows show the flow of percentage between states.
Table 18.9 summarizes percentages of the Functional Bands for each phase.
These fluctuations in values provide an underlying structure to an otherwise confusing
process. Arrows show the flow of a “floating” 20-30% of time that moves between
bands to show the changing process. From Convening to Engagement, it moves from
Functional to Sociable, then into Unsociable in Positioning, to Sociable again in
Consolidation and to Functional in Idealization. It falls to Unsociable in
Disenchantment and up to Functional in Working; finally, Functional and Unsociable
combine into Sociable in Separation. Although very generalized, it indicates the gross
movement which therapists may expect as groups move through the phases of therapy.
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 7 Phase 8 Total all
Groups
Functional Conven- Engage- Position- Consolid- Ideal- Disench- Working Separat- Function-
Band ing ment ing ation isation antment ion al Bands
Functional 9% 6% 4% 7% 25% 11% 20% 4% 14%
Sociable 40% 73% 48% 68% 47% 44% 46% 71% 55%
Unsociable 21% 21% 48% 25% 28% 45% 34% 25% 31%
Table 18.9. Percentages of Functional Bands for each Developmental Phase and for all
groups; arrows show the flow of percentage between bands.
232
19. RESULTS: 2 STRUCTURE
2.1. Group Function and Structure.

The first thesis is that quality of group process and functional level depend on
structure. It is hypothesised that Whole is a demanding state. Groups are expected to be
less cognitively organized, more unstable, unpleasurable and conflictual until they learn to
manage themselves; then Whole states should be more creative and higher functioning.
This leads to the general hypothesis:
H2.1. The group’s functioning will alter according to its Structure.
Three hypotheses derived from this were tested.

H2.1.1. The distribution of GFR categories for Whole will differ from
Subgroup Structures.
The total incidence of Structure categories in Table 17.6 is:
Whole: 60.3%,
Subgroups: 5.9%,
Subgroup+Individuals: 29.2%,
Individuals: 4.7%.
Because of their small percentages, all three subgroup and individual states were combined
to form a category called “Subgp/Ind” in tables or “Subgroups” in the text, totalling 39.8%
in a Dimension called “Structure #2.”
The null hypothesis predicts the frequency of other categories in different
Structures would follow proportions of 60%, 6%, 29% and 5% in Structure categories.
Table 19.1 shows percentages of Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action Coherence
categories for Structure categories for all groups. Taking a criterion of 10% difference
from the expected frequency, categories with relatively higher frequency in Whole
structure are: Representational, Joy, Concord. This suggests whole groups are more
likely to be self-reflective, have unstable, pleasurable affect and unite in common goals.
Using a 5% difference criterion, categories with lower than expected frequency
233
in Whole Structure are Normative and Unorganized Cognitive Organization,

Contentment and Boredom for Affect and Accord in Action Coherence. Subgroups are
more likely to be stable, cognitively less organized, have inert affect and cooperate with
compatible goals. Individuals are likely to be bored.
Structure for All Groups.

Whole Sub Subg Individ
Grp groups p+Ind uals
Row Row Row Row
% % % %
Cognitive Representational 78.5% 2.4% 19.1%
Organisation Systemic 63.1% 8.6% 28.3%
Normative 53.5% 5.8% 33.0% 7.7%
Unorganised 52.5% 4.3% 32.3% 10.9%
Affect Contentment 26.1% 35.0% 38.9%
Joy 72.5% 4.8% 22.7%
Interest 59.2% 5.7% 30.8% 4.3%
Discontent 60.7% 3.7% 30.4% 5.2%
Distress 66.1% 5.6% 25.8% 2.4%
Boredom 29.9% 16.1% 54.0%
Action Concord 70.4% 6.6% 23.0%
Coherence Accord 51.6% 6.4% 33.5% 8.5%
Discord 65.2% 3.2% 28.3% 3.2%
Contracord 64.5% 6.8% 28.6%
Table 19.1. Percentage of Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action Coherence

categories in Structure ratings for all groups.
There is little difference for other categories; rule-based Cognitive Organization,

stable Affect and conflict are relatively constant for all structural conditions.
Unpleasurable Affect, conflict and aggression are likely to occur in any structural
condition. When groups are divided, stable Affect and cooperation are more likely, but
cognitive operations or common goals are less likely. Whole is associated with
increased chance of therapeutically advantageous categories. It supports the therapeutic
goal of encouraging Whole structure. Subgroups are more emotionally stable.
Summary 2.1.1. There is a greater tendency for groups in whole states to

function with rule-based or self-reflective organization, exhibit unstable affect and
cooperation in common goals. Whole groups are more likely to function well or to be
organized but unstable and conflictual. Subgroups are more likely to be disorganized
234
with inert affect and cooperate in compatible goals. They are stable but less productive.
Stable affect is constant for both structures. Individuals are likely to be unorganized
and bored.
The effect of change into and out of the Structure categories is explored in
hypothesis 2.1.2.
H2.1.2: Movement from Whole to Subgroup Structures will be

associated with reduced unpleasure and conflict categories;
movement in the opposite direction will be associated with
increased unpleasure and conflict categories.
Structure Change for All Groups.

Negative No Positive
Change Change Change
Affect Contentment Subtable % 1.7% 2.7% 1.0%
Rating in Joy Subtable % 14.9% 16.8% 12.5%
Preceding Interest Subtable % 57.5% 64.0% 64.0%
Minute
Discontent Subtable % 20.5% 12.8% 16.2%
Distress Subtable % 2.9% 1.9% 1.5%
Boredom Subtable % 2.5% 1.9% 4.8%
Affect in Contentment Subtable % 1.7% 2.7% 1.0%
Minute of Joy Subtable % 12.5% 16.6% 17.1%
Structure Interest Subtable % 61.4% 64.0% 59.8%
Change
Discontent Subtable % 16.4% 12.9% 18.3%
Distress Subtable % 1.9% 2.0% 1.5%
Boredom Subtable % 6.0% 1.8% 2.3%
Table 19.2. Frequency of Affect categories in preceding and designated minutes

associated with Structure Change for all groups.
2.1.2a. Effect of structural change. To test whether structural change manages

affect and conflict, a variable called “Structure Change” identified all minutes with
changes to greater or to lesser structure from the previous minute or no change. Table
19.2 gives the percentage of Affect categories associated with Structure Change. The
proportion of Affect categories in the minute before is compared with the minute of
structural change. The percentage of each category for each structural change condition
is given. “Negative change” is from Whole to Subgroups, “positive change” from
235
Subgroups to Whole.
Negative structural change reduces Joy (2.4%), Discontent (4.1%) and Distress
(1%), while Interest and Boredom increase, stabilizing pleasure and reducing
unpleasure. There is negligible affect change without structural change. Positive
change reduces Interest (4.2%) and Boredom (2.5%), and increases Joy (4.6%) and
Discontent (2.1%). The proportion of pleasure/unpleasure changes by 1.5% for
negative change and 0.4% for positive change.
Affect provides weak support for Hypothesis 2.1.2. It is interesting that change
towards decreased structural integrity stabilizes both pleasure and unpleasure (since
Boredom has lower energy than Discontent) and change towards greater structural
integrity destabilizes pleasure, (in the form of increased Joy), but stabilizes unpleasure.
Change towards subgroups reduces affective intensity, whereas change towards whole
stabilizes unpleasure, but destabilizes pleasure.
Percentages of Action categories associated with structural change are shown in
Table 19.3 to test the hypothesis for Action Coherence.
Structure Change for All Groups

Negative No Positive
Change Change Change
Action Coherence Concord Subtable % 17.4% 33.0% 18.7%
Rating in Accord Subtable % 52.5% 46.3% 59.4%
Preceding Minute Discord Subtable % 24.3% 17.6% 17.1%
Contracord Subtable % 5.8% 3.1% 4.8%
Action Coherence Concord Subtable % 20.3% 33.0% 16.2%
Accord Subtable % 56.9% 46.2% 55.8%
Discord Subtable % 19.5% 17.5% 23.3%
Contracord Subtable % 3.3% 3.4% 4.8%
Table 19.3. Percentage of Action Coherence Categories in preceding and designated

minutes associated with Structure Change for all groups.
Negative structural change is associated with movement from conflict to

cooperation of 7.3% (Concord 2.9%, Accord 4.4%); in positive structural change,
cooperative categories decrease and Discord increases (6.2%). For unchanged
Structure, there is no change. This supports Hypothesis 2.1.2, indicating change
towards Subgroups increases cooperation and change towards Whole increases Discord.
236
Summary 2.1.2.a: Movement from Whole to Subgroups is associated with

increased cooperation, stabilized pleasure, reduced unpleasure, conflict and aggression;
movement from Subgroups to Whole is associated with increased unstable pleasure,
stabilized unpleasure and conflict.
2.1.2b. Probabilities of changes in Group Action states. The hypothesis can

also be tested by evidence that when in Whole, groups have lower quality Cognitive
Organization, Affect and Action Coherence, while movement to Subgroups stabilizes
and raises the process’ quality. Transition from Whole-unstable-low quality to
Subgroup-stable-high quality should be more frequent than the reverse. This can be
examined by considering Action Coherence with Structure change.
A variable, “Group Action” was computed showing the incidence of change
between Whole-Cooperation, Whole-Conflict, Subgroup-Cooperation and Subgroup-
Conflict within a five-minute period. For all groups there were 61.6% unchanging
states and 38.4% changes. The percentage of stable states is:
Whole-Cooperation: 28.9%;
Subgroup-Cooperation: 26.7%;
Whole-Conflict: 4.5%;
Subgroup-Conflict: 1.5%.
Total unchanging states: 61.6%.
Conflict is largely responsible for instability. Cooperative groups, regardless of

structure, are more likely to be stable. Whole is marginally more stable than Subgroups.
To magnify this effect, stable minutes were excluded and each change as a proportion of
all change was computed. Changes in each direction between states are combined to
give an overall probability of transition between the two states within the five-minute
period. Figure 19.1 shows change between states as a percentage of all minutes and a
proportion of all change.
The highest movement is between Whole-Cooperation and Subgroup-
Cooperation (14.2%, or 0.37 of all change). The next highest is between Whole-
Cooperation and Whole-Conflict (8.8%, or 0.24 of all change); then Subgroup-
237
Cooperation to Subgroup-Conflict (5.9%, or 0.15 of all change); between Whole-

Conflict and Subgroup-Cooperation is 4.5% or 0.12 of all change between Whole-
Cooperation and Subgroup-Conflict is the same as between Whole-Conflict and
Subgroup-Conflict at 2.8%, or 0.06 of all changes.
Hypothesis 2.1.2 predicts movement between Whole-Conflict and Subgroup-
Cooperation would be greater than the opposite direction. It does not comment on the
movement between Whole-Cooperation and Subgroup-Cooperation, nor Cooperation
and Conflict within the Whole- or Subgroup- conditions. While there is support for the
hypothesis, the greatest change indicates rhythms between Cooperative whole and
subgroups and between cooperation and conflict in unchanged structure.
Whole- Whole-
Cooperation 8.8%, .23 Conflict
2.5%, .06
14.2%, .37 2.5%, .06
4.5%, .12
Subgroup- 5.9%, .15 Subgroup-

Cooperation Conflict
Figure 19.1. Change between Group Action states over a five-minute period for
all groups as a percentage of all minutes and as a proportion of all changes.
Summary 2.1.2b: The probabilities of movement between Group Action states

shows that in whole states, conflict is most likely to be managed within the whole; if it
moves to subgroups, it is twice as likely to become cooperative as remain in conflict. In
subgroups, conflict is most likely to be managed in subgroups and it is equally likely to
remain in conflict or become cooperative if it changes to whole. There are important
238
oscillations within whole states and between whole and subgroup cooperation.
Figure 19.2 shows the net percentage changes when the percentage of change in
each direction between each pair of states is subtracted from each other. Although
small, they show there is a small tendency for groups to move out of Subgroup-
Cooperation into any other state and to drift through Whole-Cooperation and Subgroup-
Conflict to end in Whole-Conflict. This suggests an underlying tendency for groups to
become whole and conflictual (see chapter 21).
Whole- Whole-
Cooperation .6% Conflict
.1%
.2% .1%
.3%
Subgroup- .5% Subgroup-

Cooperation Conflict
Figure 19.2. Net percentage change between Group Action states over a five-
minute period for all groups.
2.1.2c. Group Action change as a proportion of stable states. Stable Whole-

Cooperation and Subgroup-Cooperation (28.9% and 26.7%) are the most frequently
occurring states. However, they are also most unstable since they have the most
movement between them (14.2%). To compensate for this, the probability of change
was weighted in relation to the amount of time spent in the states. This was done in two
ways. (a) The percentages associated with all three changes for each state shown in
Figure 19.1 were added, forming the total probability groups will depart from, or arrive
239
at that state. (b) The amount of time spent in each state was allowed for by dividing
these percentages by the percentage of stable states, to describe changes as a proportion
of the total number of those states, giving a comparative indication of the likelihood that
the group will move out of each state. These are shown in Table 19.4.
Conflict states are four times more unstable in whole and eight times more
unstable in subgroup than Cooperation states. Subgroup-Conflict is more than twice as
unstable as Whole-Conflict. This is understandable since subgroups are smaller and the
effects of conflict more disruptive. However, smaller groups function better and are
more attractive to their members (see Chapter 11), suggesting subgroups are not the
same as small whole groups. It also shows group stability in cooperation is similar
irrespective of structural state. Although a low incidence of structural change is
associated with subgroups, it is significant as a proportion of its incidence. However,
the move from Subgroup-Conflict to Subgroup-Cooperation is greater than to Whole-
Cooperation suggesting that remaining in subgroups is also effective to control conflict.
Group Action State Total percentage Percentage Change as a

departure/arrival of Stable proportion of
from state States Stable minutes
Whole-Cooperation 12.9% 28.1% 0.44
Whole-Conflict 7.4% 4.5% 1.64
Subgroup-Conflict 5.3% 1.5% 3.53
Subgroup-Cooperation 12.8% 26.7% 0.48
Table 19.4. Proportion of change in Group Action characteristics for all groups after
five minutes.
Summary 2.1.2c: In proportion to the number of occasions it occurred,

Subgroup-Conflict is the state most likely to change; the next most unstable is Whole-
Conflict, with cooperative states of similar stability, regardless of structure.
Conclusion 2.1.2: Groups use movement from whole to subgroups to resolve

conflict, stabilize pleasure and reduce unpleasure. Though they also resolve these
problems within the structural state, they are four and eight times (for whole and
subgroups respectively) more likely to change structure when conflictual than when
cooperative. Important transitions occur between whole conflict and cooperation and
between whole and subgroup cooperation states.
240
H2.1.3: In early stages of group life, more therapeutically desirable

states will occur in Subgroup Structure; in the later stages, they
will occur in Whole Structure.
This hypothesis concerns change in these relationships over the groups’ life.
Small trends may obscure more definite patterns specific to time of year. Change in
structural conditions over year quartiles are examined. Table 19.5 gives the proportion
of Structure categories for each quartile for all groups. There is an increase in Whole
and decrease in other categories after quartile 1.
Structure for All Groups.

Whole Subgro Subgp+I Individu
Grp ups nd als
Row % Row % Row % Row %
Year 1 48.7% 7.4% 38.8% 5.1%
Quartiles 2 65.5% 4.2% 28.3% 2.0%
3 61.0% 8.4% 25.7% 4.9%
4 65.5% 4.0% 24.4% 6.1%
Table 19.5. Percentage of Structure categories in each quartile for all groups.
The proportions of Structure categories occurring in each quartile are shown for
each group in Table 19.6. Whole is lowest in quartile 1, and then is similar for other
quartiles in 1988; it is lowest in quartile 1, next lowest in quartile 3 and higher for
quartiles 2 and 4 for 1990 and 1992; while 1993 and 1996 had the lowest Whole in
quartile 2, the highest in 1 and 3, probably because they continued from the previous
year. The percentage of Whole increases by 11-17% in the last three quartiles,
suggesting groups are more able to manage this state as they develop. This is achieved
quickly in quartile 2, which is understandable otherwise the group would disintegrate.
Although the years differ in proportions, they conform to this format except for 1993,
which had more inconsistent attendance (see Appendix 1). Table 19A.1 in Appendix 3
shows quartile percentages of all categories for all groups for each Structure category.
Representational, Discontent and Discord show a linear increase in each quartile.
Others are consistent or fluctuate. This does not support the hypothesis that groups
gradually develop the capacity to manage Whole structure. They acquire it quickly in
241
the quartile 1.
Structure
Whole Subgr Subg Individ
Grp oups p+Ind uals
Row Row Row Row
% % % %
YEAR 1988 Year 1 61.3% 2.4% 32.3% 4.1%
Quartiles 2 77.2% 1.5% 20.8% .4%
3 77.0% .2% 11.7% 11.1%
4 76.5% 1.0% 16.3% 6.2%
1990 Year 1 22.8% 14.6% 59.1% 3.5%
Quartiles 2 56.8% 14.0% 29.1%
3 38.6% 28.0% 33.4%
4 50.5% 13.2% 36.1% .3%
1992 Year 1 19.0% 16.4% 57.5% 7.1%
Quartiles 2 60.9% .6% 37.3% 1.2%
3 41.9% 3.2% 52.7% 2.2%
4 54.3% 4.1% 29.0% 12.6%
1993 Year 1 74.9% 3.9% 19.0% 2.2%
Quartiles 2 37.8% 43.3% 18.9%
3 80.5% .7% 14.3% 4.4%
4 68.6% 29.7% 1.7%
1996 Year 1 70.8% 19.5% 9.7%
Quartiles 2 68.7% 3.9% 25.1% 2.3%
3 93.5% 6.5%
4 89.8% 1.9% 6.8% 1.5%
Table 19.6. Percentage of Structure categories for year quartiles for each group.
Cognitive Organisation for All Groups.

Represen Unorgan
tational Systemic Normative ised
Year 1 Structure Whole Group 8.5% 45.4% 27.9% 18.1%
Quartiles #2 Subgp/Ind 4.3% 34.9% 38.1% 22.7%
2 Structure Whole Group 10.6% 50.2% 24.7% 14.5%
#2 Subgp/Ind 8.7% 41.5% 28.7% 21.1%
#2 Subgp/Ind 7.2% 24.5% 37.4% 30.9%
#2 Subgp/Ind 13.5% 23.3% 35.0% 28.1%
Table 19.7. The percentage of Cognitive Organization categories in each Structure #2

category by quartiles for all groups.
242
Table 19.7 shows change in Cognitive Organization in each structural condition

for year quartiles. Systemic dominates in the first quartile (45.5%), but negative
organization accounts for almost half the incidence (46%). In quartile 2,
Representational and Systemic increase at the expense of negative organization (by
2.1% and 4.8% respectively); in quartile 3, Systemic falls and Representational
increases (by 16.5%), but so does Normative (5.8%) and Unorganized (6.5%). In
quartile 4, both higher categories increase (Representational 1.3%, Systemic 4.6%) at
the expense of lower categories. There is no simple linear relation however; Whole
favors increased Representational and reduced Normative and Unorganized through the
year.
For Subgroups, only 4.3% is Representational in quartile 1. In quartile 2, both
higher categories increase at the expense of lower categories (Representational by 4.4%,
Systemic 6.6%). In quartile 3, this trend reverses; Normative increases (by 8.7%) and
Unorganized (9.8%). In quartile 4, all three categories contribute to increased
Representational (6.3%). There is greater increase in higher functional categories in
Whole over the year; for Subgroup, Representational increases.
Summary 2.1.3a: For Cognitive Organization, the hypothesis is not supported,

but Representational increases in both structures through the year and there are rhythms
present the hypothesis does not reveal.
Affect #2 for All Groups.

Joy Interest Discontent Distress
#2 Subgp/Ind 13.0% 65.8% 18.2% 3.0%
#2 Subgp/Ind 21.0% 61.9% 16.4% .7%
#2 Subgp/Ind 17.0% 67.5% 13.2% 2.2%
Table 19.8. Proportions of Action Coherence categories in each Structure #2 category in

year quartiles for all groups.
243
Table 19.8 shows percentages of Affect #2 categories for structural categories in

each quartile. In quartile 1 for Whole, two thirds of the time is Interest and 1% Distress.
In quartile 2, Interest increases at the expense of Joy and Discontent (11.5%), Distress
remains stable; in quartile 3, Joy increases (3.8%) at the expense of Interest and
Discontent, Distress remains stable. In quartile 4, Interest reduces in favour of all other
categories suggesting Whole groups spend more time in pleasure in quartiles 1-3, but
are more emotionally turbulent at the end of the year. A similar movement occurs in
Subgroups until quartile 4, when Interest increases, contrary to Whole.
Summary 2.1.3b: For Affective states, the hypothesis is not supported; both
structures show a similar movement towards Interest then Joy until quartile 4 when
there is more turbulence and unpleasure in Whole, but further stabilization in pleasure
for Subgroups.
The percentage of Action Coherence categories occurring in Whole and

Subgroups for each quartile for all groups is shown in Table 19.9. In quartile 1, 78% of
Whole occurs in cooperative categories. In quartile 2, Concord and Discord reduce in
favor of Accord (12.8%) and Contracord (1%). In quartile 3, this is reversed with
increased Concord (6.3%) and Discord (1.1%). In quartile 4, both cooperative
categories fall in favor of both conflictual categories (Discord 2%, Contracord 3.7%).
Action Coherence for All Groups.

Concord Accord Discord Contracord
#2 Subgp/Ind 26.9% 48.2% 20.4% 4.5%
#2 Subgp/Ind 25.4% 56.7% 16.0% 2.0%
#2 Subgp/Ind 35.0% 45.5% 15.7% 3.7%
Table 19.9. Percentages of Action Coherence categories in each Structure #2 category

in year quartiles for all groups.
244
For Subgroups, a similar proportion of cooperation to Whole occurs in quartile 1

(78.8%); In the remaining quartiles, the opposite tends to occur; in quartile 2, Accord
reduces (by 6.5%) in favor of the other three categories; in quartile 3, this is reversed,
Accord increasing by 8.5%, then in quartile 4, Concord and Contracord increase (by
9.6% and 1.7%) at the expense of Accord and Discord.
Summary 2.1.3c: For Action Coherence, the hypothesis is not supported.

Whole increases Accord, then Concord and Discord, then both conflict categories;
subgroups shows the opposite trends.
Conclusion 2.1.3: For Whole structure, as the year progresses, higher-level

Cognitive and Affect categories increase, but Action fluctuates. For Subgroups, there
is a more complex relationship with a rhythmic interchange between increases and
decreases in the second category in each Dimension suggesting Subgroups is not unitary
since it reflects three distinct conditions.
2.2. Group Function and Group Size.

The total number of members present in each session was recorded as a variable
called “Group Size,” including members arriving late or leaving the room. The only
groups with six members were 1990 (four sessions) and 1992 (one session). These had
the highest proportion of Subgroups (18% and 5.4%); remaining groups had 2.5% or
less. For groups of less than six, Subgroups+Individuals predominates. This needs to
be born in mind in the following investigations.
H2.2. Group functioning will alter according to Size.
Proportions of Structure #2 categories for group size are shown in Table 19.10.
The larger the group, the smaller the proportion of time spent in Whole. The hypothesis
is supported.
Summary 2.2: The smaller the group, the more time it spends in Whole. This
supports the hypothesis that Whole is more difficult and demanding for groups to
maintain and this increases with the size.
245
Structure #2 for All

Groups
Whole Group Subgp/Ind
Row % Row %
Total
members 2 73.4% 26.6%
present. 3 70.2% 29.8%
4 58.7% 41.3%
5 53.0% 47.0%
6 25.4% 74.6%
Table 19.10. The proportion of Structure #2 categories for different sized groups.
H2.2.1. Different sized groups will show different distributions of GFR

categories.
Differences in structural effects of group size were compared for other GFR
Dimensions. Table 19.11 shows the relation of group size to the proportion of each
Cognitive Organization condition in each structural condition. Groups of two members
were excluded since the structure can only be a group of two or two individuals.
Comparing all groups with different sized groups shows Representational is 5.3%
greater for groups of three in Whole and 7.3% larger for Subgroup, but is progressively
smaller in both structures for larger groups. The much higher relative proportion of
Representational in Whole than Subgroups is consistent in all sizes, suggesting the
larger the group the more difficult is self-reflection. Systemic in Subgroups is
consistent for sizes above 3 (32%-36% compared with 31% for all groups). For groups
of 3, (23.8%) a subgroup is two members. Whole is similar in three and four members
(37.7% and 40.7% compared with 34.9% for all groups), but reduces in larger groups to
24.2% for five and only 4.6% for six members. It is more difficult for larger groups to
develop rule-based Cognitive Organization, but it is also more difficult with only two,
the optimum being three or four members.
Normative increases for size in Whole (22.8% to 30.8% compared with 26.8%
for all groups), except for groups of three (26.4%). It is smallest for Subgroups in
groups of five and largest in groups of three (41.1% compared with 35.3% for all
groups). The smallest figures are Whole (22.8%) in groups of four and Subgroups
246
(26.4%) in groups of five, which usually means subgroups of four, since the most
common structure in this category is Subgroups+Individuals. Unorganized shows
greater variation. Whole increases with size from 11% for three members to 61% for
six and Subgroups increases from 19.6% for three to 27.5% for five and decreases for
six (24.6%).
Cognitive Organisation for All Groups.

Representational Systemic Normative Unorganised
Structure Whole Group Row % 19.6% 34.9% 26.8% 18.7%
#2 Subgp/Ind Row % 8.2% 31.0% 35.3% 25.6%
Cognitive Organisation for Groups of different size.

Total 3 Whole Group Row % 24.9% 37.7% 26.4% 11.0%
members Subgp/Ind Row % 15.5% 23.8% 41.1% 19.6%
present. 4 Whole Group Row % 17.2% 40.7% 22.8% 19.2%
Subgp/Ind Row % 7.0% 32.4% 34.8% 25.8%
5 Whole Group Row % 14.5% 24.2% 28.4% 33.0%
Subgp/Ind Row % 7.4% 38.6% 26.4% 27.5%
6 Whole Group Row % 3.1% 4.6% 30.8% 61.5%
Subgp/Ind Row % .5% 36.1% 38.7% 24.6%
Table 19.11. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories in Structure#2 for all

groups and different sized groups.
Summary 2.2.1a: The larger the group, the higher is the proportion of less
organized states. This is most evident in Whole, but for Subgroups, the smaller the
group, the easier it is for Representational to occur. Units of three to four members
favor Systemic.
Table 19.12 shows percentages of Affect #2 categories in Structure #2 for all

groups and group sizes. There are linear increases for Joy and Distress with increasing
size (except for Subgroups in groups of six). For Whole, Joy ranges from 11.5% to
46.2% compared to 19.6% for all groups and for Subgroups, from 3.6% to 23%
compared with 11.3% for all groups; for Distress, the range for Whole is 0.5% to 9.2%
compared to 2.1% for all groups and for Subgroups 0.4% to 2.5% compared with 1.7%
for all groups. This emphasizes the importance of size.
247
A ffect #2 for A ll G roups.

Joy Interest D iscontent D istress
R ow % R ow % R ow % R ow %
S tructure W hole G roup
19.6% 63.4% 14.8% 2.1%
#2 S ubgp/Ind
11.3% 69.7% 17.3% 1.7%
Affect #2 for All Groups.

Total 3 Structure #2 Whole Group Row % 11.5% 72.9% 15.1% .5%
members Subgp/Ind Row % 3.6% 72.3% 23.8% .4%
present. 4 Structure #2 Whole Group Row % 22.0% 62.4% 13.4% 2.2%
Subgp/Ind Row % 12.6% 72.5% 13.3% 1.6%
5 Structure #2 Whole Group Row % 33.0% 44.4% 17.6% 5.1%
Subgp/Ind Row % 14.2% 65.2% 18.0% 2.5%
6 Structure #2 Whole Group Row % 46.2% 40.0% 4.6% 9.2%
Subgp/Ind Row % 23.0% 71.7% 3.1% 2.1%
Table 19.12. Percentage of Affect #2 categories in Structure #2 for all groups and for
different sized groups.
Interest shows a linear decrease for Whole groups with increasing size (72.9% to
40% compared to 63.4% for all groups), while the proportion for Subgroups remains
relatively stable (between 65.2% and 72.9% compared with 69.7% for all groups). The
larger the group, the less time spent in constant affect when Whole and more time in
unstable Joy; but formation of Subgroups preserves a stable proportion of stable
pleasure (supporting Hypothesis 2.2.1.). The total value of pleasure for Whole is
between 77% and 86% for each size. Groups maintain relatively constant proportions
of pleasure/unpleasure.
There is no linear relation for Discontent, but an increase in Whole up to five
members (15.1% to 17.6%), then a decrease for six (4.6% compared to 14.7% for all
groups). For Subgroups, Discontent tends to decrease with greater group size (from
23.8% to 3.1% compared with 17.3% for all groups), supporting it as a means of solving
problems in larger groups. Distress shows a linear increase with group size in Whole
(0.5% to 9.2% compared with 2-1% in all groups) and in Subgroups ups to groups of
five (0.4% to 2.5%) with a similar level for six members.
Summary 2.2.1b: When groups increase in size, they exhibit more unstable
affect, but the proportion of pleasure/unpleasure remains relatively constant. Subgroups
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has a stabilizing effect with a more constant value of Interest and generally lower levels
of unstable affect.
Table 19.13 shows percentages of Action Coherence categories for Structure #2

for all groups and different sized groups. Concord shows a linear decrease with
increasing group size in Whole (from 46% to 1.5% compared with 35.7% for all
groups). In Subgroups, five members has significant less (17.1%) than the other sizes
(24.1% to 27.5% compared with 22.7% for all groups). Group size is crucial to
achieving Concord. Proportions of Accord are stable for three to five members in
Whole (39.6% to 37.8%) but increase for six (47.7% compared with 41% for all
groups). Subgroups reduces from 64.1% to 5.3% between group of three and five,
(compared with 58.3% for all groups), but increases for groups of six (60.2%).

Structure Whole Group 35.7% 41.0% 19.6% 3.7%
#2 Subgp/Ind 22.7% 58.3% 15.8% 3.1%

Total 3 Structure #2 Whole Group 46.1% 39.6% 13.3% 1.0%
members Subgp/Ind 24.3% 64.1% 10.8% .7%
present. 4 Structure #2 Whole Group 39.2% 37.8% 19.3% 3.7%
Subgp/Ind 27.5% 55.3% 14.8% 2.4%
5 Structure #2 Whole Group 16.2% 39.6% 35.0% 9.3%
Subgp/Ind 17.1% 53.0% 22.8% 7.1%
6 Structure #2 Whole Group 1.5% 47.7% 40.0% 10.8%
Subgp/Ind 24.1% 60.2% 13.6% 2.1%
Table 19.13. Percentage of Action Coherence categories in Structure#2 for all groups
and for different sized groups.
Discord increases with group size for Whole (13.3% to 40% compared with
19.6% for all groups) and Subgroups, (10.8% to 22.8% compared with 15.8%) except
for six members, (13.6%) which is comparable to groups of four, which would be their
size. There is a similar linear increase for Whole in Contracord for increasing size (1%
to 10.8% compared with 3.7% for all groups) indicating size is crucial for conflict.
249
Subgroups reduces conflict (0.7% to 7.1% compared with 3.1% for all groups), except
for groups of six whose subgroups will be three or four members. Conflict increases
with size.
Summary 2.2.1c: As size increases, it is more difficult to maintain cooperation,

but forming subgroups increases the proportion of cooperation in larger groups. The
effect of group size is greatest on the most challenging states.
H2.2.2. The smaller the group, the lower will be the amount of change in
categories from one minute to the next.
This hypothesis concerns stability for all dimensions, so Condensed States are
used. A variable was computed comparing each minute with the preceding minute in
each session (excluding first minutes) identifying whether the state remained the same,
moved to a higher or lower value state. This allowed “positive change,” “negative
change” and “no change” to be recorded. The stability of Condensed States for
different size groups is shown in Table 19.14.
Hypothesis 2.2.2 predicts the percentage of stable minutes decreases as size
increases. This is confirmed for groups of two to five members (65.2% - 51.6%), but
stability increases for six (58.6%), indicating the stabilizing effect of subgroups of two
to four members. Positive and negative change increase with size up to five members
and fall for six members.
Total members present for All

2 G 3 4 5 6
Col Col Col Col Col
Stability Negative Change %
17.8% %
21.2% %
22.0% %
24.5% %
19.1%
f
Condensed No Change 65.2% 59.0% 56.0% 51.9% 58.6%
States
Positive Change 17.0% 19.8% 22.0% 23.7% 22.3%
Table 19.14. Stability of Condensed States for different sized groups.
Summary 2.2.2: The smaller the group, the greater is the stability, unless it is
large enough to form subgroups without individuals when it functions like smaller
250
groups.
H2.2.3. Sessions of smaller size will function at higher quality compared

to other sessions.
The influence of group size on the quality of group function can be examined by
comparing the distribution of Condensed States. If larger groups are more unstable,
their quality may be lower. Table 19.15 shows the percentage of all Condensed States
for different sized groups.
Total members present for All Groups.

2 3 4 5 6
9 Functional Col % 11.2% 13.1% 7.4% 6.1% .8%
Condensed Limited Functional Col % 2.7% 4.7% 6.4% 16.4%
States Sociable Col % 48.8% 41.4% 34.8% 21.4% 11.7%
Limited Sociable Col % 16.7% 24.2% 22.8% 46.1%
Unhappy Cooperation Col % 8.8% 8.4% 5.4% 4.1% .4%
Happy Conflict Col % 1.1% 6.3% 11.3% 22.2% 18.0%
Productive Turmoil Col % 2.7% 2.3% 1.6% 2.1%
Dysfunctional Col % .8% 4.2% 7.6% 12.8% 6.6%
Nominal Col % 26.6% 4.7% 3.0% 2.1%
Table 19.15. The percentage of Condensed States by group size for all groups.
There are linear relationships for group size with every state except Productive
Turmoil and Dysfunctional. The proportion of Functional and Sociable decrease as
groups become larger as do Unhappy Cooperation, and Nominal (which also lack
conflict). By contrast, Limited Functional, Limited Sociable, Happy Conflict and
Dysfunctional increase with size, except for six members.
Summary 2.2.3: There is a direct relationship between the proportion of higher

quality states and group size. The smaller the group, the larger is the proportion of
higher quality states, except that Unhappy Cooperation and Nominal behave like higher
quality states (due to absence of conflict). The larger the group, the more likely it is to
engage in conflict states.
H2.2.4. The tendency to move from Whole to Subgroups to resolve

251
conflict will be more likely in larger groups.
Findings for Hypothesis 2.1.2 indicated groups were most likely to resolve
conflict by moving to cooperation within the same structure, but Subgroup-Conflict was
the most labile state, followed by Whole-Conflict. The effect of different sizes was
compared for Group Action. Table 19.16 shows the percentage of changes between the
Group Action states for groups of different sizes.
Group Action State Group Group Group Group All

size = 3 size = 4 size = 5 size = 6 Groups
Whole-Cooperation <-> Subgroup-Cooperation 16.3% 12.8% 9.9% 10.6% 14.2%
Whole-Conflict <-> Whole-Cooperation 8.9% 9.0% 10.7% 3.2% 8.8%
Whole-Conflict <-> Subgroup-Cooperation 3.5% 4.6% 6.1% 7.8% 4.5%
Subgroup-Conflict <-> Subgroup-Cooperation 2.9% 3.7% 10.4% 2.9% 5.9%
Whole-Conflict <-> Subgroup-Conflict 0.9% 2.1% 5.9% 2.8% 2.5%
Subgroup-Conflict <-> Whole-Cooperation 2.3% 2.7% 2.5% 1.2% 2.5%
Table 19.16. Total percentage of changes between Group Action states in different sized
groups after 5 minutes (excluding percentage of stable minutes).
There is a linear progression for all categories between groups of three to five,
except Subgroup-Conflict and Whole-Cooperation and a change at six members
reflecting the effect of subgroups. However, the linear relationship is increasing
percentage from three to five members except for Whole-Cooperation <-> Subgroup-
Cooperation, which is more likely to occur in a group of three than four or five (16.3%
to 9.9%), but more likely with six (10.6%, with all groups 14.2%). Changes between
cooperation and conflict within Whole are more likely from three to five members
(8.9% to 10.7%) and least likely with six (3.2%). Movement between Whole-Conflict
and Subgroup-Conflict increases from three to five members (0.9% to 5.9%) and falls
for six (2.8%). Change within Subgroups from conflict to cooperation increases
fourfold between three and five members (2.9% to 10.4%) and falls for six, similar to 3
members (2.9%). Change between Whole-Conflict and Subgroup-Cooperation
increases from three to six members (3.5% to 7.8%) indicating more members are more
likely to be in conflict when together. Change between Subgroup-Conflict and Whole-
Cooperation is inconsistent, showing little change between three to five members (2.9%
to 2.5%), but less for six (1.2%).
252
Since six members does not represent a pure factor of group size, cooperative
movement between whole and subgroup structures becomes less frequent with
increasing size, because there is increased conflict. Movement into and out of conflict
increases with size, but movement from whole to subgroups as a means of managing
conflict increases with size, including six members. Movement from whole to
subgroups as a strategy for resolving conflict is used more as size increases. The larger
the group, the more likely it is to develop conflict in whole or retain conflict in the move
to subgroups. However, the more members there are, the less likely it will move
between whole and subgroup structures when cooperative. The likelihood of becoming
cooperative in whole when there is conflict in the subgroups is relatively unchanged.
Summary 2.2.4: The effect of increased group size increases the likelihood of
movements between whole group conflict and subgroup cooperation.
2.3. Group Function and Completeness.

Another structural element of group process is the number of members missing
from sessions. Absentees for each minute are recorded including late arrivals or
members leaving the room
H2.3. Groups’ functional quality will alter according to their Completeness.
H2.3.1. The more incomplete the group, the higher will be its functional
quality in GFR categories.
The effect of absentees on quality is indicated by comparing the percentage of

Condensed states shown in Table 19.17.
Functional and Sociable increase between no absentees and two, with a
reduction at three. Limited Functional and Limited Sociable progressively reduce, since
more members missing makes subgroups less likely. Unhappy Cooperation, Happy
Conflict, Productive Turmoil and Dysfunctional decrease between none and two
absentees and increase for three, the opposite of Functional and Sociable. When groups
are missing three members, they spend almost a quarter of their time as individuals in
Nominal.
253
Number of Members Absent

0 1 2 3
9
Condensed Functional Col % 8.7% 8.0% 10.2% 7.8%
States Limited Functional Col % 6.5% 4.2% 3.2% .3%
Sociable Col % 27.5% 34.4% 44.0% 30.1%
Limited Sociable Col % 21.9% 24.1% 16.8% 16.8%
Unhappy Cooperation Col % 6.3% 6.1% 5.3% 6.4%
Happy Conflict Col % 16.1% 10.0% 7.9% 9.0%
Productive Turmoil Col % 2.3% 1.7% 1.5% 2.0%
Dysfunctional Col % 8.6% 7.5% 5.6% 3.8%
Nominal Col % 2.2% 3.9% 5.5% 23.8%
Table 19.17. Percentage of Condensed States in groups with different numbers of

absentees.
The effect of absentees is not linear. It confounds two influences: (a) loss of
problems through loss of members and (b) threat to the group’s integrity and continued
existence. Loss of one or two members reduces conflict and increases functional and
sociable tendencies, although for the loss of one member this improvement is in
Sociable not Functional. When absentees are great enough to threaten the integrity of
the group, Unsociable and Nominal states increase.
Summary 2.3.1a: Absentees decrease Unsociable states and increase higher

quality states until three or more absentees threaten group integrity, then higher quality
states decreased and Unsociable and Nominal increase.
The quality of GFR categories is analyzed by comparing the effect of group size
and absentees on Action Coherence, since conflict was found to be crucial for group
function. Table 19.18 shows percentages of Action Coherence categories for group size
and absentee for Structure #2.
For groups of three or four members complete or with one absentee, there is no
effect on Concord and little effect on Accord or Discord. However, when these groups
are the remainder of larger groups with two or more absentees, there is about a 20%
reduction in Whole Concord and a corresponding increase in Accord and Discord.
Absentees greatly reduce the group’s capacity to be in Concord. Although there are
254
similar trends for Cognitive Organization and Affect, they are not as clear and
systematic as for Action Coherence, which proves highly sensitive to structural factors.

Total 3 Number 0 Structure Whole Group 55.5% 26.1% 16.5% 1.8%
members of #2 Subgp/Ind 22.9% 61.5% 13.5% 2.1%
present. Members 1 Structure Whole Group 53.1% 31.5% 14.6% .8%
Absent #2 Subgp/Ind 10.5% 78.5% 10.5% .4%
2 Structure Whole Group 39.0% 48.4% 11.7% .9%
#2 Subgp/Ind 35.8% 52.8% 10.8% .6%
4 Number 0 Structure Whole Group 46.0% 33.5% 18.3% 2.1%
of #2 Subgp/Ind 34.1% 50.2% 12.3% 3.3%
Members 1 Structure Whole Group 46.4% 33.7% 14.8% 5.1%
Absent #2 Subgp/Ind 36.9% 46.0% 15.4% 1.7%
#2 Subgp/Ind 4.5% 79.5% 12.7% 3.3%
of #2 Subgp/Ind 19.0% 50.8% 22.6% 7.5%
Members 1 Structure Whole Group 33.7% 51.9% 14.4%
Absent #2 Subgp/Ind 2.7% 69.3% 24.0% 4.0%
of #2 Subgp/Ind 24.1% 60.2% 13.6% 2.1%
Members
Table 19.18. Percentage of Action Coherence in Structure #2 categories showing the

influence of group size and absentees.
Summary 2.3.1b: When small groups result from larger groups with absentees,
their capacity to be in Concord is greatly reduced. The trend of the interaction of size
and absentee for other GFR Dimensions is not so consistent.
H2.3.2. The more incomplete the group, the more stable it will be as
shown by the amount of change in GFR categories in consecutive
minutes.
Variables were computed for each GFR Dimension comparing each minute with
the preceding one within each session to show the proportion of unchanged states and
the extent to which they contribute to Condensed stability. Table 19.20 shows the effect
of absentees on stability for Structure, Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action
Coherence.
255
Number Absent for All

0 G 1 2 3
Col Col Col Col
Stability Negative Change %
24.5% %
20.3% %
19.9% %
21.7%
f
Condensed No Change 51.4% 59.4% 61.3% 58.3%
States
Positive Change 24.1% 20.3% 18.8% 20.0%
Table 19.19. Absentees’ effect on Stability of Condensed States for all groups.
All GFR Dimensions do not contribute equally to the results for Condensed
States. There is only 1% increase in stability for Structure with absentees. Cognitive
Organization is similar with only 1% increased stability when two are absent, but
reduced stability of 4% with three absent. For Affect, however, one absentee increases
stability by 6%; loss of two gives an additional 6%, but loss of three reduces stability by
3%. For Action Coherence, the loss of one member increases stability by 11%, but
there is little additional stability for two, and three increases stability by 1%.
Number Absent for All Groups

0 1 2 3
Stability of Structure Prestructure = Structure 79.0% 79.0% 80.9% 80.0%
Stability of Cognition Precogn = Cognorg 73.9% 73.6% 74.0% 69.9%
Stability of affect Preaffect = Affect 63.0% 69.7% 75.7% 71.9%
Stability of Action Preaction = Action 63.8% 74.9% 74.6% 75.9%
Table 19.20. Effect of absentees on percentage of stable minutes for Structure,

Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action Coherence.
The increased stability from absent members is a result of Affect and Action
Coherence. One absentee has a pronounced effect on both Dimensions, two absentees
alter Affect, with little impact on Action Coherence, whereas the third absentee (causing
insecurity about the group’s future in 5-6 member groups) decreases the stability of
Affect, but produces a marginal increase in stability in Action Coherence. The threat to
the group’s survival is registered by increased affective instability, whereas the fewer
members, the less conflictual tension is likely (see Table 19.13).
256
Summary 2.3.2a: Absentees increase stability until there are sufficient members
away to throw doubt on the viability of the group, then stability decreases. The effect is
mainly derived from Affect and Action Coherence, with little change for Structure and
Cognitive Organization.
Table 19A.2 in Appendix 3 shows the effect of absentees on Condensed States

for all groups by year quartiles. The effect of absentees varies during the year (see
discussion in Appendix 3). In quartile 1, absentees are disruptive as groups are trying to
consolidate. In quartiles 2 and 3, absentees allow them to function better by avoiding
tensions of all members together. They function better with up to two absentees, after
which the group is threatened. In quartile 4, groups are most functional when everyone
is present and do not function as well with absentees.
Summary 2.3.2b: Although absentees have a stabilizing and enhancing effect on

the group process, this is clearest in the middle quartiles of the year. In quartile 1, they
threaten the group when it is establishing itself and in quartile 4, groups function best
with all members present.
257
20. RESULTS 3: DYNAMICS.
Hypotheses about group dynamics investigate relationships between GFR

Dimensions.
3.1. Cognitive Organization and Group Function.

When groups achieve better cognitive function, it is hypothesised they are more
likely to regulate Affect and manage conflict.
H3.1. Low quality Cognitive Organization categories (Unorganized,

Normative) will be more likely to be associated with Dysfunctional
categories of Affect (Discontent, Distress, Boredom) and Action
Coherence (Discord, Contracord). Conversely, high quality categories of
Cognitive Organization (Systemic, Representational) will be more likely
to be associated with higher functional categories for Affect (Joy,
Interest) and Action Coherence (Concord, Accord).
1.1. Proportions of Categories. The percentage of Affect and Action Coherence

categories present in Cognitive Organization categories are shown in Tables 20.1 and
20.2.
AFFECT Contentment 2.0% 6.2% .3%
Joy 10.8% 14.1% 15.2% 25.0%
Interest 63.8% 73.0% 66.1% 44.6%
Discontent 22.6% 5.6% 13.6% 20.0%
Distress .7% .9% 1.6% 5.0%
Boredom .1% .1% 3.1% 5.4%
Table 20.1. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories associated with Affect

categories for all groups.
The distribution of Affect categories for Unorganized shows 44.6% is stable

pleasure, 45% divided between Joy and Discontent and 10.4% between Distress and
Boredom. As Cognitive Organization increases to Normative, Interest increases,
258
showing additional stabilized pleasure of 22%. With Systemic, Contentment appears

and stable pleasure increases by 11% from other categories. In Representational, all
pleasure categories reduce for 17% increase in Discontent. Distress is only significant
in Normative and Unorganized, while Joy shows a linear decrease with organization.
Increased organization stabilizes Affect into Interest and self-reflection increases
stabilized unpleasure, which is related to discussion of their problems rather that
interpersonal tensions of lower organization.
Summary 3.1.1a: The hypothesis is supported with a linear relation of increasing

pleasure and stable affect from Unorganized to Systemic, but Representational shows
increased stable unpleasure.
In Table 20.2, Unorganized has negligible Concord, Accord 52.3%, Discord

38.4% and Contracord 8.8%. As groups become Normative, conflictual categories
reduce to increase Accord 22% and Concord 6%. In Systemic, conflictual categories
and Accord reduce for Concord 65%. But in Representational, Concord reduces to 46%
in favor of Accord and Discord. Self-reflection is associated with increased conflict as
members consider their problems.
ACTION Concord 45.6% 64.9% 6.3% .6%
Accord 40.6% 25.0% 73.8% 52.3%
Discord 12.1% 8.7% 17.1% 38.4%
Contracord 1.7% 1.5% 2.8% 8.8%
Table 20.2. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories associated with Action

Coherence categories for all groups.
Summary 3.1.1b: The hypothesis is supported with increasing cooperation and

reduced conflict from Unorganized to Systemic, but increased conflict for
Representational.
259
3.2. Effects of unstable affect and conflict on group function.

