Third Edition

Research

j: /, .

Guahtitative and

, Perspectives
. " " 'v

Ted Palys
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THOIVISON

NELSON

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4 CHAPTER 1 - PERSPECTIVES
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But beyond these principles there are few things
on which all scientists agree, and the variation
among perspectives can be immense. This seems
appropriate given what is perceived to be at stake-
ultimately no less than truth itself.
Not surprisingly, over millennia, much time has
been devoted to considering such fundamental
questions about truth and knowledge as whether
"facts" exist; how we might recognize one if we saw
one; and how to distinguish "legitimate" data and
"reasonable" interpretations from their opposites. If
you're serious about becoming a researcher, you
owe it to yourself and to your colleagues not only
to enrol in research courses where these issues are
discussed, but also to take courses in such disci-
plines as history and philosophy, where the nuances
of those issues are considered more fully than Lean
do here.
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE
RESEARCH
..... : :
This chapter embodies more modest goals,..-
to begin to talk aboutithe varied methods and
perspectives of rhesocial sciences by introducing
you to-two research traditions or perspectives:
. tg:n3ili.t~~ire., approaches and quantitative
·'~le·.''''~,,~~fY \" .
approaches..
When'f dichotomize all research into only two
traditions; I'm simultaneously on solid ground and
shaky ground. There's abundant evidence to·sug~
gest that dividing research and researchers into
these two categories describes a state of affairs that
really 'exists in the world. Practically any social sci-
ence department in: any university, and .certainly
any discipline as a whole, will contain people whose
research falls within one of these two perspectives.
And although such persons sometimes coexist quite
happily, they sometimes inhabit two virtually sep-
arate worlds: they speak with those in their own
group more often than with those' in the other;
they tend to read and publish in different journals;
and often they attend different conferences, con-
gregating only with people who share their episte-
mological assumptions.
ON RESEARCH
Nor did I make up these terms: members of
each camp actually use the term "qualitative" or
"quantitative" to describe their data, or the
approach underlying how the data were gathered,
when they write books and journal articles. But
the knowledge that qualitative and quantitative
researchers have about each other-at least as
revealed in polemical articles-can be very sim-
plistic and stereotypical. - Members of each group
can become extremely self-righteous, believing that
their perspective is the only "rational" choice any
truly thinking person would make. Of course, by
implication, this means that anyone who makes j
the opposite choice cannot be a very thoughtful j
person at all. Kidder and Fine (1987) capture the
spirit well with their ;tongue~in-cheek description
of how quantitative researchers perceive them-
selves as seekers of ','numerical precision," 'charac-
terizing qualitative researchers as "navel-gazers." In
contrast, qualitative researchers refer to their data
as "rich in detail," writing off quantitative
. researchers as "number crurrchers." .Both "betray
not onlya preference for-one but also a distrust of
the other" (57).
-But my distinction between qualitative and
quantitative perspectives is. nor-simply descriptive.
In abstracting the concepts qualitative and quanti-
tative to explain what appear to be-oonsistenrpar-
. ,
terns in what I observe, I am also being infirential.
And that's where I'm admittedly on less solid
ground because the boundary between qualitative
and quantitative can-be a hard one to demarcate
clearly. Ir'sa bit.like dividing people according to
whether they're "shorruor "tall": it may be a useful
distinction to make, especially when picking
players for the basketball team, but any dividing
line between the two groups is bound to be ~tbi-
trary and hard to justify beyond .the specific cir-
cumstances in which it's used. Despite many clear
differences between rherwo research. camps>, there
are also areas of significant overlap; and researchers
who .are allegedly from one side often incorporate
features from the other.'
/'_;".,/iIII"
But dichotomies can be useful pedagogical
devices, and because I think that's the case here, I'll
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use this one to give you the flavour of each tradi-
tion. I'll first discuss the dichotomy in abstract
terms and then show how one dispute can be
understood in qualitative-quantitative terms. Keep
in mind, though, that in distinguishing berween
qualitative and quantitative research and
researchers, I'm actually much more interested in
forging links of communication berween the rwo
than in driving them further apart.
Quantitative Approaches
Quantitative approaches have traditionally been
the dominant of the rwo traditions: they represent
the mainstream in a wide variety of social science
disciplines (e.g., sociology, psychology, economics,
political science, business administration).
A NATURAL S,CIENCE MODEL
Although quantitative approaches have a long
philosophical lineage, ,their contemporary forms
are often traced to 'the mid- to late 19th century.
Such individuals as Auguste Comte (in sociology
and social psychology) and Wilhelm Wundc(in
psychology); noting the tremendous theoretical
and technological advances in the natural sciences,
argued 'that natural, science methods could' be. of
service to the social sciences as well. The metaphors
they used to describe the challenge.to social scien-
tists were replete with natural science imagery, For
Comte, "societies and groups [were] organisms-
analogous to biological or physical organisms-
that exist and behave-in accordance with objective
and external laws" (Faulconer & Williams 1985:
1181). For Wundt, physlts and chemistry-were the
models to which social scientists should aspire; he
viewed psychology's task as one of uncovering the
"atoms of consciousness" (Adair 1973).
A POsITIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY
Comte, Wundt,.and others embraced an-empirical
