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Why Pragmatism Now?

Author(s): Eugene Rochberg-Halton


Source: Sociological Theory, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Autumn, 1987), pp. 194-200
Published by: American Sociological Association
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WHY PRAGMATISM NOW?

EUGENE ROCHBERG-HALTON

University of Notre Dame

Across several disciplines there has been renewed interest in philosophical pragmatism

in the past few years. What had been a body of thought reduced largely to the influence

of George Herbert Mead in sociology, has reemerged with significance for semiotics,

philosophy, literary criticism, and other disciplines. The reasons for a renewed interest

in the thought of Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and a revised George

Herbert Mead can be found in the theory of meaning proposed by the pragmatists: a

theory of meaning that can include more phenomena within the realm of significance,

and therefore a theory of meaning that can contribute to ongoing attempts to refashion

social theory.

At a seminar last year in West Germany, a for a remaking of social theory at work,

colleague asked me why pragmatism is so tendencies that blur previously distinct disciplin-

popular now in America. Before I could answer, ary boundaries, that revive previously "dead"

another colleague replied that the current theories, that seek to forge new vocabularies and

interest in pragmatism is due to a resurgence of new directions for social theory. If this is so-if

"Americanism" in the 1980s. I retorted, "Yes, social theory is undergoing some kind of

a resurgence of interest by such "good ol' restructuring-the questions seem to me: Does

American boys" as Karl Otto-Apel, Jiirgen pragmatism in some way contribute to this

Habermas, and Hans Joas, to name some restructuring? And if it does, then what kinds of

Germans involved in the resurgence." possibilities does it hold for social theory?

This renewed interest in pragmatism does not, Finally, the pragmatic question itself: What is

in my opinion, have much to do with American- the purport of a remaking of social theory?

ism. On the contrary, pragmatism as a body of Perhaps one of the indicators of a restructur-

ing of social theory is the very presence of


thought provides a critical antidote for the blind

and mindless optimism characteristic of Amer- pragmatism today as a lively issue in contempo-

rary thought. Whereas ten or fifteen years ago


ica today. If anything, one could point to

pragmatism per se would be excluded from most


neofunctionalism as the symptom of American-

ism in the 1980s. Yet even neofunctionalism discussions of contemporary theories of mean-

ing in philosophy or literary criticism, and, if


includes among its "good ol' American boys"

we except George Herbert Mead, in sociology,


the Germans Richard Munch and Niklas Luh-

today we find that pragmatism seems to be a hot


mann, so characterizing a school of thought as

topic in literary criticism, and that there is


representing Americanism may be a more

renewed interest in pragmatism in continental


slippery endeavor than it first appears. Talcott

thought. Why? Pragmatism might be in contem-


"Heidelberg" Parsons, for example, the Godfa-

porary consideration precisely because it pro-


ther of neofunctionalism, has often been ac-

vides a theory of meaning that answers the


cused of "Germanism" in his early neglect of

needs of the time for a broadening of meaning


American thought and his continued infatuation

beyond the self-imposed restrictions of moder-


with the thought of Max Weber. But when one

nity. As a body of thought, the theories of the


considers the ways Parsons "Americanized"

classic pragmatists Charles Peirce, William


Weber, both in his translation of The Protestant

James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead


Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism and in his

provide a comprehensive theory of meaning that


transformation of Weber's angst in the face of

undercuts the constrictive tendencies in so much


modernity into Parsons' own "see no evil"

of contemporary theory.
enthusiasm for modernization, then one sees

These tendencies to exclude significant as-


that Parsons himself may be one of the cultural

pects of human experience from the domain of


indicators of Americanism, with its tendencies

significance or meaning, as I hope to show, are


to blind optimism and technicalism.

not limited to isolated influences of positivist or


It seems to me that we must approach the

subjectivist schools of thought, but are manifes-


question of why there is renewed interest in

tations of a pervasive rationalism in contempo-


pragmatism now from a different perspective. A

rary intellectual life. Richard Rorty, for exam-


number of theorists, such as Richard Bernstein

ple, is a philosopher associated with the revival


and Clifford Geertz, have discussed tendencies

194 Sociological Theory, 1987, Vol. 5 (Fall:194-200)

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WHY PRAGMATISM NOW? 195

of pragmatism, but he could equally be singled the "business" mentality. This is the false

stereotype that infected many European theo-


out as an example of contemporary rationalism.