The next hypothesis examines the relationship between unstable affect and
conflict.
H3.2. High, unstable Affect (Joy, Distress) and conflictual Action Coherence
categories (Contracord, Discord) will be associated with instability and
change on the other dimensions in the same or succeeding minutes.
The null hypothesis predicts the proportion of stable minutes would be constant
for each category of Affect and Action Coherence for the other Dimensions. The
proportions of minutes for each GFR Dimension for all groups in Affect and Action
Coherence categories were examined. Reduced stable minutes from the general
frequency would indicate a selective effect associated with the indicated category. The
percentage of unchanged minutes for each Dimension is:
Structure: 83.6%
Cognitive Organization: 86%
Affect: 83.5%
Action Coherence: 81%
A difference of 5% could be considered a significant departure from these

general rates (see chapter 17).
3.2.1. Affect. The percentages of minutes in which groups remained in the same
category were calculated for each Affect category. The Hypothesis predicts a higher
percentage of change for high, unstable Affect (Joy and Distress) than for other
categories. The percentages are shown in Table 20.3. Those highlighted are higher or
lower by 5% or more than unchanged percentages for all groups.
In Structure, Contentment has 6% higher stability, but Discontent and Boredom
are lower (5.4% and 9.9%); Cognitive Organization has 8% increased stability for
Contentment. In Affect, increased stability is present for Contentment and Distress. In
Action Coherence, Contentment is significantly more stable (15.1%) but Discontent and
260
Distress are lower (by 7.2% and 14.9%), and there is reduced stability for Joy.
Discontent and Distress reduce stability in Structure and Action Coherence tending
towards conflict.
Summary 3.2.1: Contentment increases stability for all dimensions, but

unpleasure decreased stability in Structure and Action Coherence.
AFFECT
Contentment Joy Interest Discontent Distress Boredom
Col % Col % Col % Col % Col % Col %
Structure Change Whole to Subgroups 5.2% 7.5% 7.7% 10.9% 9.2% 19.5%
No Change 89.6% 85.2% 83.9% 78.1% 83.5% 73.7%
Subgroups to Whole 5.2% 7.4% 8.3% 11.0% 7.3% 6.8%
Cognitive Change Organised to Disorganised 1.9% 6.9% 6.7% 7.3% 6.4% 12.8%
No Change 93.5% 85.9% 85.9% 84.6% 89.0% 85.7%
Disorganised to Organised 4.5% 7.1% 7.2% 8.0% 4.6% 1.5%
Affect Change Pleasure to Unpleasure 1.9% 6.9% 6.7% 7.3% 6.4% 12.8%
No Change 93.5% 85.9% 85.9% 84.6% 89.0% 85.7%
Unpleasure to Pleasure 4.5% 7.1% 7.2% 8.0% 4.6% 1.5%
Action Change Cooperation to Conflict .6% 11.3% 7.5% 16.1% 18.3% 7.5%
No change 98.7% 77.2% 83.6% 73.8% 66.1% 85.7%
Conflict to Cooperation .6% 11.6% 8.8% 10.1% 15.6% 6.8%
Table 20.3. Percentage of stable minutes in each Affect category for all GFR
Dimensions.
3.2.2. Action Coherence. In Discord and Contracord, members’ different or

incompatible goals place group cohesion under stress and may decrease stability in
other dimensions. Table 20.4 shows the percentages of stability for the rated and
subsequent minutes of Action Coherence since the effect may only occur in the
following minute. Increased stability of more than 5% is highlighted, and increased
change is shown in italics.
In Structure, stability increases in Concord for both the observed and following
minutes (6.3%-6.8%). Stability reduces in Contracord for both minutes (5.2% and
9.9%), indicating a persisting effect. Cognitive Organization stability increases in
Concord for both minutes (5.6%). For Affect, stability increases in Concord for both
261
minutes (10% and 8.1%), but reduces in Discord and Contracord for the observed
minute (14.4% and 22.4%). For Action Coherence, stability increases in Concord for
both minutes, (13.7% and 12.4%), but Discord has decreased stability in both minutes
(28.2% and 27.9%) and Contracord (12.6% and 7.8%).
Summary 3.2.2: Concord increases stability in all Dimensions in observed and

following minutes; Discord and Contracord decrease stability in all except Cognitive
Organization. These effects continue into the following minute for Contracord in
Structure and Action Coherence and Discord in Action Coherence. This supports the
hypothesis, but shows Concord increases stability.
ACTION COHERENCE
Structure Change. Whole to Subgroups 5.5% 9.9% 9.0% 8.9%
No Change 89.9% 80.4% 80.4% 78.4%
Subgroups to Whole 4.5% 9.6% 10.6% 12.6%
Structure Change 1 Whole to Subgroups 4.7% 8.6% 10.8% 14.2%
minute after. No Change 90.4% 81.3% 81.7% 73.7%
Subgroups to Whole 4.9% 10.1% 7.5% 12.1%
Cognitive Change. Organised to Disorganised 1.4% 9.0% 9.8% 9.5%
No Change 91.6% 82.9% 85.4% 84.2%
Disorganised to Organised 7.0% 8.1% 4.8% 6.3%
Cognitive Change 1 Organised to Disorganised 7.2% 6.4% 5.0% 7.4%
Disorganised to Organised 1.2% 9.7% 9.9% 10.0%
Affect Change. Pleasure to Unpleasure 2.2% 5.4% 22.4% 29.5%
No Change 93.5% 84.0% 69.1% 61.1%
Unpleasure to Pleasure 4.3% 10.5% 8.5% 9.5%
Affect Change 1 Pleasure to Unpleasure 7.2% 6.4% 5.0% 7.4%
Unpleasure to Pleasure 1.2% 9.7% 9.9% 10.0%
Action Change. Cooperation to Conflict 47.2% 31.6%
No Change 94.7% 84.1% 52.8% 68.4%
Conflict to Cooperation 5.3% 15.9%
Action Change 1 Cooperation to Conflict 6.6% 15.2%
Conflict to Cooperation 46.9% 26.8%
Table 20.4. Percentage of change in Group Dimensions associated with Action

Coherence categories for the minute of observation and the following minute.
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3.2.3. Trends in Condensed States for Affect and Action Coherence. Changes
for conflict in the minute after Condensed States’ occurrence are explored over a three-
minute period. Percentages of Condensed States for each minute after the rating were
computed and compared. Where there was a consistent trend for these values to
increase or decrease in each of the three minutes, the value of the third minute was
subtracted from the first and expressed as a percentage of change from the highest
figure. It was positive if it was an increase and negative if it was a decrease. This value
is a numerical indication of the trend for that Condensed State to change following the
Affect or Action Coherence category concerned, indicating the dynamic properties of
Affect and Action Coherence categories and their effect on the direction of the group
process. No clear trend is indicated by the sign “~” and unchanged values are indicated
by “=”. Computations are given for Affect#2 and Action Coherence separately in
Tables 20.5 and 20.6.
3.2.3a. Affect. Joy shows no consistent trend for Functional or Sociable states,
but increase for Unsociable states. There is a modest decrease in Interest for Functional
and Sociable states and increases in all Unsociable states. The greatest increase is for
Unhappy Cooperation. Increases are evident for Discontent in Functional and Sociable
states and decreases in Unsociable states except for Happy Conflict which is
inconsistent. There are increases in Distress for Sociable and Limited Sociable and
decreases in Dysfunctional and Productive Turmoil, which is the opposite pattern to
Joy.
Functional ~ -8% +34% ~
Limited Functional ~ -10% +41% =
Sociable ~ -4% +20% +4%
Limited Sociable ~ -3% +20% +25%
Unhappy Cooperation +71% +26% -34% ~
Happy Conflict +18% +7% ~ ~
Productive Turmoil +36% +19% -26% -29%
Dysfunctional +18% +14% -17% -30%
Nominal +7% +7% +7% ~
Table 20.5. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Affect#2 categories over
three minutes.
Summary 3.2.3a: In the following three minutes, pleasurable Affect is associated

with increased Unsociable states and decreased Functional and Sociable states;
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unpleasurable Affect is associated with the opposite trends, except Distress does not
have trends for Functional or some Unsociable states.
3.2.3b. Action Coherence. Similar trends as for affective states are evident for
action in Table 20.6. Cooperative action categories are associated in the following three
minutes with decreased Functional and Sociable states and increased Unsociable states;
conflictual categories are associated with increased Functional and Sociable states
(except for Contracord) and decreased Unsociable states. Aggression in Contracord
initiates movement away from Productive Turmoil and Dysfunctional towards more
constructive states.

Functional -12% -8% +34% ~
Limited Functional -5% -10% +41% =
Sociable -5% -4% +20% +4%
Limited Sociable +4% -3% +20% +25%
Unhappy Cooperation +15% +26% -34% ~
Happy Conflict +13% +7% ~ ~
Productive Turmoil ~ +19% -26% -29%
Dysfunctional +26% +14% -17% -30%
Nominal +38% +7% +7% ~
Table 20.6. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Action Coherence

categories over three minutes.
Summary 3.2.3b: In the following three minutes, cooperative action is associated

with increased Unsociable states and decreased Functional and Sociable states; Discord
is associated with the opposite trends, Contracord increases Sociable states and
decreases Productive Turmoil and Dysfunctional states.
Condensed States show Affect and Action Coherence categories have a tendency
to change towards the opposite pole of the Dimension. These results extend findings for
hypothesis 2.2. Instead of general instability, both Affect and Action Coherence initiate
trends towards the other pole of group states creating a cyclical group process.
These results throw light on groups’ development of homeostatic regulation.
Each Affect category is associated with a tendency to change to the other states: Joy has
a strong tendency towards unpleasurable, conflictual states and away from pleasurable
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cooperative states. Interest has less consistent trends to decrease constructive states, but
stronger tendencies towards Unsociable states. However, Discontent and Distress tend
toward constructive pleasurable states and reduced Unsociable states. In Action
Coherence, the same pattern is evident. The more conflictual the category is, the
stronger the compensatory tendency, indicating stabilizing, self-structuring group
process, essential for preserving social life (Turner 1988).
3.2.3c. Group Differences. If groups differed in extent and pattern of these
processes, it would suggest they indicate therapeutic progress. Groups were compared
for these relationships over the year. In Appendix 3, Tables 20A.1 – 20A.5 show
considerable variation of change in Condensed States in the three minutes following
Affect and Action Coherence categories. Although there are consistent patterns for all
groups, they differ from each other. The 1988 group shows the most comprehensive
changes, but there are inconsistencies with positive changes for Joy and Accord. The
1990 group has fewer changes overall, but similar inconsistencies. The 1992 and 1993
groups differ from each other in details with considerable variability, while 1996 has a
higher degree of stability. The pooling of data shows the overall trends, but specific
groups are less likely to show them clearly.
Summary 3.2. Unpleasure and Conflict are likely to increase group instability
in Structure, Affect and Action; however, there is a more general trend for Affect and
Action Coherence states to be associated with a trend towards their opposite as
expressed by changes in Condensed States over three minutes.
3.3. The relationship between changes in affect and action.

Clinical observation suggests Action Coherence changes from cooperation to
conflict often precede changes in Affect from pleasure to unpleasure. As groups move
to lower Functional states affect follows action. The hypothesis examines how general
this phenomenon may be.
H3.3. Changes from positive to negative Affect will be preceded by changes

from positive to negative Action in the preceding 1-3 minutes.
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Affect Change in successive minutes.

Pleasure
Cooperation/Conflict Action Rating in to Unpleasure
relation to Affect change. Unpleasure Unchanged to Pleasure
Count Count Count
Action 5 minutes after Cooperation 251 3338 268
Affect change. Conflict 149 899 128
Action 1 minute after Cooperation 239 3445 259
Action Rating at Cooperation 151 3518 300
Action 1 minute before Cooperation 295 3519 171
Action 2 minutes Cooperation 287 3463 245
before Affect change. Conflict 113 774 151
Table 20.7. Action rating at Affect Change, 10 minutes before and 5 minutes after for
all groups.
3.3.1. Association between Action categories and change of Affect. A variable

was computed comparing each Affect rating with the previous one, recording “negative
change” from pleasure to unpleasure, “no change” or “positive change” from unpleasure
266
to pleasure. The frequency of conflictual Action Coherence states was compared with
Affect change or stability for the ten preceding minutes and following five minutes.
Hypothesis 3.3 predicts increased conflict for Action in minutes preceding Affect
change.
Table 20.7 shows the frequencies of conflict and cooperation for affective
change or stability in the same minute, preceding 10 and subsequent five minutes. The
first and last five minutes of each session were excluded to avoid overlapping across
sessions. The figures for the row “Action Rating at Affect Change” are frequencies of
cooperative or conflictual Action Coherence ratings in all minutes in which there is
negative, positive and no Affect change. Most of the unchanged Affect is Cooperation
(3518 or 69.9%) and Conflict (719 or 14.3%). Change accounts only for 15.8%.
3.3.1a. Negative Affect Change (Pleasure to Unpleasure): Although the

difference is small for each category, cooperation decreases from 300 in minute 10 to
267 in minute 3 then increases to 295 in minute 1 before the change. Conflict mirrors
this, increasing from 100 in minute 10 to 133 in minute 3 and decreasing to 105 in
minute 1 before negative Affect change. In the minute of Affect change, there is a 49%
decrease to 151 for cooperation and 137% increase to 249 for conflict. In minute 1 after
the change this is reversed with 58% increase to 239 for cooperation and a decrease of
35% to 161 for conflict. Cooperation increases inconsistently but remains below pre-
change values with 251 in minute 5. Conflict remains elevated over pre-change values,
being 149 in minute 5 post-change, indicating a persisting effect on Action Coherence.
Average % for 10 Percentage in Average % for 5

minutes before minute of negative minutes after
negative change. Affect change. negative change.
Cooperation 71% 38% 62%
Conflict 29% 62% 38%
Table 20.8. Mean percentage of cooperation and conflict minutes of the 10 minutes
before, minute of negative Affect change and 5 minutes after.
Expressed as percentages, the range for conflict for the 10 minutes before Affect
change is 25-33%, and 37-40% for the 5 minutes after the change. They are compared
in Table 20.8 by expressing the average of pre- and post-change frequencies for
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cooperation and conflict as percentages, and comparing them with the percentage for
the minute of change. A massive change in action in the minute of change is indicated.
Summary 3.3.1a: The percentage of conflict increases slightly towards the

minute of Affect change, then increases by 33% in the minute of change and reduces by
24% afterwards. The percentage of cooperation shows the reverse pattern.
3.3.1b. Positive Affect Change (Unpleasure to Pleasure): The same pattern is

repeated for positive Affect changes (from unpleasure to pleasure). As the minute of
change is approached in Table 20.7, cooperation falls from 281 at 10 minutes before, to
245 at 2 minutes before; conflict rises from 115 to 151 in the same period. In the
penultimate minute, cooperation is 171, 30.2% below the previous lowest in minute 2
before and conflict 225, 49% above the previous highest in minute 2. In the penultimate
minute, cooperation falls 41% below and conflict rises 49% above the previous highest
values. At positive Affect change, cooperation increases by 75% to 300 and conflict
falls by 57% to 96 in the minute of change. Five minutes after the change, values are
similar to those of five minutes before - 268 for cooperation and 128 for conflict. There
is a higher state of conflict in the minute before a positive Affect change, which is
accompanied by a dramatic change in cooperation.
Average % for 10 Percentage in Average % for 5

minutes before minute of positive minutes after
positive change. affect change. positive change.
Cooperation 74% 76% 66%
Conflict 26% 24% 34%
Table 20.9. Mean percentage of cooperation and conflict minutes of the 10 minutes
before, minute of positive Affect change and 5 minutes after.
Mean percentages are given in Table 20.9 for the preceding 10 minutes, the
minute of change and the 5 minutes after. There is little difference for the mean
percentage for the preceding minutes and the change, but there is an increase of the
mean by 10% for conflict after the change. However, if the penultimate minute pre-
change is excluded, mean percentages are 68% cooperation and 32% conflict, showing a
change toward conflict in the penultimate minute, reversed for positive Affect change.
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Summary 3.3.1b: The percentage of conflict increases by 49% in the minute

before positive Affect change, decreases 57% in the minute of change and increases
again in the following minutes. There is little difference between the mean of preceding
minutes and the change but 10% increase in the mean for conflict following the change.
Positive change may often be a response to negative action change in the preceding
minute.
3.3.1c. No Affect Change: In the unchanged Affect column, Action has a

similar pattern of change in minutes 10 to 2 before the change with cooperation from
3431-3485 and conflict 752-802. In the penultimate minute, these values are raised to
3519 for Cooperation (2.1% above the previous highest value at minute 3 pre-change)
and lowered to 718 for Conflict (4.5% below the previous lowest value also at minute 3
pre-change). Values for the minute of change are almost identical, then in the five
minutes after, they return towards pre-change values with Cooperation 3338-3445 and
Conflict 792-899. Groups spend most of their time in unchanging Affect states
associated with 83% cooperation and 17% conflict and there is minimal change before
and after the minute.
Summary 3.3.1c: Conflict and cooperation proportions alter little when there is
no Affect change.
3.3.1d. Graph of Affect changes. Figure 20.1 shows the data in graph form.
The rhythmic nature of the values is evident with a symmetrical relationship between
cooperation and conflict values.
In the minute preceding positive Affect change, the group is likely to be in an

unpleasurable state, associated with increased conflict; but this is reduced when the
change to pleasure occurs. At negative Affect change, there is increased conflict when
the group enters unpleasure, but not in the preceding minute.
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Figure 20.1. Frequencies of cooperation and conflict for 10 minutes before,

during and 5 minutes after Affect change for all groups.
3.3.1e. Cooperation Quotients for Affect changes. The figures can be more
efficiently described by forming a single figure by dividing the cooperation value by the
conflict value to express the proportion of cooperation in relation to negative, positive
and no Affect change. This is called the “Cooperation Quotient” (CQ). The higher this
figure is, the greater the proportion of cooperation over conflict. CQ’s for figures in
Table 20.7 are given in Table 20.10.
Relatively consistent values occur before Affect change. At the change, the CQ
decreases indicating negative Affect change is associated with increased conflict with
and this continues for five minutes. Positive Affect change is associated with lower CQ
in the previous minute and a four-fold increase at the change, returning to the values in
minute 2 pre-change. Unchanged Affect is associated with a small increase in
cooperativeness in the preceding and the observed minute.
270
Proportion Cooperative Pleasure > No Change Unpleasure

/Conflictual Action Unpleasure > Pleasure
5 mins after 1.7 3.7 2.1
4 mins after 1.8 3.9 1.8
3 mins after 1.5 4.0 2.1
2 mins after 1.6 4.2 1.8
1 min after 1.5 4.3 1.9
Minute of Affect change 0.6 4.9 3.1
1 min before 2.8 4.9 0.8
2 mins before 2.5 4.5 1.6
10 mins before 3.0 4.3 2.4

Quotient) for Affect changes in associated minutes.
Proportion Cooperative 1988 1992 1993 1996 1990

/Conflictual Action Latency
5 mins after 2.3 2.2 1.0 4.8 0.7
4 mins after 2.5 2.2 1.2 3.4 1.0
3 mins after 2.4 1.7 0.8 3.4 0.8
2 mins after 2.8 1.4 1.2 2.9 0.8
1 min after 2.7 1.6 0.7 4.0 0.6
Minute of Affect change 1.0 0.6 0.5 1.1 0.2
1 min before 4.8 3.5 1.5 16.5 1.2
2 mins before 4.1 2.7 1.1 7.8 1.7
3 mins before 3.2 2.5 1.3 6.0 0.8
4 mins before 3.5 2.6 1.3 4.8 1.0
5 mins before 4.5 2.3 1.5 6.0 1.2
6 mins before 3.4 2.6 1.9 7.8 1.2
7 mins before 2.9 2.7 1.3 7.8 1.4
8 mins before 3.5 2.8 1.9 16.0 1.7
9 mins before 4.8 3.1 2.2 7.8 1.1
10 mins before 4.3 2.8 2.4 34.0 1.5

Quotient) for negative Affect changes in associated minutes for each group.
The groups were examined for consistency with these findings. Table 20.11
shows proportions of cooperative and conflictual ratings in each group. Each group has
different values and pattern over the period. All show significant reduction in CQ.
Unpleasurable Affect change is associated with increased conflict ratings, persisting for
271
five minutes after the change. The 1996 group is more erratic, ranging from values of 6
to 34 before the change, stabilizing between 2.9 and 4.8 afterwards. The difference in
values between adolescent and latency groups suggests a higher proportion of
conflictual ratings for the Latency (1990) group, but a similar pattern. These figures are
graphed in Figure 20.2, showing the similarity of pattern in the CQ over the time period.
The discrepancy for 1996 suggests different patterns may occur in other groups.
[34.0] [16.0] [16.5]

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Proportion of Cooperative/Conflictual Ratings
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Figure 20.2. Proportion of cooperative/conflictual action ratings (Cooperation

Quotient) for 10 minutes prior to 5 minutes after negative Affect change for
each group.
3.3.1f. Controlling for overlapping data. The figures above were selected from
within sessions. If two or more minutes showed Affect change within ten minutes, they
would be counted several times in the tables shown above. A designated minute might
be one minute before Affect change at minute x, but three minutes before another Affect
272
change in minute y, and five minutes before another Affect change in minute z. The
results may be an artifact of not discriminating these minutes.
To control for this, the data pool was split to differentiate Adolescent groups
from Latency. Then only minutes with negative Affect change, but without change in
the preceding three minutes were selected. Significant differences would be evident
within three minutes before or after the change. The proportion of cooperation to
conflictual minutes showing positive and negative Affect change was computed. These
are shown for all adolescent and the latency groups in Tables 20A.7 – 20A.8 in
Appendix 3. The same patterns were found, confirming the findings are valid in spite of
the overlap in pooling data.
Time before / after negative Cognitive Affect Action

Structure change Organization Coherence
5 mins After 0.8 3.7 3.0
4 mins After 0.9 3.3 2.9
3 mins After 0.8 3.8 2.6
2 mins After 0.8 3.2 3.1
1 min After 0.6 2.9 2.9
Minute of Change 0.7 3.1 3.2
1 min Before 0.8 2.7 2.2
2 mins Before 0.9 3.1 3.1
Table 20.12. Proportions of positive/negative Ratings for negative Structure Changes in

associated minutes for the other GFR Dimensions.
3.3.2. Comparison of Affect change with other GFR Dimensions. Tables 20.12 –
20.14 show combinations among Structure, Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action
Coherence showing proportions of positive and negative ratings for five minutes on
either side of the change in the dimension examined.
Negative change as the most variable function provided the basis for comparison.
Action Coherence and Affect are the only Dimensions with a difference between the
values in the minute of change, the preceding and subsequent five minutes. All others
show no appreciable effect.
273
Time before or after Cognitive Structure Affect Action

Organization Change Coherence
5 mins after 2.4 4.5 3.2
4 mins after 2.4 3.2 2.7
3 mins after 2.0 3.7 2.9
2 mins after 2.1 3.6 2.8
1 min after 2.0 3.7 2.0
Proportion +ve/-ve 1.9 3.0 2.2
1 min before 2.6 5.7 4.4
Table 20.13. Proportions of positive/negative Ratings for negative Cognitive

Organization Changes in associated minutes for the other GFR Dimensions.
Time before or after Action Structure Cognitive Affect

Coherence change Organization
5 mins after 1.6 0.7 3.4
4 mins after 1.8 0.7 2.8
3 mins after 1.5 0.7 2.9
2 mins after 1.4 0.6 2.7
1 min after 1.5 0.7 2.4
Proportion +ve/-ve 1.9 0.5 1.4
1 min before 1.4 0.8 8.9
Table 20.14. Proportions of positive/negative Ratings for negative Action Coherence

Changes in associated minutes for the other GFR Dimensions.
Summary 3.3: Action changes tend to coincide with Affect changes, last
for one minute and return to the previous state. This correspondence is absent from
other GFR Dimensions.
3.4. Crises in Group Life.

Crises alter groups’ functioning, potentially causing loss of members or
breakdown of trust. Clinically, this is often only evident in retrospect. Identifying
moments within sessions and the year, where stability changes indicate positive and
274
negative features of the crises or intervening periods may enable them to be managed.
H3.4.1. The group’s function will alter before and after the appearance
of specific crisis categories or combinations.
3.4.1. Crisis Events within Sessions. Destructive crises were defined as states
involving high, unpleasurable Affect (Distress) and aggression (Contracord). As shown
in Table 20.15, crises for all groups occur within five periods separated by at least 3
sessions without crises (although gaps in the data influence these findings). Crises
occur in each quartile, but each group has its own pattern. They tend to be later in
quartile 1, in the middle of quartile 2 and earlier in the last two quartiles. The 1992
group continued longer so there were later events.
Session Nos. Sessions Sessions Sessions Sessions Sessions

3-8 11-14 17-22 25-31 35-37
1988 2 2 2 2
1990 1 1 2 4
1992 2 3 1 2 2
1993 3 2 3
1996 1
Range of Quartiles 1-8 9-16 17-24 25-32
Table 20.15. Number of Sessions for each group in which destructive crisis events
occur, compared by quartiles.
It is curious that they occur in a remarkably consistent pattern of two to three

sessions without crises, then five with, suggesting yet another rhythmic relationship.
Summary 3.4.1: Crises occur throughout the year, but in distinct periods within
quartiles.
3.4.2. Distress crises. The characteristics of group process approaching Distress

crises were also examined.
H3.4.2a. Distress will have identifiable precursors in the preceding 2-5

minutes, which will predict their occurrence.
275
Structure #2 5 minute 1 minute Crisis

pre-crisis pre-crisis minute
Whole 63% 65% 66%
Subgp/Ind 37% 35% 34%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Table 20.16. Percentage of Structure #2 categories for 5 and 1 minutes before and in
Distress crises for all groups.
Percentages of GFR categories for five and one minutes preceding and at
Distress crises are shown in Tables 20.16 – 20.19 to examine this hypothesis. Structure
categories in Table 20.16 remain relatively constant approaching Distress incidents;
66% of Distress events occur in Whole, which increases slightly from the preceding five
minutes. Distress is more likely to occur in Whole Structure.
Percentages of Cognitive Organization categories approaching and at Distress
crises are shown in Table 20.17. The groups’ cognitive functioning is more likely to
become Unorganized in the preceding minute and Distress events are associated with
increased probability of Unorganized (55%), indicating it is more likely with a loss of
cognitive organization, although it occurs in all states.
Cognitive 5 minute 1 minute Crisis

Organization pre-crisis pre-crisis minute
Representation 8% 5% 6%
Systemic 19% 15% 15%
Normative 37% 33% 24%
Unorganized 36% 47% 55%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Table 20.17. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories for 5 and 1 minutes

before and in Distress crises for all groups.
Percentages of Affect categories approaching and at Distress crises are shown in

Table 20.18. Groups move out of pleasure and the preceding minute can be in any
affective state indicating Distress is unpredictable, but likely (25%) to follow another
Distress event.
Percentages of Action Coherence categories approaching and at Distress crises
276
are shown in Table 20.19. Action Coherence moves steadily into increasing conflict
with a sharp rise in aggression in the minute of the Distress event. Contracord doubles
in the preceding minute of Distress, showing that sometimes (21%), it precedes Distress
as suggested in Hypothesis 3.3.
Affect 5 minute 1 minute Crisis

Joy 36% 26%
Interest 37% 26%
Discontent 23% 23%
Distress 4% 25% 100%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Table 20.18. Percentage of Affect categories in 5 and 1 minutes before and in Distress
crises for all groups.
Action 5 minute 1 minute Crisis

Coherence pre-crisis pre-crisis minute
Concord 12% 6% 3%
Accord 41% 33% 12%
Discord 36% 40% 32%
Contracord 11% 21% 53%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Table 20.19. Percentage of Action Coherence categories in 5 and 1 minutes before and
in Distress crises for all groups.
Summary 3.4.2a: Distress is more likely to occur when groups are in Whole
structure, deteriorating Cognitive Organization, any category of Affect and increasing
conflictual Action Coherence.
3.4.3. Contracord Crises. In the same way, characteristics of the group process
approaching Contracord crises were examined in Tables 20.20-20.23.
H3.4.2b. Contracord has identifiable precursors in the preceding 2-5 minutes,

which should predict their occurrence.
The percentage of Structure categories associated with Contracord is shown in

277
Table 20.20. In the preceding five minutes leading up to a Contracord event, there is a
slight trend towards increased Whole Structure. Five minutes before it is 57%, one
minute before it is 60% and in the minute of the crisis, it is 65%. Contracord is more
likely to occur in Whole but may occur in any Structure.
Structure #2 5 minute 1 minute Crisis

Whole 57% 60% 65%
Subgp/Ind 43% 40% 35%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Table 20.20. Percentage of Structure #2 categories for 5 and 1 minutes before and in
Contracord crises for all groups.
Percentages of Cognitive Organization categories approaching and at Contracord

are shown in Table 20.21. Contracord is associated with deteriorating Cognitive
Organization; it may occur in constructive states, but it is most likely in Unorganized.
Cognitive 5 minute 1 minute Crisis

Organization pre-crisis pre-crisis minute
Representation 11% 8% 7%
Systemic 19% 15% 14%
Normative 32% 28% 25%
Unorganized 38% 49% 54%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Table 20.21. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories in 5 and 1 minutes before

and in Contracord crises for all groups.
Affect 5 minute 1 minute Crisis

Joy 27% 22% 16%
Interest 42% 31% 18%
Discord 24% 35% 37%
Distress 6% 12% 30%
Total 100% 100% 100%

Contracord crises for all groups.
278
Percentages of Affect categories approaching and at Contracord are shown in

Table 20.22. There is a trend towards unpleasurable states, sharply increasing in the
crisis minute; aggression is more likely with increasing unpleasure and deterioration in
the minute of the aggression.
Percentages of Action Coherence categories approaching and at Contracord are
shown in Table 20.23. There is a significant probability that Contracord occurs over
several minutes and is likely to be longer-lasting state than Distress. Action Coherence
becomes increasingly conflictual until Contracord occurs, and may follow any state.
Action 5 minute 1 minute Crisis

Coherence pre-crisis pre-crisis minute
Concord 12% 8%
Accord 30% 23%
Discord 36% 34%
Contracord 22% 35% 100%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Table 20.23. Percentage of Action Coherence categories in 5 and 1 minutes before and
in Contracord crises for all groups.
Summary 3.4.2b: Contracord crises may occur in any state, but are associated
with deteriorating Cognitive Organization, increasing unpleasurable states and may
occur over a period of minutes and be longer-lasting than Distress. Action Coherence
becomes increasingly conflictual until Contracord occurs.
3.4.4. Group Size and Absentees for Crises within Sessions. Size and absentees
of sessions in which crises occur are shown in Tables 20.24 and 20.25.
Group Size Crisis Sessions

6 3
5 12
4 12
3 4
2 1
Table 20.24. Group size for crisis sessions.
Crises are more likely in groups of four or more members when there are one or
279
no absentees. In the sessions following these with destructive crises, there were fewer
members for 10 sessions, more members for 4 sessions, the same number of members
for 10 sessions and in 6 instances there are no records or it was the last session of the
year. There is a 30% risk some members will not attend following a destructive crisis.
Absentee Crisis Sessions

0 16
1 10
2 5
3 1
Table 20.25. Absentees for crisis sessions.
Summary 3.4.4: Crises occur more often in larger groups with one or no
absentees, and there is a 30% risk of members missing the next session.
3.4.5. Functional Level of Crisis Sessions. Condensed States provide a means of

examining the quality and stability of the crisis sessions.
3.4.5a. Session Quality. Graphs of the means of Condensed States for sessions
are shown for each group except 1996 (which had few crises) in Figures 20A.1 – 20A.4
in Appendix 3. The crisis sessions are by no means the least Functional; there are
sessions with high and low quality.
Summary 3.4.5a: Destructive rises may occur at any time and seem to be
associated with specific events rather than of session quality.
3.4.5b. Session Stability. The relation of crises to session stability was

examined for each group except 1996 in Figures 20A.5 - 20A.8 in Appendix 3. The
stability of Condensed States is the percentage of minutes in each session that do not
change when compared with the next minute. Although most crisis sessions have low
stability scores and are often on the trough of a stability cycle, this is not always so.
Destructive crises do not necessarily occur in unstable and disorganized sessions, but
throughout the year and in a wide variety of situations. They reflect specific
interpersonal situations and circumstances of the moment.
280
Summary 3.4.5b: Destructive crises occur in stable and unstable sessions.
3.4.6. Minutes leading up to Crisis Events. A number of characteristics related

to crises were explored, including states leading up to and minutes following crises,
whether they are the culmination of a period of conflict, or break out suddenly and
without warning; whether the group settles quickly or remains Dysfunctional for some
time. The frequency and percent of Condensed States in the crisis minutes and for the
preceding five minutes are shown in Table 20.26.
The group was in conflict in the five preceding minutes 63% of the time. There
is no simple pre-crisis situation and many states precede it. However, Happy Conflict is
the single state most likely to lead to a crisis, probably because of affective instability
associated with conflict. The next most likely are Dysfunctional and Sociable states
(together they are the highest, 32.5%). Percentages for each group in Table 20A.8 in
Appendix 3 are consistent with this.
Condensed State Frequency Percentage

Functional 4 1.4%
Sociable 49 16.6%
Limited Sociable 47 15.9%
Unhappy Cooperation 11 3.7%
Happy Conflict 93 31.5%
Productive Turmoil 11 3.7%
Dysfunctional 80 27.1%
Total 295 100%
Table 20.26. The frequency and percentage of Condensed States in the five minutes
leading to crisis events.
Summary 3.4.6: Crises are most likely to occur within an Unsociable period
especially after Happy Conflict, but there is a 55% chance of there being constructive
states in the five minutes immediately before it.
3.5. Crisis Sessions:

Crises can also be defined in terms of whole sessions challenging the group’s
continuation and requiring homeostatic mechanisms to restore functionality. A pattern
281
in their occurrence may allow them to be anticipated and managed. Crisis sessions are
defined in two ways: (a) low quality indicated by low percentage of Constructive
Condensed States for the session and (b) the unstable Condensed States.
The percentage of Constructive Condensed States for each session (taken as the
percentage of minutes in which the group is in either Functional or Sociable states) and
stability of Condensed States (taken as the number of consecutive minutes the group
remains in the same Condensed State) are shown in Figure 20.3 for 1988. Quality
Crisis sessions are defined as those with more than 50% Unsociable states or more than
half the average of the data set. Stability Crisis sessions are defined as those with below
45% stability of Constructive Condensed States.
Figures 20A.9 – 20A.11 in Appendix 3 show graphs for three other groups.
Stable minutes show oscillation in synchrony with the percentage of Constructive states
although which is the lowest varies. Using the <45% criterion, stability crises overlap
but do not coincide with the quality crises and occur in sessions 4, 7, 11, 17, and 30.
There are such clearly defined fluctuations, that it is tempting to see trough sessions as
crises because of the relative change from previous sessions. In this case, sessions 9,
13, 19, 22 and 33 would need to be added.
YEAR: 1988
100
90
80
70
60
50
% Stable Mins
40 % Constructive
30 States
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33
SESSIONS
Figure 20.3. Graph of percentage of stable Condensed States and percentage of

Constructive Condensed States for each session of 1988.
282
Quality crises occur in sessions 9, 11, 13, 17, 20, 29 and 31. Other troughs are
in sessions 4, 7, and 26. There is greater differentiation between these two dimensions
in the second half of the year, suggesting crises become modified by only occurring on
one dimension at a time. The crisis would be greater when Unsociable and unstable
together. Figures 20A.9 – 20A.11 in Appendix 3, demonstrate similar patterns occur for
all groups with individual variation.
Summary 3.5: Groups move through a series of crises that influence the
process, but their structure is complex and there are different types of crises.
3.6. Stability and Quality Cycles.

The character of sessions forming the peaks and troughs of stability or quality
was examined. The position of each session within quality and stability cycles was
computed.
Session Stability
Valid Cumulative
Percent Percent
Valid Trough 28.9 28.9
1 pre-trough 9.7 38.6
4 pre-trough .9 45.9
8 pre-peak .7 48.2
4 pre-peak .9 49.1
3 pre-peak .8 49.9
2 pre-peak 6.8 56.7
1 pre-peak 11.4 68.1
Peak 31.9 100.0
Total 100.0
Table 20.27. Percentage of sessions forming troughs, peaks and intermediate sessions
in stability cycles for all groups.
3.6.1. Session Stability. Table 20.27 shows the percentage of sessions forming
peaks, troughs or other positions for stability cycles. Peaks and troughs constitute 60.8%
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of the sample; including immediately preceding sessions, they form 81.9%. Two-thirds
of sessions involve a change of direction and over 80% of sessions are in cycles only
two sessions long. The percentage of GFR Dimension categories are shown for the
positions of sessions in stability cycles in Table 20.28. Structure varies by less than 2%.
This is surprising since it would be expected that stability troughs might show less
Whole than stability peaks.
For Cognitive Organization, the highest Representational is in troughs (19.3%)
while peaks have the lowest (10.4%). Peaks have the highest Systemic (43.6%), 1 pre-
trough has the highest Normative (33.8%) and 1 pre-peak has the highest Unorganized
percentage (26.1%).
Session Stability for All Groups

Trough 1 pre-trough 1 pre-peak Peak
Structure #2 Whole Group Subtable % 61.8% 62.3% 60.9% 61.3%
Subgp/Ind Subtable % 38.2% 37.7% 39.1% 38.7%
Cognitive Representational Subtable % 19.3% 16.3% 18.3% 10.4%
Organisation Systemic Subtable % 30.2% 26.8% 31.8% 43.6%
Normative Subtable % 27.4% 33.8% 23.8% 30.5%
Unorganised Subtable % 23.1% 23.0% 26.1% 15.6%
Affect #2 Joy Subtable % 12.3% 14.7% 18.7% 19.3%
Interest Subtable % 63.3% 74.3% 62.2% 66.8%
Discontent Subtable % 21.7% 10.1% 16.5% 12.7%
Distress Subtable % 2.8% .7% 2.6% 1.2%
Action Concord Subtable % 29.4% 40.1% 31.4% 29.8%
Coherence Accord Subtable % 43.6% 53.5% 48.5% 49.2%
Discord Subtable % 21.9% 5.6% 17.6% 18.5%
Contracord Subtable % 5.1% .8% 2.5% 2.5%
Table 20.28. Percentage of GFR Dimension categories for peaks, troughs and
preceding sessions for stability cycles in all groups.
This suggests peak sessions are the end of a rising stability trend and the figures
show the culmination of a constructive process most active during the upward
trajectory, and the beginning of a reversal towards the other pole. The peak is not the
culmination of constructive group function, but the end of a process that will not
continue in the following session. The quality of peaks has the cause of the trajectory
change inherent in them. Perhaps the combination of low Representational and high
Systemic in peaks indicates groups become passive, less self-reflective and Systemic
organization provides the stability. If this continued, the group would stagnate;
therefore it destabilizes in the following session towards greater variety. The highest
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Representational in troughs indicates these sessions stimulate self-reflection. This

confirms that instability is therapeutically desirable, but as part of a rhythm.
Affect shows highest Joy in stability peaks (19.3%). Since Joy is unstable, this
requires interpretation. Joy may be part of the mechanism destabilizing stability peaks.
However, this does not happen in the session itself (or it would not be a peak). It is
understood not as a goal state, but the end of a trajectory towards increasing stability. It
achieves change in the following session (usually a trough), which has lowest Joy
(12.3%) and highest unpleasure (24.5%), or a pre-trough, which has the highest Interest
(74.3%).
Percentages for Action Coherence show pre-trough has highest Concord (40.1%)
and peaks and troughs share lowest Concord (29%). Concord is likely to occur after the
group has been stable and is becoming less stable. In troughs, the highest percentage of
Discord and Contracord (27% together) show instability is related to conflict. Highest
Accord (53.5%) occurs in the pre-troughs, showing that they have the lowest incidence
of conflict. When conflict is lowest, the group is nearest to a stability trough. However,
peaks have high proportions of Accord (49.2%) and significant conflict (21%). There is
less difference between peaks and troughs than other sessions. The only significant
difference is that Contracord, although low, is doubled in troughs (5.1%), indicating the
instability. The highest stability has significant conflict that is greatly reduced in the
session before troughs. The most cooperative sessions are before the greatest conflict.
When the group is on a falling stability trajectory it cooperates, but when it is going to
change direction, conflict increases. Stability does not mean absence of conflict. It can
be contained and managed by the presence of other dimensions such as in Systemic
Cognitive Organization. Maximum cooperation is related to increasing instability and
the expectation of a resurgence of conflict. Action Coherence is crucial to homeostatic
process.
Summary 3.6.1: Troughs are the end of a trajectory of increasing instability and
the beginning of a stabilization trajectory. The close relationship between pre-troughs
and peaks indicates that after a peak the trajectory falls slightly in many instances and
then descends sharply to the trough. Hence, pre-trough sessions are closer to peaks than
troughs.
285
3.6.2. Session Quality: Session Quality is the percentage of Functional and

Sociable Condensed States. Although a crude measure, it represents absence of conflict
and unpleasure and the presence of Representational and Concord. The frequency and
percentage of sessions in Session Quality cycles is shown in Table 20.29.
Quality peaks or troughs constitute 65.6% of sessions, and 82.8% with the
immediate preceding session. Only about 20 sessions (17%) out of 119 are not within
this 3-session quality cycle. Figures are similar to session stability.
Session Quality
Valid Cumulative
Percent Percent
Valid Trough 29.0 29.0
10 or more pre-peak 1.7 49.3
8 pre-peak .7 50.1
7 pre-peak .7 50.8
6 pre-peak .7 51.5
2 pre-peak 5.0 56.4
1 pre-peak 7.0 63.4
Peak 36.6 100.0
Total 100.0
Table 20.29. Percentage of sessions forming troughs, peaks and intermediate sessions
in quality cycles for all groups.
In Table 20.30, percentages of GFR Dimension Categories are shown for quality
cycles. In Structure, the lowest proportion of Whole is in troughs (54.5%), the highest
in pre-trough (68.6%). This is similar to peaks and repeats the pattern found in stability
cycles that pre-troughs are closer to peaks than troughs, suggesting they are better
considered as “post-troughs.” The higher proportion in pre-troughs indicates groups are
most likely to be whole just before a trough when they are least likely to be whole.
In Cognitive Organization, groups are most likely to be in Representational in
pre-troughs or peaks (18% or 17%) and least in troughs (13%). The highest Systemic is
in peaks (42.8%) and lowest in troughs and pre-troughs (27% and 29%). Peaks have the
lowest proportion of Normative and Unorganized (26% and 14%). Highest Normative
286
is in pre-peak (32%) and Unorganized in troughs (29%). Groups are most likely to be
in Systemic or Representational in quality peaks, but equally likely to be in
Representational before a quality trough or after a peak. For Cognitive Organization,
troughs are indicated by higher Normative and Unorganized. The highest quality is
determined by Systemic and Representational. High Systemic leads to peaks, but
Representational continues high after the peak. Peaks are closer to the subsequent
session than the preceding. Troughs have the highest Unorganized, and the same
proportion of Normative with pre-peaks (post-troughs). They are better understood as
post-peaks instead of pre-troughs, emphasizing peaks and troughs as changes of
trajectory having greater affiliation with later sessions than the preceding.
Session Quality for All Groups

Trough 1 pre-trough 1 pre-peak Peak
Subtable % Subtable % Subtable % Subtable %
Structure #2 Whole Group 54.5% 68.6% 60.6% 66.7%
Subgp/Ind 45.5% 31.4% 39.4% 33.3%
Cognitive Representational 12.7% 17.9% 13.3% 17.1%

Organisation Systemic 27.1% 29.8% 35.4% 42.8%
Normative 31.8% 29.2% 32.0% 26.1%
Unorganised 28.5% 23.1% 19.4% 13.9%
Affect #2 Joy 13.2% 21.1% 18.0% 17.5%
Interest 65.7% 69.6% 64.2% 64.3%
Discontent 19.3% 7.8% 15.8% 16.0%
Distress 1.7% 1.6% 2.0% 2.1%
Action Concord 30.4% 43.2% 23.4% 27.9%

Coherence Accord 50.7% 39.1% 57.2% 47.4%
Discord 16.4% 15.5% 15.8% 20.2%
Contracord 2.5% 2.2% 3.6% 4.5%
Table 20.30. Percentage of GFR Dimension Categories for peaks, troughs and
preceding sessions for session quality cycles in all groups.
For Affect, highest Joy is in pre-trough (21%) followed by pre-peak (18%). Joy
is significantly higher in peaks (17.5%) than troughs (13.2%), indicating that although
Joy is unstable, it is more likely to occur in high quality sessions. Highest Interest is in
pre-trough (69.6%) although is equally likely in all types of sessions. Lowest
proportions of unpleasure are in pre-troughs (9.4%). Although Discontent is highest in
troughs (19.3%) as expected, Distress is higher in peak and pre-peak (2%). This
appears contradictory, but session quality is the percentage of Functional and Sociable
287
Condensed States.
In those sessions where the greatest proportion of time is in constructive states, a
significant amount of time is spent in unpleasure. In high quality states, Affect is more
likely to be mixed than Cognitive Organization. However, it supports peaks as being
the beginning of a change of trajectory with Distress indicating increased unpleasure.
Pre-troughs (or post-peaks) have highest pleasure and troughs lowest, again indicating
change in trajectory.
For Action Coherence, highest Concord is in pre-troughs (43.2%) followed by
troughs (30.4%). Accord is highest in pre-peak (57.2%), followed by troughs (50.7%).
The highest conflict categories are in peaks (20.2% and 4.5%). This seems to contradict
them as high quality sessions until the measure of percentage of constructive minutes is
remembered. The figures indicate sessions with high Functional or Sociable also have
high conflict. Groups are more liable to conflict in their highest quality than in the other
states. Quality peaks contain the basis of reduction in quality and change in the
trajectory. The lowest conflict is in pre-troughs (post-peaks) suggesting they change
trajectory from peaks.
Summary 3.6.2. Highest quality sessions are associated with significant

unpleasure and conflict and there is evidence of homeostatic processes oscillating
groups between peaks and troughs. This is understood as changing trajectories rather
than attainment of goal states.
3.7. Occurrence of Crises within Sessions.