tradition known as' positivism. tBhaskar (986)
notes that
the term "positivism" was first used systernati-
cally by Saint-Simon; It was adopted by his erst-
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CHAPTER 1 - PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH 5
while secretary Auguste Comte, to express the
ideas that the world consists of phenomena which
are real, useful, certain, precise, organic, and rel-
ative and that knowledge consists in and only in
the description of the coexistence and succession
of such phenomena. (225)
Many have treated "positivism" and "quantitative
approaches" as virtually synonymous (e.g., see
Blumer 1969; Denzin 1978; Schwartz & Jacobs
1979). Although equating these terms may have
been understandable in the 19th century, it's no
longer accurate to do so. Being a positivist does
imply a quantitative approach, but engaging in
quantitative research no longer means you are nee-
essarilya positivist. Those who have avoided quan-
tification because .they. are dissatisfied with
positivism are simply practising guilt by associa-
tion, and an imperfect association at that.
A REALIST,PERSPECTIVE
The attribute most strongly associated with posi-
tivism is its realist perspective. Filstead (1979)
notes that "at the heart of the distinction berween
the quantitative and qualitative paradigms lies the
classic argument in philosophy berween the schools
of realism, and idealism" (34). MQ§O! vigorously
applied in the context, of positivism, realism impJj~s
adhering to the' notion that there isa reality oqt
there-that awaits our, discovery. .Positivists-aimqp
uncover the/facts .andro understand. the lawsx;Q_~
principles that account for those fact~ositiy!sts
maintain that we. need' only think of the "right"
theoretical concepts and develop. techniques that
are, sufficiently: precise to .measure.and- test them~
The positivist reliance on .a natural science
modeland a realist perspective influences the-types
of theoretical concepts and data considered legiti-
mate for.inclusion in any science of human behav-
iour. References to Charles Darwin's evolutionary
theory were frequent among turn-of-the-century
positivists. John B. Watson (e.g., 1913), for
example; was clearly impressed by Darwin's work
and its impact on the biological sciences.-A. prime
reason for this advance, said Watson, was. that
6 CHAPTER 1 - PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH
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Darwin resisted the temptation to treat the human causes and effects (or outcomes). Recall the image
species as a special entity; instead, he treated of billiard balls being knocked around arable men-
humans as just another organism, subject to the tioned earlier. We see the causes (e.g., the white cue
same scientific principles as any other. Regarding ball hits a red ball), observe the effects (e.g., the red
psychology's love affair with metaphysical notions ball moves and bounces into a pocket), and can
like "consciousness," Watson asserted that develop principles to describe that action (e.g., the
angle of incidence equals the angle of reflection, as
it is granted that the behaviour of animals can be any physicist or pool player knows) without wor-
invesrigated without appeal to consciousness ... rying about what is going on "inside" either ball.
The position is taken here that the behaviour Similarly, early positivists felt that organisms can
of man and the behaviour of animals must be be treated as "black boxes": any invisible processes
considered on the same plane; as being equally that might go on inside (such as thinking in
essential to a general understanding of behaviour. humans) are deemed irrelevant; all that really.
[The social sciences} can dispense with con- counts is what goes in (the causes) and what comes
sciousness. (176) out (the effects or outcomes). Only those causes
external to individuals were deemed "legitimate" -to
Watson's rationale rests on Occam's razor, the scrutinize, largely because· such forces,and processes
principle that simplicity is preferable where theo- ' are most amenable to observation and measure-
ries are concerned. That is, if two theories account ment. We can't see people's-thoughts 'orsmetives,
for a phenomenon equally well, then the one that but we can see what people do. Classic positivists
does so more simply (i.e., using fewer variables and argued that only external; observable forces can be
positing less complex relations) should prevail. If considered "real" and that only such "real'; vari-
we can account for human behaviour and animal ables are worth considering -in the "science" of
behaviour with the same theories, argued WatsOn; human behaviour. ..
why develop separate theories with separate con- In sociology; for example,· positivism' was ori-
cepts? ginally epitomized by .Emile Durkheim. Like
The ideal theory would be both' simple arid Watson" Durkheim argued for a.knowledge that
comprehensive, involving concepts that are adapt- was ·based on objective, observable: causes and
able to any specific situation, in the same way that effects. For him, this iinplied getting outside the
the theoretical concept of "gravity" or "gravitational individual: " ,
forces" can be used to explain the big (e.g., the
movement of the galaxies), the small (e.g., why and We must, therefore, consider social phenomena
how electrons revolve around an atom), and the in themselves as distinct .frorn .rhe. consciously
mundane (e.g., why you need to wear suspenders formed representations of them in the mind; we
when your· trousers are too big). The ideal theory 'must study them objectively' as external things,
would also limit itself to expressing relationships for it is this character that they 'present to us.
among variables and to expressing them precisely, . (Durkheirn1968 [1938]: 252) ,.
preferably in mathematical. terms, rather like
Eigstein's simple but provocative statement that Natural science perspectives on "objectivity"
E=m? were also adapted to the quantitative cause.
Dealing with "reality," while a: necessary step, was
OBSERVABLE CAUSES AND EFFECTS not in itselfsd:'n.~~ufficient to ensure scientific
This mechanistic purity was also sought with progress. Clearly, we would also have to avoid
respect to the variables that were to be included in tainting our measurement of reality with subjec-