Rorty finds Dewey's situationalism conducive to rists, who were perhaps unwilling to confront a

a pluralistic vision of philosophy as "conversa- mode of thought that rejected certain foundational-

tion," in keeping with such key pragmatist ist and dichotomizing tendencies key to their

concepts as the dialogic nature of thought and own thinking. Emile Durkheim, for example,

community. But Rorty only appropriates a could not understand why pragmatism did not

selected portion of Dewey and pragmatism: accept the fundamental duality of human nature.

Rorty's Dewey is a kind of refurbished Georg Simmel could not understand why

deconstructionist, freed from biological and pragmatism rejected the fundamental duality of

historical concerns. He only allows those parts life and form. If he had chosen to comment on

of Dewey and James which fit contemporary it, Max Weber would probably have not

relativist rationalism to filter through. understood why pragmatism did not accept the

Rorty even goes so far as to say that Peirce's fundamental dichotomy between facts and

contribution to pragmatism was merely to have values. These three thinkers share foundations

given it a name, and to have stimulated James. of Kantian dualism rejected by pragmatism.

In other words, none of Peirce, pragmatism's Durkheim accepted a variation of the Cartesian

founder, can filter through Rorty's constricted assumption that one begins with a subject and an

relativist rationalism. Imagine Marxism without object and then faces the epistemological

Marx, or psychoanalysis without Freud, and you problem of how to put them together. His

can see why such a facile dismissal of Peirce is solution was that collective representations

dubious at best. Though Rorty is associated with provide a foundational mediation (which some

the revival of pragmatism, he can also be seen have claimed is similar to Mead's "generalized

as a manifestation of the selective forgetting of other"). But in retaining an underlying dichot-

pragmatism in the name of contemporary omy, Durkheim had to stress a radical difference

rationalism. between social facts as things and the individu-

This rationalism shows itself even among that als involved in those social facts, between

school most associated with pragmatism by sociology and psychology, between the elemen-

sociologists, symbolic interactionism. Symbolic tary forms or Cartesian cardinal conceptions

interactionism, as practiced today and as underlying religion and the varieties of religious

originally set forth by Herbert Blumer, is largely experience in various religions.

an act of selective forgetting of pragmatism. It Durkheim's idea that social facts must be

has organized itself around George Herbert treated as external things has a corollary that

Mead, to the neglect of William James, John "individual" facts have to be treated as internal

Dewey and C.S. Peirce. One can see why Peirce things. His idea of the duality of human nature

was ignored: Peirce's chief interest was in logic, is insufficiently social; it retains the fiction of an

and his writings are not easy reading. It is more underlying individual always needing to be

difficult to understand why James and Dewey synthesized into the realm of the social. The

dropped out of the sociological consciousness. pragmatic view that Durkheim denigrated is

Dewey is clearly a thinker of broader scope than broader in seeing human beings as fundamen-

Mead, yet his influence in symbolic interaction- tally social, including even inner human psychol-

ism has been minimal. The average intellectual, ogy and biological life.

on being asked to name a pragmatist, would Pragmatism was an attempt to undercut the

probably name John Dewey or William James, Cartesian problem of starting with a subject and

but the average sociologist has been socialized an object and then figuring out how to put them

to think of George Herbert Mead. And the Mead together. It began instead with triadic mediated

image impressed upon sociologists is that sign-acts, from which could be prescinded a

derived from symbolic interactionism, in which "subject" and an "object." Pragmatism denied

the lively interest by Mead and the other that knowledge was reducible either to a rational

pragmatists in forging a socialized conception of knowing subject or to an immediate sensation of

nature and human biology for social theory has an object: it rejected rationalism and the

been purged, and the significance of history and sensationalism of British empiricism. Pragma-

social critique too frequently forgotten. tism denied the myth of a private and asocially