Since crises are of short duration, their occurrence within the sessions can be
examined.
H3.4.3. Crisis points, particularly Distress and Contracord will be more

likely to occur in the middle quartiles of sessions than the first or
last quartiles.
The percentage of Distress and Contracord in session quartiles is shown in Table

20.31.
288
Session Quartiles
1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Affect Joy 13% 15% 16% 20%
#2
Interest 70% 68% 66% 60%
Discontent 16% 15% 15% 17%
Distress 1% 2% 3% 3%
Action Concord 23% 32% 37% 29%
Coherence Accord 62% 48% 39% 42%
Discord 14% 18% 19% 23%
Contracord 1% 2% 5% 5%
Table 20.31. Percentage of Affect and Action Coherence categories for session
quartiles for all groups.
Session lengths vary and quartiles are calculated so variability falls in the third
quartile making it a larger than the others, but retaining the integrity of the first and last
quartiles. Joy increases to quartile 4, while Interest falls. Discontent remains relatively
stable, but comparatively, Distress becomes more frequent in the second half.
Dynamics resulting in Distress take time to develop and tend to increase throughout the
session.
Concord is more frequent in quartile 3 and Accord decreases in quartiles 1-3,
increasing again in quartile 4. Discord and Contracord increase in each quartile,
suggesting that conflict increases with time, which has been found in other contexts and
will be shown in relation to Therapists’ Interventions.
Summary 3.7: The hypothesis is not supported. Crises are more likely to occur
in the second half of sessions with Contracord in quartile 4.
289
21: RESULTS 4: THERAPISTS’ INTERVENTIONS.
Hypotheses concerning effects of Therapists Interventions were explored by

analyzing their relations to GFR Dimensions. Percentages of Therapists’ Interventions,
Limits and Locomotion for each group are shown in Table 21.1. There is 3% variation
for Group Interventions, 20% for Member and 18% for Group and Member
Interventions. Limits vary by 25% and Locomotion by 40%. The pattern varies for
each group.
YEAR
1988 1990 1992 1993 1996
Therapist Interventions Group Intervention Subtable % 10.4% 9.8% 8.4% 7.0% 7.1%
Member Interventn Subtable % 38.9% 39.4% 59.0% 48.6% 59.7%
Group & Member Int Subtable % 13.9% 18.3% 14.1% 31.1% 13.0%
No Intervention Subtable % 36.9% 32.5% 18.5% 13.3% 20.2%
Limits by set Therapists No Limit Subtable % 89.0% 75.1% 80.4% 69.4% 94.9%
Limit set Subtable % 11.0% 24.9% 19.6% 30.6% 5.1%
Locomotion by No Locomotion Subtable % 90.9% 58.1% 82.6% 61.9% 98.5%
Therapists Locomotion Subtable % 9.1% 41.9% 17.4% 38.1% 1.5%
Table 21.1. Percentage of Therapists’ Intervention, Limits, and Locomotion for each
group.
Quartile percentages are shown in Table 21.2. Proportions of No Intervention,

Limits and Locomotion show a complex pattern of changing levels of interventions for
each group.
Size of significant changes. GFR Dimensions were used to analyse

interventions’ effects. Changes of proportions in successive minutes range from 1-10%.
Because both therapeutic and non-therapeutic interventions are included in ratings, only
a small proportion of them are likely to effect group function. Small percentage
changes may represent the proportion of effective interventions. Pooling of data also
means multiple interventions occur in some successive minutes and blur the search for
effects, consequently, small effect sizes may represent net outcomes. A significant
change in proportion of GFR categories in the intervention minute compared to the
previous minute probably represents the situation to which therapists respond by
making interventions. However, interventions may occur and are rated at any time
290
throughout the minute, whereas group function Dimensions are rated from a 15 or 30
second sample of the minute; hence, the relationship between group state and
intervention is unclear. The data are therefore “noisy,” obscuring and reducing
significant relationships to small percentages. Trends are described, assuming they
point to effects that would be larger and more significant with a more sensitive rating
system.
YEAR
1988 1990 1992 1993 1996
Year 1 Therapist Group Intervention Subtable % 9.5% 6.0% 10.1% 7.8% 4.3%
Quartiles Interventions Member Interventn Subtable % 35.3% 46.1% 50.0% 53.2% 69.6%
Limits by set No Limit Subtable % 87.4% 86.7% 78.7% 64.5% 91.1%
Therapists Limit set Subtable % 12.6% 13.3% 21.3% 35.5% 8.9%
Locomotion No Locomotion Subtable % 89.0% 65.3% 82.5% 64.1% 99.2%
by Therapists Locomotion Subtable % 11.0% 34.7% 17.5% 35.9% .8%
2 Therapist Group Intervention Subtable % 11.7% 10.2% 8.7% 16.7% 11.1%
Interventions Member Interventn Subtable % 36.9% 30.5% 61.2% 46.7% 54.7%
by Therapists Locomotion Subtable % 18.2% 30.2% 20.8% 34.4% 2.0%
Therapists Limit set Subtable % 6.5% 36.8% 28.5% 26.5%
by Therapists Locomotion Subtable % 4.7% 53.4% 29.6% 44.5%
by Therapists Locomotion Subtable % 2.9% 47.0% 9.7% 34.3% 1.9%
Table 21.2. Quartile percentages for Therapists’ Intervention, Limits, and locomotion
for each year.
The percentage of categories for each GFR Dimension was computed for each
type of intervention for the minute before, minute of intervention and following three
minutes for all groups. They are shown in Tables 21.3 – 21.6. The percentage for each
minute was compared with the preceding minute to show changes in distribution.
291
Change greater than 1% is considered significant. Groups spend more time in

categories showing increase at the expense of decreased categories.
Several patterns can be defined for change associated with interventions.
• “Drift” is a similar change in category percentages for consecutive minutes
indicating a persisting effect, such as reduction in cooperative and increase
in conflictual categories.
• “Reversal” describes a similar sized change to the previous minute, but
reversing the previous change, indicating the effect is short acting.
• “Oscillation” is a sequence of Reversals in consecutive minutes, indicating
the intervention stimulates a counteracting effect to the change in the
preceding minute destabilizing the process.
• “Rebound” refers to a single Reversal occurring after a change maintained
for several minutes, marking the termination of the effect.
• Interventions may be long or short acting, indicating a deeper or more
superficial impact.
• The deeper the impact, the more the group is changed over time, leading to
rebounds, oscillations or drifts.
• Impacts may be immediate, short, acting, delayed or ineffective.
Relationships between interventions and changes are described as causal for
convenience, but they are actually relationships of association. They should be
expressed as interventions associated with changes in following minutes. However,
they are heuristics to support further clinical observation and research.
4.1. Effect of Therapists Interventions on GFR Dimensions.
H4.1. Group Interventions will lead to higher GFR categories in the succeeding
minutes.
Change in Dimensions for Therapists Interventions were examined for the five-
minutes described.
Structure:
Group Interventions shift from Whole to Subgroup+Individuals by 2% in the
intervention minute, then a drift of 1% in the next two minutes is reversed by 1% in
292
minute 3 post-intervention. Group Interventions encourage subgrouping for 2 minutes,

then tend to be reversed.
Therapist Interventions for All Groups.

Group
&
Group Member Member No
Intervention Interventn Int Intervention
LAGS(STRUCTUR,1) Whole Grp Subtable % 65.8% 57.2% 62.4% 62.4%
Subgroups Subtable % 3.9% 5.9% 4.4% 7.6%
Subgp+Ind Subtable % 26.6% 31.2% 27.8% 27.3%
Individuals Subtable % 3.7% 5.6% 5.4% 2.7%
Structure Whole Grp Subtable % 63.1% 57.0% 65.0% 62.2%
LEADS(STRUCTUR,1) Whole Grp Subtable % 62.7% 57.2% 64.8% 62.2%
Table 21.3. Percentage of Structure categories for all groups from one minute before
“LAGS(STRUCTUR,1)” to three minutes after Therapists’ Interventions
“LEADS(STRUCTUR,1-3).”
Member Interventions have no effect in the intervention minute nor minute 1

afterwards; in minute 2 there is 1% move from Subgroup+Individuals to Whole, tending
to reverse in minute 3. Any effect of Member Interventions tends to be delayed two
minutes then encourages greater Wholeness, but is short lived.
Group and Member Interventions show 3% swing from Subgroup+Individuals to
Whole in the intervention minute. This remains for minute 1 after, reverses in minute 2,
then remains stable in minute 3. Group and Member Interventions encourage Whole
Structure for two minutes, then it tends to reverse.
No Intervention has no effect on Structure.
Group Interventions tend to move groups from Whole to
Subgroups+Individuals, while Member Interventions and Group and Member
Interventions have the opposite tendency. Effects are short, lasting only a minute or
293
two, Member Interventions having a delayed effect. Without interventions there is no

change. Structure is a stable, sensitive dimension but elastic with inertia; interventions
tend to lose their effect after two minutes, returning to the previous state. To produce
sustained change, successive interventions are required, allowing a two-minute latency
time for their full effect.
Cognitive Organization:
For Group Interventions, Representational and Systemic move 1% to Normative
and Unorganized in the intervention minute; in minute 1 after, 1% of Normative
changes to Unorganized; in minute 2, 1% from Representational to Systemic, then in
minute 3, 1% from Unorganized to Representational. Group Interventions produce a
drift to lower Cognitive Organization in the first two minutes, but in the third, delayed
self-reflection emerges.

Group
&
LAGS(COGNORG,1) Representational Subtable % 15.2% 16.8% 14.0% 12.6%
Systemic Subtable % 30.2% 29.6% 18.3% 50.9%
Cognitive Organisation Representational Subtable % 14.1% 16.9% 15.4% 11.9%
LEADS(COGNORG,1) Representational Subtable % 14.0% 17.0% 15.3% 11.9%
Table 21.4. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories for all groups from one
minute before, “LAGS(COGNORG,1)” to three minutes after Therapists’ Interventions,
“LEADS(COGNORG,1-3).”
Member Interventions move Systemic to Normative by 1% in the intervention

minute; this tends to oscillate for three minutes. Member Interventions’ initial effect is
294
cognitively disorganizing for the group, constructive effects follow a minute later.
Group and Member Interventions split in the intervention minute with 1%
change from Systemic to Representational and 2% from Normative to Unorganized. In
minute 1 after, there is 1% reversal from Unorganized to Normative and Systemic; in
minute 2, a further 2% from Unorganized to the higher categories. This drift continues
in minute 3 with 1% change from Unorganized and Representational to Systemic and
Normative. Computations for the next two minutes showed it remains stable in minute
4 and then Unorganized increases again in minute 5. If the group can cognitively
integrate the intervention, it provokes self-reflection; if not, it increases Unorganized in
the intervention minute; then there is a drift to higher organization for three minutes,
Group and Member Interventions are stressful when groups are poorly organized.
No Intervention shows 3% move to Systemic from the other categories in the
minute of consideration. In minute 1 after, 2% reverses from Systemic to Normative,
reversed in minute 2 towards Representational and Unorganized and continues in
minute 3. Not intervening is associated with groups organizing themselves in Systemic,
then organization deteriorating over three minutes.
Group Interventions reduce organization for several minutes, with delayed self-
reflection. Member Interventions initially lower organization, then groups oscillate
between Systemic and Normative, similar to No Intervention, indicating Member
Interventions, being directed to individuals, have negligible effect on group Cognitive
Organization. The most stable organizations are Systemic and Normative; oscillation
between these is the most likely natural state. However, Group and Member
Interventions increase organization over three minutes, producing different effects to
either alone. Cognitive Organization is sensitive to interventions. Changes persist, but
do not necessarily return to the previous state. Constructive consequences only emerge
after three minutes. Interventions may work for several minutes before further
intervention is required. Too frequent interventions may cause confusion since groups
cannot assimilate them, but need several minutes to cognitively “process” them.
Affect:
Group Interventions in the intervention minute stabilize Joy and Discontent
towards Interest by 3%. In minute 1 after, this is partially reversed with 1% change to
Joy and Boredom; it then oscillates for two minutes. Group Interventions stabilize
295
Affect in pleasure for a minute, then it oscillates.

Member Interventions show no effect on Affect.
Group and Member Interventions in the intervention minute change Interest to
Joy and Discontent by 1%. In minute 1 after, Joy decreases, but Discontent reverses,
increasing Interest by 3%, and continues a 1% drift in the next two minutes. Increased
Discontent and Joy in the minute of Group and Member Intervention, leads to 4% drift
to Interest over three minutes.
No Intervention shows no effect in the minute under consideration, then Interest
oscillates 1% with Discontent increasing in minute 1, Interest in 2 and Discontent in 3.
Discontent continues to increase in minute 4 before stabilizing in minute 5 (not shown).
No Intervention is associated with oscillation between Interest and Discontent.

Group
&
LAGS(AFFECT,1) Contentment Subtable % 2.1% 2.2% 1.4% 3.9%
Joy Subtable % 23.8% 13.9% 22.9% 13.8%
Distress Subtable % 2.5% 1.9% 3.7% .6%
Boredom Subtable % 2.5% 2.2% 2.7% 1.7%
Affect Contentment Subtable % 2.1% 2.1% 1.2% 4.1%
Joy Subtable % 22.6% 13.5% 23.7% 14.3%
Distress Subtable % 2.3% 2.0% 3.7% .7%
LEADS(AFFECT,1) Contentment Subtable % 1.8% 2.1% 1.3% 4.2%
Joy Subtable % 23.5% 14.0% 22.4% 13.9%
Distress Subtable % 1.8% 2.0% 3.4% 1.1%
Joy Subtable % 20.6% 14.3% 22.1% 14.6%
Joy Subtable % 20.7% 14.9% 21.9% 13.7%
Table 21.5. Percentage of Affect categories for all groups from one minute before,
“LAGS(AFFECT,1)” to three minutes after Therapists’ Interventions,
“LEADS(AFFECT,1-3).”
296
Group Interventions stabilize pleasurable states, Joy increasing, then oscillating

with Discontent. Member Interventions have little effect; but Group and Member
Interventions have the opposite effect to Group Interventions; pleasurable states lead to
stable unpleasure, then drift to stable pleasure for three minutes, indicating initial
unpleasure and sustained stabilization of pleasure. No Intervention suggests Interest
naturally tends to oscillate with Discontent. Affect is labile and responsive, destabilized
by Group Interventions, stabilized by Group and Member Interventions for three
minutes. Therapists need to distinguish background oscillation from interventions’
effects. Affect is sensitive, but less elastic than other dimensions.
Action Coherence:
Table 21.6 shows the proportions of Action Coherence categories for Therapists
Interventions for five minutes after the interventions.
Group Interventions in the intervention minute show conflict reduced 3% and
cooperation increased, which oscillate for two minutes. Group Interventions improve
cooperation, which then oscillates with conflict.
Member Interventions in the intervention minute show 1% Concord move to
Accord, reversed in minute 1 after, then Discord moves 1% to Accord in minute 2,
reversing in 3, and increasing Concord. This remains stable to minute 5. Member
Interventions break the unanimity of Concord, but increase it for the next five minutes,
while Accord and Discord oscillate.
Group and Member Interventions show 3% increased Discord from cooperative
categories in the intervention minute, reversing in minute 1 after, and maintained for
three minutes. Discord decreased 8% in total from the intervention minute to minute 3
after, while Concord and Accord increase by 4% each. Group and Member
Interventions have a lasting effect increasing cooperation.
No Intervention shows increased Concord from Accord and Discord in the
minute of consideration, then a persisting trend for Concord to reduce and Discord to
increase by 5% over three minutes. No Intervention shows a drift towards increased
Discord and decreased Concord for three minutes.
297

Group
&
LAGS(ACTION,1) Concord Subtable % 26.6% 27.0% 16.3% 47.4%
Accord Subtable % 45.9% 51.3% 49.4% 41.6%
Contracord Subtable % 5.1% 3.1% 6.7% 1.4%
Action Coherence Concord Subtable % 28.6% 25.5% 14.1% 50.8%
Accord Subtable % 48.3% 52.1% 48.9% 39.6%
LEADS(ACTION,1) Concord Subtable % 26.9% 27.0% 15.3% 48.0%
Accord Subtable % 47.5% 50.7% 52.6% 39.9%
Accord Subtable % 49.7% 51.4% 50.1% 39.5%
Accord Subtable % 50.4% 50.0% 52.3% 40.5%
Accord Subtable % 48.9% 50.3% 51.6% 40.8%
Accord Subtable % 49.7% 49.9% 51.1% 41.5%
Table 21.6. Percentage of Action Coherence categories for all groups from one minute
before, “LAGS(ACTION,1)” to five minutes after Therapists’ Interventions,
“LEADS(ACTION,1-5).”
Group Interventions initially increase cooperation, which then oscillates with

conflict for two minutes, indicating a short, constructive effect that destabilizes groups.
Member Interventions reduce Concord to Accord, then increase it for five minutes and
Accord oscillates with Discord. Like Group Interventions, an initial effect stimulates
lasting change. Group and Member Interventions, increase Discontent, then drift
towards cooperation for three minutes. The combined intervention is more potent in
promoting cooperation than either alone. No Intervention shows a drift towards Discord
out of Concord.
Interventions immediately produce persisting effects in Action Coherence. It is
inherently unstable, needing constant attention to counteract the trend, whereas other
dimensions tend to oscillate. Group Interventions increase higher action categories, but
in other Dimensions, they increase lower categories at first. It is affected for a minute,
then drifts towards Discord or oscillates into and out of it. The tendency to reverse the
298
initial effect and then oscillate, suggests it is the most elastic but least sensitive
dimension. Therapists need to constantly attend to it and expect interventions to have
only a minute’s effect.
Summary 4.1: Therapists Interventions have varied effects on all GFR

Dimensions and alter the functional quality of group process. Some changes persist for
up to five minutes, but most tend to extinguish after three minutes. This could
tentatively be regarded as an “effect period” for interventions.
Characteristics of Interventions.
Generalizations about effects of interventions are also suggested.
Group Interventions have a pronounced effect, increasing lower categories
immediately, except for Action Coherence. For Structure, Cognitive Organization and
Affect the full benefit does not occur for about three minutes. Properly timed Group
Interventions are powerful agents of change, but demanding and temporarily
disorganizing; benefits require several minutes to emerge, and may need time to work
before being repeated.
Member Interventions have no initial effect on Structure or Affect, and only
slight perturbation of the natural background variation in Cognitive Organization and
Action Coherence. Member Interventions alone are ineffective in changing groups.
Group and Member Interventions are most effective, differing from either alone.
For Structure and Cognitive Organization, higher categories are immediately increased,
but Affect and Action Coherence respond to unpleasure and conflict, reversing them in
the following minute. There is less oscillation after the initial change than with other
interventions and more stable effects over three minutes. It is the most powerful
intervention (Battegay, 1999), but should be allowed to work over several minutes.
No Intervention allows the background “Brownian movement” of dimensions to
be glimpsed. Structure is most stable, tending not to change in the short term.
Cognitive Organization oscillates slowly between Systemic and Normative. Affect is
the least stable, oscillating rapidly between Interest and Discontent, while Action
Coherence drifts towards Discord. Cognitive Organization and Affect may have self-
correcting tendencies; Structure has inertia and may need intervention to change it, but
Action Coherence needs constant attention to avoid drifting into conflict.
299
These indications are summarized in Table 21.7.
4.2. Effect of Limits.
H4.2. Limits will be associated with decreased destructive categories in the

same or the succeeding 1-3 minutes.
In considering the results for Limits, it needs to be remembered that although

reliability was over 0.7 it was less consistent than for other dimensions, so findings can
be taken with less confidence than for Therapists Interventions (see Chapter 18). Tables
21.1 and 21.2 show considerable variety in the percentage of Limits set in each group in
each quartile. The effect of Limits on GFR Dimensions is shown in Appendix 3 in
Tables 21A.1 – 21A.4, giving percentage of change for the penultimate minute, minute
of limit and succeeding three minutes.
Structure: There is little effect on Structure indicating Limits are not set because
of Structural change. In the minute after the Limit, there is a 1% change from
Subgroups to Whole, which ceases in minute 2.
Cognitive Organization: There is 8% increase in Unorganized at the expense of
other categories in the minute of Limit, indicating conditions provoking Limits. The
following three minutes drift towards higher organization. Representational and
Normative increase by 3% in minute 1, Systemic by 1% in minute 2 and Normative by
2% in minute 3. Groups increase self-reflection following Limits, and Unorganized
states tend towards Normative. Limits improve Cognitive Organization reducing
Unorganized by 9% for up to three minutes.
Affect: Unpleasurable states increase by 4% with Limits, indicating the
situation requiring them. In minute 1 post-Limit, Affect is stabilized by reducing Joy
and Distress, and also increasing Interest and Discontent by 2%. In minute 2, Joy and
Discontent reduce, while Interest increases by 2%, another 2% in minute 3 makes an
increase of 6% in Interest. Limits stabilize Affect towards pleasure for up to three
minutes.
Action Coherence: The situation requiring Limits shows 7% increased Discord
300
and Contracord. In minute 1 post-Limit, Accord increases 4%, with conflict reducing.
In the next two minutes, a drift to cooperation is shown by reduced Contracord of 3%
and Discord of 6%. Limits reduce conflict for up to three minutes.
These findings are also summarized in Table 21.7.
Summary 4.2: Limits have a negligible effect on Structure, but produce higher
Cognitive Organization, stabilize Affect, reduce Unpleasure and Conflict, persisting for
up to three minutes.
4.3. Effect of Locomotion.
H4.3. Locomotion by the therapists will be associated with decreased destructive

categories in the same or the succeeding 1-3 minutes.
Locomotion occurs when therapists move around the room. They may set
Limits, assist members cleaning up and other activities or move towards members
anticipating conflict. The incidence of Locomotion for all groups is 20.8%. Its effects
on GFR Dimensions are shown in Appendix 3 in Tables 21A.5 – 21A.8. They are
summarized below.
Structure: There is no change in Structure from Locomotion.

Cognitive Organization: In the minute of Locomotion, Unorganized increases
by 5% at the expense of higher categories, indicating why therapists move. In the next
three minutes, there is a drift to higher Cognitive Organization of 1-2% in each minute.
Locomotion is associated with higher Cognitive Organization.
Affect: There is little change in the minute of Locomotion. Therapists do not
move because of Affect changes. However, in the first two minutes post-Locomotion,
Interest increases 2% with reduction in Joy, but little change in unpleasurable
categories. Locomotion does not reduce unpleasure, but stabilizes pleasure for two
minutes.
301
STRUCTURE COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION AFFECT ACTION COHERENCE

GROUP Increased Subgroups for 2 Lowering of organization then Stabilizes Interest then Increased Cooperation then
INTERVENTION minutes then reversed increased Representation after 2 oscillates between Joy and oscillates after 1minute
minutes Discontent after 1 minute
MEMBER Increased Whole group after 1 Systemic oscillates with No effect. Breaks Concord then oscillates with
INTERVENTION minute then reversed Normative (same as No increasing conflict after 2 minutes
Intervention) and Concord increases
GROUP & MEMBER Increased Whole group for 2 Split to increased Stabilizes Discontent then drifts Drift to increased cooperation,
INTERVENTION minutes then reversed Representational and to Interest after 1 minute which lasts.
Unorganized then drift to higher
organization after 2 minutes
NO INTERVENTION No effect, remains stable. Oscillation from Systemic to Oscillation between Interest Drift to Discord
Normative, stabilizes at and Discontent for 5 minutes
Systemic after 2 minutes
LIMITS Minimal effect to increase Whole. Increased organization for 3 Increased stabilized Pleasure Reduced Conflict for 3 minutes
minutes for 3 minutes
LOCOMOTION No change. Increased organization for 3 Stabilizes Pleasure for 2 Reduced Conflict for 3 minutes
minutes minutes
DIMENSION Stable without intervention; Oscillates between Systemic & Oscillates between Interest & Drifts toward conflict without
CHARACTERISTICS Changes delayed, last 2 minutes Normative without intervention, Discord without intervention. interventions, very sensitive and
then reversed. Elastic but less stabilizes at Systemic; GI’s & Stabilized by GI’s and GMI’s, responsive. Affected then
sensitive with inertia. GM’s constructive effects after a then oscillates. Sensitive but rebounds.
delay of 2 minutes are retained. inelastic.
THERAPEUTIC Will not change readily without Oscillates between Systemic and Oscillates between pleasure and Initial constructive effect but this
TECHNIQUE interventions. GI’s reduce Normative, requires intervention unpleasure without only lasts 1min, sustained effect
Whole, MI’s & GMI’s increase to achieve Representational. interventions. Interventions derived from GMI’s and constant
Whole. Interventions work for 2 GI’s effective, but require GMI’s required to stabilize, but only intervention needed to prevent drift
minutes then are reversed. for persisting effect. MI’s have last 1minute. MI’s have no to Conflict.
Sustained change requires little effect. Maximum effect effect, GI’s stabilize for 1
repeated interventions at 2 minute achieved after 2 minute delay. minute then oscillate, GMI’s
intervals. initially increase Discontent
then stabilize Interest.
Table 21.7. Characteristics of Therapists Interventions and their effects of GFR Dimensions.
Action Coherence: Discord increases 2% and Contracord increases 302
1% in the minute of Locomotion, stimulating therapists’ movement. In the minute after,
there is 3% reduction in conflict and increase in Accord. This trend continues for two
minutes with 3% increase in cooperation. Action Coherence is affected by Locomotion
with 7% reduction in conflict over three minutes.
These findings are summarized in Table 21.7.
Summary 4.3: Locomotion has no effect on Structure and it is not stimulated by

change in Affect, but responds to increased cognitive disorganization and conflict; it
increases Cognitive Organization and cooperation for three minutes and stabilizes
pleasurable Affect over two minutes.
4.4. Year Differences.

Although there are slight differences for each group, they the show findings for
all groups are valid. The effects of Therapists Interventions on Condensed States for
each year are described in Appendix 3, Tables 21A.9 – 21A.13.
4.5. Differentiating Therapists Interventions, Limits and Locomotion.
H4.4. Therapists’ Interventions, Limits and Locomotion will be independent in

their effects.
Locomotion by Therapists
No
Locomotion Locomotion
Limits by set Therapists No Limit Table % 73.2% 9.0%
Limit set Table % 5.9% 11.9%
Table 21.8. Percentage of coincidence of Limits and Locomotion for all groups.
When Therapists’ Interventions, Limits and Locomotion coincide in the same

minutes, it is not clear which is responsible for change. Table 21.8 shows 11.9%
coincidence of Limits and Locomotion. Two-thirds of the time there is Locomotion
when a Limit is set.
303
Limits by set
Locomotion by Therapists Therapists
No No Limit
Locomotion Locomotion Limit set
Therapist Group Intervention Layer % 7.0% 2.0% 7.4% 1.6%
Interventions Member Interventn Layer % 37.2% 10.3% 38.1% 9.5%
Group & Member Int Layer % 10.5% 6.5% 10.8% 6.2%
No Intervention Layer % 24.4% 2.1% 26.0% .5%
Table 21.9. Percentage of coincidence of Therapists Interventions with Limits and

Locomotion for all groups.
Table 21.9 shows the percentage of Therapists Interventions coinciding with

Locomotion and Limits. Only 2% of Locomotion and 0.5% of Limits are not associated
with Therapists’ Interventions.
4.5.1. Therapists Interventions with Limits.

The relative effect of Therapists Interventions and Limits was shown by
comparing the effect of Therapists Interventions on GFR categories with and without
simultaneous Limits. Results are summarized. Full tables and discussion are in
Appendix 3, Tables 21A.14 and 21A.15.
Structure: Limits intensify the effect of Group Interventions on Structure by an
additional 3%. Adding Limits to Group and Member Interventions sustains the
constructive effect. There is no effect for Member or No Intervention. Limits increase
the effect of Therapists Interventions on Structure.
Cognitive Organization: Limits magnify the effect of Group Interventions with
immediate change, which then reverts to the normal pattern, indicating Limits’ capacity
to change Cognitive Organization may only last 1 minute, but leaves an echo increasing
the effect of other processes. Limits with Member Interventions magnify changes and
extend the affected period for one minute. For Group and Member Interventions,
Limits increase Representational throughout. Limits probably magnify Member
Interventions because groups are more Unorganized in the intervention minute than for
No Limits. However, Limits sustain interventions’ effect by a minute and the effects of
the intervention operate again. This suggests a need to distinguish between a change
and magnification of the pattern. Limits exaggerate the effect of interventions in
Cognitive Organization for all three minutes, but change the pattern for 1 304
minute.
Affect. Limits with Group Intervention double the decrease in unpleasurable
Affect from the intervention for three minutes. Limits with Member Interventions
stabilize pleasure and unpleasure and reduce the Distress. They magnify Group and
Member Interventions and reduce unpleasure three times as great as for the total data
set. Limits magnify Therapists Interventions on Affect.
Action Coherence. Limits magnify Group Interventions, stabilizing and
reducing aggression, bringing the increase in Contracord forward by one minute to
minute 2. Limits make a difference for 1 minute in the pattern of effect and stop the
oscillation. Member Interventions with Limits are the most effective way of reducing
Contracord (by 5%) over three minutes; they prevent oscillation between Discontent
and Accord and increase a drift to cooperation. Limits increase cooperation by 14%,
postponing the rebound of conflict at minutes 2 and 3 (although it is then more likely to
be Contracord than Discord). Limits alter the pattern by postponing conflict by one
minute. The effect of Limits for Action Coherence is two or three times greater
(especially Member Interventions), but recurrence of conflict is more likely in minutes 2
or 3 presumably reflecting increased conflict associated with the need to set Limits.
Summary 4.5.1: Limits are a potent intervention and greatly enhance

Therapists’ Interventions, in some instances altering their effect.
4.5.2. Locomotion distinguished from Therapists Interventions and Limits.

In considering results for Locomotion, it needs to be remembered that reliability
was less consistent than for the other dimensions, although it was over 0.7; but findings
can be taken with less confidence than for Therapists Interventions (see Chapter 18).
To ascertain the effect of Locomotion in its own right, changes for Locomotion with No
Limits could be compared to Locomotion with Limits. However, Limits and
Locomotion, have high unsociable functioning whereas Locomotion without Limits is
more likely to contain varied states. A more effective comparison is with No
Locomotion as a whole, to account for all states with No Locomotion. The comparison
is between Locomotion/No Limits and No Locomotion on Therapists Interventions and
Limits. Detailed results are shown in Appendix 3, Tables 21A.16-21A.17.
Structure: For Group Intervention, Locomotion increases the trend 305
from Whole to Subgroups threefold. Locomotion adds to the structural impact of Group
Interventions. Locomotion occurs in association with Member Interventions when there
are isolated individuals and helps integrate them. It magnifies Group and Member
Interventions and stimulates groups to oscillate into and out of higher Structure
categories. Locomotion is likely to integrate unattached individuals, but these
Structures tend to oscillate.
Cognitive Organization: Locomotion is more likely in states of lower
organization. It magnifies Group Interventions, but changes the process, introducing
oscillation from Unorganized to Systemic and Normative. It achieves higher
organization faster, making Member Interventions more effective. There is only a 2-
minute delay before the rebound to Representational instead of three. With Group and
Member Interventions, it stops the oscillation and increases organization. Locomotion
introduces oscillation instead of a drift to less functional states and reduces oscillation in
favor of more persisting functional states. The effect of Locomotion without other
intervention ceases after 2 minutes, but is more likely to preserve higher organization
and assist in the appearance of delayed Representational at minute 2.
Affect: Locomotion stabilizes Group Interventions’ oscillation and movement is
between Interest and Joy or Discontent. It converts Joy to Interest and increases
pleasurable states. It makes Member Interventions effective, stabilizing Joy into
Interest. The oscillation initiated by Locomotion lasts for the full three minutes. For
Group and Member Interventions, Locomotion damps down oscillation of dysfunctional
states for two minutes and promotes oscillation in functional states, which are otherwise
unchanging. Locomotion stabilizes Affect and makes the effect of Therapists
Interventions longer lasting.
Action Coherence: Locomotion with Group Interventions polarizes Discord into
stable cooperation as Concord or to Contracord. Locomotion may act as a partial limit,
but only for a minute and postpones rather than prevents conflict. This suggests
Locomotion alone is ineffective in preventing crises. For Member Interventions,
Locomotion is associated with increased conflict only in the intervention minute.
Locomotion with Group and Member Interventions reduces fluctuation encouraging
consistent cooperation. With Locomotion, the drift from cooperative categories towards
conflict is replaced by oscillation between Discord and Concord, reiterating the
principle that Locomotion tends to convert a dysfunctional drift into an 306
oscillation with more functional categories.
Summary 4.5.2: Locomotion is an effective intervention, although it may only

last a short time. It magnifies Therapists Interventions and initiates constructive
processes in all dimensions. Locomotion tends to damp down oscillations with
dysfunctional states and increase functional states. It promotes trends for dysfunctional
states to oscillate with more functional states. However, it is ineffective in dealing with
dysfunctional states unless accompanied by Limits.
PART IV. DISCUSSION. 307
In Part IV, the results are discussed in four sections. In Chapter 22, their
implications for the Group Function Record are discussed and the usefulness of the
dimensions evaluated. Then findings for hypotheses are discussed in Chapter 23,
followed by a discussion of implications for developmental phases in Chapter 24. The
findings’ implications for the theoretical background are discussed in Chapter 25.
Finally, further research is considered in Chapter 26. However, before this, a synopsis
of the results is provided.
Synopsis of Results.
Groups were found to function rhythmically on all parameters with a wavelength
of 2-3 sessions and less regularly within sessions, supporting their organic nature.
Instead of a regression towards the mean, peak and trough sessions demonstrated a
tendency towards starting the new trajectory rather than fulfilling the preceding one,
suggesting change is an inherent property of extreme states. The higher the
functionality of a state, the more likely it is followed by more dysfunctional states in the
next few minutes and vice versa. Like organic homeostatic functions, stability is
preserved by rhythmic alternation between limits. Instability is proportional to group
size; one or two absentees tend to increase stability; more threaten group survival and
decrease stability.
Although clinically most members progressed well, increase in frequency of
therapeutic goal states is relatively small over the year. They tend to occur in resolving
dysfunctional states, allowing the group to resume enjoyable sociable activity and
demonstrate regulatory functions. Changes in how states are managed are qualitative.
Self-representation occurring briefly after each conflict enables problems to be resolved
preserving the group. Learning to manage the pleasurable stimulus of social life means
encouraging Whole states while allowing Whole-Subgroup rhythms until sufficient
Systemic organization has developed. The greater the size, the more demanding is the
group. An eight-phase developmental process was demonstrated in changes of the
relative proportions of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable states over the year.
Structure is a stable dimension, with groups tending to oscillate slowly between
Whole and Subgroups. Therapeutic goal states are most likely in Whole, which is most
demanding and least stable. While more stable, Subgroups is less 308
constructive, representing avoidance. Moving to Subgroups resolves conflict when
effective common rules are lacking; when they are present, conflict tends to be resolved
within Whole. The Whole/Subgroup rhythm assists in regulating groups; as they
become more stable, groups creatively use Whole states. Group Interventions increase
the likelihood of Subgroups; Group and Member Interventions increase Whole.
Cognitive Organization oscillates between Systemic rules and non-systemic
organization (Normative or Unorganised). It is easier for smaller groups to achieve
higher organization, especially Representational. The homeostatic regulatory
mechanism comprises any shared system of rules; those of a game or conversation
regulate tensions as effectively as social rules. Norms can also achieve this if they form
a comprehensive “corpus” governing behaviour. Systemic rules manage affect, but
deteriorating Cognitive Organization (from Systemic to Normative or Unorganised) is
associated with increasing unpleasure, conflict and interactional crises threatening the
group. Observing Cognitive Organization enables therapists to anticipate changes in
both Affect and Action Coherence. Therapists Interventions act like organizational
factors and Limits act as auxiliary rules.
Affect is the least stable dimension, oscillating between pleasure and unpleasure
from one minute to another. Unpleasurable states destabilize Structure and Action
Coherence. Action Coherence change anticipates Affect change when groups are in
Normative or Unorganised states and therapists following affective cues will lag behind
the process. However, when groups are in Systemic organization with rules containing
the process, unpleasurable Affect can be expressed before conflict breaks out. Groups
recover from Affect crises within a minute or two. This does not seem to depend on
Therapists Interventions, though they help. Dysfunctional states tend towards pleasure
in succeeding minutes; while high functional states tend towards unpleasure.
Therapists’ Interventions briefly stabilize Affect.
Action Coherence tends to drift towards increasing probability of conflict with
time. Therapists Interventions tend to reverse this; constant interventions are required
to maintain cooperation. Conflict is particularly likely in Representational, but constant
in all Structures and other levels of Cognitive Organization. It is proportional to size,
larger groups showing more conflict. Conflict is resolved by a mutually accepted system
of rules that provide guidelines for resolution of actions. Unsociable states tend towards
cooperation, Functional states toward conflict in the next few minutes. 309
Aggressive crises occur when Cognitive Organization deteriorates, impairing rules,
loosening the regulating system holding action in a common frame. Systemic rules
organize the numerous possible relationships into a single prescribed set. The most
powerful means of therapists intervening is by verbal representation of Action
Coherence states and their consequences.
Therapists’ Interventions have a different “half life” for each dimension.
Although any intervention may work, Group Interventions tend to last 1-2 minutes and
encourage lower Structure and Cognitive Organization unless the group has good
organization. They temporarily stabilize Affect, increase cooperation and seem to
“pressure” the group and require the group to be in Systemic organization to be
interpreted. Group and Member Interventions tend to last for 2-5 minutes and produce
more sustained, uniformly constructive changes to Whole, higher Cognitive
Organization, stabilizing pleasure and lasting cooperation after a delay of 2 minutes.
Member Interventions have inconsistent effects, little different to No Intervention.
Limits and Locomotion increase the effect of other Interventions. Locomotion responds
to deteriorating organization or cooperation, and provides a stimulus to self-regulation.
22. DISCUSSION 1: THE GROUP FUNCTION RECORD. 310
The Group Function Record defined dimensions of group function observed

independently of individual members. Although the membership and completeness of
groups varied, whole-group states were recorded and features of group life not evident
to clinical observation were demonstrated. The GFR can be said to have fulfilled its
purpose although it was applied to only one type of group, and it is not clear whether the
distribution of categories is specific to them or characteristic of groups in general.
However, these preliminary findings enable some comments to be made about
dimensions defined by the GFR. Where there are general implications for therapeutic
technique, these are mentioned under the heading of “Technique.”
Structure.
The structure of social communication (Sigman, 1987) is the primary
dimension determining relationships and units to be rated. The findings showed
Structure was the most reliable dimension and in defining the units to be rated, provided
a valuable means of analysing group phenomena. Structure is a stable dimension, slow
to react and changes tending to persist. A difference in phenomena was found between
whole and subgroups, but little difference between subgroup/individual categories.
Whole is the most creative structure. Subgroups are more stable, but less creative with
predominantly normative or unorganised Cognitive Organization. Systemic
organization, stable affect, unpleasure and conflict have constant proportions for all
structures. Cognitive Organization and high-energy pleasure are related to wholeness,
rather than size. Movement to subgroups helps groups leave whole unsociable
conflictual states and stabilise unpleasure. Conflict is as likely in subgroups as in
whole, but subgroups are more likely to change structure to avoid conflict and this
effect is stronger for larger groups.
Change in communication structure is an important self-regulating mechanism
in managing unsociable states, but may only be effective for some types of conflict
situations (see Chapter 23, Durkheim, 1964; Simmel, 1950; Northern, 1988). Conflict
produced in Systemic organization (such as rule-based games) is not resolved by
transition to subgroups, which would destroy the game, further destabilising the group.
However, where conflict concerns decisions in Normative or Unorganised situations,
structure change terminates the activity and source of conflict. Structural 311
change may successfully avoid conflict when group organization is deteriorating or
undeveloped; but within logical systems conflict can be resolved since common rules
provide the means of reconciling problems distinct from personal sentiments (Collett,
1977). Rules need to be implemented or they will be devalued and rendered obsolete
(Harré 1993). It can be concluded that movement to subgroups is likely to stop conflict
and unpleasure in deteriorating organization; but common rules resolve conflict within
systemic organization without structural change. Structural change is a self-regulating
mechanism in the absence of common rules or systems for conflict resolution
(Cartwright and Lippitt, 1976). Resolving conflict without breaking structure requires
an agreed rule system establishing what is common, with shared values by which
decisions can be made.
Structural change disrupts communication to solve problems (Bion, 1961;
Yalom, 1995). When communication is broken, the systemic organic nature of
communication (organic solidarity) is replaced by normative or unorganised interplay of
forces with a more mechanical quality (Durkheim’s, 1964 mechanical solidarity).
Subgrouping splits communication, replacing collective representations with specific
subgroup representations. For the group entity, collective representations become self-
representational, but splitting structure sets aside self-representations temporarily since
the whole is lost. It does not solve problems, which re-emerge in continuing tension as
the new structure settles down. Subgroups are more readily stressed by conflict.
Rhythmic structural restlessness therefore indicates groups’ failure to establish common
adherence to systemic organization and collective representations capable of self-
regulation.
The collective organism seems most self-reflective when whole; stabilisation in
subgroups is at the expense of self-representation (Kellerman, 1979). When individuals
split and repress conflicts from consciousness, loss of awareness follows. Structural
change in groups is likened to repression in individuals (Bion, 1961; Yalom, 1995).
Therapeutic: Technique should promote common systemic representations, placing
contending ideas within them; the logic of the system enables them to be
reconciled.
Representational organization is less likely in subgroups, confirming their

repressive function. However, the move to subgroups may initiate systemic 312
organization (Northern, 1988), which can be transferred to whole and assist achieving
Representational organization, since it is easier in small, whole groups less likely to
split and more likely to confront problems systemically. This favours treatment of
difficult patients in small groups. Movement to subgroups alleviates, but does not solve
conflict and is a substitute for adequate organization. The larger the group, the more
likely it is to self-regulate by this method (Forsyth, 1990).
Higher levels of functioning occur in subgroups early in groups’ lives because the
entity is immature and tends towards mechanism, not yet having achieved systemic
organization. When it achieves “entitativity” (Campbell, 1958) from developmental
phase 4, it functions better whole, using collective representations in circulation to
address problems within systemic organization, with the flexibility of organic solidarity.
However, rhythmic structural change persists and must be respected (Ettin, 1999), just
as repression does not cease because of therapy, but is more integrated. Absentees do
not affect structural change; they are stabilising in the middle of the year, but not early
when the group is insecure or later when loss reduces it. When threatened, the group
cannot address its problems and security takes precedence.
Unpleasure tends to affect structure in the minute it occurs while conflict tends to
have a more lasting effect into the following minute. Uniting in common goals
stabilises structure, showing goals are collective representations that unite groups.
Therapists’ interventions tend to change structure, but Limits and Locomotion do not,
since they institute or strengthen rules by which the group addresses problems instead of
repressing communications by structural splits.
Technique: Movement from whole to subgroups splits communication and represses
conflicts. This postpones, but does not resolve problems; therapists need to help
groups solve problems by finding common themes to unite members.
Conclusion. Communication structure as defined by the GFR is a central and

informative dimension of group process. Therapists can understand and manage
groups by recognising structural rhythms and common themes in the whole or
subgroups. Structure is a means of regulating unpleasure and conflict when a
cognitive system for confronting problems is lacking; but like repression, it only
postpones the problem. Systemic organization, pleasure and cooperation are
independent of it. 313
Cognitive Organization.
Cognitive Organization defines four degrees of collective organization of the
communication process to describe group cognitive function. It was the second most
reliable dimension. It tends to alternate between Systemic and Normative organization
before stabilising in Systemic. Normative and Unorganised organization are most likely
in subgroups, Representational most common in whole and Systemic is constant.
Representational is easier to attain in smaller groups, since integrating members into a
common cognitive unit becomes more complex as numbers increase (Napier and
Gershenfeld, 1989). It is unaffected by absentees.
The rule system of Systemic organization is associated with the greatest stable,
pleasurable affect, followed by Representational, then Normative, with Unorganised
having the least. Self-representations challenge group function, while normative or
unorganised groups disorganise easily and lose homeostasis. Systemically organised
rules that manage social and psychic energies constitute social organisms’ self-
regulating homeostatic system (Anzieu, 1984). However, only members’ commitment
to rules makes them work (Harré 1993). Rules are collective representations of group
identity and safeguard members’ mutually acknowledged need for the group
(Durkheim, 1964). The power of rules belongs to the whole group, not the influence of
particular members or therapists; they make all members equal and related to each other
and apply to whatever happens (Wittgenstein 1953; Werhane, 1992). They are an
impersonal representation of the group entity, since they cannot belong to any member,
only to the whole (Durkheim, 1964; Collett, 77; Harré 1993). Groups need to be
encouraged to make rules into a system of collective representations.
Technique: Self-regulation involves a system of rules to organise members. Their
condition for success is not their orientation towards psychological issues, but
their common acceptance and expression of the group’s reason for existing.
Therapists must articulate and promote these themes in discussion and avoid the
impression they impose rules on the group.
Systemic organization also manages affect. Pleasure is maximised and

organised by Systemic rules. Cognitive Organization is not influenced by group affect,
but Affect is influenced by organization. Unpleasure and distress are more 314
likely with deteriorating organization, which produces affective crises. Conflict is
constant and expressed according to the type of organization. Contracord crises are also
more likely in deteriorating organization, whereas cooperation or discord does not seem
influenced by organization. Therapists’ Interventions and Limits seem to act like
organizational factors. Limits are like additional rules, promoting higher organization.
Setting limits reminds groups about rules necessary for therapy (Malekoff, 1997).
Locomotion occurs with deteriorating organization, when rules are failing to organise.
It recognises that rules and collective representations breaking down, leads to crowd
psychology based on normative, arbitrary and situation-specific emotional
representations (Le Bon, 1923; Reicher, 1987). In this sense, affective conditions are
created as consequences of the type of cognitive organization. Members of unorganised
groups function by personal, individual rules or norms that do not integrate collectively.
Technique: Interventions must assist groups to retain rules when organization is
deteriorating. Rules are needed to constitute groups; their importance
emphasizes interventions need to be made in the dimension of cognitive
organization to have the greatest effect on the group. They may be more
powerful than interventions directed towards affective states.
Interventions around cognitive deterioration can precede action situations since

it is a predisposing condition for crises. Although conflict may be associated with
organizational deterioration, it is not caused by organization, but constant for all states.
Members’ attachment to rules determines how strongly they retain organization or allow
it to deteriorate. Loss of collective representations results in rules based on the common
cause no longer being relevant and splits the group’s integrity; members tend to break
the collective unity and operate separately (Durkheim, 1964). Departure from rules is
the first step to abandoning them, which happens when they no longer effectively
influence members. Wherever the entity is split, it tends towards loss of organicity and
increased mechanism in the form of individualistic power dynamics (Durkheim, 1964).
Deteriorating organization may lead to action change, which results in affect change.
Technique: The first sign of impending crises may be when conflict is not maintained
within the organizational level and collective representations are lost, reducing
members’ attachment to rules. Therapists need to reassert collective
representations that have been undermined or instigate new ones 315
related to what is common in the current situation.
Sub-systemically organised groups (Normative or Unorganised) function like

crowds and must be systemically organised before rationality can be expected
(MacLennan and Dies, 1992). Le Bon’s (1923) guidelines for communication with
collective entities unable to perform cognitive functions show how groups can be drawn
into normative organization around the leader’s clear communication without requiring
interpretation (Sampson and Marthas, 1990). Therapists’ interventions tend to increase
organization and promote representational states.
Technique: Normative or Unorganised groups act like crowds. Therapists need to
communicate to them directly with clear suggestions and images not requiring
interpretation to reassert therapeutic norms and systemic rules expressing
members’ own goals and values.
Conclusion. Cognitive Organization as defined by the GFR is essential to

understanding groups’ capacity for self-regulation. Rule systems create an
organizational infrastructure to collectively process experience. However, the system
need not be psychological in itself; any rule system will regulate. When organization is
reduced to Normative or Unorganised, it is likely to provoke crowd psychology and
therapists need to be clear and assertive; when groups cannot interpret, they will not
respond to symbolic interventions. It may well be that interventions directed toward
changing cognitive organization are crucial for achieving therapeutic goals.
Affect.
The GFR defines Affect as the collective energy states of the communication
process. It was the least reliable of the four group dimensions, being rated from a
shorter time interval. Affect is inherently highly reactive, tending to oscillate between
pleasure and unpleasure without stabilizing (Bion, 1961; Ettin, 1999). The larger the
group, the more unstable affect is, though the proportions of pleasure to unpleasure
remain constant regardless of size or structure. One or two absentees stabilize affect,
but more destabilize and threaten the group. Affect does not alter Cognitive
Organization, but most stable affect occurs in systemic organization. Unpleasure is
most likely to cause instability in structure and action. Cooperation in 316
common goals tends to stabilize the current affective state. Affective instability seems
to resolve into rhythmic fluctuations (Bion, 1961; Ettin, 1999). Unsociable groups are
more likely to move towards pleasure and Sociable groups towards unpleasure. Affect
and action form a functional pair of dimensions, with change in one reflecting change in
the other. Their rhythms determined the fundamental dynamic of all groups studied.
However, the rhythmic instability also means affective crises are often short and self-
correcting.
Any affective state may precede crises of distress, which are more likely in whole
structure, deteriorating organization and conflict. Deteriorating organization seems the
important indicator, since affect destabilises when the regulating system breaks down,
provoking crises. However, the stimulus for the crisis often comes from action since what
is done evokes affects. Although not shown in ratings, it appears deteriorating
organization fails to regulate action, causing conflict to erupt and stimulate distress.
Deteriorating organization may predict affect change better than action may, since affect
is so closely tied to action that it changes within the rating interval, while change in
organization may be evident a minute or more before. Although affect does not influence
organization, it is affected by it, suggesting it is a consequence of cognition and action,
consistent with cognitive theories of affect (see Chapter 13; Lazarus, et al., 1980; de
Sousa, 1991; Fridja, 1993). Unpleasure is also associated with the highest quality
sessions and inherent to group functioning. Therapists interventions tend to stabilize
affect oscillations. Limits further stabilize affect, reduce unpleasure and increase self-
regulation. Locomotion is not stimulated by affect
Technique: Affect expresses effects of other dimensions. Affects are shown to be
consequence rather than cause of group process. Therapists can anticipate and
manage crises by observing and basing interventions on organization and action
rather than affect. Intervening tends to stabilize affect.
Affective states may add to instability by stimulating action patterns. To be

available for regulation, affects must be named and verbally represented so they can be
understood and related to rules by entering communication. Groups need a vocabulary
of affective experiences to talk about them before they can be managed (Malekoff,
1997).
Technique: Groups need a language to manage and regulate affective states 317
within systemic rules. Therapists need to promote a discourse naming affective
states so they can enter the communication system as the precondition to
interpreting them.
Conclusion. Affect as defined by the GFR is highly responsive, reflecting the

impact of other dimensions on group energy, especially organizational states and action
events. It is a consequence rather than cause of group process. Affect is inherently
unstable and only regulated and managed by non-affective functions of Cognitive
Organization and Action Coherence. While affects need to be named and articulated,
since they are a consequence of other processes, they need not be the primary focus of
interventions.
Action Coherence.
The GFR defines Action Coherence as the quality of cooperation or conflict in
the communication process. It is the third most reliable dimension and its inherent
characteristics are sensitivity and responsiveness to events, with a tendency to drift
steadily towards increased conflict. Action Coherence has an intimate relationship to
structure of communication, which itself is a form of action (Harbermas, 1984, 1989;
Harré, 1993). Conflict within inadequate organization breaks communication;
consequently, promoting communication re-integrates structure. Conflict is likely to
cause structural change by forcing issues out of communication and therefore out of
group representation (Foulkes, 1964).
Technique: Structure is defined by communication. Stimulating separated members or
subgroups to communicate integrates groups and confronts conflict through
action.
Cooperation is more difficult to maintain with increased group size; conflict is

proportional to size (Forsyth, 1990). Action is the dimension most stressed by increased
size and complexity of relationships, presumably because each set of relationships can
cause conflict and the more members, the greater is the potential for conflict (Napier and
Gershenfeld, 1989). The highest proportion of cooperation occurs in Systemic
organization. Cooperation is reduced when the group is self-representational and
progressively less in Normative and Unorganised. Cooperation is based on a 318
system of rules for the group rather than individual guidelines in normative organization
(Harré, 1993). Rules as collective representations form the common ground for
cooperation (Flick, 1998). Conflict is likely when there are splits in communication
fabric or collective representations fail to coordinate conflict.
Technique: Conflict may occur between individuals about specific issues, however, since
it represents failure of a guiding rule system in the group entity, interventions
should aim to re-establish shared collective representations and rules as well as
confronting individual actions.
Cooperation changing to conflict is associated with unpleasure. There is a

reciprocal relationship between unpleasure and conflict so they invoke each other.
Cooperation for common goals stabilises all other dimensions. The occurrence of conflict
is constant for all types of organization. Cooperative states tend to produce Unsociable
states in succeeding minutes, whereas conflict tends to produce Functional and Sociable
states, pointing to action and affect as the dimensions in which homeostatic self-
regulation is expressed. It seems likely that action stimulates affect. Contracord is
associated with deteriorating organization and produces increasing unpleasure. However,
conflict is also associated with the highest quality sessions. Therapists’ interventions
increase cooperation, while Limits reduce conflict, acting like rules.
Conclusion. Action Coherence as defined by the GFR is expressed in
communication and a central dimension of group process. Anticipation and management
of the inevitable crises of group life require recognition of their action characteristics and
the most powerful interventions are directed toward this dimension. With time, groups
drift towards conflict in all conditions, but it is related to size, complexity and
organization. Splits in communication are related to conflict. Common goals and
collective representations organised by systemic rules prevent and manage conflict.
Action is most affected by working on the common basis for communication and limits
are an important extension to make rules more effective.
Therapists Interventions, Limits and Locomotion.