any analysis. flhe'world was seen to be made up of riviry..Dernonstrating the reliability and validity of
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· .
one's techniques was thus also paramount, since
such demonstrations provide assurance that the
constructs being considered are more than just the
fuzzy and self-serving creations of an isolated
investigator.
OBJECTIVITY THROUGH SOCIAL DISTANCE
Positivists suggest that the route to objectivity
requires investigators to depersonalize the research
situation, like the proverbial Martian who naively
investigates these strange beings called humans (see
Lofland & Lofland 1984). "Good" data are dis-
passionate data, far removed from their source. The
closer one comes to dealing with people on a one-
to-one basis, the more dangerous the situation
becomes, since one might De' tempted to resort to
metaphysical concepts su~h .as thoughts, percep-
tions, attitudes, and values.
Indeed, many quantiratively oriented research
textbooks suggest that the worst event that-can
b~fall anyone who engages in-fieldres~aich is for
him or her to "go native" or overidentify=wirh
those being studied; -rescarchers sometimes
become So attuned'ahd sensitive ·to the-culture or
group they're investigating that they take on the
perspective of-that group's members, leaving their
supposedly more appropriate detached, analytical
perspective 'behind. Hagan (l989) makes the
common: 'argtimenrrthat 'the appropriate role for
researchers lisstudied neutrality.one should nei-
ther love nor hate the group one studies, and one
should always maintain some social-distance. He
explains that a problem commonly experienced in
fieldwork-is ' ;'
. " '
the 'ttnde'izcyofobservers to oueridentijy-ioith groups:
, Thereare.examples in the literature of an anthro-
pologist who married' a cannibal chief arid' of
other individuals who; without being aware of it,
have taken orr the mannerisms of'the'groups they
have studied. "Going native" is .a 'situation in
which the researcher identifies with and 'becomes
a member of the study group, and in' the process
abandons ;his or her' role." as an objective
researcher; (156.i.57;' italics in' original)
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CHAPTER 1 - PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH 7
Hagan also quotes a case in which on'e social sci-
entist chastised another for "romanticising crimi-
nals" and losing his sense of objectivity:
We ought to restrain impulses, including benign
impulses, that prevent us from seeing the world
realistically. Just as anthropologists cannot be
trusted (intellectually) when they "go native" to
the extent that they glorifY rather than study their
preliterate societies, so a criminologist who has
gone native cannot be trusted to tell us what
criminals are like. (Toby 1986 [1938]: 2, quoted
in Hagan 1989: 157)3
NOMOTHETIC ANALYSIS
The ideal of detachment is also consistent with the
quantitative preference for aggregated data, which
compile responses from many persons so thatgerr-
eta! trends or patterns across people are-made-vis-
ible, a process called nomothetic aii:i:lysi's~'s
opposed to idiographic analysis.t which is ori-
ented toward the case study. This approach assumes
that, across many responses, all "exceptions to the
,nile,"whether in a positive or negative direction,
will cancel one another out-in any group as a
whole, making the group "average" the purist state-
ment of how someone in a given situation "typi-
cally" or "normally" behaves.
THEINDEPENDENT (CAUSAL) VARIABLES: SOCIAL
FACTS The belief in thedesirabiliry of aggregation
can also be seen in the quantitative attachment to
social facts, influential aspects of social life that
i~dividuals do not create and that continue to
operate no matter' how we feel about them .
Durkheim (e.g., 1968 [1938]) argued that social
facts, the most appropriate causal factors for social
scientists to investigate, exert their influence coer-
cively, particularly when we try to resist:
Asocial fact is to be recognized by the power of
external coercion which it exercisesor is capable
of exercisingover individuals, and the presenceof
this-powermay; Ire recognizedin its turn either by
the existence of some specific sanction or by the
8 CHAPTER 1 - PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH
resistance offered against every individual effort
that tends to violate it. (1968 [1938): 250)
Social facts were seen as desirable research foci
because they represented an external reality that
was thought to influence us and exist entirely inde-
pendently of our opinions of it:
The most important characteristic of a thing is
the impossibility of its modification by a simple
effort of the will ... Social facts have this charac-
teristic. Far from being a product of the will, they
determine it from without; they are like molds in
which our actions are inevitably shaped.
(Durkheim 1968 [1938): 253)
Thus, for Durkheim, the important social facts
of life, and hence the appropriate causal variables
to study, were such social practices and institutions
as education, religion, the law, and the economic
systcm.? You and I clearly did not cause them; they
existed before we did. They influence us all,
although the nature of the effect may vary. And
even had you and I not been born, they would still
exist and still influence whoever happened to be
here. For example, if you were born in Canada,
you were born into a capitalist economic system;
Canada would still be capitalist even if you had not
been born here. That system is a social fact of your
life; it has affected you in ways that-differ (rom the
effects of being born in, say, a socialist or cornrnu-
nist co uri try.
THE DEPENDENT (OUTCOME) VARIABLES: AGGRE·
GATED RATE DATA To measure the effects of social
facts, Durkheirn recommerided relying on official
rate data (e.g., birth rates, divorce rates, suicide
rates, crime rates). Such data deal with matters rel-
evant to and affected by "social facts," are outside
the influence of researchers or of the individuals the
data described, and describe "reality." In addition,
they make it easier to compare two areas or to com-
pare an area with itself over time.
Since each of these [rate) figures contains all the
individual cases indiscriminately, the individual
circumstances which may have had a share in the
