The fundamental "formula,'of Gcstalt theory
loguingattitude adopted toward thern. What
Gestalt Theory
Max Wertheirner
What is Gestalt theory and what does it intendl
Gestalt theor)'was the outcome ofconcrete inves-
tigations in psychology, logic, and epistemology.
The premiling situation at the time of its origin
may be briefly sketched as follows. We go from
the world of everyday ev€nts to that of science,
and not unnaturally assume that in making this
transition we shall gain a deeper and more precise
understanding of essentials. The transition should
mark an advaqce. And yet, though one may have
lcarncd a great doal" one is poorer than befole. lt
is thc eame in psychology. Here too we find
scicnce intent upon a systematic collection of
data, yet often cxcluding through that very activ-
ity procisely that which is most vivid and real in
the living phenomona it studies. Somehow the
thing that matters has eluded us.
What happeos when a problem is solved, whtn-
one suddenly "sees the point"? Common as this
experience is, we seek in vain for it in the text-
books of psychology. Of things arid, poor, and
inessential there is an abundance, but that which
really matters is missing. Instead we are told of
formation of concepts, of abstraction and gener-
alization, of class concepts and judgments,
perhaps of aseociations, creative phantasy, intu-
-
itions, talents anything but an answer to our
original problem. And what are these last words
but n.anes for the problem? Where are the pene-
trating answ€rsi Fsych,:logy is replete with terms
of great potentiality - persond.ity, essence, intu-
irion, and the rest, But rvhen one seek to grasp
their concrete content, such terms fail
This is the situation and it is characteristic of
rnodern science that the same problem should
appear everpvhere. Several attempts have been
made to remedy the matter. One was a frank
From M" Wertheimcr (1938). Gestalt theory. In W. D.
Ellis (Ed.), Source book of Gestab psychology (pp. l-ll)
New York: Harcourt, Blace. [A lecture before the Kant
-{uciery i:T fiellin in 1924]. Reprinted with peimission.
defeatism preaching the severance of science and
life; there are regions which arp inaccessibld to
science. Other thcorics established a sharp dis-
tinction b€tween the natural and moral sciences;
the exactitude and precision of chemistry and
physlcs are characteristic of natural scicnce, but
"scientific" accuracy has no place in a study ofthe
mind and its ways. This must be renounced in
favour of other gategories.
Without pausing for fi.lrther examples, let us
consider rather a question naturaUy underlying
*science"
the whole discussiou Is really the kind
of thing wq have implied? The word science has
often suggested a certain outlook, certain funda-
mental assumptions, certain procedures and atti-
tudes - but do these irnply that this is the orily
possibility of scientific mcthod? Perhaps science
already embodies methods leading in afl entirely
different direction, methods rvhich have been
continually stilled by the seemingly necessar';
dominant ones. It is conceivable, for instarce,
that a host of facts and problems have been con-
cealed rather than illuminated by the prevailing
scientific tradition. Even though the traditional
methods ofscience are undoubtedly adequate in
many cases, there may be others where they lead
us astray, Perhaps something in the verf nature
of the traditional outlook may have led its expo-
nents at times to ignore precisely that lvhich is
truly essential.
Gestalt thmry will not be satisfied with sham
solutions suggested by a simple dichotomy of
science and life. Instead, Cestalt theoryis resoh'ed
to penetrate the problem itself by examining the
fundamental assumptions of science. It has long
seemed obvious - and is, in fact, the characteristic
tone of European science - that "scicnce" means
breaking up complexes into their component ele-
ments. Isolate the elements, discover their laws'
then reassemble them, and the problcm is solved.
All wholes are reduced to pieces and piecewise
relations between pieces.
might be expreseed in this way. There are wholes,
the behaviour of which is not determined by
that of their individual elements, but where the
part:procesies are thernselves deternrined by the
intrinsic natur€ of the whole. It is the hope of
Gestalt theory to deterrnine the nature of such
wholes.