The GFR classifies Therapists Interventions according to the object they are
directed towards. It is the least reliable dimension and needs greater precision and
definition. However, results show trends indicating their effects. Group 319
Interventions act as challenging stimuli to groups (Bion, 1961), often provoking initial
regression towards lower categories (Agazarian and Peters, 1989) before leading to
increased function after a couple of minutes. Member Interventions promote whole
Structure and undermine Concord, but have little effect on Cognitive Organization or
Affect. The most consistently constructive intervention is Group and Member, which
tends to produce lasting higher functional categories in all dimensions (Ettin, 1999).
Limits and Locomotion increase the power and effect of the other interventions.
Technique: The most consistently constructive and reliable type of intervention is
Group and Member. Interventions should where possible link members to group
states, and articulate the effects of group states on members.
Conclusion. Even in the crude analysis provided, differences in the effects of

Therapists Interventions indicate their impact on GFR dimensions. The difference in
effect related to the object of intervention supports the notion that it is therapeutically
advantageous to consider (or speak to) the group as an entity, but this is challenging
unless members are also referred to.
The value of the GFR.

The GFR allows four dimensions of whole group process to be differentiated and
reveals a set of relations between them, which together provide an account of both
structural and dynamic phenomena. These relations suggest therapeutic strategies to
promote group goals.
23. DISCUSSION 2. HYPOTHESES. 320
In Chapters 19-21, results showed some hypotheses were supported fully or

partially and some not. However, there were also indications of important group
functions not hypothesized and worthy of discussion in relation to theory.
1. Group Development.
Several implications of the findings for group development can be considered.
1.1. Rhythmicity.
The results for H1.1 did not show progressive change throughout the year for
any dimension. Instead, the rhythmic waveform was observed. The fact that a similar
pattern is evident for all aspects of group function revealed by the GFR, suggests
rhythmicity is a fundamental property of groups (Bion, 1961; Malekoff, 1997; Ettin,
1999). Continuity of progressive change between sessions was not supported as a
criterion of therapeutic progress. The findings show group functioning is
multidimensional, not linear (Kellerman, 1979; Ahlin, 1996) and must be evaluated
rhythmically rather than against linear “progress.” It suggests that rather than attaining
goal states, therapeutic achievements are associated with groups repeatedly entering and
leaving states while maintaining functionality.
Rhythmicity may be a general property of social entities, not restricted to these
groups (Durkheim, 1964; Bion, 1961). If so, group process needs to be conceptualized
in terms of its rhythmic character. If critical periods of rhythmic group development
exist (Lewis et al., 2000), interventions need to be synchronized with developmental
phases to make greatest use of the natural process. Allowing for missing data, the
period in these groups is about three sessions. It may be valuable for group conductors
to know whether they are on an ascending or descending trajectory of the natural
rhythm in deciding upon interventions.
The findings in relation to crises indicate natural rhythms help bring groups out
of their difficulties. Therapeutically desirable states may also be self-limiting in spite of
therapists or members efforts to shorten or prolong them, like the social organism’s
natural breathing rhythm. Groups may progress in their own rhythm and therapists are
likely to feel inactive or may intervene too much if they do not wait to see if
problematic states self-correct (Kennard, Roberts and Winter, 2000). 321
Technique: Groups’ rhythmicity may alter therapists’ understanding of events and
interventions; allowing for natural rhythmic change may be an important support
to resolve group problems.
1.2. Change through the year.

In spite of the groups being successful and members progressing as assessed by
referring clinicians and parents (see Appendix 1), changes in Condensed States
throughout the year were modest as shown in results for H1.2. Percentages are small
and the pattern of change complex. Given the patients had not been successfully treated
by other methods, therapeutic progress was significant and seems to have resulted from
qualitative rather than quantitative changes. This suggests groups need not spend long
periods in harmonious self-reflection for members to develop. They need to solve
problems so the group continues and membership is maintained, enabling them to learn
to belong to natural peer groups (Gordon, 1983, Cotterell, 1996).
Technique: Therapists need to watch for target states, even if only lasting a few
minutes, as indicating therapeutic progress. They are effective even if only brief
responses to crises followed by non-reflective, cooperative games. Quality of
group function is more important than content.
Each group developed its own “personality” reflected in the pattern of states and
changes. These characteristics may reflect the relationship between those individuals
and the group experience they need. One group, for example (1993), may need to spend
time in Unsociable states for members to resolve aggressive tendencies, while another
such as (1996) may spend more time in Sociable for self-centered members to learn to
play by rules. Groups’ progress may be best judged by its quality and members’ change
relative to themselves, rather than independent criteria.
Technique: Therapists need to consider the life of the group as a whole and be cautious
of prescribing preconceived states as therapeutic.
2. Group Structure.
Some findings for the effects of groups’ structure have implications for
therapeutic technique.
2.1. Whole-Subgroup Structure. 322
Findings for H2.1.1 indicate a complex pattern of different group states for
whole or subgroup structural conditions. Rule-based cognitive activity, stable pleasure,
unpleasure, cooperation about different goals and conflict are constant for all structures,
indicating groups are likely to encounter problems in both whole and divided structures
and that all structural conditions demand therapeutic work. However, therapeutic goal
states are less common in subgroups where less organized cognitive activity,
cooperation with separate goals and inert affect are more likely. Nevertheless, high
quality states occur in subgroups and may enable groups to become whole (Northen,
1988, Yalom, 1995). Increased unstable pleasure in whole reflects Durkheim’s (1954)
hypothesis that “social effervescence” is a product of groups meeting together and the
inherent pleasure of association in whole states seems to destabilize the structure.
Perhaps socially troubled adolescents are unable to manage such pleasure and this is an
important therapeutic goal for them.
Technique: It is as important to help adolescents have pleasure and manage arousal,
especially in whole structure, as it is to focus on their intra-psychic and
antisocial problems.
Self-reflection and Concord were most likely in whole structure, but so was
unstable, high pleasure. Whole is a demanding, but creative structure; groups need to
move into and out of it to master it.
Technique: While whole structure is most creative, groups must learn to manage it by
movement into and out of it; inhibiting this dynamic may be counterproductive,
causing repeated loss control and destructive states.
Groups were found likely to have less organized cognitive functioning in

subgroups than in whole. Although more stable, subgroups are less likely to develop
self-regulation skills and may be “rests” from “work” in whole structure. They may
also be a “resistance” or refuge from therapeutic work when it is too threatening
(MacLennan and Dies, 1992). They give stability at the expense of higher quality
functioning. The similar proportions of unpleasure and conflict in whole and subgroups
indicate therapeutic challenges are not escaped, but unstable pleasure and self-reflection
are. Movement into subgroups seems to be defensive, but only works for a time; then
problems re-emerge (Yalom, 1995; Ettin, 1999). Nevertheless, the 323
combination of the two structures allows the group varied opportunities to manage its
changing states. Movement between whole and subgroups may begin defensively, but
become self-regulatory. In Chapter 11, the literature on subgroups showed they were
thought to be both constructive and destructive (Kellerman, 1979; MacLennan and Dies,
1992; Yalom, 1995). Stable structure for long periods may stagnate or create tensions,
only relieved by structural change. Enlivening, stimulating structural change may also
occur. Further research is needed to develop criteria distinguishing constructive, self-
regulatory processes from defensive flight into subgroups.
Technique: Movement between structures is an important rhythm and may be both
defensive and constructive. Therapists must work with this until groups have
learned to manage their arousal rather than always encouraging them to remain
whole.
Findings for H2.1.2 showed movement from whole to subgroups reduced

unpleasure and conflict. It indicated structural change can reduce conflict, stabilize
pleasure and reduce unpleasure. However, this is only one means of managing threats
since groups also resolve problems within the same structure. Relative to the amount of
time they spend in different structural states, conflict is four to eight times more likely
to be associated with structure change than cooperative states. Perhaps this shows
different types of group tensions are affected differently by structural change. On one
hand, some types of group tension may be considered threats of engulfment for
members, such as demands for conformity, which are helped by structure change. For
example, two boys resisting the demand to play a card game initiated by a third,
dominating member separated themselves from the game and established another of
their own, causing the conflict to subside for a time (1988, session 3). On the other
hand, tensions resulting from the clash of identities, such as interpersonal rivalries,
power struggles or obtuseness may prevent structure changes from occurring or may
persist in spite them. For example, conflicts about a game’s conduct or the
interpretation of rules need to be resolved within the structure so it can continue;
formation of subgroups would destroy the game. Structure changes when
communication is interrupted between some members, which may solve some conflicts,
but not others. Content analysis combined with GFR ratings would identify the types of
conflict resolution methods used in relation to structural change. 324
This study has shown that structural change is one method of managing conflict,
but not every structural change reflects a conflict change. Movement to subgroups also
stabilizes pleasure and reduces unpleasure, while movement to whole destabilizes
pleasure and increases unpleasure. Hence, structural change manages affect as well.
However, groups were more likely to resolve conflict within the structure in which it
occurred than to change. Non-structural methods of solving problems are thus more
likely. If the whole group in conflict moves to subgroups, it is twice as likely to become
cooperative as remain conflictual. The most frequent oscillations are between
cooperation and conflict within whole, the next most frequent is between whole and
subgroup structures while remaining cooperative. These indicate group rhythms.
Conflict states are more likely to change structure than cooperative states (see Figure
18.1).
The results for H2.1.3 showed while there was not systematic change from
subgroup to whole functioning during the course of the year, there was a linear relation
between higher Cognitive Organization and whole structure. This was not found for
Affect and the same conflict occurs in both structures. This suggests that structure is
closely related to Cognitive Organization, but the relationship is more complex for Affect.
Many hypotheses imply linear relationships, but the dynamics of affect and action do not
reflect these relations and may need non-linear hypotheses to show the relationships
(Kellerman, 1979; Ahlin, 1995).
2.2. Group Size.

Results for H2.2 showed that in contrast to the prevailing wisdom, which
recommends larger groups (MacLennan and Dies, 1992; Yalom, 1995; Malekoff, 1997),
the larger the group, the greater the difficulty it has achieving high functional states and
the more likely it is to have unstable affect, conflict and crises. The smaller the group, the
more it attains self-reflective cognitive functioning, stable and higher quality states
(Unhappy Cooperation and Nominal behave like constructive states indicating the
centrality of conflict). Size has a linear relation to conflict. Larger groups are more likely
to be stimulating and demanding, but treating difficult patients may be more successful in
small groups of even two members, until the group develops self-regulatory capacities.
Technique: Group size is important in forming groups. Difficult patients may 325
be easier to manage and less conflictual in smaller groups; withdrawn patients
may be stimulated in larger groups. Size can be increased as the group develops.
2.3. Group Completeness.

Results for H2.3 showed absence of members makes it easier for groups to
function at higher functional levels until the group’s survival becomes uncertain
(MacLennan and Dies, 1992) and functionality is lowered (König, 1991). It is easier for
a member or two to be away, but the whole group is important. The main effects of
absentees are in affect and action, with little effect on structure or cognitive
organization. Groups manage better without one or two members, demonstrating again
that wholeness is the most challenging social experience. Members staying away for a
session may be another self-regulation technique. There is 30% chance of absentees
following crises, which compares with the overall dropout rate in adolescent groups of
20-40% (Holmes, 1983). When groups are securely established in the middle quartiles
of the year, absent members help them function better, perhaps because they need not
face problems when all members are not present. However, when establishing itself in
the first quartile, or later in the Working phase, absentees are disruptive to groups,
suggesting the organism is disturbed by lack of members. The implications are that
absenteeism is not only likely, but may be an inevitable phenomenon of group process
(rather than being considered as a failure or resistance, it may be conceptualized as
another expression of the rhythmic interplay of disorganization and control (Slavson,
1979; MacLennan and Dies, 1992; Ettin, 1999).
3. Group Dynamics.
The findings for hypotheses concerning dynamics showed several important
features of group processes.
3.1. Dimensions affecting stability.

In H3.1, Affect and Action Coherence showed a linear relationship with
Cognitive Organization categories, except for Representational. More organized states
were associated with increased stable pleasure and reduced conflict, while less
organized states were associated with increased unpleasure and conflict. However,
Representational is systemically organized self-representational content and 326
more inclined towards conflict and stable unpleasure when members talk about
themselves and the group. It includes argumentation, disputes and talk of problems as
well as cooperative communications. The most stable states are present in Systemic,
indicating groups governed by rule-based communication are most cooperative and
emotionally stable. A system of rule-based logical relationships is essential to maintain
stability and constructiveness even if it is not psychologically oriented. It is evident that
much of the group organism’s development and functioning can happen without
Representational organization. Encouraging self-reflection makes groups less stable
and cooperative. Although it is required for psychological work, it is more challenging
(Slavson, 1979; Azima, 1989).
Technique: Groups must achieve self-regulation and resilience before being able to
successfully manage Representational communication, or they are likely to
become unstable and conflictual. While self-confrontation is necessary in
psychotherapy, therapists must consider its demands, which may work against
the group becoming an organism; too much psychology may overload and
disorganize it, particularly in its early life. Psychological material is unlikely to
be integrated successfully unless Systemic organization is maintained.
Organizational resilience is therefore important to consider in making
psychological interventions.
H3.2 examined categories associated with instability. Unpleasure was most

associated with instability and tends to be associated with change in structure and
action, while cognitive organization is relatively unaffected. Conflict and Concord were
also associated with increased instability in structure and action. Unsociable states
(conflict and unpleasure) cause instability in structure and action, but Concord is also
unstable since it demands high quality integration that easily fails. These findings may
allow therapists to anticipate disruption and focus their interventions on structure and
action, which are most likely to be disrupted.
Technique: Unsociable states are likely to change group structure and action states.
Interventions can anticipate splitting or conflict and assist groups to manage the
stress.
3.2.3. Self-correcting tendencies. 327
The matrices derived for H3.2.3 showed the tendency for affect and action states
to change to categories of the opposite quality over three minutes. The higher quality
the states, the stronger is the trend towards lower quality states and vice versa. This
finding indicates rhythmic mechanisms are perceptible within the session over even
short periods. The more extreme the affect and action states, the more strongly groups
self-correct towards opposite states. Regression towards the mean would tend toward
moderate categories, whereas the trend is towards the opposite extreme states. Rather
than indicating a tendency towards a stable mean state, these groups functioned like a
pendulum: the larger the amplitude away from the stable state, the greater the tendency
toward the opposite extreme.
Like organisms, it seems groups need to occupy all possible states. Homeostasis
is not maintenance of a mean, but the organized rhythm of stimulus and correction
(Goldstein, 1995), which at first over-corrects and does not remain static for any length
of time. The better the group functions now, the worse it is likely to function soon. The
matrices show this tendency within sessions and the graphs of stability and quality in
Figures 18.1-6 and 20.5 show it over the year. The rhythmic, homeostatic tendency
seems to permeate the fabric of the group at every level. It is the most reliable feature
of groups’ functioning. If therapists assume its presence, they might direct their
interventions not to counteract these tendencies, but to resonate with and modulate them
towards the therapeutic goals (Azima, 1989).
The fact that the same rhythmic characteristics are evident in all dimensions of
group function within and between sessions for all groups, suggests that to interpret this
fluctuation exclusively in causal terms from the interpersonal dynamics may obscure a
more fundamental collective characteristic of the groups (Azima, 1989). The
alternation seems to occur regardless of the content of interpersonal interactions. It may
be that the establishment of such rhythms is an essential feature of group identity and
that a therapeutic goal may be for therapists not to need to intervene for self-correction
to occur. This may indicate the group’s progress towards becoming self-regulating.
Technique: Rhythmic oscillation is inherent within and between sessions. Therapists
should identify, anticipate and resonate with group rhythms, aiming to modify
rather than counteract them, which would risk disrupting the group process. A
further therapeutic goal may be to assist the group to undertake its own self-
regulation of these oscillations. 328
3.3. Effects of affect change.

Although H3.3 did not show that negative affect change was preceded by
conflict, there is evidence that action change does precede affect change in a proportion
of instances. However, affect is rated from 15 seconds of the minute while action is
rated from 30 seconds; consequently affect may be rated from a different portion of the
minute than action, obscuring occasions when the hypothesized changes occurred. Two
sorts of affect changes seem likely: one preceded by action changes and another not.
An example of the first is a conversation or game in which a member begins to be
teased and continues to laugh and tease in return; then after the teasing continues, the
victim becomes angry or hurt and withdraws. The activity moves from cooperation to
conflict while the affect remains pleasurable and only later does the affect change to
unpleasure in keeping with the conflict. An example of the second is when a member
participating in a game or conversation begins to express anger, boredom or
unhappiness; when the others do not take any notice, he disrupts or withdraws from the
game. In this case, the affect change signals an action change to come. It is possible
that cognitive organization may distinguish these two patterns, since the first occurs in
Normative or Unorganized organization, while the second is Systemic. Perhaps the
presence of systemic rules enable affect to be expressed more openly, before conflict
occurs.
Clinical experience suggests this distinction is important in successfully
managing groups, but a more sensitive rating procedure is needed to identify these
instances. If therapists use affect as their main focus in observing group process and
guiding interventions, they may fail to anticipate important moments in the process
where action change precedes it. The consequences of not intervening at the time of the
change may mean destructive crises occur before the affect registers and are completed
before the therapist has intervened.
Action and affect usually change within the same minute and are corrected in the
next or subsequent minute. These events are generally short-lived and rhythmic
tendencies provide inherent self-correcting processes. Although therapists’
interventions influence affect and action, the proportion is small. Therapists can
recognize desired change and allow groups to continue, rather than intervening further
when it has been resolved. Sometimes groups can be left to manage the 329
problem, but other crises threaten the group’s existence and require intervention.
Some therapists’ interventions tend to have their full effect a minute or more
later, while others are immediate. To be successful, therapists need to make short-
acting interventions within the minute of the problem that allow self-correction to occur
in the following minute. Brief interventions would aim to respond to group
circumstances, rather than personal psychological content. Member Interventions have
little impact on affect and only change conflict after two minutes. Group Interventions
tend not to reduce unpleasure or conflict, whereas Group and Member Interventions do
so immediately. Brief interventions consisting of concise statements relating
individuals’ actions to the group are likely to be most effective rather than
psychological interpretations (Azima 1989; Rachman, 1989). Therapists who intervene
too much may interfere with self-correcting processes preventing groups managing
themselves (Kennard, et al., 2000).
Technique: Therapists need to be aware of action as an important dimension to monitor
group function. Negative changes in affect and action tend to self-correct in the
following minute or two. Therapists intervene most effectively by making short
Group and Member Interventions relating the actions of individual members to
the whole group situation and allowing the group’s own homeostatic
mechanisms to respond.
3.4. Crises and group processes.

Crises of Distress and Contracord are most likely to occur in larger groups
without absentees, but with deteriorating Cognitive Organization. Group organization is
crucial to stability; moving from rule-based to normative to unorganized states predicts
crises and instability; therapists may anticipate this. The cause of organizational
deterioration may also produce the interpersonal crisis, but if organization and rules
manage group states, effective interventions may try to re-establish higher organization,
rather than focus on interpersonal emotional issues, which require psychological
responsiveness from members. However, only increased organization enables the group
to process these interventions and assert its capacity for self-regulation (Azima, 1989).
Group Interventions and Member Interventions do not increase organization, but Group
and Member Interventions tend to do so over three minutes and will promote the
group’s cognitive capacity to manage the problem and use the therapist’s 330
help. Crises emerge out of any state and there is 55% likelihood of others in the next
three to five minutes. They do not come singly, but the group oscillates rapidly in and
out of crises before stabilizing. Therapists can work for increased stability over a period
using the interventions discussed.
Technique: Deteriorating cognitive organization predicts crises of distress and
aggression. Effective interventions may increase organization with Group and
Member Interventions allowed to work over two to three minutes.
3.5-6. Cycles in group life.

H3.5 and H3.6 concern cyclic alternation of stability and quality across sessions.
Peaks and troughs were not the culmination of trends, but the beginning of new
trajectories, directing the group process towards the opposite states. There is no
evidence of random fluctuation; the regularity (allowing for missing data) is striking,
showing homeostatic tendencies since the range of values (means for stability or
quality) is consistent for all groups. It resembles fluctuation of physiological variables
between limits. What parameter of homeostatic process is measured?
If groups did not institute trajectory change, they would disband. Continued
increase in either direction would make them dysfunctional. The values represent limit
states of stability and quality compatible with continued functioning. Completely stable
groups would be boring; members would leave, as nothing unexpected would happen.
Constantly unstable groups would be equally dissatisfying and members would leave.
The measure of quality is the percentage of constructive states (Functional and
Sociable Condensed states). If it were close to 100% constructive for many consecutive
sessions (the 1988 group achieves this on four occasions), members would lack
opportunities to express their needs. It would be unvarying, unrewarding, and could not
continue. If the quality were equally low, it would be chaotic, unpleasant and would not
continue.
Groups seem to “dose” themselves with states needed to achieve therapeutic
goals. However, there is no guarantee that self-correction or limits will be successful.
An analogy is an infection in a person; fever is induced to combat it, determined by
homeostatic processes designed to preserve the organism. Yet, the fever may itself
cause damage or death in the attempt to recover. It seems reasonable for similar
mechanisms and mishaps to occur in social organisms. A “rational” group 331
would work through conflicts and anxieties, then reach a state of harmony. An
alternative is to visit various states in rhythmic sequence. Rhythm is a feature of
organicity (Goldstein, 1995) and gives the impression of groups not only being
organized within the session, but of “knowing where they are” on the wave so the next
session continues the rhythm.
Technique: Sensitivity to group rhythms enables therapists to map progress and
identify self-correcting homeostatic processes. Stability and quality of sessions
may be more determined by their sequence in oscillations than interpersonal
dynamics within the session.
4. Therapists Interventions.
Therapists’ interventions rest on slight proportions (1% or greater) of frequency
change of categories in the three to five minutes following them. These net changes are
clues to their global effects. Interventions are defined by the object they are directed to
and vary from abstract psychological interpretations to simple descriptive statements.
Some interventions change group states, others do not (Dalal, 1995). The net effect may
be caused by only a small proportion of that intervention. The fact that Member
Interventions do not appreciably affect ratings of whole group process validates the GFR,
since it would not expect interventions to individuals to influence the whole organism.
Talking to the group entity in Group Interventions changes it, though tends to initially
lower functional levels. It affirms groups as psychic entities, since they respond to being
addressed (Battegay, 1999). Further analysis of forms of intervention and content of
group process may provide additional insight into this relationship.
Group Interventions increased the probability of lower categories in Structure and
Cognitive Organization; initially stable pleasure and cooperation increase, followed by
oscillations. They stimulate the group when static or resistant to confront issues and
challenge it to respond to its own states. Therapists talk about the group to the group
(König, 1991), so the content is self-representational; therefore Group Interventions
indicate how the group responds to Representational stimuli. Response to these
interventions would gauge how well the group can handle collective representations and
indicate therapeutic progress (Azima, 1989).
Technique: Group Interventions stimulate the group and challenge it when 332
resistant or stagnant. Responses to their self-representation indicate groups’
ability to confront themselves.
Member Interventions temporarily increase the likelihood of whole structure, do

not affect Cognitive Organization or Affect and disrupt participation in common goals.
Talking to a member brings that person to the attention of the group and unites everyone
else around the common interest (Gordon, 1997). This may help integrate members into
the group, providing all can hear it. However, talking to individuals in Concord singles
them out, disrupting the common goal (Rutan and Stone, 1984; Azima, 1989). It is
important not to talk to individuals under these circumstances, but address the group
instead.
Technique: Member Interventions bring individuals to the attention of the group and help
integrate them, but addressing individuals in activities with common goals
disrupts concord.
Group and Member Interventions are most effective in all dimensions (Battegay,
1999), continuing for up to three minutes. Presumably, this is due to relating the activity
of members to the group. The therapeutic purpose is to enable members to form groups.
It is in harmony with therapeutic goals by its form, irrespective of content. Individual
members need to become “organs” of groups and therapists need to talk about this
relationship. Group and Member Interventions are likely to articulate the relationship
between member and group, facilitating communication. Therapists need to verbally
represent the relationship, bringing it to consciousness so groups can work with it. The
members lack experience of groups and are often unable to communicate their effect on
the group or it on them. Many interventions may name events in relation to participants
and group (Azima, 1989, Rachman, 1989; Gordon, 1997).
Technique: Therapists need to articulate relationships between members and group to
develop a language to understand the effects on individuals and the whole.
Limits and Locomotion are effective interventions managing the group and
reducing destructive states. Limits added to Group and Member Interventions enhance
their effects and last several minutes. Locomotion is a response to deteriorating cognitive
organization and conflict. Physical proximity turns out to be an effective 333
stimulus for the group to control itself regardless of what else happens (MacLennan and
Dies, 1992; Malekoff, 1997).
Technique: Close physical proximity is an effective intervention to maintain order and
control in groups and indicates therapists need to move around the room.
The indications derived from the analysis of therapists’ interventions give the
basis for a technique which is not restricted to content, but provides tentative directions
for using both the object of the intervention and the therapists’ personal movement as
additional dimensions to their intervention. Since these are already present in all
interactions with the group, these principles allow for some systematic exploration of their
relationship with content of intervention.
24. DISCUSSION 3: GROUP DEVELOPMENT 334
The majority of phases postulated in the literature review of group development

were integrated into an eight-phase sequence. Evidence of phases was not found when
single dimensions of group process such as stability and quality were examined, nor
with Condensed States. However, when relative proportions of time spent in the three
Functional Bands were examined, evidence of developmental phases was found.
Hypothesised proportions likely to be associated with the characteristics in each phase
could be identified. This finding remains tentative since the sample is restricted to five
groups with similar characteristics and sessions are missing in some groups. However,
it is significant in the light of the skepticism expressed about the notion of
developmental phases (Whitaker, 1985; Ahlin, 1995) and confirms that development is
not a unitary, linear process (Kellerman, 1975; Ahlin, 1995, Ettin, 1999). The finding is
strengthened by the fact that the phases’ characteristics were derived from conceptual
analysis of the literature and then identified in the data. In spite of their limitations, the
results may provide a framework for analysis of other groups.
Central to these findings is that GFR data allowed for simultaneous description of
three aspects of groups as entities (Functional, Sociable and Unsociable states). The
power of considering the group as an organism rather than a “multiple” of individuals
(Sandelands and St Clair, 1993) is demonstrated by the GFR’s capacity to integrate the
complexity of interpersonal interactions into a three-dimensional system which
differentiated phases. However, in conceptualizing the phases hypothetically (see
Chapter 18), the sequence of members’ interpersonal contributions to the group process
was described. It remains to consider the phases as descriptions of the development of a
collective organism.
1. Convening.
The group initially belongs to the therapists, who set the agenda and bring
members to treatment; it consists of individuals needing to establish communication and
common understanding as the Nominal Group (Gn). Members depend on therapists
creating the group and respond to their lead, functioning as an “extrinsic” group, whose
reason, control and direction come from outside it. Tensions are avoided by external
influences; individual behaviour is motivated to engage in the group (Lewis, Beck,
Dugo and Eng, 2000). 335
The group is the commonality among members, as a common idea (the “group
to join,” Long, 1984) formed by getting to know each other and discussing rules and
expectations, where the group itself is the focus. Members initially have in common
only what therapists tell them. The therapeutic task is initially beyond their grasp and
they must first seek commonalities to form a group (Ettin, 1999). They need to
communicate, but lacking common experience, the content comes first from the
therapist, then from the commonalities they find. When communication is established,
individual experience is complemented by a common structure in the communicational
dimension. Members seek Sociable activity to develop shared experience as group
content and make the group their own. The therapists define the functional, self-
representational content. This phase is short-lived if the group becomes an entity. If it
persisted, the group would be didactic, reliant on therapists and fail the therapeutic task.
The first stage requires considerable self-representation to find common content or the
collectivity cannot form. This explains the high percentage of Functional. Where
groups continue from the previous year, the tendency is reduced.
The phase is called “Convening,” in reference to convening the tissue of
communication that defines the group’s existence, enabling the Watzlawick Principle
(see Chapter 9) to operate and establish dimensions of group function. Convening
describes the formation of the material basis (communication) of the collective
organism before any self-sustaining process has begun within it. Once continuity of
self-sustaining communication is formed, the group becomes a Social Group (Gs)
however rudimentary, marking the transition from Convening to the next phase of
Engagement.
2. Engagement.
From the interpersonal perspective, Phase 2 describes members taking flight
from self-disclosure to avoid the anxiety of group membership (Bennis and Shepard,
1956). However, the term “avoidance” pre-supposes that members recognize problems,
but lack successful group experience and do avoid them as threatening. “Flight” into
predominantly Sociable activity facilitates shared experience and cooperation, but does
not address their experiences. It also provides a body of non-threatening experience to
create sufficient sense of belonging for members to accept therapy. Dependence
expresses their need for each other and the group. 336
Taking the perspective of the group being, this phase is the opposite of
avoidance; it is “engagement” in non-conflictual activity by establishing spontaneous
communication. If it does not occur, members become bored, leave and the group fails,
or it becomes educational rather than therapeutic. The natural movement in the second
phase is away from formal content, towards shared experience about whatever can be
communicated. Social problems are communication problems (Sigman, 1987), but
sustained social communication establishes the group and is therapeutic; therefore,
avoidance of problems is also engagement in group-forming communication. Most
communication is likely to be about familiar, shared experiences. “Therapeutic” self-
referential material is less likely, since it is more problematic. The group’s social body
forms of communication, common experience, shared events and history. The
communication derives from awareness of others and the desire to engage with them in
Sociable activity. As this occurs, the experience of the group changes from “otherness”
defined by the therapist to “shared-ness” and “own-ness” as they contribute their
content into the communication body.
Communicational integrity forms in Engagement; members are incorporated into
the tissue of social communication and begin to feel the group as a common, collective
structure (Rachman, 1989). The indication for this is in each member recognizing the
group as an independent entity to which they belong. This is implicit in members’ talk
about the group, referring to other members as “we” and “us.” As they get to know
each other, identifications form around commonalities, constituting the group being by
mechanical solidarity based on similarities and common images binding members, but
leaving little room for differences (Durkheim, 1964). This is expressed in high
proportions of Sociable and low Functional and Unsociable states. In Engagement, the
group entity assembles itself from members as “organs,” forming a communication
body to unite them through common (Sociable) activity. The group has come into
being, but lacks consensual (Functional) collective representations of itself. Conflict
between members’ individual needs and the group’s requirements leads to the next
phase.
3: Positioning.
The third phase begins as members acquire ownership of the group and develop
conflicting expectations about it. They assert desires about their position. 337
Problems appear that have previously made group membership difficult and the
capacity for constructive activity diminishes. Unsociable activity increases as members
try to make the group what they want and resist each other or the group. When
members express their desires in the group, it loses “otherness” and becomes an
extension of themselves; but conflict is created between being individuals and becoming
organs of the collective entity (Durkheim, 1964). The emerging sense of membership
of a collective unit creates concern about the position each will occupy.
“Positioning” describes members working out their place in the structure they
are building. “Group-ness” forming from the common content in Engagement is felt to
be their “own-ness.” If successful, it makes the group their own social structure in
which they can express themselves. Members want the group as an opportunity to
express their interests; enjoyment of it encourages satisfaction, but motivates conflict as
personal drives collide (Burrow, 1927b). Social problems are evoked. If membership
cannot be put before self-satisfaction, the group loses members. Feeling recognized and
valued by the group motivates compromises. High proportions of Unsociable states
indicate fragmentation, disorganization, unpleasurable affect and conflict. Positioning
concerns members’ desire for belonging conflicting with their fear of engulfment, past
painful social experiences and independence. Its dynamics manifest interpersonal
tensions and struggles for dominance, motivated by attempts to gain power over the
group to reduce anxiety.
The conflict is between whether “the group exists for me or I exist for it.”
Members want to make the group an extension of themselves or become part of it, but
risk losing personal identity for an unknown gain in social identity. At this stage,
members cannot make the group itself an object, because it lacks collective
representations. Consequently the conflict manifests in the interpersonal dimension.
Instead of the group being felt as the threat, other members are. When someone
dominates, what they want becomes what the group wants, such as when a member
insists the group plays a card game for several sessions. Joining the activity is joining
the group, but this puts the member under the influence of the dominant individual who
demands others do what they want and conflict develops. Others become dissatisfied;
eventually someone resists the domination and refuses to play.
For the group to progress, members must express differences and similarities in
their interaction. The mechanical solidarity of Engagement must change to 338
organic solidarity, with division of labor in the sense of recognizing each other’s
different needs. Positioning expresses the conflict between mechanical solidarity
asserting similarity interpreted by dominant members as membership criteria, and
organic solidarity placing differences within a framework of the common need for
therapy. The conflict is expressed in tension about what can and cannot be
communicated and how the communicational tissue preserves its integrity (Malekoff,
1997). For the group to continue it must achieve tolerance for difference and
relationships organised on another basis than power (MacLennan and Dies, 1992;
Hopps and Pinderhughes, 1999).
In Positioning, the group entity, having formed from members as heterogeneous
organs, has to “shake down” into a working unit serving the whole rather than
individuals. It establishes the possibility of being an organism. The group entity’s
existence provokes tension between individuality, membership and collectivity. It has
to cope with collective experiences that are not always gratifying and develop self-
regulating processes to manage Unsociable states or there can be no change in group or
members. Common communication has to provide an integrated body for members and
the group. Consequently, although the proportion of Unsociable states is high, so is
Sociable, whereas Functional is low because of the lack of collective representations.
4. Consolidation.
In this phase, members achieve an agreed basis for functioning. They develop
norms and rules, resolve problems and achieve shared group-maintenance activity.
Self-representation (Functional) is less likely than Sociable activity, because the group
cannot yet confront problems. Conflict and unhappiness (Unsociable) occur, but are
resolved. The social unit is secured, allowing group building to continue to
“consolidate” the group entity. The group becomes the members’ own place.
Satisfaction arises from membership of the collectivity rather than personal
gratification. Common experience creates norms and shared expectations. A
developing common history forms a collective identity in which the group’s rules are
expressed. If this does not happen, the group fails or members leave because they
cannot achieve the compromise membership requires.
Consolidation describes the group achieving security in collective identity
(Rachman, 1989.) The conflicts of Positioning may continue. Powerful 339
members may not relinquish their drive for power, subordinates may not exercise their
rights, but the therapeutic process attains a mutual structure that may be a compromise
or collusion depending on how Positioning is resolved. At the conclusion of
Positioning, members accept the group not being what they want it to be and more than
they expected. In Consolidation, they begin to experience organic solidarity (Durkheim,
1964), being organs of an entity greater than themselves, regulated to give satisfaction.
Members accept the group’s sovereignty and conflicts resolve for the collective welfare,
because the group becomes more important than personal desires.
In Consolidation, the group organism forms collective representations consisting
of shared ideas that give it psychic existence; group functionality is established and
membership enjoyed. The collective entity consolidates itself. This requires a high
proportion of Sociable and lower Unsociable, while Functional is also low since the
group is only beginning to achieve collective representations by the end of this phase.
The growing sense of security and satisfaction leads to a qualitative change in the
group, arising from members achieving a collective identity, which introduces the next
phase (Rachman, 1989).
5. Idealization.
The hopes members brought to the therapeutic situation arise in the next phase.
Consolidation must culminate in recognition of successfully constituting the group and
be expressed as a sense of collective well-being. With the emerging capacity to enjoy a
collective identity (perhaps for the first time), members hope it will provide all they
want. However, because they expect more than it can give, these hopes are unrealistic.
They relate to a common “imaginary group” consisting of each one’s ideal rather than a
mutual, actual one (Agazarian and Peters, 1981). It alienates them from genuine
collectivity. In this phase of “Idealization,” the group becomes an object in members’
experience because of their successful involvement, indicated by the high proportion of
Functional self-reflective communication; Sociable may also be high, indicating
common activity, but Unsociable is low.
Idealization follows Consolidation. Members’ hopes are aroused by the “own-
ness” forming high expectations because norms and group identity are successfully
formed. The group entity’s self-awareness is indicated by Representational in the high
proportion of Functional states. Members readily refer to the group and its 340
consolidation is expressed in the Functional capacity. Idealization emerges quickly and
lasts only 1-3 sessions since it is unstable. It occurs because limits have not yet been
found; they belong to the next phase (Shambaugh, 1989). The imaginary group almost
immediately fails to live up to expectations. In the previous phase, the group entity
gained functionality from the Sociable activity. Because of the consolidation of the
entity’s existence, Idealization describes a brief period in which it responds to the
vitality associated with its own psychological functioning by high proportions of
Functional self-representation states. Perhaps it could be said the entity “celebrates” its
existence and this threatens members’ feeling of incorporation, stimulating them to
regain personal identity against group identity introducing the following phase.
6. Disenchantment.
The imaginary group of Idealization is unsustainable. Almost as soon as it
forms as a tacit collective representation, it provokes disappointment. Conflict and
tension erupt from unrealistic ideals of the group and members must confront problems
preventing them accepting the group as it is. This is essential preparation for the
Working phase and involves “Disenchantment” or dissolution of the idealized group
(Bennis and Shepard, 1956; Schambaugh, 1989). It is inevitable that something
unrealistic, fabricated from the hopes of the group’s early success must be lost in this
phase if the group is to discover what is not possible and accept failures instead of
swinging between idealization and rejection of social life. This may include losing
control, testing limits and feeling frustrated. Disenchantment is a crisis likely to be
expressed in rebellion or conflict; it has the highest proportion of Unsociable (44.5%)
after Positioning (47.3%).
For the group entity, this phase occurs when communication regulates members
so they do not only utilize the group for personal satisfaction. Disenchantment indicates
re-appearance of the tensions resulting from the group’s organs also being individuals
who cannot give themselves completely to it. Failure to be disillusioned would mean
increasing involvement and ultimately loss of identity. Resolution of Disenchantment
requires members to convert hopes into clearer expectations and substitute limited
satisfaction for idealized gratification. Group existence must be put before self, making
the group more durable; reduced expectations form a shared identity compensating for
personal disappointments. Members can begin working, since the group 341
becomes safe enough to bring their problems into an environment that expects less, but
feels theirs. However, this crisis may involve regression to Positioning and reworking
the process if they cannot relinquish ideals. In Disenchantment, the group being
confronts its conflicts and limitations and in doing so, shows it can successfully regulate
disorganized, unpleasurable and conflictual states to maintain its life.
7. Working.
In this phase, the group oscillates between Unsociable and Functional states with
considerable Sociable activity. Members have achieved sufficient belonging to feel
attached to each other and it is their group; they tolerate conflict, resolving problems
threatening the group (Ettin, 1999). The group is resilient; as problems are worked on,
conflict leads to Functional activity; periods of satisfying Sociable activity reward
members for persisting in being together and motivate continuing involvement and
problem-solving. “Working” involves fluctuations in all three bands of Condensed
activity.
The group is a shared space, neither “other” nor “own,” but “ours.” As
Functional Group (Gf) it offers members a new category of social experience. The full
range of social phenomena occur with mutual acknowledgment and shared commitment
to care for self, others and group in spite of hostility an conflict. It opens when the
group successfully emerges from Disenchantment and enters a state where all
conditions rhythmically alternate in a self-preserving and self-regulating entity. It
manages harmonious, boring and conflictual states with homeostatic functions avoiding
dismemberment. The group entity is stable, balancing group and individual needs
through rhythmic interchange (see Chapter 23). Each state is complemented and
compensated by others later in the session or subsequent sessions. The collective entity
shows its life and integrity through the rhythmic fluctuation across the variety of states
to develop a complex, creative existence. However, it is hard to acknowledge the end of
the group, since this may be the first experience of belonging, and this introduces the
final phase.
8. Separation.
In this phase members confront loss and separation associated with the group
ending. In spite of conflicts, it should provide increased recognition of the 342
group’s role in members’ lives. However, adolescent groups are often unable to
confront loss, since they may not have belonged before and do not know what it means
to lose a group. Their avoidance of self-reflective Functional states in this phase is not
only defensive, since high Sociable states also express shared cooperative and enjoyable
activity that has been the core of the group (Wardi, 1989). Separation often celebrates
and re-creates earlier phases of Engagement or Consolidation with similar proportions
(Functional 3-7%, Sociable 67-73% and the lowest proportion of Unsociable 21-23%).
In the face of ending, the group entity may try to maintain itself and avoid
dismemberment by reverting to patterns similar to Consolidation, avoiding
Representational, which would confront the reality of ending, but also conflict states
that would threaten the group (Peternel, 1991; Etting, 1999).
This phase is called “Separation” rather than termination, because members have
to integrate the group so that it continues to affect them. If ending is threatening, it
leads to denial or rejection and “disintegrating” rather than integrating the group
(Wardi, 1989). It is not just a matter of mourning and loss, but re-constituting the group
as a symbolic element in their experience and reference point for the future. There is
insufficient data to draw conclusions about this phase other than suggesting it exists.
There was never a full ending since all groups continued the following year. However,
a tentative conclusion is that for the group entity, the high proportion of Sociable and
low Functional and Unsociable in this phase may indicate the failure of collective
representations to deal with the group’s disbanding. Consequently, the denial of
termination is as though the group prefers to “fall asleep” in unrepresented Sociable
activity, rather than confront its own demise and the grief that would provoke.
Overview.
Developmental dynamics and vicissitudes of phase sequences are also possible
(McCollom, 1995). Their order may vary if things go wrong, but they are hypothesised as
an essential sequence for forming functional group entities. Vicissitudes may include not
fulfilling phase requirements, becoming fixated, advancing and regressing within or
between phases, jumping and aborting phases or traumatic events disrupting continuity of
development (Ahlin, 1995). The sequence identified becomes a framework to identify
such dynamics. It shows how the group entity forms, consolidates and settles to work on
its task. Such an overview may define strategies or tasks for each stage and 343
guide aspects to focus on at each phase.
Relevance of development phases. The value of a developmental scheme
depends on how it is used. Rigid application will obscure the unique individuality of
each group and inhibit effective treatment. However, if a developmental sequence
exists, its recognition is comparable to the role of understanding child development in
individual psychotherapy. Although treatment may not aim to achieve developmental
tasks, it is the context for understanding the problems; neglecting development is a
failure in responsible treatment, but development is not the end in itself. The treatment
outlined here aims to bring groups into existence; it cannot only follow the
developmental sequence, but takes members’ experiences and the particular group
events into account. The present system is more complex than others reviewed; none
include all eight phases (however, see Lewis et al., 2000). Although more cumbersome
for treatment, this sequence has been validated empirically, may be more discrete in its
specification of phenomena and less suitable to simplistic programmatic use.
Clinical relevance of the phases. It would be inimical to therapy if treatment
pushed groups through preconceived developmental tasks. Knowledge of
developmental phases provides a context to evaluate group phenomena and inform
interventions. Understanding phases may enable problems in sessions to be interpreted
as part of the natural oscillations of the therapeutic journey rather than failures. It may
enable moments to be mapped in relation to the whole process. Therapists may focus
interventions non-prescriptively around the phase tasks as a background to interpreting
events (Lewis et al., 2000). It describes a group-building process, since the phases are
identified in the whole group. The developmental phases may provide a framework to
interpret group process longitudinally over the group’s lifespan, indicating a sequence
of distinct dynamics to be negotiated (Ettin, 1999).
Implications for length of treatment. A developmental sequence may also point
to requirements for the length of treatments. A Group Forming Paradigm of treatment
(Gordon, 1997; see Chapter 9) may necessitate groups having sufficient sessions to
allow for the sequence of processes and relative length of these phases as part of a
complete treatment. Too short a treatment may restrict the necessary group-forming
processes and set them at cross-purposes with the formal aims of groups (Ettin, 1999).
Treatment outcomes. If personal therapeutic attainments are associated with
being a functional organ of a group being, then treatment outcomes may 344
correlate with groups successfully completing these developmental phases.
25. DISCUSSION 4: THEORY. 345
This study began by surveying group-entity theories to formulate a theory of the

group entity and the GFR as an instrument to observe it. The current meaning of “group”
is barely half a century old (Anzieu, 1984) and theoretical advances are required to solve
theoretical problems (Steiner, 1974, 1983; Turner, 1988; Bednar and Moeschl, 1981;
Ahlin, 1995). The theories are re-considered here in light of the findings.
The Group Organism.

