CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

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 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Research Study

The world order has been in transition – moving ahead in creating multiple poles of power.
The dynamic nature of the world order requires introspection. China to an extent occupies a
pivotal position in this ongoing transition. There have been varying debates on the emerging
challenges to the multipolar system. The end of the Cold War provided impetus to the
members of academic and strategic community to deliberate and discuss about the nature of
the international system. The transition from bipolar to multipolar world requires a
comprehensive assessment. At the same time, there is certainly a geopolitical shift from the
Atlantic to the Pacific basin, which appears to have gained accelerated momentum of late.
The global balance of power gives the impression of a geopolitical tilt towards the East.
There are numerous factors which have led to the transition. Perhaps, the most compelling
explanation appears to be the empowerment of the Eastern hemisphere at a time of a relative
ebbing of the Western power status. Conceivably, at the very centre of the debate seems to be
the narrative of rise of China.

The rise of China is being perceived as a major factor of the ongoing debate on the shift of
the centre of gravity from West to East. The economic growth of China and its growing
military capabilities have led to an expansion of its political clout globally. China reflected all
its aspirations of becoming a strategic power when it launched its strategic modernisation
programme as well as opening up of its market economy during the later part of the 20 th
century. It to an extent was making an attempt to get coupled with the members of the
international community in general and the major powers in particular. As a result, China’s
status as a global power is increasingly being recognized and appreciated in the international
system. However, with China becoming increasingly powerful and assertive on the world
stage, the intent and the future trajectory of China’s behavioural patterns remain uncertain or
least understood by the rest of the world, and at times filled with apprehension and
intimidation. This appears to be especially so in the strategic sectors where an accelerated
build-up of capabilities is an ongoing phenomenon. Consequently, the strategic and academic
community across the world seems to be divided on their view as to whether China’s rise will
be characteristic of a power which will be revisionist, challenging the existing world order or
status-quo, getting assimilated into the existing power structure. A similar divergence in
perspectives seems to exist on the types of strategies China will utilize in realizing such

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revisionist or status-quo objectives. Therefore, there is a necessity to understand how China
will utilize its evolving capabilities to achieve its fundamental goals in the international
setting. What has driven China in its strategic thinking remains a part of geopolitical
discourse.

Perhaps, China has passed through inimitable historical experiences, which combines their
strategic vision with the larger fundamental goals in the international system. Its geographical
sphere of influence has undergone a sea change over the centuries, shaped by territorial
expansion and an aspiration to be the world leader. These experiences of China have helped
in maturing their strategic thinking through the evolution of strategic culture. It has been seen
that Sun Zi’s Art of War has found resonance in China’s critical military and diplomatic
vision. Undoubtedly, the impact and influence of Sun Zi on the policy community in China is
becoming more and more visible. The inherent power and force trajectory of China is a bi-
product of its will to retain a pre-eminent position in Asia. At the same time, China’s official
policy statements appear to reflect age old Confucian values as they stress on peaceful co-
existence, win-win co-operation and harmony. China’s latest attempts at creating a
rejuvenated Silk Road seem t o resonate with a need to recreate its self-image as a dominant,
yet benevolent power at the apex of a hierarchical order in the changing dynamics of
geopolitics.

There are various other indicators which suggest that China’s behavioural patterns have
certain historical parallels. Presently, China’s status seems to be rising to a level, which it
sees at par with any other global major power. China’s attempts at gaining world leadership
are becoming more and more apparent, as its influence is extending all over the world,
enhancing its relations with the major powers and learning the art of dealing with each of the
poles of multipolar system. However, the concept of world leadership itself can be seen to be
very much central to China’s civilizational worldview. China’s continuing openness to trade
is directly based on its own interests, as the result of which economic reform has preceded
much talked political reform. This reverberates with the spirit of the imperial tribute system
which had defined China’s traditional approach to diplomacy, whereby trade was possible
only on China’s terms. China’s negotiations ability on trade has always been seen highly
biased in its favour. These are few of the varied instances which suggest that twenty first
century China seems to combine both its ancient wisdom on the notion of strategy as well as
the realistic assumptions of contemporary world. These observations highlight a growing

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belief that the experiences gained from history are instrumental in shaping the emerging
behavioural patterns of China. It is, however, important to validate China’s emerging
strategic posturing through proper rationale.