With a formula such as this one might close,
for Gestalt tJreory is neither more nor less than
this. It is not interested in puzzling out philo-
sophic qr.restions which such a fbrmula might
suggest.
Gestalt theoryhas to do with concrete research;
it is not only an outcome but a device: not only
a theorl about results but a means torvard further
discoveries. This is not merely the proposal of one
or rnore problems but an attempt to see rvhat is
really taking place in science. This problem cannot
be solved by listing possibilities for systenratiza-
tion, classiEcation, and arrangement. if it is to be
a.ttacked at all, rve milst be guided by the spirit
of
the new method and by the.concret€ nature ofthe
things themselves which rve are studying, and set
ourselves to penetrate to that which is reilly given
by nature.
There is anorher difficulty that may be illus-
trated by the following example. Suppose a math_
ematician shows you a proposition and you begin
to "classift" it. This proposition, you say, is of
such and such type, belongs in this or that histori-
cal category, and so on. Is that how the mathema_
tician lvorks?
"!Vhy, 1.ou haven'r grasped the thing at rrll," the
mathematician will exelaim. ..See here, this
formula is not an independent, closed fact that
can be dealt with for itself alone. you must see its
dynamic functional relationship to the rvhole
frorn which it lvas lifted or you will ner.er under-
stand it."
lfhat holds for the mathematical formula
applies also to the "fonnula,' of Gestolt theon-.
The atrempt of Gestalt theory to disclose the
functional meaning bf its orvn formula is no less
strict than is the nrathernatician's. The attempt to
explain Gestalt theory in a short essay is the more
difficult becau"se of the terrns whiih are used:
interpreted, v. Ehrenfels's position was this: I play
part, whole, intrinsic determination. All of them
a familiar nrelody sf six tones and
have in the past been the topic ofendless discus_
tones, yet you recognize the nrelody, despite
sions where each disputant has understood them
change. There must be a something
dilferently. And even worse has been the cata-
the sum of six tones, viz. a seventh- sornething,
they
lacked has been actual research. Likc many
"philosophic', problem they have been
"1:S"_"
withheld from contact rvith reality and scientific
work.
About all I can hope fqr in so short a discus-
sion is to suggest a few of the problems which
at
prescnt occupy the attention of Gestalt theory
and
-something
of the way they are being
attracked.
repeat: the problem hes not merely to do
. ]o
with scientific lvork - it is a fundamental problem
ofour times. Gestalt theory is not something sud_
denly and unexpectedly dropped upon uJfro*
above; it is, rather, a palpable convergence of
problems ranging throughout the scieices and
the rarious philosophic standpoints of modern
times.
Let us take, for example, an event in the history
of- psychology.
One turned from a living experience to science
and asked rvhat it had to say about this experi,
ence, and one found an assortment ofelements,
sensational images, feelings, acts of rvill and larvs
gor.erning there elements _ and was told, ..Take
your choice, reconstruct from them the expeli-
ence you had." Such prr:cedure led
to difficulties
in concrete psvchological research and to the
emergence of problems rvhich defied solution
by
traditional analltic methods. Historicallv the
most important impulse came from v. Ehrenfels,
:th: rir:"9 the following problem. ps.vchology
had said that experience is a cornpound of ele_
ments: w€ hear a me.lody and then, upon hearing
it-again, memory ennbles us to recognize it. Bui
rvhat is it that enables us to recognize tlre melody
rvhen it is plal.ed in a netu key? The sum of the
elements is different, yet rhe melody is the same;
indeed, one is often not even aryare that a trans-
position has been made.
lVhen in retrospect rve consider the prer.ailing
.
situation we are struck b,v trr.o aspects oiv. Ehreni
fels's thesis; on the one hand one is strrprised
at
the essentiall,r summ:rtir.e cniiicter of his rheory,
on the other oue adnrires his courage in pro_
pounding and defending his proposition.