Pragmatism, therefore, has undergone a constituted subject or object by locating mean-

radical diminution in the sociological tradition, ing in praxis, intelligible conduct rooted in the

and the renewal of interest should at the least


vital tissue of the generalized community. One

break through the constricted understanding of sees in Peirce's semiotic realism, rooted in a

pragmatism in contemporary social theory. But conception of an "unlimited community of

there is another stereotype that needs disman- inquirers," in Dewey's treatment of community

tling (if not deconstruction), and that is the in The Public and its Problems and in his

image of pragmatism as expedient practicalism,


discussions of the qualitative situation, in James

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196
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

and Mead's discussions of the dialogic nature of


"autopoeisis," which attempts to describe the

the self, a thoroughly socialized conception of tendencies of systems for self-generation, is

the social, one that cuts through the underlying


simply a recapitulation of that old theme of

lingering traces of solipsistic individualism


science fiction-how to create a self-generating

found in the mainstream European roots of machine-transposed to the technical lingo of

social theory. The key term for meaning in the


systems theory. Why would one need to attach

pragmatic view is habit, sign-habit, living "auto-" to "poeisis," if not to highlight the

sign-habit-a concept that encompasses struc- claim that an impersonal system can do what

ture and individual.


persons by nature do, without the need or bother

of persons being considered? Through his

concentration on events or "communicative

Meaning as Semiosis

acts" at the exclusion of human persons,

As a theory of signs, pragmatism includes more Luhmann excises those living qualities that are

phenomena as signs than a number of sign difficult to capture in the mechanical theory of

theories or theories of symbolism, semiology or systems. To the extent that moder conditions

semiotics. Varieties of structuralism, for exam- have turned human individuals into functioning

ple, do not include emotions, the communica- automata of social systems, Luhmann's may be

tion of feelings, and human experience as a theory well-suited to its time. But it is more

themselves signs. These phenomena would only appropriate to see Luhmann himself as a

be the "surface level," because meaning occurs functioning automaton serving the great ma-

at a deep structural level. In other words, the chine of modernity, attempting to steal that last

ongoing emotive and other communicative holdout and treasure of humanity, life itself, by

capacities of human experience are ignored by attributing its generative and self-transcending

these theories. Pragmatism, by contrast, counts power, "autopoeisis," to the lifeless machine

more things as significative. Experience itself is system.

significative, and thereby significant. This reified conception of meaning that one

In this sense another contribution of pragma- reads today in Luhmann's systems approach, in

tism is that it denies reified theories of meaning structuralism and those influenced by its binary

that make meaning to be, for example, a "deep logic, in which I would include Anthony

structure" insusceptible to human manipulation, Giddens, Umberto Eco, and poststructuralists

cultivation, practice, or correctability. One of such as Jacques Derrida, would give to a

the problems in the structuralist theory of disembodied "structure," "system," or "text"

meaning is precisely that it is located in some model those properties of human practice, of

nether-world where human practice cannot human sign-practice. Those who would turn

touch it. Meaning is literally in no place in living human action and institutions into the

structuralism and its poststructuralist offspring, model of the text, such as Derrida or Paul

for the place and space of a code or convention Ricouer, are lackeys of rationalism, who must

signifies but does not exist. Meaning may attach necessarily ignore those features of experience

itself to persons, places or things, but as and history that do not fit the "text." These are

meaning it in no way touches or is touched by not critical theories of meaning so much as the

those persons, places, and things. Need I remind mirroring, in social theory, of the same

you of Thomas More's word for "no place": tendencies in late modernity to turn all life,

utopia. Pragmatism, by contrast, provides a public and private, into prepackaged script. And

theory of meaning that has human praxis built what are "texts" themselves, if not potential

into it, a theory that includes the embodiment, human activities and tracings of human life

as well as the bodying forth, of meaning. brought to life in the activity of reading and its