Rhythms in GFR states suggest whole-group organic processes of growth,
structure, continuity, order and control as discussed in social organisms (Spencer, 1860;
Radcliff-Brown, 1952; Merton, 1949) and systems theorists (Grinker, 1956; von
Bertalanffy, 1975; Maturana and Verula, 1980, Becvar et al., 1997). They are revealed by
the whole group, whose members form its organs and their relationships its life processes.
The GFR defines groups as units of individuals incorporated into a common
communicational world organizing the social, cultural and psychological environment.
Communication’s effects are independent of its informational content (Sigman, 1987). Its
structure forms templates within which members come and go or change position.
Organic processes within this social communicational organism are defined by presence
of the Watzlawick Principle, that it is impossible for the members not to communicate
with each other (Watzlawick et al., 1967; see Chapter 9). Organic processes rendering
communication comprehensible and the group viable are independent of individual
members or content and point to communication as the social entity’s “tissue.”
Organisms consist of continuously connected tissue composed of discrete cells
within boundaries; reciprocal influences connect every part to every other part.
Connectedness can be called “Continuity,” giving members a common fate (Campbell,
1958). Reciprocal influence can be called “Integrity.” The group’s “materiality” is
communication; its continuity and integrity are organized, creating patterns, regularities,
directed change, a set of possible states and limit conditions signalling breakdowns
(Goldstein, 1995). Processes organizing and maintaining tissues (metabolism) can be
called “Order.” Three fundamental metabolic processes can be described for organisms
and communicational systems.
Growth consists of irreversible, directed changes forming the mature 346
organism by creating structures that become the framework for later developments. Each
organ is connected to all others and nourished by growth. Growth also occurs in
communication. Talk is not random. Groups tend to maintain a set of topics; the longer
they meet, the more the set consolidates. Members take roles in the structure; the same
thing is not said repeatedly, each contribution stimulates some sort of development. If
themes and content do repeat, they lead to new conclusions or structural consequences.
These phenomena are independent of individuals or content. Topics, norms, values, ideas
and other constant aspects form a developing identity. Adolescent values such as “nerdy”
or “cool” and games form frameworks within which the group’s communication tissue
grows, amalgamating members’ contributions. This growth is evident if communication
quality is compared at the group’s start and end.
Self-maintenance preserves viable conditions, initiating feedback and modification
if the homeostatic range is exceeded. When tissues or functions are disrupted, the
organism attempts restoration within existing functions or structures. Self-maintenance
also occurs in communication. Continuity of topic is preserved until an appropriate point
for departing from it occurs. Conflict and disruption threaten to break communication.
Groups try to preserve discourse structure, bringing sanctions against changing roles or
incompatible topics and attempt to repair it. The status quo is maintained in dialectical
interplay between growth and maintenance.
Self-creation or “autopoiesis” (Maturana and Verula, 1980) occurs when reference
points for homeostasis are damaged or dysfunctional and the previous state cannot be re-
established, so a new structure or homeostasis is created. Self-creation also occurs in
communication. When aspects of the communicational organism are destroyed, there is
vigorous, though not necessarily constructive re-creation of communicational integrity,
changing the previous structure. When influential members are lost, role structures re-
form. If aggression destroys a safety norm, inhibition against conflict or controversy may
become normative. Autopoietic constancies maintain communicational integrity, but
restructure it creating discontinuity with the past.
Growth, self-maintenance and self-creation are implied by the GFR findings.
Growth is evident in the systematic change through the year (as shown in quartile changes
in Condensed states, Tables 18.2-18.6), with individual characteristics in each group.
Rhythmicity and rebound from instances of Distress and Contracord within a minute or so
(Tables 20.5, 20.6 and Figure 20.2) suggest self-maintenance. Self-creation is 347
indicated by the characteristics of quality and stability peak and trough sessions (Tables
20.28 and 20.30).
Technique: Establishing communication creates a social organism and brings members
into communication, including them in its social growth, self-maintenance and
self-creation processes, required for their development.
The organism concept provides a theoretical structure to describe whole group

functions and reveal unique aspects of their processes. Systematic application of this
theoretical material to the communicational social organism might yield important new
concepts to understand social phenomena.
The Crowd.
Crowd psychology describes homogeneous, poorly structured collective mentality
lacking self-regulation reactive to impulse with unstable affect. Crowds are primal
communicational organisms incapable of symbolic processing. In the GFR, this is whole
structure, normative organization. Without systemic organization, cognitive integration is
concrete and arbitrary; communication is unrestrained by systemic rules, it is governed by
the values, emotions and impulses of the moment without regard to wider implications or
consequences. Cognitive organization governs functionality essential to self-regulation.
Crowds form around similarities (Le Bon, 1923) in mechanical solidarity
(Durkheim, 1964) when communicational organisms stabilise from unstructured,
disorganized states or when systemic entities deteriorate, replacing rules with sentiments.
The group’s history provides normative organization as customs, but not systemic rules.
Implanting ideas is difficult, but once done, they persist as stereotypic, uncompromising,
non-logical sequences of images; they are uncritical of contradictions, influenced by
emotional appeals, analogy, high-sounding phrases and images (Le Bon 1923). “Crowd
mind” refers to the Continuity, Integrity and Order in this type of communicational
organism and is specifiable as a set of GFR states and could be studied as such.
Technique: Uncontrolled groups function as crowds. Their inability to reason means the
cognitive capacity required by interpretive interventions is absent. Principles of
managing crowds are effective for highly aroused normative or unorganized
groups.
348
“Social instincts” (McDougall, 1920; Trotter, 1916) are expressed in the GFR as
normative collective representations drawing individuals into cooperative action
coherence. They act from within and are unquestioned because collective representations
of their arbitrary origin are lacking. Self-representational cognition breaks the power of
norms allowing independent thinking. Influential individuals or “crowd crystals”
(Canetti, 1960) assert norms, defy rules, command members, instigating action and
expressing normative justification for their actions. Activation of norms “stings”
members subject to them into conformity because of the lack of systemic organization.
For example: Bill laughs at Jim’s appearance for not doing what he demands,
successfully pressuring others to join in humiliating Jim, who may then miss sessions or
leave the group. Bill asserts the norm that leaders determine what members do and
disobedience is punished. Therapists can relate norms to the therapeutic rules by Group
and Member Interventions: “Bill you are bossing everyone to do what you say or be
punished; is that what you others think too? This makes the group like school, but won’t
help your problems;” or, “Bill, you were picked on yourself like you are doing to Jim, but
you’ve all joined the group to help each other.” The GFR suggests this would tend to
increase functionality, giving a moment of self-reflection and cooperation.
Technique: Therapists need to articulate and challenge emergent norms to be replaced by
rational, collective rules. Interpretation is ineffective for managing rule-breaking
or norms activated in crowd states, because systemic cognitive organization is
lacking. Describing actions, naming motives and articulating normative
assumptions provide representations of the therapeutic purpose and self-
representations (Gordon, 1997).
These concepts can be defined in observable terms within the GFR. In crowd
states, normative ideas are selectively aroused and torn from their relationship to other
norms governing group functioning. They act like prescriptive or proscriptive rules
(Forsyth, 1983, see Chapter 12). Unless exposed as norms, they must be obeyed as a
condition of membership. Non-reflective, aroused communicational organisms enact
sentiments. In splitting or scapegoating, the normative idea is: one subgroup or person is
the problem and must be rejected to solve it. The problem for crowd states is to regulate
energy enough to move from norms to systemic rules.
Regulation of action derives from cross-referencing ideas within rule 349
systems. One member may feel hostile because his (normative) prestige is threatened, but
is prevented from enacting hostility by other norms, such as group purpose or losing face.
Affectively aroused norms must be cross-referenced to other elements in the norm
“corpus” or they are immediately enacted. Cross-referencing is a product of the
communicative continuity and integrity in social life, not personal cognitive development
(Mead, 1962). The system of cognitive elements is synonymous with members’
communicational relationships, which convert cognitive relations into social actions with
affective consequences. Continuity and Integrity ensure mutual respect (or power
relations) and refer personal ideas to the normative corpus. Group Integrity and Order
impose integrity and order on individual thought and action. Therapists promote this by
articulating sequences leading to misunderstandings, responsibility for interactions,
egocentric assumptions about the group being for personal enjoyment or understanding of
scapegoat’s actions (MacLennan and Dies, 1992).
Technique: Therapists must intervene in crowd dynamics when selective arousal of
normative ideas begins and distribute arousal by verbalising links to other ideas in
the normative corpus or rules. Enactment of one norm (collective representation)
is modified by activating others.
The Social Mind.

The “general mind” forms from the residue of common experiences and becomes
objective or is a pre-existing field organising the individual mind (Lewes, 1879). The
common residue theory suggests culture, tradition and history are mind-creating.
Collective experiences become collective representations by being articulated. Groups
are the medium of individual minds, social communication the tissue and social mind is
organized communication (McDougall, 1920). Members’ actions form residues through
communicative action (Habermas, 1985, 1989) and social action becomes mental
organization when communicated. The GFR describes this as collective representations
forming in systemic cognitive organization. It requires representational organization.
Shared communicative actions create a residue of common mind, whose quality is
determined by the collective cognitive organization. Cognitive processes in whole
structure and cooperative action are mind-creating. Therapists promote collective
representations by articulating what members share.
If mind is a pre-existent field in social organisms, participation in such 350
an entity immerses members in a mind-creating situation. Mind becomes active through
language, peer culture and the therapeutic culture. Communicative enactment of mental
elements activates and integrates them into members’ minds. The organization of the
group’s mental life directly structures members’ minds. However, they must feel the
group is theirs to participate in its mental life. “Belonging” entails “internalisation” and is
a therapeutic function in itself (Yalom, 1985; Bloch and Crouch, 1985).
Social mind as residue describes how content is acquired, while social mind as
pre-existing field describes its organization. Normative accumulation of experiences in a
social context forms the residue; systemic organization pre-exists and is activated by
communicative action in the pre-existing linguistic (symbolic) dimension that includes
reason, moral rules and social structures (Collett, 1977b). Content includes members’
peer culture, therapists’ therapeutic culture and common cultural fundamentals of the
“foundation matrix” (Foulkes, 1964). The residue consists of collective representations;
the pre-existent field is the collective mentality postulated as nous (see Chapter 9).
McDougall’s (1920) “self-regarding sentiment” extended to the whole group is the
condition for group mind. In GFR terms, this is reflected in whole structure,
representational organization, pleasure and concord. Mind or cognitive organization is
linked to action coherence since equally strong deliberative (cognitive) and executive
(action) functions are needed. Rational discussion (as systemic cognitive organization
and cooperative action) integrates the common content of the collective mind (Giddings,
1897). Social memory creates group identity from events represented in the
communicational system; common mind forms by repetition, reproduction and
accumulation between minds (Small, 1905) indicating representational organization is
necessary for groups to become self-regulating. Social mind arises by agreement and
cooperation where individuals think and feel alike (Gillette, 1916). These theorists affirm
the mind-creating character of Functional and Sociable states.
Technique: Attention must be given to cognitive and action aspects of groups or they
become dysfunctional. Linking past and present events, developing collective
identity, describing events or conversations forms common mind through sociable
content even though this is not necessarily expressed in psychological terms.
Agreement, cooperation, solidarity and mutual support must be represented
verbally to accumulate into collective mind.
351
Self is formed in primary groups where people live a simple, rewarding social life
in cooperation; it is interchangeable with group life as “we” consciousness (Cooley,
1909). It develops with common aims and cooperative actions, irrespective of content
and purposes. Cognition and action unite in “significant symbols” calling out the other’s
response (Mead, 1962). Significant symbols produced by a member have meaning for
others; they evoke action, because they are constituted by a social environment. The
response is conditioned as much from within the individual as from without. Linguistic,
cultural and behavioural symbols form mind by becoming common property through
actions articulating them. Cognitive function accounts for mentality when expressed as
social action (Habermas, 1985, 1989); reciprocity between collective and individual
mentality is inherent in cooperative action coherence in the GFR. The social becomes
personal (Toulmin, 1972); the dichotomy between individual/group, subject/object is
superseded by a dimension of communication bringing mind into being (Harré, 1993).
Group therapy makes available a repertoire of significant symbols, for members’ and
facilitates reciprocity independent of content. The act of communication itself is
therapeutic (Foulkes, 1990) when the other understands what is intended and names the
significant symbol.
Technique: The therapeutic goal is to maintain continuity of meaningful, pleasurable
group experience in which social and communicational facts are named for the
individuals to the group. Communicational processes themselves must be
differentiated from their content. Content becomes significant when organization
is Functional.
Meaning, consciousness and self come into being through members taking the
position of the other towards themselves, (Mead, 1962) making possible abstract,
systemic relationships. Normative phenomena do not imply reciprocity and must become
systemic. For example, normative leadership structures apply to one member who is the
leader; other members feel they have no influence. However, when ideas of leading,
following and influence are made reciprocal so everyone should be included in each
situation according to a principle, such as who has the best idea, it becomes a systemic
rule, allowing members to experience their own capacities and how they are seen. Self-
forming occurs by verbally representing members’ impact on others and giving this
meaning within a framework of therapeutic values. Such interventions 352
promote meaning, consciousness, self-reflection and representational cognitive
organization.
Technique: Members must be helped to take the position of the other towards themselves.
Therapists need to relate normative elements to each other, articulate logical
relationships, inconsistencies, contradictions or lack of relationship to encourage
systemic and representational organization within cooperative action.
The self as “an eddy in the social current,” (Mead, 1962, p 182) describes it
coming into being through rhythmic group process. Eddies do not form in a viscous
medium; only changing relationships allow members to meet self-forming needs.
However, unorganized change is chaos; eddies form in the rhythms of a complex,
organized medium. The group process must be flexible enough to constantly present new
situations to members, but fluctuations must be part of a series where particular states
regularly reappear as reference points for the rest of the process. For example, periods of
stability lead to dissatisfaction and conflict and then restoration of cooperation and
enjoyment. Socially immature individuals must learn by consequences of mistakes.
Reverting to less functional group states can gradually be recognised as consequences of
self-indulgent, anti-social acts and then can become the subject of interpretive
interventions. Group instability and lability are inherent to therapeutic change.
Technique: Therapists need to work within group process rhythms. Fluctuations can be
used to demonstrate causes and consequences. Eddies in the social current of
group process confer a sense of self on members when therapists articulate them
with Group and Member interventions.
This confirms the importance of cognitive organization and systemic rules as the
means of achieving the regulation that constitutes rhythmicity and enables self and mind
to be nurtured. The rules of systemic organization interconnect, cover all situations, allow
each person a place and enable the group to undertake logical processes. An intact corpus
of norms may also achieve concrete integration. The communicational organism
reciprocally relates each person’s contribution to all others forming a cognitive system
resting on significant symbols as collective representations. Group thought is expressed
as cooperative action coordinated by the system or corpus. In the social mind, there is no
purely “mental” process divorced from action as the inner experience of a 353
collective subject, since action is inherent to mentality (Mead 1962; Harbermas, 1989).
Action places communication beyond individuals, in the intersubjective space
(Merleau-Ponty, 1976; Gordon, 1985) where social phenomena exist. Individual
contributions forming a residue of collective representations, within consensual rules or
norms constitute social mind. The products are not inner mental events in individuals, but
collective action in regulated group life (Durkheim 1954). An aroused idea or norm
stimulates the system to reassert itself, re-connecting it to other ideas or norms, modifying
its expression. Scapegoating in a systemically regulated group causes one or other
member to intervene with something like: “come on, let’s get on with the game,” or “no, I
don’t think he should leave.” Power hierarchy cannot over-ride individual judgements
coordinated by common commitment to the collective purpose.
The GFR’s differentiation of group function dimensions confirms the importance
of cognitive organization for developing collective mentality. GFR categories allow the
development of collective mental life to be differentiated according to the organizing
principle of the collective cognitive functions. They can be understood as structural
conditions that groups rhythmically move into and out of, rather than forming a linear
sequence, which is not found by the GFR.
Initially, groups emerge from an unorganized state. Normative structures organize
contributions as similarities, asserting that everyone should be the same; complementary
relationships such as leader/follower are specified. Differences threaten norms and evoke
sanctions. For example, when the norm is leader/follower, the presence of a leader/leader
structure results in power struggles. The collective normative corpus forms over time as
norms are inter-related by being successively enacted within action coherence. The
corpus integrates each norm with others so they are not torn from their context. This
regulates arousal. Action is subject to the implicit goals of the corpus, which are concrete,
contingent, imperative or prescriptive; they assert, “You must or must not do this.” When
norms in a corpus are broken, they are replaced by new norms. If enough are broken, the
group becomes unorganized. The normative corpus is the group’s initial cultural identity.
Gradually, the symbolic system of rules allows flexible organization to develop in
the paradigm of the rules of language (Whorf, 1995). Structure describes relationships;
rules describe the actions conforming to it. They are abstract, non-contingent, logical and
teleological, governing action flexibly towards goals; they specify meaning of sentences,
content of discussions or winners of games. They are not prescriptive, but 354
constitutive, allowing different means to achieve the same end (Collett, 1977a). Rules
allow for differences, and specify pure relations such as how disputes are decided (Harré,
1977). They apply to any content as abstract nous structures in discourse, organising
contributions and reconciling differences. Rules are usually implicit and only effective if
no one owns them and all submit to them. The rule system comes from beyond the group
and allows collective thinking to occur. It already exists and is invoked by someone
obeying or transmitted by identification, suggestion or power relationships. Rule-
following needs to become a norm.
Whereas a normative corpus is conservative, rule systems are innovative,
especially if there are rules about making rules. The game is an inadequate paradigm for
human rule-systems (Wittgenstein, 1953) since a game’s end cannot be changed, whereas
in culture, both ends and means change, but rule-fully (Harré, 1972, 1977). Rules
distribute arousal to the whole system and activate additional rules to preserve goals;
rather than prescribing actions, they create options defining actions according to
circumstances. Breaking rules and displacing collective gaols by individual or sub-group
goals activates other rule systems or destroys them, causing reversion to normative or
unorganized states.
The social mind’s collective system includes contingent norms organized as a
corpus (culture and social structure) and teleological rule systems and is described as nous
(see Chapter 9). It is the members’ mental infrastructure; nous or social mind is a
development of the communicational organism upon which its Continuity, Integrity and
Order depend. Dysfunctional communication is reflected in loss of social mentality.
Technique: Before groups can think, regulate themselves or learn from experiences, they
must attain communicational Continuity, Integrity and Order. Therapists need to
promote these at every opportunity, since the social communication organism is
the supportive medium of the social mind.
Society as a Being.
GFR dimensions and categories can interpret phenomena discussed in Durkheim’s
account of the social being. The totality of common ideas and sentiments forms a
collective conscience (Durkheim, 1964) constituted by revealing what members have in
common and their shared activity. Membership at least is common. Rules and enjoyment
are essential for social units, since the pleasure of communing is attractive and 355
coercive (Durkheim, 1954) demonstrated by increased unstable pleasure in whole
structure. Coerciveness is indicated by the simultaneous increase in conflict. Whole
states require systemic rules to be functional.
Technique: Therapists should encourage implicit commonalities of problems,
predicaments or attitudes to be articulated. Naming extends communication,
helping form the collective conscience. Pleasure in whole structure needs
containment with common rules to help members temper the arousal of
associating.
Common life animates, warms, humanizes and destroys egotisms (Durkheim,

1954). Communication can be thought of as generating warmth in social organisms, like
metabolic activity in the body. Whole interactions generate friction; inadequate
homeostatic mechanisms lead to excess warmth (fever) expressed as social tension.
Unregulated affective energy becomes conflict, but it is therapeutic to belong and
experience the rewards of being subject to rules. Three technical principles follow.
Technique: (1) Therapy is constituting the group, bringing members under a consensual
system of rules. (2) Members must accept the coercion of group rules to get what
they want. (3) Limits are essential to restrict excess warmth when groups cannot
regulate themselves.
Division of labour resolves the tension between self-sufficiency and belonging by

differentiating members’ contribution to group life, instead of normative prejudices
producing power struggles or rejection. In mechanical solidarity, similarities unite into
collective representations. Contradictory representations weaken each other, similar
representations reinforce each other; this is whole structure, normative, concord. Organic
solidarity places differences within higher order similarities integrated by rules, common
values and purposes, expressed as whole, representational accord. Oscillating repetition
of activities is essential to creating solidarity (Durkheim, 1964; Small, 1905) and integral
to communicational integrity.
Technique: Repetition of different human endeavours is essential to group-building.
Therapists must avoid pre-conceived ideas of what the group should do to
constitute itself.
356
Organic solidarity incorporates rule-governed relationships, such as games and
rests on symbolic relationships rather than images, emotionally charged norms and
associations. Repressive laws are associated with mechanical solidarity and restitutive
laws with organic solidarity (Durkheim, 1964; Lukes and Scull, 1983). Rules determine
how restitution is made for problems, ensuring fairness. Restitutive rules can be
generative and constitutive (Harré and Lamb, 1984; see Chapter 12). They are
homeostatic mechanisms influencing future action in relation to the past, regulating
affects, determining whether something is fair and how to correct it. Their symbolic
status denotes when actions violate them (Anzieu, 1984). Repressive rules are systemic,
but restitutive rules are representational, reflecting group values and goals. Their effect is
expressed by the efficacy of Group and Member Interventions, linking members’ actions
to the group.
Technique: Restitutive rules do not prescribe consequences for infringements, but show
their effects and how to rectify them. They are more important than setting limits
to antisocial behaviour, since they create the possibility for group cognition.
Mechanical solidarity is inherently possessive, promoting dependency, coercing

participants to sameness and threatening individuality (Durkheim, 1964). Individuality is
sustained by participation in mutually recognised relationships (Mead, 1962) and conflict
is healthy when individuality is undervalued. Organic solidarity coerces members to be
useful, differentiated organs of group purpose. The therapeutic relationship is “belonging
to,” as opposed to “being owned by” the group. Belonging implies a useful function,
valid role and acknowledged position. Members are needed by the group as much as
needing it. In organic solidarity, members and their roles form a system. They are
needed and valued as organs with differentiated roles serving group purposes. The
dynamic of mechanical and organic solidarity is of difference and similarity. In the GFR,
conflict may disrupt normative concord in mechanical solidarity, allowing differentiation
into subgroups and facilitating experiences of belonging and having a valued role. The
group’s inexperience may mean enjoyment of collective life enhances sense of self,
leading again rhythmically to power struggles, coercion and mechanical solidarity.
Technique: Therapists need to name the coercion to be similar or conform to norms in
mechanical solidarity. Movement towards organic solidarity is by articulating
logical consequences of group tendencies and members’ 357
complementary functions. Dynamics of similarities and differences allow
members to find complementary functions. The therapeutic goal is for everyone’s
contribution to be valued in whole structure.
Cooperation creates mutual involvement and morality (Durkheim, 1964),

extending systemic organization beyond pragmatic rules into abstract guidelines about
future actions. Division of labour and differentiation are necessary for attachment, but
integrative forces hold society together (Durkheim, 1964). Differences co-exist by
dividing the unity of similarities, as shown by the GFR’s developmental phases. In the
Engagement phase, members find commonalities and consolidate belonging around
sameness. Differentiation begins in Positioning and is repeated often to form complex
social units. Differences are integrated by repetition and rhythm. Cyclical movement
between mechanical and organic solidarity organizes groups with complexity in
Consolidation. However, Idealization and Disenchantment express the breakdown of
similarities before a more stable organic solidarity is established in Working.
Differentiation happens when individuals associate through cooperation (Durkheim,
1964). Rhythms of cooperation and conflict reflect the coercion to be like something and
have a unique role in organic and mechanical solidarity. Cooperation is essential to
division of labour, since all members are needed to serve a purpose.
Technique: Rhythms between cooperation and conflict must be seen not just as
interpersonal, intrapsychic tensions, but oscillations between simple and complex
forms of organization as the group becomes an organic rather than mechanical
entity.
Social facts are distinct from individual manifestations (Durkheim, 1966). Group
phenomena do not occur because they are general, but they are entailed by membership,
as group functions repeated in the individual, because they are in the whole. They are
strengthened by repetition, but only in their totality in the whole group; the strength is not
common, but collective in the group. Arbitrary norms become social facts. Events early
in the history of groups such as aggressive outbursts or loss of members are coercive and
have enduring effects. Anti-therapeutic norms develop easily such as leaving the room or
absenteeism, need to be changed by persistent, repeated interventions (Bion, 358
1961). Common patterns link the past to current sessions.
Technique: Once tendencies are incorporated into the group as collective phenomena,
they are only changed by persistent, repeated interventions by therapists.
Articulating what is common to members individually and collective group
structures distinguishes collective characteristics from individual manifestations.
It helps groups develop collective self-representations allowing members to
express themselves.
The categories and framework of thinking come from organized group action and
rituals; collective representations form from rhythmic cooperation (Durkheim, 1956).
Action unites members, imposing common structures on experience, taking members out
of their “egocentrism” into a common communicative world. Relations between
members, actions and group events are common as are ideas and general relations
(Durkheim, 1956) and make communication possible. They are lawful (systemic),
providing a framework for thinking, because all members are involved rather than their
content or type of order. Normality is being in collective forms of thought, emotion and
action (Durkheim, 1956); the group provides a microcosm for experiencing normality
(Burrow, 1953).
Technique: Therapists do not need to work for a specific order or set of rules; any
effective rules will further the therapeutic goal and create the experience of
normality.
The common frame of thought, sentiment and action is incorporated through

collective effervescence (Durkheim, 1956) where members think, feel and act together
because they enjoy it. The GFR expresses pleasure as common connection in Joy or
Interest. Affect consolidates individuals’ incorporation into collective processes.
Rhythms of affect reflect differing degrees of involvement. Affect must creatively bind
members, but not overwhelm them.
Technique: Members must enjoy the group to attach to and be affected by it. Pleasurable
moments must be recognised for their binding function; even when joy is
disruptive, it binds members more intimately to the group. Groups need to learn
to manage pleasure.
359
Group Psychotherapy.
The GFR defines communication as an observational field, developing a theory of
communication for psychotherapy. There is no clear demarcation between intra-psychic
and group functions (Foulkes, 1948, 1990); communicational phenomena are both.
“Work in communication is the operational basis of all therapy in the group” (Foulkes and
Anthony, 1965, p. 28). Group consciousness is what can be voiced, group
unconsciousness what cannot (Foulkes, 1964). The communicational system is the
medium for shared consciousness.
Technique: Communication is the medium of therapeutic action; promotion to
communication is the precondition to therapeutic action. Naming and verbal
articulation are preconditions to other interventions. Promoting action into
communication changes groups’ and members’ consciousness.
The subject is a node in a communication network (Cooley, 1909; Mead, 1962;

Durkheim, 1964; Burrow, 1927b; Foulkes, 1964). Bringing members into
communication is identity forming. The fact of communication rather than the content is
therapeutic, provided it is relevant, meaningful and affectively significant. The GFR’s
analysis of communication properties rather than content is a tool to observe this.
Foulkes’ (1990) foundation matrix shows individuals do not externalise separate inner
experiences, they are interpenetrated by social phenomena. “What is outside is always
inside” (Ahlin, 1985, p. 113). Work on group process is work on intrapsychic process.
Technique: Confronting personal experience presupposes the capacity for communication
and incorporation in a social structure. Members who cannot yet do so are
supported by a group. The effectiveness of Group and Member Interventions
indicates the importance of relating the member to the group.
Unconscious group mentality obscures individuality; incorporating members into

stereotypic structures like crowds, does not help individual problems. Talking about these
processes disbands them by making them conscious and promotes representational
cognitive function. The GFR demonstrates these forces oscillate with functional states
and must be managed in cycles inherent to group function. Integration does not come
through cognitive insight, emotional release or action until the cognitive infrastructure for
insight, regulation of emotion and cooperation develop. Until then, integration 360
occurs by oscillation between all possibilities in overlapping rhythms in the social
communicative medium. Instability is contained by “inert material” not involved in
group states, formed by therapists, intervals between sessions or members’ involvement
in other groups and activities (Bion, 1961). Subgrouping, changing activity, therapist
intervention, interval between sessions or other social involvements accumulate inert
material. Interventions’ effects often only evident become or tendencies are rectified
later in sessions or in following sessions rather than at the time (Bion, 1961), as described
by the GFR’s peaks and troughs.
Technique: The full effect of interventions often occurs later or between sessions.
Therapists should wait till the following session before judging crises and
interventions.
Integration of Themes.
The GFR defines observable group phenomena constituting an order distinct from
individual behaviour. It emphasises thinking in the whole system (Sighele, 1891; Mead,
1962), and group cognition as organization of action rather than “internal” processing of
mental representations. Groups have no internal space in which this processing happens,
they “think with their limbs.” Group mentality exists in action; thinking occurs in the act
of communication.
Technique: Therapy should focus on talking about the meaning of what is said and done
as enacted cognitive process rather than members’ internal mental representations.
Affects are organized energy states where the group takes hold of members.
Pleasure is essential for organicity and binds members symbiotically into the group,
(Gordon, 1989b, 1991) but to become creative requires regulation of affect. If social
experience is not enjoyable, socialization is distorted. However, it requires social
competence to manage emotional arousal in groups. In the GFR, regulating unstable
affect in whole structure allows members to participate in collective mentality.
Sentiments translate directly into action when there is insufficient cognitive organization;
but adaptation of common or compatible goals occurs through organization of
communication, as does reconciliation of incompatible goals. Otherwise group action is
impossible and the group is damaged.
Technique: Therapists must articulate how members’ goals relate to each 361
other and the group and show how they share fundamental goals like pleasure in
being together and getting well as the basis of reconciliation.
Conclusion.
The GFR allows these concepts to be operationalised into observational terms in
the group context and made available for developing theoretical strategies and guidelines
in therapeutic technique.
26. DISCUSSION 5: CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH. 362
This study submits group psychotherapy based on the group entity approach to
an empirical examination describing and testing hypotheses about processes. Some
conclusions and suggestions for further research can be drawn from it.
Theory.
Part I showed how the heritage of group entity theory lost currency against
ideological threats of the twentieth century (Allport, 1954). Except for Burrow (1927b,
1956), most theory is philosophical or sociological and lacks applicability to practical
social situations. The most important issue in the twentieth century has been protection
of individuality (Jordan, 1927; O’Neill, 1973), which was seen as threatened by group
entity theories (Ginsberg, 1956, 1960). Psychoanalysis and other individualistic
theories gained precedence, even in sociology (Ginsberg, 1961) and succeeded in
theorizing contemporary issues. Social theory moved from exploring the nature of
social life and individuality towards social interaction (Mills, 1967) and empirical issues
(Collins, 1985). In the twenty-first century the survival questions are protecting
individuality, but also integrating individuals into groups, groups into societies and
societies into global community (Matustik, 1993).
The social organism, crowd mind, social mind and social being theories have
much to offer to these questions; the relevance of their conclusions to empirical findings
was discussed in Chapter 25. A gap remains between these theories and the dominant
individualistic paradigm, although contemporary group entity theories in social
psychology (Sandelands and Stablein, 1987; Sandelands and St. Clair, 1993) and group
psychotherapy (Foulkes, 1990; Brown and Zinkin, 1994; Brown, 1996; Dalal, 1998) lie
between them. Theoretical work is required to apply group entity theory to the small
group situations it claims are central to communal life and individuality (Cooley, 1909;
McDougall, 1920; Mead, 1962; Durkheim, 1964). Their therapeutic potential needs to
complement individualistic theories (Ettin, 1999).
In Chapter 9, an integrative theory of the collective mind proposed the term nous
to refer to the inherently collective part of mentality. The difficulty with this notion for
the present study is its philosophical formulation. While the philosophical and
epistemological task of defining a field of collective mental phenomena precedes its
scientific investigation (Toulmin, 1972; Harré and Secord, 1972), the 363
concept remains theoretical. However it can become a clinical heuristic in individual
and group therapy (Gordon, 2000). Personal and collective mentality needs clearer
differentiation and a theory of their developmental relationship is required. This study
is a starting point for these tasks.
The GFR.
The GFR’s central concept is social communication. While continually
emphasized in group entity theories, communication is rarely defined with precision.
The conceptualizations of Social Communication Theory (Sigman, 1987) define
communication with sufficient clarity to do justice to the complexity of group
phenomena. Observable criteria for communication in Structure are only a beginning.
Although its reliability is high, more can be done to describe this field of
communication. Empirical studies of interpersonal communication (Duncan and Fiske,
1977; Siegman and Feldstein, 1979; Tronik, 1982; Goody, 1995) need to be reviewed to
give greater rigor to the GFR.
The theoretical base for other dimensions and categories were not derived from
group entity theories, which were too general. They were conceptualized to preserve
continuity between dimensions of individual psychic function and collective mentality
(cognition, affect and action), since group entity theories argue for common psychic
content in groups and individuals (McDougall, 1920; Durkheim, 1964). The GFR
dimensions were specified by analyzing essential characteristics of cognition, affect and
action and conceptualizing them in collective communication. The theory could be seen
as an eclectic collection of convenient constructs and the GFR merely an observational
tool. More rigorously establishing the theoretical dimensions may prove them more
than an observational framework. A set of concepts describing group functions relevant
to fundamental psychological constructs is needed to establish a group entity field of
investigation. Without this, the group entity will not be integrated with individualistic
psychology, will lack relevance and disappear again. Further theoretical work is needed
to establish group function dimensions to be operationalised in observable
communicational phenomena.
To increase the GFR’s power, low frequency combinations need to be collated
into more balanced states. However, too few categories may obscure some
relationships. Only 180 of 384 possible combinations of categories 364
occurred, none above 10% frequency. To reduce the possibilities in Structure, Whole
and Subgroups/Individuals provided sufficient differentiation as Structure #2; in Affect,
Contentment and Boredom were combined with Interest and Discontent with little loss
as Affect #2, reducing possible combinations to 128. Remaining low frequency states
(Representational, Distress, Concord and Contracord) are all important. Further
reducing the number of states must be balanced with retaining sensitivity to infrequent,
but influential states. To determine whether the low frequencies for some categories
depend on these groups or the GFR, other groups must be rated.
Combining categories into nine Condensed States reduced complexity.
However, some important states were obscured; the crowd state (see Chapter 25) needs
to be extracted as a separate state from Sociable (51% of states), since movement
between crowd and more organized states may be as important as achieving Functional
states (Slater, 1966; Kissen, 1976a, 1976c; Bennis, 1976; Gordon, 1985). Productive
Turmoil (1.9%) could be combined with Dysfunctional (7.3%) with little loss. A
limitation of the GFR is that ratings are made from different portions of the minute.
Cognitive Organization and Action Coherence ratings are made from thirty seconds, but
Structure and Affect from fifteen seconds, because thirty seconds proved too long for
reliability. Findings could reflect time sampling differences of 50% for Cognitive
Organization and Action Coherence and 25% for Structure and Affect. Ratings may
also be made from different portions of the minute and not be simultaneous
observations. In these groups, much happens in a minute and it can be asked how the
rated portion of the group’s functioning relates to that not rated.
Consistent application of rating criteria should ensure important phenomena
within the minute are recorded (see GFR Rater’s Instructions in Appendix 2). This
could be tested by comparing a sample of sessions rated every thirty seconds and each
minute. Cognitive Organization and Action Coherence would be rated in fifteen-second
criteria, consistent with Structure and Affect.
The variability of time criteria may explain why some reported relationships
represent small changes in proportions. Shorter time sample ratings may strengthen
these trends by increasing the frequency of instances. More sensitive ratings seem
unlikely to change some persistent features (for example, rhythmic oscillations).
However, in examining relations such as between affect change and action, it may be
possible to demonstrate the clinical impression that action change precedes 365
affect change.
Another problem is the GFR’s specialization for socially dysfunctional boys.
Although these groups pose questions about fundamentals of social interaction and
group formation, they did not develop sophisticated group function. The GFR is
designed to record fundamentals, but lacks sensitivity for adults talking about their
problems. It must be adapted for other social situations. Criteria for rating categories
need to be re-defined for groups restricted to conceptual, verbal communication. This
could all be considered “re-calibrating” the instrument and may require other categories
to differentiate functional states.
Structure may require differentiating degrees of involvement in whole group
communication rather than only its interruption (Fuhriman and Burlingame, 2000). In
Cognitive Organization, Unorganized may describe ideas not following in logical
sequence. Normative may describe sequential conversation lacking conclusions.
Systemic may describe logical conversation progressing toward a goal, and
Representational reserved for psychological interpretations rather than mere reference to
self of group. It could be analyzed into talk with different degrees of therapeutic value,
such as conversation where anecdotes dominate from analysis, self-recognition or
insight (Simon and Agazarian, 2000). In Affect, people with more highly differentiated
emotional lives may require the pleasure/unpleasure distinction to be differentiated
qualitatively rather than in terms of stability and quantity (Karterud, 2000). It may be
necessary to differentiate socially structured emotional states, such as group climate
(Ahlin, 1996) rather than simple energy categories. Action Coherence categories can be
re-defined in terms of degrees of cooperation, difference or antagonism in conversation
(Benjamin, 1999). Distinctions within Discord between constructive debate and
defensive disagreement may be required. Cooperative conversation about daily events
in Accord may need to be distinguished from coordinated contributions attempting to
find common aspects of different experiences. Therapists Intervention dimensions
including both object of the intervention (as categorized) and type of intervention would
clarify their effects.
The GFR could also be modified to evaluate committee meetings, social groups,
informal peer groups, school classes, educational groups, team meetings or other work
groups; structured, time-limited therapy groups could be compared with long-term
groups. Despite its limitations, the GFR has proved itself by answering 366
some questions, revealing phenomena and raising new questions that could not have
been asked before.
Group Development.
The identification of discrete developmental phases is significant, but only an
initial indication. Theoretical and empirical research is needed to demonstrate group
entities’ developmental processes more rigorously. Stages by which collective
mentality emerges need to be researched, their communicational requirements
understood and techniques for facilitating them identified. Are phases discrete periods
in which developmental processes need to unfold, or group-constituting processes
integrating members into organic units? If the latter is true, they may not be restricted
to episodes. The relative uniformity of phases may be a product of the groups’
uniformity. Although developmental functions were recognized by examining discrete
phases, once defined, they might be freed from the sequence and seen as group-forming
processes to be sought in the content instead. A phenomenological account of group
activity constituting functions of Convening, Engagement, Positioning, Consolidation,
Idealization, Disenchantment, Working and Separation is needed, then sought in other
situations. Theoretical work may enable more precise mapping of group conditions to
identify therapeutic or counter-therapeutic states (Lewis et al., 2000). This would also
allow more sensitive consideration of interventions promoting these processes. The
generality of developmental phases and rhythmicity also needs to be established with
other groups.
Content analysis of sessions in each phase is needed to relate them to
hypothesized processes, but may need interpretation since they are unlikely to
demonstrate issues overtly. Questions to be addressed are: What typical Engagement
phenomena constitute the group? How do they compare with Consolidation phenomena?
What are session themes of Idealization Functional peaks and Disenchantment troughs?
What are themes of peaks and troughs of stability and quality in Working?
Characteristics of interpersonal process in peak and trough sessions and the role of rhythm
in successful outcome are important to understand collective development. Interpersonal
interaction may need examination in relation to themes of developmental stages and
group the entity’s process (Davis, Budman and Soldz, 2000). Content analysis may show
how interpersonal themes serve the group entity’s development, since it is 367
expressed in the totality of interpersonal phenomena oriented towards a goal of
entitativity. Phenomena at the boundaries between developmental phases and whether it
is possible to detect qualitative and content differences in sessions need to be examined
(Lewis et al., 2000). Whether they are phases or processes, forming a conceptual frame
for their interpretation is important.
Hypotheses.
Some hypotheses may benefit from re-formulation and re-testing. The
association between Therapists Interventions and processes identified in Dynamics
needs investigation. Interactions in the minute or two before various changes could be
analyzed and compared with the content of successful and unsuccessful interventions.
Size may be the most important factor for those patients whose treatment is
unsuccessful or have difficulty remaining in groups and needs further investigation as a
therapeutic dimension to be matched to patients’ needs (Ettin, 1999). Psychological
work happens at a price of group function (illustrated by the turbulence of the Working
phase); the goal of forming self-maintaining groups needs to be balanced against their
psychological function. The therapeutic value of self-maintaining groups compared to
psychologically oriented process needs clarification, perhaps with comparative studies.
Patients may be more suited to either group-forming or psychologically oriented
treatments (Gordon, 1997; Malekoff, 1997). Alternatively, these aspects may dominate
different phases of the same group’s life. Structure and action dimensions were most
sensitive to affective tension (unpleasure) and responsible for instability. Clearer
conceptualization of interventions for managing communicational structure and action
in the group and members is required. Better understanding of psychosocial processes
constituting homeostatic mechanisms governing rhythms will enable therapists to
coordinate with them. More sensitive GFR ratings can investigate affective and action
change to provide better understanding of group crises and their management. Molar
effects may camouflage powerful or ineffectual therapists’ interventions; they may be
clarified by examining session content when identified phenomena occur and provide
indications for therapeutic technique.
368
Conclusion.
The study’s findings result from operationalising an unfashionable collective
mentality paradigm. While intra-psychic and interpersonal views complement this view,
the GFR takes up the challenge for theoretical advances to guide empirical work (Bednar
and Moeschel, 1981, Steiner, 1986). The observational technique assumes the validity of
submitting the social mentality thesis to scientific investigation. Its results affirm the
group entity hypothesis’ value as a heuristic for group psychotherapy of children and
adolescents. It can be applied to other populations, techniques and domains of social
activity. If observed appropriately, groups - even of disorganized adolescents –
demonstrate order and rhythmicity not evident in the complex phenomenological
experience of therapists. This study is a beginning at constituting structural dimensions
for observing the collective reality of human existence and understanding its therapeutic
power.
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APPENDIX 1. 415
Changing Definitions of the word “group.”
The following definitions show the transition of the meaning of group over the
years:
“A cluster, crowd or throng; an assemblage, either of persons or things; an
assemblage of figures or objects in a certain order or relation, or having some
resemblance or common characteristic, in painting or sculpture” (Library Dictionary
of the English Language, 1872).
“A number of persons or things standing near together, knot, cluster; a number of
persons or things belonging or classed together or forming a whole” (Concise
Oxford Dictionary, 1964).
“A collection or assemblage of persons or things considered as a unit;
aggregation, cluster. A number of persons or things having in common certain
characteristics, interests etc.,” (Funk and Wagnall's Dictionary, 1980).
The Groups.
A brief synopsis of the groups, their members and progress in the course of
treatment is provided. All names and certain identifying details have been changed to
protect confidentiality.
Adolescent Group, 1988. One of the five members had been in a previous group.
All 33 sessions were recorded. Members finished at sessions 17 (Mick) and 30 (Sid).
Their problems were:
Bill: Social isolation, aggressive behaviour, school refusal.
Dom: Epilepsy and social problems.
Sid: Behaviour problems.
Peter: Anxiety, previous history of psychosis, school refusal.
Mick: Anxiety, school refusal, aggressive behaviour.
Sid dominated the group for the first half of the year, organising card games.
Conflict escalated when Mick and Dom challenged his leadership. Bill and Peter were
submissive. Mick had difficulty joining in and kept bringing sexual themes and conflict
to the group. After he left, the group was more unified and talked about problems. When
Sid left in November, the remaining three spent whole sessions talking about 416
themselves and their problems.
Mick’s mother brought him to the group each week from a country town 3 hours’
drive from the city, because of his aggression at home and school refusal. However, by
mid year his behaviour had improved. He had recommenced at school and she no longer
felt his condition warranted the weekly trip. Sid’s behaviour also improved although
there were several crises during the year. He left when his family moved to the country.
His mother was pleased with his progress and said his behavior problems at home had
subsided. He had abandoned his attempts to control the group with card games and
participated fully in the conversations. Bill, Dom and Peter became steadily more
involved with each other during the year and spent the last few months together
discussing a wide range of personal and adolescent life issues. Bill arranged to start at
school the following year. Peter gained greater confidence and in the following year
started at a technical college. Dom’s epilepsy continued to give him difficulties, but he
became more socially adept, made friends at school and was happier. Bill and Dom
continued in the group in the following year.
Adolescent Group, 1992. The group began with six members, three of whom
were in the previous year’s group. Members left at sessions 4 (Jack) and 14 (Brad).
New members started on sessions 19 (Ned) and 23 (Eddie). There were 38 sessions; 11
were not recorded. Members’ problems were:
Brad: Genetic syndrome, behaviour problems.
Ben: Genetic syndrome, mild intellectual disability, aggressive behaviour,
social problems.
Phil: Genetic syndrome, mild intellectual disability, behavior and social
problems.
Jack: Behavior problems.
Jim: Behavior problems.
Ernie: Emotional and behavior problems, sexual behavior problems.
Ned: Juvenile offender, behavior problems.
Eddie: Behavior problems, depression, peer relationship problems.
Ernie talked and joked incessantly avoiding problems and dominated this group.
The dynamics of membership were played out in war games led by Ernie for 417
much of the year. Some members wanted to discuss problems, but Ernie tended to
derail conversations. Ned’s arrival in May unified the group and reduced Ernie’s power
and Eddie contributed further to this. The group cared for the two intellectually
disabled boys (Ben and Phil). Towards the end of the year school problems were
discussed.
By the end of the year, Ernie had become less extreme and avoidant, although he
was still reluctant to communicate about his feelings. Brad had been in the group the
previous year and left at session 14 when his parents moved to the country. His
behaviour had improved and he was attending school regularly. Ben’s conflict with
peers at school diminished and Phil’s uncontrolled eating and other behaviour problems
also diminished. Ben and Phil were reluctant to engage with the others at the start of the
year and tended to play together separately. By the end of the year, they were included
and participated in the conversation.
Jack’s family situation was very disturbed and he had no support to attend the
group. He stopped after the 4th session. Jim was a depressed, isolated boy who was
constantly teased by peers. In the group he took every opportunity to talk about his
problems and family difficulties. Ned had charges pending for car stealing and other
offences. He was isolated and his peer contacts were restricted to exploitative
relationships with other offenders. During the group, he was protective of Ben and Phil
and enjoyed the interaction and games with the others. However, he often engaged in
hostile, belligerent talk designed to provoke the therapists. During the year, he became
more cooperative and seemed more willing to acknowledge his personal problems.
Eddie changed noticeably through the year. While at first tentative and detached, he
soon relaxed and joined the games, laughing and enjoying the activity. He began to
discuss some of his personal and family problems and this occasionally put him out of
step with others. He took every opportunity to talk, although he was not very articulate.
By the end of the year, he no longer had problems at school and was much happier. He
continued the following year.
Adolescent Group, 1993. The six initial members were from the previous group.
New members commenced at sessions 5 (Jay), 11 (Jake) and 27 (Aron). Brad returned
at session 18. Ben ended on session 29. Several members had prolonged absences.
There were 30 sessions; 12 were not recorded. Members from the previous 418
year were: Brad, Ben, Phil, Ernie, Ned and Eddie. Other members’ problems were:
Jake: Antisocial and aggressive behaviour problems.
Andy: Behaviour problems.
Jay: Anxiety disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, school refusal.
Ned attended from juvenile detention, was hostile, antagonistic and motivated by
getting the time out of custody. Unlike the previous year, he was belligerent, attacked
the intellectually disabled boys and was generally hostile, provocative and conflictual.
In the first half of the year Ernie continued to instigate war games as he had the
previous year. Ben and Phil were out of their depth in the increasingly conflictual group
with reduced support. Ben’s behaviour deteriorated at school with increased fighting
and defiance towards teachers, while Phil became more reserved. The decision was
taken to finish Ben’s time in the group at session 29 since he was beginning to lose the
achievements he had gained.
Jake and Andy commenced during the year. They were highly conflictual,
denigrated the other members and said they did not want to attend. Jake did not persist
with the group, while Andy finished the year. Jay joined late in the year, having been in
the 1990 Latency group three years earlier. When he entered secondary school, his
behaviour had deteriorated, he became more anxious and was unable to attend. In the
group, he was active and disruptive, tending to incite conflict. However, his anxiety
reduced by the end of the year. Eddie attended less regularly in the last term and
seemed frustrated that the rest of the group was not able to talk about themselves.
However, he continued to manage well at home and at school.
Towards the end of the year there was more conversation by group members
about themselves. This group was not as successful as the previous year, largely
because of Ned’s disruptive attitudes.
Adolescent Group, 1996. Three members had been in the group the previous
year. Brad had also been in the 1992 and 1993 groups. There were 35 sessions; 19
were not recorded. New members commenced at sessions 4 and 29. In addition to
Brad, there were:
Bert: Socially withdrawn, mild intellectual disability.
Sam: Depression, bereavement, social isolation. 419
Geoff: Social withdrawal, behaviour problems.
Tony: Anxiety disorder, social withdrawal.
Brad rejoined the group the previous year on a magistrate’s order following
involvement in a burglary incited by peers. His parents had returned to the city and he
was attending a technical college. During the group he turned 18, making him
significantly older that the others; his behaviour stabilised, he established a relationship
and went to live with his girlfriend’s family. He demonstrated insight into his problems
and a decision to manage his life appropriately. Bert was highly restricted when first
joining the group, but in the course of the year, he became more confident, joined the
games and talked about himself. His mother reported considerable improvement and he
began attending school; he continued in the group the following year. Sam had been in
the group the previous year. He suffered from depression following the death of his
mother and had been very isolated and bullied at school; in the group, he interacted
sporadically. During the year, he became more outgoing and began to enjoy himself,
taking a dominating role in organising activities and talking readily about various events
in his life. He began to make friends at school.
Geoff joined at the 4th session and was isolated and passive. By the end of the
year, however, he was engaging actively in the sessions and interacting with the other
members. His parents reported improvement at home and school. Tony was fearful and
restricted in his interactions and refused active participation for the first half of his time in
the group (he joined at session 19). Towards the end of the year, he began to interact,
participate in games and joke with the other members. His parents reported great
improvement in his participation in the family and his anxiety decreased. All except Brad
and Geoff continued in the group the following year.
Stable card games occupied most of the sessions. They were usually started by
Brad, who functioned as an auxiliary therapist, keeping order and interpreting the others’
behavior like a good-natured older brother. They talked about their lives during the
games and reluctant members gradually joined in. It showed maturity attributable to the
second year of stable groups.
Latency Group, 1990. This group consisted of six boys, although two stopped at
sessions 11 (Isi) and 17 (Len) and two started at session 18, (Tim and Jay). 420
None had been in groups before. There were 31 sessions; 6 were not recorded.
Isi: Chronic medical condition, social problems.
Len: Social withdrawal, behaviour problems.
Shaun: Behaviour problems.
Ken: Physical handicap, anxiety disorder, mild intellectual disability.
Bob: Behaviour problems.
Don: Anxiety, social problems.
Tim: Social problems
Jay: Behaviour problems, anxiety disorder (subsequently in the 1993 group).
Members tended to play in subgroups. In early sessions, Isi was self-centered,

controlling and created conflict. He was referred for social difficulties and lack of
cooperation at home. He did not want to attend the group and constantly rejected the
therapists’ attempts to show him the consequences of his behaviour. Finally he insisted
to his mother than he no longer attend and terminated at session 11.
After Isi’s departure, the group unified; then subgroups rivaled for dominance
and tested the therapists by leaving the room. Ken was the scapegoat and his behavior
invited rejection. However, by the end of the year he had become more aware of this
tendency and was better able to participate in games with the others. Jay started on
session 18 and encouraged the scapegoating. Over the year, Ken’s behaviour modified,
but then aggressiveness increased again towards the end of the year encouraged by Jay.
However, the members were more able to communicate experiences and began to talk
about their families. The other members all demonstrated varying degrees of
improvement in their presenting problems in spite of the general rebelliousness that
developed at the end. The best level of functioning of this group was at the end of Term
3. The final term produced deterioration in the group’s function and increased
rebelliousness towards the therapists.
The Validity of the GFR.