production of the phenomenon are neutralized
and, consequently, do not contribute [0 its deter-
mination. The average, then, expresses a certain
state of the group mind. (Durkheim 1968
[1938): 249)
A DEDUCTIVE APPROACH
For classic positivists, prediction demonstrates
understanding: if you truly understand a phenom-
enon (e.g., hurricanes, depression, birth rates), YOLl
should be able to predict its occurrence. Not sur-
prisingly, therefore, quantitative researchers prefer
the hypothetico-deductive method (known more
simply as deduction, or the deductive method),
which involves making predictions and assessing
their success in an ongoing process of theory devel-
opment.
Chapter 2 discusses this approach in detail; here
we need only note that it involves beginning with a
theory, deducing a hypothesis (prediction) from the
theory, gathering data to test the prediction (and
hence also the theory that gave rise to it); and then
either looking for another situation in which to test
the theory (if the prediction is borne out) or dis-
carding or revising the theoryfif the prediction proves
inaccurate). In. the ideal situation, the effects of cer-
tain variables can be assessed with all other influences
held constant, making the true experiment the
deductivist's method of choice (see Chapter 10).
Qualitative Approaches
The choices that characterize .qualirative
approaches have traditionally been the opposite of
those made by quantitative researchers on every
dimension discussed above. Although qualitative
researchers' opinions about quantitative science
vary considerably (from respectful tolerance to
complete rejection), Schutz (1970) is neither
extreme nor atypical.
Schutz disagrees with behaviourists' and other
positivists' choice .to.,investigate a mechanistic
world fr;om the aloof stance of the knowledgeable
social scientist, but his disagreement isn't based on
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· .
a belief that such a science would necessarily give
"wrong" information. Rather, he feels that in the
long run, such an approach would inevitably fall
short of a comprehensive understanding of
human action. And it is important, Schutz asserts,
to adopt a method for the right reasons: not
because that method is easier, not because we asso-
ciate it with some prestigious field of inquiry, and
not because it's expedient to adopt it in the short
term, but because, over the long haul, it's the right
thing to do:
The basic postulate of the methodology of social
science, therefore, must be the following: choose
the scheme of reference adequate to the problem
you are interested in, consider its limits and pos-
sibilities, make its terms compatible and consist-
ent with one another, and having once accepted
it, stick to it! (Schutz 1970: 270)
A HUMAN-CENTRED APPROACH
Qualitative researchers assert that "adequacy" in
the social sciences begins with acceptance of a more
human-centred methodology, since 'social scien-
tists, in trying to understand humawbehaviour,
face challenges fundamentally different from those
faced by the natural scientist: .
The world of nature, as explored by the' natural
scientist, does riot "mean"-anyrhingro the mole-
cules, atoms and electrons therein. The' observa-
tional field of the social scientist, however, .;. has
a specific-meaningand relevancestructure for· the
human' beings: living. '. 'acting, and '. thinking
therein. By a series cf'common-scnse 'constructs
nhey have .pre-selected and' pre-interpreted this
world which ·thdy experience as the reality'of their
daily lives: It: is' these' thought objects of theirs
which ddtermine their behaviour by motivating
it: (Schutz 1970: 272-73)
Schutz thus believes that social science ought
to view humans as thinking, 'motivated' actors;
while acknowledging that. as both-social scien-
tists and humans; social scientists are part of the
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CHAPTER 1 - PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH 9
very entity we seek to understand. The philos-
ophy that expresses this view is known as
phenomenologism.
PHENOMENOlOGISM
Phenomenologists maintain that any effort to
understand human behaviour must take into
account that humans are cognitive beings who
actively perceive and make sense of the world
around them, have the capacity to abstract from
their experience, ascribe meaning to their behav-
iour and the world around them, and are affected
by those meanings. WI. Thomas (1928) stated that
"perceptions are real because they are real in their
consequences"; that is, in many situations the influ-
ence of "reality" (if indeed such a thing exists inde-
pendently of our experience of it) pales in
comparison to the influence of our perceptions of
the situation-s-indeed, those-perceptions dejineour
"reality:'
Suppose that next week you were expected to
give a class presentarion on some topic related to
research methods. In "reality," such a situation is a
fairly trivial event; among the "big" things that will
happen in your life, it probably won't even rank in
the top· 500. Your career; your future happiness,
and your ultimate impact on the human race are
unlikely tobe significantly affected by your per-
formance on that one day .'
. Yet-ifyou're-like most students, you won't treat
it as trivial: You'll do the appropriate preparation at
the library; you'll <read YOUr presentation a dozen
times before the actual day you present; making
last-minute changes and trying to learn it by heart;
you may not sleep well the night before you -pre-
sent; and you'll probably coine to class on "the big
day" feeling at least' a Iitrlenervous. Can we, as
social scientists, adequately understand your behav-
iour without recourse to the way you perceive this
situation and the meaning you ascribe to it?
To take another example, many Canadians these
days, seem deeply concerned about violent crime.
Julian Roberts of the University of Ottawa reported
that concern about violent crime had increased'sig-
nificantly during the preceding five years (e.g., see
10 CHAPTER 1 - PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH
...........................................................................................................................................................................................................