Strictly
employ slt new
the
-oi.
thun
397 Cht{rt:r 1l: Cogru,are Psythotogy
which is the form-quality, the Gestaltqualitlit, of
the original six. It is this seventh fac{or or eletnent
rihich en.rbled. you to recognize the melody
despite its transpositiotr' However strange this
riew may seem, it shares with marrr/ another sub'
sequently abandoned hlpothesis the honour of
having clearly seen and ernphasized a fundarnen'
tal problem.
but other explanations were also proposed'
One maintained that in addition to the six tones
there were intervals * relations * and that these
rvere what remained constant: [n other words we
are asked ro assume not only elernents but "rela-
tions-bet1r'een-elements" as additional cornPo-
nents of the total complex. But this vierr failed to
account tbr the phenomenon because in sorne
cases the relations too may be altered without
destroying the original melodY.
,A,nother type of explanation, also designed to
bolster the elementaristic h.ypothesis' was that to
this total of six or more tones there conre certain
"higher processes" which operate upon the given
material to "produce" uniry.
This rr'as the situation until Crstalt theory
raised the radical question: Is it really true that
rvhen I hear a melody I have a sum of individual
tones (pie;es) which constitute the primary foun-
dation of my experience? Is not perhaps the
reverse oi this true? \\that I really have, what I
hear ofeach individual note, what I experience at
each place in the melody is apart which is itself
determined by the character of the rvhole. What
is given me by the melodl'does nst arise (through
the agenry ofany auxiliary factor) as a secondary
process from the sum of the pieces as such.
Instead, rrhat takes phce in each single part
alread,r, d3pss4s upon ir'htt the whole is. The
flesh and blood of a hritrl{ depends from tlre start
upon its role in the melody: a b as leading tone
to c is something radic,riil'diffefent from the b as
tonic. It belongs to tht tlesh and blood of the
things given in experience, horv, in rvhat role, irt
what function they are in their whole.
L.et us lEqve the rrelod.v exlnrple and turn to
anotlrer hel.l. Take the case of threshold phenom-
enrr. It has long treen held that a certain stimulus
necessarilu Froduces a certain sensation. Thus,
rvlren trvo stimuli are strfficiently different, the
sensations also rvil! be different. Psychology is
tille.l to'irh caretli inquirie; regarding threshold
con-
Frhcr,]iilena. To r,:ccttnr for the difliculties
stantly being ertcountered it was assumed that
picture is the opposite ofwhat actual inquiry has oor",,,,u *o;;;,- :;:--"
these phenomena must be influenced by higher
disclosed. We have learned to recognize the "sen- as it to Gestalt theory, also er.rs in its
appears
sations" of our textbooks as products of a late efforts to solve the problern, for it, too, begins
mental functions, judgments, illusions, attention,
culture utterly differeat from the experiencos of with the assurnption that natural occunences are
etc. And this cor'rtinued until the radical question
rnore primitive stages. Who e{:eriencesthe sen. tlrernselves essentially blind and haphazard * and
was raised: Is it really true that a sPecific stirnulu$
sation of a specific red in that sense? What the adds a mystical something orrer and above thern
always gives rise to the same sensation? Perhaps
man of the streets, children, or prini tive rn€n which imposes order. Vitalism fails to inquire of
the prevailing whole-conditions will themselves
norrnaUy react to is something eoloured but at physical events r+hether a genuine orider nright
deteimine the efifect of stimulatiori? Thls kind of
forrrulatiori leads to experimentatiorr, and exper-
the sam€ tirne exciting, gay, strong or affeeting - not already prevail arnongst thern Ahd y€t natufe
not "sensations." does exhibit numerous lnstances of physical
iments show, for example, that when I see tw'o
The prograrnrne to treat the organisrn as a wholes in which part ev€nts afe {ctormincd by
colours the sensations I have are determined by
part in a larger field necessitates the reformula- the inner structure of the whole,
the rr'holc-conditions of the entir€ stirnulus situ-
tion of the problem as to the relation between These brief references to biology will suffice
ation. Thus, also, the same local physical stimulus
organism and environment. Thc stimulus-sensa- to remind us that whole-phcnomena are not
patt€rn can give rise to either a unitary and
tion connection must be teplaced by a copnec. "rnerely" psychological, but appear in other sci-
ho*rg.nuout figure, or to air articulated figure
tion between alteration in the field conditions, ences as well. Obviously, therefore, thc problern
wi*h different parts, all depending upon the
the vital situation, and the total reaction of the is not solved by separating offvarious provinces
whole-conditions which may favour either unity
organism by a change in its attitude, suiving, of science and classiSing whole-phenonrena as
or articulation Obviously the task, then, is to
uwhole-conditions' and discover and feeling. something peculiar to psychology.