The GFR was developed as an instrument to structure a field of observation,
which previous instruments did not conceptualize (Beck and Lewis, 2000). Although
the validity of the GFR has not been established, a number of considerations indicate
how this might be done. 421
The concept of validity is normally applied to psychological tests and other
techniques to denote the degree to which they measure what they claim to measure
(Gregory, 1996; Aiken, 2000) and to research methods to show the results are due to the
factors attributed to them by the investigation (Shaunessy and Zechmeister, 1997).
Three aspects of validity will be discussed in relation to this study. First, the validity of
the GFR as an instrument is considered; second, the validity of the methodology of the
study in which the GFR is used is discussed and finally, their functional validity
(Gregory, 1996).
Particular problems of the GFR.

Some specific characteristics of the GFR need to be mentioned before
considering validity. As an observational instrument, the GFR is not a test or “measure”
of group process, but describes group functionality; it yields descriptive rather than
quantitative data by defining observational dimensions and categories that allow whole
groups to be observed. It is more than a “system for analyzing change” in groups (Beck
and Lewis, 2000), since its dimensions define the field of observation that the categories
“measure” or rather record. Its validity depends on whether it is justified to describe the
group-as-a-whole without discriminating individual interactions and whether the
dimensions and their categories provide a valid description of the group. Perhaps the
validity will only develop when the method provides new approaches to problems of
group function that have been comparatively dormant following research in group
dynamics (McCollum, 1995), since validity develops throughout the life of a technique
according to its use (Anastasi, 1986, quoted in Gregory, 1996).
The GFR’s group-entity focus makes it is not directly comparable with other
instruments developed or adapted for group psychotherapy (Ahlin, 1996; Beck and
Lewis, 2000) or other group contexts (Davis, 1977; Forsyth, 1990), since they record
interpersonal interaction between nominated members. The GFR records conditions of
the group’s communicational field. However, like some instruments, GFR dimensions
yield qualitative categories ranked in ordinal scales of their hypothetically therapeutic
value instead of quantitative measures.
Instruments for recording group processes have generally not established
adequate convergent or discriminant validity and are criticised for paying insufficient
attention to “the preliminary scientific steps of observation and 422
measurement;” they show “lack of articulation in conceptualization” and “vagueness
and ambiguity about the theoretical concepts” (Greene, 2000, p. 38 and p. 39). Methods
for establishing validity in group instruments include normative studies comparing
different populations (Fuhriman and Burlingame, 2000), differentiating persisting
members from drop-outs (Chambon, Tsang and Marziali, 2000), untrained observers
comparing ratings of items’ face validity with other measures (Simon and Agazarian,
2000) and factor analyses of data (Benjamin, 2000). The GFR has defined the
communicational field and its phenomena to articulate theoretical concepts upon which
it is based and form unambiguous definitions of categories. Its success will depend on
the findings’ repeatability and application to other contexts.
Instrumental Validity of the GFR.

This form of validity is applied to psychological tests to ensure they measure
what they claim to. In the GFR, instrumental validity refers to whether it actually
records the collective states. The main types of instrumental validity are content,
criterion-related and construct validity. These are discussed in turn.
Content Validity.
Content validity refers to how adequately the domain to be measured by a test
is represented in its items (Gregory, 1996). For the GFR, this means how adequately
the definition of communication covers the domain of social communication and how
adequate the Dimensions and their categories are to define group functions.
The validity of the conception of communication needs to be considered. The
GFR bases its observations on the fact of communication rather than its content (Simon
and Agazarian, 2000), context (Davis, 1977), purpose or direction (Ahlin, 1996). While
other techniques, document interpersonal “interaction” (Bales, 1980; Fuhriman and
Burlingame, 200; Kelly, 2000), the GFR regards this as a derivative of communication.
The description of communication adopted is that of Social Communication Theory
(Sigman, 1987, see chapter 10). Validation of such a broad definition of
communication and its presence or absence needs to be conducted by critically
analyzing other conceptions of communication and comparing their definitions of
communicative phenomena with those adopted. One approach would be to ask naïve
observers to judge the presence or absences of communication between 423
members from selected video segments and compare this with ratings defined by the
GFR. This could be augmented by replication studies and by applying the GFR to other
types of group.
The content validity of the dimensions and categories depends on how
adequately they represent the possible range of functional states within the dimensions.
The GFR assumes the existing categories cover possible states on each dimension for
adolescent groups. It is possible other types of groups may spend most of their time
within one or two states as presently defined. For example, a group of articulate adults
may remain in Functional Condensed state much of the time as they spend the sessions
discussing their problems. This requires the validity of the present categories to be
linked to the type of group and may mean that they would need to be re-structured to
provide sensitivity to the functional states relevant for the group to be observed (see
Chapter 26). Such requirements could be defined in relation to the therapeutic goals of
the group concerned. Some comments about each dimension are provided below.
Structure: The dimension of Structure will be validated by the existence of
communication since it documents the existence and extent of communication within
the group.
Cognitive Organization: This dimension is based on the notion that
communication is the fundamental context for the development of mind itself
(Durkheim, 1954; Mead, 1962; Burrow, 1927b; Foulkes, 1974; Flick, 1998) and the
dimensions are those of functional mind itself. Their validity rests on their relationship
with the relevant domains of social science – cognition, affect and action. However,
since the functionality of the mental dimensions is the object of observation rather than
their content, the definition of the dimensions is rudimentary compared to their
complex, sophisticated description in psychology, whose main concerns are with
content and processes rather than their existence. This is shown by the lack of
definition of cognition itself in texts describing its structures and functions (Newall,
1990; Posner, 1991). It is defined in a philosophical context (Gregory, 1987;
Honderich, 1995). Whereas “cognitive science” is the blanket term subsuming
cognitive phenomena in much contemporary thought (Posner, 1991; von Eckardt, 1993;
Audi, 1999), the GFR is intended to detect the emergence of cognitive capability within
the communicational field and so categories intend to differentiate states describing the
functional capacity of groups to undertake their therapeutic task. The 424
categories are defined from a review of theories of cognition to describe degrees of
organization (see Chapter 12). To validate them, independent examinations of the
fundamental organization of cognition would be required and they would then need to
be operationalised for the group situation.
Affect: The categories for Affect are derived from a review of emotion theory and
are intended to define fundamental aspects of affective quality applicable to groups.
Since they are affective properties of communication, they define the range of possible
states of hedonic quality and quantity. The same problem exists as for cognition, that the
literature concentrates on the content of affective states rather than their fundamental
character (Tomkins, 1961; Stein, 1991; Fridja, 1993). Content validation would require
independent analysis of the manifestations, interpreting them for the group
communicational context and then determining if they are encompassed by GFR
categories.
Action Coherence: The dimension of Action Coherence describes properties of
the field of group communication pertaining to cooperation or conflict. Rather than the
content of group action, the GFR records the emergence of the preconditions for group
action. As discussed in Chapter 13, the dimension of action is neglected in
psychological theory (Shotter, 1975) and is more commonly used in social theory
(Habermas, 1984, 1989; Joas 1991) and philosophy (Lennon, 1990). It has been used in
phenomenological psychology, but not for communication as such (von Cranach and
Harré, 1982). The content validity of this dimension of group communication needs to
be established by ensuring the present categories adequately describe the possible range
of coherence of communicational states. Like Cognitive Organization, it may be
necessary to add differentiations for other types of groups.
Therapists Interventions, Limits, Locomotion: Content validity should be
adequate for these dimensions since they are restricted to describing presence of
absence of various forms of communication by therapists.
Criterion-related Validity.
Criterion-related validity describes the extent to which the GFR estimates
performance on another criterion or measure. This might be conducted by rating the
same sessions with other instruments and showing whether findings are consistent, or
predictive of GFR performance. The problems here is again that the GFR 425
records group function and validation would need to be by other techniques estimating
group function. This may be done with test situations where more functional groups in
GFR terms would be predicted to perform better on tasks, such as problem solving or
other techniques from experimental social psychology (e.g., McLintock, 1972;
Berkowitz, 1976; Eiser, 1986; Tajfel and Fraser, 1986; Hewstone, et. al, 1993).
However, to show how well the GFR indicates group function towards
therapeutic goals, it would need to be compared with other group instruments. The
closest instrument to the intent of the GFR is the Matrix Representation Grid (Ahlin,
1996), which records dimensions of boundary character, communication flow, imagery,
emotional climate, self-disclosure, acceptance, relating pattern and authority pattern,
each with five ranked categories. Although it differs from the intent of the GFR, ratings
of the same material with both instruments should provide points of comparison and
validation. Other instruments for analyzing group change (Beck and Lewis, 2000)
could provide helpful validation of some aspects of GFR function. Those analyzing
communication are most likely to be helpful. The Group Emotionality Rating System
(Karterud, 2000) records verbal statements in categories representing fight, flight,
dependency, pairing, neutrality and mixed emotionality using Bion’s (1961) theory and
is likely to identify some Affect and Action Coherence categories. The Group
Development Process Analysis Measure (Lewis et al., 2000) may validate some GFR
findings on group development. While it postulates nine stages, they are described in
interpersonal interactional terms. The Psychodynamic Work and Object Rating System
(Piper and McCallum, 2000) may intersect with the notion of functionality postulated
by the GFR. Although it rates communication, it is content oriented towards specific
verbal messages related to personal psychodynamic themes. The System for Analyzing
Verbal Interaction (Simon and Agazarian, 2000), in spite of being restricted to
interpersonal and verbal communication, may also validate some GFR categories.
Another method of developing criterion-related validity would be by matching
members’ outcome with GFR functionality of sessions and evaluation of members’
social functioning, capacity for cooperation and communication skills, using formal
instruments and comparing the GFR findings.
Finally, criterion-related validity can be demonstrated by detailed content
analysis of sessions in parallel with the GFR ratings. Since the GFR describes group
states in terms of observable characteristics, narrative descriptions of the 426
events and interpersonal interactions will enable the character of the ratings to be
matched with the events. This can be done with high or low functional minutes and
sessions. Criteria of what independent therapists consider high or low quality function
could be developed and judged in relation to the content and then matched that with
GFR ratings.
Criterion-related validity was demonstrated by the GFR to the extent that the
progress of the groups were reflected anecdotally in members’ progress. The 1988,
1992 and 1996 groups were all associated with constructive outcomes for all members
at the end of the year. However, the 1990 and 1993 groups, which showed deterioration
in functional quality in the final term of the year and high levels of conflict were
associated with loss of members and some members not achieving personal therapeutic
goals.
Construct Validity.
Construct validity concerns validity of theoretical constructs or the concepts the
instrument purports to measure (Aiken, 2000). A construct is normally regarded as a
quality or trait on which individuals differ and the instrument registers (Gregory, 1996).
However, the GFR is not measuring, but recording the capacity for collective mentality
as indicated in collective functioning of group entities. This characteristic of functional
collective mentality is operationalised by GFR dimensions and categories. In tests,
construct validity is normally established by comparing results of the test with other
tests, procedures and findings to demonstrate convergent validity where similar
characteristics produce consistent results, or demonstrate discriminant validity where
different constructs or tests produce results that allow them to be discriminated
(Gregory, 1996).
GFR categories purport to provide an inclusive description of group structure,
cognitive organization, affect and action coherence. Comparison of GFR findings with
other group instruments (Beck and Lewis, 2999) should provide opportunities to
establish both convergent and discriminant validity since some factors are similar and
others are different to GFR measures. For example, there should be relationships
between instruments rating content of communication and GFR ratings describing
quality. Affect and Action Coherence on the GFR should be related to “Emotional
Climate” and “Boundary Character” on the Matrix Representation Grid 427
(Ahlin, 1996); conflict in Action Coherence on the GFR should be associated with
“Fight” on the Group Emotion Rating System (Karterud, 2000).
The constructs of GFR dimensions are derived from a diverse body of theory to
articulate concepts for a collective mentality theory. The task is not only to compare the
GFR with other instruments, but also to test them against as wide a range of theories as
possible to determine if their phenomena, states or characteristics can be described with
the existing categories or modifications that do not violate the integrity of the
dimensions.
A test of discriminant validity would be to apply the GFR to other types of
groups and identify whether there were phenomena that could not be described by the
dimensions and categories (allowing for their sensitivity to vary as discussed above).
Rating other types of groups would test other factors likely to influence construct
validity such as developmental stage, group differences and effects of interventions
(Gregory, 1996).
Methodological Validity of the study.

Validity also applies to the methodology or the study. If the procedure of the
investigation is not valid the results are of uncertain meaning. The validity of the
method is examined by considering threats to internal validity by compromising or
confounding variables under investigation and its external validity by the
generalizability of the findings to other situations (Shaughnessy and Zechmeister,
1997).
Internal Validity.
Internal validity ensures that causal inferences can reliably be made from the
results because of adequate controls for confounding of variables. The study is
descriptive, not an experiment; the method is designed to make observations of the
functionality of the social unit in adolescent psychotherapy groups and develop a
methodology to define and record group phenomena, based on a body of theory.
Threats to internal validity do not arise as they would in an experiment with
independent and dependent variables (Shaughnessy and Zechmeister, 1997). However,
in the results, some analyses did show risks to internal validity and control procedures
were undertaken to ensure reliable inferences could be drawn. For example, 428
when considering the influence of change in Affect and Action Coherence over several
minutes (see Chapter 20, hypothesis 3.3), the pooling of data necessarily counted
overlapping minutes. This was controlled by excluding overlapping data and ensuring
that the same trends were present in the modified data pool (which was the case, see
Chapter 20, section 3.3.1f).
Internal validity is often established by randomization, use of control groups and
other procedures designed to restrict the variables present (Shaughnessy and
Zechmeister, 1997). However, this study was designed to develop an empirical basis
for a mode of observation to show that complex social situations could be rendered
coherent. In the course of the groups, threats to internal validity were present. They
included extraneous variables impacting on the groups such as change of building
during 1996, failure of video records of sessions, loss of subjects, inconsistent
attendance and continuity of membership from one year to another. Some of these
factors could be controlled in the analysis by splitting the data pool to compare
differences such as loss of members compared with size of intact group and with
absentees (see results, Chapter 19, section 2.3.1b). This revealed differences of effect,
which however, did not negate other findings.
The internal validity of the GFR is supported by the fact that when the
distribution of combinations was examined (see Chapter 7, section 4) no contradictory
combinations were present. However, 204 of the possible 384 combinations of
categories were not observed. These combinations need to be examined and compared
with those that occurred to ensure internal validity was not compromised (see discussion
in Chapter 26). It could be argued that the occurrence of less than half of the
combinations suggests the GFR is more than twice as detailed as it needs to be. On the
other hand this may be a function of the restricted repertoire of communicational
function these groups demonstrated. Other groups may produce more or different
combinations. This could only be ascertained by rating other types of groups. More
work needs to be done to establish the GFR’s internal validity.
External Validity.
External validity describes the extent to which findings can be generalized
beyond the groups examined. Although little can be said about this from an empirical
point of view, the inclusion of a Latency Group (1990) in the study showed 429
that it demonstrated definite characteristics setting it apart from the adolescent groups
and was successfully rated by the GFR. The differences shown by the GFR suggest it
was sensitive to the different quality of groups of different age. However, this needs to
be repeated on other groups of various ages, conducted by other therapists and non-
therapeutic groups to establish its usefulness. It could also be used to rate appropriately
recorded educational or recreational groups.
Functional Validity of the GFR.

A wider concept of functionalist validity analyses of the study’s value
implications, the usefulness of its findings, interpretations for applications and the social
consequences of its use. A test is considered valid to the extent the inferences made
from it are appropriate, meaningful and useful (Gregory, 1996). It can be argued that
the GFR could be considered valid to the extent it reliably records change in a variety of
groups and enables therapists or conductors to keep track of process, record the past and
anticipate the future as an aid to more effective interventions. Differences recorded by
the GFR were consistent across a number of groups and demonstrated rhythms and
other regularities that could be predictive from one session to another.
A study’s value implications are part of its functional validity (Gregory, 1997).
The GFR does not discriminate individuals and protects them in its documentation. It
does not assign value to the group state other than in its approximation towards the
hypothesized therapeutic goal state. However, this may need to be reviewed in the light
of developing knowledge. It is possible that certain types of conflict in association with
Representational Cognitive Organization (e.g., the Condensed State of Productive
Turmoil) may be considered more therapeutic than Sociable states because of the self-
representations. This would mean that the order of states’ therapeutic desirability might
change. The theory acknowledges the necessity of groups moving rhythmically through
all the states as part of their development. The criteria of therapeutic progress are
related to the proportions of time spent in the different states, their combinations and
sequences rather than their simple incidence, presence or absence.
Functional validity is also supported by evidence for an instrument’s usefulness
and application (Gregory, 1997). The GFR will be useful if it can assist therapists to
describe groups more effectively, provide indications for their general therapeutic
orientation and interventions in managing them. If it is demonstrated as 430
useful for other therapeutic groups, it may also provide valuable assistance (albeit in
modified form) for other settings such as managing school and recreational groups. Its
validity would be enhanced if it assisted teachers and youth leaders to understand and
mange their groups.
Finally, functional validity is demonstrated by the potential and actual
consequences of its application (Gregory, 1997). These remain to be seen.
APPENDIX 2: GROUP FUNCTION RECORD - RATERS 431
INSTRUCTIONS.
Four documents are included in this appendix.

“Group Function Record – Raters’ Instructions,” is a detailed description of the
criteria and definitions for applying the rating system. Each Dimension is described.
This is the document used to train raters.
“GFR Examples,” is a list of ambiguous and problematic situations likely to be
encountered in rating video sessions with clear instructions on how they are to be
interpreted and rated.
“GFR Outline,” is a two-page outline of the criteria to prompt raters while they
are doing the ratings.
“Group Function Record – Rating Sheet” is a copy of the sheet used to rate the
videos.
432
GROUP FUNCTION RECORD - RATERS’ INSTRUCTIONS
Draft 10
Rob Gordon
University of Melbourne
STRUCTURE
Structure describes the communicating units within the group in a given minute.
CRITERIA: Communication occurs when a member does two or more of the

following:
Proximity: is so close that it is clear that this is an intentional selection of the other in
preference to random placement.
Looking: looks at or keeps another in view or eye contact.
Listening: listens to or maintains auditory monitoring of another.
Talking: talks to or engages in other form of verbal communication with another.
Gesturing: provides some form of bodily movement or positioning, which is perceived as
having meaning by the other (body language or non-verbal communication).
Engaged: is engaged in a common activity or shared enterprise even if the other conditions
are not met; e.g. parallel play or continuing to perform a common task when other
communication has ceased.
Possible categories are:
WHOLE GROUP (W): all members are in communication.

SUBGROUPS (S): all members are in communication with a number of other members in
sub-groups, no one is isolated.
SUBGROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS (SI): there are one or more subgroups and one or
more isolated individuals not in communication with anyone.
INDIVIDUALS (I): No members of the group are in communication with each other.
Include members in a communion who:

* Sustain communication with a member of a unit for more than 15" continuous
contact during a minute,
* Play in parallel, wait to take a turn, or monitor others,
* Share resources or space involving tacit communication,
* Come and go within the minute as part of play, game or conversation,
* Remain attached to a conversation or interaction, but contribute only periodically.
Exclude members who:

* Break communication for the minute; or make only fleeting contact for less than 15"
at a time,
* Are in close proximity, but not communicating and undertake unrelated activity,
* Ignore, don't attend or are indifferent to communication with or from a unit,
* When members cannot be seen to be communicating, (eg, off camera, out of sight);
unless there is clear auditory communication.
Rate the highest Structure category that is evident for 15" in the minute.
COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION 433
Cognitive Organization describes the organization of the communication process
according to the presence of shared themes or topics, the quality of the members'
contributions to the communication, the extent to which norms, rules, relationships or
system are present. These are discriminated at four different levels, which provide four
categories.
Norms: Shared standards, expectations or prescriptions of valued behaviour or
interest that are also likely to regulate conduct. They may be the basis for sanctions to
maintain the behaviour. A norm gives a simple binary relation, such as "this should or
should not be done/said/thought", or "this is good or bad, cool or dumb, acceptable or not
acceptable". It does not specify anything about the relations between the various elements
that are covered by the norms, or its relationship with other norms. Norms are expressed
in terms of actual behaviour, not as principles in themselves. Examples: Limit setting by
members in a game (eg skittle wars), maintaining the topic of a conversation.
Rules: Principles or propositions that determine the production and evaluation of
conduct. Rules indicate what to do and give action a meaning in relation to the other
possible things that could be done. Rules may be: regulative in that they give explicit
value or meaning to the conduct in relation to a system of principles; constitutive which
means they determine whether conduct is given a particular meaning or significance; or
generative in that they determine how conduct will be produced or generated as speech,
conversation, sentiment or action. Generative rules are evident when the conduct of the
members or their communication is clearly governed by a purpose or goal and the
contributions are articulated in relation to each other. This will be most easily observed in
the order or succession of actions or contributions to the communication process. E.g. the
rules of a game both prescribe the possible actions to be undertaken, but do not determine
what the actor should do. Rules also enable to actor to evaluate the significance of his or
her action in relation to the overall purpose of the game.
REPRESENTATIONAL ORGANIZATION: Consistent themes and representations of

group or members of themselves, life, or their problems which can be processed at
a systemic level.
Examples:
• Discussions about problems,
• Decision making and planning about the group,
• Discussion and debate about the group and its activities,
• Complaints and emotional communication about the group,
• Talking to therapist about themselves provided it is not just answering questions,
• Discussion of issues of adolescent concern such as sex, sex education, violence,
juvenile crime.
SYSTEMIC ORGANIZATION: Common terms, ideas, symbols; contributions related
to the topic, show logical structure, develop the ideas, build on previous
contributions. Rules are understood or accepted and are consistent and govern the
process enabling common activity, problem solving and information processing.
Members understand their place in the system.
Examples:
• Rule based games, e.g., cards, hangman,
• Discussion, ie not just one member dominating the conversation.
• Shared anecdotes about movies, activities, joke sessions,
• When the group listens to the therapist or responds to the therapist's 434
intervention,
• Debate, argument, problem solving,
• Advice and sympathy,
• Quiz or question and answer sessions involving knowledge or information.
• More than 1 member is active in the process.
NORMATIVE ORGANIZATION: There is a common theme or topic, norms, a shared

code promoting activity or communication. Contributions are bound by this but
lack logical relationship. Descriptions, narratives or reports are inconsistent and do
not develop ideas. Relations of similarity, comparison and sequence. Problem
solving or consistent information processing not achieved. Rules or system may be
present, but are inconsistent or ineffective. A game bound by norms rather than
rules (eg skittles).
Examples:
• Only 1 member sustains the theme or activity and others are passive, regardless of
the organization of the game or the conversation.
• Conversations without development of themes, any common theme or topic of talk
or action;
• The therapist talking, but the group not listening.
• Fighting or competitive games with only rudimentary rules.
• Questions and answers, agreement and disagreements; comparisons
• Failed or inadequate rules and system
• Listening to the therapist
• Rule-based games that are not properly undertaken or which do not work (cards).
• Activity games, throwing, ball games, mucking around, skittle throwing.
UNORGANIZED: Common terms are not shared, inconsistent or not sustained for more
than 30". Contributions are simple declarations or actions, lack development of
ideas, have no sequential or constructive relation to others. Norms or rules absent;
overall meaning or purpose absent. Tasks not undertaken; information not
processed or responded to.
Examples:
• Talk in which members make comments which are not taken up or developed by
others; no consistent theme or topic for > 30".
• motor play, mucking around, uncoordinated activity lacking common theme; there
is no agreed "game".
• periods of confusion or disorganization
• when more organized activities collapse
Include: replies to comments lacking connectedness or sequence;
Exclude: question and answer and agree- or disagreement.
General Criteria
* Rate the highest functioning sub-group.
* Rate the organizational level which best describes the communication for the minute
or at least 30 seconds.
* When organization fluctuates or no clear rating is possible, rate Unorganized.
* If only 1 member talks and the others are not participating, rate Normative,
regardless of the organization of the member concerned.
435
Cognitive organization describes four different levels of organization of the
communication process. It presumes that members contribute to communications, which
have some relation to each other and content in themselves. It is the extent of organization
of the communication process itself. Four aspects of the communication structure are
distinguished in order to evaluate the structural aspects. They comprise (1) common
themes or terms; (2) the contributions which members make to the communication
process; (3) the relations between these contributions; (4) the systemic aspects of the
communication as a whole. Although these elements cannot be defined in detail for each
observation, they are described in the table below to assist in observing and judging the
process.
Definitions UNORGANIZED NORMATIVE SYSTEMIC REPRESENT-

ATIONAL
TERMS & Terms include any No common Common terms and Common terms, Common terms
THEMES common elements terms, inconsistent topics, shared by allow for elaboration refer to self or
which allow topics, themes or topics; members of common ideas group
ideas to be shared, members have and creation of a
actions or themes of their own themes group culture
communication, and topics.
CONTRI- Communicative acts Basic content, not Guided and bound by Themes are Contributions
BUTIONS of the members: developed or topics. Basic, descriptive, elaborated in a elaborate self or
utterances, actions, elaborated, narratives, reports not logical structure, group
responses idiosyncratic and expressing development There is a point or representations
inconsistent of ideas. One person relevance to the or refer to them.
may dominate sequence; bound by
rules and purposes
RELAT- Relations between No relations, or Relations present, but not Relations are logical, Logical and
IONS contributions, only rudimentary logical structures or sequential, with a associative
articulations related relatedness argument, only com- developmental order relations
to each other or between parison, similarity, agree and relevance. allowing the
operations that may contributions. /disagree, reply, sequ- Rules guide and theme to be
be undertaken by the encing; rules and norms direct the process, elaborated for
group. present but incomplete or may be implicit the whole group
ineffective
SYSTEM Overall goals, No system, no Overall meaning and Goal oriented, Goal oriented to
purpose, meaning purpose, direction connectedness, but not contri-butions to develop and
and directedness of or overall problem solving, elaborate on each understanding,
the communi-cation meaning. exchange and other to solve share or solve
process as a whole. communication are problems, gain problems about
reason enough. knowledge or the group or
undertake actions. selves
436
AFFECT
Affect describes the energy level and emotional quality within the group’s
communication. The affect does not necessarily have to be observed in each member.
One or two members may manifest a strong emotional state that influences the whole
group even though not all the other members can be said to share the same emotion.
Affect in this sense indicates the emotional state which is present within the group as a
whole in each minute according to the criteria below. These record the general affective
state of the group rather than attempting to describe the members’ specific emotions. Six
categories for group affect are derived from the matrix of two dimensions of quantity of
energy and hedonic quality as shown in the table below. Although specific emotional
names are given, they are intended to indicate group-affective states rather than the
emotions of individuals. The following table describes the energy level and hedonic
tension in the communication process.
PLEASURE UNPLEASURE
UNSTABLE Joy Distress
STABLE Interest Discontent
INERT Contentment Boredom/Apathy
The following definitions describe the basic dimensions of affect:

Tension: This forms the basis for the distinction of hedonic quality between pleasure and
unpleasure. Tension in the group is defined as: A strained condition of the mind,
feelings or nerves, manifesting as a constrained condition of members of a group in
which they are subjected to emotional forces motivating them away from shared
emotions or rapport, tending to draw them apart, balanced by forces of cohesion
drawing them together; the force or combination of forces acting in this way
(adapted from the Shorter Oxford Dictionary). Tension is the description of the
emotional influences of constraint or strain manifested in emotional differences or
tendencies for the members to pull away from their participation in the
communion.
Pleasure: Rewarding hedonic emotional quality, expresses increased togetherness in the
form of emotional states of low interpersonal tension among the members of the
communion; moods of happiness, enjoyment, expressions of pleasure,
demonstrated by gestures, smiles, pleasant modulations of the voice.
Rate Pleasure when there is no significant tension lasting for more than 15 seconds
within the minute, even if only expressed by 1 member.
Unpleasure: Aversive hedonic emotional quality, expressed as increased interpersonal
tension in the form of aversive emotions, separateness and different emotional
states among the members of the communion, or between the communion, other
members or therapists, including: anger unhappiness, displeasure, fear, expressed
by cries, facial grimaces, gestures.
Rate Unpleasure when there is significant tension or aversive emotions lasting 15
seconds or more within the minute, even if only expressed by 1 member.
Mixed Quality: Where there is fluctuation in hedonic quality within the 15" rating
interval, or throughout the if there are 3 or more moments of unpleasurable
tension, minute, this is viewed as mixed emotion and should be rated as 437
Unpleasure.
Unstable Energy: The emotional energy level fluctuates, involving discharge, reduction
and increase. The energy cannot be maintained within the communication process
proper. It manifests in phenomena that disrupt the social structure of
communication and the flow of syntactical messages resulting in paralinguistic
communication or motor discharges.
Rate Unstable when the energy level fluctuates significantly (including discharges)
for more than 15 seconds within the minute, even if only 1 member demonstrates
this.
Stable Energy: The emotional energy level is maintained at a relatively constant level
without discharge or marked fluctuations. It is expressed within the
communication process and motivates maintenance of its current state and reflects
a stable emotional state through stable communication. Paralinguistic phenomena
are generally subjected to the requirements of syntactical messages.
Rate Stable when there are no marked fluctuations of emotional energy level for
more than 15 seconds within the minute.
Inert Energy: The emotional energy level is low, and emotion is not expressed overtly;
there is low arousal which involves minimal communication, lack of syntactical
messages and little paralinguistic phenomena, while maintaining the contact
between the members of the communion.
Rate Inert when there is low arousal and minimal communication for 45 seconds or
more in the minute, i.e. when no significant emotion occurs for more than 15
seconds in the minute.
The six emotional states that are defined by these dimensions are described below:
CONTENTMENT: Pleasurable emotional states involving little expressed emotion but

maintaining a communion which does not involve significant overt exchange. The
mood present promotes togetherness. No significant emotion or tension for > 15".
Examples:
• Relaxation,
• Following a satisfying experience,
• Quiet and unaroused states in which members are in contact but not actively
exchanging
JOY: Pleasurable, unstable emotion, exultation, happiness, excitement, gladness, mirth,
delight, intense enjoyment leading to marked fluctuations in energy level and
motivation, and tending to disrupt communication with non-syntactical
contributions (i.e. emotional discharges), but low interpersonal tension. Tension <
15"; Fluctuation > 15".
Examples:
• Jokes,
• Laughter,
• Boisterousness,
• Excited talk and play,
• Exclamations of pleasure,
• Gestures, e.g. slapping on the back.
INTEREST: Pleasurable emotion or mood maintained at a stable level motivating

continuing involvement with low interpersonal tension, or increased engagement
in syntactic communication or the current activities. Fluctuations & Tension <
15". 438
Examples:
• Pleasant conversation,
• Talk of interest or satisfaction of curiosity,
• Modulated, stable interaction in conversation or game,
• Interest as shown by attention or questions to ensure contact.
DISCONTENT: Unpleasurable or mixed pleasurable and unpleasurable emotion or mood
maintained at a stable level, motivating continued engagement even though
involving significant interpersonal tension, frustration or dissatisfaction. Give
preference to Discontent when there is a combination of Joy and Discontent.
Communication is maintained at existing levels or increased. Fluctuation < 15";
Tension > 15".
Examples :
• Complaints,
• Talk about fears,
• Teasing, criticism,
• Passive unpleasure such as sadness, regret, nostalgia,
• Arguments and disagreements accompanied by tension and aversive emotion,
• Worries or grievances and unhappy experiences invoking empathic responses.
DISTRESS: Unpleasurable, or mixed pleasurable and unpleasurable unstable emotion,

intense unpleasurable excitement, leading to marked fluctuation of energy levels or
motivation and disruption in the syntactical communication process by paralinguistic
phenomena (i.e. discharges of affect). Marked differences in emotion may be
present among members leading to high interpersonal tension. Fluctuation &
Tension > 15".
Examples:
• Hits or jeering,
• Shouting, abuse,
• Anger, tears, grief,
• Unhappiness, sadness,
• Teasing and mocking laughter,
• Cries of pain, rage or frustration.
BOREDOM: Unpleasurable mood leading to an inactive state of the group with little
overt communication or emotional expression; the communion is maintained but
there is a lack of significant energy among the members. Interpersonal tension is
present. No emotions > 30", Tension > 15".
Examples:
• Anger,
• Boredom,
• Paralysis,
• Frustration,
• Disappointment.
• Moods of sadness,
• Inability to tackle problems or engage in active communication about issues,
General Criteria:
* Unpleasure is rated when there is a mixture of positive and negative emotion since
this creates interpersonal tension.
* 15 seconds (quarter of a minute) is the minimum time for the presence of 439
unpleasure, instability or tension. This is best taken as a continuous period, but
may be cumulative over the course of the minute.
* Fluctuation needs to occur for more than 15 seconds for Joy or Distress.
* Rate the most obvious affective state in the minute.
* Rate Interest or Discontent when fluctuations occur for less than 15".
* Rate Discontent or Distress when unpleasurable tension is manifested by at least one
member.
* Contentment and Boredom are demonstrated by the majority of members even if one
member is more active.
440
PLEASURE UNPLEASURE
Definitions Rewarding hedonic quality, Aversive hedonic quality,
expresses increased together- expresses increased inter-
ness or shared emotional personal tension in the form of
states, decreased interpersonal separateness and different
tension, happiness, enjoyment, emotional states; anger
expressions of pleasure eg unhappiness, displeasure eg,
gestures, smiles, pleasant cries, facial grimaces, gestures;
modulations of the voice;
UN- Emotional energy level JOY: Pleasurable, unstable DISTRESS: Unpleasurable,
STABLE fluc-tuates, involving emotion, exultation, happi- unstable emotion, unhap-
discharge, reduction and ness, pleasurable excitement, piness, anger, grief, sadness,
increase. This can't be gladness, mirth, delight, en- unpleasurable excitement
maintained within the joyment expressed intensely, expressed with intensity,
communication process. It leading to marked fluctuations leading to fluctuation and
interrupts syntactical in energy and disrupts disruption in the syntactical
messages, shown in para- communication with non- communication process by
linguistic communication. syntactical contributions. paralinguistic phenomena.
Examples Jokes, laughter, boisterous, Anger, tears, shouting, abuse,
excited talk and play cries of pain, rage or
exclamations of pleasure, frustration, hits or jeering,
gestures, slapping on the back, teasing and mocking laughter
STABLE Emotional energy is main- INTEREST: Pleasurable DISCONTENT: Unpleas-
tained at a stable level for emotion maintained at a stable urable emotion at a stable
more than half the minute level that motivates continuing level, motivating continued
without discharge or involvement or becoming engagement even though in-
marked fluctuations. It more engaged in syntactic volving tension, frustration or
motivates maintenance of communication or the current dissatisfaction. Commu-
the current state of the activities. nication is maintained at
communication process. existing levels or increased.
Examples Pleasant conversation, Complaints, arguments and
modulated interaction in the disagreements accompanied by
context of a talk, game or other tension and aversive em-otion;
activity, interest as shown by teasing, criticism of a less
attention or questions to ensure intense type, talk about worries
contact. Talk of interest or and unhappy exper-iences
satisfaction of curiosity involving empathic responses.
INERT Energy level low, emotion CONTENTMENT: Pleas- APATHY: Unpleasurable
not expressed overtly; lack urable states involving little emotions leading to inactive
of arousal, may involve expressed emotion and state of the group with little
minimal communication, maintaining a communion that overt communication; com-
lack of syntactical does not involve significant munion maintained but lack of
messages, but contact overt exchange. significant energy
maintained.
Examples Quiet and unemotional states Boredom, frustration, paralysis
in which the group is in inability to tackle problems or
contact but not actively engage in active
exchanging such as following communication about issues,
a satisfying experience. moods of sadness, anger,
disappointment
441
ACTION COHERENCE
This describes the group's capacity to act as a group. Group action involves the
capacity to adopt a common goal and to cooperate in achieving it. The categories indicate
the stages from collective action where group members cooperate with each other through
to adopting diverse or incompatible goals or become uncooperative or oppositional
towards each other or the group goal. The ratings describe the condition of the
combination of all activities occurring in a group or subgroup; e.g. a game of cards with a
concurrent conversation. These processes are defined in terms of the observable acts
within the communication process.
Mixed Coherence: Where there are 3 or more fluctuations in the degree of
coherence throughout the minute or 30" rating interval such that no category adequately
describes the group's state, this is regarded as mixed coherence and is rated in terms of the
lowest (or most incoherent) category of activity present. Fluctuations involve a change in
coherence category to the lower category even though this may only last a few seconds.
CONCORD: All act as one in the pursuit of a common goal, expressed as a common
activity or concurrent activities in which each plays a cooperative role. There is a
clearly observable group action involving all members of the group or dominant
subgroup. All concurrent activities must be have the same degree of coherence.
This must occur > 30".
Examples:
• A closely coordinated discussion in which members maintain a theme and make
cooperative contributions;
• A game (irrespective of its organizational complexity - the cooperation and
common goal are rated).
ACCORD: Members demonstrate diverse, but compatible goals which are not
contradictory to each other. This must apply to all concurrent activities within the
unit. They act in cooperation, but not with a common activity. Rate this category
when the common goal or activity are failing or incomplete. There may be
differences, but cooperation occurs. There is no conflict. This must occur > 30".
Examples:
• Conversation which lacks goal or common theme;
• Games when there is a failure to maintain the goal or one or more members
remains within the structural unit but does not participate in the activity or
share the goal;
• Lack of coordination where the group fails to achieve an end; members are
engaged in different or unrelated activities but there is no particular
uncooperativeness or conflict; debates or constructive arguments which
preserve a goal or purpose.
• Competitive games, eg fighting of skittles as long as they agree to play.
DISCORD: The members demonstrate diverse and incompatible goals, or engage in

uncooperative activities which are disruptive (but do not intend to damage) each
other or to the group achieving a common goal. The activity may be diverse or a
common activity with incompatible goals and an actively uncooperative attitude.
Rate as Discord when one activity is concordant or accordant (e.g. a game of cards)
while another concurrent activity within the same unit is discordant. Where there
are 3 or more fluctuations in coherence within the 30" time interval with moments
442
of discord interspersed with higher coherence, this is mixed coherence and rated as
Discord. This must occur > 30".
Examples:
• Competition for resources, role, position or space,
• Disagreements about what to do or how to play a game,
• Argument or teasing while engaged in a cooperative game,
• Good natured teasing where the other is not really intended to be hurt,
• Arguments or disagreements resulting in threatening or disruption to the
conversation or activity with no active conflict or disagreements but a lack
of common activity or cooperation.
CONTRACORD: A member or members act against others with incompatible goals and
adopt an oppositional attitude to the group, therapist or other members. This
includes aggression, hostility, antagonism. It involves active opposition towards
others. This must occur > 5". Where there is mixed coherence with several
moments of Contracord not extended for the minimum 5" it is viewed a mixed
coherence and rated as Contracord.
Examples:
• Abuse,
• Coercion and intimidation,
• Fighting, hostile argument,
• Forcing others against their will,
• Verbal or physical threats of aggression,
• Taking or commandeering resources or space by force actual or threatened,
• Destructive behaviour, talk or action intended to hurt another or damage the group
or activity.
General Criteria
• Rate the largest or best functioning sub-group.
• Rate the category which best describes the minute (more than 30 seconds) for
Concord, Accord and Discord.
• Rate Contracord when ever a significant episode (more than 10" duration) of
opposition occurs within the minute
• Rate Discord and Contracord when one or more members act in a disruptive of
conflictual manner.
• Where the degree of cooperation and categories fluctuate throughout the minute,
rate it as Discord.
• Consider all concurrent activities in making the rating. It should reflect the
combined state.
443
AIMS COHESION ACTIVITY

CONCORD Members have a Members cooperate to There is a shared
common aim which a high degree and activity, which
enables them to act in present unanimity in involves all members
relation to each other their combined action. in the communion.
to achieve it. Cohesion and mutual
engagement are high.
ACCORD Aims are different but Members cooperate, The activities are
compatible. They are loosely and allow for diverse but compat-
not shared, but do not different involvement ible, or similar but
interfere with each or communication. not shared. They do
other. Cohesion is low with not interfere with
loose engagement. each other.
DISCORD The aims are different Members do not Activities are diverse
and incompatible cooperate and are and incompatible and
though not directly uncooperative though interfere with each
conflicting with each not oppositional. other.
other. Cohesion is low and
engagement loose
CONTRA- Aims are incompat- Members may be Activities may be
CORD ible and one or more highly cohesive and diverse or common,
members try to impose intensely engaged, but but within them
their aims on others or in an oppositional members actively
oppose the other's manner. oppose each other.
aims.
444
THERAPISTS' INTERVENTIONS
The therapists' communications to the group or members are rated in terms of
being addressed to the group as a whole or to the members as individuals.
GROUP INTERVENTION (G): The whole group or a functional sub-group is

addressed, or all members of the group are addressed, even if individually.
Assume the group is addressed if there are general comments without referring to
anyone in particular, or if a member is talked about in the third person (e.g. “Bill is
feeling angry”).
MEMBER INTERVENTION (M): One or more members are addressed, but not all
members of the group or sub-group.
GROUP AND MEMBER INTERVENTION (G&M): Both the above interventions are
made within the minute. Rate it if an intervention includes both group and
references to individual members.
LIMIT: Limits are set on members, rules are invoked, an attempt is made to verbally or
physically restrict members' activity. Rate by checking the box for the minute.
LOCOMOTION: The therapist changes position in the room during the minute. This is
rated by checking the box for the minute.
General Criteria
• The first three categories are rated mutually exclusively.
• Limit and locomotion are checked for each minute in which one or more of these
interventions occurs. The number of interventions is not recorded, only that at
least one occurred.
• Where an intervention overlaps a minute boundary, do not rate it in the second
minute unless it lasts more than 30 seconds.
• In the case of a dialogue between the therapist and one or more members, regard
the separate comments as though they comprise one intervention, unless
there is a 30 second break between comments.
• If an intervention starts at the end of 1 minute, but only part of the first sentence is
in that minute rate it in the next minute.
• Where the therapist addresses both group and member in an interaction, rate both
group and member intervention.
• Where no member is specified, and the object of the intervention is unclear, rate as
group intervention.
• When the therapist talks about a member, mentioning their name, but not talking
directly to the member, assume the group is being addressed about the
member.
445
GFR EXAMPLES
Draft 10.
The following examples indicate the ratings to be given to typical phenomena in
adolescent groups
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
STRUCTURE & AFFECT: Rate the 15" that shows the best Structure or the worst Affect.
COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION & ACTION COHERENCE: Rate the first 31+" unless a
clear rating is not possible, then start rating the second 30" and rate the greatest part
of the minute.
STRUCTURE
Rate the best structure that is observable for 15" in the minute.
Absent members: when a member temporarily leaves the room, or is off camera and
cannot be seen or heard, treat as an individual and rate as SUBGROUP +
INDIVIDUAL.
Late arrivals: when only some members arrive on time and others arrive after the group
has started, rate those in the room at the time as though the group consists of them.
Looking: When a member is looking at the group from a distance, rate as a separate
INDIVIDUAL unless there is evidence of reciprocity in communication. If one
member just glances across from time to time while otherwise looking away and is
not otherwise involved or following the process, count them out of the communion
as an INDIVIDUAL.
Off Camera: when one member is off camera and there are no cues to their activity, count
as separate from the Communion and therefore as an INDIVIDUAL. When there
are two or more members off camera in the same part of the room and voices can
be heard, assume they are communicating and form a communion or SUBGROUP.
Same Activity - but separate: When a member separates himself from the communion
physically but continues to engage in the common activity (such as to prepare
something for the game) include him in the communion. This could be seen as
parallel play
Silence: When members are silent for the whole minute, rate as INDIVIDUALS unless
there is observable non-verbal communication between them.
Sitting together: If two or more members are close together, such as sitting on a couch,
rate as being in communion and forming a SUBGROUP even if not actually
communicating unless one member is talking to someone and ignoring the other
who is obviously not attending to the other.
COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION
Rate the best organization, which is evident for 30" in the minute. Rate the first
30"unless it is variable or ambiguous. If so, then rate as much of the second 30" as
required to get a 30" segment to rate.
Anecdotes disconnected: Where the anecdotes are not closely related and the members do
not seem to associate to each other's anecdotes and the sequence is not connected,
rate as NORMATIVE.
446
Comparisons: of watches, clothing or other physical material, or of verbal material does

not imply any logical operations therefore is rated as - NORMATIVE
Conversations: when the members discuss or swap jokes, anecdotes about movies, stories
or incidents and 1 member dominates for most of the minute, but he talks to the
others and they respond to allow the topic to be maintained rate as - SYSTEMIC
even though there may not be any actual analysis of the material.
Fantasy discourse: spinning stories and fantasies which have a direction and development
are rated as SYSTEMIC, since the contributions are part of an articulated logical
sequence. The truth, cognitive accuracy or complexity are not relevant to the
rating.
Inaudible talk: When a communion is conversing, but the content is inaudible or unclear,
rate as UNORGANIZED if there is no clear evidence of content or quality. Rate as
NORMATIVE if the members are clearly all involved and there is evidence of
maintaining a common topic even if this cannot be heard.
Movie anecdotes: Where members swap anecdotes about movies and share incidents from
the same movies, or they are consistent in theme or content, rate this as
SYSTEMIC since it involves the sequencing and articulation of a shared content.
Play with implements: Where members each use the same implements or materials even
when the game lacks organization, it is rated as NORMATIVE since they are using
common materials.
Problem talk with therapist: When members talk about their problems with the therapist,
but do not direct communication to other members, rate as NORMATIVE even
though it about problems. Only rate REPRESENTATIONAL when they talk
among themselves and the group sustains the communication.
Questions: Questions forming a quiz or requiring the application of thinking or knowledge
are rated as SYSTEMIC. Questions not directed to knowledge (E.G. "Do you like
football?") are rated as NORMATIVE.
Responding to therapist about themselves as a group: When the therapist talks to members
about themselves and their problems as a group and more than one member
participates, rate as NORMATIVE if they do not do more than answer therapist's
questions. If they respond and converse with the therapists about themselves, rate
as REPRESENTATIONAL. It does not qualify for REPRESENTATIONAL
unless they are talking to each other about themselves at a SYSTEMIC level.
Silence: When all members are silent for a whole minute, rate as a UNORGANIZED.
Talking to Therapist as individuals: When a member is talking to the therapist as an
individual and the others are listening but not participating, rate as NORMATIVE
regardless of how well organized it is since the rating measures the group's
functioning not that of individuals in relation to the therapists. Only rate
SYSTEMIC for talk or activity between members.
Therapist Interviews: When the therapists ask members questions and they respond to the
therapist rather than each other, even if they do so in sequence on the same topic,
rate as NORMATIVE.
AFFECT
Rate the worst Affect evident for 15" within the minute except for JOY, which is
given preference over INTEREST.
Boredom: only rate this when members are showing BOREDOM by their expressions and
actions, e.g. yawning, slouching, gazing around etc. Do not rate BOREDOM just
because they are silent or inactive, this is rated as INTEREST if there is evidence
447
of activity or may be CONTENTMENT.