.Mitchell 1994<.:), an increase that in turn is related acceptable to talk to people, ask them about their
to our collective belief that the rate of violent crime beliefs and experiences, and consider "cognitive
in Canada escalated significantly over that same processes" and their associations with behaviour-
period. In response to these concerns, citizens and fundamental differences between qualitative and
their elected representatives frequently call for more quantitative researchers remain. While quantita-
punitive sentencing, more caution in the granting tive researchers may now talk to their research par-
of parole, and "special measures" that would give ticipants, the belief that one must still retain an
courts greater leeway to incarcerate particularly aloof, socially distant stance remains; "overidenti-
nasty people and habitual offenders for a long, long fication" is still seen as a problem, and the ideal of
time. Yet Roberts also documents the "reality" that, the researcher as a detached analyst is still sought
at least as measured by the rates reported by and praised. We may talk to "subjects," but we
Statistics Canada, violent crime in Canada didn't can't trust what they say. Their job is simply to
increase at all during that period. So which is more provide us with raw data for analysis; deciding what
important in accounting for Canadians' behaviour their verbal utterances mean is still our job.
regarding violent crime: the "reality" of the situa- The difference is subtle but important. For
tion or people's perceptions of it? qualitative researchers; the choice comes down to
Phenomenologists feel that positivists, in their whether it's better to ask people what thrythink is
zeal to mimic the natural sciences, did an injustice important, and incorporate their answers into our
to the very humans, they wanted 'to understand. efforts to make sense of their behaviour, or to ask
Qualitative researchers therefore argue that any sci- only what we think is important, and then try to
ence .of human behaviour is destined to be trivial infer what they must have been thinking in order
a~r incomplete unless it takes people's percep- to give such answers. But surely it is better to ask
tions into account. Any approach that defines itself respondents directly for their own reasons than for
as phenomenological makes understanding human us to try to invent them (see also Becker [1996] and
perceptions its major research focus: if perceptions Blumer [L969] on this point).
are real .in their consequences, and if they are a
major determinantof what we do, then clearly we NUMBERS CREATE DISTANCE
must understand them and their origins. The shift to phenomenologism affected many
This approach obviously clashes with the pos- other.aspects of theory and method. For example,
itivist emphasis on observables: suddenly We must a central aim of positivism was to establish func-
"get inside people's heads" and understand how tional relations among explanatory concepts,
they 'perceive their world. Yet this transition may expressed, ideally, in mathematical (quantitative)
be less revolutionary than it might at first appear. form, Marty .phenomenologists believe that
Even many positivists have come to accept that at imposing a quantitative, measurement just remove~
least some aspects of phenomenological researchers further from directly understanding
approaches have some merit and that strategies human' experience .• Instead, of trying, to come to
that ignore our ability to think, imagine, and so.on grips with, the anger and, powerlessness a woman
are destined to come up short. Perhaps as.a result, feels when assaulted, for example, the requirements
contemporary positivism (often known as post- of quantification leave us either merely counting
positivism or neopositiuisms' is far less dogmatic the frequency of such occurrences (with all the
about excluding "unobservables"-attitudes, attendant technical problems of how to count "cor-
values, beliefs, perceptions, and motives-from rectly") or asking women to describe their experi-
the research vocabulary.f ence .on a series of ten,p.oint rating scales.
Although such changes have altered what more Phenomenologists, in .conrrast, argue, that the
positivistically inclined researchers do-it's nOW closer we can come to such experiences, say, by lis-
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tening to women explain, in their own words, the
nature of their experiences, the better.
UNDERSTANDING EQUALS VERSTEHEN
Once the variables of analysis are quantified, posi-
tivists argue that the language of mathematics
makes our statements far more precise.
"Explanation" in the positivist sense involves inves-
tigating which "big" variables (e.g., social facts)
most significantly affect human existence. Being
able to identify these factors and to predict their
occurrence and magnitude becomes the acid test of
understanding. The rationale is that if you can suc-
cessfully predict the values a variable will take on,
you must understand the phenomenon in ques-
tion; conversely, if youunderstand a phenomenon;
you should be able to predict its .occurrence with
some degree of consistency.
Qualitativeresearchersreject the idea that a-sta-
tistical criterion can ever,define expltliation/6t
understanding. Instead, they embrace Max Webds
concept of Versteben, which involves the more
intimate and empathic understanding of human
action in terms of
its interpretive meaning t~'i1l:~
subject. While quantitative researchers sought .gen~
eral principles of behaviour, 'Weber argued that, in
themselves, such' principles couldn't account for
action in context: '
.-_-;,
An "objective" analysis of cultural .events.cwhich "
proceeds according to the thesis that the ideal-of
science is the reductio n of empirical reality to
"laws," is-meaningless .. .'The knowledge of sociali
laws is not knowledgeof social reality but is rather
one of thevariousaids used byour minds for
attaining this end ... Knowledgeof cultural events
is inconceivable except on a basis of the sif!!tifi~'
cance which the concrete' constellations 'ofrreality
have for us in individual' concrete situations;
(Weber 1968a [1949):; 91)
Weber didn't completely dismiss quantitative
research or the theories associated with inhejust
felt that one had to g6 beyond blanket assertions to
account for action in Context: He wasn't averse to
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CHAPTER 1 - PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH 11