If China has really learnt from its history and ancient traditions, then it would be a
worthwhile exercise to assess the direction under which it has moulded its strategic thinking.
This underscores the possible existence of a specific set of established behavioural
preferences in China’s decision making system. An understanding of these predispositions
will thereby bring in more predictability about China’s behavioural patterns in the
international system.

Under this backdrop, the research study on the concept of strategic culture gains salience as a
critical tool to develop a coherent understanding of China’s strategic behavioural traits.
China’s geopolitical moves are at best a sheer matter of speculation for China watchers,
scholars and analysts. In addition, strategic culture as a concept is itself ridden with
ambiguity, and has been proven to be highly elusive to any sort of consensus building among
theorists. An attempt would be needed to deconstruct both the ambiguity and complexity in
the consensus building. There are a number of debates which has evolved over the decades on
strategic culture require a comprehensive analysis mainly at the conceptual and theoretical
levels. Some of these debates not only highlights the diversity in understanding a number of
aspects of strategic culture, but also whether or not strategic culture plays a role in shaping
behavioural patterns of China.

In this scenario, the very attempt at utilizing a highly divisive concept like strategic culture
raises significant challenges to uncovering China’s behavioural tendencies and its
fundamental goals. The present research study is therefore an effort to analyse the evolving
contours of China’s behavioural patterns by overcoming these challenges and developing a
holistic theoretical and methodological viewpoint on strategic culture. How China has
streamlined its behavioural patterns through the notion of strategic culture has formed a
major part of the research. Whether the strategic culture has evolved and got ingrained in
larger strategic thinking process in China needs to be studied.

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1.2 Objectives of the Research Study

The objectives of the research would be the following:

 To critically explore the emergence and evolution of the concept of strategic culture
and assess its nature, constitution and influence on the strategic behaviour of states;
 To develop an operational definition for the concept of strategic culture in general in
order to build up a theoretical framework to explain comprehensively the strategic
behaviour of states;
 To critically explore and evaluate the varying perspectives which have been
developed on China’s strategic culture over the decades;
 To analyze the historical and geographical dimensions of China’s strategic culture;
 To articulate China’s strategic intent, behaviour and its worldview through the
theoretical framework developed on strategic culture; and
 To assess the nature of evolving developments in China’s strategic domain and
analyse whether such developments reflect China’s strategic culture.

1.3 Survey of Literature

The survey of literature for the research on China’s strategic culture has been classified into
two broad sections – the first is an attempt on exploring the concept of strategic culture and
the second is on largely the discourse on China’s strategic culture. It has been observed that
there are multiple and conflicting perspectives on the concept of strategic culture as well as
on China’s strategic culture. In order to grasp the complexity in China’s strategic culture, it is
essential to initially explore the discourse which has developed on the concept of strategic
culture. Strategic culture, in the form of culturally influenced strategic preferences, has been
found to be existing since ancient times among states, kingdoms and empires. The concept
can be said to be as old as the concept of politics itself, and has been manifested in ancient
classical texts like Kautilya’s Arthashastra and Sun Zi’s Art of War.

However, the systematic study of strategic cultures of various nations started only four
decades ago. The term strategic culture, at that time, emerged in criticism to the dominant
neorealist theoretical framework’s failure to explain the differences of the two superpowers
on nuclear strategies. Three generations of strategic culture theorists have been spawned as a
result of the attempt for theoretical refinement in strategic studies – the determinist

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generation of the late 1970s and early 1980s, instrumentalist generation of the 1980s and
positivist generation since the 1990s. The first generation of strategic culture theorists views
strategic culture as an all-encompassing concept which determines the decision-making
preferences of states. The second generation discounts the influence of strategic culture and
sees it solely as a cover for concealing and advancing realpolitik driven set of strategies. The
third generation adopts a methodologically rigorous and positivist approach, delving into
concepts which are specific derivatives of strategic culture, instead of probing into the notion
in general. (Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture”, International Security
(USA), v. 19, n. 4, Spring 1995, pp. 36-43.)