Discontent: When a member teases, criticizes or otherwise denigrates another member,
rate as DISCONTENT when there is clear indication of unpleasurable affect as
well as the conflict.
Excitement: JOY is unstable, high-energy pleasure and should be rated when there is high,
unstable emotional energy, even if actual pleasurable discharges are not present to
criterion.
Joy: A general guffaw including all or most members of the communion which lasts 5 or
more seconds and involves the whole communion qualifies for JOY
Noises: General noises such as car or missile noises or those accompanying play are
regarded as high energy pleasurable discharges and count towards a rating of JOY.
Silence: When all members are silent for the whole rating period (30") rate affect as
BOREDOM or CONTENTMENT, depending on which seems most accurate.
Songs playful noises and Cries: count as discharge unstable pleasure and can be rated as
Joy.
ACTION COHERENCE
Rate the worst Coherence evident for 30" in the minute. Rate the first 30" unless it
is variable or ambiguous. Then rate as much of the second 30" is necessary to obtain a
rating of 30".
Brief Discord: To rate DISCORD there must be at least 3 expressions of discord over 30".
Where there are brief moments of DISCORD lasting 5" or so, only rate as
DISCORD if there are at least three in 30".
Contracord: Examples of CONTRACORD include hitting, verbal abuse, swearing
intended to denigrate or hurt, pushing, kicking or other aggressive words or action.
Conversation: When talking together, CONCORD is rated when there is union in the
activity in the form of well-coordinated turn-taking and maintaining the theme or a
sequence of anecdotes on a common theme. This may include joke sessions,
movie anecdotes, discussion of events etc. If there are discrepancies in theme,
rhythm or sequencing, rate ACCORD.
Individual: When only one member is visible and there are no observations possible of
the others or there is only one member, rate as ACCORD
Individuals: When there are only INDIVIDUALS, rate the COHERENCE as ACCORD,
since they have individual goals, but since they are not communicating they must
not be incompatible.
Joking teasing: When there is teasing of one member by another, whether this is in a
joking way or with animosity, rate as DISCORD, even when this is done in a
conversational form.
Misunderstandings: When these occur between members of a communion such that the
communication is impaired, rate as DISCORD.
Questions and discussion: When all participants contribute to the discussion and share in it,
rate as CONCORD.
Silence: When members are silent for the minute, rate as ACCORD since they have
compatible goals.
Topics: In conversations, when there is agreement in the topic and common degree of
involvement (not necessarily verbal contributions though) rate CONCORD.
THERAPISTS' INTERVENTIONS
Overlaps: Where an intervention overlaps the boundary of a minute, if it only lasts a
448
couple of seconds in one minute, rate it in the minute that contains most of the
intervention. Rate an intervention in the minute in which it originates.
Non-verbal interaction: Do not count nods, "Mm-hm", looking while listening to a
member. Only rate verbal responses.
449
GROUP FUNCTION RECORD OUTLINE

Draft 10
STRUCTURE: Units in the group communicating by two or more of: Proximity,
Looking, Listening, Talking, Gesturing, Engaged. Contact is for > 15" continuously.
WHOLE GROUP All members are in communication.

SUBGROUPS All members are in communication with a number of other members in sub-
groups, no one is isolated.
SUBGROUPS & There are one or more subgroups and one or more isolated individuals not in
INDIVIDUALS communication with anyone.
INDIVIDUALS No members of the group are in communication with each other.
COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION: Common terms and system in the communication

process. > 30"
REPRESENT- System of representations by the group or members of themselves, life, their

ATIONAL ORGn problems which are processed systemically.
SYSTEMIC ORGn Common terms, symbols, logical structure, rules govern common activity.
NORMATIVE Common theme, norms, shared code promoting and ordering .
ORGn
UNORGANIZED Common terms not shared, inconsistent, not sustained for more than 30".
AFFECT: Energy level and hedonic tension in the communication process. > 15".
CONTENTMENT Inert, pleasurable, emotional states. Emotion & Tension < 15"
High energy, unstable pleasurable emotion.
JOY
Fluctuation > 15"; Tension < 15"
INTEREST Stable pleasurable energy. Fluctuation & Tension < 15"
DISCONTENT Stable unpleasurable or mixed emotion. Fluctuation < 15"; Tension > 15"
DISTRESS High energy, unstable, unpleasurable or mixed emotion.
Fluctuation & Tension > 15".
BOREDOM Low energy unpleasurable or mixed emotional states.
Emotion < 15"; Tension > 15"
450
ACTION COHERENCE: Collective or individual action as

cooperation/opposition in the communication process. All concurrent activities are rated.
CONCORD Common goal, cooperative action. Lasting > 30".
ACCORD Diverse goals, cooperative action. Lasting > 30"
DISCORD Diverse goals, uncooperative or mixed action. Lasting > 30".
CONTRACORD Diverse goals, mixed or oppositional action towards each other.
Lasting > 5".
THERAPIST INTERVENTIONS: Therapist's communications to the group or

members.
GROUP The whole group or a functional sub-group is addressed, or all

INTERVENTION members of the group are addressed, even if individually.
MEMBER One or more members are addressed, but not all members of the
INTERVENTION group or subgroup.
GP & MEMBER Both group and one or more members are talked to within.
INTERVENTION
LIMIT A limit is set on the members, a rule is invoked or some attempt is
made to verbally or physically restrict the members' activity.
LOCOMOTION The therapist changes position in the room during the minute.
GROUP FUNCTION RECORD – RATING SHEET.

A copy of the sheet used to rate video records is attached below. The rater sits
in front of the video and watches it for the first 30”, noting the character of each
dimension. In the second half minute, Cognitive Organization and Action Coherence
are rated on the basis of the most appropriate category for 30 or more seconds. In the
last 15” of the minute, the rater decides which category to rate for Structure and Affect.
Therapists Interventions are marked as they occur and at the end of the minute a rating
is made. Limits and Locomotion are recorded as they occur. Ratings are made by
marking the horizontal line for the category chosen in the minute indicated on the time
counter of the video. An example of a completed rating sheet is also provided as an
illustration.
451
452
APPENDIX 3: GROUP FUNCTION RECORD RESULTS.
Distribution of GFR Categories.

The frequencies of states for each group are shown in Tables 17A.1. – 17A.5.
AFFECT
0
Contentment 1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress 5 Boredom
STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 2 34 208 30 1
2 Discord 11 36 1
3 Contracord 3 1
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 1 103 365 12 1
2 Discord 10 17 13 1
2 Discord 6 7 19
COHER. 1 Accord 23 35 6 1 7
2 Discord 28 9 20 2
1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 2
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 1 1
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 1 3
2 Discord 1 1
3 Contracord 1
2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 1 3
COHER. 2 Discord 1
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 1
COHER. 2 Discord 1
3 Contracord 1
2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 2 17 9
2 Discord 4 8
3 Contracord 1
2 Discord 2 13 7
3 Contracord 1 1 2
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 5
2 Discord 1 5
3 Contracord 2
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 4 16 5 2
3 Contracord 1
3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 9 13 3 3
ORGANISn COHER. 2 Discord 1 4 2
Table 17A.1. Frequencies for all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1988.
453
AFFECT
0
Contentment 1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress
Count Count Count Count Count
STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 11
2 Discord 2 9 2
3 Contracord 2 1
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 2 13 65
2 Discord 2 11 8 1
3 Contracord 2 1
2 Discord 6 15 17
1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 2
2 Discord 2
3 Contracord 1
2 Discord 9 2
3 Contracord 1 2 1
3 Contracord 1 3 2
2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 10
2 Discord 2 2
3 Contracord 1 2
COHER. 1 Accord 76
2 Discord 2 17 9 1
3 Contracord 1
2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 1 91 2 1
COHER. 2 Discord 11 14
3 Contracord 6 5
3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 9 1
ORGANISn 3 Unorganised COHER.
ACTION 1 Accord 1
Table 17A.2. Frequencies of all GFR Categories for Latency Group 1990.
454
AFFECT
1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress 5 Boredom
Count Count Count Count Count
STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 8 31 2 1
2 Discord 8 8
3 Contracord 1
2 Discord 2 3 6 1
3 Contracord 1
COHER. 1 Accord 61 181 14 3 5
2 Discord 13 26 42 7
1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 1 Accord 1 1
ORGANISn 1 Systemic COHER.
ACTION 0 Concord 3 7
COHER. 1 Accord 3 6
2 Discord 1
2 Discord 1 1 1
2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 5 10
2 Discord 2 1 2
COHER. 1 Accord 2 13
2 Discord 3 3
3 Contracord 1 2
2 Discord 3 12 14 1
3 Contracord 1 1
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 21 85 6 2 3
COHER. 2 Discord 9 7 32 6 2
3 Contracord 4 4
3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 42 1 9
ORGANISn COHER. 2 Discord 6
COHER. 2 Discord 1
Table 17A.3. Frequencies of all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1992.
455
AFFECT
0
STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 8 1 14
2 Discord 1 5 5
3 Contracord 1 2 1
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 14
2 Discord 1 2 1
COHER. 1 Accord 3 46 96 14 5
2 Discord 26 14 8 1
3 Contracord 1 4
2 Discord 45 21 33 8 1
1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 1 Accord 2 1
ACTION 1 Accord 1
2 Normative COHER. 1 Accord
ACTION 2
COHER. 2 Discord 1
3 Unorganised ACTION 2 Discord 1 1
COHER. 3 Contracord 2
2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 1 3
2 Discord 2
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 23 1
COHER. 1 Accord 7
2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 11 51 2 1
2 Discord 15 11 10 1
3 Contracord 2 1 1
3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 18 2 2
ACTION 1 Accord 5 11
COHER.
456
AFFECT
0
STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 1 22 1
2 Discord 4
2 Discord 7 19 14
3 Contracord 1 2 2
2 Discord 2 6 4
3 Contracord 1
3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord 1
2 Discord 3 3
1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 1 Accord 2
ACTION 0 Concord 7
COHER. 1 Accord 2
2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 3
COHER. 2 Discord 1
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 1
2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational COHER.
ACTION 1 Accord 8 7
ORGANISn COHER. 2 Discord 1
2 Discord 3
2 Discord 2 5
3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 19 3
ACTION 1 Accord 15 1
COHER.
The percentages are shown in Tables 17A.6. – 17A.10.

457
AFFECT
0
Table % Table % Table % Table % Table % Table %
STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .1% 1.8% 11.1% 1.6% .1%
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .4% 2.8% 1.6%
2 Discord .6% 1.9% .1%
3 Contracord .2% .1%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord .1% 5.5% 19.4% .6% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord .7% 2.6% .5%
2 Discord .5% .9% .7% .1%
3 Contracord .2% .2% .1% .2%
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord .2% 2.2%
COHER. 1 Accord .9% 4.5% .6% .6%
2 Discord .3% .4% 1.0%
3 Contracord .1% .1% .2% .1%
3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord .1% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord 1.2% 1.9% .3% .1% .4%
2 Discord 1.5% .5% 1.1% .1%
3 Contracord .1% .1% .2% .2%
1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .1%
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .1% .1%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord .1% .2%
COHER. 1 Accord .1% .2% .1%
2 Discord .1% .1%
3 Contracord .1%
2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord .1% .2%
COHER. 2 Discord .1%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .1%
3 Contracord .1%
2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .1% .9% .5%
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .2% .6% 1.0%
2 Discord .2% .4%
3 Contracord .1%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord .6% 5.3% .2% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord .6% 2.4% .1% .1%
2 Discord .1% .7% .4%
3 Contracord .1% .1% .1%
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord .3%
COHER. 1 Accord .1% 2.0% .5% .1%
2 Discord .1% .3%
3 Contracord .1%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .2% .9% .3% .1%
COHER. 2 Discord .2% .5% .2% .1%
3 Contracord .1%
3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord .5% .7% .2% .2%
ORGANISn COHER. 2 Discord .1% .2% .1%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .9% .5% 1.1%
COHER. 2 Discord .3% .5% .3%
Table 17A.6. Percentages of all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1988.
458
AFFECT
0
Contentment 1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress
Table % Table % Table % Table % Table %
STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .8%
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .3% 2.1% .1%
2 Discord .1% .7% .1%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord .1% 1.0% 4.8%
COHER. 1 Accord .1% .3% 5.4% .1%
2 Discord .1% .8% .6% .1%
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord .1% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord .4% 4.3% .1%
2 Discord .4% 1.1% 1.3%
3 Contracord .2% .1% .3% .2%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 1.5% 3.4%
COHER. 2 Discord 2.6% 2.1% 2.4% .3%
3 Contracord .4% .3% .8% .6%
1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .1%
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .7% .1%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 3.8% .1% 3.2% .2%
COHER. 1 Accord .2% .1% 2.3% .1%
2 Discord .1%
3 Contracord .1%
COHER. 1 Accord .7% 2.8% .1%
2 Discord .7% .1%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .2% .6%
COHER. 2 Discord .2% .2% .2% .1%
2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .7%
2 Discord .1% .1%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 2.1% .4% 9.3% .3%
COHER. 1 Accord 5.6%
2 Discord .1% 1.3% .7% .1%
3 Contracord .1%
2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord .1% 6.7% .1% .1%
COHER. 2 Discord .8% 1.0%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .2% 2.8% .1%
COHER. 2 Discord .5% 1.9% .7% .2%
3 Contracord .3% .1% 1.2% .1%
3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord .7% .1%
ACTION 1 Accord .1%
COHER. 2 Discord .1% .1%
Table 17A.7. Percentages for all GFR Categories for Latency Group 1990.
459
AFFECT
1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress 5 Boredom
Table % Table % Table % Table % Table %
STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .5% 2.1% .1% .1%
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .9% 1.8% 1.0%
2 Discord .5% .5%
3 Contracord .1%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord .2% .8% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord .3% 1.8% .1%
2 Discord .1% .2% .4% .1%
3 Contracord .1%
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 1.0% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord 4.2% 12.4% 1.0% .2% .3%
2 Discord .9% 1.8% 2.9% .5%
3 Contracord .1% .2% .1% .2%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 1.4% 3.4% .2% .3%
COHER. 2 Discord 1.1% .7% 1.3%
3 Contracord .1% .1% .2% .4%
1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 1 Accord .1% .1%
ACTION 0 Concord .2% .5%
COHER. 1 Accord .2% .4%
2 Discord .1%
COHER. 1 Accord .3% 1.6% .1%
2 Discord .1% .1% .1%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .6% .9%
COHER. 2 Discord .1% .1%
2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .3% .7%
2 Discord .1% .1% .1%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord .3% .7% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord .1% .9%
2 Discord .2% .2%
COHER. 1 Accord 3.8% 13.3% 1.0% .6%
2 Discord .2% .8% 1.0% .1%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 1.4% 5.8% .4% .1% .2%
COHER. 2 Discord .6% .5% 2.2% .4% .1%
3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 2.9% .1% .6%
ORGANISn COHER. 2 Discord .4%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 2.0% .1% .9%
Table 17A.8. Percentages for all Group Dimensions for Adolescent Group 1992.
460
AFFECT
0
STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 1.0% .1% 1.7%
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 1.0% .6% 4.2% 1.2%
2 Discord .1% .6% .6%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 1.7%
COHER. 1 Accord .5% 1.7% .1%
2 Discord .1% .2% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord .4% 5.5% 11.6% 1.7% .6%
2 Discord 3.1% 1.7% 1.0% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord 2.7% 5.4% 1.0% .2%
2 Discord 5.4% 2.5% 4.0% 1.0% .1%
3 Contracord 1.0% .2% .6% 1.2%
1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 1 Accord .2% .1%
ACTION 1 Accord .1%
2 Normative COHER. 1 Accord
ACTION .2%
3 Unorganised ACTION 2 Discord .1% .1%
COHER. 3 Contracord .2%
2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .1% .4%
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .1% .6% .1%
2 Discord .2%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 2.8% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord .8%
2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 1.3% 6.2% .2% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord 1.3% 2.3% .1%
2 Discord 1.8% 1.3% 1.2% .1%
3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 2.2% .2% .2%
ACTION 1 Accord .6% 1.3%
COHER.
Table 17A.9. Percentages for all Group Dimensions for Adolescent Group 1993.
461
AFFECT
0
STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .1% 2.7% .1%
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .2% 4.2%
2 Discord .5%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 2.0% 5.8% 27.6% 1.0%
COHER. 1 Accord 1.8% 10.8% .2%
2 Discord .9% 2.3% 1.7%
COHER. 1 Accord .4% 5.9% .7% .1% .5%
2 Discord .2% .7% .5%
3 Contracord .1%
3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord .1%
COHER. 1 Accord .6% 2.1% .2%
2 Discord .4% .4%
1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 1 Accord .2%
ACTION 0 Concord .9%
COHER. 1 Accord .2%
2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord .4%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .1%
2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational COHER.
ACTION 1 Accord 1.0% .9%
ORGANISn COHER. 2 Discord .1%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord .7% .9% 3.8%
COHER. 1 Accord .4% .9% .1%
2 Discord .4%
COHER. 1 Accord .2% .4% 3.1% .2% .1%
2 Discord .2% .6%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .6% 1.3% .2% .1%
3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 2.3% .4%
ACTION 1 Accord 1.8% .1%
COHER.
Table 17A.10. Percentages for all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1996.
Frequency, percentage, rank and cumulative percentage for all 180 states is
given in Table 17A.11 below.
462
State State Frequency Percentage Rank Cumulative State State Frequency Percen Rank Cumulative
No Percentage No tage Percentage
1 0120 681 10.70 1.0 10.70 91 3252 8 .10 90.0 0.0
2 0221 467 7.40 2.0 18.10 92 3322 8 .10 90.0 0.0
3 2221 398 6.30 3.0 24.40 93 0223 7 .10 94.5 0.0
4 0020 286 4.50 4.0 28.90 94 1111 7 .10 94.5 0.0
5 2120 267 4.20 5.0 33.10 95 2010 7 .10 94.5 0.0
6 0121 249 3.90 6.0 37.00 96 2130 7 .10 94.5 0.0
7 0321 192 3.00 7.0 40.00 97 0113 6 .10 100.0 0.0
8 0021 177 2.80 8.0 42.80 98 1110 6 .10 100.0 0.0
9 2321 169 2.70 9.0 45.50 99 2012 6 .10 100.0 0.0
10 0110 166 2.60 10.0 48.10 100 2313 6 .10 100.0 0.0
11 2121 148 2.30 11.0 50.40 101 2343 6 .10 100.0 0.0
12 0211 131 2.10 12.0 52.20 102 2351 6 .10 100.0 0.0
13 0312 127 2.00 13.0 54.00 103 3352 6 .10 100.0 0.0
14 0332 105 1.70 14.0 55.70 104 0033 5 .10 107.0 0.0
15 3221 97 1.50 15.0 57.20 105 0213 5 .10 107.0 0.0
16 0232 90 1.40 16.5 58.60 106 1231 5 .10 107.0 0.0
17 0311 90 1.40 16.5 60.00 107 1232 5 .10 107.0 0.0
18 0220 82 1.30 18.0 61.30 108 1332 5 .10 107.0 0.0
19 2211 72 1.10 19.0 62.40 109 1333 5 .10 107.0 0.0
20 0322 71 1.10 20.0 63.50 110 2233 5 .10 107.0 0.0
21 0222 68 1.10 21.0 64.60 111 0023 4 .10 115.5 0.0
22 1221 67 1.10 22.5 65.70 112 0123 4 .10 115.5 0.0
23 3321 67 1.10 22.5 66.80 113 0241 4 .10 115.5 0.0
24 1120 61 1.00 24.0 67.80 114 0310 4 .10 115.5 0.0
25 2100 58 .90 25.5 68.70 115 1312 4 .10 115.5 0.0
26 2332 58 .90 25.5 69.60 116 1322 4 .10 115.5 0.0
27 2322 57 .90 27.0 70.50 117 2112 4 .10 115.5 0.0
28 0031 55 .90 28.5 71.40 118 2143 4 .10 115.5 0.0
29 0032 55 .90 28.5 72.30 119 2212 4 .10 115.5 0.0
30 0212 53 .80 30.0 73.10 120 3232 4 .10 115.5 0.0
31 0122 52 .80 31.0 73.90 121 0012 3 .00 127.0 0.0
32 1100 51 .80 32.5 74.70 122 0043 3 .00 127.0 0.0
33 2021 51 .80 32.5 79.50 123 0133 3 .00 127.0 0.0
34 0231 46 .70 34.5 76.20 124 0201 3 .00 127.0 0.0
35 3351 46 .70 34.5 76.90 125 1011 3 .00 127.0 0.0
36 0010 44 .70 36.5 77.60 126 1101 3 .00 127.0 0.0
37 2311 44 .70 36.5 78.30 127 1123 3 .00 127.0 0.0
38 0132 42 .70 38.5 79.00 128 1130 3 .00 127.0 0.0
39 1121 42 .70 38.5 79.70 129 1343 3 .00 127.0 0.0
40 0111 41 .60 40.5 80.30 130 2022 3 .00 127.0 0.0
41 2232 41 .60 40.5 80.90 131 2323 3 .00 127.0 0.0
42 2020 40 .60 42.0 81.50 132 2341 3 .00 127.0 0.0
43 2031 38 .60 43.0 82.10 133 3241 3 .00 127.0 0.0
44 2122 36 .60 44.5 82.70 134 0142 2 .00 140.5 0.0
45 2312 36 .60 44.5 0.0 135 1020 2 .00 140.5 0.0
46 0022 33 .50 46.5 0.0 136 1030 2 .00 140.5 0.0
47 0030 33 .50 46.5 0.0 137 1031 2 .00 140.5 0.0
48 0011 31 .50 48.5 0.0 138 1131 2 .00 140.5 0.0
49 2222 31 .50 48.5 0.0 139 1220 2 .00 140.5 0.0
50 2231 30 .50 50.0 0.0 140 1233 2 .00 140.5 0.0
51 2110 28 .40 51.0 0.0 141 1342 2 .00 140.5 0.0
52 0343 27 .40 52.0 0.0 142 2033 2 .00 140.5 0.0
53 0251 25 .40 53.0 0.0 143 2131 2 .00 140.5 0.0
463
54 0333 23 .40 55.0 0.0 144 2133 2 .00 140.5 0.0

55 1321 23 .40 55.0 0.0 145 2141 2 .00 140.5 0.0
56 2220 23 .40 55.0 0.0 146 2201 2 .00 140.5 0.0
57 0112 22 .30 57.5 0.0 147 2352 2 .00 140.5 0.0
58 0130 22 .30 57.5 0.0 148 0040 1 .00 164.0 0.0
59 2333 21 .30 59.0 0.0 149 0042 1 .00 164.0 0.0
60 3231 20 .30 60.0 0.0 150 0050 1 .00 164.0 0.0
61 0100 19 .30 62.0 0.0 151 0101 1 .00 164.0 0.0
62 0331 19 .30 62.0 0.0 152 0140 1 .00 164.0 0.0
63 2132 19 .30 62.0 0.0 153 0152 1 .00 164.0 0.0
64 2111 16 .30 64.0 0.0 154 0230 1 .00 164.0 0.0
65 0131 15 .20 66.0 0.0 155 0320 1 .00 164.0 0.0
66 0313 15 .20 66.0 0.0 156 0330 1 .00 164.0 0.0
67 2032 15 .20 66.0 0.0 157 0341 1 .00 164.0 0.0
68 0342 14 .20 69.5 0.0 158 0352 1 .00 164.0 0.0
69 1211 14 .20 69.5 0.0 159 1041 1 .00 164.0 0.0
70 2331 14 .20 69.5 0.0 160 1133 1 .00 164.0 0.0
71 3251 14 .20 69.5 0.0 161 1200 1 .00 164.0 0.0
72 0351 13 .20 72.5 0.0 162 1212 1 .00 164.0 0.0
73 1021 13 .20 72.5 0.0 163 1223 1 .00 164.0 0.0
74 0243 12 .20 75.0 0.0 164 1243 1 .00 164.0 0.0
75 1311 12 .20 75.0 0.0 165 1313 1 .00 164.0 0.0
76 2251 12 .20 75.0 0.0 166 2000 1 .00 164.0 0.0
77 0233 11 .20 78.5 0.0 167 2023 1 .00 164.0 0.0
78 1222 11 .20 78.5 0.0 168 2043 1 .00 164.0 0.0
79 2342 11 .20 78.5 0.0 169 2113 1 .00 164.0 0.0
80 3331 11 .20 78.5 0.0 170 2123 1 .00 164.0 0.0
81 0000 10 .20 82.0 0.0 171 2140 1 .00 164.0 0.0
82 0210 10 .20 82.0 0.0 172 2142 1 .00 164.0 0.0
83 3332 10 .20 82.0 0.0 173 2150 1 .00 164.0 0.0
84 0323 9 .10 85.5 0.0 174 2210 1 .00 164.0 0.0
85 2011 9 .10 85.5 0.0 175 2241 1 .00 164.0 0.0
86 2030 9 .10 85.5 0.0 176 2243 1 .00 164.0 0.0
87 2223 9 .10 85.5 0.0 177 2252 1 .00 164.0 0.0
88 0001 8 .10 90.0 0.0 178 2320 1 .00 164.0 0.0
89 0143 8 .10 90.0 0.0 179 2340 1 .00 164.0 0.0
90 0242 8 .10 90.0 0.0 180 3222 1 .00 164.0 0.0
Table 17A.11. Frequencies and percentages of Group States for all Groups (shown as
category values in the order Structure, Cognitive Organization, Affect, Action
Coherence).
Group Development.
Tables 18A.1 – 18A.5 show the percentages of stable and positive or negative
changes in categories in successive minutes. The calculations are made by computing
variables for each dimension that compare each minute in each session (except the first
minute) with the preceding one and assign it a value of –1 if there was a negative change
(to a lower rated category), 0 if there was no change and +1 if there was a positive change
(to a higher rated category). The graphs in Figures 18.1 – 18.5 were drawn using the
464
value of the 0 (no change) percentage as an indication of stability. Tables 18A.1 – 18A.5
show the percentages of stability and change for each dimension for each group.
Stability of Structure Stability of Cognition Stability of Affect Stability of Action

-1 0 1 0 1 -1 -1 0 1
Prestructure
Prestructure
Prestructure1 PrecognPrecogn =Precogn > Preaffect0 Preaffect
1 Preaffect
Preaction <
Preaction =
Preaction >
< Structure= Structure> Structure< Cognorg Cognorg Ccognorg < Affect = Affect > Affect Action Action Action
SESS 1 13.0% 72.2% 14.8% 14.8% 68.5% 16.7% 14.8% 70.4% 14.8% 9.3% 79.6% 11.1%
2 3.4% 91.5% 5.1% 15.3% 69.5% 15.3% 18.6% 62.7% 18.6% 13.6% 72.9% 13.6%
3 3.4% 91.4% 5.2% 12.1% 77.6% 10.3% 19.0% 63.8% 17.2% 15.5% 69.0% 15.5%
4 8.5% 81.4% 10.2% 23.7% 52.5% 23.7% 28.8% 45.8% 25.4% 28.8% 42.4% 28.8%
5 15.3% 69.5% 15.3% 16.9% 62.7% 20.3% 16.9% 64.4% 18.6% 18.6% 64.4% 16.9%
6 5.4% 89.3% 5.4% 8.9% 82.1% 8.9% 7.1% 82.1% 10.7% 16.1% 67.9% 16.1%
7 19.3% 63.2% 17.5% 12.3% 73.7% 14.0% 26.3% 49.1% 24.6% 26.3% 45.6% 28.1%
8 13.6% 74.6% 11.9% 8.5% 83.1% 8.5% 11.9% 76.3% 11.9% 6.8% 84.7% 8.5%
9 3.5% 89.5% 7.0% 5.3% 86.0% 8.8% 24.6% 54.4% 21.1% 22.8% 54.4% 22.8%
10 1.7% 96.6% 1.7% 19.0% 69.0% 12.1% 13.8% 72.4% 13.8% 8.6% 81.0% 10.3%
11 11.5% 77.0% 11.5% 19.7% 60.7% 19.7% 24.6% 39.3% 36.1% 23.0% 54.1% 23.0%
12 98.3% 1.7% 8.6% 82.8% 8.6% 17.2% 65.5% 17.2% 5.2% 87.9% 6.9%
13 14.8% 70.4% 14.8% 16.7% 66.7% 16.7% 29.6% 46.3% 24.1% 22.2% 53.7% 24.1%
14 12.5% 73.2% 14.3% 21.4% 60.7% 17.9% 17.9% 60.7% 21.4% 12.5% 73.2% 14.3%
15 3.4% 93.2% 3.4% 11.9% 78.0% 10.2% 11.9% 76.3% 11.9% 6.8% 86.4% 6.8%
16 100.0% 6.9% 86.2% 6.9% 19.0% 62.1% 19.0% 98.3% 1.7%
17 10.6% 76.6% 12.8% 19.1% 63.8% 17.0% 19.1% 63.8% 17.0% 25.5% 51.1% 23.4%
18 3.7% 88.9% 7.4% 9.3% 79.6% 11.1% 9.3% 77.8% 13.0% 3.7% 88.9% 7.4%
19 12.1% 79.3% 8.6% 12.1% 77.6% 10.3% 17.2% 69.0% 13.8% 13.8% 70.7% 15.5%
20 11.3% 79.0% 9.7% 17.7% 71.0% 11.3% 21.0% 61.3% 17.7% 11.3% 79.0% 9.7%
21 3.6% 91.1% 5.4% 10.7% 75.0% 14.3% 10.7% 76.8% 12.5% 8.9% 78.6% 12.5%
22 17.9% 67.9% 14.3% 16.1% 69.6% 14.3% 12.5% 73.2% 14.3% 16.1% 66.1% 17.9%
23 3.6% 92.7% 3.6% 3.6% 92.7% 3.6% 7.3% 85.5% 7.3% 1.8% 96.4% 1.8%
24 1.8% 92.7% 5.5% 3.6% 90.9% 5.5% 18.2% 65.5% 16.4% 10.9% 80.0% 9.1%
25 5.3% 89.5% 5.3% 19.3% 63.2% 17.5% 14.0% 70.2% 15.8% 5.3% 89.5% 5.3%
26 13.2% 73.6% 13.2% 9.4% 84.9% 5.7% 22.6% 58.5% 18.9% 5.7% 88.7% 5.7%
27 100.0% 19.3% 57.9% 22.8% 17.5% 66.7% 15.8% 15.8% 61.4% 22.8%
28 100.0% 19.7% 65.2% 15.2% 19.7% 62.1% 18.2% 9.1% 80.3% 10.6%
29 5.7% 88.7% 5.7% 5.7% 86.8% 7.5% 17.0% 67.9% 15.1% 15.1% 66.0% 18.9%
30 16.7% 65.0% 18.3% 23.3% 60.0% 16.7% 21.7% 53.3% 25.0% 26.7% 48.3% 25.0%
31 12.7% 76.4% 10.9% 21.8% 61.8% 16.4% 16.4% 69.1% 14.5% 20.0% 56.4% 23.6%
32 9.3% 79.6% 11.1% 16.7% 63.0% 20.4% 16.7% 64.8% 18.5% 16.7% 64.8% 18.5%
33 10.2% 79.7% 10.2% 13.6% 67.8% 18.6% 13.6% 72.9% 13.6% 15.3% 67.8% 16.9%
Table 18A.1. Stability of Group Dimensions as percentage of Sessions for 1988.

465

-1 0 1 0 1 -1 -1 0 1
Prestructure
Prestructure
Prestructure1 PrecognPrecogn =Precogn > Preaffect0 Preaffect
1 PreaffecPreaction <
Preaction =
Preaction >
< Structure= Structure> Structure< Cognorg Cognorg Ccognorg < Affect = Affect > Affect Action Action Action
SESS 1 12.1% 74.2% 13.6% 10.6% 78.8% 10.6% 1.5% 95.5% 3.0% 7.6% 86.4% 6.1%
2 12.9% 75.8% 11.3% 22.6% 53.2% 24.2% 9.7% 82.3% 8.1% 16.1% 64.5% 19.4%
5 4.8% 91.9% 3.2% 16.1% 72.6% 11.3% 11.3% 77.4% 11.3% 19.4% 64.5% 16.1%
6 14.3% 73.0% 12.7% 11.1% 76.2% 12.7% 17.5% 63.5% 19.0% 28.6% 42.9% 28.6%
7 12.1% 74.1% 13.8% 6.9% 86.2% 6.9% 15.5% 70.7% 13.8% 19.0% 63.8% 17.2%
8 8.6% 84.5% 6.9% 8.6% 79.3% 12.1% 3.4% 93.1% 3.4% 5.2% 86.2% 8.6%
9 3.8% 92.5% 3.8% 5.7% 86.8% 7.5% 9.4% 81.1% 9.4% 9.4% 81.1% 9.4%
10 9.1% 80.0% 10.9% 5.5% 87.3% 7.3% 7.3% 83.6% 9.1% 10.9% 76.4% 12.7%
11 11.7% 75.0% 13.3% 18.3% 61.7% 20.0% 10.0% 80.0% 10.0% 15.0% 68.3% 16.7%
12 16.9% 69.5% 13.6% 1.7% 94.9% 3.4% 6.8% 84.7% 8.5% 10.2% 79.7% 10.2%
16 15.5% 69.0% 15.5% 10.3% 77.6% 12.1% 6.9% 86.2% 6.9% 8.6% 82.8% 8.6%
17 5.3% 89.5% 5.3% 7.0% 86.0% 7.0% 17.5% 59.6% 22.8% 19.3% 57.9% 22.8%
18 10.5% 78.9% 10.5% 3.5% 89.5% 7.0% 7.0% 87.7% 5.3% 3.5% 91.2% 5.3%
19 17.9% 64.1% 17.9% 7.7% 84.6% 7.7% 33.3% 38.5% 28.2% 17.9% 61.5% 20.5%
21 16.1% 69.6% 14.3% 17.9% 64.3% 17.9% 23.2% 55.4% 21.4% 28.6% 42.9% 28.6%
22 21.7% 56.7% 21.7% 18.3% 60.0% 21.7% 10.0% 80.0% 10.0% 23.3% 53.3% 23.3%
23 16.7% 68.3% 15.0% 23.3% 55.0% 21.7% 20.0% 60.0% 20.0% 20.0% 56.7% 23.3%
24 14.0% 70.2% 15.8% 12.3% 73.7% 14.0% 15.8% 71.9% 12.3% 14.0% 73.7% 12.3%
25 20.7% 60.3% 19.0% 22.4% 55.2% 22.4% 17.2% 65.5% 17.2% 17.2% 63.8% 19.0%
26 5.2% 89.7% 5.2% 10.3% 74.1% 15.5% 8.6% 84.5% 6.9% 13.8% 69.0% 17.2%
27 8.3% 83.3% 8.3% 13.3% 75.0% 11.7% 10.0% 78.3% 11.7% 20.0% 63.3% 16.7%
28 11.5% 75.4% 13.1% 14.8% 68.9% 16.4% 14.8% 68.9% 16.4% 21.3% 55.7% 23.0%
29 7.7% 84.6% 7.7% 12.8% 69.2% 17.9% 17.9% 66.7% 15.4% 17.9% 61.5% 20.5%
30 10.5% 84.2% 5.3% 21.1% 63.2% 15.8% 31.6% 36.8% 31.6% 26.3% 47.4% 26.3%
31 8.3% 79.2% 12.5% 12.5% 70.8% 16.7% 16.7% 66.7% 16.7% 16.7% 70.8% 12.5%

466

-1 0 1 0 1 -1 -1 0 1
Prestructure
Prestructure
Prestructure
1 PrecognPrecogn =Precogn > Preaffect0 Preaffec PreaffecPreaction Preaction
< Preaction
= >
< Structure
= Structure
> Structure< Cognorg Cognorg Ccognorg < Affect = Affect > Affect Action Action Action
SESS 3 16.0% 70.0% 14.0% 12.0% 78.0% 10.0% 100.0% 4.0% 94.0% 2.0%
4 3.5% 94.7% 1.8% 8.8% 82.5% 8.8% 15.8% 68.4% 15.8% 12.3% 77.2% 10.5%
6 11.1% 75.9% 13.0% 7.4% 83.3% 9.3% 13.0% 75.9% 11.1% 9.3% 79.6% 11.1%
7 18.9% 58.5% 22.6% 11.3% 77.4% 11.3% 26.4% 49.1% 24.5% 20.8% 58.5% 20.8%
8 18.5% 63.0% 18.5% 16.7% 66.7% 16.7% 22.2% 55.6% 22.2% 22.2% 55.6% 22.2%
11 7.4% 83.3% 9.3% 11.1% 77.8% 11.1% 20.4% 61.1% 18.5% 13.0% 74.1% 13.0%
12 3.9% 90.2% 5.9% 5.9% 88.2% 5.9% 25.5% 49.0% 25.5% 23.5% 51.0% 25.5%
13 25.0% 55.8% 19.2% 11.5% 76.9% 11.5% 21.2% 57.7% 21.2% 15.4% 69.2% 15.4%
14 18.5% 63.0% 18.5% 18.5% 61.1% 20.4% 25.9% 51.9% 22.2% 16.7% 68.5% 14.8%
15 5.1% 89.8% 5.1% 8.5% 84.7% 6.8% 30.5% 40.7% 28.8% 20.3% 61.0% 18.6%
16 15.4% 69.2% 15.4% 19.2% 65.4% 15.4% 7.7% 82.7% 9.6% 17.3% 63.5% 19.2%
17 13.8% 72.4% 13.8% 3.4% 93.1% 3.4% 17.2% 63.8% 19.0% 17.2% 65.5% 17.2%
18 10.3% 79.3% 10.3% 6.9% 84.5% 8.6% 13.8% 72.4% 13.8% 15.5% 70.7% 13.8%
19 10.9% 78.2% 10.9% 14.5% 69.1% 16.4% 23.6% 45.5% 30.9% 18.2% 60.0% 21.8%
22 14.3% 73.2% 12.5% 7.1% 87.5% 5.4% 7.1% 83.9% 8.9% 8.9% 83.9% 7.1%
24 10.0% 80.0% 10.0% 8.0% 84.0% 8.0% 10.0% 80.0% 10.0% 6.0% 90.0% 4.0%
25 8.0% 84.0% 8.0% 8.0% 80.0% 12.0% 20.0% 60.0% 20.0% 12.0% 74.0% 14.0%
26 5.3% 87.7% 7.0% 10.5% 77.2% 12.3% 14.0% 68.4% 17.5% 14.0% 70.2% 15.8%
29 22.0% 55.9% 22.0% 20.3% 62.7% 16.9% 18.6% 61.0% 20.3% 8.5% 84.7% 6.8%
30 14.8% 68.5% 16.7% 14.8% 70.4% 14.8% 25.9% 50.0% 24.1% 22.2% 55.6% 22.2%
31 13.2% 69.8% 17.0% 15.1% 66.0% 18.9% 18.9% 62.3% 18.9% 13.2% 73.6% 13.2%
33 13.0% 75.9% 11.1% 13.0% 74.1% 13.0% 1.9% 94.4% 3.7% 7.4% 83.3% 9.3%
34 11.3% 75.5% 13.2% 13.2% 73.6% 13.2% 18.9% 62.3% 18.9% 13.2% 73.6% 13.2%
35 13.5% 73.1% 13.5% 19.2% 63.5% 17.3% 23.1% 53.8% 23.1% 25.0% 50.0% 25.0%
36 22.6% 56.6% 20.8% 18.9% 62.3% 18.9% 13.2% 71.7% 15.1% 100.0%
37 5.5% 87.3% 7.3% 5.5% 89.1% 5.5% 14.5% 72.7% 12.7% 5.5% 87.3% 7.3%
38 8.3% 85.4% 6.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

467

-1 0 1 0 1 -1 -1 0 1
PrestructurePrestructurePrestructure-1 Precogn Precogn = Precogn > Preaffect 0 Preaffect 1 Preaffect Preaction < Preaction = Preaction >
< Structure = Structure > Structure < Cognorg Cognorg Ccognorg < Affect = Affect > Affect Action Action Action
SESS 1 16.7% 59.5% 23.8% 26.2% 47.6% 26.2% 11.9% 76.2% 11.9% 16.7% 71.4% 11.9%
3 8.7% 82.6% 8.7% 8.7% 80.4% 10.9% 23.9% 54.3% 21.7% 8.7% 80.4% 10.9%
5 4.9% 90.2% 4.9% 9.8% 80.5% 9.8% 17.1% 65.9% 17.1% 19.5% 65.9% 14.6%
7 2.1% 93.6% 4.3% 17.0% 70.2% 12.8% 23.4% 53.2% 23.4% 29.8% 42.6% 27.7%
8 5.5% 89.1% 5.5% 9.1% 81.8% 9.1% 27.3% 49.1% 23.6% 21.8% 54.5% 23.6%
11 8.9% 84.4% 6.7% 17.8% 64.4% 17.8% 20.0% 57.8% 22.2% 8.9% 82.2% 8.9%
12 11.1% 75.6% 13.3% 13.3% 68.9% 17.8% 11.1% 77.8% 11.1% 13.3% 71.1% 15.6%
17 10.4% 79.2% 10.4% 10.4% 81.3% 8.3% 22.9% 54.2% 22.9% 12.5% 75.0% 12.5%
18 2.0% 96.1% 2.0% 15.7% 74.5% 9.8% 11.8% 76.5% 11.8% 3.9% 92.2% 3.9%
21 24.0% 56.0% 20.0% 12.0% 76.0% 12.0% 16.0% 68.0% 16.0% 100.0%
22 8.0% 82.0% 10.0% 16.0% 64.0% 20.0% 26.0% 44.0% 30.0% 30.0% 38.0% 32.0%
23 5.9% 88.2% 5.9% 15.7% 68.6% 15.7% 11.8% 78.4% 9.8% 19.6% 60.8% 19.6%
24 10.6% 78.7% 10.6% 21.3% 59.6% 19.1% 6.4% 85.1% 8.5% 8.5% 80.9% 10.6%
25 100.0% 19.1% 63.8% 17.0% 27.7% 46.8% 25.5% 14.9% 70.2% 14.9%
26 12.8% 78.7% 8.5% 12.8% 72.3% 14.9% 2.1% 93.6% 4.3% 6.4% 85.1% 8.5%
28 3.9% 90.2% 5.9% 13.7% 68.6% 17.6% 17.6% 66.7% 15.7% 21.6% 54.9% 23.5%
29 4.1% 91.8% 4.1% 12.2% 79.6% 8.2% 22.4% 57.1% 20.4% 16.3% 69.4% 14.3%
30 4.8% 90.5% 4.8% 11.9% 76.2% 11.9% 19.0% 54.8% 26.2% 14.3% 71.4% 14.3%
Table 18A.4. Stability of Group Dimensions as percentage of Session for 1993.
Stability of Structure Stability of Cognition Stability of Affect Stability of Action Preac/action

-1 0 1 0 1 -1 -1 0 1
Prestructur
Prestructur Precogn =Precogn >Preaffect0 Preaffec
Prestructur1 Precogn 1 Preaffec
Preaction Preaction
< Preaction
= >
< Structure > Structure< CognorgCognorg Ccognorg < Affect = Affect > Affect Action
= Structure Action Action
SESS 1 15.7% 70.6% 13.7% 11.8% 74.5% 13.7% 5.9% 86.3% 7.8% 11.8% 74.5% 13.7%
3 3.8% 88.5% 7.7% 9.6% 80.8% 9.6% 19.2% 61.5% 19.2% 26.9% 46.2% 26.9%
4 11.3% 79.2% 9.4% 9.4% 83.0% 7.5% 17.0% 66.0% 17.0% 15.1% 71.7% 13.2%
6 13.2% 71.7% 15.1% 9.4% 81.1% 9.4% 15.1% 69.8% 15.1% 11.3% 77.4% 11.3%
7 12.5% 75.0% 12.5% 10.4% 77.1% 12.5% 2.1% 95.8% 2.1% 6.3% 87.5% 6.3%
10 11.8% 76.5% 11.8% 15.7% 66.7% 17.6% 7.8% 80.4% 11.8% 13.7% 70.6% 15.7%
11 10.4% 81.3% 8.3% 18.8% 64.6% 16.7% 16.7% 66.7% 16.7% 10.4% 77.1% 12.5%
12 4.3% 89.4% 6.4% 10.6% 76.6% 12.8% 19.1% 66.0% 14.9% 19.1% 59.6% 21.3%
13 9.4% 79.2% 11.3% 13.2% 71.7% 15.1% 17.0% 67.9% 15.1% 18.9% 62.3% 18.9%
15 15.7% 70.4% 13.9% 20.4% 60.2% 19.4% 14.8% 69.4% 15.7% 13.0% 74.1% 13.0%
18 4.3% 91.3% 4.3% 23.9% 54.3% 21.7% 2.2% 95.7% 2.2% 19.6% 58.7% 21.7%
25 100.0% 12.0% 78.0% 10.0% 16.0% 70.0% 14.0% 12.0% 78.0% 10.0%
29 100.0% 18.8% 66.7% 14.6% 10.4% 79.2% 10.4% 18.8% 64.6% 16.7%
31 12.0% 74.0% 14.0% 12.0% 76.0% 12.0% 8.0% 84.0% 8.0% 12.0% 76.0% 12.0%
35 5.2% 89.7% 5.2% 6.9% 87.9% 5.2% 6.9% 87.9% 5.2% 3.4% 93.1% 3.4%
Table 18A.5. Stability of Group Dimensions as percentage of Session for 1996.