investigate these
There is, however, another step to tie consid- The fundamental question can be very simply
nhat influences they exert upon experience'
ered. A rnan is not only a part of his field, he is $tated: Ate the parts of a given whole determined
Advancing another step lve come to the ques-
also one among other men. When a group of by the inner structure of that whole, or are the
tion u*iether perhaps any Part depends uPon the
people work tq;ether it rarely,occurs, and then events such that, as independent, piecerneal, for-
particular whole in which it occurs. Experiments'
only under very special conditions, that they con- tuitous and blind the total activity is a sum ofthe
iaagely on vision, have answered this question in
stitute a mer€-surh of independent Egos, Instead part-activities? Human beings can, of course,
the affirmative. Among other things tt*eydemand
the cornmon enterprise often'becomes their -
devise a kind of physics of their own e.g. a
that the traditional theory of visual contrast be
replaced by a theory which takes account of
mutual concern and each works as a..meaning- sequenoe of rnachines - exernplifring the latter
fully functioning part of the whole. Consider a halfofour question, but this does not signifr that
whole-part conditions.
group of South Sea Islanders engaged in some all natural phenomena are of this type. Here is a
Our next point is that rny field comprises also
community occupation, or a group of children place where Gestalt theory is least easily under-
my f,go. There is not from the beginning an Ego
playing together. Only under very special circum- stood and this because of the great number of
over-against others, but the genesis of an Ego
stances does an "1" stand out aloneruThen the prejudices about nature which have accumulated
offers one of the most fascinating problems, the
balance rvhich obtained during harmonious and during the centuries. Nature is thought of as
sc{ution of which seems to lie in Gestalt princi-
systematic occupation may be upset and give way something essentially blind in its laws, u'here
ples. Horvever, onc€ constituted' the Ego is a func-
before to a surrogate (under certain conditions, patho- whatever takes place in the whole is purely a sum
iional patt ofthe total field' Proceeding as
we mal'therefore ask What happens to the Ego
logical) new balance. of individual occurrences. This vierv was the
Further discussion of this point rvould carry natural r€sult of the struggle which physics has
as a part of the field? Is the resulting behaviour
us into the rvork of socill and cultural science alrvays had to purge itself of teleology. To-day it
the piecewi.se sort of thing associationism, experi-
rr'hich cannr:t be follorved here. Insteild let us can be seen that we are obliged to traverse other
ence th"ory, and the like, rvould have us believe?
consider certain other illustrations. What was routes thrn those suggested by this kind of'
E*perirnental results contradict this interpreta-.
said above of stimulus and sensation is applicable purposivisnr.