There has evolved a number of debates on the concept of strategic culture. The major debate
in this regard is about the nature of the concept. At the core of the debate is the conflict
between the ideational and behavioural nature of strategic culture. This has developed into
the cause versus context debate with respect to state behaviour. Some argue that strategic
culture is a behaviour shaping construct, (Colin S. Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context: The
First Generation of Theory Strikes Back”, Review of International Studies (UK), v. 25, n. 1,
January 1999, pp. 50-51.) while others argue that it is basically a causal factor affecting
behaviour. (Alastair Iain Johnston, “Strategic Cultures Revisited: Reply to Colin Gray”,
Review of International Studies (UK), v. 25, n. 3, July 1999, pp. 519-523).

There are also debates about the number of strategic cultures a state might have – whether a
nation’s strategic culture is monolithic or composite in structure. In addition to this, there are
also debates on the historical depth a nation’s strategic culture is rooted in. There are some
views which argue that strategic culture is based on ancient historical thinking and
experiences and others which emphasise the role of more recent periods in a nation’s history.
(Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture”, International Security (USA), v.
19, n. 4, Spring 1995, pp. 32-64.)

Strategic culture is sometimes seen as an abstract concept, and as a result there have been
conflicting views about its role and relevance in guiding a nation’s behavioural patterns. One
such view portrays strategic culture as the principal determinant of strategic behaviour. In
sharp contrast, there are other views which dismiss any such role and relevance, pointing to
the international structure as the determinant of behaviour. There are also views which take
the middle path and argue that strategic culture has a limited role in determining state
behaviour. According to this view, there exists a symbolic component in a nation’s strategic

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culture, which is based on ideology; and an operational component, which reflects
contemporary realist thought. Strategic culture works on the basis of this realist operational
component. Meanwhile, the symbolic component only plays the role of legitimising and
justifying the strategies chosen. (Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture”,
International Security (USA), v. 19, n. 4, Spring 1995, p. 56.)

As a result of multiple and contradictory perspectives, strategic culture is understood more as

a collection of multi-layered spectra of views than as a coherently structured concept. The
diverse and conflicting perspectives on strategic culture certainly add to the ambiguity of the
abstract concept. Understanding and analysing the varied set of views becomes imperative in
understanding the intricacies of the concept.

The debates on strategic culture are not just limited to the conceptual realm, but also can be
extended to the theoretical realm of international relations. The argument that whether
strategic culture can be used as a basis for understanding national strategy, or only as an
“explanation of last resort” with respect to explaining exceptional strategic behaviour of
states, requires introspection. (Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Strategic Culture and National Security
Policy”, International Studies Review (UK), v. 4, n. 3, Autumn 2002, pp. 103-104.)

In addition to this core debate on strategic culture’s place in the overall framework of
International Relations theory, there also exist a number of views on the concept’s links with
rationalism, realism and constructivism. Theoretically, the concept of strategic culture seems
to have found its roots in constructivism; its ability to reconcile with rationalism needs to be
explored. The concept of strategic culture is not antithetical to rationality. Rather, strategic
culture may act just as a limitation to rational thinking, when rationality is taken as bounded
and not absolute in nature. (Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture”,
International Security (USA), v. 19, n. 4, Spring 1995, p. 56.) There have also been
viewpoints which indicate the positioning of strategic culture as a bridge between realism and
constructivism. This seems possible on the basis of the argument that there does exist some
level of compatibility between the two theories. (J. Samuel Barkin, “Realist Constructivism”,
International Studies Review (UK), v. 5, n. 3, September 2003, p. 326)

When it comes to the literature on China’s strategic culture, it is found that there are a
number of schisms in the discourse including the debates on its nature, content and
orientation. As for the assessment, China has perceived that its military thought has been a

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by-product of interactions on the pursuit of peace, high priority accorded to national unity,
and the emphasis on defence rather than offence, based on the experiences through centuries
of cultivating and refining the strategic thinking. The foundational logic was that wars should
be abandoned as an instrument, and the use of force could only be justified to stop violence.
Through the core military concept of active defence, this perspective counters the “China
threat” theory and promotes a view supporting China’s concept of peaceful rise. (Li Jijun,
“Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China”, Letort Papers (USA),
n. 1, 29 August 1997, pp. 1-7.)