Pragmatism also provides an alternative to effects on a person's or people's conduct? These

theories that would surrender meaning to a theories are themselves symptoms of the etherializa-

mechanically conceived "system," operating tion of human life in the late twentieth century,

like a homeostatic thermostat rather than some rather than critical antidotes: they support the

human institution or practice. One current avatar "invisible dictator" of rationality in its attempt

of this approach, Niklas Luhmann, would have to turn world into word. Pragmatism, by

us believe that education has the function of contrast, views meaning as living habit, and

"the socialization of individuals as an adequate structure and system as organized habit. As

environment for future social systems" (The living habit, meaning is open to emergence,

Differentiation of Society 1982, p. 241). In less corruption or cultivation, death or transforma-

bloodless language, education functions to make tion to new sign-habits. And again, by contrast,

cogs for the machine. Luhmann's theory is structuralism does not provide for the death of

simply a flow chart for a functioning machine, meaning, let alone the birth of meaning. In

and one can see Luhmann as an updated avatar providing a theory of meaning that can allow for

of the Parsonian Grand Theorist. His concept of death or transformation of meaning, of large

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WHY PRAGMATISM NOW? 197

scale cultural and epochal changes, pragmatism them to the effects of capitalism or rationaliza-

includes developmental aspects frequently ex-


tion, but curiously enough, and especially

cluded from consideration.


curiously for so-called critical theorists, all

Meaning in the pragmatic tradition is embod- criticism stops when it comes to the question of

ied and can body forth. I use the word "body"


nature. The ways the same deforming tenden-

intentionally. Pragmatism roots meaning in the


cies may have transformed the concept of nature

body public as well as the body private. It


are strangely ignored. Critical theorists, in

thereby stands in stark contrast to those


which I would include Habermas or Giddens,

etherialized theories of meaning rooted in the


simply do not take a critical enough approach: to

inorganic image of the machine, theories that


examine critically what it was in the seventeenth

would alienate meaning from organic human


century that brought about a transformation to

bodies.
the mechanical view of nature, a view that

Another, and more controversial contribution


spread across the natural and human sciences,

of pragmatism is that it develops a theory of


and to ask whether that view of nature is valid

meaning continuous with nature and biology. today.

There is a bio-social theory of meaning in


Pragmatism denies the mechanical view of

pragmatism shared by all four of the classic


nature, revealing how the "naturalistic fallacy"

American pragmatists, but one by and large


is not simply the ascription of qualities of

ignored by those who claim to be following


culture to nature, but more significantly, the

tenets of pragmatism. One of the problems that


ascription to nature of the lifeless qualities of the

exists in contemporary social theory today-


machine. Pragmatism rejects the uncritical

indeed one of the great problems of our time -is


repression of nature characteristic of so-called

precisely the repression and denial of nature.


"critical" social theories today, as well as the

The critical theorists, for example, or structural-


uncritical repression of the critical human

ists, would have us believe that culture is


capacities by human ethologists and so-called

something radically opposed to nature. Nature is


"sociobiologists" (who are neither socially nor

purposeless and culture is the realm of invention


biologically rooted, but rather are exponents of

and meaning and symbolization. The pragma-


rationalistic calculation).

tists developed a theory that stated something


The pragmatists, I would suggest, undercut

quite different-that culture is a continuous


that mechanical view of nature and attempted to

relation in nature, not something radically


develop a theory that could allow generality or

opposed to it.
sign-making as a constituent of nature: purpose

In this sense, pragmatism represents an


is not divorced from nature, and human nature is

alternative to both sociobiology and so-called


not divorced from culture. In this sense

critical theories of culture. These two seem to be


pragmatism was rejecting the uncritical repres-

at odds with each other. Sociobiology individu-


sion of nature characteristic of many of these

alizes Darwin's already overly individualistic


theories today. And I would say that with the

theory of evolution and claims that culture


emergence of the new plague of AIDS,

counts for nothing. Culture is just the subli-


contemporary social theory desperately needs to

mated version of nature, and nature is greedy.


reconceive nature and biology. It is important

Sociobiology is itself a kind of philosophy of


not only to investigate how biology may be

greed, which "naturalizes" those core concepts


functioning in human behavior but more gener-

of capitalism: maximization, continual struggle,


ally to reconceive the nature of nature.

inevitable progress.