quantification in principle, but he was cautious
about how useful it might be for articulating sub-
jective meaning:
Causal explanation depends On being able to
.deterrnine that there is a probability, which in
the rare ideal case can be numerically stated, but, ,
is always in some sense calculable, that a given
observable event (overt or subjective) will be fo[::""
lowed or accompanied by another event .. )'
[Nonetheless], statistical uniformities constitute' "
understandable types of action in the sense of this "
discussion, and thus constitute "sociologicalgen'.\'\'1
eralizarions," only when they can be regarded asY'
manifestations of the understandable subjective~}'
meaning of a course ofsocial action. (Webe'rl1:,
1968b [1947]: 30-31) ,,>I;'
, VALIDITY REQUIRES INTIMACY
Qualitative researchers believe tharrunderstanding
people's' perceptions requires getting dose to
"research participants" Of ,"infotmants", or "collab-
orators." You must-spend time with , them; get.to
know them; feel 'dose to them, be able to
empathize wlthvtheir concerns, perhaps even be
one of thernvif you hope to truly understand. This
approach directly contradicts the quantitative view
that "objective": understanding requires aloof
detachment, lest the researcher "lose perspective."
Some- qualitative: researchers believe that one
can never-iindersrand-a.group of which one is not
a part-that male: researchers .can never truly
understand what it means to, be-a 'Woman, for
example.-or that 'non-Aboriginal researchers can
never.know'what-ir: means to "grow up Indian," or
that someone who has never 'spent time in prison
will "never completely understand what it means to
do time}, "
AN INDUCTIVE CASE STUDY APPROACH
Associated with the view that closeness is desir-
able is the idea that researchers should listen to
their informants, aiming to understand categories
and theoreticaledimensions- from the' p'et~p'et;t:i'()'e
oftheir.informants' experience-and to ,incor~rat:e .
12 CHAPTER 1 - PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH
those understandings into their analysis, rather
than relying exclusively on theoretical categories
imposed from the "outside." Accordingly, qualita-
tive researchers emphasize inductive approaches
(where observation in the field precedes the gener-
ating of theoretical concepts; see Chapter 2) and
ca~e study analysis. Instead of beginning with
theory and assuming that there's one theory that
willzvenrually account for everything, the qualita-
tive approach typically involves beginning with
individual case studies in context, trying to under-
stand each situation on its own terms, and leaving
open, for the moment, the question of whether
generalizable theoretical concepts can ever eventu-
ally be drawn together in anything resembling a
grand theory. For qualitative researchers, theory
isn't something you start with; it's something
you build.
COIIISTRUCTIONISM
We saw earlier that classic positivists embraced a
philosophical perspective known as realism.
Phenomenologists, in emphasizing the role .of
human perception in understanding human behav-
iour, adopt a contrasting perspective known as con-
structionism. As described by Schwandt (1994),
constructivists are deeply committed to the ...
view that what we take to be objective knowledge
and truth is [actually] the result of perspective.
. Knowledge and truth are created, not discovered
by mind. They emphasize the. pluralistic and '
plastic character of reality-pluralistic in the
sense that reality is expressible in a variety of
symbol and language systems; plastic in the sense
that reality is stretched and shaped to fit pur-
poseful acts of intentional human agents. They
endorse the claim that, "contrary to common-
sense, there is no unique 'real world' that preex-
ists and is independentofhuman mental activity
and human symbolic language." (125; the last.
sentence quotes Bruner 1986: 95)
Suppose we were interested in the phenomenon
of"chea:ting," known in some universities as "acad-
emic dishonesty." A realist approach to studying
cheating would affirm that there are behaviours we
consensuaIly recognize as "cheating" and that some
people are more or less likely to cheat than others.
Given these two assertions, our attention might turn
to trying to measure either "frequency of cheating"
or how likely a given person or group of persons is
to cheat; investigating why some people are more
likely to cheat than others; or why some situations
result in more or less cheating than others.
A constructionist looking at cheating probably
wouldn't deny the usefulness of any of these
approaches. But he or she also would encourage us
to take a step back and look at "cheating" as a
sociaIly produced construct. "Cheating" per se
doesn't exist in the world in any "real" sense;
instead, our, using the word. says as much about
those of us who are identifYing the "cheating" as it
does about the people doing it. A comprehensive
anaIysis of cheating' requires U$ to ask other kinds
of questions: Why do we consider "cheating" some-
thing worth asking abouri Why do we consider
some behaviours "cheating" (e.g., looking over
another person's shoulder, to see What answers he or
she puts down. in an exam) but not. others (e.g.,
studying together)? We might also want to inter-
view people who have been .idenrified as cheaters
about how they perceived their actions: Did they
consider it "cheating" or did they caIl it something
else? . How did they come to engage in that
behaviour?
The realist, then, takes the existence of certain
behaviour categories asa given, believing that there
are such things 'as "cheating," "aggression," and
"crime," along with such supposedly "apparent"
givens as "birth," "death," "taxes," and "murder."
Constructionists, on: the other hand, are at least as
interested in why these categories interest us, whom
or where we decide to sample in order.to investi-
gate the phenomenon firsthand, where the bound-
aries of the phenomenon are, what meanings the
termshave for us, and how those boundaries and
meanings change over time. To be a constructionist
is not to deny that certain phenomena.exist, but
just to insist that their existence cannot be corn-
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 CHAPTER 1 _ PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH 13
................................................................................................................................ .........................................................................