titir and again we often find that the laws of to physiolo$r and the biological sciences no less Let us proc-eed another step and ask: Horv does
rrhole-processes operative in such a field tend
than to psychology. It has been tried, for example, all this stand rvith regard to the problem ofbodv
toward a "meaningfut" behaviour of its parts'
by postulating sums of nrore and more sgrecial and mind? \'Vhat does m1, knorvledge of another's
This fielct is not a suntntation of s€nse data
apparatus, to account tbr meaningtirl or, as it is r-nental experiences amount to and horv do I
and no description of it n'hich considers such
often called, purposive behaviour. Once more rve obtain it? There are, ofcourse, old and established
separate pieces to be prinrary will be correct' If it
find meaninglessly combined reflexes taken for dogmas on these points: The mental and physical
were, then for children, prinlitive peoples and
granted although it is probable that even with are n'holly heterogeneous: There obtains between
animals experience lvould be nothing but piece-
minute organisrns it is not true that a piece- them an absolute dichotomp (From this point of
sensations. The next most developed creatures
stimulus automatically bring about its corres- departure pirilosophers have drawn an arrav of
rvould have, in addition to independent sensa-
ponding piece-elfect. ntet{ph}'sicnl deductions so is to attribute all the
tions, sornething higher' and so on' llut this whole

qualities to rnind while reserving for nature
"oododious.) As regards the second qtlestion, my
the
discerning mental phenomena in others is tradi'
tionallyexplained as inference by analogy. Strictly
interpreted the principle here is that something
mental ie meaninglessll' coupled with something
- I
physical. observe the physical and infer the
mental from it rnore or less accordi;rg to the fol'
button on
lowing schemel I see someone press a
thc wall and infer that he wants the liglrt to go on'
There may be couplings of this sort. Horvevetr,
manv scientists have been disturbed by this
-dualism
and have tried to save themselves by
recourse to very curious hypotheses. lndeed, tbe
ordinary person would violendy refruse to believe
that when he sees his companion startle{ fright-
ened, or angry he is seeing only certain physical
occurrences which themselves have nothing to do
(in their inner nature) with the rnental, being
only superficially coupled with it: you have fre-
quently scen this and this combined ' . . etc' There
have been many attemPts to surmount this
problem' One speaks, for example, of intuition
and sa1's there cafl be no other possibility' for I
see my companion's fear. It is not true, argue the
intuitionists, that I only the bare bodily activ'i-
see
ties meaninglessly cor"rpled with other and invisi-
ble activities. Horvever inadmissible it
may
otherwise be, an intuition theory does have at
least this in its favour, it shows a suspicion that
the traditional procedure might be successfully
reversed. But the word intuition is at best only
a naming of that which we mu$t strive to lay
hold of'
This and other hlpotheses, apprehended as
they nolv are, will not advance scientific pursuit,
for science dcmands fruitful penetration' not
nrere catirlo;luirrg and systematization' But the
qttestion is, How dr:es the matter really stand?
Looking more closelv we find a third assumption,
nanrel.v that a process such as fear is a matter of
consciou$ness- Is this true? Suppose you see a
person who is kindly or trenevolent' Does anyone
suppo-se that this person is feeling mawkish? No
one could possibly believe that' The charatteristic
feature of such behaviour has very little to do
with conscirrusness. [t has been one ofthe easiest
contrivances of philosophy to identi$' a nran's
real behavior'rr and the direction of his mind rvith
his consciortsness. Parenthetically, in the opinion
r,'i ttr*nt' peo6:ic ilr*' Liistinction between idealism
and materialism implies that between the noble
and the ignoble. Yct does onc really mean by this
to contrast consciousncas with thc blithesome
budding oftrccsl lndced, what is th?re so rePug-
nant about the rnaterlalistic qnd mechanicali
What is so attractivq about thc idcalistic? Does it
come from the matefial qualltid of the connected
piecesi Broadly spcaking rnost psychological
theories and textbooks, despite thcir continued
emphasis upon consciousncss' arc fcr more
"matelialistic", arid, and spiritless than a living
tree - which probably has no consciousness at all.
The point is not what the material pieces are, but
what kind of whole it is. Froceeding in terrns of
specific problems.one soon realizes how many
bodily activities there are rvhich give no hint of a
separation between body and mind. Imagine a
dance, a dance full of grace and joy. What is the
situation in such a dance? Do we have a summa-
tion of physical limb movements and a psychical
consciousness? No. Obviously this ansn'er does
not solve the problern; we have to start anew
and it seems to me that a proPer and fruitful
point of attack has been discovered. One finds
many processes which, in their dynamical form,
are identical regardless of variations in the rnate-
rial character of theil elements. When a man is
timid, afraid or energetic, happy or sad, it can
often be shown that the course of his phpical
processes is Gestalt-identical with the course
pursued by the mental Processes.