The critical culture theorists seem to say the

The Pragmatic Attitude

exact opposite. In this view nature counts for

nothing, because it is the "arbitrariness" of


I have used the term, "the pragmatic attitude,"

meaning that determines human endeavors and


to suggest the kind of mindset, Weltanschauung,

human institutions. The problem is that both


or world picture characterizing the pragmatic

share a mechanical view of nature: one saying it


mind (see my Meaning and Modernitv: Social

counts for everything; the other saying it counts


Theory in the Pragmatic Attitude, University of

for nothing, but both uncritically believing in


Chicago Press, 1986). It seems to me that the

the received mechanical view of nature. Now


classic pragmatists only partially realized the

we sociologists know of all the different and


inherent possibilities of the pragmatic attitude.

powerful critiques of the rise and deforming


William James-if we look at William James as

characteristics of capitalism and rationalization.


the most vivid and earthy of the four major

We know that the character of work, family and


pragmatists-had the problem that his very

political life, and what it means to be a self have


vividness caused him to be the weakest

all radically changed in the past few centuries.


philosophically of the pragmatists. Dewey and

All of these phenomena have emerged in


Mead attempted to work out the social and

peculiar ways in modernity, and we can trace


political implications of pragmatism, and to a

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198
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

great extent ran counter to those tendencies of


otherwise metallic hue of professional sociology

the twentieth century toward closed systems of


the appearance of fleshtone: The appearance of

thought. The very idea that logic is binary that fleshtone.

one finds in structuralism, for example, seems Dewey and Mead grew into maturity in the

to me not to be a factor of the human brain, as organic culture that flourished at the turn-of-the

Levi-Strauss suggests, but a factor of the


century in Chicago. They were contributing

twentieth century, the either/or century-a members to a milieu that included Jane Addams

century of the split brain: either of extreme and her Hull-House companions, Louis Sullivan

rationalism or extreme primitivism. The objec- and Frank Lloyd Wright and their organic

tive situationalism of both Dewey and Mead architecture, Thorstein Veblen, and others. The

stood in contrast to the foundationalism of the ideals of this milieu stood in stark contrast to the

early twentieth century, just as it stands today in machine ideals of virulent capitalism at work in

contrast to the overly subjectivist tendencies in Chicago. In this sense Dewey and Mead's

symbolic interactionism. Dewey and Mead optimistic pragmatism was a much needed

counter the tendencies to dichotomize existence alternative to the machine of modernity.

and thereby provide still valuable ideas for Yet Dewey and Mead's situationalism and

contemporary thought. optimism, I would claim, proved in the end

Dewey and Mead are complementary to each inadequate to meet the dark forces at work in the

other, and in a sense are almost two sides of the twentieth century. It has been Max Weber's

same coin, though Dewey is, in my opinion, the pessimistic scenario of the dominance of the

broader of the two. George Herbert Mead, faceless bureaucratic machine and its rationality

despite the valuable contributions of his thought, that has thus far prevailed.

has overly dominated discussion in contempo- But even today Dewey and Mead present a

rary sociology. It must be noted again that this is powerful counterclaim to Weber: ever increas-

a weird historical fact. James and Dewey ing "rationalization" is not, as Weber believed,

certainly had important influences early in the an unavoidable consequence of modernity. Not

century. Yet for whatever reasons, perhaps even only can human institutions and large scale

the fact of having posthumously published patterns of meaning be revised and corrected,

books by Mead that one could actually hold and but the very model of the rational proposed by

that had his name on it, or students like Herbert Weber is a distorted abstraction, an uprooted

Blumer who were inspired by his work, for conception of rationality that by no means

whatever reasons Mead came to ascendency defines reasonableness. Zweckrationalitdt, pur-

while the rest of pragmatism dropped into posive or instrumental rationality, makes the

virtual oblivion. We need to broaden our instrument, the strategic calculating machine of

understanding of pragmatism and social theory rationality, to be the ultimate master of

to include the whole framework: to realize at the humankind. This is the story of alienation, not

very least in what stream of consciousness Mead of rationality, the story of the means becoming

himself was swimming. With the renewal of reified as end. Weber may have been accurately

interest in pragmatism, sociology in general and describing an historical process at work, but his

symbolic interactionism in particular must own foundations of thought-the legacy of Kant

and his dichotomous view of the world-are


recognize the fact that the "Meadian" is no

longer the mode. products of the very same historical process, of

what I have termed "cultural nominalism."