There are other views which also tap into China’s diverse civilizational values to explain
China’s behavioural patterns. One such view attempts to portray a harmonic interplay of
contradictory strategic traditions as well as their parallel narratives. Thus, the offensive
stratagem of Sun Zi appear to go hand-in-hand with the defensive stratagem of Mo Zi in
much the same way as the concepts of Yin (defensive) and Yang (expansive) as well as Wen
(civility) and Wu (martiality). In addition to this, China’s strategic culture has been argued to
be driven by the historical concepts of “inviolability” and “rightful place” and guided by the
Confucian values of hierarchy and moral leadership. The Daoist philosophy of the three
stages of retreat (isolationism), return (interdependence) and transcendence (utopianism) have
also been used to provide an alternate explanation of China’s strategic culture. (Rosita
Dellios, “Chinese Strategic Culture: Part 1 – The Heritage from the Past”, CEWES Research
Papers (Australia), 1 January 1994, pp. 1-21.)

There are also others who suggest a dominant role of “modern pragmatic nationalism” which
consists of nativism, anti-traditionalism and pragmatism in the development of China’s
strategic culture. This has been argued to be co-existing along with the traditional Confucian
legacy from China’s history. (Kenneth D. Johnson, “China’s Strategic Culture: A Perspective
for the United States”, Strategic Studies Institute (USA), June 2009, pp. 1-21.)

However, there is another dimension, which has questioned the effect and relevance of
strategic culture for China’s behavioural patterns, where the role of strategic culture is
completely marginalized in the formulation of China’s strategic behaviour on the basis of
empirical inconsistencies. One such view marginalises the role of strategic culture in the
formulation of China’s strategic behaviour on the basis of empirical inconsistencies. Further,
the uniqueness of China’s strategic culture and thinking has also been questioned and a more
dominant role of external factors has been emphasised. (Yuan Kang Wang, Harmony and

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War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics (Columbia University Press: New York,
2011); Christopher P. Twomey, “Chinese Strategic Cultures: Survey and Critique”, Defense
Threat Reduction Agency Report (USA), 31 October 2006, pp.1-21.)

Beyond the debate regarding whether or not China’s strategic culture matters in reality, the
most dominant discourse has been with regards to the degree of offense and defence
involved. In the contemporary discourse, China’s strategic culture is seen as a combination of
both offensive and defensive capabilities, largely compatible with the realist and traditional
paradigms. Some argue that the realpolitik - para bellum strategic culture has existed for
centuries and has survived virtually unchanged until the present. The para bellum culture,
being ideationally rooted has been defined as “cultural realism”, and has marginalised the
role of the Confucian stream of thought. (Alastair Iain Johnston, “Cultural Realism and
Strategy in Maoist China” in Peter J Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security:
Norms and Identity in World Politics (Columbia University Press: USA, 1996), pp. 216-268.)

There are other views which emphasize that the “root narrative” of China’s strategic
discourse continues to persist, albeit in slightly altered form. (Andrew Latham, “The
Confucian Continuities of Chinese Geopolitical Discourse”, Macalester International (USA),
v. 18, 2007, pp. 243-251.) Some have argued that China’s strategic culture is inherently
Confucian and pacifist. (Huiyun Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy
Decision Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War (Routledge: UK, 2007), pp. 17-35.)

Others have opined that China’s strategic culture is a combination of two contradictory
components. This composite strategic culture has been termed as the “Chinese cult of
defence”, where one component is the actual operational one, and the other provides the
validation of the action. The way this strategic culture manifests itself is by pursuing
offensive actions and rationalizing it on the basis of defensive intent. Therefore, this peculiar
view proposes China’s strategic culture as creating a self image marked by Confucian-
Mencian benevolence, based on which a contradictory yet well-rationalized aggressiveness is
pursued. (Andrew Scobell, “China and Strategic Culture”, Strategic Studies Institute (USA),
May 2002, pp. 1-39.)

There is an alternate approach, which uses a layered framework consisting of three levels –
national, military and organizational. At the national level, strategic culture reflects a
society’s values with regards to the use of force. At the military level, it reflects the way in
which the nation would pursue the use of force. At the service level, it represents the

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organizational culture of the service body. This perspective contrasts the Chinese cultural
characteristic of collective identity, social obligation and group guidance of individual
behaviour with that of the Western cultural characteristic of individualism to explain China’s
strategic behaviour. (Thomas G. Mahnken, “Secrecy and Strategem: Understanding Chinese
Strategic Culture”, Lowy Institute (Australia), February 2011, pp. 1-27.)