conceptually free. How can we observe anything

pletely understood unless one understands why, without having implicit categories-a product of
how, and to whom they are applied. This perspec- language, which in turn is a product of culture-
tive, which falls clearly within the phenomenolog- with which to begin our observation? And if we
ical traditions exemplified by Weber and Schutz, already possess those categories, how can we argue
has several implications. that the theoretical categories we derive ire inher-
For one thing, many of the research results we ently real? Perhaps our observations say as much
take at face value and perceive as enduring may be about us (the observers) and about the social con-
little more than transient relationships that reflect text in which we operate as about the behaviour we
the prevailing social order. While realists may be
observe.
content to try to assess the effects of race, poverty, One example of research guided by the con-
being gay, or taking illicit drugs, constructionists structionist perspective (although it actually incor-
argue that we can understand such matters only if we porates both qualitative and quantitative data) is
also understand something about how they're con- that by Menzies and his colleagues on predicting
strued and.about the context in which they occur. dangerousness (e.g., see Menzies 1985, 1989;
Bronfenbrenner (1977), for example, argues Menzies, Webster, & Sepejak 1985; Sepejak,
that much of the research that purports.to evaluate Webster, & Menzies 1984). The researchers exam-
the "effects" of particular familial arrangements ined assessments of dangerousness in a pretrial psy-
(e.g., single-parent families, children of divorce, chiatricclinic in a major Canadian city over several
daycare use) on developmental outcomes (e.g., years, in the context of the broader process-from
school achievement; :involvement in crime) is, in arrest to the assessment to sentencing and follow-
itself, meaningless .. From a constructionist per- up. Their methods included observation, inter-
spective, there's no inherent or "real" effect to' being views; and archival study.
a child ofdivorce or attending day care that's true They also included a historical analysis of
acr~ss:all .rime and space. We can understand the the. "dangerousness" construct that .encouraged a
effects of divorce only if we understand the'context broader perspective on their contemporary findings
inwhich:divorce occurs and people's'perceptions of (e.g., see Menzies 1985, 1989). Making danger-
it. If children of divorce are indeed more likely to ousness itself..-:.how it evolved as a cdnstrUct, who
become involved in j'uvenile delinquency, this pat- employed it, how it was employed-an object of
tern may simply reflect the social stigma often inquiry not only helped the researchers give.evalu-
associated with divorce or the social conditions that ation feedback within a contemporary ;evaluation
typically ptevailupdn separation (e;g., whetemorhers research perspective (e.g., see Sepejak et al, 1983)
often end up.with b6ththe children and nhe more but also influenced social' theory by articulating
ecOnomically' disadvantaged' situation). Similarly, changes in the construct's social meaning and use.
studies -that show' day care to· be associated with Menzies and his colleagues reveal a decision-
positive effects on later school performance may making process ·that seems to say at least as much
reflect the lack of universal day care; most children about the social beliefs and constraints of the deci-
who go to day care are from professional and better" sion-makers as it does about the behaviour of those
educated families and, hence, .are more advantaged being assessed. Gergen (1985) reports that
and likely to succeed anyway. In.sum, the "effects"
of day care or divorce are associated less with the similar kinds of critiques have been launched
statuses themselves thari.with the social context in against the taken-for-granted character of suicide,
which they exist; ... beliefs, .. ; schizophrenia, .. , altruism, .;. psy-
k For another thing, this approach argues that the chological disorder, ... childhood, .. , domestic vio-
world's structures are in no sense- given, nor is our lence, ... menopause, .. , and situational causes ... In
observation of them in any sense dispassionate or