468
Session Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean

1988 1990 1992 1993 1990
1 80.18 83.7 63.7 76.5
2 74.15 69.0
3 75.45 85.5 74.4 69.3
4 55.53 80.7 75.0
5 65.25 76.6 60.9
6 80.35 63.9 78.7 75.0
7 57.90 73.7 60.9 64.9 83.9
8 79.68 85.8 60.2 68.6
9 71.08 85.4
10 79.75 81.8 73.6
11 57.78 66.1 74.1 72.2 72.4
12 83.63 82.2 69.6 73.4 72.9
13 59.28 64.9 70.3
14 66.95 61.1
15 83.48 69.1 68.5
16 86.65 78.9 70.2
17 63.83 73.3 73.7 72.4
18 83.80 86.8 76.7 84.8 75.0
19 74.15 62.2 63.2
20 72.58
21 80.38 58.1 75.0
22 69.20 62.5 82.1 57.0
23 91.83 60.0 74.0
24 82.28 72.4 83.5 76.1 81.5
25 78.10 61.2 74.5 70.2
26 76.43 79.3 75.9 82.4
27 71.50 75.0 .
28 76.90 67.2 70.1
29 77.35 70.5 66.1 74.5 77.6
30 56.65 57.9 61.1 73.2
31 65.93 71.9 67.9 77.5
32 68.05
33 72.05 81.9
34 71.3
35 60.1 89.7
36 72.7
37 84.1
38 96.4
Table 18A.6. Means of percentage of stable minutes for Group Dimensions for each
group.
Tables for Structure Hypotheses.

469
Structure
Whole
Grp Subgroups Subgp+Ind Individuals
Year 1 Cognitive Representational Row % 65.3% 4.0% 30.7%
Quartiles Organisation Systemic Row % 55.3% 9.8% 35.0%
Normative Row % 41.1% 6.1% 47.3% 5.5%
Unorganised Row % 43.1% 6.2% 34.8% 16.0%
Affect Contentment Row % 73.3% 26.7%
Joy Row % 66.9% 6.5% 26.6%
Interest Row % 43.0% 8.1% 42.8% 6.1%
Discontent Row % 53.5% 7.1% 35.3% 4.1%
Distress Row % 64.3% 35.7%
Boredom Row % 8.3% 25.0% 66.7%
Action Concord Row % 60.6% 7.9% 31.6%
Coherence Accord Row % 34.7% 8.6% 47.0% 9.7%
Discord Row % 62.3% 3.7% 31.5% 2.6%
Contracord Row % 68.1% 6.4% 25.5%
2 Cognitive Representational Row % 69.9% 1.4% 28.8%
Organisation Systemic Row % 69.6% 4.3% 26.0%
Normative Row % 62.0% 6.0% 27.0% 5.0%
Unorganised Row % 56.5% 2.4% 36.6% 4.5%
Affect Contentment Row % 55.6% 44.4%
Joy Row % 75.1% 2.6% 22.3%
Interest Row % 65.0% 4.9% 28.0% 2.0%
Discontent Row % 53.7% 3.2% 38.9% 4.2%
Distress Row % 62.5% 8.3% 29.2%
Boredom Row % 33.3% 16.7% 50.0%
Discord Row % 64.4% 2.0% 32.8% .8%
Contracord Row % 71.0% 6.5% 22.6%
Normative Row % 56.0% 8.9% 29.6% 5.5%
Unorganised Row % 51.4% 4.0% 32.2% 12.4%
Affect Contentment Row % 25.6% 60.5% 14.0%
Joy Row % 73.3% 6.7% 20.0%
Interest Row % 61.7% 5.6% 29.4% 3.3%
Discontent Row % 65.8% 1.5% 23.6% 9.0%
Distress Row % 56.7% 10.0% 33.3%
Boredom Row % 36.1% 63.9%
Discord Row % 65.3% 3.5% 26.0% 5.1%
Contracord Row % 68.2% 2.3% 29.5%
Normative Row % 57.5% 2.5% 26.2% 13.8%
Unorganised Row % 58.2% 4.4% 27.9% 9.5%
Affect Contentment Row % 6.4% 6.4% 87.2%
Joy Row % 74.8% 4.4% 20.8%
Interest Row % 68.0% 4.2% 22.6% 5.2%
Discontent Row % 65.8% 3.6% 26.7% 3.9%
Distress Row % 76.2% 4.8% 11.9% 7.1%
Boredom Row % 30.1% 21.7% 48.2%
Discord Row % 68.4% 3.5% 24.3% 3.8%
Contracord Row % 59.2% 9.2% 31.6%
Table 19A.1. Percentage of Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action Coherence in

Structure categories for all groups in each year quartile.
470
Number of Members Absent for All

Groups.
0 1 2 3
Year 1 Functional Subtable % 5.8% 1.6% 3.7%
Quartiles Limited Functional Subtable % 3.1% 5.9% 8.3%
Sociable Subtable % 35.3% 29.4% 24.6%
Limited Sociable Subtable % 22.7% 37.2% 38.1% 50.0%
Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 3.5% 3.9% 4.0%
Happy Conflict Subtable % 14.3% 10.9% 8.6% 50.0%
Productive Turmoil Subtable % 2.7% 1.0% .6%
Dysfunctional Subtable % 5.5% 6.8% 7.2%
Nominal Subtable % 7.1% 3.3% 4.9%
2 Functional Subtable % 4.4% 5.5% 6.9% 5.6%
Limited Functional Subtable % 3.3% 4.8% 1.7%
Sociable Subtable % 35.8% 47.5% 58.5% 55.6%
Limited Sociable Subtable % 24.2% 16.4% 17.3%
Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 3.9% 9.5% 5.2% 3.7%
Happy Conflict Subtable % 17.8% 9.0% 3.1%
Productive Turmoil Subtable % 2.7% 1.1% .3%
Nominal Subtable % .3% 1.5% .7% 35.2%
Productive Turmoil Subtable % 1.4% 4.1% 2.7% .7%
Nominal Subtable % .7% 2.3% 1.3% 38.1%
Limited Functional Subtable % 7.1% 3.4% .2% .6%
Productive Turmoil Subtable % 2.2% .8% 2.0% 3.9%
Dysfunctional Subtable % 10.6% 6.8% 4.5% 8.4%
Nominal Subtable % .5% 8.4% 12.5% 7.7%
Table 19A.2. Percentage of Condensed States for different absentees for all groups for
year quartiles.
Table 19A.2 indicates the dynamic observed for Whole only emerges toward the
middle of the year. In the early part of the year, Limited states show the trend most
471
clearly; Functional states decrease with loss of members and trends are generally
opposite to those found overall and by the end of the year. This suggests several
dynamics influence these figures. At the start of the year, the groups appear to function
better when all are present and loss of members is a threat, creating increased Limited
states but reducing whole group functioning and Unsociable states. This may be
because the groups have not yet achieved a secure collective identity and are still trying
to consolidate their existence. The effect of absentees in reducing conflict and allowing
groups to function better is greatest in the middle two quartiles, suggesting the dynamic
of removing problems by absentees is greatest then. However, by the end of the year,
groups again are most functional with everyone present. Some groups had lost
members and were smaller then, but their capacity for Functional activity is greater and
they were more active and better able to perform with all members present.
Tables for Dynamic Hypotheses.
Joy Interest Dis- Distress Concord Accord Discord Contra-

content cord
Functional +9% -8% +40% -10% +11% +46% =
L. Functional -29% ~ ~ = +10% = =
Sociable -5% -3% +31% = ~ -6% +29% =
L. Sociable +18% -9% +37% ~ ~ ~ +11% =
Unhappy Coop ~ +32% -36% ~ ~ ~ ~ =
Happy Conflict -6% ~ ~ ~ +30% ~ -30% =
Produc Turmoil = ~ -36% = ~ ~ -33% ~
Dysfunctional +39% ~ -4% ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Nominal = +20% -18% = ~ = -25% -46%
Coherence categories over three minutes for 1988.

content cord
Functional ~ +12% = -30% ~ = ~
L. Functional +40% -12% +85% = -10% ~ +42% =
Sociable ~ ~ -24% +40% -3% ~ ~ +60%
L Sociable ~ ~ +24% ~ +6% -9% +9% +51%
Unhappy Coop = +21% = ~ ~ ~ ~
Happy Conflict -11% +5% -13% +41% ~ ~ ~ ~
Produc Turmoil ~ ~ = = ~ ~ =
Dysfunctional = +19% -14% -46% = ~ ~ -24%
Nominal = = = ~
472

content cord
Functional ~ ~ +42% = -13% +18% ~ =
L Functional +7% -15% = +10% -16% =
Sociable -10% -4% +22% +63% ~ -6% +27% ~
L Sociable ~ -3% ~ +46% ~ -3% ~ +73%
Unhappy Coop +36% ~ +27% ~ = ~ ~ =
Happy Conflict -25% +7% ~ ~ ~ +11% -8% =
Produc Turmoil = = = -22% =
Dysfunctional +25% +14% ~ ~ = +22% -14% -53%
Nominal = +8% = +63% ~ -30%

content cord
Functional = -10% ~ -31% ~ ~
L Functional = = = = = =
Sociable +10% -13% +39% ~ ~ -6% +23% =
L Sociable ~ ~ ~ = ~ -11% +33%
Unhappy Coop. ~ +21% -47% ~ = -19% ~ ~
Happy Conflict -24% ~ +30% ~ -60% -31% -26% ~
Produc Turmoil = = = = = ~ =
Dysfunctional +7% +26% -32% ~ +60% +28% -13% -35%
Nominal -4% = +87% ~ =

content cord
Functional = ~ = +9% -9% =
L Functional -6% = = = =
Sociable ~ ~ ~ = -6% +9% ~ ~
L Sociable ~ ~ = = +16% -13% ~ =
Unhappy Coop. ~ +13% ~ = ~ -25% +63% =
Happy Conflict ~ ~ ~ = +5% -15% +18% =
Produc. Turmoil ~ +20% = ~ ~ =
Dysfunctional = ~ = +66% = =
Nominal = -3% = +87% ~ =
473
Affect
change +/-
Negative
Affect
change
Action Change 3 Negative change 23
mins Previous No change 228
Positive change 34
Positive change 29
min Previous No change 231
Positive change 25
Action Change Negative change 91
No change 184
Positive change 10
min Following No change 203
Positive change 67
mins Following No change 218
Positive change 34
Positive change 28
Table 20A.6. Frequencies of Action change three minutes before to three minutes after
negative Affect change for all Adolescent Groups, controlling for overlapping minutes.
In Table 20A.6, the instances of negative Action change do not increase

significantly in the three minutes before the minute in which there is Affect change
towards unpleasure. However, there is a threefold increase in negative action change in
the minute in which the affect change occurs, accompanied by a similar decrease in
positive action change. However, this is reversed in the minute after the affect change
when there is a decrease in negative and increase in positive action change. This
suggests that in the pooled data of all adolescent groups, there is no support for the
hypothesis that Action precedes Affect change. However, it confirms that Action
change accompanies Affect change and the tendency is reversed in the following
minute.
This is not the same in the Latency group, indicated in Table 20A.7. Although
the numbers are smaller since only one group is recorded, there is a twofold increase in
474
negative Action change in the minute preceding negative Affect change. This is
followed by a further increase of negative Action change in the minute of Affect change
and then reversed in the minute after the change. The Latency group provides some
support for the hypothesis of Action preceding Affect change. However it is only
limited since there is a further increase in the minute of change.
Affect
change +/-
Negative
Affect
change
Positive change 7
Positive change 18
min Previous No change 37
Positive change 6
Action Change Negative change 24
No change 32
Positive change 2
min Following No change 37
Positive change 17
Positive change 14
Positive change 11
Table 20A.7. Frequencies of Action change three minutes before to three minutes after
negative Affect change for the 1990 Latency Group, controlling for overlapping
minutes.
Graphs of Stability and Quality.

The values of Condensed States have been put in a negative form to allow the
graph to place the highest-level states at the top (Functional = 0, Limited Functional = -
1, etc.).
475
YEAR: 1988
0
-1
Mean 9 Condensed States -2
-3
-4
-5
-6
-7
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33
SESSION
sessions: 7, 8, 11, 13, 21, 27 and 31.
YEAR: 1990
-1
-2
-3
Mean 9 Condensed States
-4
-5
-6
-7
1 5 7 9 11 16 18 21 23 25 27 29 31
2 6 8 10 12 17 19 22 24 26 28 30
SESSION
sessions: 5, 11, 19, 21, 28, 29 and 30.
476
YEAR: 1992
-1
-2

-3
-4
-5
-6
3 6 8 12 14 16 18 22 25 29 31 34 36 38
4 7 11 13 15 17 19 24 26 30 33 35 37
SESSION
sessions: 7, 11, 12, 14, 19, 22, 30, 31, 35 and 37.
YEAR: 1993
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6
1 3 5 7 8 11 12 17 18 21 22 23 24 25 26 28 29 30
SESSION
sessions: 5, 7, 8, 11, 17, 25, 29 and 30.
477
YEAR: 1988
100
90
80
%in(0,0) Stability of Constate
70
60
50
40
30
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
SESSION
crisis sessions: 7, 8, 11, 13, 21, 27 and 31.
YEAR: 1990
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
1 5 7 9 11 16 18 21 23 25 27 29 31
2 6 8 10 12 17 19 22 24 26 28 30
SESSION
crisis sessions: 5, 11, 19, 21, 28, 29 and 30.
478
YEAR: 1992
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
3 6 8 12 14 16 18 22 25 29 31 34 36 38
4 7 11 13 15 17 19 24 26 30 33 35 37
SESSION
crisis sessions: 7, 11, 12, 14, 19, 22, 30, 31, 35 and 37.
YEAR: 1993
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
1 3 5 7 8 11 12 17 18 21 22 23 24 25 26 28 29 30
SESSION
crisis sessions: 5, 7, 8, 11, 17, 25, 29 and 30.
In 1988, although session 7 has a low stability, sessions 8 and 21 have high
scores. Only sessions 11, 13 and 31 have significantly low scores. In 1990, only
sessions 19, 21 and 30 are low, but several others are on troughs: 11 and 19. In 1992,
sessions 7, 12, 14, 19 and 35 are low. In 1993, only session 7 is particularly low, but
sessions 17 and 30 are troughs.
479
Incidence in Preceding minute

Limited Unhappy Productive
Functional Sociable Limited Sociable Cooperation Happy Conflict Turmoil Dysfunctional
Row Row Row Row Row Row Row
Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
YEAR 1988 3 21.4% 1 7.1% 2 14.3% 2 14.3% 1 7.1% 5 35.7%
1990 1 5.9% 1 5.9% 3 17.6% 5 29.4% 2 11.8% 5 29.4%
1992 3 17.6% 2 11.8% 1 5.9% 5 29.4% 1 5.9% 5 29.4%
1993 2 12.5% 1 6.3% 6 37.5% 7 43.8%
1996 1 50.0% 1 50.0%
Total 1 1.5% 9 13.6% 7 10.6% 3 4.5% 19 28.8% 5 7.6% 22 33.3%
Table 20A.8. Frequency and Percentage of Condensed States in minute preceding

destructive crisis.
YEAR: 1990
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
%i Stability
20
10 % Constructive
0 States
1 5 7 9 11 16 18 21 23 25 27 29 31
2 6 8 10 12 17 19 22 24 26 28 30
SESSION

Constructive Condensed states for each session of 1990.
Adopting the <45% criterion for the 1990 group shown in Figure 20A.9, crisis
sessions for stability occur at session 6, 19, 21, 22, 25 and 30. Other significant troughs
of stability occur in sessions 2, 11 and 16. For quality of state, the crises occur only at
sessions 21, 23, 28, 31 according to the strict criterion, but significant troughs also occur
at sessions 6, and 7. The synchrony between these two dimensions seems to be in phase
for most of the year except for a few points at sessions 2, 23, 29 and 31.
480
YEAR: 1992
100
90
80
70
60
50
% Stability
40
% Constructive
30 States
3 6 8 12 14 16 18 22 25 29 31 34 36 38
4 7 11 13 15 17 19 24 26 30 33 35 37
SESSION

YEAR: 1993
100
90
80
70
60
50
40 % Stability
30 % Constructive
20 States
1 5 8 12 18 22 24 26 29
3 7 11 17 21 23 25 28 30
SESSION

In Figure 20A.10, the stability and quality for 1992 shows that according to the
strict criterion there are stability crises at session 7, 8, 13, 15, 30, 31 and 35. Another
481
trough occurs at session 19. For quality, strict criterion crises occur at sessions 14, 29,
and 35. Other troughs are at sessions 8, 12, 19 and 33. The synchrony is consistent
except for two points at session 13 and sessions 30 and 31.
The stability and quality of sessions for 1993 shown in Figure 20A.11 indicates
that there are strict criterion crises for stability in sessions 1, 7, 21, 22 and 28. Other
troughs are at 17 and 24. For quality, there are strict criterion crises at sessions 5, 7, 21,
28, 29 and 30. Another trough is at session 25. The synchrony is consistent except for
three points at sessions 17, 24 and 30.
Tables for therapists Interventions, Limits and Locomotion.
Limits by set
Therapists for
All Groups.
No Limit
Limit set
LAGS(STRUCTUR,1) Whole Grp Subtable % 60.1% 60.8%
Subgroups Subtable % 5.9% 5.9%
Subgp+Ind Subtable % 28.7% 31.3%
Individuals Subtable % 5.2% 2.0%
Structure Whole Grp Subtable % 60.3% 60.1%
LEADS(STRUCTUR,1) Whole Grp Subtable % 60.1% 61.3%
Table 21A.1. Percentage of Structure categories associated with Limits and No Limits
for all Groups for the minute in which the Limit is applied, the preceding minute,
“LAGS(STRUCTUR,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(STRUCTUR,1-3).”
482
Limits by set
Therapists for
All Groups.
No Limit
Limit set
LAGS(COGNORG,1) Representational Subtable % 16.6% 7.9%
Systemic Subtable % 37.7% 13.5%
Normative Subtable % 29.9% 31.3%
Unorganised Subtable % 15.8% 47.2%
Cognitive Organisation Representational Subtable % 17.1% 5.9%
LEADS(COGNORG,1) Representational Subtable % 16.5% 8.6%
Table 21A.2. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories associated with Limits

and No Limits for all Groups for the minute in which the Limit is applied, the preceding
minute, “LAGS(COGNOG,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(COGNOG,1-3).”
483
Limits by set
Therapists for
All Groups.
No Limit
Limit set
LAGS(AFFECT,1) Contentment Subtable % 2.9% .6%
Joy Subtable % 13.6% 28.5%
Interest Subtable % 66.9% 47.6%
Discontent Subtable % 12.8% 17.8%
Distress Subtable % 1.2% 5.1%
Boredom Subtable % 2.5% .4%
Affect Contentment Subtable % 2.9% .4%
LEADS(AFFECT,1) Contentment Subtable % 3.0% .3%
Boredom Subtable % 2.4% 1.0%
Table 21A.3. Percentage of Affect associated with Limits and No Limits for all Groups
for the minute in which the Limit is applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(AFFECT,1)”
and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(AFFECT,1-3).”
484
Limits by set
Therapists for
All Groups.
No Limit
Limit set
LAGS(ACTION,1) Concord Subtable % 35.1% 9.5%
Accord Subtable % 48.2% 46.7%
Discord Subtable % 14.5% 34.8%
Contracord Subtable % 2.2% 9.0%
Action Coherence Concord Subtable % 35.8% 6.2%
LEADS(ACTION,1) Concord Subtable % 35.6% 6.9%
Table 21A.4. Percentage of Action Coherence associated with Limits and No Limits for
all Groups for the minute in which the Limit is applied, the preceding minute,
“LAGS(ACTION,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(ACTION,1-3).”
485
for All Groups.
No
LAGS(STRUCTUR,1) Whole Grp Subtable % 60.9% 58.0%
Structure Whole Grp Subtable % 61.0% 57.6%
Table 21A.5. Percentage of Structure Categories associated with Locomotion and No

Locomotion by therapists for all Groups for the minute in which the Locomotion occurs,
the preceding minute, “LAGS(STRUCTUR,1)” and the succeeding three minutes
“LEADS(STRUCTUR,1-3).”
486
for All Groups.
No
LAGS(COGNORG,1) Representational Subtable % 17.4% 6.3%
Cognitive Organisation Representational Subtable % 17.8% 4.9%
Table 21A.6. Percentage of Cognitive Organization Categories associated with

Locomotion and no Locomotion by therapists for all groups for the minute in which the
Locomotion occurs, the preceding minute, “LAGS(COGNORG,1)” and the succeeding
three minutes, “LEADS(COGNORG,1-3).”
487
for All Groups.
No
LAGS(AFFECT,1) Contentment Subtable % 2.8% 1.4%
Affect Contentment Subtable % 2.8% 1.4%
LEADS(AFFECT,1) Contentment Subtable % 2.8% 1.3%
Table 21A.7. Percentage of Affect Categories associated with Locomotion and no

Locomotion by therapists for all groups for the minute in which the Locomotion occurs,
the preceding minute, “LAGS(AFFECT,1)” and the succeeding three minutes
“LEADS(AFFECT,1-3).”
488
for All Groups.
No
LAGS(ACTION,1) Concord Subtable % 35.5% 11.8%
Action Coherence Concord Subtable % 35.7% 10.9%
Table 21A.8. Percentage of Action Coherence Categories associated with Locomotion

and no Locomotion by therapists for all groups for the minute in which the Locomotion
occurs, the preceding minute, “LAGS(ACTION,1)” and the succeeding three minutes,
“LEADS(ACTION,1-3).”
489
Therapist Interventions for 1988

Group
&
9 Condensed Functional Subtable % 15.4% 14.9% 15.3% 18.0%
States #3 Limited Functional Subtable % 1.5% 3.1% 2.3% 1.4%
Productive Turmoil Subtable % .5% 6.0% 3.1% 1.2%
Nominal Subtable % 4.6% 7.8% 8.4% 2.0%
LEADS(COND9,1) Functional Subtable % 14.9% 15.9% 17.6% 16.5%
Limited Functional Subtable % .5% 3.3% 2.7% 1.4%
Productive Turmoil Subtable % 1.0% 5.3% 3.8% 1.4%
Limited Functional Subtable % .5% 2.9% 3.4% 1.6%
Limited Functional Subtable % 1.0% 2.7% 3.1% 1.7%
Table 21A.9. Percentage of Condensed States associated with Therapists Interventions

in the minute of intervention and the following three minutes in the 1988 group for the
minute in which the Intervention is applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(COND9,1)” and
the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(COND9,1-3).”
1988: In the minute of Group Intervention, there is a change of some 7% from

Unsociable states to Sociable and Functional from the preceding minute. In the
following three minutes, Functional remains stable but there is an oscillation from
Sociable to Happy Conflict and Dysfunctional. The effect of Member Interventions is
to bring about a decrease in Constructive states in the same minute in favour of Happy
Conflict, Productive Turmoil and Dysfunctional, then a steady drift towards decreased
Unsociable states and increased Sociable. Group and Member Interventions provide the
clearest evidence of effect on the group. In the preceding minute, there is a polarisation
490
with a reduction in Sociable states and an increase in both Functional and Unsociable
states. Then in the minute after the intervention, there is a decrease in Happy Conflict
and Dysfunctional and an increase in Constructive states. In the second minute
following, this trend is reversed with a move towards Unsociable states and then in the
third minute, this in turn is reversed again with a move back to increased Constructive
states. This seems to introduce yet another instance of oscillation or rhythm in the
group’s functioning. Finally, for No Intervention from minute before the intervention
there is a trend from Unsociable states towards Constructive states, but in the following
three minutes there is a drift towards increased Happy Conflict and Dysfunctional.
1990: For the 1990 group, in the transition from the minute before the
intervention to the minute of the intervention, there are changes for Group Intervention
indicating increase in Functional, Limited Functional and Dysfunctional. In the
following three minutes, after the intervention, there is at first a reversal of this with a
reduction in Functional and Dysfunctional and an increase in Sociable. Then in the
second minute, there is a reduction in Happy Conflict, while in the third minute Happy
Conflict again increases showing the rhythmic oscillation. For Member Interventions,
there is a slight increase in Sociable and Dysfunctional from the penultimate minute.
Then in the first minute after the intervention, there is a movement from Sociable to
Limited Functional, followed in the next minute by a reduction in Dysfunctional and
increase in Happy Conflict with a further increase in this state in the third minute. As
time passes, Member Interventions are associated with a drift towards increased
conflict. For Group and Member Interventions, there is an increase in conflictual states
and Functional and a decrease in Sociable states, leading in the next minute to a
reduction in Happy Conflict and increase in constructive and Dysfunctional states. This
then oscillates between conflictual and Sociable in the next two minutes. No
Intervention is associated with a drift towards increased Happy Conflict in the following
minutes.
491
Therapist Interventions for 1990.

Group
&
States #3 Limited Functional Subtable % 6.8% 12.3% 4.0% 18.8%
Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 1.5% .9% 2.0% 1.4%
Productive Turmoil Subtable % 1.5% .2% 1.6% 1.4%
Nominal Subtable % .8% 1.3% .8% .9%
Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 1.5% .4% 2.0%
Productive Turmoil Subtable % 1.5% .7% 1.6% .7%
Nominal Subtable % .8% .9% .4% 1.6%
Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 3.0% 1.1% 1.6% .9%
Productive Turmoil Subtable % .8% 1.3% .8% .7%
Nominal Subtable % 1.5% .7% 1.8%
Productive Turmoil Subtable % .8% 1.1% .8% .9%
Nominal Subtable % 1.1% .4% 1.6%

492
Th e ra p is t In te rve n tio n s fo r 1 9 9 2 .
G ro u p
&
G ro u p M em ber M em ber No
In te rve n tio n In te rve n tn In t In te rve n tio n
9 Condensed F u n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 7 .3 % 6 .3 % 2 .9 % 3 .3 %
S ta te s # 3 L im ite d F u n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 5 .7 % 3 .8 % 2 .9 % 2 .6 %
S o c ia b le S u b ta b le % 2 6 .8 % 2 5 .1 % 2 1 .5 % 2 9 .0 %
L im ite d S o c ia b le S u b ta b le % 2 4 .4 % 2 9 .9 % 2 6 .8 % 4 0 .9 %
U n h a p p y C o o p e ra tio n S u b ta b le % 5 .7 % 7 .7 % 7 .8 % 4 .1 %
H a p p y C o n flic t S u b ta b le % 9 .8 % 8 .7 % 1 4 .1 % 7 .1 %
P ro d u c tive Tu rm o il S u b ta b le % .9 % 3 .4 % .4 %
D ys fu n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 1 5 .4 % 1 0 .4 % 1 3 .7 % 4 .5 %
N o m in a l S u b ta b le % 4 .9 % 7 .1 % 6 .8 % 8 .2 %
L E A D S (C O N D 9 ,1 ) -1 S u b ta b le % .8 %
F u n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 8 .9 % 5 .4 % 4 .4 % 4 .5 %
L im ite d F u n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 4 .1 % 4 .7 % 2 .9 % .7 %
H a p p y C o n flic t S u b ta b le % 1 0 .6 % 8 .6 % 1 2 .7 % 8 .2 %
P ro d u c tive Tu rm o il S u b ta b le % .8 % .7 % 2 .9 % 1 .1 %
D ys fu n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 9 .8 % 1 1 .4 % 1 0 .2 % 6 .3 %
L im ite d F u n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 4 .1 % 4 .0 % 4 .9 % 1 .5 %
U n h a p p y C o o p e ra tio n S u b ta b le % 1 2 .2 % 6 .9 % 7 .3 % 4 .5 %
H a p p y C o n flic t S u b ta b le % 7 .3 % 8 .5 % 1 1 .2 % 1 1 .2 %
P ro d u c tive Tu rm o il S u b ta b le % 1 .6 % .9 % 1 .5 % 1 .1 %
D ys fu n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 1 3 .0 % 1 0 .5 % 1 1 .2 % 7 .1 %
L im ite d F u n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 4 .9 % 4 .2 % 2 .4 % 2 .2 %
H a p p y C o n flic t S u b ta b le % 9 .8 % 8 .7 % 7 .8 % 1 1 .9 %
P ro d u c tive Tu rm o il S u b ta b le % 1 .6 % 1 .3 % .5 % .7 %
D ys fu n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 8 .1 % 1 0 .8 % 1 3 .2 % 6 .7 %

Interventions in the minute of intervention and the following three minutes in the 1992
group for the minute in which the Intervention is applied, the preceding minute,
“LAGS(COND9,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(COND9,1-3).”
In 1992, in the minute of intervention, Group Interventions show a move from

Functional to Limited Functional and from Limited Sociable to Sociable and from
Unhappy Cooperation and Happy Conflict to Dysfunctional. In the 1st minute after the
intervention all of these changes are reversed. These changes indicate that the
interventions bring the group together when they are in touch with their own states or
encourage them to differentiate when they are Sociable. It also means that it encourages
493
them to become more constructive when in Dysfunctional. In the following minutes,

there is oscillation into and out of Dysfunctional. Member Interventions show little
change except for some oscillation between Limited Sociable and Dysfunctional.
Group and Member Interventions show a move from conflictual states to constructive
state and then oscillation between them. For No Intervention, there is a drift towards
Happy Conflict.

Group
&
States #3 Limited Functional Subtable % 1.7% 2.5% .8% .9%
Productive Turmoil Subtable % 1.5% 1.2%
Limited Functional Subtable % 3.4% 2.2% .4% 1.8%
Productive Turmoil Subtable % 1.7% .8%
Limited Functional Subtable % 3.4% 1.7% 1.6% .9%
Productive Turmoil Subtable % 1.5% 1.2%
Limited Functional Subtable % 6.9% 1.7% .8% .9%
Productive Turmoil Subtable % 1.5% .8% .9%

494
In 1993, in the minute of intervention, all constructive states reduce and there is
an increase in all Unsociable states. In the 1st minute after, there are changes from
Sociable to Functional and to most Unsociable states and this tendency increases in the
2nd minute. However, it reverses in the 3rd with a reduction in Dysfunctional and
Nominal and an increase in Sociable states. In this year, it seems that Group
Interventions initially increase unsociable functioning and then lead to stabilization after
2 minutes. For Member Interventions, there is a reduction in Sociable in the minute of
intervention and the in the 1st minute after, this is reversed with Sociable continuing to
increase for the next two minutes and then reversing in favour of Functional in the 3rd
minute. Dysfunctional tends to oscillate between decreasing in the 1st minute then
increasing in the 2nd. For Group and Member Interventions, in the minute of
intervention there is little change but in the 1st after, there is a move from Unsociable to
Constructive states which continues as a drift in the 2nd minute and then stabilizes in the
3rd. These interventions are clearly effective in producing constructive change in the
group that is maintained for the three minutes. No Intervention shows a steady drift
towards Dysfunctional from the minute of consideration onwards.
495

Group
&
States #3 Limited Functional Subtable % 3.1% 1.9% 1.2%
Productive Turmoil Subtable % 3.1% 2.8% 2.4%
Nominal Subtable % 1.7% 5.5% 8.5% .6%
Dysfunctional Subtable % 1.8% 1.8%
Nominal Subtable % 3.4% 5.5% 7.6%
Dysfunctional Subtable % 1.7% 1.8% 1.0% .6%
Dysfunctional Subtable % 1.9% 1.9% .6%

the succeeding three minutes “LEADS(COND9,1-3).”
In 1996, for Group Intervention in the minute of intervention, there is a

reduction in Functional and Limited Sociable in favour of Happy Conflict. This trend is
maintained in the 1st minute with and increase in Unhappy Cooperation and then in the
2nd minute there is a split with moves from Sociable to Functional and Unhappy
Conflict and Productive Turmoil to Dysfunctional. This movement is reversed in the 3rd
minute, except that Functional continues to increase. For Member Intervention, in the
496
minute of intervention, Sociable increases from Limited Sociable and Unhappy

Cooperation, but there is little change in the 1st minute. For the next two minutes,
constructive states increase. In Group and Member Interventions, in the minute of
intervention there are increases in Sociable and Happy Conflict and then in the 1st
minute, movement from conflictual to constructive states. This then reverses in the 2nd
minute and consolidates an increase in Sociable states in the 3rd minute. For No
Intervention, there is a steady drift towards increased conflictual states over the three
minutes.
An overview of the effects of therapists’ interventions is gained by looking at
the overall impacts. For Group Interventions, it appears that if there is an increase in
Constructive states in the minute of intervention, this leads to an oscillation between
these constructive states and Unsociable states in the following three minutes (this
occurs in 1988, 1990 and 1992). Where there is an increase in Unsociable states in the
minute of intervention (as in 1993 and 1996) this is followed by a drift towards
increasing Unsociable states in the following three minutes. Group interventions seem
likely to stimulate conflict, but this oscillates with constructive states where these are
stimulated by the intervention.
For Member Interventions, although the results are not as consistent, there
appears to be an initial tendency for the minute of intervention to see an increase in
some Unsociable states (for 1988, 1990 and 1992) followed by either a drift to increased
Constructive states or oscillation between these and some Unsociable states. However,
three groups (1990, 1993 and 1996) recorded an increase in Constructive states in the
minute or intervention. There is also a stimulus to Unsociable states, but they seem to
be often compensated by an increase in some Constructive states at the same time.
Group and Member Interventions either seem to produce a stimulus to some
constructive and some Unsociable states in the minute of intervention. When these
Unsociable states are stimulated, there is an oscillation between constructive and
Unsociable states in the following three minutes (1988 and 1990). Where there is an
initial stimulus to increased constructive states this is followed by a steady drift to
increased Constructive states in the next three minutes. There seems to be an overall
trend for group and member interventions to be more constructive than the others.
For No Intervention there is a consistent pattern of a drift towards increased
Unsociable states. In most cases this is increased Happy Conflict.
497
Structure + Cognitive Affect + Limit Action Coherence +

Limit Organization + Limit Limit
Category W = Whole R = Representational C = Contentment Cn = Concord
Code S = Subgroups S = systemic J = Joy A = Accord
Si = Subgp+Ind N = Normative I = Interest D = Discord
I = Individuals U = Unorganized Dt = Discontent Ct = Contracord
Ds = Distress
B = Boredom
Group 0-2:W -> S 11% 0: R/S/N -> U 10% 0:C/J/D -> I/D/B 2%/5% 0:Cn/A->D/Ct 3%+2%
Intervention 3: S -> W 4% 1: U/S ->R/N 6%/6% 1:C/D/B -> J/Dt 2%/3% 1-3:D/Ct-> A/Cn 21%
2: R/N ->U/S 5%/3% 2:J/Ds -> I/Dt/B 3%/3%/ (2: D-> Ct 2%)
3: U->N/S 3%/6% 1%
3:J/Dt -> I/B 3%/1%
Member 0-2: S -> W 3% 0:R/S/N -> U 7% 0: J/I -> Dt/Ds 6%/1% 0:Cn/A -> D/Ct 10%
Intervention 3: No change 1:U/S -> R/N 4%/3% 1: Ds -> J 1% 1-2:Ct/D-> A/Cn 7%
2: U -> S 1% 2: J/Ds -> I/B 2%/1% 3:Ct/A -> D/Cn 3% +
3: R -> N 1% 3: J -> I/Dt 2%/1% 2%
Group & 0-1: S -> W 2% 0: R/S -> U 6% 0: I -> J/Ds 3%/1% 0:Cn/A->D 4%
Member 2: W->S 2% 1:U -> R/S/N 1: J/Ds -> I 6% 1-3:D/Ct -> Cn/A 14%
Intervention 3: No change 1%/1%/ 1% 2: J/Ds -> I/Dt 1%/1% (3: D -> Ct 2%)
2-3: U-> R/N 3%/3% 3: Dt -> J/I 1%/2%
No Sample too Sample too small (31 Sample too small (31 Sample too small (31
Intervention small (31 mins) mins) mins) mins)
Table 21A.14. Effect of Therapists Interventions accompanied by Limits compared with

those without Limits for all GFR Dimensions from the minute of intervention to the
three minutes after.
Tables 21A.14 summarizes the results of the changes in GFR categories

associated with Therapists Interventions from the minute of intervention through the
following three minutes in association with Limits being set. The categories are
indicated by the letter as indicated in the Category Code shown in the second row. The
minutes are shown in the left of each row in the cells. Minute 0 indicates the minute in
which the interventions were made and minutes 1-3 are the first to third minutes
following the intervention. The percentages represent the percentage of change in the
frequency of the category in the minute indicated compared to the previous minute. The
symbol “->”means an increase relative to the previous minute. Where there are changes
in several categories in the same interval the categories are listed in sequence followed
by the percentage of change in the same sequence. For example, in the second minute
after the intervention, Representational and Normative are reduced by Group
Intervention in favour of Unorganized and Systemic, which increase by 5% and 3%
498
respectively. This is shown in Table 21A.14 as “2:R/N -> U/S 5%/3%.”

In Table 21A.15, the effect of Therapists Interventions with Limits on categories
is compared with those without Limits. A positive sign indicates that the addition of
Limits to the Intervention increases the frequency of the category, while a negative sign
means the presence of Limits reduces the frequency.
Group Member Group & Member No Intervention

Intervention Intervention Intervention
Whole +4% +14% -18%
Sub+Ind +6% -8%
Systemic -8% -17%
Normative +5% -8%
Unorganized +20%
Joy -6%
Interest +6% +13% -17%
Concord -9%
Accord +13% -14%
Discord -5%

Interventions accompanied by Limits compared with Therapists Interventions
accompanied by No Limit. Categories not shown had no differences.
Table 21A.16 summarizes the results of the changes in GFR categories

associated with Therapists Interventions from the minute of intervention through the
following three minutes in association with no Limits and Locomotion in the same
format as Table 21A.14.
499
Structure + No Cognitive Affect + No Limits + Action Coherence + No

Limits + Locomotion Organization + No Locomotion Limits + Locomotion
Limits +
Locomotion
Category W = Whole R= C = Contentment Cn = Concord
Code S = Subgroups Representational J = Joy A = Accord
Si = Subgp+Ind S = systemic I = Interest D = Discord
I = Individuals N = Normative Dt = Discontent Ct = Contracord
U = Unorganized Ds = Distress
B = Boredom
Group 0:W -> S 7% 0: R/N -> S/U 0:J/Ds -> I/Dt 0:D/Ct -> Cn/A 3%/ 9%
Intervention 1:no change 1%/1% 3%/3% 1:Cn/Ct -> D 10%
2:W -> S 5% 1: S/N -> U 11% 1:C/J/Dt/Ds -> I 7% 2:A/D -> Cn/Ct 3%/3%
3:Si -> S/W 3%/4% 2: R/U -> S/N 6%/ 2:I -> J/Dt 3%/9% 3:D -> A/Ct 4%/3%
8% 3:Dt -> C/ J/I/Ds 1%/
3: S/N-> R/U 1%/ 3%/2%/1%
3%
Member 0:S -> Si/I 2%/1% 0: R/U -> N 3% 0:Dt/Ds -> I 2% 0:D/Ct -> Cn/A 1%/6%
Intervention 1:Si/I -> S 3% 1: N -> S 1% 1:C/I -> J/Ds 2%/1% 1:A/D -> Cn/Ct 1%/2%
2:S/Si -> W/I 2%/1% 2: S/U -> R/N 2:J -> I/Ds 1%/1% 2:Cn/A-> D/Ct 1%/1%
3:No change 3%/3% 3:I/Ds -> J/Dt 2%/1% 3:Ct -> Cn 1%
3: U -> S 1%
Group & 0:Si -> W/S/I 6%/ 0: N -> R/S/U 2%/ 0:C/J/Ds -> I/Dt/B 0:Cn/D -> A/Ct 5%/2%
Member 2%/4% 1% /5% 2%/2%/1% 1:A -> Cn/D/Ct 3%/1%/
Intervention 1:W/S/I -> Si 6% 1: U/N -> R/S 4%/ 1:J/Dt -> C/I/Ds/B 2%
2:I/Si -> W/S 1%/2% 4% 2%/4%/3%/1% 2:D -> A 2%
3:W -> S/Si/I 1%/ 2: U -> N 4% 2:Dt/Ds -> J/I 2%/1% 3:D/Ct -> A 8%)
6%/ 2% 3: R/U-> S/N 3%/ 3:I/B -> Dt 2%
1%
No 0:Si/I -> W/S 3%/2% 0: N/U -> S 2% 0:C/Dt -> J 3% 0:A/Ct -> Cn/D 1%/2%
Intervention 1:W/Si -> S/I/ 1%/ 1: R/S -> N 6% 1:Ds/I -> C/J/Dt 1%/ 1:Cn/D/Ct -> A 8%
5% 2: N/U -> R 4% 5%/3% 2:Cn -> D/Ct 3%/2%
2:S/I -> W/Si 5%/5% R/N -> U 3% 2:Dt -> C/I 2%/1% 3:D -> Cn 3%
3:W -> S/Si 4%/2% 3:Dt -> I/B 1%/1%
Table 21A.16. Effect of Therapists Interventions accompanied by Locomotion

compared with Therapists Interventions accompanied by No Limits and No Locomotion
for all GFR Dimensions from the minute of intervention to the three minutes after.
In Table 21A.17, the effect of Therapists Interventions with Locomotion on

categories is compared with those without Locomotion. A positive sign indicates that
the addition of Locomotion to the Intervention increases the frequency of the category,
while a negative sign means the presence of Locomotion reduces the frequency.
500
Group Member Group & Member No

Intervention Intervention Intervention Intervention
Whole +12% -16%
Sub+Ind +5% -4%
Representation -6%
Systemic +6% -12%
Normative +4% -5%
Unorganized +17% +17%
Joy -4%
Interest +11% -12%
Concord -7%
Accord +6% +12% -7%

Interventions accompanied by Locomotion compared with Therapists Interventions
accompanied by No Limits and No Locomotion. Categories not shown had no
differences.
Minerva Access is the Institutional Repository of The University of Melbourne
Author/s:
Gordon, Peter Rob
Title:
A study of group psychotherapy: an empirical study of the whole group
Date:
2001
Citation:
Gordon, P. R. (2001). A study of group psychotherapy: an empirical study of the whole
group. PhD thesis, Department of Psychology, The University of Melbourne.
Publication Status:
Unpublished
Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/11343/39542
File Description:
A study of group psychotherapy: an empirical study of the whole group
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A Study of Group Psychotherapy.

An empirical study of the whole group.

Peter Rob Gordon

Submitted in total fulfillment of the requirements

adolescents are discussed in relation to the theoretical background. Considerable merit

Signed: ………………………………… Date:……………..

PART I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND. 27

1: THE STUDY OF GROUPS 28

3: GROUP AS CROWD OR HERD. 39

4: GROUP AS SOCIAL MIND 44

6: GROUP ENTITY IN SMALL GROUP RESEARCH 59

7: COLLECTIVE MIND IN GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY 65

8: CRITICISM OF COLLECTIVE MENTALITY 76

Crowd and herd theories. 76

A theory of group mentality. 89

Group Organizational States. 96

PART II. THE GROUP FUNCTION RECORD. 110

10. GROUP PHENOMENA AS SOCIAL COMMUNICATION. 111

Group Function Record 111

Social communication and group status. 115

Group Function Record dimensions. 120

11. GFR DIMENSION 1: STRUCTURE 122

12. GFR DIMENSION 2: COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION 131

13. GFR DIMENSION 3: AFFECT 149

A synthesis of affect theories. 155

14. GFR DIMENSION 4: ACTION COHERENCE. 162

Characterizing group action. 173

15. GFR DIMENSION 5: THERAPISTS INTERVENTIONS. 177

PART III. METHOD AND RESULTS. 181

16: HYPOTHESES. 182

17: METHOD. 188

Subjects and groups. 188

Data collection. 189

Reliability studies. 190

Description and characteristics of the data. 195

Defining and classifying composite group states. 198

Phases of Group Development 203

18. RESULTS 1: GROUP DEVELOPMENT 210

19. RESULTS: 2 STRUCTURE 232

2.3. Group Function and Completeness. 252

20. RESULTS 3: DYNAMICS. 257

21: RESULTS 4: THERAPISTS’ INTERVENTIONS. 289

PART IV. DISCUSSION. 307

22. DISCUSSION 1: THE GROUP FUNCTION RECORD. 310

23. DISCUSSION 2. HYPOTHESES. 320

3. Group Dynamics. 325

24. DISCUSSION 3: GROUP DEVELOPMENT 334

25. DISCUSSION 4: THEORY. 345

26. DISCUSSION 5: CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH. 362

The Groups. 415

THE VALIDITY OF THE GFR. 420

APPENDIX 2: GROUP FUNCTION RECORD - RATERS INSTRUCTIONS. 431

GROUP FUNCTION RECORD - RATERS’ INSTRUCTIONS 432

GFR EXAMPLES 445

GROUP FUNCTION RECORD OUTLINE 449

GROUP FUNCTION RECORD – RATING SHEET. 450

APPENDIX 3: GROUP FUNCTION RECORD RESULTS. 452

Distribution of GFR Categories. 452

Tables for Structure Hypotheses. 468

Tables for Dynamic Hypotheses. 471

Graphs of Stability and Quality. 474

Tables for therapists Interventions, Limits and Locomotion. 481

each phase for each group. 229

the influence of group size and absentees. 254