There are also views which bring out a distinctive geographically based perspective on
China’s strategic determinants. One such outlook suggest three overriding geopolitical
imperatives for China – maintaining internal unity in the Han Chinese regions, maintaining
control over the buffer regions and protecting the coast from foreign encroachment. (“The
Geopolitics of China: A Great Power Enclosed”, Stratfor (USA), June 2008.)

There seems to be a consensus among the members of academic and strategic community that
the concept of strategic culture in China’s context has varied dimensions and interpretations.
There are a number of gaps in the evolution of China’s strategic culture which requires
further academic discourse and research. The way China has come up in its strategic core
sectors since 1949 has to be understood in the context of their geopolitical milieu and the
articulation of their threat perceptions. Undoubtedly, the concepts of Sun Zi figures
prominently in the lexicon of China’s strategic culture, but at the same time one has to
examine the evolution of coherent, consistent and systematic strategic thinking enshrined in
all their strategic requirements. The research on alternate views on strategic culture needs to
emphasise the challenges in building the consensus among the members of the scholarly
community.

1.4 Research Gaps

The theoretical discourse on the concept of strategic culture have been characterised by
divisive debates on its nature and constitution as well as on the degree of influence it has on
the strategic behaviour of states. As a result, there is the lack of a single coherent narrative on
strategic culture which can be used for analysing China’s behavioural patterns in its external
environment. Therefore, in order to explain the strategic behaviour of any state in general,
there needs to be developed an operationalized definition and conceptual framework which
takes into account all these inconsistencies. This should be holistic in nature, yet amenable to
suit the particular national context under study at the same time. Such a formulation should

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also exploit the concept’s less explored potential in interlinking the seemingly disparate
realist and constructivist theories to explain state behaviour.

The conventional theoretical approach of utilizing strategic culture has also warped the
understanding on China’s behavioural patterns. This method of analysis has been using a dual
component analysis for evaluating the dominant characteristics of China’s strategic culture,
starkly dividing the traditional from the modern features and the ideological from the realist
paradigms. This does not explain the modern realpolitik aspects which are very much visible
in the classical strategic discourse in China. At the same time, most of the perspectives on
China’s strategic culture take a largely temporal view on its development, by mostly
emphasizing on the role of its unique historical experiences. The spatial dimensions of
strategic culture have been marginalized by neglecting the equally vital and unique
geographical determinants of China. As a result, the debates which have taken place on
China’s strategic culture have resulted in restricting and distorting the discourse.

Therefore, a theoretical approach derived from an operationalised definition of strategic

culture is essential to uncover its complex characteristics. This approach should extract and
integrate the traditional thought patterns, which are congruent with the behavioural patterns,
injecting a fresh new perspective into the discourse. This should also be holistically
considerate of the spatial and temporal dimensions. Such a theoretical framework can then be
applied to better explain China’s strategic culture in addition to understanding its emerging
strategic intentions and behaviour in the changing international scenario.

A modest attempt has been made to understand the alternate discourses on the evolution of
China’s strategic culture, and its larger relevance to the rising China. Understanding the
complexities of the term strategic culture would remain a complex task, but unravelling the
contentious issues especially in the context of varying degree of approaches will be certainly
of greater value addition.

The rising China obviously connotes to its strategic ambition and occupies a pivotal position
not only in the Asian geopolitics, but to the rest of the international system. Hence, an effort
has been made to understand China’s growing trajectory and its emerging power and
influence in the twenty first century. Whether it has been a by-product and cumulative effort
of China’s strategic thinking and culture has formed a major part of the research. Integrating
the various nodes and components of strategic culture in China’s context needs to be
emphasised with plausible explanation and objectivity.

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1.5 Methodology Used in the Study

The research has utilized both deductive and inductive methods. The study has been largely
analytical. A comprehensive and critical literature review has been carried out from both the
available primary as well as secondary sources. The white papers, policy statements and other
official documents issued by the government and related institutions in China has been used
as primary sources in the literature review to assess China’s projection of its strategic
power. In addition, the ancient Chinese classics have also been utilized to extract the
civilizational base of its strategic thought. In secondary source literature, the works from
eminent experts in the field, including books, journals, reports and commentaries has
been utilized. An attempt has been made to ascertain the facts and figures for analysis
only from reliable sources.

