II .

TOP SECRET CONUOl NUMBER ~ SA"",

FO"M OS.7£7
~.•. H
SIP FILE COpy
DEPARTMENT '<!!lIn,st".Tlii'--'--==--":::'-=-=-:::
aD- S/P-61-163/2
6/
TOP SECRET COVER SHEET
sIP FILE COpy
.. UIEf DISC'II'TION O' ATTACHED DQCUMUH(SI (O,I~ln, n.b/l:ct, reference no. or
OCTOBlm 23, 1961
otller IHlrlinent data )
NSlM #1£9- US Pol icy on Military ActMI?-! Jlt;B ".l:~ l.. . " ' ( L· .... ~.CT~?tI, CepY'_ _ _ INfOtMATION CO,Y'_ __
Berlin onfiict. ..... ,~-, t..... ~' •. ~... ..- _.
'...v:J.... ~ .. ",~ ............ v-(l,E ~E~DESPA1(HIS, ETC. _ _ __

•ro;iW:i""'-=------:--------=--:-~~~_::;~~
J. fORWARDED
"<Jd"'iI'-"
..~~~·c·~·~·~f--=~~''''~~ Of
- -_
oJ~#,
DATE
1710lJ'USON
tOI'oI
~ I ~
Of ...EP...COPIES
IING FORM

Novemb er 8 . 1961 I . St otler /' g -"7 " il78/ E. Cahill

(DoI8) (1·0f> S.crCl COlllrol OfJicr:r) "7
••
PU$ONS TO WHOM ROUTED O'
,.
OHiCE
•• • ... n.
SIGN ...1UUS D... n RECEIYED DAlE READ 0 ...1£ UtEASED
.£... DING DOCUMENT SVM80L
/

Mr . Cur t 1.
• • 'l

Mr . Morgan

,
~Mr~.~fu~11=e~
r ____-r_____+.~~=~~~ I//q
)

Mr. Lindl8Y
, ,

~.
Mr . Harvey 1.
It,!' .y
Mr . Owen II )~/

Mr. Fr ance

! /31 { 1.

726lA

i-l u . . . cQv(" .... € .. T p"',"T'''C QFFle", ' • • 0---57.703

 'lOP SECRET attachJMnt
DEPAL .dENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARI AT

November 6, 1961

sip - Mr . McGb.•• ../

sjo - Mr. Achille.
G/PM - Mr. Kitchen
FILE copy
NBAM 109
Attached for your informat1on is Nat10nal
Security Act10n MeD:orandum no. 109. By direct10n
of the President earlier J this document waa given
a very l.1.mited oU.tr~butlon . It u nov be1Ilg
released for your f'i~e.

~
L. D. Battl.e

Attechment:

TOP SEalET attac:m-.t

, . 2
THE WHITE HOUSE '( ~9
~ .
WASHINGTON

October 23, 1961 . / ' /

oD_slf-I,,(-I~'" 2-
T OP ~E: C:tET

)Ll.TIO"AL SECURITY AC " ION MEMORANDUM NO. 109

TO; The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense SIP FILE COpy
,

SUBJECT: U. S. Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict

The President has approved the following statement of U. S. policy

on military actions in a Berlin conflict:

In the event mili ' ary far ICe is applied in tho Berlin .itu~~
tion it is United Stabs policy that the nature and sequence m
such use should pre! erably be:

I .:.£ Soviet/GDR a d ninistrative or other action interferes

with Berlin aece5S by ground or air but is short of defini-
tive blockage, then the tripartite powers should execute
Berlin contingency plans, to include tripartitely agreed
probes of Soviet i ntentions by a platoon or smaller force
on the ground and by fighter escort in the air; they
should continue to use fully any unblocked mode of access. "

(COMMENT: Through this point, risks of major war,

unless Soviets wish to start one, are not materially raised
by any tripartite action, and therefore, decision on execu-
tion is tripartite rather than NATO responsibility.)

