We have challenged the long-standing assumption that

[Herbert] Blumer's symbolic interactionist methodology

is an extension and explication of “the Meadian
tradition.” [Geoge Herbert] Mead’s characterization and
analysis of scientific inquiry are strikingly different from
Blumer’s naturalistic methodology. We have attributed
these epistemological differences to their diverse
ontological assumptions. We have argued that Blumer’s
ontological assumptions contradict a basic premise of his
symbolic interactionist theory. His naturalistic inquiry
neither compliments nor extends Mead’s methodological
perspective.
We have challenged the related assumption that Mead’s
theoretical ideas are not amenable to systematic
empirical examination. This assumption has arisen from a
confusion of Blumer’s symbolic interactionism with
Mead’s social behaviorism. Blumer’s methodology does
not lend itself to the investigation of Mead’s ideas but
those ideas have been investigated in a manner
consistent with Mead’s own methodological perspective.
Clark McPhail and Cynthia Rexroat, “Mead vs. Blumer:
The Divergent Methodological Perspectives of Social
Behaviorism and Symbolic Interactionism.” American
Sociological Review. Volume 44, number 3, June 1979.
Pages 449-467.

Would [George Herbert] Mead find modern behaviorism

to be compatible with his social behaviorism? A
comparison of Mead and modern behaviorism
demonstrates that modern behaviorism—especially the
so-called radical behaviorism of [B. F.] Skinner and the
social learning theory of [Alan] Bandura and his
colleagues—represents position very compatible with
Mead’s. This does not mean that there are no differences
between Mead and modern behaviorism. However, the
differences are not great and are for the most part
overshadowed by the similarities. Neither of the two
main differences creates major problems or justifies
further separation of the two schools of thought. First,
Mead’s social behaviorism has a strong social
orientation, though it does not exclude nonsocial events.
In contrast, modern behaviorism includes both social and
nonsocial events on an equal basis, focusing on either as
the situation demands. Second, modern behaviorism has
access to more empirical data than Mead had a half-
century ago; and the modern data have stimulated
theoretical developments that simply were not possible
in Mead’s time. Since Mead valued the scientific method
highly, it seems likely that he would have welcomed the
new data that would allow his views to be brought in line
with current empirical findings.
John D. Baldwin, “George Herbert Mead and Modern
Behaviorism.” The Pacific Sociological Review. Volume
24, number 4, October 1981. Pages 411-440.

There is a schism in modem symbolic interactionism that

results from different preferences for using empirical or
subjective methods for studying action and interaction.
This is clearly seen by contrasting the work of [George
Herbert] Mead and [Herbert] Blumer. Mead’s social
behaviorism is modeled on the empirical sciences,
whereas Blumer’s symbolic interactionism reflects a
rejection a scientific analysis in favor of subjective and
empathetic methods. Since Blumer coined the term
“symbolic interactionism,” some of the more empirically
oriented symbolic interactionists are returning to Mead’s
label of “social behaviorism” to identify their standpoint.
This paper presents Mead’s social behavioristic approach
to emotions and compares it with the work of
contemporary behaviorists, revealing striking similarities.
The essential differences lie mostly in the addition in
modem behaviorism of operant behaviorism (traced
largely to [B. F.] Skinner), social learning theory
(identified with [Alan] Bandura), behavior modification,
and behavioral sociology. Although contemporay
behaviorists in psychology do not cite (and probably have
not read) Mead, their work is remarkably similar to
Mead’s position on most facets of behavior and
interaction. This is not surprising when one realizes how
strongly Mead was committed to social behaviorism. The
main difference between modem behaviorism and
Mead’s social behaviorism is that contemporary
researchers have a larger empirical data base and more
refined theoretical models at their disposal.
John D. Baldwin, “Social Behaviorism on Emotions: Mead
and Modern Behaviorism Compared.” Symbolic
Interaction. Volume 8, number 2, fall 1985. Pages 263-
290.

[George Herbert] Mead’s “constructive pragmatism” is

based upon a theory of the act and of social experience.
As one of the most perceptive American historians of
ideas of his generation, Mead grasped the meaning of
pragmatism within its historical setting and social milieu.
Noting that " ... what philosophy has been doing,
especially since the time of the Renaissance, is to
interpret the results of science,” Mead ascribed
pragmatism to the conjunction of two scientific
developments: behavioristic psychology and scientific
methodology….
Mead’s “constructive pragmatism”… includes a social
theory of the mind and of the self. This theory, called
“social behaviorism," has been considerably influential in
the field of social psychology….
… By “social behaviorism” he meant “... an approach to
the study of the experience of the individual from the
point of view of his conduct, particularly, but not
exclusively, the conduct as it is observable by others.” …
… Unlike [John B.] Watson’s behaviorism, which neglects
the inner side of behavior, that “part of the act” which
“... lies within the organism and only comes to expression
later,” Mead’s social behaviorism acknowledges the
existence of the inside, the inner, the private.
Andrew W. Reck, “The Philosophy of George Herbert
Mead (1863-1931),” in Andrew J. Reck, Harold N. Lee,
Carl H. Hamburg, Louise Nisbet Roberts, James K.
Feibleman, and Edward G. Ballard. Studies in Recent
Philosophy. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature
Switzerland AG imprint of Springer Nature. 1963. Pages
5-51.