The research uses a combination of qualitative as well as quantitative approaches. However,

the research data and methods are predominantly of qualitative nature. Conceptual models
have been used so as to reformulate various concepts, systems and processes. The tools of
content and trend analysis, as well as scenario building have been applied during the study for
explanatory as well as predictive purposes, respectively. Some of qualitative data has been
quantified for the purpose of trend analysis, where simple mathematical models and statistical
tools have been used. A critical content assessment of the literature has been carried out,
which has revealed the various inconsistencies in the discourse. The assessment of historical
trends in China’s strategic behaviour has been utilized to trace the evolution of China’s
strategic culture, and scenarios have been used to predict China’s possible behavioural
trajectory in the near future.

The theoretical framework which has been used in the analysis is composed mainly of realist,
neorealist and constructivist theories along with the rationalist as well as the culturalist
paradigms. The study seeks to integrate these two approaches in order to develop a holistic
assessment of China’s strategic culture. A modest attempt has been made to operationalize
the major theoretical concepts like strategic culture in the context of the study in order to
ensure the conceptual framework’s compatibility with the subject.

Interactions with the experts in the strategic and scholarly community both in India and
abroad, especially China, have also been conducted in understanding their perspectives on
the subject. These interactions have been based on open ended structured questionnaires

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which have been prepared methodically and with utmost rigour, reflecting the most
salient issues pertaining to the subject. A field visit to China has been carried out so as to
especially understand the views of the academic and strategic community in China, since the
dominant perspective on the discourse is Western. During the field visit, the leading scholars
working on China’s external strategy in the eminent universities and think tanks of the
country has been interviewed. Due attention has been paid to the ethical dimensions of
research.

1.6 Structure of the Thesis

In order to analyze China’s strategic culture, it is imperative to initially understand the

concept of strategic culture. The existence of cultural differences across the societies and
nations of the world is a well-established fact. However, what has not been sufficiently clear
is the nature and degree of their influence on their respective decision making process. It is
quite logical to argue that cultural differences have a key role in shaping the way nations
behave distinctly in the realm of international politics. However, any step further in
exploring the concept is filled with numerous differing and even divergent outlooks and
approaches.

In this context, the second chapter of the thesis, titled “Evolution of the Discourse on
Strategic Culture”, has made an attempt on the foundational aspect, and also reviewed the
contemporary perspectives on the concept of strategic culture. In addition to the foundational
aspect, it has also explored the various dimensions of the debates existing on strategic culture
as a means to understanding the contemporary discourse on the concept. A close examination
will reveal that the problem at hand may not be as much attributed to “strategic culture”, than
to the constituent “strategic” and “culture” parts of it. A bottom-up reformulation of the
construct, using a feasible synthesis of existing views and perspectives which are relevant
from the existing literature on the discourse has therefore been helpful in getting the notion of
strategic culture right. A theoretical scaffold of strategic culture cannot be conceptualized in a
setting devoid of the international relations theory. A key question in the effort is where to
locate or base it in the theoretical structure of International Relations, or which theoretical
domain is the conceptual framework compatible with. Correlating strategic culture and its
theoretical construction with the broader framework of theoretical International Relations is a
daunting challenge, as the very nature of the concept is without any tangible consensus.

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In order to explain the strategic behaviour of any state in general, there needs to be developed
a rigorous template for analysis. Developing an operationalized definition and theoretical
framework of strategic culture which is holistic in nature serves the purpose. The third
chapter of the thesis, titled “A Conceptual and Theoretical Framework for Strategic Culture”,
makes a modest attempt in this regard. The concept of strategic culture has been broken down
to its basics and an effort has been made to reconstruct it with a fresh new perspective being
introduced at its fundamental levels. Valid multidisciplinary analogies have been utilized for
reinforcing legitimacy to the arguments on which the reformulation has been carried out.
Strategic culture can play a role in the interlinking of the neorealist and constructivist
theories, which have largely been portrayed as opposing in nature. This possible convergence
has been used to widen the theoretical foundations and superstructure of strategic culture.
This has also been used to explore opportunities for understanding and predicting behaviour
of states more precisely. The degree of autonomy of the theoretical domain of strategic
culture with reference to the discourse on International Relations theory is also an important
issue which has been addressed in the reformulation.