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14 CHAPTER 1 - PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH
..........................................................................................................................................................................................................

each case, the objective criteria for identifying such structed on an ongoing basis (the constructionist
"behaviours," "events," or "entities" are shown to be view). According to those who hold the latter view,
either highly circumscribed by culture, history, or our constructions of the world-and hence the
social context or altogether nonexistent. (267)8 world itself-are open to change.
As we've seen, positivist/quantitative researchers
As a third and perhaps broader example, con- tend to emphasize the measurement of outcomes in
sider the variety of meanings that some social insti- their research. This is consistent with the positivist
tutions have for different peoples. A realist division of the world into causes and effects and
perspective on matters of "criminal justice," for with the view that there are real, monolithic forces
example, would take "the criminal justice system" that rule our lives. But constructionists consider
and the existing Criminal Code as givens, starting the world a more ephemeral, transient place whose
any analysis with the view that "criminals" are those dynamics are more directly contingent on the
who violate the Code and that the extent to which meanings and understandings we use to negotiate
"crime" and "criminality" exist in a society is best our world. Accordingly, qualitative approaches are
reflected by such data as the officia] crime rates also characterized by greater attention to processes,
reported annually by Statistics Canada." particularly the processes by which constructions
.Such an approach may be fine for those who arise .and, by implication, the 'processes by which
subscribe to mainstream conceptions of justice and constructions can be changed.
the underlying values they represent, but, marty
argue that "the law", and those it deems "criminal" Comparing Research Perspectives
• •••••••••••••••••••• ! •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••

are best seen as socially .constructed entities.

Critical theo~ists note how the criminal law '(and Thus far, we've seen that numerous differences have
even the very division between criminal and civil traditionally characterized the approaches of qual-
law) and its agenciesappear to ,systema.tically ben- itative and quantitative researchers. Table 1.1 '(::om-
efit the upper classes more than the lower ones, pares these differences more, explicitly, .at least
men more than women, and those with Western as they've been associated with each approach
Europeaq/colonia.list roots more than'other (e.g., historically.
indige.Qous) peoples (e.g., see Faith 1993; [ackson ; Each element.in the table has been discussed in
1992; Lowman& Palys 1991; Monture-Oka.nee & the preceding pages, so you should now be able to
Turpel J992). define and explain each element and understand
According-to these views, the Criminal Code whyand how each is characteristic of one. or the
and cr] me statistics are anything but neutral other of the two perspectives discussed in this
descriptions .of. criminal behaviour and its [re- chapter and throughout this book. But be aware,
quency of occurrence. Instead, crime statistics toc.: that. the quantitative-qualitarive dichotomy
embody just one of many .possib]e .conceptions of is more than. an abstract set of principles that
justice and can't be understood outside the context philosophers .of science debate' over afternoon tea;
that makes thejTI,meaningfuL these approaches affect' how people do research
and are ,fundame~,5aL. to understanding any
EMPHASIZING'PROCESS ',' research you read. To see the quantitative-
A distinct difference in emphasis also follows from qualitative distinction in. action, Jet's look at a dis-
",ett~~~jJ1g,the' important elements of,t;h(:lJYf,Qdci pute in the literature; a-dispute that can best be
as essentially stable and awaiting; discovery .(the explained by the different (quantitative versus
,!'.c;;alkt::view~,or seeing rhe.worldas something that qualitative). perspectives that two sets of authors
is actively constructed, deconstructed, and recon- bring to the table.

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 CHAPTER 1 - PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH 15

Table 1.1
Comparing Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches

Qualitative Approach Quantitative Approach

Human-centred approach: people's ability to think Natural science model: humans are just another
and abstract requires special consideration organism

Phenomenological Positivist

Constructionist Realist

No variables ruled out; internal, perceptual variables Emphasis on observable variables that are external
expressly considered to the individual; social facts

Direct, qualitative verbal reports are preferred; Quantitative measures are preferred for their precision
qua~tifying responses is a step removed from people's and amenability to mathe~atr~al analysis
words and perceptions

Emphasis on processes: perceptions and their Emphasjs oncauses an,d effects: what goes in and
meanings and how these emerge and change how itcomes 'out;' inputs, outcomes
.' ; ": >, ',--; ,"_.

Valid data corne from .closeness and extended contact Objectivity is achieved .throuqh.social distance and a
with research participants detached, analytical stance

The criterion for' understanding 'is' Ve?stehen: The criteria for')understandin'g'are the 'ability to '
understanding behaviour in 'context in terms predict and-statistically significa.nt associafione:
meaningful to the actor between variables

Preference for idiographic, case study analysis Prefer~nc~ r6r ribmothetic analysis aggre'g~f~d over
" . it,"
m~nyi6kses '" " .
Preference for an inductive approach: ~tarting Preference for a deductive approach: starti~g with
with observation and allowing grounded theory to theory and creatinq situations in Which to test
el11erge hypotheses ' , -' ' ,