Given its partial understanding of Mead and

its limited Mead-centered understanding of Hence Weber's own theoretical preconceptions

pragmatism, symbolic interactionism has as- may have prevented him from seeing the

sumed a rear-guard position in the ongoing possibility that rationalism may not truly

renewal of interest in pragmatism. Its major represent rationality, but only an exaggerated

controversies revolve around the correct inter- and one-sided view of what constitutes rational-

pretation of Mead, never questioning his ity. We should also keep in mind, though, that

centrality. Until symbolic interactionism gets Dewey did not call his work pragmatism early

on: he called it instrumentalism. And some of


over its half-century long infatuation with

George Herbert Mead, it will remain the same overly instrumental tendencies pervade the

dubious sociological sect it is today-providing work of Dewey and Mead. Perhaps the very

the great machine of professional sociology with great amount of attention Dewey and Mead gave

a situational escape-valve, never threatening the to the scientific grounding of a broad theory of

machine itself but actually serving it. Symbolic meaning underemphasized the place of things

interactionism currently serves as "humanoid such as the imagination, the Poetic Imagination,

as William Blake called it.


tissue" for the great sociological machine. In

serving up studies of isolate situational interac- Dewey and Mead's avoidance of trans-

tions stamped with the imprimatur of Mead and situational norms prevents them in the end from

His representatives on this earth, it gives the sufficiently undermining the foundations of

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199
WHY PRAGMATISM NOW?

moder rationality and proposing a broad-based we need culture to complete it. But in acting

alternative. For this broader perspective we have suggestively, in giving us vague inclinations,

instinctive capacities provide us profound con-


to turn to Charles Peirce, the founder of

nections to the world and in that sense outreach


pragmatism, whose semiotic, pragmaticism, and

"theory of concrete reasonableness" provide even the most developed rationality.

possibilities for broadening-radically broaden- In saying that we are possessed of indubitable

ing-the base of social theory. yet fallible ideas in the doctrine of critical

It was Peirce who in the nineteenth century common-sensism, Peirce pointed the way to a

first proposed fallibilism as an alternative to perspective yet to be fully realized. It is a

foundationalism. And it was Peirce's fallibilism prospectus that social theory may not be ready

that Dewey and Mead most resonated with- for-a prospectus that admits the capacities to

although they developed it in their own ways marvel and to imagine, to feel and act as well as

independently. But it was also Peirce who reason, as genuine, even logical, ingredients of

first-and more deeply-proposed that we are reasonableness in all its fullness.

possessed of deep-rooted biocosmic capacities

of feeling and inference: of tempered prejudices.

The Purport of Pragmatism

Peirce accepted Kant's idea that we see the

world through our faculties of knowing. Only he Why pragmatism now? It is not so much

went further than Kant, to say that our faculties because of Americanism as in spite of Ameri-

of knowing are themselves transilluminations of canism that pragmatism has resurfaced. The

the general patterns of nature. We are built the pragmatic attitude offers to contemporary social

way the world is built, and have a gift within theory much that it presently seeks: a compre-

our human nature for inferring about the world hensive theory of signs, communication, and

and hypothesizing about it. human action; a means to encompass both

In Peirce's claim that we are possessed of structure and human agency through the concept

indubitable yet fallible ideas in his doctrine of of living habit; a critical theory of rationality,

"critical common-sensism," we see a typical society, and modernity. But the pragmatic

Peircean marriage of opposites-the critical attitude also offers certain ideas that social

philosophy of Kant with Scottish common- theory would prefer not to know about, whether

sensism. Peirce, who criticized Descartes' through self-interest or simple embarrassment.