The fourth chapter of the thesis, titled “China’s Strategic Culture: Existing Perspectives”,
attempts to explore the existing views on China’s strategic culture to assess the diversity in
the discourse. The literature which has been surveyed and analysed in the chapter are entirely
secondary sources, mostly the key books and journal articles which have been instrumental in
creating a diverse understanding on China’s strategic culture. An attempt has also been made
to include the views of the academic and strategic community in China through interviews
made during field visit to the country. The set of literature involves both the direct works
assessing China’s strategic culture as well as those indirect works which offer valuable
glimpses into the topic. The various outlooks on the topic have been categorised based on the
domains of debates cutting across the discourse – structural v/s cultural frameworks,
ideological v/s realpolitik strands and defensive v/s offensive orientations. The differences in
perspectives at each level hold the key to establishing a grand narrative of China’s strategic
culture, as they point to the inconsistencies within the discourse which needs to be rectified.

The inconsistencies identified based on a rigorous assessment of the existing debates

highlight the need to develop an alternate perspective on China’s behavioural patterns using
the operationalized framework on strategic culture. This involves developing an ideational
narrative on China’s strategic thought and correlating it with the behavioural trends through

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cognitive links. In order to do this, it is imperative to initially extract the ideational
foundations of China’s strategic thought from its civilizational wisdom, which is the key
focus of the fifth chapter, titled “The Foundations and Narratives of China’s Strategic
Thought: An Assessment”. In this context, the ancient Daoist, Confucian, Legalist and
Mohist strategic traditions have been analysed to deconstruct the basic conceptual framework
of China’s strategic thought. The strategic traditions themselves have been extracted from the
respective philosophies, as they have political and strategic dimensions inherent in them. The
strategic traditions have been broken down into conceptual components, which have been
used to deconstruct a set of parameters with which China’s behavioural trends can be
assessed. An attempt has also been made at comparing and contrasting these four strategic
frameworks to gain a proper understanding of what type of influence they have on the
development of China’s strategic thinking. Further, the presence and influence of these
ideational frameworks has been explored by dissecting the conceptual frameworks of China’s
military strategic thought. The Seven Military Classics of Chinese history, which has been
the subject of various assessments on China’s strategic culture, has been used to validate the
existence and entrenchment of the fundamental traits of the four schools in China’s strategic
thought.

The sixth chapter, titled “Emerging Trends in China’s Strategic Behaviour”, deals with
evaluating the behavioural trends in China’s strategic course based on the four strategic
traditions and their traits identified in the fifth chapter. A set of general parameters have been
drawn from these traits so as to evaluate the influence or presence of each of the strategic
traditions. The key phases or incidents in China’s strategic history have been evaluated using
these parameters. A quantitative method has been evolved so as to assess the trends clearly
over the years. The existing enquiries on China’s strategic culture are limited to use of
primarily military force through a historical-ideational prism. Therefore, the present research
endeavours to incorporate an inclusive orientation through the addition of a geostrategic
dimension along with the ideologically derived ones. Using such a holistic framework of
China’s strategic thought developed in the fifth chapter, the sixth chapter attempts to link
China’s strategic culture with the evolving geopolitics. The key instances in China’s strategic
course, divided into politico-historic periods, have been assessed to study how China’s
strategic culture has been influencing its current geopolitical moves. This helps in
establishing the cognitive linkage between ideational and behavioural aspects of China’s
strategic culture. The primary focus has been the assessment of strategic policies of the

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People’s Republic of China under Mao Zedong’s rule, Deng Xiaoping’s leadership and the
Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao as well as Xi Jinping administrations.

The thesis concludes with the seventh chapter, where a summary of major observations and
inferences drawn from each of the chapters have been highlighted and linked, which broadly
represents the objectives of the research study. China’s emerging strategic course have also
been analysed with a focus on projecting China’s strategic behaviour for the immediate future
under various possible structural conditions of the country’s strategic environment. In this
milieu, a modest attempt will be made to project China’s strategic course in the future under
various possible scenarios. The concluding chapter also offers pointers for further research in
this highly relevant and challenging subject.

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