II If, despite the above tripartite actions, Soviet/GDR action

indicates a determination to maintain significant blockage
of our a<&ess to Berlin, then the NATO Allies should
undertake such D n-combatant activity as economic embargo,
maritime harass :lent, and UN action. Simultaneously,
they should mobiize and reinforce rapidly to improve
capability for tal ng actions listed below. Me:mwhile, they
should use fully ny unblocked aCcess to Berlin. (If, how-
ever, the situati· n has so d",veloped that NATO forces have
been subs:Ultiall ' r einfor.:e ~ after appropriate non-
combatant measL;. res undertake without delay one or more

TOP SECRET
..
•

TOP SECRET

of the courses of military action shown below.)

(COMMENT: Since the _llliance proposes to exploit

othe r means before initiating major military operations,
non-combatant efforts to restore ground access will pr ee ( de
the military efforts shown below in any case. A separatl'
issue is the choice between delay while reinforcing in E: ope ,
and prompt action. Without a build... up by the Allies, th,
::.'ange of options £or early military action by us is limite
U:ldue delay could weaken nuclear credibility, threaten t.
viability of Vlest Serlin, and erode Alliance resolve, b u..
these potential disadvantages may be outweighed by the
higher risk of nuclear escalation if early non-nuclear acL~ on
were taken with no more than the currently available for ces.
To the extent that .lUliance forces in Europe are raised above
present levels, the delays in initiating military action can
be reduced or the military action can be tailored to the
existing force levels. )

III If.. despite the above Allied actions., our Berlin access is lot
restored, the JUlies should take appropriate further ac tio to
clarify whether the Soviets / GDR intend to maintain blockage
of air ·o r ground a ccess,
, or both, while making clear our
intention to obtain re ... opened access. Then embark on o,e or
more of the following expanded military courses of acti o:r~:

~ European Theatre

1. Expanding non-nuclear air action, against a bad::ground

of expanded ground defensive strength, to gain local air superiority.
Extend size and scope as necessary.

(Comment: Opposing strengths probably will

be roughly comparable. Military success locally
is not impossible. As a political operation, thi
shows the Soviets visibly higher risks of nucle tl
war. The pace and volatility of extended air
operations raise risks of rapid escalation. )

z. Expanding non_nuclear ground operations i:::.to CDR

ter ritory in divi sion and greater strength, with strong (u.. ..-
support.

- 2 _ TOP SECRET
..•
TOP SECRET

(Comrner:t: This is a politically oriented

military aper ation aiming to display to the
Soviets tb.e approaching danger of pos sibly
irreversible escalation. Military overpowering
of determined Soviet resistance is not feasible.
The risks rise, as do the military pressures on
the Soviets.)

.3. World Wide

Maritime con ~ rol, naval blockade, or other world...wii

measures, both for reprisal and to add to ~eneral pressur
on the Soviets.

(Comm.ent: This action, by itself, is not apt to be

effective and might lead to Soviet initiation of action
on the European central front in any casc It lacks
g

direct relation to Berlin and may entail political

liabilities. It exploits pronounced .Allied naval
superiority. It would have a delayed impact on
nuclear risks. It is the view of the JCS and the
principal unified commander 5 that a naval blockade
should be accompanied by other military action in
Central Europe.)

IV 1£, despite Allied use of substantial non-nuclear forces, the

Soviets continue to encroach upon our vital interests, the n
, ----
the Allies should use nuclear weapons J starting with one oi
the following courses of action but continuing through C
below if nece ssary:

,..\.. Selective nuelear attacks for the primary purpose of

clemonstrating the will to use nuclear weapons.

B. Limited tactical employment of nuclear weapons to

achieve in addition significant tactical advantage such as
preservation of the integrity of Allied forees committedJ
t extend pressure toward the objective.

w 3 w TOP SEC ET
•
.,
•• ....
TOP SECRET

C. General Nuclear \ \ 3.'1' .

(Comment: The A ll ies only partially control the timing

and scale of nuclear weapons use . Such use might be
i nitiated by the Soviets, at any time after the opening
of small - scale hostilities. Allied initiat;.ion of limited
nuc lear action may elicit a reply in kind; it may also
pro mpt unrestrain e d pre - emptive attack . )

In view of the Presiden t ls approval of the above statement,

'"iupplcmcnt It "U . S . Policy o n Berlin", to NSC 5803. "U.S. Policy
rO w a1:a Ge:!:'ma ny. II is declared to be no longer applicable .

fn-r... fl..v/
McGeorge Bundy

Information Copies to:

General Maxwell Taylor

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

- 4 - TOP SECRET