search for indubitable foundations for knowl-


The pragmatic attitude, in its furthest reaches,

edge, came in the end to the opinion that we do rejects the continued rationalization of the world

have indubitable ideas: prejudices, tempered in favor of the instinctualization of reason. It

ideas, sentiments, instincts that are so deeply claims that there are profound connections

rooted in traditions that it doesn't even occur to


between human meaning and human bodies, and

us to question them. His difference with the that biology is a significant factor in the highest,

Scottish common-sensists, and the influence of and not simply the lowest, human endeavors.

the Kantian turn, is that though we may be The vagueness of human instinct, which makes

possessed of indubitables, this does not mean human infants less intelligent than chimpanzee

that they are infallible. As indubitables arise infants, does not signify the absence of instincts,

over time in human affairs for questioning they but the presence of specifically human biology,

can themselves be corrected. But there may be


"grown" to require human communication as its

some kind of harmony or "condensation of most essential organ.

nature" in the way we are built so that these Those who see pragmatism as a reflection of

tempered prejudices may provide profound American self-interest, expediency, and crass

sources for action. It was Peirce, the great


commercialism should remember what the

logician and inventor of "symbolic logic," the


founder of pragmatism, Charles Peirce, had to

champion of scientific method, who expressed say in 1898: "To pursue 'topics of vital

the seemingly anti-scientific idea that rationality


importance' as the first and best can lead only to

is but a thin film on the great sea of the mind. one or other of two terminations-either on the

From the perspective of everyday life, Peirce


one hand in what is called, I hope not justly,

saw rationality as a mere scum on the waters, a


Americanism, the worship of business, the life

significant one perhaps, but one minute in


in which the fertilizing stream of genial

comparison with the greater human capacities.


sentiment dries up or shrinks to a rill of comic

In this sense the genuinely non-modem turn of


tit-bits, or else on the other hand, to monasti-

Peirce's thought that could have great value in


cism, sleepwalking in this world with no eye nor

social theory is his view that rationality is the


heart except for the other. Take for the lantern

most immature of human capacities and that


of your footsteps the cold light of reason and

sentiment and human instinct are our most


regard your business, your duty, as the highest

mature capacities. Instinct may work vaguely,


thing, and you can only rest in one of those

but that is precisely why we are human, because


goals or the other (Collected Papers of Charles

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200 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Sanders Peirce, 1.673). From these and other The renewal of interest in pragmatism signi-

words, it is quite clear that Peirce saw fies a broadening of social theory, but a full

pragmatism as opposed to practicalism and remaking of social theory will involve going

rationalism, and rationality itself as subordinate beyond the limitations of classic pragmatism. I

to sentiment in the conduct of life.


submit that in its deepest workings, in the

The renewal of interest in pragmatism poses a


thought of Charles Peirce, there was in

question for social theory that even goes beyond


pragmatism signs of a new and non-modem

pragmatism: Can the cold light of reason which


mind beginning to body forth. A reconstituted

has thus far served as the lantern for social th-

"pragmatic attitude," drawing from these ideas,

eory's footsteps give way to that brighter transil-

offers what much of contemporary social theory

luminated light of warm sentiment? To those who

rejects: against contemporary objectivists it

believe in the supremacy of rationality the very

claims that the denigrated human capacities to

question is embarrassing. But to those who sus-

muse, marvel, imagine, and body forth meaning

pect that reasonableness is more than rationality,

are our chief claim as humans to objectivity.

the renewal of meaning in contemporary life in-

Against contemporary subjectivists it claims that

volves reconceiving human intelligence and re-

the repressed or despised biological roots of

claiming critical, organic human purpose. Clas-

human existence form the living source for

sic pragmatism may not always provide clear or

meaning, subjectivity, and transformation. Against

adequate answers, but in raising the very ques-

those who would etheralize human meaning, the

tion of the grounding of rationality in suprarati-

pragmatic attitude presents strong counterclaims

onal biocosmic resources of the human body,

for the incarnation of bodied intelligence, and


pragmatism attempts to reassert the wholeness of

indeed the reincarnation of that intelligence


intelligent life against the all too frequently in-

through human communication.


humane intelligence of rational life.

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