Again I can only indicate the direction of
thought. I have touched on the question ofbody
and rnind merely to showthat the problem we are
discussing also has its philosophic aspects. To
strengthen the import of the foregoing sugges-
tions let us consider the fields of ePistemology
and logic. For centuries the assumption has pre-
railed that our world is essentially a summation
of elements. For Hume and largely also for Kant
the world is like a bundle of fragments, and the
dogma of meaningless summations continues to
play its part. As for logic, it supplies: concePts'
onni.n tn.n rigorously viewed are but sums of
properties; classes, which upon closer inspection
p.otte to b. mere catchalls; syllogisms, devised by
arbitrarily lunrping together any hvo ProPosl-
tions having the character that . . ' etc. lVhen one
considers *hut . .on..pt is in living thought'
what it real.ly means to grasp a conclusion; when
one considers what the crucial thing is about
mathematical proof and the coucrete interrela-
tionehips it involvcs, one sees tliat the categories
oftroditional logic have accomplished norhing in
this dircction.
It is our task to inquire, whether a logic is pos,
sible which is not piecemeal. Indeed the same
question arises in mathernatics also. Is it neces-
rarF that all mathematics be establisfued upon a
piecewise basis? What sort of mathematical
system would it be in which this were not the
casei There have been attempts to a-nswer the
latter question but alrnsst ahvays they har.e fallen
back in the end upon the old procedures. This
fate has overtaken many, for thc result oftraining
in piecewise thinking is extraordinarily tenacious.
It is not enough and certainly does not constitute
a solution of the principal problem if one shows
that the atorr$ of mathematics are both piece-
meal and at the same time evince something of
the opposite character. The problem has been sci-
entifically grasped only when an attack specifi-
- cally designed to yield positive results has been
launched. |ust horv this attack is to be made seems
to many mathernaticians a colossal problem, but
perhaps the quantum theory will force the math-
ematicians to attack it.
This brings us to the close of an &ttempt to
present a view ofthe problem as illustrated b,v its
specilic appearances in various 6elds. In conclud-
ing I may suggest a certain unification of these
illustrations sornelvhat as follorvs. I consider the
situation from the point of vien- of a theory of
aggregates and say: How should a lvorld be irhere
science, concepts, inquiry, investigation, and
comprehension of inner unities were impossible?
The answer is obvious. This rvorld ru:ould be a
manifold ofdisparate pieces. Secondly, rvhat kind
a
of &orld would there have to be in which a piece-
wis.c sciense would apply? The ansrver is again
quite simple, for here one needs only a system of
r€current couplings that are blind and piecewise
in character, whereupon ev€rlthing is available
for a pursuit of the traditional piecewise methods
of logic, mathematics, and science generally in so
fat as rhese presuppose this kind of world. But
there is a third kind ofaggregate which has been
but cursorily investigated. These are the aggre-
gates in which a manifold is not compounded
from adjacently situated pieces but rather such
that a term at its place in that aggregate is deter-
mined by the whole.laws of the aggregate itself.
Pictorially; suppose the world r4'ere a vast
plateau upon whicb were many musicians, I walk
about listening and rvatching the players. First
suppose that the world is a meaningless plurality.
Even:one does as he will, each for himself. What
happens together r'hen I hear ten players might
be the basis for m1'guessing as to what the), all
are doing, but this is merely a matter of chance
and probabiliry much as in the kinetics of gas
molecules. - A second possibility rvould be that
each time one musician plaved C, another played
F so and so rnanu seconds later. I rvork qut a
theory of blind couplings but the playing as a
whole remains nreaningless. This is what man,v
people think physics does, bur the real ryork of
ph1'sics belies this. - The third possibility is, san
a Beethoven slmphony where it would be possi-
ble for one to sele* one part of the whole and
work trom that torvards arr idea ofthe structural
principle rnotivating and determining the n'hole.
Here the fundamental laws are not those of for-
tuitous pieces, but concern the very character of
the event.